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# THE REIGN OF THE CALIPH AL- QADIR BILLAH (381/991- 422/1031)

by
Udjang Tholib

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Institute of Islamic Studies

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For my late father: M. Yasin

For my mother : Murtha

#### ABSTRACT

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Title

: The Reign of the caliph al-Qādir billāh (381/991-422/1031)

Department: Istitute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

Degree

: Doctor of Philosophy

This dissertation tries to study the reign of al-Qādir billāh, the 'Abbāsid caliph who assumed power in 381/991. It deals with political, economic and religious aspects of his reign in an attempt to give a balanced description of his achievement.

When al-Qadir was appointed caliph the 'Abbasid caliphate had already declined politically and economically. The political decline was caused mainly by the soldiers' intervention in politics since the reign of al-Mutawakkil (232/847-247/861) onwards and the take over of the state administration and military control by the amīr al-umarā. The economic decline resulted from two important factors: first, it was caused by a great decrease in revenues coming from the lands since they were now held by the newly emerging principalities. Second, it was due to the military iquas which prevailed during Buwayhid rule and damaged the lands so badly that they could no longer be cultivated.

With this political and economic decline al-Qadir was unable to face the encroachment of the Buwayhids. However, with the support of the Ghaznavids and the increasing weakness of the Buwayhids, al-Qādir tried to exert himself. In 390/1000 he sent a letter to the new qādī of Jīlān asking him to exhort the people to be loyal to the caliph. He rejected Bahā' al-Dawla's appointment of the Sharīf al-Mūsawī to the post of the qadi al-qudat in 394/1003. In 401/1010 he ordered Baha' al-Dawla to crush a deviant ally of the 'Abbāsids, Qirwāsh b. Muqallad. He criticized Musharrif al-Dawla's initiative to renew the oath of allegiance of the soldiers in 414/1023 without his

permission. And during the conflicts in (419/1028) between the soldiers and the Buwayhid *amīrs*, he succeeded in reconciling both parties and prevented them from fighting. Finally, al-Qādir was also able to appoint his successors without first consulting the Buwayhid *amīrs*.

Realizing that his temporal power was limited, al-Qādir embarked on the Sunnite restoration and made a serious attempt for this purpose. In 408/1017 he demanded that the Ḥanafite-Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite jurisconsults and *qādīs* make public renounciation of Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism and Rāfiḍism and banned any discussion and instruction of all other allegedly deviant doctrines. In 420/1029 he wrote three epistles in which he acknowledged the excellence of Sunnite orthodoxy, condemned Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism and declared that those who believed in the createdness of the Qur<sup>2</sup>ān as *fāsiq*. All these epistles which were obviously inspired by the ideas of the Ḥanbalite Traditionalists were called *al-I<sup>c</sup>tiqād al-Qādirī* (the Profession or Creed of al-Qādir).

In maintaining his caliphate, al-Qādir established good relations with scholars of the four schools of law, most significantly with the Mālikite al-Bāqillānī, the Shāfi ite al-Māwardī and the Ḥanbalite Abū Ya lā. Finally, al-Qādir contributed to the literary development of the theory of the Sunnite imāmate.

#### RÉSUMÉ

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Cette thèse a pour but l'étude du règne d'al-Qādir billāh, le Calife fabbāside qui exerca le pouvoir en 381/991. Elle traite des aspects politiques, économiques et religieux de ce règne et tente de donner une description équilibrée de ses réalisations.

Lorsque al-Qādir monta sur le trône, le califat abbāside etait en déclin, à la fois sur le plan politique et économique. Le déclin politique était principalement dû à l'intervention des militaires dans la vie politique depuis le régne d' al-Mutawakkil (232/847-247/861) et à la soumission de l'administration de l'Etat et de l'armée à l'*amīr al*umara. Le déclin économique résultait de deux facteurs importants: tout d'abord, une forte décroissance des revenus fonciers, liée à l'appropriation des terres par les nouvelles principautés émergentes. En second lieu, ce déclin était lié aux *iqta*'s militaires qui étaient puissants durant la période du contrôle Buwayhide et qui dévastaient les terres, de telle sorte qu'elles n'étaient plus cultivables.

Dans ce cadre de déclin politico-économique, al-Qādir ne pouvait faire face à la puissance des Buwayhides. Néanmoins, avec l'aide des Ghaznavides et l'affaiblissement progressif des Buwayhides, al-Qadir tenta de prendre le dessus. En 390/1000, il a envoyé une lettre au nouveau qadi de Jilan, lui demandant d'exhorter le peuple de se comporter loyalement vis-à-vis du Calife. Il a refusé la nomination, effectuée par Bahā' al-Dawla, du sharīf al-Mūsawī en qualité de *qādī al-qudāt* en 314/1003. En 401/1010 il

a ordonné Bahā' al-Dawla d'écraser un allié des 'abbāsides, Qirwāsh b. Muqallad. En 414/1023, il osa citiquer Musharrif al-Dawla, qui demandait à l'armée, sans lui avoir demandé l'autorisation, de renouveler son allégeance. Durant le conflit qui opposa en 419/1028 l'armée à l'émīr buwayhide, il réussit à réconcilier les deux parties et à éviter l'affrontement. Finalement, al-Qādir put désigner ses successeurs sans obtenir au préalable l'accord des émīrs buwayhides, et sans que ces derniers ne soulèvent d'objection.

Réalisant les grandes limites de son pouvoir temporel, al-Qādir se consacra à la restauration sunnite. Il fit plusieurs tentatives entre 408/1017 et 420/1029. Tout d'abord, en 408/1017, il exigea que les jurisconsultes hanafites-mu'tazilites et les *qādīs* renoncent publiquement au mu'tazilisme, et interdit toute discussion ou enseignement du mu'tazilisme et du rāfidisme, ainsi que des autres doctrines déviantes. En 420/.1029 il écrivit trois ordonnances faisant l'apologie de l'orthodoxie sunnite, condamna le mu'tazilisme, dénonça ceux qui considéraient le Coran comme crée comme *fāsiq* (grands pécheurs). Ces ordonnances prirent le nom d'al-l'tiqād al-Qādirī (la Profession de Foi d'al-Qādir) et étaient evidemment inspirées par les idées traditionalistes hanbalites. Durant son maintien au pouvoir, al-Qādir entretenait de bonnes relations avec les savants des quatres écoles de la Loi, plus significativement avec le mālikite al-Bāqillānī, le shāfi'ite al-Māwardī, et l'hanbalite Abū Ya'lā. Enfin, al-Qādir contribua au développement des documents religieux, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le dogme concernant le rôle de l'Imām chez les sunnites.

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
Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to my beloved wife, Siti Fatimah for her love, patience, encouragement and willingness to stay alone for quite long time looking after our three dearly loved and growing children Fuad Thahir, Amalia Fatmawati and M. Farid Wajdi during the years of my study in Montreal, Canada.

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#### INTRODUCTION

#### A. THE STATE OF THE FIELD

Al-Qādir billāh was the 25th caliph of the 'Abbāsid dynasty, who reigned from 381/991 to 422/1031. Born on Tuesday 9, Rabī° al-Awwal 336/947-8, Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad b. Ishāq was the grandson of the caliph al-Muqtadir and his mother was a pious woman called Tumnā or Dumnā, a slave girl of 'Abd al-Wāḥid b. al-Muqtadir. He was one of the outstanding caliphs in the eyes of certain chroniclers. For example, Ibn al-Athir and Ibn Tiqtaqa regard al-Qadir as a powerful ruler who was able to restore the caliphate, revive its authority and raise its glory after it had succumbed to the Daylamites and the Turks. Ibn al-Athīr adds that God made him feared by his people so that they obeyed him.<sup>2</sup> Ibn Ţiqṭaqā goes even further, describing him as one of the best 'Abbāsid caliphs,3 and al-Suyūtī regards him as the most learned of the caliphs,4while piety, beneficence and righteousness are ascribed to him by most chroniclers. 5 Al-Baghdādī maintains that al-Qadir devoted most of his nights to prayer, gave most of his livelihood for charity, was well-mannered and had a sound creed. He wrote a book [kitāb] on the uṣūl (orthodox creed)6 in which he mentioned the superiority of the Companions according to the arrangement of the Traditionists. He also cited the virtues of 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz and regarded the Mu'tazilites and those who believed in the created

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Al-Khatīb Al-Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, vol.4 (al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Khanjī, 1921), 37-38; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam fī Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-Umam*, vol. 7 (Haydarābād: Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-Uthmāniyya, 1358H), 161; D. Sourdel, "Al-Kādir bi'llāh" in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., vol. 4 (London: E.J. Brill, 1960): 378-379.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil tī al-Tārīkh, vol. 9 (Beirūt: Dār Sādir, 1966), 415.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ibid.; Ibn Tiqtaqā, Al-Fakhrī on the Government and the Muslim Dynasties, trans. by C.E.J.Whitting (London: Luzac, 1961), 282.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Al-Suyūtī, Tārīkh al-Khulafā' (Beirūt: Dār al-Qalam, 1986), 469;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 161; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.9, 415; al 'Utbī, *Tārīkh Yamīnī* (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1858), 349.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Probably the official epistle called later on al-Risāla al-Qādiriyya, the Epistle of al-Qādir, which contains the basic creeds of the Hanbalites. The full content of the Risāla will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Qur'an as infidels. The epistle [risala] was read every Friday in the sessions of the Traditionists in the mosque of al-Mahdī and in the presence of the people.

Despite these achievements, little is known about the caliph al-Qādir, his significance and his contribution to Sunni orthodoxy. Al-Qadir's reign has until now attracted only superficial attention. This is probably due to the fact that he had been overshadowed by his amīr al-umarā, who was generally considered as the real holder of the power of the caliphate. For this reason, most Western scholars, especially I. Goldziher, E. Tyan and K.V. Zettersteen, reject the chroniclers' description of al-Qādir's achievements. Goldziher, for example, maintains that the chroniclers' assessments of the significance of al-Qādir's influence on his empire cannot be supported by the evidence of his administrative measures except for his rebuke of the Muctazilites, Shicites and other dogmatic dissenters; his written decree forbidding the Buwayhid *amīr* Jalāl-al-Dawla to have drums beaten during the obligatory prayers (though this decree had later to be revoked); and his decision to subject a preacher who delivered an incorrect khutba to disciplinary investigation.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, E.Tyan rejects the chroniclers' insistence on al-Qadir's power, arguing that in reality the condition of the caliphal institution did not change significantly and that while the Buwayhid sultanate was in the process of disintegration, the caliphate did not thereby regain any of the power that it had lost so long ago; the decadence of the sultan was not matched by any corresponding restoration, even a partial one, of caliphal authority. The caliph did not appear to take in hand the affairs of the government, recruit troops for war, or exercise appreciable public activity.9 Moreover, most modern Muslim writers and non-Muslims alike who deal with the general history of Islam, classical or medieval, fail to mention any significant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād, vol.4, 36-37

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> I. Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, vol. 2, ed. S.M. Stern (Chicago: Aldine, 1971), 70-71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Emile Tyan, *Institutions du droit public musulman*, tome deuxieme: *Sultanat et Califat* (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1956), 95.

that there was nothing worthy of mention of al-Qādir. Ocarl Brockelmann puts al-Qādir in the same line with his predecessors, al-Mustakfī, al-Muṭī, and al-Ṭāʾi, who were prisoners of the Buwayhids. They had to be content with the honorary rights of coinage and their mention in the Friday khuṭba. And Thomas Arnold treats al-Qādir insignificantly, even mistakenly states that due to the weakness of the Abbāsid caliphs, al-Bāqillānī, a contemporary of al-Qādir, proposed that the caliph need not be of the Qurayshī tribe. The truth is that al-Bāqillānī maintained that the caliph should not be necessarily of one particular Qurayshī tribe (not only from the House of 'Alī), but other Qurayshī tribes were possible (like the House of 'Abbās or the House of Umayya). He, like other Sunnī scholars, maintains that one of the most important qualifications of the imām is his descent from the Qurayshī tribes. In addition, the general impression held by scholars of the 'Abbāsid caliphs during this period is that the caliphs became mere puppets in the hands of the Buwayhids, even though the name of the caliph was mentioned in the Friday khuṭba and was struck on the coins.

Thus far, al-Qādir has merited no more than a cursory chapter within Islamic general histories. The earliest examples of this type of study in the modern period were produced by European scholars in the first half of the twentieth century, i.e., (1) William Muir's *The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall* (1915); (2) Thomas Arnold's *The Caliphate* (1924); (3) Carl Brockelmann's *History of the Islamic Peoples* (1949), and many similar works written in the second half of the twentieth century, i.e., (4) G. E. Von Grunebaum's *Classical Islam: A History 600-1258* (1963); (5) John Glubb's *The* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> William Muir, *The Caliphate: its Rise, Decline and Fall* (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 579.

<sup>11</sup> Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), 155

<sup>12</sup> Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924), 108.

<sup>13</sup> Yusuf Ibish, *The Political Doctrine of al-Bāqillānī* (Beirut: American University of Beirūt, 1966), 97.

Course of the Empire (1965); (6) Hugh Kennedy's The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates (1986). Though Kennedy follows the same line, he diverges from others in that he gives a fair assessment of al-Qādir, not only does he state al-Qādir's weakness, but he also mentions several points indicating his power and contribution to the 'Abbāsid caliphate.<sup>14</sup>

Most modern Arab scholars who have written the general history of Islam or even who deal with 'Abbāsid history follow in the steps of the Western scholars when they deal with the caliph al-Qādir. They describe al-Qādir in a few sentences, focusing on his personality and his relations with the Buwayhid sultāns and demonstrate only his weakness. We find examples in (1)Muḥammad al-Khuḍarī Bek's Muḥāḍarāt fī Tārīkh al-Umam al-Islāmiyya: al-Dawla al-'Abbāsiyya (1930); (2) Tārīkh al-'Arab of Philip K. Hitti (1954); (3) Mawsū at al-Tārīkh al-Islāmī wa al-Ḥaḍāra al-Islāmiyya of Aḥmad Shalabī (1954); (4) Tārīkh al-Islām of Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan (1957); (5) 'Alī Ibrāhīm Ḥasan's Tārīkh al-Islām al-'Āmm: al-Jāhiliyya - al-Dawla al-'Arabiyya - al-Dawla al-'Abbāsiyya (1972).

Other type of studies of al-Qādir by both European and Muslim writers provide littlemore information about the caliph, because they focus on the Buwayhids and their relations with 'Abbāsid caliphs, including al-Qādir. In this type are the work of Mafizullāh Kabir, *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdād (334/946-447/1055)* (1964) and Heribert Busse's work, *Chalif und Grosskönig: die Buyiden im Iraq (945-1055)* (1969).

Another type of study related to al-Qādir is that which deals with the religious movements during eleventh century Baghdād in which the caliph al-Qādir is discussed for his religious policy towards the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites, Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and Ash<sup>c</sup>arites. In this category are the work of George Maqdisi, *Ibn 'Aqīl et la resurgence de 1' Islam traditionaliste aux XIe siècle (Ve siècle de 1' hegire)* (1963) and Henry Laoust's articles "Le hanbalisme

Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: the Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century (London: Longman, 1986) 241-243

sous le califat de Baghdad (241/855-656/1258)" Revue des Etudes Islamiques 27 (1959):67-128; "La pensée et l'action politiques d' al-Māwardī." Revue des Etudes Islamiques 36 (1968):11-92 and "Les agitation religieuses à Baghdād aux IVe et Ve siècle de l'Hegire." in Islamic Civilization 950-1150, ed. D.S. Richards (1973).

In *Ibn 'Aqii* Maqdisi maintains that al-Qādir played a very important role in a Sunnite restoration during the reigns of the Buwayhids. The sign of the official Sunnite restoration was proclaimed by al-Qādir in 408/1017 when he demanded the Ḥanafite-Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite jurisconsults to make public retraction of Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism. In addition, he banned them from holding discussions on *kalām*, Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism, Rāfiḍism and all anti-Islamic doctrines. Furthermore, in the following year, 409/1017 he composed an epistle which was read publicly in the caliph's palace. The epistle contained a doctrine of traditionalist Sunnism, emphasizing the theory of the uncreatedness of the Qur'ān and charged with infidelity one who believes that the Qur'ān is created and declared his blood to be lawful to shed.<sup>15</sup>

Laoust holds that one year after his ascension al-Qādir in 382/992 began to embark on a Sunnite restoration. He built in Baghdād a new mosque at the Ḥarbiyya section where the *khuṭba* was made in his name. He also led the politico-religious opposition party and placed himself in the vanguard of the ideologies which were developed or founded for the defense of Sunnism. The movement of the Sunnite restoration, which not only involved the Ḥanbalites but also the followers of other schools of laws and theology, was rallying around al-Qādir. Like Maqdisi, Laoust mentions that the year 408/1017 was a starting point of the movement of the Sunnite restoration in which he first launched great measures against all deviant sects. He demanded that the Ḥanafite jurists who were suspected of having sympathies with

<sup>15</sup> George Makdisi, *Ibn 'Aqīl la resurgence de l'Islam traditionaliste aux XIe siècle (Ve siècle de l'hégire* (Damas: Institute Français, 1968), 300-301.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Henry Laoust, "Hanbalisme sous le califat de Baghdad (241/855-656/1258)." Revue des Etudes Islamiques 27 (1959): 87.

Mu<sup>°</sup>tazilism make repentance in public; the teaching of Mu<sup>°</sup>tazilism, Shī<sup>°</sup>ism and in general all doctrines contrary to Islam was banned. Al-Qādir was also credited with the invention of the Qādiriyya (Qādirite creed), which conformed with the doctrine of the Salaf (ancient generation) and was declared as an official credo of the state.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, in addition to the fragmentary information of al-Qādir in these larger works, there are also two articles in the First and New Editions of *the Encyclopaedia of Islam* by K.V. Zettersteen and D. Sourdel respectively. As encyclopaedia articles, however, their purpose is to survey the major events and achievements of al-Qādir's life and reign and summarize the primary and secondary works dealing with him.

Most studies about al-Qādir mentioned in the above works are superficial, fragmentary and unbalanced. In other words, they reveal only al-Qādir's weakness and fail to investigate his positive achievements. If there are works which mention al-Qādir's contribution, they describe it only in a few sentences. Others deal only with his religious policies. None of them presents al-Qādir in his full dimension, not only his weakness but also his power, not only his failure but also his contribution to the Islamic world, not only his religious policy but also his political endeavour and his influence on Muslim scholarship in his period.

Al-Qādir's reign deserves more profound study through its different aspects: political, economic and socio-religious in order for us to draw a more coherent picture of the caliph and his reign, and, in turn, we can judge fairly whether he was a passive caliph or active, whether he gave some appreciable contributions to the Islamic world and especially to the 'Abbāsid caliphate or no significant contribution at all. Furthermore, his reign is worthy of study since it marks a turning point in the sultanate of the Buwayhids and a transformation in the history of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. It was during the reign of al-Qādir that the Buwayhids started to decline and the 'Abbāsid caliphate began to regain

<sup>17</sup> Idem, "La pensée et l'action politiques d' al-Māwardī (364-450/974-1058)." Revues des Etudes Islamiques 36 (1968): 70.

its prestige. Compared with his predecessors who were also under the tutelage of the Buwayhid amīrs, al-Qādir was prominent and powerful by virtue of his attempt to restore the authority of the 'Abbāsid caliphate, his piety and religious erudition, his defense of Sunnism and his survival under the four Buwayhid amīrs for forty-one years and his ability to transfer the caliphate to his successor. The accession of al-Qādir marks a turning point in the relationship of the caliphs to the amīrs. And the impious action of Bahā' al-Dawla in deposing al-Ṭā'i' was in fact beneficial, leading as we can see to the more meritorious reign of al-Qādir. His reign, though for completely different reasons, marks a dividing line between a subservient caliph and an assertive one.¹8Al-Qādir differed from his predecessors in that he was able and willing to assert himself against his Buwayhid amīrs. He was one of the few caliphs who died in their beds.¹9 And after the Buwayhid amīr Bahā' al-Dawla moved to Shīrāz in 389/998, al-Qādir was able to take a more positive part in public affairs.²0

For example, in 387/997 or 388/998 'Abdullāh b. Ja' far called Ibn al-Waththāb, a relative of al-Ṭā'i' lillāh who was imprisoned by al-Qādir, escaped from prison and went to Jīlān where he claimed that he was al-Ṭā'i' lillāh. The people of Jīlān accepted his claim and paid allegiance to him and one of their chieftains, Muḥammad b. al-'Abbās, gave him his daughter and propagated his claim in his town. To supplant this pretender, al-Qādir sent a letter to the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  of Jīlān revealing his false claim. After the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  Abū al-Qāsim b. al-Kajj cleared up the misunderstanding and explained the truth to the people of Jīlān, they demanded that Ibn al-Waththāb leave the region. 21

Moreover, in 390/999 he had occasion to show his determination to defend the Sunnī caliphateby sending a letter to the new  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  of Jīlān, Muḥammad b. 'Abdillāh b.

<sup>18</sup> Mafizullah Kabir, *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdād (334/946 -447/1055)* (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1964), 189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> R. Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1957), 283.

<sup>20</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 241.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 202-203.

al-Ḥasan, asking him to exhort the people to be loyal to the caliph.<sup>22</sup> This letter perhaps has a connection with the affair of Ibn al-Waththāb. In addition, al-Qādir must have realized that this remote region was quite vulnerable for the appearance of any pretender to the caliphate or that the Jīlānīs might throw their allegiance to a ruler of their own.

In 391/1000 al-Qādir appointed his son Abū al-Faḍl as his successor and gave him the title al-Ghālib billāh (The Conquering through God). The son was at this time just eight years old and four months. According to the Arabic sources, the reason for al-Qādir to take this initiative was that 'Abdullāh b. 'Uthmān al-Wāthiqī, one of the descendants of al-Wāthiq billāh (the ninth 'Abbāsid caliph) had claimed the succession. He proclaimed his claim in Khurāsān where the people paid allegiance to him and mentioned his name in the *khuṭba* throughout the region. It was at this time that the caliph appointed his successor. He also sent letters to Aḥmad Qarākhāqān, Hārūn's successor, the ruler of Khurāsān, and to Khān dynasties, rejecting the claim of al-Wāthiqī.<sup>23</sup> And Maḥmūd of Ghazna, a loyal ally of al-Qādir, captured the pretender when he came to Ghazna and put him in prison till he died.<sup>24</sup>

Unfortunately, al-Ghālib billāh predeceased the caliph and died in Ramaḍān 409/1018. The caliph had to appoint another son, Abū Ja<sup>c</sup> far al-Qā<sup>c</sup> im billāh, as his successor in 421/1030 during the emirate of Jalāl al-Dawla. On both occasions the caliph did not meet any objection from the Buwayhid *amīrs* or from the Turkish troops who usually interfered in the appointment of any caliph and tried to play the game by appointing a caliph who could easily be manipulated by them.

In 401/1010 the caliph demanded that the Buwayhid *amīr* intervene in the affair of the *amīr* Qirwāsh, the ruler of Mawṣil, who had proclaimed his allegiance to the Fāṭimid ruler, al-Ḥākim, and had his name declared in a *khuṭba*. Bahā al-Dawla

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> D. Sourdel, "al-Kadir bi'llah," in E.I., new ed., vol. 4, 387.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Miskawayh, *The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate*, trans. and ed. H.F. Amedroz and D.S. Margoliouth, vol. 6 (Baghdād, Maktabat al-Muthannā, [1916), 421-422.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol.9, 165.

complied with the caliph's order and obliged Qirwāsh to reestablish the 'Abbāsid *khutba* in 401/1010.25

On several occasions the caliph did not hesitate to rebuke the Buwayhids for their measures and quite often the latter had to obey the orders of the caliph. For example, when in 394/1004 Bahā' al-Dawla appointed the Sharīf Abū Ahmad al-Mūsawī as chief qādī (judge), naqīb (agent) of the 'Alids, head of the court of appeal (mazālim), as well as amīr of the pilgrimage, al-Qādir refused the appointment of the Sharīf as chief judge but accepted his other three positions. Similarly, in 415/1023 al-Qādir protested to Musharrif al-Dawla for the latter's having occasion to renew the oath of allegiance of the Turks and the muwallads (those who were born and raised among Arabs, but not of pure Arab blood) without the caliph's permission. The affair ended in a mutual vow of sincerity and fidelity between the amīr and the caliph respectively.<sup>26</sup>

On many occasions the caliph played a role as mediator between the Turkish troops and the *amīr*. First, during the confusion in 416/1034, following the death of Musharrif al-Dawla, the troops had recognized Jalāl al-Dawla as their *amīr al-umarā*, but when the latter delayed to advance to Baghdād, they appealed to the caliph to approve their choice of Abū Kālījār. The caliph first did not give any answer, but when they came again to him, he fulfilled their demand and the *khutba* was delivered for Abū Kālījār. Thowever, when the latter had been absent for two years since his appointment, being involved in war with his uncle, the ruler of Kirmān, the Turkish troops therefore came back to the caliph and demanded that he look after their affairs and approve their change of choice to Jalāl al-Dawla. The caliph first rebuked them for their breaking the oath and then sent a letter to Abū Kālījār demanding him to come to Baghdād or else lost the chance. Since there was no reply from Abū Kālījār, they came back to the caliph and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. .7, 249.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Ibid., vol. 8, 15-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Ibid. 20.

asked his permission to proclaim the *khuṭba* for Jalāl al-Dawla. The *khuṭba* was then read in his name.<sup>28</sup>

In 419/1028 the troops complained to the caliph about the sultān's indulgence in pleasure and negligence of the administration of the state and asked him to invite the sultān's son to take control over them. The caliph sent a representative to Jalāl al-Dawla bringing the letter of complaint of the troops to which the amīr admitted his fault and asked for forgiveness, and the stipulation was concluded that the amīr would produce gold and silver coins worth more than one hundred thousand dirhams, but this still did not satisfy them. They started plundering the house of the wazīr (vizier) of Ibn Mākūlā, some houses of the sultān's entourages and those of the people causing chaos and riot. The Turkish troops finally demanded that the amīr leave the city and they even expressed their intention to kill him. They finally sent a representative to the caliph, asking him to make a settlement with the leaders of the Turks. The caliph met them and made a reconciliation between them and the amīr Jalāl al-Dawla in which they took an oath and kissed the ground in front of the caliph and then returned to their houses. <sup>29</sup>

Finally, when Jalāl al-Dawla clashed with the troops and the latter demanded his dismissal, the caliph sent the chief notables, the two  $naq\bar{\imath}bs$ , and the  $h\bar{\imath}jib$  asking him to leave the city; he obeyed the order and was prohibited from returning to the capital for some time afterwards.<sup>30</sup>

In several instances al-Qādir was also involved actively in religious affairs, especially in the conflict between the Sunnites and the Shī'ites. For example, in 398/1007 following controversies on the issue of Ibn Mas'ūd *mushaf* (copy of the Qur'ān), al-Qādir held a meeting of Sunnī scholars to investigate the *mushaf* and finally condemned the suspect version and burnt it in front of the people. When a Shī'ite who at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 366; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.8, 35.

<sup>30</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 366.

Karbala had dared to curse "those who had burnt the *mushaf* of Ibn Mas'ūd " in 14/15 Sha ban 398/1007 the caliph demanded his arrest and ordered his execution. The following year the caliph issued a manifesto condemning the Fatimid doctrine and criticizing the genealogy of the Fatimid caliphs. The manifesto was signed by Imami as well as Sunnī scholars. And in 408/1017 al-Qādir took a major step by issuing a decree banning any discussion of Mutazili, Ashari and Shit doctrines. Finally, in 420/1029 he issued three letters which were solemnly read in the palace: "the first denounced Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism anew, the second attacked in particular the doctrine of the 'created Qur<sup>2</sup>ān'; the third proclaimed the superiority of the early caliphs and affirmed the obligation to command good and forbid evil." 31 Al-Qadir's decrees later were known as al-Risala al-Qādiriyya (al-Qādir's Epistles) or al-Qādir's Creed, which became an official creed of the state and had to be applied in all the Muslim world. This *Risāla al-Qādiriyya* was read every Friday during his reign and his successor al-Qa'im billah. For all of al-Qadir's religious policies, which clearly indicate his championing of the Sunnites against the Shī tites, he was credited by some scholars to the restoration of Sunnism or Sunni revival in the eleventh century of Baghdad.<sup>32</sup>

Al-Qādir's relation with the Ghaznavids, in particular, Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, to some extent helped the caliph to maintain his authority, especially in the eastern regions of the empire. As soon as Maḥmūd rose to power by subjugating the Sāmānids, who kept paying allegiance to the deposed caliph al-Tā'i', he forced the Sāmānids to pay allegiance to al-Qādir and to mention the caliph's name in the *khuṭba*. 33 In religious aspects, Maḥmūd also helped the caliph to restore Sunnism. When the caliph banned Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism and Baṭiniyya, Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin executed many people

<sup>31</sup> D. Sourdel, "al-Kādir bi'llāh," in *E.I.*, new ed., vol. 4, 379; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 8, 41.

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$  Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam , vol. 8, 108-111; Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 70; Maqdisi, "Ibn 'Aqīl'," 303-305.

<sup>33</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol.6, 370.

who were charged of having Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilī and Bāṭinī tendencies of the district of Rayy and in other districts in his domain.<sup>34</sup>

Al-Qādir's long reign (41 years) and the appointment of his successor before his death without any reference to and opposition from the Buwayhid *amīrs* indicate that he was not so weak as some scholars claim. Moreover, none of the four Buwayhid sultāns who seized the reins of the empire entertained the idea of deposing the caliph. Similarly, the statements of Ibn al-Athīr that al-Qādir was endowed with dignity (*hayba*) which inspired fear and obedience in his people to some degree might be true.

From the aforementioned it is clear that al-Qādir attempted to assert his authority and restore the power of the caliphate. However, he faced many problems, besides the pressure of the Buwayhid sultāns, which constituted the main obstacle; there were also economic and socio-religious problems. It is said that al-Qādir only received the stipends that the Buwayhid *amīr* assigned to him, even that they confiscated his *iqtā*, while the poll-tax being his privilege, was seized by the Buwayhid soldiers during the time of Jalāl al-Dawla.

Among religious problems which faced al-Qādir was the division of his two main conflicting groups, namely the Sunnites and the Shī tes. Since the Buwayhids were Shī tes or more precisely Zaydites, they supported the Shī tes so that during their reign the Shī tes flourished and obtained more power than in the preceding periods. Facing this increase of Shī te ascendancy, the Sunnites as represented by the Ḥanbalites formed an active opposition to the Shī tes, which resulted in a number of conflicts and riots between both communities. Furthermore, with the rise of the Fāṭimids, another sect, called Ismā the preceding periods into the centre of the empire. The division of the community into several groups, and especially into two main fronts, Sunnī and Shī tes.

<sup>34</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.8, 34-40.

created a situation in which it was difficult for the caliph to be able to gain full support for the restoration of 'Abbāsid authority.

My study tries to prove that al-Qādir was not so weak as some scholars (mentioned earlier) claim and not so powerful as some chroniclers describe. He was in between. It will be shown that he made deliberate attempts to gain political authority and on several occasions his efforts can be said to be successful, but he was not strong enough to regain the traditional power of the caliphate because of some problems of politics, economy and religion. Nevertheless, he succeeded in raising the prestige of the caliphate considerably. Above all, al-Qādir succeeded in reasserting the threatened Sunnism and in this way as Sourdel says,"... achieved ends as much political as religious." <sup>35</sup>

This dissertation is the first monograph devoted to al-Qādir's life and reign and is based on a wide range of contemporary and late contemporary sources. The study has four primary purposes: (1) to investigate the economic decline of the caliphate and its influence on al-Qādir's power; (2) to analyze and evaluate al-Qādir's success in restoring the caliphate and raising its prestige; (3) to present al-Qādir's contribution to the revival of Sunnism and (4) to assess al-Qādir's influence on the development of Muslim scholarship in his time.

The organization of the thesis is intended to serve these purposes. In Chapter One we shall discuss the political and economic backgrounds of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. It consists of two sections. In the first we shall examine the political situation of the caliphate in particular from the time of al-Mutawakkil up to the ascension of the Buwayhid amīr, Bahā' al-Dawla, the contemporary of al-Qādir. This is aimed at giving some information on several factors contributing to the decline of the 'Abbāsid caliphate during the fourth/tenth century onwards. The second deals with the economic condition

<sup>35</sup> D. Sourdel, "al-Kādir bi'llāh," in E.I., new ed., vol. 4, 379.

of the 'Abbāsid caliphate in general until the time of the reign of al-Qādir and analyzes the factors that led to the decline of the economy. This is intended to throw light on the failure of the 'Abbāsids to restore their power and to overcome various lords and amīrs who undermined their authority. At the end of this section, we shall look at attempts made by some caliphs and sultān or amīrs to improve the economic condition.

Chapter Two is devoted to the political measures of al-Qādir. To analyze his political activity, the chapter comprises two sections. In the first we try to trace al-Qādir's career, beginning with his background until his succession to the caliphate. The second deals with the political career of al-Qādir. In this section we shall discuss his internal and external relations. His internal relations includes the relations with the Buwayhid amūrs, the amūrs of local principalities; his attempt to appoint his own successors and his endeavour to appoint his own officials within the administration, judiciary, religious establishment, etc. The external relations deal with his foreign policies, beginning with his contacts with the Fāṭimids and other amūrs of principalities and then with the Sāmānids, Qarākhānids and finally the Ghaznavids.

Chapter Three focuses on al-Qādir's attempts to restore Sunnism. It comprises five sections. The first section investigates the Shī tie movement. The second section discusses the Ḥanbalite movement and its role in the conflicts between the Sunnites and the Shī ties, al-Qādir's involvement in these conflicts and his policy towards different religious groups. The third section deals with the conflicts between the Shī ties and the Sunnites. The fourth section elaborates al-Qādir's role in the Sunnite and caliphal restoration. The last section analyzes al-Qādir's relations with Sunnite and Mu tazilite scholars. But the stress will be placed on their influence on al-Qādir and his contribution to the development of the literary works and the Muslim scholars of Baghdād.

#### B. SURVEY OF THE SOURCES

The primary sources for al-Qādir's reign are of two kinds: contemporary and later, and the range of the sources includes chronicles, biographical dictionaries, geographical works, theological and literary (adab) works. The secondary sources are those of modern scholars, Western and Muslim alike.

Unlike the previous period of the 'Abbāsids, which was rich in historical works and great chroniclers such as al-Ṭabarī, al-Mas'ūdī and al-Balādhūrī, al-Qādir's reign, or more generally the Buwayhid period, had relatively few historical works. Nevertheless, there were court histories written for the Buwayhids together with the annals of the caliphate in the works of Thābitb. Sinān ( *circa*, d. 363/974), Ibrāhīm b. Hilāl al-Ṣābī (d. 394/1003), Hilāl b. Ibrāhīm al-Ṣābī (d. 448/1056), Miskawayh (320-421/932-1030) and Abū Shujā' al-Rūdhrāwarī (437-88/1045-95). However, not all works of these authors have come down to us.

The work of Thābit b. Sinān does not survive except in quotation by Miskawayh, nor does the work of Ibrāhīm b. Hilāl al-Ṣābī entitled *Kitab al-Tājī* written for 'Adud al-Dawla (d.372/982), but it is quoted occasionally by later historians, and anonymously by Miskawayh. Ibrāhīm b. Hilāl al-Ṣābī first served as a secretary in the state-chancellery of Mu'izz Dawla. But when the latter died in 356/966, he retained his post under Mu'izz Dalwa's son 'Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiyār. He is said to have drawn a contract for a settlement between Mu'izz al-Dawla and his uncle 'Adud al-Dawla about their respective positions when the latter came to Baghdād. The document was revealed to have contained terms which offended 'Adud al-Dawla. When 'Izz al-Dawla was killedin a quarrel with his uncle 'Adud al-Dawla, Ibrāhīm b. Hilāl al-Ṣābī was put in jail by the *amīr* and it was during his imprisonment that the *amīr* asked him to write a history of the Buwayhid dynasty, *Kitāb al-Tājī*, after the new title of 'Adud al-Dawla Tāj al-Milla. In 372/982, at the latest, the *Kitāb al-Tājī* was completed (in which the

Buwayhids were mentioned as descendants of the Bahram V).<sup>36</sup> The *amīr* endeavored to read and corrected the work as he desired, to the extent that Ibrāhīm was annoyed and told a friend that he was writing lies and flattery.<sup>37</sup>

Ibrāhīm's grandson, Hilāl b. al-Muḥassin al-Ṣābī, is another of our sources for the history of the reign of al-Qādir and his contemporaries. He was born in Shawwāl 359/1004 and was a Sabian like the other members of his family. He was the first member of his family who became a Muslim in 399/1008 as a result of a vision he saw. His career began as a secretary of the vizier Fakhr al-Mulk Abū Ghālib Muḥammad b. Khalaf. Hilāl al-Ṣābī died on Thursday 17th Ramaḍān, 448/1056 and is said to have written several works, but most of them have been lost, except the fragment of his Tarkh dealing with the years 389-393/998-1002 edited and included in the Dhayl Tajārib al-Umam by H.F. Amedroz (Leiden, 1904), Kitāb al-Wuzarā' (on the wazīrs preceding the period of al-Qādir) and Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa. His Tārīkh was actually a continuation of that of his father-in-law, Thabit b. Sinan, containing the events of the years 360-447/970-1055.38 Fortunately, however, other fragments of it are preserved in the works of Ibn al-Jawzī, Sibt Ibn al-Jawzī and in a Munich manuscript of an anonymous author covering the period from 402/1011 to 432/1040, while Hilal's Tarikh is also cited by al-Khāṭib al-Baghdādī, Yāqūt, Ibn Khallikān, al-Dhahabī and others.39 Hilal's Kitab al-Wuzara' is of limited use for us since it deals with the 'Abbasid wazīrs of the preceding period. Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa deals with formal etiquette and ceremonies in the palace, letters of correspondence and contracts. Although not much information regarding al-Qadir can be drawn from it, the formalities and ceremonies of investitures perhaps will be useful to our discussion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Heribert Busse, "The Revival of Persian Kingship under the Buyids." *Islamic Civilization 950-1150*, ed. D.S. Richards (Oxford: The Eastern Centre, University of Pennsylvania, 1973), 62

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> F. Krenkow, "al-Sābī," in *E.I.*, 1st ed., vol. 4, 20.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 215.

The most important source for the study of the Buwayhid period is Tajārīb al-Umam of Abū 'Alī Ahmad b. Ya'qūb b. Miskawayh (d.421/1030), covering the years 340/951 to 369/979. Miskawayh (commonly known, not Ibn Miskawayh) became a secretary and librarian under the following viziers: al-Muḥallabī (340-52/950-63), Abū al-Faḍl (353-60/951-70) and Abū al-Faṭḥ (360-6/970-6) and finally under the Buwayhid 'Adud al-Dawla (d.372/983). He was one of the very rare intellectuals in the Arabic language who mastered both philosophy and history and practiced the two disciplines with competence and with a determination to embark on the most complex ethicopolitical reflection.<sup>40</sup>This is in accordance with his statements in the introduction of the Tajārib al-Umam that he found in the histories of people and kings, reports of countries and historical works events or affairs which can be taken as lessons since similar events or affairs always recur and are expected to happen in the future.41 The Tajārib al-Umam deals with a universal history from the Flood to the year 369/980. For the period after al-Tabari, Miskawayh is probably the best source we have particularly for the years from 340-/951-952 till 372/98342, namely from the end of the reign of al-Mustakfi and the beginning of the Buwayhid period up to the death of 'Adud al-Dawla (d.372/983) and the reign of the 'Abbasid caliph al-Ta'i', and other contemporary rulers. The early section of the Tajārib seems to have been an edition of al-Țabarī, but omitting many isnāds (chains of authorities) and alternative versions, while for the later period he supplies his materials from the chronicles of Kitāb al-Tāpī of Ibrāhīm b. Hilāl al-Ṣābī, Thābit b. Sinān's and Hilāl al-Ṣābī's Tārikh with the addition

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> H.F. Amedroz and D.S Margoliouth edited and translated the *Tajārib al-Umam* to English *The Experiences of Nations* in 7 volumes in their series *The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate* (Oxford: London, 1920-1)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib al-Umam*, vol. 1, ed. Abū Qāsim al-Imāmī (Tehran: Dār al-Shurūs, 1987), 30

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> D. M. Dunlop, *Arab Civilization to AD 1500* (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1971), 123.

of other information and accounts which seemed relevant.<sup>43</sup> Miskawayh collected his materials in the *Tajārīb* for his own time from the leading actors in the events, such as the vizier Ibn al- Amīd (with whom he was attached as his secretary and keeper of the vizier's library ) or from his personal experience (as he himself witnessed the events occurred during his service with the Buwayhids, the last amīr he served being Bahā' al-Dawla). Miskawayh was famous for his boldness in criticizing even his patrons the Buwayhids, for his freedom from religious bigotry and his ability as historian.<sup>44</sup> If one analyzes the work of al-Tabarī and that of Miskawayh one will find that the latter's qualifications for the composition of history are very much greater than those of the former. Especially for his own time he himself witnessed many events and had the great advantage of personal acquaintance with prominent individuals so that he was able to gain information at first hand. In addition, from his office (as secretary and keeper of the library of the wazīr) he was familiar with the methods of administration and of the warfare of the time by which he was able to describe events knowledgeably. And unlike al-Tabari, Miskawayh's information on the economy of the empire and the source and methods of taxation is copious and instructive. He carefully comments on any cause of success or failure of military campaigns. 45 His style is throughout exceedingly simple and he pays no attention to unimportant matters, but important events are skillfully and coherently presented. Rosenthal maintains that "his narrative of the events of the first seventy years of the fourth century Hijra, due to his own merit or by virtue of the sources he used represents the high-water mark for historical writing in annalistic form."46The Tajārib al-Umam differs greatly from earlier Islamic writings since it seems to be a meticulous record of contemporary events rather than a reconstruction of the past

<sup>43</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 368.

<sup>44</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 215.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> D.S. Margoliouth, *Lectures on Arabic Historians* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 128-129.

<sup>46</sup> Franz Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1968), 142.

by means of Traditions and *akhbār*. <sup>47</sup> Miskawayh, according to Caetani in his introduction to the *Tajārib* quoted by Abū Qāsim Imāmī, left us a work which is founded on a basic method and is very close to the principles taken by Western and the later historians. <sup>48</sup>

Miskawayh's *Tajārib* is of much value in the study of the Buwayhids from the beginning of their entry to Baghdād until the emirate of al-Muṭī<sup>c</sup>, but it is of little importance for the reign of al-Qādir. Though he lived up to the last year of the reign of al-Qādir (d. Dhū al-Ḥijja 12, 421), he seems to have ended his history with the year 369/979. We do not know why, but perhaps he was occupied at that time with his philosophical work: the *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq wa Taṭhīr al-ʿArak* (The Treatise on Ethics).<sup>49</sup>

Part of the void in Miskawayh's work was filled by Abū Shujā' Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn Zahīr al-Dīn al-Rūdhrāwarī (437-88/1045-95). He served al-Muqtaḍi' as wazīr in 471/1078-8 for a short period and then from 477-484/1084-1091. He was a wise and humane wazīr in Baghdād who pursued a conciliatory policy regarding the Sunnīs and Shī'is and their rivalries in the city and whose piety and literary skill are mentioned in Arabic sources. Intellectually, he was inferior to Miskawayh and did not exhibit anything like the practical acquaintance with an interest in the administration of the empire as Miskawayh did. He wrote poetry and a *Dhayl* (continuation) to Muskawayh's *Tajārib al-Umam*, covering the years 368-89/979-9951 and Hilāl al-Ṣābī's fragment, or part eight, forms a continuation of al-Rūdhrāwarī from the years 389/998 to 393/1002, which are both included in the *Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate* (forming 6 volumes: i-iii, the Arabic text, iv-vi, English translation) by H.F. Amedroz and D.S.

<sup>47</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 368.

<sup>48</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib al-Umam, ed. Abū Qāsim Imāmī, vol. 1, 31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> M. Arkoun, "Miskawayh," in *E.I.*, new ed., vol. 7, 143-144.

<sup>50</sup> Margoliouth, Arabic Historians, 147.

<sup>51</sup> C.E. Bosworth, "al-Rūdhrāwarī," in E.I., new ed. vol. 8,

Margoliouth. Therefore, al-Rūdhrāwarī's *Dhayl Tajārib al-Umam* constitutes an important source for the reign of al-Qādir, since it covers the reign al-Ṭā'i and nine years of the first reign of al-Qādir.

A later historian who provides us with very important and detailed information on the reign of al-Qādir is 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad Abū al-Faraj b. al-Jawzī known as Ibn al-Jawzī. Born in Baghdād in 510/1126 he was a juristconsult, traditionist, historian, preacher and was one of the most famous Hanbalis of Baghdad. He was brought up in a fairly wealthy family and received a comprehensive education. He began his career in the reign of the caliph al-Muktafi (530-55/1136-60), but it was during the year 574/1178-9 that Ibn al-Jawzī reached the zenith of his career in Baghdād, where he became a director of five madrasas (schools) and had already written one hundred and fifty works. He established excellent relations with the caliph al-Mustadi', and with the wazīr and the chief 'ulamā', he played a great role in leading Hanbalism to great popular prestige in Baghdad and was one of the most prolific writers of Arabic literature. According to Muwaffaq al-Dīn al-Muqaddasī, Ibn al-Jawzī was the most outstanding preacher in his time, who wrote on all Islamic sciences quite well; he learnt figh (Islamic jurisprudence) and hadith (Tradition) and then mastered both sciences, but al-Muqaddasī was not satisfied with his works on Sunna and his methodology in that subject.<sup>52</sup> In history he was a prolific author.<sup>53</sup>

Ibn Rajab in his *Dhayl* lists more than 200 works by Ibn al-Jawzī, of which three are famous:(1) al-Muntazam fi Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-Umam on universal history (ed. Krenkow, Haydarābād 1357-9/1938-40, 6 vols.), (2) Sifat al-Ṣafwa, on Ṣūfism (Haydarabad, 1355/6/1936-7) and (3) Talbīs Iblīs, an attack against various sects.<sup>54</sup> But

<sup>52</sup> Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl alā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* (al-Qāhira:Maṭba at al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya, [1952-1953]), 412.

<sup>53</sup> Ihid 415

<sup>54</sup> H. Laoust, "Ibn al-Jawzī," in E.I, new ed., vol. 3, 752.

when Ibn al-Jawzī was asked about his works he claimed that he wrote more than 340.55 And according to Ibn Taymiyya, he wrote more than one thousand.56 Perhaps the latter includes all Ibn al-Jawzī's individual *fatwās*, or Ibn Taymiyya exaggerates his achievement.

In al-Muntazam fī Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-Umam Ibn al-Jawzī incorporates the lost work of Hilāl al-Ṣābī. The Muntazam is a remarkably rich source for the history of the caliphate from 257/971-579/1179. It combines a chronicle of events with biographical obituaries which became a model for later chroniclers. The 7th and 8th volumes are devoted mainly to the time of al-Qādir and the Buwayhid sultāns and other contemporary Muslim dynasties and provide detailed information for the urban and Sunnī-Shī te riots, in particular during the time of al-Qādir. In addition, Ibn al-Jawzī provides much more information of al-Qādir's involvement in politics and socio-religious affairs than other chroniclers. Therefore, among primary sources which relate to our study, Muntazam is the main source.

In spite of its importance for the reign of al-Qādir, the *Muntazam*, according to Rosenthal, "reached the lowest level to which Muslim historiography in its main representatives, ever sank. The *Muntazam*, represents a transitional stage in which theology had not yet fully established its hold over historical writing, though political interest was waning." <sup>57</sup>He further says that Ibn al-Jawzī introduced a sharp distinction between events and obituary notices. The latter is placed after the events of each year and arranged alphabetically. This arrangement is basically not new. Aḥmad b. Abī Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī already arranged annalistically obituary notices after the description of each caliph's reign in his *Tārīkh Baghdād* (or *Kitāb Baghdād*). However, the consistent

<sup>55</sup> Ibn al-'Imād al-'Akarī, *Shadharāt al-Dhahab*, vol.4 (al-Qāhira: Matba'at al-Quds, [1931-1932]), 331.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Rosenthal, History, 143.

treatment of biographies in this particular way which was adopted by later historians is credited to Ibn al-Jawz $\bar{i}$ . <sup>58</sup>

But Rosenthal criticizes Ibn al-Jawzī for paying more attention to insignificant events such as extraordinary natural phenomena, while the more important happenings are neglected. This criticism perhaps springs from the fact that Ibn al-Jawzī in the *Muntazam* presents all kinds of information. Besides important historical events such as the deaths and succession of the caliphs, the demise of famous personalities, religious developments, including those of Christians and Jews, he also includes natural calamities such as a severe unseasonal cold, the eruption of a star, a great fire, famines, earthquakes, diseases, and economic aspects such as cases of inflation and deflation.<sup>59</sup>

As for Ibn al-Jawzī's sources for the *Muntazam* we know only, as already mentioned, that he quotes many accounts from Hilāl al-Ṣābi. Ibn al-Jawzī's description of the Shī°ī-Sunnī riots and biographical notices of prominent personalities form the most original part of his work. Though he might insert in his accounts on the Shī°ī-Sunnī controversies his personal bias as an orthodox Sunnī and zealous Ḥanbalī, he gives a complete picture of the issues involved and the information on this topic, which we cannot find in the works of Miskawayh, Abū Shujā° and Hilāl al-Ṣābī.60

We next come to Ibn al-Athīr, whose universal history differs completely from the work of Ibn al-Jawzī and his group as regards treatments and outlook. 'Izz al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan Ibn al-Athīr was born on 4 Jumādā al-Ūlā 555/13 May 1160. He is one of a family of learned brothers, all of whom gained distinction through their literary activities. Their father was a high functionary of Jazīrat Ibn 'Umar; his elder brother Majd al-Dīn ibn al-Athīr was a traditionist, and his younger brother Diyā' al-Dīn ibn al-Athīr was a philologist. Among the three, 'Izz al-Dīn ibn al-Athīr gained the highest

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Ibid., 145.

<sup>60</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 216.

fame owing to his work, *Kitāb al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh* (The Perfect in History), which is one of the great productions of Arabic historiography and, like the *Annals* of Tabarī, is one of the best known and most highly valued sources for Islamic history. The great contributions of Ibn al-Athīr's work, besides its general reliability, are its coverage of many centuries (it comes down to the year 628/1231) and its readability. Unlike al-Tabarī's *Annals*, the *Kāmil* presents a continuous text, leaving aside the authorities and abandoning altogether the long *isnāds* which are a distinctive feature of the earlier works.<sup>61</sup>

The *Kāmil* is a universal history of the Islamic world and though it has some lacunae, there is no historical work before it which contains such vast information with a balanced treatment between regions. Moreover, the author proves himself to have rare qualities: his dominant preoccupation is to make the accounts coherent and intelligible. He removes unimportant details, fuses the sources, chooses the most plausible version for each point, reconstructs from different elements a personal account, groups the above information according to time-limits and connects them in a coherent account. Unfortunately, his work is not without defects: partiality for the Zangids, neglect of the chronology, and finally, failure to name the sources. These he transforms so completely that a search for these sources is difficult. Nevertheless, the richness of his information renders the *Kāmil* indispensable.<sup>62</sup>

According to Rosenthal, al-Kāmil fi al-Tārīkh is the best annalistic work on the history of the Islamic world for its well balanced coverage of vast areas. He also attempted to follow the steps of his predecessors in treating "strange happenings" and the biographies of important individuals but without putting much stress on them. When

<sup>61</sup> Dunlop, Arab Civilization, 128-129.

<sup>62</sup> Claude Cahen, La Syrie du Nord à l'epoque des Croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche (Paris, Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1940), 598-599.

he came to his own time in his historical presentation, he provided more detailed information, but again he tried not to go beyond the limits.<sup>63</sup>

According to Ibn al-Athīr, to know what are the real facts of history is almost impossible. Some of the extended works are overloaded by *isnāds*, while the abridged ones often fail to record an event. Moreover, most of them neglect the important events and the famous personalities; still many other histories are full of minor things which are best to be discarded. Each historian tends to write history up to his time and another historian who comes after, makes a *dhayl*, continuation and addition to it. The historian of the East [eastern parts of the empire] fails to mention the history of the West, while the historian of the West neglects the history of the East so that if a student wants to read a history up to his time he needs many volumes and books, which make him bored. When Ibn al-Athīr realized this problem, he began to write a comprehensive history of the kings of the East and the West and those between these regions, and he includes in his history events and people from the beginning of the creation up to our time.<sup>64</sup>

For his general history, Ibn al-Athīr borrows from a large number of sources, including al-Ṭabarī. He also uses other famous historical works whose authors' credibility is well known. 65 He does not mention these historians whose accounts he quotes save al-Ṭabarī. However, we can ascertain that for the early Buwayhid period he largely quotes a lot of information from Miskawayh and Abū Shujā. He supplies materials on the Sāmānids and the Ghaznavids mainly from al-ʿUtbī, and one of his sources for the later Buwayhid period [including the reign of al-Qādir] is Ibn al-Jawzī. 66 This is evident both from the record of religious riots and from actual references he makes to his work. On the Sāmānids and Ghaznavids Ibn al-Athīr supplies more detailed information than Ibn al-Jawzī. The most important contributions of Ibn al-Athīr

<sup>63</sup> Rosenthal, History, 146-147.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 216-217.

for the Buwayhid and the 'Abbāsid period are the accounts between 391/1000, when the chronicles of Abū Shujā' and the eighth part of Hilāl's *Tārīkh* come to an end, and 436/1044, when the Munich manuscript terminates, up to the date of the end the Buwayhid dynasty. The way Ibn al-Athīr writes in *al-Kāmil* influenced later generations of annalists, such as Ibn Kathīr, Abū al-Fidā' and even Mir Khawand; Khwand Amir's works seem to have been mainly based on *al-Kāmil* though they include other materials.<sup>67</sup>

There are other rival court histories which are relevant to our discussion: Tarkh Yamīnī of Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Jabbār al- Utbī, a contemporary of the later Buwayhids who enjoyed the patronage of Mahmūd of Ghazna. He was born at Rayy about the year 350 (961) From his early youth he moved to Khurāsān and lived with his maternal uncle Abū Naṣr al-Utbī, who held an important post under the Sāmānids. After the death of his uncle, al-"Utbī served as secretary first to Abū "Alī al-Simjūrī, the commander of the army of Khurāsān from 378/988 to 383/993, then for a short time to Shams al-Ma'ālī Kābūs and then to Sabuktagin. After the death of Sabuktagin, he served under his son Ismā il b. Sabuktagin and then under Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin and finally under his son Mas'ūd b. Sabuktagin till he died in 427 (1036). It was during his service under Mahmud b. Sabuktagin that al-'Utbī wrote his Kitāb al-Yamīnī (after the title of Mahmūd, i.e., Yamīn al-Dawla), which he finished in 412 (1021). Actually, al-"Utbī wrote several works, but only one, the *Kitāb al-Yamīnī*, has survived. As the title indicates, it is a history of the reign of Mahmud b. Sabuktagin, his son Sultan Mas° ud and the contemporary rulers. Its style is very ornate and verbose and has always been admired in the East.<sup>68</sup> Though its rhythmical prose and its tone of exaggerated eulogy greatly reduce its value as a historical source, yet it throws light on the relationship of the Buwayhids with the Samanids. Moreover, the importance of Kitab

<sup>67</sup> Ibid

<sup>68</sup> M. Nāzim, "al-"Utbī, " in E.I., 1st ed. vol., 1059.

al-Yamīnī for our discussion is that it forms as additional information to the Muntazam of Ibn al-Jawzī when we deal with the relation of al-Qādir with Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin and the latter's expedition to India and neighbouring regions.

The Tārīkh Bayhaqī by al-Bayhaqī, a memoir of Masʿūd b. Maḥmūd of Ghazna, also provides additional information for the later period of al-Qādir, especially during the last years of his reign and regarding his relation with the Ghaznavids. As for information on the caliph's relations with the Fāṭimids of Egypt the following works need to be consulted: al-Maqrīzī's (766-845/1364-1442) Itti ʿāz al-Ḥunafā ʾ bi Akhbār al-A ʾimmat al-Fāṭimiyyīn al-Khulafā ʾ; Ibn Sayrafī's al-Ishāra ilā mā nāla al-Wizāra and Ibn Idhārī's (late seventeenth century) al-Bayān al-Mughrib fī akhbār al-Maghrib.

There is an important local history relevant to our discussion, i.e., Tārīkh Baghdād of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (392-463/1002-1071). His complete name was Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. Thābit b. Aḥmad b. Mahdī al-Shāfi'ī. He was born on 24th Jumādā II 392/10th May 1002 in Hanikiyya, a village in the neighbourhood of the Nahr al-Malik below Baghdād, but according to another source, he was born in Ghuzayya, a hamlet about half-way between Kūfa and Mecca. The son of a preacher, he began his studies very early with his father and other shaykhs. He first learnt hadīth at the age of eleven years, 69 and among his teachers of hadīth in Baghdād were Abū al-Ḥasan b. Ṣalat al-Ahwāzī, Abū 'Umar b. Mahdī, al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan al-Jawāliqī and many others, but the most important and influential teacher was al-Burqānī who suggested that he travel to the East to collect hadīth. He learned jurisprudence (fiqh) under the guidance of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Maḥāmilī and the qādī Abū al-Ṭayyib. After completing his study of the Qur'ān, he was occupied with the study of hadīth, a science which became his main interest throughout his life. Therefore, from the age of twenty he

<sup>69</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.8, 265.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Al-Dhahabī, *Tadhkīrat al-Ḥuffāz*, vol. 3 (Haydarābād: Dā°irat al-Ma°ārif al-Uthmāniyya, 1957), 1136

travelled in many cities to collect hadiths such as Basra and Kūfa and in the eastern regions of the empire such as Nīshāpūr, Rayy and Isfahān, Hamadhān and Dīnawar. He wrote many works mostly on *hadith*; according to al-Sam'ānī and Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Baghdadi's works amounted to fifty six, but according to others they reached between sixty to one hundred. 71 Regarding al-Khatīb's competence in *hadīth*, Ibn Mākūlā says that al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī is the last outstanding traditionist of Baghdād who had deep knowledge, good memory, proficiency in the hadith of the Prophet and skill in distinguishing the sound *hadith* from the strange or weak one and its *isnāds*. "After al-Dāruqutnī," he says," there was no other traditionist like him in Baghdād." <sup>72</sup>His fame, however, in general is due to his biographical encyclopaedia of more than 7800 scholars and other personalities, including women, who were connected with political and cultural life in Baghdād. His biographical work seems to have been intended as a reference book for traditionists, through which chains of transmitters (isnāds), relations between teachers and pupils, questions on the reliability of a hadith scholar etc., can be ascertained, checked and established. This traditionist tendency can be seen very clearly in the arrangements and contents of the biographies, which are not strictly in alphabetical order. 73The importance of al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī for our discussion lies in his presentation of personalities of various affiliations and expertise who lived and had direct or indirect relations with the caliph al-Qadir. In addition, during his early life, he was a contemporary of al-Qādir and during the reign of his successor al-Qā'im he gave lectures in the mosque of al-Mansūr. Since much of his biographies are quoted by Ibn al-Jawzī and later biographers, the Tārīkh Baghdād constitutes a check and additional information to the Muntazam<sup>74</sup> and also to other biographical works.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 1139: Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 8, 226.

<sup>72</sup> Al-Dhahabī, Tadhkīrāt Ḥuffāz, vol.3, 1137.

 $<sup>^{73}</sup>$  H. Laoust, "al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī," in E.I, new ed., vol. 4, 1111-1112.

<sup>74</sup> Muntazam is not strictly a biographical work which is arranged based on the list of names of important persons who lived and died in certain dates, but it is a mixture

Since the dissertation also discusses the intellectual climate during al-Qādir's reign and its significance for the development of Islamic sciences, tabaqāt (classes) works will be consulted, the most important of which are: Tabaqat al-Ḥanābila of Abū al-Ḥusayn b. Abī Ya°lā b. Muḥammad (d.526/1131) and Dhayl ʿalā Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila of Ibn Rajab ʿAbd al- Raḥmān b. Aḥmad (738/1337-796/1393); Tabaqāt al-Ṣhāfi ʿiyya al-Kubrā of al-Subkī (727/1326-771/1369) and Tabaqāt al-Ṣhāfi ʿiyya of Ibn Shuhba Aḥmad b. Muḥammad (779/1377-852/1448); Tabaqāt al-Ḥanafiyya of al-Tamīmī al-Dārī; Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila of Ibn al-Murtaḍā and Ṭabaqāt Aʿlām al-Shīʿa of Agha Buzurg al-Ṭihrānī. There are other important biographical dictionaries which are worth consulting for they contain ample materials which are not included in the chronicles: Muʿjam al-Udabāʾ of Yāqūt, Ibn Khallikān's Wafayāt al-Aʿyān, al-Ṣafadī's al-Wāfī bi al-Wafayāt and Ibn al-Nadīm's al-Fihrist.

The last type of source materials which need to be consulted are literary (adab) and theological works, of which the most important are Tha alibū's Yatīmat al-Dahr fī Shu'arā ahl al-'Aṣr', al-Tanūkhī's al-Faraj ba da al-Shidda and Nishwār al-Muḥāḍara. These works contain information especially on the socio-economic life of the people of Baghdād during this period. Another works are al-Ṣābī's Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa and Rasā'il al-Ṣābī wa al-Rāḍī which provide information relating to the official ceremonies and etiquettes. While al-Ṣūlī's Kitāb al-Awrāq fī Akhbār al-'Abbās wa Ash'āruhum throws light on the background for the later period of the Buwayhids and the 'Abbāsid caliphate, since al-Ṣūlī's Awrāq ends with the reign of the caliph al-Rāḍī to whom he was attached. And al-Māwardī's al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya and Qawānīn al-Wuzarā' and Abū Ya'lā's al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya provide information on the political theory and organization of the caliphate and 'Abbāsid relations with the Buwayhids. Finally Ibn

between biography and history (chronicle), because besides it is arranged based on year to year events, it also contained obituaries.

Batta's al-lbāna constitutes an important source when we want to look at theoretical and religious basis for the Ḥanbalīs and perhaps for the caliph's religious policy.

# CHAPTER ONE : POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE 'ABBĀSID CALIPHATE

#### CHAPTER ONE:

## POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE 'ABBĀSID CALIPHATE

#### I. Political background

#### A. The condition of the caliphate before the Buwayhid entry to Baghdad

In this section we will discuss the political situation of the caliphate before the coming of the Buwayhids in an attempt to shed light on some of the factors contributing to the decline of the 'Abbāsid caliphate during the fourth/tenth century onwards, especially during the reign of al-Qādir billāh. The decline of the 'Abbāsid empire during the reign of al-Qādir originated from the periods of his predecessors. Consequently, in his reign there appeared no less than twenty dynasties in the eastern and western parts of the Muslim world, some of which were Shī 'ite dynasties.¹ Therefore, before we go further in discussing the 'Abbāsid decline during al-Qādir's reign, we will retrace events back to the time of al-Mutawakkil (232-247/847-861) up to the reign of al-Mustakfī (333-334/932-933), at which date the Buwayhids entered Baghdād and the latter's rule until the death of 'Adud al-Dawla

Ibn Khaldūn and most modern Arab historians maintain that the decline or the disintegration of the 'Abbāsids gathered momentum from the reign of al-Mutawakkil and his murder. From this time onwards the authority of the caliphs began to be undermined by viziers and army commanders, while the domain of the caliphate was increasingly being limited to Baghdād and its close vicinity. In dealing with this issue, we will not discuss events in detail, but refer mainly to the important events in the political life of the empire, namely the caliphs' relations with the viziers and army commanders and rivalries between the caliphs and the latter, as well as between the generals and the amūs, all of which contributed to the decline of the caliphate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> C. E. Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967), vii-ix.

The event of al-Mutawakkil's murder at the hands of his Turkish commanders,2 after he had reigned for fifteen years (232/847-247/861), marked the beginning of the decline of the 'Abbāsid caliphate.3 The murder was ostensibly a result of al-Mutawakkil's anti-Turkish policy: first, he murdered Itakh, the leading Turkish officer, and then he raised a new army consisting of non-Turkish elements in an effort to balance their power. In this situation the Turks found an ally in the heir-apparent, al-Muntasir, whose father was considering removing him from this position in favour of his younger son al-Mu tazz.4 Once the caliphate declined, governors, family members and the pretenders began to undermine the institution so that many riots occurred in Baghdad and new rulers and dynasties emerged in remote districts of the empire. The 'Alids went to various districts and proclaimed their da wa (propaganda). Abū Abdillāh al-Shī'ī, for instance, preached in North Africa in the name of 'Ubaydillah al-Mahdi (297/909), and in Tabaristān there appeared al-Hasan b. Zayd known as al-Dā<sup>c</sup>ī (the Preacher), <sup>5</sup>who occupied the region in 250/864 during the time of al-Mustacin. In Yemen Ibn Tabataba converted people to Zaydite Shī ism and occupied Ṣa da and Ṣan ā and the whole country of Yemen. The Sāmānids took control over Transoxania at the end of 260/873 and the Saffarid dynasty appeared in 253/8686 after taking control of Sistan and Herat in Khurāsān. Similarly the Zanj made their appearance in 255/867,7 and in 254/866 the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa al-Rusul*, edited by Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, vol. 11, ( al-Qāhira: Dār al-Ma'ārif, n.d.), 62-67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh Ibn Khaldūn* [*Kitāb al-'Ibar wa Dīwān al-Mubtadā wa al-Khabar*], vol. 3 (Fez: Muḥammad al-Madhī al-Habābī, 1936), 594; Aḥmad Ramaḍān Aḥmad, *Hadārat al-Dawla al-'Abbāsiyya* (Baghdād: al-Jihāz al-Markazī li al-Kutub al-Jāmi'iyya wa al-Madrasiyya wa al-Wasā'il al-Ta'līmiyya, 1978), 61; Muḥammad al-Khuḍrī Bek, *al-Dawla al-'Abbāsiyya* (Beirūt: Dār al-Qalam, 1986), 302-303; Aḥmad Mukhtār al-'Ibādī, *Fī Tārīkh al-'Abbāsī wa al-Fāṭimī* (Beirūt: Dār al-Nahḍat al-'Arabiyya, 1971), 124; Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, *Tārīkh al-Islām al-Siyāsī wa al-Dīnī wa al-Thaqātī wa al-Ijtimā'ī*, vol. 3, (Beirūt: Dār al-Jayl, 1991), 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Suyūtī, *Tārīkh al-Khulafā* (Beirūt: Dār al-Qalam, 1986), 395; Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates* (New York: Longman, 1988), 169-170.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, 9, 271-277.

<sup>6</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh, vol. 7 (Beirūt: Dār Sādir, 1966), 338-339.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 9, 410.

Tūlūnid dynasty emerged,8coming to occupy Syria by the end of 276/877 and annexing it to Egypt. The Qarmatians began to appear in 276/889, and in 286/899 their power had grown to the extent that they were to take Baḥrayn.9 On the other hand, the western Maghrib and Andalus had already been cut off from the 'Abbāsid empire several decades earlier.10

The murder of al-Mutawakkil, which was the first peacetime assassination of an 'Abbāsid caliph, was much more than simple murder. Rather, it was the beginning of a trend that would see the eventual decline of the caliphate and a rise in the power of the non-Arab elements in the army. The army commanders confiscated gradually all powers of the caliph, so that nothing remained in his hands except for the right to have his name struck on the coins and mentioned in the *khutbas*; even the latter honour they shared with the caliph. The Turkish or Daylamite army commander was able to appoint and depose the caliph as he liked, even kill him, <sup>11</sup> as in the case of al-Mutawakkil.

The domination of the army commanders over the caliphs, however, did not occur as soon as al-Mutawakkil died. Some of his successors still maintained most of their authority in their rivalry with the leaders of the army. Quite often this rivalry ended with the murder of the caliphs; for example, al-Muntaṣir (247-248/861-862)was poisoned before he had reigned for six months<sup>12</sup> because immediately on taking office he had began to blame the Turks for the assassination of previous caliphs.<sup>13</sup> Al-Musta<sup>c</sup>in (248-252/862-866) was slain after his exile on the orders of the caliph al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tazz (252-255/866-869), following the civil war between the two: the former holding power in Baghdād and the latter in Sāmarrā<sup>a</sup>. The civil war lasted for months, causing much loss

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 187.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ibid., 440

Hasan Munaymanah, Tārīkh al-Dawla al-Buwayhiyya al-Siyāsī wa al-Iqtisādī wa al-Ijtimā'ī wa al-Thaqāfī - Muqāţa'at Fāris (n.p.: al-'Alam al-Jāmi'iyya, 1987), 47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>12</sup> Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 403.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Ibid., 403-404.

of life, increase in prices and spread of plague, so that both parties agreed to make peace. Nevertheless, al-Musta in was forced to abdicate. 14 Al-Mu tazz later died of thirst after being exposed to the sun for a whole day in a very hot summer, because he had shown his aversion towards the Turks and had failed to meet their demands to provide them some amount of money for assassinating Salih b. Wasif<sup>15</sup> whom the caliph feared. Al-Muhtadī (255-6/869-70) was killed during a battle between the soldiers who supported the caliph, consisting of Farghanians, North Africans and the Turkish soldiers who rebelled against him.<sup>17</sup> Al-Muhtadī reigned only eleven months and though a pious, brave, strong, just caliph, he unfortunately had no supporters. 18 Both he and al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tazz were among the caliphs who showed courage and determination in their efforts to restore the caliphate. 19 They could not be called "puppet rulers," no more than could some of their successors such as al-Muwaffaq and al-Muctadid (278/891-289/902). The former was well-known for his tireless campaigns against the Zanj until they were crushed in 270/883, putting an end to ten years of trouble for the caliphate. While al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tadid was for his part called al-Saffāh al-Thānī (the second al-Saffāh)<sup>20</sup> because he tried to revive the 'Abbāsid caliphate, 21 taking inspiration from the caliph al-'Abbās al-Saffāḥ, the founder of the 'Abbasid dynasty. He was the only 'Abbasid caliph who spent most of his time in campaigns. On the caliph al-Mu tadid, Kennedy says, "He was also a skillful diplomat, always prepared to make compromises with those who were too powerful to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Ibid., 405-406.

<sup>15</sup> Sālih b. Waṣīf was a Turkish military leader who, along with Bāyikbak, took control of the caliphate of Sāmarrā' in 244/869 after the assassination of his father, Waṣīf, in 253/867. Kennedy, *Prophet*, 174.

<sup>16</sup> Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 407-408.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ibid., 411.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ibid., 404-405.

<sup>19</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 172.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Saffāḥ from Arabic word safaḥa yasfaḥu safh, meaning to shed, spell out, pour out. So al-Saffāḥ means the shedder of blood, killer or murder. Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, edited by J. Milton Cowan (Beirūt: Librarie du Liban, 1980), 412.

<sup>21</sup> Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 420.

defeat." 22 Due to al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tadid's effective rule and successful campaigning, at the death of his successor al-Muktafi in 295/908, the 'Abbasid caliphate reached the peak of its revival. Syria and Egypt were subjugated, "the treasury was full and the caliph left 15 million dinārs. The army seems to have been effective and firmly under the control of the caliph and his civilian administrators."23 His dignity, his stature among the people and the harsh measures he employed rendered the city of Baghdad peaceful.<sup>24</sup>In addition, al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tadid's great strengths were his close relations with the army which he had inherited from his father and the harmony existing between civil and military leaders, assets which he was determined to use in reasserting the power of the 'Abbāsid family.25During al-Muktafi's reign (289-295/902-908) his commander Muhammad b. Sulaymān was successful in crushing the Qarmatians who rebelled in southern 'Irāq and some districts in Syria, led by Yaḥyā b. Zikrawayh. The latter was killed in 290/902, and his brother al-Husayn who succeeded him was also killed in 291/903. Muhammad b. Sulaymān also put an end to the Ṭūlūnids in Egypt in 292/904.26 Following al-Muktafī's death, the caliphate once again began to decline because his successors did not inherit his power, courage and statesmanship nor those qualities possessed by al-Mu<sup>s</sup>tadid. Therefore, according to Hamzah al-Isfahānī, the phase of the 'Abbāsids' sharp decline began thirteen years after the caliphate of al-Muqtadir, namely at the end of 308/920.27 At this time there began to occur many problems and upheavals in their courts, so that their dignity faded before the army and their subjects; furthermore, their treasuries were empty as was the public treasury. These troublesome events lasted for twenty-five years.

<sup>22</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 183

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Ibid., 187.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Suyūṭī, *Tārīkh*, 420.

 $<sup>^{25}</sup>$  Kennedy, "Mu tadid," in  $\emph{E.I.}$  , new ed., vol. 7, 760.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Hasan, Tārīkh, vol. 3, 25; Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 428.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> We have already mentioned that the momentum of decline started from the death of al-Mutawakkil; from this time onwards the 'Abbāsids gradually declined. But the sharp decline, as maintained by Hamzah al-Isfahānī, happened after al-Mu'tadid, because there were no more powerful rulers of the 'Abbāsids, who were not dominated by courtiers, viziers, army commanders or amīr al-umarā'.

During this period, the caliphs were in the grip of the viziers or the army commanders for their rise to power or their deposition since there were no caliphs powerful enough to rid themselves from the tutelage of the army commanders or viziers. In addition, the emptiness of the royal treasury rendered the caliphs powerless. The caliphs who held power during this critical period were: al-Muqtadir billāh (295-320/907-932), al-Qāhir billāh (320-323/932-933), al-Rāḍī billāh (322-329/933-940), al-Muttaqī lillāh (329-332/940-944), al-Mustakfī billāh (333-334/944-945).

In order to have sufficient freedom to control the affairs of the empire, the basic policy adopted by the army, viziers and courtiers who held the power of appointing the caliphs, was to keep the latter weak.<sup>28</sup> Based on this principle, al-Muqtadir was appointed when he was only about eleven years old. His appointment was proposed by Abū al-Ḥasan Ibn al-Furāt, the secretary who later became vizier, to the vizier Abū Aḥmad al-ʿAbbās b. al-Ḥasan.<sup>29</sup> This was so unusual that the *qāḍī* Aḥmad b. Yaʿqūb was in fact slain because he refused to swear allegiance to al-Muqtadir, maintaining that he was a child and the swearing an oath of allegiance to him was not allowed.<sup>30</sup>

It was al-Muqtadir's mother, a slave from Greece, who in reality exercised the power of the caliphate. It was she who took control and stood against any intervention of the people into the caliph's affairs. In addition, she spent lavishly from the state treasury for the expenditures of expensive caliphal households, thousands of slave girls and eunuchs. Al-Muqtadir is said to have had about eleven thousand eunuchs, mainly Sicilians, Greeks and Blacks. The internal rivalry among the 'Abbāsid family brought about al-Muqtadir's deposition twice during his reign, which lasted for twenty four years

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> In the sense that the caliph were still too young or mature but had no personal ability so that they depended on other person: a vizier or other member of the family, and in several cases the mothers of the caliphs held the power.

Miskawayh, Tajārib al-Umam, taṣḥīḥ H. F. Amerdroz, vol. 1 (Miṣr: Shirkat al-Tamaddun al-Ṣinā°iyya, 1914), 2-3; Adam Mez, The Renaissance of Islam, trans. Salahuddin Khuda Bukhsh and D. S. Margoliouth (London: Luzac & Co, 1937), 33.

<sup>30 &#</sup>x27;Arīb b. Sa'īd al-Qurtubī, Silat Tārīkh al-Tabarī (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1897),20.

<sup>31</sup> Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 437.

and two months. First, he was deposed after he had reigned for only four months following the murder of al-'Abbās b. al-Ḥasan the vizier and Fātik, the client of al-Mu'taḍid. Then Ibn al-Mu'tazz was appointed caliph, but his reign only lasted for a day because al-Muqtadir was returned to his throne and Ibn al-Mu'tazz was slain in 296/908.<sup>32</sup>The second deposition occurred after he had been in power for twenty years and his brother Muḥammad b. al-Mu'taḍid was raised to power and given the title al-Qāhir billāh in 317/929. This happened on a Saturday in Muḥarram, but on the Monday the army reversed its decision and restored al-Muqtadir<sup>33</sup> because Nāzūk, the head of police who became the chief leader of the rebels, could not satisfy the demands of the troops for ascension-money and their pay.<sup>34</sup>

Al-Muqtadir allowed himself to be dominated sometimes by courtiers, and sometimes by viziers. His caliphate showed therefore a gradual decline. Two Shī te dynasties emerged during his reign: the Fāṭimids and Hamdānids. In addition, the Qarmaṭians under the leadership of Abū Ṭāhir Sulaymān al-Jannābī resumed their activity, plundering Baṣra in the years 307/919-20 and 311/923. Furthermore, al-Muqtadir's reign was also marked by extravagant expenditure by the court establishment and military, causing bankruptcy of the treasury. His heavy expenditure are coupled with his practice of confiscating his vizier's properties once he had them deposed by

<sup>32</sup>Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam fī Tārikh al-Mulūk wa al-Umam, vol. 6 (Heiderabad: Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-Uthmāniyya, 1349H/1940), 69; Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 6-8; Suyūtī, Tārīkh 431-434; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 296-297.

 $<sup>^{33}</sup>$  Ibn al-Jawzī,  $\it al-Muntazam$ , vol. 1, 195; Miskawayh,  $\it Taj\bar arib$ , vol. 1, 198-199; Suyūtī,  $\it T\bar arikh$ , 436.

<sup>34</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 195.

<sup>35</sup> K.V. Zettersteen, "al-Muktadir, " in E.I., new ed. vol. 4, 542.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.; Kennedy, Prophet, 190.

<sup>37</sup> Al-Muqtadir spent about seventy-two million dīnārs or 2, 880, 000 dīnārs annually for twenty-five years of his reign. His palaces were luxuriously embellished, their curtains amounted to 830, 000 pieces of fine silk with gold embroidery and 620, 000 pieces of carpet of different kinds and from different countries. He had five hundred horses along with saddles made of gold and silver; about seven hundred chamberlains and seven thousand slaves, three thousand of whom were white slaves and four thousand were Blacks (al-Khātib al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, vol. 7, 52-53); see also A.A. Duri, Tārīkh al-Irāq al-Iqtisādī (Baghdād: Matba°at al-Ma°ārif, 1942), 267.

collaborating with the courtiers and the aspirant to the office of vizierate, who promised the caliph an increase of revenue and seizure of a huge sum from the present vizier.<sup>38</sup>

When Mu'nis al-Muzaffar (commander of the army) went to Mawsil occupying the area and defeating Banū Ḥamdān, his enemies took advantage to eliminate him, telling the caliph that Mu'nis intended to depose him. 39On the other hand, one of the caliph's servant told Mu'nis that the caliph had made a trap (by digging several holes) in his palace in an attempt to kill him. 40 The enmity between both developed to the point that Mu'nis marched to Baghdād at the head of his army. Al-Muqtadir was persuaded to take the field against him. He first refused to join his army and his mother begged him not to go into battle, but his commanders insisted that he lead them onto the field. He was killed at the first encounter in Shawwāl 320/31 October 932.41

After the death of Muqtadir, Mu'nis was inclined to appoint Muqtadir's son Abū al-'Abbās, <sup>42</sup> but his commanders did not agree with his choice on the consideration that he might be able to assert himself. <sup>43</sup> They then chose Muḥammad b. al-Mu'tadid. First Mu'nis bitterly rejected their choice, for he hated the former, but his commanders assured him that he was supposed to be weak. <sup>44</sup> Finally Mu'nis gave his consent and Muḥammad b. Mu'tadid billāh was appointed caliph with the title of al-Qāhir billāh in 320/932. However, as soon as al-Qāhir ascended to the throne he tried to reinforce his authority and succeeded in thwarting the plan of the chamberlain, Ibn Yalbak, and Mu'nis to depose him. Both were arrested and then slain in the presence of the caliph in 321/933, while the vizier, Ibn Muqlā took flight. <sup>45</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 191.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> K.V. Zettersteen, "al-Muktadir," in E.I, new ed., vol. 4, 542.

<sup>40</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, a 1-Kāmil, vol.8, 169.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 170; Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 1, 196.

<sup>42</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 241.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Ibid., 242.

<sup>44</sup> Qurtubi, Silat Tārīkh, 320.

<sup>45</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 1, 267-268.

The new caliph was known for his ruthlessness and addiction to drinking.<sup>46</sup> He did not hesitate to torture even the closest courtiers and shed their blood in the most cruel way. He seized Muqtadir's mother and tortured her himself till she died. He showed no gratitude for the kindness she had done to him when he had himself been seized by al-Muqtadir.<sup>47</sup> In 321/923 he arrested Abū Aḥmad b. al-Muktafī and had him plastered between two walls while he was still alive.<sup>48</sup>In 322/933 he killed Isḥāq b. Ismāʿīl al-Nawbakhtī, a courtier of the previous caliph, by plunging him into a well. <sup>49</sup>

The cruelty of the caliph incited great fear among his commanders. Added to this, there was a rumour that the caliph had placed underground traps in his house in an attempt to kill the leaders of the army. 50 The troops of the Sājiyya and the Ḥujriyya were then stirred up to rise against the caliph and succeeded in arresting him and imprisoning him in 322/933. They then appointed the son of al-Muqtadir and gave him the title of al-Rāḍī billāh (322-329/933-939). When al-Qāhir refused to abdicate he was blinded with the agreement of the then caliph al-Rāḍī billāh. 51

The administration of the caliphate was run by his viziers (five in number), who took office one after the other during al-Rāḍī's six year reign. Ibn Muqlā was the first who held the office and the last was Sulaymān b. al-Ḥasan b. Makhlad. None of the viziers, however, was able to resolve the financial difficulties which were faced by the caliphate. This problem was aggravated by increasing internal rivalries between the leaders of the army, the viziers and the amūrs. With the hope of resolving the political and economic problem, al-Rāḍī appointed Ibn Rā'iq, the governor of Wāsiṭ and Baṣra in 324/935, amūral-umarā' with leadership of the army and the responsibility of collecting

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 269; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil., vol. 8, 287; Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 386.

<sup>47</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 242; Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 439.

<sup>48</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 242, 266; Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 439.

<sup>49</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 285; Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 440

<sup>50</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 289; Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 440; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol.8, 280-281.

<sup>51</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 1, 291-292; Suyūtī, *Tārīkh*, 441.

taxes, overseeing state lands and maintaining public security in all the regions under the control of the 'Abbāsids. In addition, he was given the responsibility of administering the empire and was permitted to have his name mentioned in the *khuṭba* throughout the empire. From this time onwards the function of the vizierate was annulled, so that a vizier no longer exercised any power over the districts and *dawāwīn* or other governmental offices, except in name only. Ibn Rā'iq and his secretary held the real power and this was also the case with the successors of Ibn Rā'iq, so that the revenues of the districts found their way into the treasury of the *amīrs*, who spent them as they liked. They likewise controlled the expenses of the caliph, and did away with the public treasury. St

Most chroniclers describe the disintegration of the Muslim empire as reaching its height during the reign of al-Rāḍī, when Wāsiṭ, Baṣra and Ahwāz were in the hands of the Barīdīs, Fārs in those of 'Alī b. Buwayh and Kirmān was held by Abū 'Alī b. Ilyās, and Rayy, Iṣfahān and Jibāl ruled by Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan b. Buwayh and Wumshukir b. Ziyār, who were competing with each other. Mawṣil, Diyār Rabī and Diyār Bakr were, furthermore, in the hands of the Ḥamdānids; Egypt and Syria were in the hands of Muḥammad b. Ṭughj; Khurāsān was under the control of the Sāmānids; Ṭabaristān and Jurjān were in the hands of the Daylamites, while Yamāma and Baḥrayn were held by Abū Ṭāhir al-Jannābī. What remained in the hand of the caliph al-Rāḍī and his amīr al-umarā 'Ibn Rā'iq was Baghdād and some of the Sawād.55

<sup>52</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 135; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 322-323; Suyūţī, Tārīkh, 446.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Miskawayh's statement does not mean that the office was annulled, but perhaps he means that the effective authority of the vizier had been lost.

<sup>54</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 352; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 323.

<sup>55</sup> Hamdhānī, Takmilat Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī (Beirūt: al-Maṭba°a al-Kāthūlikiyya, n. d.), 101; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.6, 288; Ibn Ṭiqṭaqā, al-Fakhrī on the System of the Government and the Moslem Dynasties, trans. C. E. Whitting (London: Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1974), 381; Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 366; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 323.

The successors of al-Rādī never retained any caliphal power. Al-Muttaqī billāh Abū Ishāq b. al-Muqtadir (329-333/940-944) was a pious caliph who spent his time in prayers and fasting and avoided wine, but he was dominated by his military commanders. The vizier acted as one of the governors exercising power on their behalf, while the real power was exercised by the amirs' secretaries. 56 According to Kennedy, al-Muttaqī seems to have been more powerful than al-Rādī in his efforts to reestablish the caliph's power, and after the murder of Bajkam<sup>57</sup> by Kurds in 329/941, he tried to reinstate the vizierate to its old ways and to suspend the office of the amīr al-umarā altogether, but the undertaking fell short and the military soon regained control.<sup>58</sup> He was the first caliph who left Baghdad twice to take refuge for his safety: first to Nasir al-Dawla<sup>59</sup>, the governor of Mawsil, when there was news that Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Barīdī,<sup>60</sup> with his Turkish and Daylamite troops, was marching on Baghdad in 330/941-2; and second, when there was conflict between him and the amīr al-umarā 'Tūzūn in 332/943- Al-Muttaqi selected Ibn Ḥamdān (Nāṣir al-Dawla) to fight Tūzūn, but when the latter succeeded in defeating Ibn Hamdan, the caliph together with Ibn Hamdan fled to Niṣībīn.<sup>61</sup>The caliph effected a reconciliation with Tūzūn, but then asked Muḥammad b. Tughj (the Ikhshīdid), the ruler of Egypt, to see him. The latter met the caliph in Raqqa and encouraged him to reside in Egypt, but he refused. 62 When he returned to Baghdad, relying upon the covenants promised by Tüzün, the latter betrayed him for the sake of

<sup>56</sup> Suyūtī, *Tārīkh*, 385; Ibid., 449; Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīkh*, vol. 3, 871.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Bajkam was appointed amīr al-umarā' (326-9/938-41) by al-Rādī when he entered Baghdād and defeated Ibn Rā'iq who then took into hiding. Suyūṭī, *Tārikh*, 447.

<sup>58</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 198.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> He was Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. 'Abdillāh, a prince of the Ḥamdānid dynasty, who succeeded his father Abū al-Ḥaydja 'Abd Allāh in the governorship of Mawṣil on the latter's death in 317/929 and held the leadership of the Ḥamdānid family. (H. Bowen, "Nāṣir al-Dawla," in E.I., new ed. vol. 7, 994.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> The Barīdī (postmaster) family were the tax-farmers in southern Iraq around Başra and in Ahwāz, who were able to recruit an army and established themselves rulers of these regions. (Kennedy, *Prophet*, 195).

 $<sup>^{61}</sup>$  Suyūtī,  $T\bar{a}r\bar{\imath}kh$ , 450-451; Miskawayh,  $Taj\bar{a}rib$ , vol. 2, 25, 47-50; Ibn al-Athīr, al- $K\bar{a}mil$ , vol. 8, 380,383, 406.

<sup>62</sup> Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 451.

the sum of 800 *dīnārs* offered by one who sought the throne for himself. Tūzūn therefore seized al-Muttaqī and deposed him,<sup>63</sup>after first blinding him. Tūzūn then presented Abū al-Qāsim 'Abdullāh b. al-Muktafī with the caliphal office that he had purchased and gave him the title of al-Mustakfī billāh.<sup>64</sup>

Al-Mustakfī (333-334/944-945) did not retain the caliphate and brought disgrace upon it through his involvement in the plot against al-Muttaqī. Nor did he gain any benefit from this intrigue, because his housekeeper " 'Alam," or Ḥusn al-Shīrāziyya, administered the affairs of the caliphate. He did not hold power for long because the Buwayhids soon entered Baghdād in 334/945, seizing all that the caliphate still possessed and forcing the caliph himself to become a mere official with a limited monthly allowance. Soon Ahmad b. Buwayh, who took the title Mu'izz al-Dawla, accused al-Mustakfī and his housekeeper of plotting to exile the *amīr* and to seize a Shī'ite leader. He was then deposed and blinded by Mu'izz al-Dawla. When al-Qāhir heard of his being blinded, he said." We were already two (who suffered from blindness) and we needed the third." The third one happened to al-Mustakfī.65

From what has been explained above that among the five caliphs, who ruled during this period of decline only al-Muqtadir who was able to rule quite long, i.e. twenty-five years, while none of his successors reigned more than seven years. Al-Muqtadir's long reign may have been due to the fact that the state treasury still supplied enough money to satisfy the army before it came to bankruptcy at the end of his reign due to lavish expenditure, while his successors were left with a state treasury empty since the beginning of their reign. Since they failed to satisfy the army, they were dominated by the viziers or amūrs. The real holders of the caliphate were either viziers or amūrs, while the caliphs had no freedom to administer the caliphate. Even the viziers and

<sup>63</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol.2, 72-75; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 418; Ibn al-Jawzī, al- Muntazam, vol. 6, 338.

<sup>64</sup> Suyūtī, Tārīkh, 451.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 452.

amīrs competed with each other for seizing the reins of the caliphate. The financial crisis due to the emptiness of the state treasury and rivalry between the viziers and amīrs contributed to the increasing decline of the caliphate.

The decline of the caliphate can also be traced back to the policy of al-Mu tasim in regard to military institutions. He recognized the gap which had been left by the civil war between al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn, which ended by benefiting the Khurāsānian army, and began to feel the pressure of this power upon the centre of the caliphate. Therefore, he decided to create a new army whose loyalty could be guaranteed and protected from internal rivalries. 66 He took two measures which were to prove very significant. First, he prevented people of Arab origin from joining the army and becoming voluntary soldiers, causing the Arabs to join rebellious movements such as the Qarmatians, and to the formation of bands of plunderers and looters. Some would fight under the banners of local amirs bringing about increasing disturbance and anarchy which prevailed in the fourth century of Islam. The second measure put forward by al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tasim was his initiative to build an army of Turkish slaves to replace his Khurāsānian mercenaries, since he felt he needed protection by soldiers who would loyally dedicate themselves to his service.<sup>67</sup> To achieve this he had to acquire these slaves while they were still boys, and to choose them on the basis of their military skill and moral qualities.68 The constitution of this army was the main cause of the transfer of the capital to Sāmarrā<sup>3</sup> in 286/836.69

The early 'Abbāsid caliphs had chosen Khurāsānians as their commanders because they had adopted novel military techniques, unlike their Arab counterparts who

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> In fact, these slave soldiers whose numbers grew rapidly to several tens of thousands (20.000 or 70.000 according to estimates of Arabic writers), could not rid themselves from partisan struggles; their appearance, though it brought about profound changes in the functioning of the political regime, did not make the caliphate any more stable (See D. Sourdel, "Ghulām," in *E.I.*, new ed. vol. 6, 1080.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.; Munaymanah, Tārīkh, 59.

<sup>69</sup> Sourdel," Ghulām," in *E.I.*, new ed., vol. 2, 1078.

relied essentially on individual skill and were unfamiliar with heavy armaments and siege warfare. The Khurāsānians were more skillful than the Arabs in using bows of any size, and were expert in mining techniques and the use of artillery and naphtha (Greek fire). Likewise, al-Muctaṣim's choice of the Turks was for technical reasons, because the Turks excelled all others in their endurance, patience, discipline and ability in archery (rapid shooting from horseback in all directions) and they were above all the best horsemen.<sup>70</sup>

At the beginning the caliph benefited from the military excellence of the Turks, and he succeeded in several campaigns against the enemies of the caliphate: the 'Alid pretenders, the Khurrāmiyya, the Zutt and the Byzantines<sup>71</sup> and more importantly against the Zanj. <sup>72</sup>However, after some of the Turkish commanders came to occupy important posts within the caliphate, they in turn, worked to its disadvantage and downfall, since their loyalty to their new leader was of short duration. <sup>73</sup>

Once more the caliphs tried to introduce a balance into the army to prevent the Turks from taking control, and the rivalries among the Turks encouraged them to look for support from other forces. As a result, the Kurdish Daylamites joined the army, which only resulted in an increase in political rivalries and the prevalence of anarchy and disturbance. Racial differences along with languages and technical differences prevented them from mingling easily together and caused disorder because they envied

<sup>70</sup> Cl. Cahen, L'Islam: des origines au debut de l'empire Ottoman ([Paris]: Bardas, 1970), 143; Jāḥiz, "Manāqib al-Turk," in Rasā'il al-Jāḥiz, 46. Al-Jāḥiz in this book by quoting many authorities enumerates the excellence of the Turks in archery, horse riding, endurance and discipline, familiarity with animal raising etc. In one passage he says, "The Turks are a race who are not accustomed with flattery, charm, hypocricy, slander, pride over the rulers, injustice towards their friends, nor are they familiar with innovation, neither are they damaged by the climates ... The Turks, however, have their vices: they keep longing for their countries, love traveling in the countries, wars and plunder and were too much associated with their traditions." Idem, 63.

<sup>71</sup> C.E.Bosworth, "Al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tasim," in E.I., new ed., vol.7, 776.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Sourdel, "Ghulām, " in *E.I.*, new ed., vol. 6, 1078.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

each other, brawling over their share of the state revenues, leading to the disagreement of their leaders. 75

The decline of the caliphate also went hand in hand with the decline of the function of the vizierate. The post of vizierate declined as surely as did the caliphate, and was in its worst ever state before the arrival of the Buwayhids. With the appointment of Ibn Rā'iq as amīr al-umarā' by the caliphal-Rāḍī, and the responsibility given him to run the empire, the importance of the vizierate was lost; its powers were transmitted to the office of the secretary of the amīr al-umarā' in 324/935, about two years before the Buwayhids took control over Fārs. Ten years later the Buwayhids entered Baghdād and took the reins of the caliphate so that the significance of the vizierate was lost completely, and the caliph from then on had only a secretary. At the same time, a new and powerful vizierate emerged, namely the vizierate of the Buwayhids, an office which had no theoretical relation with the caliphate. <sup>76</sup>

Before this time, the vizierate had already expanded as far as it could and reached its peak of independence [from the caliph's control] due to the power it had attained and its attempt to overcome factors which would lead to decline. Its success was also due to the weakness of the power of the caliph. In addition, the power of the army was being challenged by those caliphs who possessed strong personalities. Ultimately, however, to satisfy the army an effective office was needed, on condition that this office had to be much less connected with the caliph. Based on this policy, the vizier became the direct and real head of the whole administration; he was originally to serve as a special assistant to the caliph in his public affairs. Because of this, the vizier was never chosen from the courtiers of the *amīr* or among his friends but from the patrician *kuttāb* (secretaries).<sup>77</sup> But during the period of decline, money or wealth was a main source

<sup>75</sup> Cahen, "Djaysh," in E.I., new ed., vol. 2, 506.

<sup>76</sup> Munaymanah, Tārīkh, 53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Ibid.; Cahen, *Islam*, 150.

behind any appointment or deposition of viziers, a tendency that was evident from the reign of al-Muqtadir onwards.

Thus, in the period before the coming of the Buwayhids, the 'Abbāsid caliphate had reached its lowest ebb. The caliph himself was powerless to stop this gradual process. Internal anarchy prevailed and independence movements spread in all districts of the empire; nor was there anyone to stand up to the threat of the Byzantines. All this brought about a wave of inflation of prices and a decline of the economic conditions, so that once again it was the common people who suffered from this terrible situation. <sup>78</sup>

From the above remarks we can infer that the introduction of the Turkish soldiers into the 'Abbāsid caliphate during the reign of al-Mu'taşim brought great disaster upon the caliphate because they, in turn, wrested control from the caliphs themselves. Added to this were the following factors: the emptiness of the state treasury due to a decrease of the 'Abbāsid domains, the extravagances of some caliphs, the huge expenditure for the large army, rivalries between the caliphs and the claimants to the succession, rivalries between the competing caliphs, the army commanders and viziers. There were other causes that derived from the caliphs themselves: some of the caliphs had little concern for politics, preferring to spend time in leisure; some of them were extravagant, while others were ruthless. The exceptions were al-Mu'tadid, al-Muwaffaq and al-Muktafī, who had personal power, independence, courage, dedication and political prowess, but none of them was able to arrest the decline of the institution of the caliphate itself.

### B. The Buwayhid ascendancy up to the time of Bahā' al-Dawla

One of the factors which facilitated the Buwayhids' seizure of power was the fact that the 'Abbāsid caliphate failed to recruit and pay a reliable standing army during the first half of the fourth/tenth century. This led to a political vacuum," filled by the warlike peoples of the mountainous areas, mostly newly converted to Islam, notably the Kurds

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Munaymanah, *Tārīkh*, 80.

of the Zagros mountains and the people of the northern Iranian provinces of Gīlān and Daylam, usually grouped together under the name of Daylamites." <sup>79</sup>It was from these latter that there emerged the most famous ruling family of the period, the Buwayhids. They originated from the region of Gīlān or Jīlān, located on the south-west shores of the Caspian Sea, of which Daylam was the mountainous hinterland. The hills and valleys of this district were inhabited by belligerent peasants, cut off by mountains from the Iranian plateau and even from their close neighbours. In pre-Islamic times they had served as mercenaries for the Iranian kings but the latter had never succeeded in subjugating them. The area had been little influenced by the coming of Islam, and its inhabitants never effectively subjugated by the Arabs either, so that no Arab settlers ever lived there.<sup>80</sup>

The Daylamites possessed two characteristics which distinguished them from others and fitted them for their future role in the Islamic world. The first was their skill as infantry, as tough and fearsome as the Turkish cavalry, "but with quite a different fighting technique." BIThough possessed of military prowess, a Daylamite army alone was not really sufficient because they had to look for confederates, mostly the Turks, or sometimes Kurds, who could supply "the cavalry to make a balanced fighting unit." BIThe second characteristic was the importance of kinship. The Daylamites demonstrated solid family loyalties, but this does not mean that they were never involved in disputes within their kinship; indeed their leaders, "tended to think in terms of family rather than in terms of more abstract ideas of state of the Muslim community." Consequently, matrimonial ties were an important way of strengthening alliances, and links through the female line were more significant there than in much of Islamic society. As Kennedy

<sup>79</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 212.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 213

noted, "this was especially true in the Būyid kingdom of Rayy, where traditional Daylamite customs seem to have been less affected by Islamic norms than in Fārs or 'Irāq." 84

At the beginning of the third/ninth century, members of the 'Alid family had taken refuge among the Daylamite people and in the latter half of the century two Zaydite imāms succeeded in establishing independent dynasties in the neigbouring province of Țabaristān, converting in the process some of the people of Țabaristān, Daylam and Jīlān to the Zaydite form of Shī ism. The two Imams were Ḥasan b. Zayd, who established himself in Tabaristan in 250/864, and his brother Muhammad b. Zayd, who later succeeded him. Another Zaydite Imām, Hasan b. 'Alī al-Uţrūsh (the deaf), occupied Tabaristān in 301/922.85 After the death of al-Utrūsh, civil war broke out between his son, Abū al-Qāsim Ja<sup>e</sup>far b. al-Uṭrūsh, and his son in-law, al-Ḥasan b.Qāsim b. al-Hasan b. Zayd, the late Utrush's general. This rivalry paved the way for a number of Daylamite and Jīlānī adventurers to reach prominent posts as military leaders. Among these were Mākān b. Kākī, who began his career by joining the army of al-Utrūsh, and Asfār b. Shīrūyah and Mardāwīj b Ziyār, both of whom distinguished themselves in the service of the Sāmānids of Khurāsān and Transoxania. It was as fighters in the army of Mākān b. Kākī that the brothers 'Alī and Ḥasan, the sons of Abū Shujā' Buwayh first made their appearance on the historical scene.86 From the struggle for supremacy between these three adventurers, Mardāwīj emerged victorious, Asfar was killed, and Mākān, in spite of the fact that he was backed by the Sāmānids, was defeated and driven out of Tabaristan. On the defeat of Makan at the hands of Mardawij, the Buwayhid brothers 'Alī b. Būya and his two younger siblings Ḥasan and Aḥmad, who had till then

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> R. Strothmann, "Utrush," in E.I., 1st ed., vol. 8, 1060; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 81

<sup>86</sup> Mafizullah Kabir, The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdād (334/946-442/1055), 2.

been in his service, now sought his permission to join Mardāwij's rank; this was their first step towards prominence.<sup>87</sup>

After the Buwayhid brothers entered his service, the eldest, 'Alī, was appointed by Mardāwīj as governor of Karaj (in Jibal),88 where he had the opportunity to recruit followers and lead them for his own purposes. His increasing popularity and power soon led him into conflict with Mardāwīj and so therefore in 320/932 he moved southward with 400 Daylamite followers to Fārs. By defeating the 'Abbāsid governor of Fārs in 332/943 he won possession of the province.89

Having established his power within Fārs, 'Alī planned to consolidate his position to expand his authority in the broader Islamic world. His first priority was to win legitimacy for his actions from the 'Abbāsid caliph, and he was successful in this respect "by promising the 'Abbāsid envoy tribute which was never in fact paid."90He was also concerned with the province of Kirmān, on the eastern frontier of Fārs, which was fought over by the Sāmānids of Khurāsān and a local adventurer, Muḥammad b. Ilyās. 'Alī asked his younger brother Aḥmad to try to take control of the area and sent him with a small force of Daylamites and Turks, but he could not subjugate the people of the Qufs and Baluch hills in the south-east of the province. The Buwayhids were not to take over the area until fourteen years later. 91

The death of Mardāwīj in 323/935 at the hands of the Turks facilitated 'Alī b. Būya's attempt to take control of Fārs and become the most powerful and successful Daylamite chief, and even a considerable number of Mardāwīj's soldiers joined his army. The political instability caused by the death of Mardāwīj was taken advantage of by Ḥasan b. Būya, 'Alī's brother, who managed to establish himself as ruler of central Iran,

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol.1, 275-277.

<sup>88</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 277.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 295-296; 297-8; Kennedy, *Prophet*, 213.

<sup>90</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 215.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

(the region from Rayy to Isfahān) in 335/946. Ahmad, the third brother focused his attention on 'Irāq after his failure to take control of Kirmān.<sup>92</sup>

The political breakdown of the 'Abbasids and the contest between military commanders for the title of amīr al-umarā meant that the Buwayhids no longer faced any united or strong opposition. This provided a golden opportunity for Ahmad. In addition, Ahmad's hopes were stimulated by the Barīdīs, the powerful tax-farmers in southern 'Iraq, who were trying to get rid of the caliphate. In 332/943 Ahmad tried to take Baghdād for the first time but was defeated by the Turkish amīr al-umarā', Tūzūn. A year and a half later, however, Tūzūn died (334/945) and his secretary Ibn Shirzād was at pains to invoke his authority as vizier. 93 It was Yinal Kusha, the governor of Wāsit, who joined the Buwayhids and invited Ahmad to Baghdād to replace Ibn Shirzād. Ahmad easily occupied the city with his forces and was accepted by the caliph al-Mustakfī as amīr al-umarā in 334/945. The caliph conferred on Ahmad the title of Mu'izz al-Dawla and the titles of 'Imād al-Dawla and Rukn al-Dawla respectively on Alī and Hasan. He further permitted all of them to include these titles and their kunyas on the coinage.94Kennedy says, "By 335/946 the three sons of Būya had established themselves in effective control of Fars, 'Iraq and Rayy, and their descendants were able to maintain themselves in most of those areas until the coming of the Seljuqs, a century later."95

About eleven days after the arrival of the Buwayhids in Baghdād, the caliph al-Mustakfī was deposed by Mu'izz al-Dawla. The reason for the latter's action, according to Miskawayh, was that 'Alam, the housekeeper had held a party which was attended by the leaders of the Daylamites. The *amīr* Mu'izz al-Dawla accused him however of disloyalty, claiming that the gathering was intended to pay allegiance to al-Mustakfī and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Ibid., 216.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 2, 83-85.

<sup>95</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 217.

throw off their loyalty to Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla. Another version mentions that the caliph had been collaborating with the Ḥamdānids and the leaders of the army to expel him from Baghdād and that he had seized al-Shāfi<sup>c</sup>ī, the leader of the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites. <sup>96</sup>The house of the caliph al-Mustakfī was plundered so that nothing remained in it. Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla then brought forward Abū al-Qāsim b. al-Muqtadir, to whom he swore allegiance as new caliph and bestowed upon him at the same time the title "al-Muṭī<sup>c</sup> lillāh". The *amī*r not only forced al-Mustakfī to abdicate, but also had him blinded and put him in prison, where he died in Rabī<sup>c</sup> al-Awwal 338/949.<sup>97</sup>

The accusation of Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla against al-Mustakfī had some grounds. The caliph had established strong relations with Nāṣir al-Dawla b. Ḥamdān, who was displeased with the appropriation of power in Baghdād by Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla. Nāṣir al-Dawla had already spent a lot of money to obtain his emirate over Baghdād, when there was confusion in Baghdād following the appointment of Ibn Shirzād as amīr al-umarā', and the soldiers demanded payment of their salaries from the caliph, the latter sent a letter to Nāṣir al-Dawla offering him the emirate provided he sent him money to silence the soldiers. Nāṣir al-Dawla sent him five hundred thousand dīnārs. <sup>98</sup> It is also reported that there were other causes for Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla's decision, which were as important as that mentioned above, namely, that the previous caliph al-Muttaqī (329-333/940-944) had established a good relationship with Ahmad b. Buwayh when the latter was in Wāṣit. Secret correspondence had even passed between the two. <sup>99</sup> Al-Ṣūlī discovered these letters and was confident that the correspondence was in fact authentic. When the soldiers of Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla arrived in the suburbs of Baghdād in 332/943 a letter of al-Muttaqī fell into the hands of some people, a letter in which he urged the Buwayhid amīr

<sup>96</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 2, 86; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 176.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid

<sup>98</sup> Şafiyya Saʿāda, Min Tārīkh Baghdād al-Ijtimāʿī: Taṭawwur Mansab Qāḍī al-Qudāt fī al-Fatrayn al-Buwayhiyya wa al-Saljūqiyya (Baghdād: Dār Amwāj li al-Ṭibāʿa wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 1988), 25

<sup>99</sup> Al-Sūlī, Kitāb al-Awrāq (Al-Qāhira: Matba at al-Ṣāwī, 1935), 263-264.

to march on Baghdād and to release him from the tutelage of the *amīr* Tūzūn. <sup>100</sup> Moreover, the relations between al-Muttaqī and his cousin 'Abdullāh b. al-Muktafī had deteriorated. The latter plotted to overthrow al-Muttaqī. His absence from Baghdād he used to persuade Tūzūn to depose him on payment of a certain sum of money. <sup>101</sup> When al-Muttaqī returned, he was then seized by Tūzūn, who had him blinded, appointing as caliph 'Abdullāh b. al-Muktafī with the title of al-Mustakfī.

Thus it was that on 8 Jumādā II 334/945 al-Muṭī became caliph and reigned until 363/973, when he was finally deposed by the Turkish general, Sabuktagin. He was able to reign for quite a long time, but he held submissive authority in keeping with his title (al-Muṭī = the faithful), since he felt satisfied with his annual allowance, like a government official, without being involved in the affairs of the government. Nevertheless, from the beginning al-Muṭī tried to be involved in politics and encouraged conflict between various groups in order to extend his control, but he failed. The caliph's vizier lbn Shirzād summoned all the people of Baghdād to support Nāṣir al-Dawla al-Ḥamdānī against the Buwayhids. He relied on the support of the masses and the 'ayyārūn of Baghdād in his attempt to expel Muʿizz al-Dawla and the Daylamites. However, Muʿizz al-Dawla, taking al-Muṭī to his side, succeeded in defeating Nāṣir al-Dawla. 103

The presence of al-Muți by Mu'izz al-Dawla's side played some role in his victory over his opponent, because Mu'izz al-Dawla was only one of many contenders to the emirate. It was perhaps one of the main reasons why the Buwayhids retained the position of the caliph, i.e. in an attempt to win religious legitimacy in his fight against his opponents; for example, he induced the caliph to remain at his side during his fight against Nāṣir al-Dawla as well as during his battle over the Barīdīs in Baṣra. 104 After

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 258-259

<sup>101</sup> Mez, Renaissance, 11.

<sup>102</sup> Sa'āda, Tārīkh, 26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 89-91.

<sup>104</sup> Miskawayh, *The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate*, trans. H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth, vol. 6 (Baghdād: al-Muthannā, [1916]), 115.

Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla succeeded in restoring order, he obliged the caliph by him and did not release him except after he had sworn allegiance, in accordance with which he was not to separate himself from Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla, or to harbour evil designs against him, or to side with his enemies. Once al-Muṭī<sup>c</sup> lillāh had taken this oath, Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla released him from custody and he returned to his palace. <sup>105</sup>

Despite the fact that Mu°izz al-Dawla had gained full power as *amīr al-umarā*, he had to overcome two enemies after having failed to subdue either of them. One was 'Imrān b. Shāhin, who became a rebel and took refuge in the Baṭīḥa to the south, where he announced his independence; the other was the Qarmaṭians of Baḥrayn who rose in revolt. Mu°izz al-Dawla up to the day of his death was never able to overcome these enemies who remained a threat to his son, 'Izz al-Dawla. <sup>106</sup>

In the sphere of administrative reform, Mu<sup>°</sup>izz al-Dawla appointed Abū Ja<sup>°</sup>far al-Sīmarī as secretary upon the death of Ibn Shirzād, a post which he had held from 335/946 to 345/956. At this time neither the caliph nor the *amīr al-umarā* had a vizier, but Mu<sup>°</sup>izz al-Dawla had a different solution in mind. Thus the post of *amīr al-umarā* was gradually strengthened as was that of his secretary, so that by 345/956 his secretary had attained complete control of the administrative apparatus and was therefore worthy of being called a vizier. <sup>107</sup>

Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla's vizier, al-Muḥallabī, tried his best to lay down sound principles of finance, but the soldiers thwarted this attempt by increasing their demands for pay, with which Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla's complied. To compensate them, he adopted the destructive policy of distributing *iqṭāʿs* to his commanders so that the districts of Wāsiṭ, Baṣra and Aḥwāz were given to the army commanders. They collected the revenues from the lands, out of which they deducted their monthly salary. Many of these

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Ibid., 110.

<sup>106</sup> Sa'āda, Tārīkh, 26.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

commanders simply became landlords and remained in their estates for years without returning to their camps in Baghdād. Falling into the role of privileged merchants, they began to send their products from one district to another without paying any taxes, for they were subject neither to the local rulers nor to the collector of revenues. This, no doubt, led to the deterioration of the financial system as a whole. 108

When Mu°izz al-Dawla died in 356/966, his son Bakhtiyār ('Izz al-Dawla) was appointed as his successor. The latter however, was faced with a legacy of mistaken policy. 'Izz al-Dawla had to face the problem of a sharp division of the Turkish and Daylamite armies. The Daylamites had already risen in revolt during the time of Mu°izz al-Dawla, led by Ruzbahān who was supported by his two brothers: Būlāk in Shīrāz and Asfar in Aḥwāz. '109 This situation had forced Mu°izz al-Dawla to rely on Turkish soldiers to drive away the Daylamite force. From this time onwards Sabuktagin, commander of the Turkish forces was to play an influential role in military affairs.

In addition to the burden of the soldiers, 'Izz al-Dawla had to solve the economic problems which prevented him from going on campaigns and which forced him to make a temporary settlements with his enemies: 'Imrān b. Shāhin and Abū Taghlib al-Hamdānī. 110 After this 'Izz al-Dawla concentrated on the sources of revenue in the state treasury, but the method he adopted resulted in calamity. This was because he reduced the salaries of the Daylamite commanders, causing them to rise in revolt. 'Izz al-Dawla found himself at their mercy and was forced to raise their ranks and salaries. The Turkish soldiers also demanded the same privileges; this however were refused by 'Izz al-Dawla. This discrimination caused further division between the two groups and led to the latter taking revenge against him. 111

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>109</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 2, 162.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Idem, *Eclipse*, vol. 5, 246, 250.

<sup>111</sup> Sa'āda, Tārīkh, 29.

With the failure of 'Izz al-Dawla to resolve the problems of paying his commanders' wages led to the post of the vizier being thrown open to anyone who would be able to pay higher for the privilege. There appeared on the field two contenders for the position of vizier, Abū al-Faḍl and Abū al-Faraj; both were appointed secretaries by Mu'izz al-Dawla, and 'Izz al-Dawla maintained them in their positions, but both were ambitious to become vizier. For this purpose, Abū al-Faḍl sought financial help from Shirzād b. Sarkhab, one of the closest friends of Mu'izz al-Dawla. Shirzād promised Abū al-Faḍl and 'Izz al-Dawla that he would provide them with an amount of money upon the appointment of Abū al-Faḍl as vizier. 112

To achieve this purpose, Abū al-Faḍl began to fine the courtiers, demanding of them sums which he knew they would pay without being ruined. He also started collecting the land-tax. By strenuous efforts he succeeded in paying the Daylamites what he had promised them, while he sent the Turks away to different regions to call in the revenues that had been assigned to them. 113

At this time, Abū al-Faraj b. Fasanjas, the second secretary, led a campaign against the Qarmatians of Oman. As soon as he learned of the affairs of Abū al-Faḍl, he delegated the leadership to another commander and quickly returned to Baghdād, where he met 'Izz al-Dawla and promised him the sums of money greater than what had been promised by Abū al-Faḍl. He and his ally Sabuktagin started to discredit Ibn Shirzād's reputation before 'Izz al-Dawla, who in turn agreed to appoint Abū al-Faraj as vizier. However, Abū al-Faraj failed to fulfill his promise because when he tried to collect the taxes following the method of Abū al-Faḍl, it turned out that he was able to raise only a portion of the sum. Therefore, Abū al-Faḍl was soon restored to his post. 114

<sup>112</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 5, 251.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Ibid., 252.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 256, 257; Sa'āda, Tārīkh, 30.

The sale of this government office created general confusion, Baghdad witnessed many plots during the period between 358/968 and 360/970. The first was organized by the masses in an attempt to depose al-Muți and replace him with Muḥammad b. al-Mustakfī billāh who lived in Egypt under the protection of Kāfūr al-Ikhshīdī. In the beginning Sabuktagin joined the plotters but he soon withdrew. 115 The second plot was led by Shirzād b. Sarkhab in effort to remove Sabuktagin, but when the plot failed to break the unity of the Turkish soldiers, Shirzād then fled to Aḥwāz. 116 The third plot was arranged by Sabuktagin with the help of Abū Qurrā' and led to the fall of Abū al-Faraj b. Fasanjas, the former ally of Sabuktagin. 117 Finally, Abū al-Faḍl arranged a plot against Sabuktagin with the approval of 'Izz al-Dawla, but this intrigue also failed and ended with the fall of Abū al-Fadl and the hesitation of 'Izz al-Dawla to ask for reconciliation. There is no doubt, the plot would have succeeded, if Baghdad had not been exposed to outside danger. 118 The Byzantines invaded the southern 'Iraq and succeeded in taking over Diyār Bakr and Diyār Rabī a from the Muslims. The people of Baghdad, overwhelmed by the influx of the Muslim refugees, rose in revolt and marched towards the palace of al-Muți, demanding that he wage holy war against the infidels. The caliph sent a letter to 'Izz al-Dawla who was on a hunting vacation, demanding that he lead a holy war. 119 'Izz al-Dawla, however, assigned this task to Sabuktagin. Since Sabuktagin was in turn preoccupied with internal disorder and fights among factions, it was inconvenient for him to leave Baghdad and make propaganda for holy war without any sufficient preparations to leave the city. There is a statement of al-Muți in which he answered 'Izz al-Dawla's demand for financial support as follows:

The Sacred War would be incumbent on me if the world were in my hands, and if I had the management of the money and the troops. As things are, and the

<sup>115</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 5, 264.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Ibid., 276.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> Ibid., 286-287.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Ibid., 313-314.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Ibid., 326.

world is in your hands and those of the provincial rulers, neither the Sacred War, nor the Pilgrimage, nor any other matter requiring the attention of the Sovereign is a concern of mine. All you can claim from me is the name which is uttered in *Khutbah* from your pulpits as a means of pacifying your subjects; and if you want me to renounce that privilege too, I am prepared to do so and leave everything to you. 120

The caliph was actually short of money when he was asked by 'Izz al-Dawla to finance the holy war. He then had to sell clothing, household goods and jewellery in order to raise four hundred thousand *dirhams*. In the end, however, 'Izz al-Dawla did not spend the money on the holy war that he demanded, but on his own interests. Indeed, a rumour was spread that the caliph had been fined. 121

It is reported that Sabuktagin, instead of leading his army against the Byzantines, manipulated the soldiers to support him in his opposition to the *amīr al-umarā*. A war then broke out among those soldiers who sided with the Sunnites and those who sided with the Shī°ites. This civil war is said to be the worst that Baghdād had ever witnessed; it came to be known as the *fitna* (riot) of the year 361/971. Despite the expression of religious sentiment on both sides, it was in reality an expression of political rivalry between the *amīr al-umarā* and the caliph. The Buwayhids were behind the Daylamites and the Shī°ites of Baghdād, while the Turkish soldiers and the Sunnites supported the caliph. 122

The conflict reached its peak when Abū al-Faḍl's chamberlain, called Ṣāfī, a fanatical Sunnite, set fire to the al-Karkh quarter, the Shī'ite section in Baghdād. This led to loss of business and the termination of industry as a result of the damage which it inflicted. The incident led to a dispute between the vizier Abū al-Faḍl and the 'Alid naqīb' (agent), Abū Aḥmad al-Mūsawī, who protested the action and criticized it with violent language, bringing about his deposition from the office. 123 The riot continued and was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> Ibid., 330.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 5, 331.

marked by many fatalities and the arrest and punishment of those participating. Abū al-Fadl was exiled and later poisoned by a Shī tie. He was replaced by Ibn Baqiyya, one of the most influential courtiers of Izz al-Dawla and a deputy controller of the kitchen.

Echoes of the riot continued up to the end of the emirate of 'Izz al-Dawla and it was the main factor in his downfall, because he had supported the Daylamites against the Turks. Sabuktagin took control of Baghdād and thereupon demanded the deposition of al-Muṭī' in favour of his son al-Ṭā'i' lillāh. The chroniclers' explanation for this disposal was that the caliph was no longer able of managing the affairs of the government because he was paralyzed and had complained of this illness for years. The caliph al-Ṭā'i' bestowed on Sabuktagin the royal robe and gave him the Prophet's cloak and appointed him amīr al-umarā' with the title of Nāṣr al-Dawla, but the latter died one month later. 125

The rule of 'Izz al-Dawla had been marked by a series of fatal mistakes. The Turkish element in his army was always against him, and he incurred the wrath of the caliph when he demanded money to finance his campaign of holy war in 361/971, and sold the office of vizier. This corrupted administration in 'Irāq was watched by 'Aḍud al-Dawla b. Rukn al-Dawla, the ruler of Fārs, who considered himself more suitable for the office of amīr al-umarā' than his cousin 'Izz al-Dawla. He, however, cunningly left 'Izz al-Dawla to face alone his inevitable downfall, and neglected at first the letters sent by the latter in which he asked 'Aḍud al-Dawla for quick intervention. 126

The crisis reached its peak when the Daylamites and Turks began to fight for supremacy. In 363/973 Sabuktagin died, but the Turkish soldiers remained united and appointed Aleptakin as their new commander. 'Izz al-Dawla asked for help from Rukn al-Dawla and 'Adud al-Dawla. Rukn al-Dawla ordered his son, 'Adud al-Dawla to help

<sup>124</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 305-306; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 60; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 8, 455, 462.

Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 8, 334; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 68.
 Saʿāda, Tārīkh, 33.

'Izz al-Dawla. 'Adud al-Dawla marched on Baghdād and defeated the Turkish soldiers, but then declared himself amīr al-umarā' replacing 'Izz al-Dawla<sup>127</sup> Rukn al-Dawla mediated in favour of his cousin 'Izz al-Dawla because he respected the sanctity of the kinship relations and the seniority of the incumbent. He therefore asked his son to withdraw from 'Irāq in order to avoid any possible negative consequences which might happen. <sup>128</sup> However, on Rukn al-Dawla's death in 365/975 'Adud al-Dawla in 367/977 returned to Baghdād where he was faced by the army of 'Izz al-Dawla at the battle at the Qaṣr al-Jaṣṣ (The Stucco Palace). The latter was captured and killed on the orders of 'Adud al-Dawla. <sup>129</sup> 'Irāq thus came under the rule of the most famous of the Buwayhid rulers, Fanā Khusrau styled 'Adud al-Dawla, who had been ruler of Fārs for about thirty years. He was only thirteen when he succeeded his uncle 'Imād al-Dawla, the founder of Buwayhid power in Fārs in 338/949. In political affairs he was assisted by experienced bureaucrats like Ibn al-'Amīd, his father's vizier. The long years of political experience gave him a very different view of government from the soldier adventurers who had formed the first generation of Buwayhid rulers. <sup>130</sup>

Following his predecessor (Bakhtiyār), 'Aḍud al-Dawla arranged a marriage between his eldest daughter and the caliph al-Ṭā'i', bestowing on her a dowry of one hundred thousand dīnārs (according to another report, two hundred thousand dīnārs. 131 'Aḍud al-Dawla must have had it in mind that should she gave birth to a son, he would have him declared as the caliph's successor, so that the caliphate and the emirate might be united in the same dynasty. 132 'Aḍud al-Dawla also asked the caliph to confer upon him

<sup>127</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 5, 371-372.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> Ibid., 378, 383-384.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>129</sup> Ibid., 419.

<sup>130</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 232.

<sup>131</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 101.

<sup>132</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 2, 414.

the title of  $Sh\bar{a}hansh\bar{a}h = Malik al-Mul\bar{u}k$ , King of Kings, the title of Persian tradition of ancient kings, by this he wanted to revive the Sasanian tradition. <sup>133</sup>

'Adud al-Dawla proved himself to be a powerful ruler in Baghdād because he succeeded in consolidating all administrative responsibilities in his own hands, and the caliph could do nothing, but fulfilled all his demands. He demanded that his own name be included after that of the caliphin the Friday *khutba*, and that a drum be sounded in front of his palace three times (according to Ibn al-Jawzī.)<sup>134</sup> This privilege had been the caliph's alone up to that time. Mu'izz al-Dawla had failed to obtain this privilege from al-Muṭī'; 'Adud al-Dawla was the first Muslim ruler other than the caliph to enjoy it. <sup>135</sup> In addition, 'Adud al-Dawla was given two standards: one was decorated with silver usually presented to the *amīrs*, and the other was adorned with gold, until then bestowed on the heir-apparent. <sup>136</sup>

'Adud al-Dawlah was the real ruler of the 'Abbāsids, and had no contender or collaborator. He succeeded in uniting the principalities of the caliphate under himself as amīr al-umarā'. He had demanded the subjugation of all local rulers who had grown more powerful as a result of the disintegration and decline experienced by the caliphate. He occupied the province of the Ḥamdānīds: Mawṣil, Diyār Rabī'a and Diyār Bakr, and forced Abū Taghlib al-Ḥamdānī to take refuge in Byzantine territory and then to southern Syria, asking for protection from the Fāṭimid caliph al-'Azīz billāh, but he was murdered by a tribal chief of Ramla, Daghfal b. al-Mufarrij al-Jarrāḥ al-Ṭā'ī in 369/979.<sup>137</sup> 'Aḍud al-Dawla also tried to take advantage of the death of 'Imrān b. Shāhin in order to gain control over Baṭīḥa. But his vizier al-Muṭahhar b. 'Abdillāh, who

<sup>133</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Mutazam, vol. 7, 113.

<sup>134</sup> According to Miskawayh, the drum was beaten five times following the Sunnite prayer times. But Ibn al-Jawzī's account seems to be more accurate because the Shī te perform prayers three times a day.

<sup>135</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 92; Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 2, 396.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>137</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 382-395; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.8, 806-808.

led this campaign, was defeated in battle by al-Ḥasan b. 'Imrān who had succeeded his father. 'Aḍud al-Dawla was forced to make peace with al-Ḥasan b. 'Imrān temporarily in 370/980, but he soon returned to the campaign and finally defeated Ḥasan b. 'Imrān. 138

In 369/979 'Adud al-Dawla sent the army to subjugate the Banū Shaybān and their allies, the Kurds of Shahrazur. His army succeeded in inflicting a savage defeat on the Banū Shaybān and putting an end to their raids on Baghdād and the Sawād and restored peace to the land. 'Adud al-Dawla was also able to overcome other bandits, among whom was Dabba b. Muḥammad al-Asadī, whose palace in 'Ain Tamr he occupied and whose followers were taken as prisoners. '40

'Adud al-Dawla succeeded in capturing the provinces which were formerly under the Kurd Ḥasanawayh: Dīnawar, Nihāwand, Samaghān and some of the regions of Adharbaijān (these areas had been under Ḥasanawayh's control for fifty years). He also captured Bakhtiyār, the son of Ḥasanawayh and took much property from the fortress. Then he seized another fortress belonging to the sons of Ḥasanawayh and arrested them. He seized another fortress belonging to the sons of Ḥasanawayh and arrested them. He seized Hamadhān, Rayy and surrounding regions from Fakhr al-Dawla, and handed them over to his brother Muayyid al-Dawla, making him his successor and deputy in this province. He

'Adud al-Dawla's power was not only acknowledged by Muslim rulers but also by the Byzantines. In 369/979 both factions in the Byzantine capital sent their representatives to the palace of 'Adud al-Dawla, the first on behalf of Bardas Sclerus, asking for help from 'Adud al-Dawla as compensation for his loyalty and observance of the peace agreement. But Constantine, another rival, sent his representative as well, asking him to cancel what had been agreed to with his rival. Both representatives

<sup>138</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 409-412; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 8,701.

<sup>139</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 398-399; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 8, 707-708.

<sup>140</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 2, 414.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> Ibid., 415, 416; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 708.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> Ibid., 414.

contended to gain his favour and therefore gave him many gifts to this purpose, but 'Adud al-Dawla was inclined to agree with Costantine and abandoned Ward (Sclerus' representative), later detaining him along with his family. 143

Similarly, the Fāṭimid caliph al-ʿAzīz, who was worried about the rumours of 'Aḍud al-Dawla's intention to raid Egypt, sent a courier to 'Aḍud al-Dawla in 369/979 in Baghdād. Despite 'Aḍud al-Dawla's assurance of his good intention, he seems to have remained up to his death a threat to Cairo. 144 When the embassy of the Fāṭimids came to Baghdād, 'Aḍud al-Dawla demanded that new honours be conferred on him by al-Ṭā'i' with elaborate ceremony. The latter bestowed upon 'Aḍud al-Dawla the new title of Tāṭi al-Milla, robes of honours and two banners, and the diploma of investiture was read out. On this occasion, al-Ṭā'i' said that he delegated his authority to 'Aḍud al-Dawla in the affairs of his subjects and the management of all dominions. 145

During the last two years of his reign 'Adud al-Dawla spent large sums for building projects and restoration. He began restoring houses and streets, public mosques of Baghdād, which had been ruined whether by arson or by demolition. He ordered that the canals which had got silted up to be cleared and the damaged bridges to be repaired and enlarged. In addition, he restored old palaces in the eastern side of Baghdād and constructed a new palace for himself. Kennedy writes: "He was determined, farsighted, and ruthless with corrupt and inefficient subordinates, but his stay in Baghdād was very short and many of his cherished projects must have been unfinished at his death." He also succeeded in solving the problems of the continued dissension between the Turks and Daylamites in the army due to his improved financial administration, since he was able to bring in the revenues of Khūzistān, Wāsiṭ, Mawṣil

<sup>143</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 2, 396.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 396-397; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 709.

<sup>145</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 98-100.

<sup>146</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, 441.

<sup>147</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 236.

and Fārs, none of which had been available to his predecessor. He succeeded in paying the troops regularly, and led them on successful foreign campaigns, which undoubtedly brought in a lot of spoil. In resolving sectarian disturbances, he carefully showed neutrality between the Sunnī and Shī a. In particular, he banned inflammatory preaching, defamation of the Companions of the Prophet and the celebration of provocative festivals by both communities. He encouraged Muslims to spend their time reading the Qur ān rather than becoming involved in debates over points of doctrine. 148

During his short rule, he accomplished his goals to a great extent, but unfortunately, the *amīr al-umarā* who succeeded him did not share the abilities of his predecessor, and the power of the Buwayhids started to decline after 'Adud al-Dawla's death. <sup>149</sup> He had not achieved all his plans when he died in Shawwāl in 373/982, even though he had restored the 'Abbāsid caliphateto its glory, power and previous influence both internally and externally. He had also restored order in Baghdād as capital of the empire, having begun to rebuild it after the damages and destruction caused by continued rioting prior to his coming. Similarly, Fārs achieved its golden era in terms of stability and internal peace in terms of the economic, social and cultural development. <sup>150</sup>

As soon as 'Adud al-Dawla died rivalry broke out between his two sons. Samṣām al-Dawla (Abū Kālījār al-Marzūbān) and Sharaf al-Dawla. The older brother, Sharaf al-Dawla, was in Kirmān when he learned his father had died, while the younger one was in Baghdād. The latter, who was ambitious to take his father's place, concealed the news of his father's death until he was appointed as *amīr al-umarā* and was given the title of Ṣamṣām al-Dawla by the caliph al-Ṭā'ic. For this he was supported by army commanders and *amīrs*. 151 He then appointed two of his brothers, Abū al-Ḥusayn and Abū Ṭāhir Fīrūzshāh to rule jointly over Fārs, ordering them to proceed quickly to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Munaymanah, Tārīkh, 137.

<sup>151</sup> Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 22-23

Shīrāz before Sharaf al-Dawla could seize it. But when they reached Arrajān, they learnt that Sharaf al-Dawla had already arrived at Shīrāz; the two returned to Ahwāz, where Abū al-Ḥusayn declared himself independent and adopted the title Tāj al-Milla. He then recruited a large army and proceeded to Baṣra and after successfully occupying the city rendered its control to his brother, Abū Ṭāhir Fīrūzshāh, who now assumed the title Diyā al-Milla. Thus the Buwayhid dynasty was divided among the Buwayhid amūrs: Sharaf al-Dawla's brother Muayyid al-Dawla retained his hold over the district of Jibāl and Jurjān, Baṣra and Ahwāz were controlled by Tāj al-Milla, Fārs and Kirmān and Omān remained in the hand of Sharaf al-Dawla, while 'Irāq and Diyār Bakr were under Ṣamṣām al-Dawla. 152

This division of power and rivalry inevitably caused a return of disturbance throughout the empire, and Baghdād once again witnessed a wave of inflation of price after the revenues of the rest of the provinces had been cut off. The groups of raiders, plunderers and local rulers began to reemerge, taking advantage of the disintegration of the central administration and rivalries among the Buwayhid amūrs. <sup>153</sup> Division and conflicts resumed among the soldiers, as had been the case before the time of 'Adud al-Dawla. In 373/983 the Turks made trouble in Baghdād and set out for Shīrāz after a group of them had already advanced and reached Fārs. <sup>154</sup> Similarly, the Qarmatians relaunched their movement, taking advantage of the death of 'Adud al-Dawla, and came to Kūfa where they looted the city. Fortunately, Ṣamṣām al-Dawla's army succeeded in defeating them, taking some of them prisoners. <sup>155</sup>

Sharaf al-Dawla, who now was the ruler of Fars, restored order and released several leaders and nobles whom 'Adud al-Dawla had imprisoned. 156 His goal,

<sup>152</sup> Rūdhrāwarī, *Dhayl Kitāb Tajārib al-Umam*, tashīh H. F. Amedroz (Misr: Shirkat al-Tamaddun al-Ṣinā'iyya, 1916), 85.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>153</sup> Ibid., 84, 86-87.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 109-110; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol.9, 42-43.

<sup>156</sup> Rūdhrāwarī, Dhayl, 81; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 22-23.

however, was to take control over 'Irāq and to seize it from his brother, Ṣamṣām al-Dawla. He began to make alliances with the Qarmaṭians with the aim of reducing Ṣamṣām al-Dawla's power. They came to Kūfa making trouble and proclaiming Sharaf al-Dawla in the Friday prayer *khuṭba*. 157 In the beginning Ṣamṣām al-Dawla was able to defeat the Qarmaṭians, but internal problems made it impossible for him to maintain his power over them. 158

The conflict between two brothers was temporarily resolved by a stipulation in which both were not allowed to transgress each other's territory; both were to be loyal to the caliph al-Tā'i', Sharaf al-Dawla was to be acknowledged as amīr al-umarā', and the name of Ṣamṣām al-Dawla was to be included in the khutba prayer after the former. When all these points were agreed upon, the caliph held an assembly and sent a letter to Sharaf al-Dawla, giving him the new title, Zayn al-Milla. However, Sharaf al-Dawla was not satisfied with this agreement. He pretended to accept the submission of Ṣamṣām al-Dawla, but he kept marching towards Baghdād. The commanders of the army suggested to Ṣamṣām al-Dawla that he withdraw to 'Ukbāra, where he could recruit more people to his army, and then wait to ambush Sharaf al-Dawla when he entered Baghdād, but he refused the proposal and surrendered himself to his brother. In 376/987 Sharaf al-Dawla entered Baghdād, where the caliph al-Tā'i' came out to greet him. The caliph then gave him an investiture and awarded him the title Shāhanshāh. 160

Sharaf al-Dawla's rule over 'Iraq began by restoring order. He returned the properties and estates to those from whom they had been confiscated<sup>161</sup> and treated

<sup>157</sup> Rūdhrāwarī, Dhayl, 109-11; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 126.

<sup>158</sup> The Daylamite soldiers mutinied, demanding their pay and then declaring for Sharaf al-Dawla. The mob also rioted, breaking open the prison and releasing the inmates, while Samṣām's officers, courtiers, adminstrators and agents kept deserting to Sharaf's camps at Ahwāz and Wāsit. Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 74; see also Rūdhrāwarī, Dhayl, 127-128.

<sup>159</sup> Rūdhrāwarī, *Dhayl*, 124-126.

<sup>160</sup> Fāḍil al-Khālidī, al-Ḥayāt al-Siyāsiyya fī al-ʿIrāq (Khilāl al-Qarn al-Khāmis al-Hijrī) (Baghdād: Dār al-Adīb, 1969), 47.

<sup>161</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 148.

people according to their ranks, abolished confiscations, resolved their causes and banned people from slandering each other. He asked his vizier, Abū Manṣūr b. Ṣāliḥān in Fārs to come to Baghdād and to be appointed as his vizier. The latter followed Sharaf al-Dawla's attempt to improve conditions and established close relations with the governors and demanded that they strive to make the country more prosperous. He ordered that agricultural produce be transported by sea and attempted to collect the revenues from each province, to solve the problem of the rise in price of the staple stuffs due to their shortage in Baghdād. 162

Sharaf al-Dawla served as *amīr al-umarā* of Baghdād for two years and eight months (367-379) during which time the soldiers revolted against him several times. In one occasion, the Daylamite soldiers tried to bring out Ṣamṣām al-Dawla from prison and to restore him to emirate, but Sharaf al-Dawla succeeded in crushing the rebellions and then sent Ṣamṣām al-Dawla to a fortress in Fārs. 163 A revolt also broke out, led by a Kurdish tribal chief named Bād who succeeded in taking Diyār Bakr from Ṣamṣām al-Dawla, and the Buwayhids could not recapture it after that. 164

Sharaf al-Dawla died of dropsy in Jumādā II, 379/998 at the age of 28. During his last illness he was persuaded to have Ṣamṣām al-Dawla blinded, but Sharaf al-Dawla died before his orders were executed. Ṣamṣām al-Dawla was blinded, and yet he retained some of his eyesight. Before his death, Sharaf al-Dawla appointed his young son Abū ʿAlī as governor of Fārs, but he was rejected by the notables of the province, led by the vizier al-ʿAlā b. al-Ḥasan. They were determined to choose a prince who was expected to be responsive to their own local interests and they turned to Ṣamṣām al-

<sup>162</sup> Rūdhrāwarī, *Dhayl*, 132, 133, 136, 137; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 8, 48-50; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 149.

<sup>163</sup> Fādil al-Khālidī, al-Ḥayāt , 47.

<sup>164</sup> Rūdhrāwarī, Dhayl, 84-87.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., 149-150; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 42. The chroniclers mention that he recovered some of his sight. This statement is necessary to legalize his being appointed as prince again. If he was completely blind, he could not be appointed amīr or ruler because he had this physical defect, which was not allowed according to Islamic law.

Dawla, who was released and restored as prince. Meanwhile in Baghdad, a third son of 'Adud al-Dawla, Fīrūz, was proclaimed as amīr and styled Bahā' al-Dawla. This, inevitably led to rivalry between the supporters of the two princes for taking possession of the rich border areas of Ahwaz and Khūzistan. The fighting became increasingly hostile due to further division between Turks and Daylamites. Al-'Alā b. al-Ḥasan had been successful in raising Samsam al-Dawla to power in Fars with the support exclusively of the Daylamites, forcing many Turks to flee to Baghdad. At first a settlement was decided that Fars and Arrajan were under Samsam al-Dawla, while Aḥwāz was to be handed over to Bahā' al-Dawla, but Ṣamṣām al-Dawla's Daylamite followers who were unwilling to transfer this important region to Bahā' al-Dawla, reoccupied the province in 383/993. As revenge for their expulsion from Fars, the Turks of Baghdad drove out the Daylamites and killed many of them. A counter-reaction took place in Fars, where the remaining Turks were driven out or massacred. Consequently, by 385/995 the army in Fars was almost entirely composed of Daylamites, commanded by their new and forceful leader, Abū 'Alī b. Ustādh Hurmuz, while in 'Irāq and Baghdad they had lost all influence and Baha' al-Dawla became totally dependent on the Turks. The struggle continued with Ibn Ustadh Hurmuz taking Ahwaz for the Daylamites in 387/997 but the next year, 388/998, the whole situation was changed again when Ṣamṣām al-Dawla died, aged only thirty-five, leaving Bahā° al-Dawla as the only survivor of 'Adud al-Dawla's son. 166 We will discuss further Baha' al-Dawla's reign and his successors in the following section.

## II. The economic background of the caliphate.

In this section we will discuss the economic condition of the 'Abbāsid caliphate in general up to the time of the reign of al-Qādir. The emphasis will be placed on factors which led to the 'Abbāsid decline, hoping that they shed light on the failure of the

<sup>166</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 237, 238.

'Abbāsids to restore their power and to overcome various lords and *amīrs* who undermined their authority, crumbled their empire and paved the way for the coming of the Buwayhids and then the Seljuqs. In addition, discussion of the economic background will add to our knowledge of the political situation of the 'Abbāsids. With these backgrounds we hope that we are able to understand that the weakness of the 'Abbāsid caliphate during the Buwayhid and later on during the Seljuqid period was not only due to incapability of the caliphs themselves but also to the political and economic conditions.

The study of economic history of the Arab caliphate is a recent development. Much of what has been written falls within the realm of fight or jurisprudence and of cultural and social history. The available sources were recorded many years after the events on the basis of information transmitted by memory. In addition, the majority of these sources deal with economic problems only tangentially in the form of stories and anecdotes. 167 Most works on economic subject that have come down to us deal with the merits of commerce and merchants, principles, rules and laws relating to commerce: these include the work of Muḥammad al-Shaybānī (d.804) entitled Kitāb al-Kasb (Book on Earning) and those of al-Jāḥiz. *Iḥdā 'Asharata Risāla* (Eleven Letters); *Risāla* fī Madh al-Tujjār wa Dhammi Khidmat al-Sultān (Epistle in Praise of Merchants and in Condemnation of Officials), al-Tabassur bī al-Tijāra (A Clear Look at Trade). In this last work al-Jāḥiz discusses the qualities, values and ways of evaluating gold, silver, pearls and precious stones, scent and aromatics, textiles, skins and other commodities, and lists the goods imported from the provinces of the Islamic empire and from foreign countries. Like al-Jāḥiz, Abū al-Faḍl Ja far b. Alī al-Dimashqī in his Kitāb al-Ishāra ilā Maḥāsin al-Tijāra (The Book of Signs to Know the Benefits of the Trade) devotes some space to theoretical and ethical discussion, but his main purpose is to provide practical guidance for merchants. He discusses the types, qualities and prices of merchandise, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> Elias H. Tuma, "Early Arab Economic Policies (1st/7th-4th/10th Century)." Islamic Studies vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1965): 1

importance of the three types of merchants (the wholesaler, the exporter and the travelling merchant) and other necessary information relating to the business of commerce. Likewise, 'Abd al-Salām Hārūn, an eleventh century author, discusses the purchase of slaves with a classification of their geographical origins in his al-Risāla fī Shirā' al-Raqīq (The Epistle on the Purchase of Slaves) while al-Jawabarī (13th century) deals with the subjects of trickery and fraud committed by the merchants: al-Mukhtār fī Kashf al-Asrār (The Selection of Revealing the Secrets). 168

The political and social history of the Islamic empire has been thoroughly recorded in works that were written and passed down from generation to generation; some of these works are expanded and many others are abridged. However, there is a serious scarcity, especially during the middle period of sources dealing exclusively with the economy, except for some brief references here and there. There is practically no work which discusses the particular domain of economic dynamism empirically. 170

In view of the above, our discussion of economic history of the 'Abbāsid caliphate before and during the Buwayhid period, and in particular, during the reign of al-Qādir, will of necessity be fragmentary. What can be said is based on the only available written sources, especially Ibn al-Jawzī's al-Muntazam and Miskawayh's Tajārib al-Umam, and these relate to the general economic condition of the caliphate, the factors that led to the decline of the economy and the attempts made by some caliphs and sultāns to reverse the economic decline.

<sup>168</sup> Bernard Lewis," Sources for the Economic History of the Middle East." Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, ed. M. A. Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 88-89.

<sup>169</sup> The expanded works on political history of Islam are such as the *Tārīkh* of Tabarī, al-*Bidāya wa al-Nihāya* of Ibn Kathīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh* of Ibn al-Athīr and many others. Abridged works of Islamic history are such as al-Suyūṭī's *Tārīkh al-Khulafā*, al-Fakhrī's *History* and al-'Imrānī's *al-Inbā*' and many others.

<sup>170</sup> Habib b. Abdallah, De l'iqta etatique à l'iqta militaire: transition économique et échangement sociaux à Baghdād, 247-447 de l'Hégira /861-1055 ap.J. (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1986), 25.

#### A. General economic condition.

The economic condition of the 'Abbāsid empire and the Muslim world in general in the fourth century was in serious decline. According to Muḥammad 'Abdul Jabbār Beg, this was manifested in economic depression as well as inflation. There are several reports which speak of the death of a large number of people due to starvation caused by scarcity of food and rising of prices. There are some accounts of famine and shortage of food at different times. We hear of military revolt because of demands for pay, which was delayed, or for higher pay, due to the rise in price, and of mass revolt against the government. The revenues of the government decreased steadily as agricultural products diminished due to the fact that most lands had been ruined and laid waste by civil wars and other conflicts. The amūrs sought ways to replenish the state treasury, resorting at times to illegitimate methods such as confiscations and levying fines against corrupt officials and adopted dangerous measures such as distributing lands to the army and civil servants. The caliph's estates were reduced, his palace ransacked, his revenues from the jawālī (poll-tax) diverted and his stipend decreased from year to year.

The decline of agriculture and the decrease in the cultivated areas started from the very beginning of Muslim rule, but it accelerated greatly in the later middle ages. Abū Yūsuf, who lived during the eighth century AD, witnessed the agricultural decay of the Jūkhā region at the eastern part of the Tigris since the Arab conquest. The water resources of this once fertile region had disappeared and its agricultural production diminished. Abū Yūsuf observed as well that the decline of 'Irāq's agriculture had begun with the conquest by the Muslims. The area which had been allowed to lie waste since that time was so large that it would be impossible to bring it under cultivation within a

<sup>171</sup> Muhammad Abdul Jabbar Beg, "Contribution to the Economic History of the Caliphate: A Study of the Cost of Living and the Economic Status of Artisans in Abbasid Iraq." *Islamic Quarterly* 16: 3-4 (July/December, 1972): 148.

short time.<sup>172</sup> The decrease in cultivated areas also occurred in the western part of the empire. The agricultural lands of Egypt grew increasingly smaller during the eighth and the first half of the ninth centuries. According to al-Maqrīzī, in the middle of the ninth century the country was in decline with deplorable effects on the revenue of the government.<sup>173</sup>

Among the phenomena of the decline of the economy at the end of the fourth/tenth century was the devaluation of the *dirham*, a silver coin favoured in business transaction. According to Abū Shujāʿ Rūdhrāwarī, the reduction in its value was among the factors which led to the Daylamite revolt in 383/993. Later in 390/999 the Daylamites criticized the government over the decline of the *dirham*, and then proceeded to the house of the vizier Abū Naṣr to seize his wealth. The factor which had caused the decline of *dirham* was financial crisis, which in turn led to the price of *dīnār* rising to an unprecedented height during the fourth/tenth century. 174

The decline of agriculture inevitably reduced the revenues of the government derived from taxes and agricultural products. Consequently, the *amīr al-umarā* or the sultān was forced to reduce the caliph's estates and other economic privileges. This encroachment on the caliph's financial resources actually started with the transfer of the administration of the caliphate to the *amīr al-umarā*, Ibn Rā iq, in 324/935 as mentioned earlier. The caliphal-Rāḍī bestowed upon him comprehensive power over the army, taxgathering and public security in the whole region under the caliph's control. Although the caliph at this time still had a vizier, he was completely powerless because he no longer had any control over the provinces and the *dīwāns*. It was Ibn Rā iq's secretary who controlled the whole business of the state. In this respect, Miskawayh says, "The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> E. Ashtor, A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages (London: Collins, 1976), 58-59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>174 °</sup>Abd al-'Azīz al-Dūrī, *Tārikh al-'Irāq al-Iqtiṣādī fī al-Qarn al-Rābi' al-Hijrī* (Baghdād: Maṭba'at al-Ma'ārif, n.d. ), 226

<sup>175</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 189.

revenue from the provinces is transmitted to the treasury of the *amīrs*; they order and prohibit everything regarding it and expend it as they please while remitting what they choose to the sultān (the caliph) for his expenses. The old treasuries have ceased to exist." <sup>176</sup>

The amīr al-umarā allotted the nafaqāt (daily allowance) to the caliph, assigning for this special purpose al-diya, called al-diya al-mustakhlasa or diya al-khidma (estates assigned for the use of the caliph). 177 The  $diy\bar{a}^c$  of the sultan or estates of the caliph originally consisted of lands which the 'Abbasids had confiscated from the Umayyads. 178 These increased gradually through purchase, through confiscation of the lands of officials who had died or those who had been dismissed from their offices for different reasons or through iljā' (protection). The divā' of the sultān extended to different parts of the province of 'Iraq, in the Sawad, in the areas adjacent to Baghdad, Kūfa, Başra and Wāsit, and in the lands reclaimed (munaja a) from the marshes, around Mawsil and in Ahwaz and and Iran. These estates of the caliph were called by different names, depending on their classification, like diyā khāssa, al-Furātiyya, al-mustahdatha, and al-murtaja'a. The diyā' al-mustahdatha were the diyā' which had been newly added (to the old ones); the *murtaja* a were the  $diy\bar{a}$  which had previously been made iqtā, and then they were annulled by the caliph for some reason. According to Jurjī Zaydān, the diyā khāṣṣa were the diyā owned by the caliph himself, and the diyā al-Furativya were the diva which lay on the banks of the Euphrates. 179

Soon after the Buwayhids entered Baghdād in 334/945, they deprived the caliph al-Mustakfi of his control of the provinces and gave him a stipend of two thousand dirhams a day for his personal expenses (or 60.000 dirhams monthly = 4.600 dinārs

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., 190; Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 352.

<sup>177</sup> Al-Şūlī, Kitāb al-Awrāq, 131, 145.

<sup>178</sup> Ibn Qudāma, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, 241; al-Jahshiyārī, *Kitāb al-Wuzarā' wa al-Kuttāb* (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Ḥalabī, 1938), 90.

<sup>179</sup> Al-Dūrī, Tārīkh, 26.

monthly),180 but as its payment tended to be delayed, Mucizz al-Dawla granted some fiefs to the caliph, which were known as diya al-khidma yielding a revenue of two hundred thousand dinars annually. These were supervised by the caliph's personal secretary. In the same year he deposed al-Mustakfi and installed al-Mutic in his place, annulling the salary and assigning the caliph an iqta' with an annual income of 200, 000 dinārs. Two years later, he stopped the daily allowance of the caliph altogether, leaving him to entirely rely on the diyā al-khidma. Therefore, the income of the caliph declined after 334/945 to about seven percent of what it had been during the reign of al-Muqtadir. 181 Subsequently, even these estates also dwindled as a result of interference of the dependants of Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla and those of Bakhtiyar, some of whom seized the outlying estates of the caliph, while others obtained some of them as iqta from him, and still others undertook to tax-farm them for revenues, which they had no intention of paying. 182 In addition, the caliph's property was frequently confiscated, his house robbed and precious objects taken. These confiscations took place three times under Buwayhid rule, but similar things had also happened before. Al-Rādī was subjected to confiscation and was forced to pay the amīr al-umarā an amount of money which he was unable to raise and had no other choice but to have gave silver and gold dishes melted down and struck as coins. Similarly, the caliph al-Muttaqī was deprived of his property and even blinded. 183

Ibn al-Jawzī states that the income from the estates of the caliph eventually decreased in course of time to only fifty thousand *dīnārs* annually. During the reign of Sulṭān al-Dawla, the latter used to pay the caliph al-Qādir every year almost the same amount, besides two hundred manns of aloe wood, fifty manns of camphor, five

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> Ibid., 250

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> Ibid., 235.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>182</sup> Ibid., 191; Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol 2, 344.

<sup>183</sup> Mahmūd Hasan Ahmad and Ahmad Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf, al-'Ālam al-Islāmī fī al-'Asr al-'Abbāsī (Al-Qāhira: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), 524.

hundred items of luxurious clothing and an unspecified quantity of scent; and Jalāl al-Dawla agreed to continue this for the next caliph al-Qā'im. 184

In addition to the fiefs and stipend, the caliph seems to have been allotted the proceeds from the *jizya* or *jawālī*, the poll-tax payable by non-Muslim subjects. In fact during the emirate of Jalāl al-Dawla, the soldiers who were not satisfied with the salary they received collected the *jawālī*, which was the caliph's prerogative, interfered with the mint and then imposed duties for their own benefit on commodities imported into the capital from Mawsil. When Jalāl-al-Dawla once again secured the proceeds of the *jawālī* in 434/1042, he was obliged in the following year again to allow their appropriation by the caliph's officers. 186

Because of the economic crisis, the caliphs during the Buwayhid period were economically weak. They were not expected to be able to build a strong army to oppose that of the sultān, or to draw bureaucrats to their circle. On the contrary, they lived in simplicity and were constantly short of revenues. A clear indication of the caliph's shortage of money was al-Muṭī 's objection against providing money for the holy war against the Byzantines, which had been demanded by Bakhtiyār as mentioned earlier.

The economic crisis during the fourth/tenth century not only caused the caliph's political weakness, but also incited brigandage, theft activity, social conflict and uprising as we will see later.

### B. Factors leading to the economic decline

M. A. Shaban maintains that the economic problems of the empire resulted from the cumulative effects of bad management in all fields, at all levels and of all regions. The symptoms were not only the lack of equal opportunities between the various sectors of society, but also between the diverse regions of the empire. The main concern of the

<sup>184</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 192.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., 103; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 78.

<sup>186</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 192.

central government was to exploit its domains without regard for the interests of its subjects. The central lords enjoyed the benefits while the people of outer areas made all the sacrifices. The government felt responsible only for enforcing tax-collection, the revenues of which were to support a corrupt bureaucracy and an almost useless army. Even public services were ignored in many cases. Necessary repairs to any damage of irrigation systems were now charged to the users who had to pay for them over and above the required taxes. For more than a century the caliphate had neglected investment in irrigation and restoration projects in the most productive of its provinces. Consequently, in the course of the late ninth and early tenth centuries, the economy of 'Irāq was ruined. 188

Corrupt practices such as hoarding wealth, which had already started under the Barmakids, continued to influence all ruling circles and became a regular practice. Members of the 'Abbāsid family acquired more and more estates as their numbers increased rapidly. Many government officials, who came from families with great land holdings, used their position to increase "their own wealth and that of their master." <sup>189</sup> Shaban further maintains:

They continually devised illegitimate means of evading their taxes at the expense of the small landowners, many of whom were thus forced to give up their holdings and join the various protest movements which were sprouting in the heart of the empire. Meanwhile, the flourishing commercial life of the cities attracted the accumulated wealth of both big landowners and government officials and the interests of both groups intertwined. The order of the day was hoarding and speculation in commodities by men in government service, and even female members of the ruler's household were involved in such operations. These malpractices were so widespread that they were officially accepted as the norm, and accordingly every high official was obliged to pay a monetary fine or even had all his wealth confiscated at his dismissal. This most unusual method of taxation could not have been completely effective since it did not prevent the same

<sup>187</sup> M.A. Shaban, *Islamic History: A New Interpretation*, vol. 2 A.D.750-1055 (A.H. 132-448) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),89-90.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 136.

<sup>189</sup> Shaban, Islamic History, vol.2, 90.

official from seeking office time and again, happily prepared to accept the consequences.  $^{190}$ 

The economic crisis during the fourth/tenth century seems to have been a general phenomenon resulting from several factors, besides the others mentioned above. Al-Tawhīdī, who lived during this period, wrote," The hardship, poverty and depressing conditions suffered by people encouraged them to be stingy; the merchants were more cautious [in spending their money] and the people were reluctant to do good deeds, this was in particular due to the hardship they suffered from." <sup>191</sup>

The decline of the economy of the 'Abbāsid empire was not primarily due to malpractice of the authorities and government officials, but to other factors as well: the civil war between al-Ma'mūn and al-Amīn, and that between al-Musta'īn and al-Mu'tazz; the revolts, especially those of the Zanj and Qarmatians; the activity of the 'ayyārūn'; the flight of peasants to urban areas; natural calamity and the spread of plague. In the next sections we will discuss these contributing factors to economic decline of the 'Abbāsid empire, in particular those of civil wars, uprisings and the activity of the 'ayyārūn. At the end of this section we will look at the attempts made by authorities to improve the economic condition of the caliphate.

## 1. Civil wars

The civil war between al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn (196/811-198 /813) had a profound effect on the economy of the 'Abbāsid empire. The conflict arose over the status of the province of Khurāsān. According to the succession agreement made in Mecca in 186/802, al-Ma'mūn was given authority over Khurāsān, while 'Irāq province was to be under the control of al-Amīn. After the death of their father Hārūn al-Rashīd (170-194/786-809), al-Amīn was persuaded by an important group of *abnā'* led by 'Alī b. 'Īsā and the *ḥājib* al-Faḍl b. Rabī' to reestablish Baghdād's control over the province

<sup>190</sup> Thid

<sup>191</sup> Ahmad and Ahmad Ibrāhīm al-Sharīf, al-sālam al-Islāmī, 209.

(Khurāsān). For his part, al-Ma'mūn, supported by his vizier al-Fadl b. Sahl and the magnates of Khurāsān, was determined to defend his rights and rejected the demands of his brother, and even went so far as to proclaim himself imam. The breach became final when in Şafar 195/810 al-Amīn appointed his own son Mūsā as heir apparent, so removing al-Ma'mūn from his place in the succession. Two months later (Rabī' II 195/January 811) Alī b. Īsā was appointed as governor of Khurāsān and supplied with an army drawn from the abna numbering 40, 000 people. In Baghdad al-Amin recruited the people of the city, contemptuously referred as ayyārān, whom the Arab sources defined as tramps, prisoners, riffraff, the unemployed men; shopkeepers; peddlers; the dregs of society. 192 These 'ayyārūn defended the city using leaves of palms as helmets, and mat of reeds filled with soil and stones as armour and shields, sticks as spears; strips of cloth for flags, and the horns of cows as trumpets. 193 Against 'Alī b. 'Īsā's army, al-Ma'mūn sent Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn to Rayy with an army of only 5000. In Sha ban 195/May 811 the two armies met outside the city walls of Rayy and Tahir won a decisive victory, Alī b. Isā was killed and his army fled west in disorder. The defeat of 'Alī b. 'Isā's army paved the way for Ṭāhir to proceed to 'Irāq. He defeated a smaller army of abnā at Hamadān and established himself, before winter set in, in Hulwan on the edge of the 'Iraqi plains, only a few day journey from Baghdad itself. While in Baghdād, al-Amīn tried to raise new armies to supplement the now weakened *abnā*, having recourse first to leading Arab tribes like the Shaybānīs and to the Qaysīs of northern Syria, but in both cases the abna declined to co-operate with their alleged allies while the Arab were unwilling to fight for al-Amīn without important political concessions and rewards. Al-Amīn was therefore unable to organize a coalition. In the

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.; C. Cahen includes among the people of the 'ayyārān as the following: the naked, 'urāt (those dressed in rags); working class people (rubaydiyya); men of the market (porters, keepers etc); street vendor (bā at al-Tarīq); the populace (rā āt); wanderers (ā îr) especially gangs (awbāsh); and finally the shrewd (shuṭṭār).

193 Ibid., 78.

spring of 916/812 Ṭāhir was joined by a large army led by Harthama b. A'yān and succeeded in capturing the cities of southern 'Irāq without any real difficulty. In Dhū al-Ḥijja 196/August 812 Harthama began to lay siege to Baghdād, which lasted slightly over a year. At the beginning of 198/September 813, after realizing the impossibility of winning the war, al-Amīn now attempted to surrender to his father's old friend Harthama, who sent a boat across the river to fetch him. Ṭāhir however suspicious of any private deals which excluded him, overturned the boat, captured the caliph and executed him. 194

The year-long siege of Baghdād was an almost unparalleled episode in the history of Islamic society in the sense of its destructive effect on the city itself and its citizenry. In addition, the years between the death of al-Amīn in 198/813 and the arrival of al-Ma'mūn in Baghdād in 204/819 saw prolonged and destructive fighting throughout the Near East but especially in Baghdād and the surrounding countryside. 195 This civil war had presumably an effect on the supply of food-stuffs from one region to another within the domain of the 'Abbāsid caliphate, which included 'Irāq, Syria, Persia and the Hejāz. Based on the numismatic evidence, the civil war had also led to the devaluation of the 'Abbāsid dīnār', and consequently to a marked inflationary trend in the cost of living. 196

The second civil war occurred between al-Musta'īn and al-Mu'tazz as a result of the rivalry between the Turkish commanders who supported al-Musta'īn and those who sided with al-Mu'tazz. The caliph al-Musta'īn left Sāmarrā' for Baghdād following his vizier Waṣīf and Bughā, the latter's younger brother, at the beginning of 251/865 due to insecurity and under attack from other Turks. The Turks remaining in Sāmarrā' realized that an alliance of the caliph, Waṣīf, Bughā, the Ṭāhirids and the *shākiriyya* 197 of

<sup>194</sup> Kennedy, *Prophet*, 148-152.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid

<sup>196</sup> Abdul Jabbar Beg, "Contribution, " 148.

<sup>197</sup> shākiriyya were intact units under the leadership of their local chiefs, from

Baghdād was a formidable threat to their position and they decided on war. They chose a new caliph for themselves, al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tazz, and embarked on the siege of Baghdād.

The second siege of Baghdād resembled in many respects the first that had occurred during the reign of al-Amīn: its long and desperate battles and the involvement of the 'ayyārūn', and finally the divisions among the defenders which led to the fall of the city. Waṣīf and Bughā were less than eager to fight the army of Sāmarrā', from which they themselves had come, and transferred the power to others. Furthermore, the Ṭāhirid leader was disappointed with the rebels, weakening the spirit of the resistance. As a result, the miserable al-Musta'īn was exiled to Wāsiṭ where he died soon after, while Mu'tazz now became an undisputed caliph taking his base in Sāmarrā' with the support of the Turkish military. 198

# 2. Uprisings and interference in politics by soldiers.

There were many revolts recorded by Muslim historians from classical up to the medieval times, which not only resulted in many deaths, but also involved acts of looting, the burning of houses and the devastation of agricultural lands. There were many causes of revolts often arising from political reasons, reaction against oppression or due to social division. The huge gap in living standards between the lower strata of the masses and the higher ones who lived luxuriously stimulated much social discontent. The rich could enjoy a wide variety of delights which were available to them and they had the means to indulge in their wealth. The poor expressed their bitterness in uprisings and participation in clandestine movements against the state, like the Qarmatian movements and that of the Zanj. The Arabs and the Bedouins embarked on attacking the Sawād of Kūfa and the lands around Baghdād. 199

Transoxania, Armenia, and North Africa. Ira M. Lapidus, Islamic Societies, 127.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>198</sup> Kennedy, *Prophet*, 173-174.

<sup>199</sup> Fahmī 'Abd al-Razzāq Sa'ad, Al-'Āmma fī Baghdād, 181-182.

The rebellions, too numerous to list here, were generally destructive, but the most significant revolts which had an important impact on the politics and economy of the 'Abbāsid empire were those of the Zanj (c. 256-270/869-883)<sup>200</sup> and the Qarmatians (c. 277-319/890-931). Zanj is a term applied to the Negroes brought from East Africa who were employed to remove the nitrous layers which covered the swamp to the north of Baṣra. They numbered initially from 50 to 500 workers called "sweepers" whose jobs it was to take out the nitrous layers and pile them up in mounds, so that the land might become arable again. Their strict discipline and the poor conditions in which they lived developed in them a group spirit, and their great numbers, amounting to many thousands, gave them a consciousness of their own strength. Their leader was a certain 'Alī b. Muḥammad, who came from Verzenin (near modern Teheran) and pretended to be an offspring of the caliph 'Alī - as did many other leaders of uprisings -, but according to Arab historians, he belonged to the tribe of 'Abd al-Qays. <sup>201</sup>

At the beginning of September 256/869 'Alī began to rouse the sweepers, promising them that he would lead them to freedom, give them property and remain faithful to them to the end. His goal was the overthrow of the existing regime and the establishment of a new social order, the restoration of a pure Islam, with the social justice it implied. As with many other leaders of revolt, he pretended to be the Mahdī whom all Muslims believe will come at the last day and strive for the restoration of the true religion. <sup>202</sup>

The first attack of the Zanj on Baṣra in 256/869 was unsuccessful because they were defeated by the 'Abbāsid army under the command of Ja'lān and the support of other Zabībī and the Banū Hāshim.<sup>203</sup> Following this defeat they built their own capital al-Mukhtāra (the Elect City), situated on the canal Nahr Abī al-Khāsib, south east of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> Ashtor, *Economic History*, 116-117.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>202</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> Ţabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, 431.

Baṣra. In the same year they took several towns in the eastern part of the empire: al-Ubulla, 'Abadān, Khūzistān, al-Ahwāz, killing many of their inhabitants. 204 They then cut Baghdād's supplies from the south, intercepting the ships on the Tigris. In September 257/870 they took Baṣra, burning several villages around it, killing whomever they found and plundering people's properties. 205 Two years later (259/872) they occupied Ahwāz for the second time and devastated the district until they were repelled by the 'Abbāsid army. 206 In 262/875 they took Baṭīḥa and Dasta Mayṣān easily because of the absence of the 'Abbāsid army to fight the Ṣaffārids; 207 and in 265/878 they took three towns on the Tigris: Jabbul, al-Nu māniyya and Jarjaraya. 208 Having subjugated all these towns they then built another new town al-Manī a, and in 266/879 they took Rāmhurmuz from the hands of the Kurdish rebels. This marked their highest achievement and the peak of their power after they had been rising for ten years. Their town al-Mukhtāra had become the capital of the Zanjī state incorporating large parts of southern 'Irāq and Khūzistān. 209

In 267/880 Abū al-ʿAbbās b. al-Muwaffaq (the future caliph al-Muʿtaḍid) was able to seize the regions along the Tigris from the leader of the Zanj, Sulayman b. Jāmīʿ. In the month of Rabīʿ al-Ākhir, al-Muwaffaq and his son Abū al-ʿAbbās succeeded in taking al-Manīʿa and al-Manṣūra. For the strategy of attacking the Zanj, in this year al-Muwaffaq built a city facing the city of al-Mukhtāra, named after him, al-Muwaffaqiyya. The next year al-Muwaffaq's army began to destroy the fortresses of al-Mukhtāra, and some of his army had already penetrated the town for the first time, but they were faced by the army of the Zanj and some of them were killed, forcing them to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, 471-473; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7, 236-237.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>205</sup> Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, 481-482; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7, 244-246.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> Tabari, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, 504-505; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7. 259.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> Tabari, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, 521; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7, 292.

<sup>209</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, 521; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7, 322.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup> Ashtor, *Economic History*, 119.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> Ţabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol.9, 585.

retreat to their encampment (the city of al-Muwaffaqiyya). Al-Muwaffaq caught the merchants who supplied the Zanj in al-Mukhtāra, killing some of them and took others prisoners. The raid on al-Mukhtāra ceased for a while because al-Muwaffaq was wounded during the combat. As soon as he recovered from his wound, in Sha'bān 269/February 883 al-Muwaffaq resumed his military activity and was backed by Lu'lu' and the Tūlūnid army who joined him. After about six months of bitter fighting al-Mukhtāra was taken and 'Alī b. Muḥammad killed (his head was brought to Baghdād and exhibited to the people) and some of his commanders such as Sulayman b. Jāmi' and Ibrāhīm b. Ja'far al-Hamadhānī were taken prisoners. The Zanj's revolt which had terrorized 'Irāq and undermined the 'Abbāsid empire for fourteen years was finally subdued. Kennedy comments on the effect of the Zanj's rebellions as follows:

Slave farming and large-scale reclamation of land were never begun again and it seems unlikely that the city of Baṣra ever fully recovered. Trade routes had been disrupted for too long, merchants had found other ways of communicating with the east, via Sīrāf in southern Iran for example, and Baṣra and southern 'Irāq in general entered a long period of decline. 214

In addition, the revolt of the Zanj was a decisive phase in the history of the caliphal empire. The disruptive forces became so strong that they brought about its decomposition. North Africa had broken away a long time ago. During the long war against the revolting slaves, and in the period that followed, many other countries separated themselves from the 'Abbāsid caliphate.<sup>215</sup>Above all the revolt of the Zanj contributed to the damage of agriculture of Sawād and its irrigation systems, paralyzed the trade and commerce of southern 'Irāq and exposed the weakness of the political and military system of the caliphate.<sup>216</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> Ibid., 603-604; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol.7, 364-365.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 7, 609; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.7, 374; Alexandre Popovic, *La revolte des esclaves en Iraq au IIIe/IXe siècle* (Paris: Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1974), 143.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Ibid., 654; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 399-400

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>214</sup> Kennedy, *Prophet*, 181.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup> Ashtor, *Economic History*, 121.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>216</sup> Sa'ad, *al-'Amma*, 181.

This major political calamity was followed by the menacing Qarmatian revolt. The Qarmatians or Qaramita (sing. Qarmati) were the adherents of a branch of the Ismā īliyya. Originally the name was given to the followers of Hamdan Qarmat (Ḥamdān b. al-Ash ath), an Ismā ilī leader in the sawād of Kūfa. It is said that he came from Khūzistān and then resided in a village called Nahrin, where his piety and asceticism attracted many people. He made da'wa on behalf of one of the 'Alid imams and so many people joined him.<sup>217</sup>Based on the work of al-Fadl b. Shādhān (d. 260/873-4), al-Radd 'alā al-Qarāmita, a refutation of the Qarmatians, the activity must have started before the year 261/874-5 or 264/877-8, which is mentioned by the sources as the date of the beginning of the movement. At first the movement led by Hamdan was "merely part of the general Isma ili movement of his time whose leadership he recognized."218 However, after his revolt against the leadership in 286/899 and his subsequent disappearance, the Qarmatians threw off their allegiance to the Fatimid caliph.<sup>219</sup>Another Qarmatī leader by name of Abū Sa<sup>c</sup>īd al-Jannābī appeared in Baḥrayn, attracting many followers from among the Arabs and other Qarmatians so that their movement became strong. They killed the people of Bahrayn and then went to Qatif, murdering its inhabitants and intending to march on Basra.<sup>220</sup>In 287/900 Abū Sa<sup>c</sup>īd and his followers raided Hajar and some of them approached Basra, defeating the 'Abbāsid army under the leadership of al-'Abbās b. 'Amr al-Ghunawī.<sup>221</sup> In Dhū al- Qa'da the 'Abbāsids sent Badr, a ghulām of al-Ṭā'ī, to fight Abū Sa'īd and was successful in killing many of the latter's followers. 222 In 289/902 the Qarmatians under the leadership

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm, *Akhbār al-Qarāmiṭa*, taḥqīq Suhayl Zakkār (Beirūt: Mu'assasat al-Risāla, 1971), 13; Țabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 10, 75; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7, 493.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> W. Madelung, "Karmațī," in *E.I*, new ed., vol. 5, 660.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al- Adīm, Akhbār, 13; Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, vol. 10, 75; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 493.

 $<sup>^{221}</sup>$  Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-ʿAdīm,  $Akhb\bar{a}r$ , 15; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 498-499; Ṭabarī,  $T\bar{a}r\bar{\imath}kh$ , vol. 10, 85.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm, Akhbār, 17; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7,

of Yahyā b. Zikrawayh, who was nicknamed Sāhib al-Nāqa (Master of the She-camel), raided Damascus, but Tughj b. Juff from the army of Hārūn b. Khumarawayh b. Aḥmad b. Tülün was able to repel them.<sup>223</sup> The Qarmatian rebellion in Kūfa was crushed by the 'Abbasid army under the command of Shibl, a slave of Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Ta'1.224 In 290/903 the Qarmatians besieged Damascus and killed many people in Tughi's army under the command of Bashir, but another reinforcement from Egypt, led by Badr, succeeded in defeating the rebels and the Sāhib al-Nāqa was killed.<sup>225</sup> The leadership of the movement was now taken over by his brother, al-Husayn, called the Ṣāḥib al-Shāma (because he had *shāma*, a mole on his face, claimed to be his sign). After attracting the people of Hims to his da wa, he marched on Hama, Ma arrat al-Nu mān and Ba albak, killing their inhabitants, including women and children. He then went to Salamiyya, where he killed the Banū Hāshim, old people, jurists, children and even animals.<sup>226</sup> The killing and capturing of many people and destruction of the country committed by the Qarmatians led the people of Syria and Egypt to send complaints to the caliph al-Muktafi. At the end of Ramadan in 291/904 the latter then sent an army to Syria under the command of Muhammad b. Sulayman, who defeated the Qarmatians in the west of Ḥamā, taking many of them prisoners, but the rest were able to escape to the desert.<sup>227</sup> The Ṣāḥib al-Shāma left his followers and tried to reach Mesopotamia, but was captured and brought to Baghdad, where he and his followers were executed. 228 In 293/906 Zikrawayh b. Mahrawayh sent Nasr b. 'Abdullāh b. Sa'īd, nicknamed Abū

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 $<sup>^{223}</sup>$  Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm,  $Akhb\bar{a}r$ , 17; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 511; Tabarī,  $T\bar{a}r\bar{\imath}kh$ , vol. 10, 94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>224</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-<sup>c</sup>Adīm, *Akhbār*, 18; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7, 512; Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 10, 86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>225</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm, Akhbār, 19; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 523; Ṭabari, Tārīkh, vol. 10, 97, 99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-<sup>c</sup>Adīm, Akhbār, 21; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 524.

<sup>227</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm, Akhbār, 23; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 526; Tabarī, Tārīkh, vol. 10, 109; al-Qurtubī, Silat al-Tārīkh Tabarī, 11-12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>228</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm, Akhbār, 25; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 530-531; Tabarī, Tārīkh, vol. 10, 115.

Ghāmim, to the Qarmaţians of the Kalb and other Qarmaţi tribes; they then raided Buṣra, Adhri¹āt and Bathaniyya. After an unsuccessful attack on Damascus, they pillaged Tiberias and killed many people, including children, and took women prisoners. They then marched towards Hīt, killing its inhabitants and pillaging their properties. <sup>229</sup> In the same year Naṣr was assassinated by some of his followers, who sought to get amnesty from the caliph al-Muktafī. <sup>230</sup> At this time (Dhū al-Ḥijja 293/ October 906) Zikrawayh emerged from his hiding place in al-Ṣawwān near al-Qādisiyya. He and his followers defeated the 'Abbāsid army and attacked the caravans of Khurāsānian pilgrims on their return from Mecca at 'Aqaba, killing most of them (about 20.000 piligrims)<sup>231</sup> and seizing many goods worth of about one million dīnārs (Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr mention two million dīnārs). <sup>232</sup> The next year (294/907) the 'Abbāsid army under the command of Waṣīf b. Suwārtakīn met Zikrawayh on the way to Khaffān or Khiffān on 18 Rabīʿ al-Awwal and the fight broke out fiercely between both armies during which Zikrawayh was captured and died a few days later. <sup>233</sup>

The first militant stage of the Qarmaţian movement seems to have ceased temporarily when Abū Sa<sup>c</sup>īd al-Jannābī was assassinated in his new capital at Haṣā near Ḥajar in 301/914. His successor, Abū Ṭāhir accepted a reconciliation offered by the caliph al-Muqtadir with the effect that a peaceful situation lasted for about ten years.<sup>234</sup> However, from 311/923 to 316/928 Abū Ṭahir launched a series of devastating campaigns into southern <sup>c</sup>Irāq, raiding Baṣra and Kūfa repeatedly and even attempting unsuccessful attacks on Baghdād, and attacking the pilgrims' caravan.<sup>235</sup> The most

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>229</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm, Akhbār, 25-26; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 7, 542-543; Ţabarī, Tārīkh, vol. 10, 122-123.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>230</sup> Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-<sup>c</sup>Adīm, *Akhbār*, 28; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7, 542-543; Ţabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 10, 124.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>231</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7, 549.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>232</sup> Ibid., 548-549; Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm, *Akhbār*, 31-33.; Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 10, 130; 'Arīb, *Silat*, 22.

 $<sup>^{233}</sup>$  Ibn al-Athīr,  $al\text{-}K\bar{a}mil$ , vol. 7, 549; Tabarī,  $T\bar{a}r\bar{\imath}kh$ , vol. 10, 130; Thābit b. Sinān,  $Akhb\bar{a}r$ , 35-36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 8, 83; Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 10, 148.

<sup>235</sup> W. Madelung, "Karmatī," in E.I., new ed., vol. 5, 662; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil,

barbarous acts committed by the Qarmaţians occurred in 317/930 when they raided Mecca, slaughtering the pilgrims and inhabitants and carrying off the Black Stone of the Ka'ba to Baḥrayn, which was not returned until 339/951. 236 In 357/968 the Qarmaţi al-Hasan al-A'ṣam took Damascus and ravaged Ramla after defeating the Ikhshīdids. 237 The next year the Ikhshīdids agreed to pay tribute for Ramla and Damascus after they had been defeated by the Qarmaţians. 238 Their attack on Egypt and Syria continued until they were defeated by the Fāṭimid caliph al-'Azīz in 368/978 and retreated to Ḥasā in exchange for a sizeable annual tribute paid to them. 239 From this time onwards up to the death of the Buwayhid 'Aḍud al-Dawla in 372/983 the Qarmaṭī uprising subsided. But in 373/983-4 they resumed their attack on Baṣra and "had to be bought off by a tribute". 240 Two years later they occupied Kūfa, but the Buwayhid army succeeded in inflicting humiliating defeat on them in al-Jāmi'ayn and depriving them of influence in 'Irāq permanently. In 378/988 they were defeated by al-Asfar, the chief of the Banū al-Muntafik of 'Uqayl, who pillaged their strongholds al-Ahsā and Qatīf. 241

In 382/992 one year after the accession of al-Qādir to the caliphate, we hear of the Qarmatians' renewal of allegiance to the Fāṭimid al-ʿAzīz, probably due to the latter's restoration of the tribute to them, which had been terminated after the victory of al-Asfar. However, this friendly relation did not last long. As soon as al-Ḥākim ascended to power in 386/996-411/1021, they resumed their hostility towards the Fāṭimid caliphate.<sup>242</sup>

vol. 8, 143-180; Thabit b. Sinan, Akhbar, 36-51; Arīb, Silat, 139.

 $<sup>^{236}</sup>$  Madelung, "Karmațī," in *E. I*, new ed. vol. 5, 662; Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-Adīm, *Akhbār*, 57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>237</sup> Madelung, "Karmatī, " in *E. I*, new ed., vol. 5, 663; Thābit b. Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm, *Akhbār*, 104.

<sup>238</sup> Kennedy, *Prophet*, 290-291.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>239</sup> Ibid., 292.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>240</sup> Madelung, "Karmațī," in E.I., new ed., vol. 5, 663.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>242</sup> Ibid.

The Qarmatians' rebellion, according to Kennedy, "was to weaken the settled communities at the expense of the bedouin, a process which was to continue throughout the next century and a half." <sup>243</sup> They also damaged the trade of the Persian Gulf and the trade between Arabia and 'Irāq, causing the latter to suffer from a decline in international trade. The disruption of the caliphate interfered with the international routes which brought goods from the Far East and South Asia to Baghdād for trans-shipment to the Mediterranean. In the late tenth century, the Fāṭimid regime helped to promote an alternative international route through the Red Sea and Cairo, which also damaged the commercial prosperity of 'Irāq. <sup>244</sup> Incessant warfare severely ruined irrigation works in the Tigris region and large districts became depopulated. <sup>245</sup>

In the midst of these severe threats, further confusion ensued due to maladministration and the interference of the Turkish soldiery in politics during the first half of the tenth century A. D.<sup>246</sup> The transfer of power into the hands of the Turkish and Daylamite soldiers led to a general decline of the economic condition of 'Irāq. The currency and banking system suffered from stagnation and financial activity decreased during this period.<sup>247</sup>

In addition, the rule of the amīr al-umarā had unfortunate consequences for the irrigation system, which could not be improved through the limited efforts of the state. During the period of rule of the amīr al-umarā between 324-335/935-945, the canals were neglected and the country ruined due to the rivalries and wars between the amīrs who sought to gain power and due to the confusions brought on by the mutiny of the army. During the conflict between the Turkish amīr Bakjam and Ibn Rā'iq, the latter destroyed the river Diyali and committed many evil acts which caused damage to the

<sup>243</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 289.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>245</sup> Lapidus, *Islamic Societies*, 136.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> Abdul Jabbar Beg, "Contribution," 148.

<sup>247</sup> Thid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> Sa'ad, *al-'Āmma*, 181.

dams of Nahrawān, consequently ruining the agriculture. And in 329/940, the dams of the rivers Rafil and Būq were damaged and were not repaired, rendering the Badūriya river useless for about ten years. In 330/941 the Nahrawān river dam was damaged by the depredations of Ibn Rā'iq and his soldiers. In the year 333/934 the 'Īsā river dam was damaged and the amīr al-umarā' failed to repair it. And finally, the Khālis river dam was damaged in the same year and no restoration was attempted except that the caliph closed the damaged dam on the Ṣarāt river in 327/938. Al-Ṣūlī describes the consequences of this deed, saying that," it destroyed the world, and increased prices to a dangerous level up to this time." i.e. to the year 334/945. This black period was closed by the invasion by the Buwayhids of Baghdād in 334/945. The Buwayhid occupation of Baghdād for a century (945-1055) was characterized by civic disturbances between Sunnites and Shī'ites, the lawless activities of the 'ayyārūn and other upheavals affecting public security, and the general debasement of the dīnār leading to inflation. 249

The authorities had tried to revive the villages and their agricultural lands. The viziers and governors were active in encouraging the farmers to stay and cultivate the lands in the attempt to increase their income. But rivalry between the leaders during the period of amīr al-umarā' to impose their power on Baghdād and the consequences of their domination on agricultural income and the destruction of farmlands and the irrigation systems, all delivered a fatal blow to agriculture. This inevitably caused famine and diseases which killed a great number of people of Baghdād and encouraged others to flee from the city.<sup>250</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>249</sup>Abdul Jabbar Beg, "Contribution," 148.

<sup>250</sup> Sa'ad, Al-'Amma, 181.

# 3. Military iqtā <sup>251</sup>

Another factor which brought about economic decline was the introduction of the military  $iqt\bar{a}^c$ , namely an  $iqt\bar{a}^c$  granted to soldiers in lieu of salary. In the fourth/tenth century the  $iqt\bar{a}^c$  passed into a military phase in which the lands were distributed to the soldiers on a large scale. This was a result of several factors, among them the emptiness of the state treasury during the last years of the reign of al-Muqtadir (after 317/929) and under his successors, the lack of experience on the part of the first Buwayhids in administration, and military anarchy. The granting of  $iqt\bar{a}^c$  and the creation of tax-farms caused the peasants lose their motivation to maintain rural productivity. 253

The year 334/945 was decisive in the development of this practice, since Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla started to distribute  $iqt\bar{a}$ 's to his soldiers without calculation, a policy which was followed by the Buwayhids who succeeded him. From that time onwards, the military  $iqt\bar{a}$ ' increased steadily to the extent that the  $iqt\bar{a}$ ' madaniyya 254 became second importance. The military  $iqt\bar{a}$ ' expanded at the expense of other kinds of lands, such as the special  $iqt\bar{a}$ ', estates of the caliph and the lands belonging to the state treasury. Adud al-Dawla went so far as to bestow his army the waqf land (land belonging to a religious endowment). 255

Actually, the military was not hereditary, neither was it for a lifetime. It was not considered a possession of the muqta' (the holder of  $iqt\bar{a}'$ ), because the Buwayhid  $am\bar{u}r$  reserved the right to cancel it whenever he so wished. If it was given to military leaders, its revenue was a compensation for the salary which the Buwayhid treasury

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> Iqtā means a grant of the rights to collect taxes from land conceded in return for development of administrative and military service. Lapidus, Islamic Societies, 922.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>252</sup> Al-Dūrī, *Tārīkh*, 30; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 8, 342-343.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>254</sup> The *iqtā' madaniyya* was granted to government officials in lieu of the salary. It was very common in the beginning of the fourth century. When a vizier received the post of the vizierate, he was given this *iqtā'*, and when he was deposed, it was taken back and then rendered to his successor. Al- Dūrī, *Tārīkh*, 29; Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 1, 155; al-Tanūkhī, *al-Faraj ba'da al-Shidda*, vol. 1, 137.

<sup>255</sup> Al-Dūrī, Tārikh, 30.

could no longer pay its soldiers. The grant of  $iqt\bar{a}$  was accompanied by an agreement which implied that the holders of the  $iqt\bar{a}$  were obliged to send a certain amount of money or its equivalent from the produce of the land all at one time or by instalments. They were also responsible for the maintenance of the canals crossing their lands. <sup>256</sup> In reality, however, they did not pay anything to the state treasury; they even exploited their land as they wished and used to entrust the working of their  $iqt\bar{a}$  to their deputies while not declaring their revenues, a tradition which was carried on from the time of Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla up to the time of <sup>c</sup>Adud al-Dawla. <sup>257</sup>

Mu'izz al-Dawla tried to restore the damaged estates in al-Sawād and ordered Abū al-Faraj b. Hishām to execute this measure in 334/945. He was also concerned with the problem of deciding at which time taxes should be collected, and how to resolve it. Therefore, in 351/962 his vizier al-Muḥallabī delayed the time for collecting taxes from the year 350/961 to 351/962 in order to make the date of collecting the taxes and the harvest time conform. But the effort of Mu'izz al-Dawla to repair the irrigation system was ruined by his own destructive policy toward the lands, the policy which he was forced to adopt due to the necessity of paying his army and replenishing his empty treasury. Miskwayh provides us a detailed description about Mu'izz al-Dawla's dealing with the lands. He mentions that in 334/945 the army mutinied against him and demanded its pay. Realizing that the treasury was empty, Mu'izz al-Dawla granted his Daylamite followers and leading officers, his courtiers and his Turkish soldiers estates belonging to the sultān, to persons who had gone into hiding and to Ibn Shirzād (a former vizier) as well and dues belonging to the public treasury on estates in private ownership. The result was that the Sawād ceased to pay taxes and passed out of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>256</sup> Ibid., 31

<sup>257</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>258</sup> Ibid., 42.

control of revenue officers; only a small part of it remained liable to taxation and was therefore farmed.<sup>259</sup>

Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla's measure in granting most of the state lands to his soldiers, according to Miskawayh, was a grave mistake. He also granted most of the lands of al-Sawād in fiefs while they were still in a desolate and unproductive state and before they were restored to cultivation. Added to this, the viziers did not take harsh measures against the frivolous holders of the  $iqt\bar{a}$ 's; they even let themselves be bribed and be persuaded by intermediaries so that the  $iqt\bar{a}$ 's were obtained on inconsistent *ibra* (measurement of the land liable to taxation). <sup>260</sup>Those who gained profits retained their grants while the loser returned their  $iqt\bar{a}$ 's and received others so as to compensate them for their losses. The mischief was so wide-spread that it became regular practice for the soldiers to ruin their  $iqt\bar{a}$ 's and then return them in exchange for land they were allowed to choose for themselves, thereby benefiting enormously. <sup>261</sup>

After mentioning the corrupt practices of the holders of  $iqt\bar{a}$ 's, Miskawayh mentions the consequences which led to the damage of the cultivated lands in particular and the decline of the economy in general. In the course of time, he maintains, principles [related to land] were abandoned, canals were ruined, government agencies were annulled so that misfortunes fell on the cultivators. They either left their villages or endured injustice without obtaining redress or surrendered lands to the  $mvqt\bar{a}$ ' in order to escape oppression by coming to terms with him. Consequently, cultivation ceased, the  $d\bar{t}w\bar{a}ns$  (some of them) were closed and the very tradition of clerkship and administration vanished. <sup>262</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>259</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 96-100; Idem, *Eclipse*, vol. 2, 100.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>260</sup> Ibra - an estimate of revenue taken as the mean between the most and the least productive years. H.F. Amedroz, "Abbasid Administration in Its Decay from the *Tajarib al-Umam*," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 2 (1913): 823.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>261</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 96-100; Idem, *Eclipse*, vol. 2, 100.

<sup>262</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 2, 96.

The grantees often entrusted the management of their estates to slaves and agents, who kept no account of profits and losses and did nothing to further productiveness or improvement. They merely embezzledtheir masters' property by various methods, while their masters recouped the loss of revenues by fines and unjust dealings. The officers in charge of the irrigation system departed because the territory was no longer in the hands of the sultan. Their duties had been reduced to calculating what was needed for irrigation, which was then apportioned to the assignees, who neglected to pay for their shares; and if they paid, the money was embezzled and not spent on the purposes for which it was levied. These inspectors were indifferent to possible accidents, being content to take what could benefit them and to disregard sources of danger, and make new demands of the government or return the grants which had gone to ruin in their possession and handed over the administration of each district to the leading Daylamites who regarded them as their private domain for life. These governors were surrounded by dishonest agents whose aim was to delay matters, to make adjustment and to put off payments or taxes from year to year. <sup>263</sup>

The districts not included in such  $iqt\bar{a}^c$  were assigned to two classes of men, one of these was generals and other officers of the army, the other was government officials and men of business. The officers were eager to hoard wealth, gain profits, raise grievances, and demand reductions in taxes. If they were investigated, they became enemies of the sultāns. If their wealth was reduced the payments were strictly demanded from them, they became open rebels. If they were treated with leniency, their greed became worse and stopped at nothing. The civilians of the official class, on the other hand, were more skillful than the military at transferring liability onto the shoulders of the government and at making stealthy profits at its expense.<sup>264</sup>

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

As the years passed, they became independent in their provinces and were subject to little interference in their dealings with others, particularly those who had to collect tax from them; whereas there were small farmers who were subject to fines, whose taxes were modified and their payments reduced in proportion to the condition of the land and their properties; still others, better able to defend themselves, had their taxes lightened, and were ready to assist the tax-farmer in his difficulties when he had to reckon with the sultān, while he had no mercy on the weak small landowners. The practice of presenting any balance sheet to the *dīwān* issuing any instruction to a finance minister; hearing any complaint or accepting the suggestion of any clerk ceased to exist.<sup>265</sup>

The investigation of the revenue-farmer was confined to mentioning the terms of the contract, the amount realized and the amount in arrears, without inquiring into the treatment of the subject populations whether they had been treated justly or unjustly; no supervision had been held to know whether the land had been protected from becoming ruined or the waste land had already been reclaimed. There was also no inquiry into improper collection of taxes or unjust fines or arbitrary additions to the assessment, or unwarranted calculation of expenditures. If any of the clerks called attention to any such point and was an important person, he was guaranteed, deposed, ruined and put to death. If he was a man of low position he was made to pay damages, disgraced, injured, killed or sold by the sultan for a small price. But if he was poor and destitute, then he would be pacified with a small sum and transferred his support to his opponent. "He was not to be blamed, as the sultān neither protected him when he was in fear, nor assisted him if he spoke." 266

Miskawayh goes further, saying that Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla continued to follow his inclination as regards his soldiers; distributed freely grants of land (*iqtā*<sup>c</sup>) and increases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>265</sup> Ibid.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

of stipends; sometimes showered them with riches and favour. He was, therefore, unable to save money against accidents or to preserve revenue; his expenses increased whereas his resources diminished till there was a deficit against him, which was never kept under control, but tended to increase at an enormous rate. In course of time this led to the Daylamites' demands not being met, and to their becoming envious of the Turks by reason of their favoured position. Necessity compelled the sultan to attach the Turks more closely to himself, and promote them higher and higher, favouring them more and more and relying on them against the Daylamites. As his favour was increasingly bestowed on the former, neglect shown to the latter, enmity occurred, and indeed with the Turks being stimulated by greed and the Daylamites by want and poverty, the instincts of revolts were engendered, which became the cause of what happened later.<sup>267</sup>

Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla had planted the roots of destruction in economic and political spheres. Economically, he damaged cultivated lands, which constituted the main source of revenues for the state. Therefore, it was no wonder that he always lacked money to pay his army, or that the latter often rebelled against him. Politically, he laid the ground for conflicts and division within his army, leading to his destruction by the policy of favouring one group, i.e. the Turks, and neglecting the other, i.e. the Daylamites.

# 4. The activity of the 'ayyārūn

The economic problems of 'Irāq and particularly those of Baghdād were aggravated by the activity of the 'ayyārūn (sing. 'ayyār). Historical accounts mention that scarcity of food stuffs or increase in prices resulted from the activities of the 'ayyārūn; frequent plundering and raiding of merchants' stores disturbed the flow of merchandise, cost them money and inevitably led to increases in prices. Furthermore, the 'ayyārūn' very often burnt the shops, and the Turkish army, when in search of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>267</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 5, 100-105; Idem, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 97-102; Amedroz, "Abbasid Administration," 823-824.

the ayyarun or during clashes with them also set fire to the shops in which they had hidden themselves. From the fourth/tenth century onwards the movement of the 'ayyārūn was a common element in the public life of Baghdad. The first appearance of the ayyarun mentioned by Tabari and Mas'ūdī was during the cruel siege of Baghdād by Tāhir, the commander of al-Ma°mūn's army. According to Tabarī, when al-Amīn saw people who had no armours and weapons, he ordered opening the house of armaments for them, and the prisoners broke out of prison and then joined al-Amīn's force to defend the capital. 268 They were organized into units of ten men commanded by an 'arif', one hundred men by a naqib, one thousand men by a  $q\vec{a}'id$  and ten thousand men by an amīr 269 Their chiefs were known as Dunal, Damhal, Abū Numla, Abū 'Asara, Daykuwayh (Halawayh) and Yantawayh (Ninawayh) -- names which indicate that men of all races and faiths mixed together. 270 These 'ayyārūn, using sticks and stones, fought to repel Tāhir's soldiers, who wore armour and carried spears. They fought as though possessed and great numbers of them were killed.<sup>271</sup> When the fight became prolonged and extended to different places of the eastern river, the 'ayyārūn came from everywhere and assembled, numbering " about one hundred thousand men" and attacked the army of al-Ma'mūn. Many of them were killed, wounded or drowned. 272 It is likely that the chief of the 'ayvārūn was among those who advised al-Amīn not to surrender after his defeat but to flee to Syria from which he could cominue the fight. At this period a number of poems were written on the heroic fight of the 'ayyarun' in defense of the city of Baghdād.<sup>273</sup> In the course of time, they sometimes mixed in the society, sometimes marched on streets or in demonstration. There are plenty of accounts on their uprisings at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>268</sup> Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol., 8, 429-430, 443.

<sup>269</sup> Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-Dhahab wa Ma'ādin al-Jawhar*, vol. 2 (Beirūt: Mu'assasat al-'Ālam li al-Maṭbū'āt, 1991), 318.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>270</sup> C. Cahen, Mouvements populaires et autonomisme urbain dans l'Asie Musulmane du Moyen Âge (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1959), 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>271</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> Ibid.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid.

the end of the 10th century, and in the thirties of the 11th century and in the forties of the 12th century. 274

When the caliph al-Muhtadī was at the head of the army and lacked support against the Turkish officers whose soldiers mutinied in 256/869, he decided to retreat and made an appeal to anyone who would like to aid him to continue the battle. Only the 'ayyārūn answered his appeal. Arriving at the front gates of the prison, they took the bridle of the caliph's horse and asked him to liberate the prisoners and did not let him go until he had given orders to this effect.<sup>275</sup>

In 325/936 the governor of Baghdād, Lu'lu', incorporated into the ranks of the police the 'ayyārūn' and the men of faction (ahl al-'aṣabiyya). 276 And when the amīr al-Barīdī marched towards Baghdād in 330/941 and the amīr Ibn Rā'iq and the caliph went out to face him, a considerable number of the 'ayyārūn' from "all quarters of the city" assembled to participate in the war. On Friday al-Barīdī was defamed in the pulpits of the city's mosques. 277 Similarly, in 334/945 the 'ayyārūn' mobilized themselves to resist the threat of the Buwayhids to Baghdād. Tūzūn sent them to guard the water supply. They fired at the Daylamite soldiers and prevented them from approaching the wells and cisterns till the latter died of thirst and hunger. 278

In addition to the patriotism demonstrated by the 'ayyārūn, they were very frequently involved in brigandage, plunder and riot. The period of trouble which marked the first part of 4th/5th centuries was naturally conducive to the appearance of the 'ayyārūn. Indeed, starting in 306/918, they began to appear as a group of thieves, sometimes as assistants of political leaders facing the weakness of the regular public force. In the course of time, the 'ayyārūn quite often fought against the authorities,

<sup>274</sup> Simha Sabari, Mouvements populaires à Baghdad à l'Époque Abbasside, IXe-Xe siècles (Libraire d'Amerique et d'Orient Adrien Maisonneuve, n.d.), 77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>275</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>276</sup> Cahen, Mouvements populaires, 37.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>278</sup> Sabari, *Mouvements populaire* s, 79.

especially the chief of the police and the preacher of the mosque. For example, in 307/919 Nujh was appointed as head of the police at Baghdād. He installed several faqīhs (experts on Islamic law) in their headquarters so that the police might act according to their rulings and advice. The 'ayyārūn, without due respect to Nujh, continued to launch attacks against the merchants of the city. 279

It seems that the activity of the 'ayyārūn in many cases depended on how powerful the head of the police and the authorities were in executing the law and in keeping order in the city. When the authorities were powerful and took severe action against the 'ayyārūn, the latter did not dare to make any trouble in the city. Contrarily, when the authorities were weak and lenient in their treatment of them, they would make their own law in the city. For example, when the Qarmatians entered Baghdād in 315/927, the vizier 'Alī b. 'Īsā ordered the chief of police to patrol day and night with the army on both rivers and announced: "All the 'ayyārūn or those who carry weapons found in the street, will be executed." 280 The 'ayyārūn went into hiding and the merchants transported their goods to their houses. The richest among them hired ships on which they shipped their goods to Wāsit. The rich as well as the poor were informed that the Qarmatians were about to conquer the city. Miskawayh attributes the tranquillity of the city and the absence of looting due to this harsh measure taken by the vizier. 281

Ayyārūn activities seem often to have been connected to those of thieves. The poverty and hardship suffered by the poor were manifested in different ways, such as theft, hard work, public disturbance, asceticism and sūfism, and adherence to Shī sism. 282 The activities of the thieves formed a significant movement. The thieves came from the poor or oppressed class of society and increased in number as changes took place in the 'Irāqī community, for instance the emergence of large and crowded cities, the

<sup>279</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 69; see also Sabari, Mouvements populaires, 79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>280</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 1, 179.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

<sup>282</sup> Sa'ad, Al-Amma, 211.

increase of consumption, the rise of cost of living, the declining conditions of farmers and the increasing pressures caused by the bedouin migration to the cities in the fourth century. This development left behind a social group, unable to feed itself or earn a livelihood, which sought vengeance and revolted against the authorities who had failed to improve living conditions.<sup>283</sup>

Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī tells us of the consequences of this political and social instability in encouraging the activity of thieves ( 'ayyārūn). 284 In 332/943, Ibn Ḥamdī, the reputed 'ayyār, began to cause trouble for the authorities. According to al-Ṣūlī, he had been a porter in an iron shop before becoming a thief. The amīr Shirzād employed him to guard the route to Wāsiṭ on condition that he return all the money amounting to fifteen thousand dīnārs from his plunder of the ships. Accordingly, Ibn and his men increased their activity of plundering the rich people of Baghdād during day and night. The governor of Baghdād Ashkorj (Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Daylamī) employed Ibn Ḥamdī to find the thieves, but the latter instead became the head of the bandits against the landlords. The amīr Tūzūn gave an order for his arrest, and when he was finally caught, he was tortured and a group of his men also seized and crucified. 285

In the face of popular pressure, in 361/971, a mobilization against the Byzantine was proclaimed. There was a massive mobilization, in the course of which the 'ayyārūn made their appearance. A fight broke out between the crowd who possessed the weapons and the 'asabiyya. The people were divided into fityān (youth), Sunnites and Shī'ites and the 'ayyārūn. The latter, taking advantage of the confusion, plundered people's properties and burnt houses and shops, especially in the al-Karkh quarter. 286 One year later (362/972) the quarter of al-Karkh was burnt anew by the order of the vizier Abū al-Faḍl as revenge for the murder of a policeman in al-Karkh. During this

<sup>283</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>284</sup> Ibid., 213.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>285</sup> Ibid.; see also Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 54-55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>286</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 8, 619.

event, many shops were burnt (17.000 shops, 320 houses) the revenues of which amounted to 43.000 dīnārs monthly.<sup>287</sup> In addition, the 'ayyārūn attacked the merchants, plundered their money, their goods and broke into their houses. The merchants were forced to mount a guard.<sup>288</sup>

When Abū Taghlib b. Ḥamdān arrived in Baghdād in 363/973, in response to the appeal of Bakhtiyār, he found the eastern river was under the control of the 'ayyārūn driving the merchants into a difficult situation. Therefore, Abū Taghlib pursued the 'ayyārūn and executed some of them.<sup>289</sup> In 364/974 the 'ayyārūn set fire to the shops of wood, butchery, mats and straw. Their power increased to the point that they were mounted on horses and claimed that they were commanders (quwwād). They took it upon themselves to guard the markets and the streets.<sup>290</sup>

The trouble made by the 'ayyārūn increased in 380/990 on both the west and east sides of Baghdād and a fight broke out, first among themselves and then spreading and eventually including the inhabitants of al-Karkh and Bāb al-Baṣra (Shī ite and Sunnite communities). Each of them had a leader and each place of commerce had its guard. Properties were plundered, crime and violence prevailed. Each group burnt the other's shops. This situation was aggravated by a fire which broke out one day in the Dajjāj River quarter, burning many people's stores and their possessions. <sup>291</sup>The evil deeds of the 'ayyārūn resumed in 384/994, resulting in a struggle between the people of al-Karkh and Bāb al-Baṣra. The 'ayyārūn joined their leader by the name of al-'Azīz, who appeared from Bāb al-Baṣra where his influence was great and where he had wreaked a great deal of terror. He and his followers burnt shops, fought the police and took product-taxes ( darā ib al-amti a) from the merchants of al-Karkh, and collected

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>287</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 60.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>288</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 619; Sabari, Mouvements populaires, 81.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>289</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 8, 619.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>290</sup> Ibid; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 74; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol.11, 298.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>291</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 153.

irtifa al-aswāq (dues taken from the markets) from other tradesmen, before escaping in a boat. 292

During the conflict between the masses and the Christians, the former plundered the Qaṭīʿa section in 392/1001 and were joined by the 'ayyārūn', among them the 'Abbāsids and the 'Alids who were involved in the riot, causing much trouble and destruction in Baghdād. They committed evil deeds and plundered the property of many individuals, killing some of them and driving many to the edge of destruction. Bahā' al-Dawla then sent 'Amīd al-Juyūsh Abū 'Alī b. Ustādh Hurmuz to 'Irāq to restore order. Once he entered Baghdād on Thursday 17 Dhū al-Ḥijja, he punished equally the 'Abbāsid and the 'Alid 'ayyārūn', as well many Turks, by drowning them in the river, and he banned the Shīʿites and Sunnites from celebrating their sacred days. <sup>293</sup>

The period from 416/1024 to 427/1035 witnessed the disintegration of Buwayhid power, whereas for a while the 'ayyārūn in Baghdād even greater power accrued. In 416/1025, for example, the 'ayyārūn increased their activity by breaking into the houses of people during the day and night, carrying torches while marching in procession. They entered into people's homes and demanded their possessions, confiscating these by force while often killing people openly and burning al-Karkh. They targeted the Turks as well. The police measures, as well as the bolting and strengthening of doors and gates, were of no avail. The Turks burnt Tāq al-Ḥarānī in the course of the riot between them and the 'ayyārūn and the masses. This state of confusion caused prices to rise, so that one kurr (of wheat) cost 80 dīnārs and many people left their home lands.<sup>294</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 106.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 220; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 171; 178.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>294</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 8, 22; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol.12, 20; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 349.

The increased activity of the ayyarun motivated army commanders (*iṣfaḥṣalāriyya*) to solve the problem. In 417/1026 the *iṣfaḥṣalāriyya* came to Baghdād and proposed negotiations with the 'ayyarun, but the latter had already left Baghdad and did not pay any attention to this proposal, even attacking the camps of the army so that the battles broke out during the day. The army in its anger took up its weapons and beat its drums as though going to war and entered al-Karkh, setting fire to the shops of sellers of wheat, copper, fish and other stores which were guarded by the 'ayyārūn'. During this confusion al-Karkh was plundered and many goods were taken from the Qatī°a and Riyāh street, where the house of Abū Ya°lā al-Mawṣilī, the leader of the ayyaran, was situated. They seized from the street of Abi Khalaf much wealth, especially from the house of Ibn Zayrak, the merchant. The gates of 'Awn street and all other markets of al-Karkh which were saved from the fire were pulled down. A widespread riot and plunder which took place for days brought the people to a critical situation. Al-Murtaḍā (the 'Alid *naqīb*) secretly left his house and went to the palace of the caliph al-Qadir, followed by the army commanders, who requested al-Murtada to return to his house. It was after the caliph's suggesting to him to go home that al-Murtaḍā did so. The caliph then decided to fine the people of al-Karkh 100.000 dinārs for their causing riots and mayhem.<sup>295</sup>

In 420/1029 many raids and evil deeds were committed by the 'ayyārūn in the east section of the capital city of Baghdād under the leadership of al-Burjūmī. Many bandits joined him and stayed with him.<sup>296</sup>They entered the stores which they had already marked before. In the absence of the police they acted freely and entered the house of Abū Bakr b. Tammām, the preacher, next to Qahramāna mosque facing towards Dār al-Mamlaka. From the eastern section they continued their attacks to the western section, and many houses were plundered and stores broken into, the mosque of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>295</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 353; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 8, 25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>296</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 44,

al-Ruṣāfa was attacked during the night and the clothes of those who were in it were stolen. The caliph al-Qādir, therefore, gave permission to transfer all the belongings of the mosque such as curtains, lamps, etc. to the residence of the caliph.<sup>297</sup>

On 20 Dhū al-Ḥijjathe same year Abū Yaʿlā al-Mawṣilī and his followers from 'Awāna and 'Ukbāra came to Baghdād. They killed five policemen and entered al-Karkh waving their swords and claiming that Kamāl al-Dīn Abū Sinān had sent them to protect the city and to serve the sultān. The people of al-Karkh opposed them, killing and crucifying those who were caught. <sup>298</sup> In 421/1030 during the night al-Burjūmī and his followers attacked the stores and khāns in the streets of 'Aliyya and Rabī' from which they seized many goods. <sup>299</sup> They plundered the garment shops, making off with a great many goods. The people of al-Karkh rose against the 'ayyārūn and chased them away, while merchants closed their stores and slept in them. They demanded that the authorities send in the police to help them restore order in the city. Abū Aḥmad al-Nasawī (chief of police) tried to crush the 'ayyārūn and succeeded in causing them to subside temporarily. However, when they began to gain the upper hand, the riot resumed and al-Nasawī was forced to flee for his life. <sup>300</sup>

On Saturday night, 22 Rabī al-Ākhir of the same year (421/1030), a group of bandits came to the Barāthā mosque and stole whatever they could, going so far as to pull up its iron windows. Rioting began and lasted for days; savage crimes were committed, especially in the al-Karkh quarter. The sultān was powerless to stop the riot and consequently lost much of his dignity and authority. A warning was issued and directed to the ayyārān in al-Karkh quarter, threatening them with retaliation and chasing them out of the city. A few days later about fifty ayyārān gathered and stood

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>298</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>299</sup> Ibid.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>301</sup> Ibid., 55.

on the Tigris bank facing the palace of the sultān, holding weapons and torches. After making a supplication to the sultān, they shouted out,"We don't want Ibn al-Nasawī as chief of police. He has to be removed, otherwise, we will set fire and make destruction," and then they dispersed. A group of them went to al-Sawād, whence they were chased away. Later they resumed their violent behaviour, launching raids against people's shops. 302

The frequent raids on al-Karkh quarter have two possible explanations: first, al-Karkh section was the centre of the merchants, where many shops were found. Second, those 'ayyārūn who often raided al-Karkh, were of the 'Abbāsid 'ayyārūn who attacked it in the attempt to make damage to the headquarters of the Shī'ites.

From the above we learn that the 'ayyārūn' had committed many evil deeds such as looting, burning and killing many people of Baghdād, causing great materiallosses to the merchants in particular and the masses in general. Many people were also killed during their raids and riots. Frequent riots incited by the 'ayyārūn brought about insecurity and recurrence of disturbances in the centre of the caliphate. This, in turn, discouraged the economic growth in the capital city because many merchants who feared the raids launched by the 'ayyārūn would not do business in Baghdād, but would trade in other cities which were secure from the activity of the 'ayyārūn. In addition, the riots incited by the 'ayyārūn very often involved clashes between the Shī 'ites and the Sunnites; the former inhabited mostly al-Karkh section, while the latter resided in the Bāb al-Baṣra. Furthermore, since among the 'ayyārūn were 'Abbāsids and 'Alids, their crimes were also linked to the enmity between both communities. The authorities seem to have been powerless to crush the 'ayyārūn. It was not until 392/1001 that the ironhanded 'Amīd al-Juyūsh, Bahā' al-Dawla's deputy in Baghdād, was able to execute and overcome the 'ayyārūn. During his tenure up to his death in 402/1011, the city was

<sup>302</sup> Ibid, 56-57.

relatively peaceful because of his harsh measures against the 'ayyārūn and the inciters of communal clash. After his death, the 'ayyārūn resumed their activity and did so the provocateurs among the Shī 'ites and Sunnites. As for the caliph al-Qādir, his passive attitude towards the activities of the 'ayyārūn might be due to two possibilities: first, like the Buwayhid amūrs, he was not able to prevent the prevalence of the evil deeds committed by the 'ayyārūn; second, he let those 'ayyārūn disturb the city to undermine the authority of the Buwayhid amūrs and his officials. He even took advantage of the grave incident in 417/1026, involving the 'ayyārūn and the soldiers, to fine the people of al-Karkh 100.000 dīnārs for their actions. And in 421/1030, he ordered transfer of the goods in the mosque of al-Ruṣāfa to his palace because of the attack of the 'ayyārūn on the mosque.

## C. Attempts at agricultural reform

The end of the third Muslim century witnessed an important effort at improving the economy carried out by the caliph al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tadid (279-289/892-902). In 282/895 the caliph delayed the deadline for collecting the *kharāj* from 11 April, namely during the Persian new year, to 27 June, so that the new year was called *al-Nawrūz al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tadadī* (al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tadid's New Year). The reason for this delay was that the traditional collection of the *kharāj* usually took place when the crops were not yet ripe. The delay would enable farmers to pay with the receipts from their spring harvest. He also looked into renovating the irrigation system; for example, he had the sediment of Dujayl canal cleared. In connection with al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tadid's concern with water distribution, al-Ṣābī relates the following anecdote. Several peasants in the Bādūriyya area complained to the caliph that some of the holders of the estates which were irrigated from the Euphrates had plotted with the official engineers to narrow the gates of the dams located at the bank of the <sup>c</sup>Īsā river so that they could monopolize the use of the water. The caliph then sent his vizier

along with the engineers to study the case on the spot, with the result that the committee verified the claim of the peasants of the area and decided to widen the middle gate of the dam to 25 dhirā (cubit). In addition, al-Mu tadid attempted to give the peasants loans to buy seed and cows. 303

Another authority who paid attention to the condition of the peasantry was al-Muqtadīr's vizier 'Alī b. 'Īsā. It is reported that he sent letters periodically to his governors in which he asked them to treat subjects fairly in paying the taxes and ordered them to work seriously and diligently in restoring farmlands. He believed that good maintenance of the irrigation system was a major factor in the prosperity of the country. When he was asked about the causes of the country's decline at that time, he answered, "The most important thing the *amīr* should think about and make it his priority is to repair the damages to the rivers; this is the root of the ruin and decline of the Sawād." 304

The efforts which had been undertaken during the time of Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla to bring about prosperity were fruitful. There were measures taken to repair the dams of the Rafil river and Bādūriyya. It is said that Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla brought the soil himself and went to Nahrawānāt and closed the holes in the damaged dams. Through these efforts Baghdād grew prosperous and the price of 20 pounds of bread eventually went down to one *dirham*. In this manner, the holders of the *iqṭā* and the guarantors and the farmers were greatly concerned with the maintenance of agriculture throughout the Sawād. 305

On the one hand, Mu<sup>\*</sup>izz al-Dawla wanted to repair and improve the irrigation system and was concerned about lands that had been ruined and those which were left uncultivated. On the other, he wanted to maintain his policy of granting military iqtā's to link his soldiers with the land. As a result, the damage to the irrigation system and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>303</sup> Al-Dūrī, *Tārīkh*, 39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>304</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

agriculture continued to occur because the central government failed to control its soldiers, nor was it able to enforce its will until 367/977 when 'Adud al-Dawla came to power.<sup>306</sup>

In the year 367/977 Adud al-Dawla became the master of 'Iraq. During the period 367-372/977-982, the government showed its good intentions and exercised administrative power which had diminished since the time of Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla. The government recovered its power in 'Iraq and showed a better understanding than before for the needs of the country and was better able to put into action its attempts for restoring agriculture. He started his agricultural improvements in 369/979. His principal aim was to restore the irrigation system and improve the method of tax collection. In Baghdād there were many canals which irrigated the city and surrounding areas like 'Isā River, Dajjāj River and Anbār mosque River between al-Qalāin River and Tābiq River and Bazzāzīn River. He had new canals dug and waterways cleared, and the breaches in the Nahrawān River near Baghdād closed. He restored the canals which were already damaged in the Sawad and built several dams and bridges over the mouths (afwah) of the rivers. He asked his subjects to go back to cultivating the land and guaranteed them his special concern with water resources, charging his inspectors to maintain those water resources day and night, and to widen the River of Nahrbayan which met the Tigris with Dujail al-Ahwāz.307 "He reclaimed all lands held by tax-farmers and fief holders and administered them directly through the government officials." 308

'Adud al-Dawla decided a regular method for collecting taxes. During his reign (367-372/978-983) he provided his subjects with sound principles and omitted unimportant additions or interpretations. He also maintained the custom of collecting the land-taxes at the New Year of al-Mu'tadid in order to accord with the harvest time. He

<sup>306</sup> Ibid

<sup>307</sup> Ibid., 46; Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 2, 406-7; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 8, 518; Rūdhrāwarī, *Dhayl Tajārib*, 66.

<sup>308</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 149.

built water scoops, dug wells and constructed many springs. In addition, he showed his concern for cultivators and encouraged them to register instances of unjust treatment and address complaints to which he tried to respond even though this often meant that he had to take action against the holders of military  $iqt\bar{a}$ 's.<sup>309</sup>

This period of peace and relative prosperity, however, was of short duration. When 'Adud al-Dawla died in 372/983, there was rivalry among the Buwayhid *amīrs*, and none of them had the time or the inclination to follow the policy of his competent predecessor. Yāqūt mentions that in 385/995 Fakhr al-Mulk closed the broken dam on the Nahrawān river. <sup>310</sup> In 395/1004 Abū al-'Abbās b. Wāṣil excavated a canal between Baṣra and Ahwāz at an equal distance from Bayān river. Apart from these projects the Arabic sources have not much to tell us, but reports on the damage and poverty of the last ten years of the fourth century/tenth century, which included ruinous floods. <sup>311</sup>

During Bahā' al-Dawla's reign and that of his successors there was no report of their concern with agricultural affairs in the sense that they tried to improve the conditions of the peasantry and to restore the damaged dams and wastelands. Accomplishing this, however, meant increasing the budget, whereas they were always short of money to pay their soldiers. Therefore, they resorted to illegal methods of getting revenues such as confiscations and fines of the dismissed officials and the sale of offices

It can be concluded from what has been explained above that during the tenth century, powerful rulers and far-sighted viziers kept the irrigation system running well. They assisted the farmers who needed financial help and seeds for their crops and attempted to put the collection of the taxes on the fair basis by postponing its date until

<sup>309</sup> Al-Dūrī, Tārīkh, 46; Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 2, 407.

<sup>310</sup> Yāqūt, Mu jam al-Udabā' wa Irshād al-'Arīb ilā Ma rifat al-Adīb, vol. 1 (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1991), 239; Dūrī, Tārīkh, 47.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid; see al-Ṣābī, Rasā'il al-Ṣābī, vol. 1 (Libanon, 1898), 444; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil vol.9. 159.

the harvest time. The capable Buwayhid *amīrs* also tried to protect the peasants from the oppression of the soldiers.<sup>312</sup> However, in the later period of the Buwayhid regime, namely after the death of 'Aḍud al-Dawla, there is no historical record of the Buwayhids' concern with the improvement of agricultural condition of 'Irāq. Perhaps this is one of the many factors contributed to the decline of the economy of the empire in general, and the decline of the Buwayhids in particular.

<sup>312</sup> Al-Dūrī, *Tārīkh*, 47.

# CHAPTER TWO : POLITICS OF AL-QĀDIR BILLĀH

#### **CHAPTER TWO:**

# POLITICS OF AL-QADIR BILLAH

#### I. Background of al-Qādir's life

# A. Sketch of al-Qadir's life before he ascended to the caliphate

The sources tell us very little about the life of al-Qādir before he became caliph. What information does exist consists mainly in the form of anecdotes which are hard to verify. By contrast, however, his life after he became caliph is recorded in some detail by historians, especially Ibn al-Jawzī and Miskawayh. One reason for obscurity surrounding al-Qādir's early life is that he was not heir apparent to the preceding caliph and was therefore not all that worthy of notice by the chroniclers. Nevertheless, in spite of the scarcity of sources on al-Qādir's life, we will include in this section some of the surviving anecdotes about him, which may shed light on his life and career.

Al-Qādir billāh's name was Aḥmad b. Isḥāq b. al-Muqtadir with the patronymic Abū al-ʿAbbās. He was born on Tuesday, 9 Rabī al-Awwal 336/947. His mother was a pious woman called Tumnā or Dumnā, a slave girl of ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. al-Muqtadir. Although some historians describe him as a learned caliph, the details of al-Qādir's youth and upbringing are unknown, for most Arabic sources do not mention his teachers or what he studied. However, al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī provide us with some information about al-Qādir's education. Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, on the authority of al-Qādī Abū al-Qāsim al-Tanūkhī, says that Abū Bashar Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Harawī (d. 385/995), the Shāfī te faqīh (jurist), served the Commander of the Faithful al-Qādir billāh before he became caliph and taught him Shāfī te jurisprudence (fiqh). In addition, he may have taught the caliph hadīths, reports (akhbār), and literature (adab), since he was an expert on these sciences. Al-

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Abū Bashar Ahmad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Ja'far al-Harawī known as al-'Ālim was born in Herāt in 328/939 and lived in Baghdād. He was a teacher of al-Qādir and the qādī al-Husayn and many others who related hadīths on his authority. He

Qādir is said to have written a book (*kitāb*)<sup>2</sup> which contained the principles of faith, the superiority of the Companions according to the arrangement of the Traditionists; the virtues of the caliph 'Abd al-'Azīz and the doctrines of the Mu'tazilites and others who maintained the createdness of the Qur'ān.<sup>3</sup> Neither Ibn al-Jawzī nor Miskawayh names al-Qādir's teachers, but they do mention his moral qualities. The former quotes al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī as saying that al-Qādir was pious and devout, spent most of his nights in prayer (*ṣalāt al-taḥajjud*), held correctly to the creed, was righteous and generous to an extent that his piety and beneficence became well known.<sup>4</sup>

It seems that al-Baghdādī's account of al-Qādir's piety and reputation was quoted and embellished by later historians in several different versions. Some, like Tiqtaqā, describe him as one of the best 'Abbāsid caliphs, who was able to restore the prestige of the dynasty, increase its glory and regain its power. Miskawayh for one maintains that al-Qādir was an "anchorite" and an ascetic, who committed no blunder and assumed responsibility without neglect. Ibn al-'Imrānī, adding to Miskawayh's statement, says that al-Qādir did not drink wine and never did an injustice to anybody. Others, like Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn al-Athīr describe him more moderately. Ibn al-Jawzī holds that al-Qādir was well-mannered, beneficent and inclined to do good deeds and dedicated himself to religious devotions. Ibn al-Athīr says that he was mild-tempered, beneficent, benevolent, loved good deeds and their doers and called people to perform them while

died in 385/995. He assumed the office of hisba in Madīnat al-Salām and became a qādi of Ṭassūjī Maskin, Qutrabul and Adharbayjān. (see Tārīkh Baghdād, vol. 5 (al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Khanjī, 1921), 89; al-Suyūṭī, Tārīkh al-Khulafā' (Beirūt: Dār al-Qalam, 1986), 469; al-Asnawī, Tabaqāt al-Shāfī'iyya, vol. 2 (Baghdād: Maṭba'at al-Irshād, [1970-1]), 208.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Kitāb here means more probably epistle, not a book in the strict sense. It will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 161.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Ibn Țiqțaqā, al-Fakhrī, 282.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Miskawyh, Eclipse, vol. 6, 218.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Ibn al-'Imrānī, al-Inbā' fī Tārīkh al-Khulafā', taḥqīq Qāsim al-Sāmarrā'ī (Leiden: Nāshiriyyat al-Ma'had al-Hūlandī li al-Āthār al-Miṣriyya wa al-Buḥūth al-'Arabiyya, 1973), 186-187

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol.7, 160.

trying to prevent evil deeds and hated those who performed them. He also says that he held a sound creed and was endowed with dignity (hayba), which inspired fear and obedience in his people. How far this remark contains the truth needs to be examined later when we discuss his relations with the sultans, troops, religious personalities and 'ayyārūn (vagabonds, bandits).

Ibn al-Jawzī mentions a story which indicates how well al-Qādir was versed in poetry, revealing as well his ascetic attitude in the following report of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Abhary who said," I was sent by Bahā° al-Dawla with a letter to al-Qādir billāh. When he permitted me to come in, I heard him reciting these verses:

Destiny precedes the existing being and Allāh is the guarantor of your livelihood.

You are able to spare what suffices you and leave behind what you have already collected as though you feel secure in the events which will happen to you.

Do you not see the world and the perdition of its inhabitants, O ye the unfaithful!

Do good deeds for the day you will leave it.

Know that you have no guarantee for what you amass and become the treasurer of others. 10

O ye inhabitants of the world! You dwell in an abode whose occupant will not be allowed to stay forever along with his destiny.

Death as you know is something real, but you neglect to remember it.

Death does never consult as to whom it will take on a given day, neither does it ask for permission. 11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kāmil*, vol.9, 415.

<sup>10</sup> Perhaps what al Qādir meant by this phrase is that the wealth which someone collects will not benefit him in hereafter if it is not used in the paths of Allāh.

<sup>11</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 163.

I said, Praise be to God who enables the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* to compose such verses, understand their meaning and put them into practice. He said, O Abū al-Ḥasan, we will receive Allāh's favour if He inspires us to remember Him and enables us to thank Him. Haven't you heard the sayings of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī who, when he was asked about the people of disobedience, said, They abased Him, so they disobeyed Him. If they exalted Him, He would protect them from becoming disobedient." <sup>12</sup>

To illustrate al-Qādir's beneficence, Ibn al-Jawzī quotes al-Qādī al-Ḥusaynī, <sup>13</sup> who relates that al-Qādir continued to send salaries every year to their recipients without cutting them. If one of them died, the money was given to his heirs. <sup>14</sup> Al-Qādir used to distribute meals which he had prepared to break his fast during the month of Ramadān in three portions: one portion was reserved for himself, another brought to the mosque of al-Ruṣāfa and the last portion sent to the mosque of al-Madīna (Madīnat al-Salām or Baghdād) and the food was also distributed to the neighbours and the poor. <sup>15</sup>

Al-Qādir appears to have lived in simplicity and used to wear ordinary clothes. In addition, Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Malik al-Ḥamdānī¹6 relates that al-Qādir used to visit the tombs of the saints like those of Maʿrūf (al-Karkhī, the Ṣūfī saint) and Ibn Bashar. There is an anecdote telling of al-Qādir's habit of visiting the tombs of saints and his stand against injustice related by al-Qādī al-Ḥusayn b. Ḥārūn:¹7

An orphan who was still a minor inherited a shop which brought in a good profit. I was told by Ibn Hājib al-Nu mān, al-Qādir's secretary, to remove the hijr

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> He was al-Ḥusayn b. Hārūn Abū 'Abdillāh al-Dabbī al-Qāḍī (see note 17).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 161-162.

<sup>15</sup> Thid

<sup>16</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi in al-Muntazam relates many accounts on al-Hamadhānī's authority. He was the chronicler and the author of Takmilat Tārīkh al-Tabarī He died as late as 521/1127. D. M. Dunlop, Arab Civilization to AD 1500 (Singapore: Longman, 1971), 90.

<sup>17</sup> Al-Ḥusayn b. Hārūn (whose kvnya was) Abū 'Abdillāh al-Dabbī was born in 320/932 and became a  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  at al-Karkh section, and then for the west side (of Baghdād), Kūfa and two sides of the Euphrates. He first became a deputy  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  for Ibn Ma'rūf in 376, and one year later he was deposed from his post and then moved to Baṣra, where he died in 398/1007. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 240.

(prohibition) <sup>18</sup> and give his friend a right to buy it. I did not comply with his order and said to his servant who was sent to me, 'Go ahead, I will follow you.' I visited the tomb of Ma rūf and Ibn Bashar and prayed to God to protect me from al-Nu mān's mischief. An old man saw me praying and asked me, For whom do you make a supplication?' I said, 'For Ibn Ḥājib al-Nu mān who asked me to do something (I told him about the orphan's property). When I came to Ibn al-Nu mān, he was angry with me and refused my apology. Then a servant came and gave him a piece of paper. When he opened and read it, the complexion of his face changed; he calmed down and asked for my forgiveness and said, 'Did you tell the caliph about this?' I said, 'No.' I realized that the old man I met was the caliph. <sup>19</sup>

The noble character of al-Qādir can also be seen in his treatment of his cousin al-Tā'i' lillāh (Abū Bakr 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Faḍl al-Mutī' lillāh b. Ja'far b. al-Muqtadir ) who was deposed by Bahā' al-Dawla. If we trace the previous history of the 'Abbāsids and the Umayyads alike, we find many instances when the caliphs who were deposed by their own family were treated badly, even sometimes to the extent of being cruelly murdered out of fear. Nothing could have been further from al-Qādir's mind when in 382/992 he took al-Ṭā'i' to his palace and assigned him a lodging and put him in the charge of some of his confidential servants. Al-Qādir treated his predecessor kindly and attentively and gave him the same service as he had enjoyed when he was in power. Ibn al-Jawzī gives an illustration of how al-Ṭā'i' demanded even better treatment than he had received during his reign, finding an excuse to complain on many occasions. For example, one day when he was given a bottle of perfume, he said, "Is it the perfume Abū al-'Abbās uses?" They confirmed this. He then said, "Tell him that in such and such a house of frankincense there is a kind of perfume which I used to consume, so send me some of it." In the matter of food he always made special demands

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Hijr in Islamic law means a prohibition of action with regard to a particular person, who is either an infant, an idiot or a slave (see Thomas Patrick Hughes' A Dictionary of Islam; being an encyclopaedia of the doctrines, rites ceremonies, and customs, together with technical and theological terms of the Muhammedan religion (Clifton, N.J. Reference Book Publishers, 1965), 174).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 162.

Neither Ibn al-Jawzi nor Miskawayh mentions the names of al-Tā'i's confidential servants.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 6, 260.

as well. Therefore, al-Qādir assigned him a special maidservant from among the caliph's cooks to present him with what he needed every day.<sup>22</sup> It is said that al-Qādir was more concerned with what was prepared for his predecessor than what he had done for himself. Al-Ṭā'i' enjoyed this kind treatment till he died in 393/993.<sup>23</sup> Al-Qādir buried his resentment of the wounds that al-Ṭā'i's autocracy and mischief had inflicted on him when the latter had been in power.<sup>24</sup>

Though the above mentioned anecdotes may contain some exaggerations, especially on al-Qādir's moral virtues, the chroniclers seem to have agreed on his piety. However, Miskawayh's remark on his relation with al-Ṭā'i that he paid more concern to his brother than to himself, is hard to be ascertained because as we will see later, al-Qādir took harsh measures against al-Ṭā'i s relatives whom the caliph suspected of plotting against him.

# B. Al-Qadir's accession to the caliphate

Al-Qādir became caliph after al-Ṭā'i' had been seized and deposed by the Buwayhid amīr Bahā' al-Dawla in 381/991. The reason for his deposition was that Bahā' al-Dawla needed money to pay his troublesome troops. Before deposing the caliph, he had already seized his vizier Sābūr b. Ardashīr in order to appropriate his wealth, but it did not suffice him. When one of his courtiers, Abū al-Ḥasan b. al-Mu'allim 27, exaggerated to Bahā' al-Dawla the property and the treasury of the caliph al-Ṭā'i', the sulṭān's rapacity was excited and he did not hesitate to arrest the caliph. 28

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 6, 200.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> 'Utbī, *Tārīkh Yamīnī* (The Kitāb-i-Yamīnī:historical memories of the Amīr Sabaktagin [Sabuktagin] and the Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna), translated from the Persian of the contemporary Arabic chronicle by James R. Reynolds (London: Translation Fund; Paris:Rupart, 1858), 349.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 3, 201.

 $<sup>^{26}</sup>$  Ibn Khaldūn,  $T\bar{a}r\bar{\imath}kh$  Ibn Khaldūn , vol. 3, 908; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam , vol. 7, 169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> His full name was Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Kawkabī, who held the bureau of literary compositon, *Dīwān al-Inshā* . Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 6, 160.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol.3, 201; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol.9, 79.

According to Ibn al-Athīr, Bahā' al-Dawla was encouraged by Abū al-Ḥasan b. al-Muʿallim to seize al-Ṭā'iʿ's wealth and he bade him do so.<sup>29</sup> But according to al-ʿUtbī, al-Ṭā'iʿ was himself at fault because he had evaded Bahā' al-Dawla's just counsel in administering affairs and had opposed him in various matters.<sup>30</sup>Al-ʿUtbī's statement seems to be tendentious in justifying al-Ṭā'iʿ's deposition since al-ʿUtbī was a courtier of Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, a stout supporter of al-Qādir. In any case, al-Ṭā'iʿ's deposition due to his evasion of Bahā' al-Dawla's good counsels, which possibly incited the latter's displeasure, cannot be confirmed from Miskawayh's *Tajārīb* or Ibn al-Jawzī's *Muntazam*.

Thus encouraged by his courtiers and motivated by his want of money. Bahā' al-Dawla sent his men to al-Ṭā'i', asking to be granted an audience for the renewal of his allegiance to the caliph. When he received Bahā' al-Dawla and some of his Daylamite troops in his palace, the latter, pretending to kiss the caliph's hand, dragged him till he fell from his throne crying out," Surely we are Allāh's and to Him we shall surely return"<sup>31</sup>, and asking for mercy, but nobody helped him. Bahā' al-Dawla's troop seized and covered him with a piece of cloth and then brought him immediately to Bahā' al-Dawla's house where he was forced to abdicate. All properties belonging to him were taken. <sup>32</sup>This action caused confusion among the people and a number of troops assembled so that those who did not know what really happened thought that it was the Buwayhid amūr Bahā' al-Dawla who had been seized and so they started to plunder people's properties, and some of them took the clothes of those who attended the meeting among the dignitaries and court witnesses. <sup>33</sup>Al-Ṭā'i' was then delivered to al-Qādir once the latter assumed the caliphate and he remained with him till he died in the year

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 79.

<sup>30 &#</sup>x27;Utbī, Tārīkh Yamīnī, 346.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Qur'ān ii:156, the verse is to be recited when a Muslim gets bad news or receives a misfortune.

<sup>32</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 79.

<sup>33</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 156.

393/993.<sup>34</sup> Al-Ṭā'i's wife, Bahā' al-Dawla's sister, was brought to a house in *Mashra'* al-Ṣakhr (Ṣakhra Quay) and Bahā' al-Dawla provided her with the means of subsistence and assigned her fiefs till she died in 386/996.<sup>35</sup>

Before compelling al-Ṭā'i to abdicate, Bahā' al-Dawla asked his troops who would be an appropriate candidate for the caliphate; all agreed to choose al-Qādir for the post. 36 He announced the transfer of authority to al-Qādir in the markets and then drew up a document in the name of al-Ṭā'i wherein the latter rendered his office to al-Qādir, after having reigned for seventeen years and five days. 37 His abdication was made in such a way that it seemed as though al-Ṭā'i himself had voluntarily abdicated and rendered his sovereignty to al-Qādir, and it was formally attested by the *sharīfs* and *qādīs* (judges) on Sunday, the next day after al-Ṭā'i's seizure. Al-Qādir was informed about this and was asked to come (to Baghdād) as soon as possible. The Turks and the Daylamites mutinied, however, demanding their share of accession-money and preventing the caliph's personal name to be mentioned in the Friday *khutba* of 25 Ramaḍān 38 (probably 25 Sha'bān) 381/991, although a supplication was made for him as follows: "O God, prosper servant and deputy (caliph) al-Qādir billāh," omitting the

<sup>34</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 80.

<sup>35</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 163; Mikawayh, Eclipse, vol. 6, 219.

<sup>36</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 79-80

<sup>37</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 6, 215.

<sup>38</sup> There is confusion of the date of al-Ta'i's seizure and al-Qadir's mention in the khutba in Ibn al-Jawzī's Muntazam. His account of al-Tā'i's seizure is on 19 Ramadān, but Miskawayh and Ibn al-Athir do not mention the date of this event or the refusal of the Turks and the Daylamites to include the caliph's name in the khutba on 25 Ramadan, but Ibn al-Jawzi says that they restored the khutba on the caliph's name on yawm al-Jum'a al-thālith min Ramadān (on Friday, 3 Ramadān or may be the third Friday of the month of Ramadān, since there are four Jum'a prayers every month). Both meanings are doubtful for two reasons: first, if 25 Ramadān fell on Friday, the next (fourth Friday) must be on 2 Shawwal; secondly, if we take that the third Friday meant 3 Ramadan, this contradicts his statement on the date of al-Ta'i's deposition, i.e., 19 Ramadan, but is in accord with Miskawayh who mentions that the khutba in the caliph's name took place on 3 Ramadan and entered the caliphal palace on 12 Ramadan. Ibn al-Jawzi may have mistaken in determining the date particularly of al-Ta"i's seizure (19 Ramadan), which must be on 19 or more probably, 25 Sha ban. This speculation perhaps can be confirmed with the letter of al-Qadir sent to Baha' al-Dawla in answering the latter's information on al-Ta'i's deposition and his invitation to al-Qadir to come to Baghdad, which was written on 27 Sha'bān.

caliph's full name (Ahmad b. Isḥāq b. al-Muqtadir Abū al-ʿAbbās). After Bahāʾ al-Dawla negotiated with the army and promised to give 800 *dirhams* a head, they agreed to pay allegiance and restore the name of the caliph to the *khuṭba* on Friday, 3 Ramaḍān (Nov. 13, 991).<sup>39</sup>

Before al-Qādir was invited to the caliphal palace to assume his new office, there had been secret correspondence between him and Bahā' al-Dawla, probably written after the deposition of al-Ṭā'i'. Hilāl al-Ṣābī found the letter written by al-Qādir billāh sent from al-Ṣalīq<sup>40</sup>to Bahā' al-Dawla. The text of the letter is quoted in full in *al-Muntazam*, and its translation is as follows:

In the name of Allāh, the Merciful, the Beneficent - From the servant of Allāh Aḥmad al-Imām al-Qādir billāh, Amīr al-Mu'minīn (The Commander of the Believers) to Bahā' al-Dawla wa-Diyā' al-Milla Abū Naṣr b. 'Aḍud al-Dawla wa-Tāj al-Milla, the patron of the Commander of the Believers. Peace be upon you, the Commander of the Believers raises his praise to Allāh, of whom we say that there is no God but He and ask that He bless Muḥammad, His servant and Messenger. Now then, may God prolong your life, perpetuate your glory, extend His support to you and bestow the favour and benefaction of the Commander of the Faithful upon you. Your letter brought by al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. Naṣr - may Allāh protect him - was handed to Amīr al-Mu'minīn following and adding to the one which had already preceded it, 41 the content of which is the same as the one before it, i.e., the consensus of the Muslims, the common people and the elite alike, before you and with your attestation to depose the transgressor, whose title is al-Ṭā'i', from the leadership of the community and to remove him from the caliphate due to his continued misfortune and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 6, 125; Ibn al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, vol.7, 157

<sup>40</sup> Salīq was a name for several places (or towns) in the swamps of Wāsit, where a palace of Muhadhdhib al-Dawla Abū Naṣr lay between them and Baghdād. Muhadhdhib al-Dawla took possession of the region from 'Imrān b. Shāhin. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Mu'jam al-Buldān, vol. 3 (Beirūt: Dār Beirūt, 1957), 421. G. LeStrange mentions that there were three towns which collectively called Ṣalīq: al-Jawāmid "the Dried Lands", al-'Ukr on the Nahr al-Sīb, and al-Shadīdīya on the Nahr Barduda. G. LeStrange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, Mesopotamia, Persia/Central Asia from the Muslim Conquest to the time of Timur (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1930), 41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>There must have been a letter sent to the caliph before this letter. However, the chroniclers do not provide us with it.

concealed wrong intentions and confession of his refusal and failure. <sup>42</sup>Added to this was the renunciation of the people's oath of allegiance and their revocation of his contract and protection and the positive response of all classes of people and their agreement to make their oath of allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful with happiness and great expectation. All this happened smoothly as a result of your good consultation with all Muslims and the good order you have established for the sake of Allāh and the Commander of the Believers, so that you have raised His religion in the remote districts and have established the da'wa in the provinces for the sake of Allah. You have revealed the truth which the transgressor concealed and you have set up the pillar of the religion that the deposed rejected and the Commander of the Believers stands on. The Amīr al-Mu'minin knew all the affairs (of al-Ta'i') and your ardour alike. May Allah perpetuate His support for you because you have been singled out for this glorious deed, and as such you have deserved the exalted position from Allah the Exalted One and from the Amīr al-Mu minīn. This position rests on you, and the uncertainty about it was removed so that you succeeded in attaining the Commander of the Believer's remembrance and his pride in this world and deserving His reward in the hereafter. So may Allah reward you generously for these deeds sooner or later and bestow upon you His guide and support so that you may continue the success of the Commander of the Faithful, for through your hand his glory is maintained. He makes you a very special assistant because you are foremost in paying allegiance and in showing sincerity to him. Therefore, you have become the sword of the Commander of the Faithful against his enemies. You are endowed with sound opinion while others are not and you are the only guardian of his properties and his subjects and mediator between him and Allāh's trust in his authority. You have already hoisted the banner of the Commander of the Faithful from al-Saliq and have carried it towards his abode which you guarded and to the place of his glory which you have built and to his palace of which you are its pillar and to the millstone of his empire of which you are its axis. The Commander of the Believers puts his confidence in you as a sincere person in his obedience and partisanship. You are honest in your intention and conviction which originate from the sort of competence which could not be compared with that of the close and the distant person. You are able

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Perhaps al-Ṭā'i's refusal to fulfill Bahā' al-Dawla's demand for money when the latter's troops asked him ascession money.

to exceed every predecessor and surpass every leader, weaken every enemy, silence the exalted and the equal alike and everybody realizes that he is far behind you and is not on a parallel with you; you love your position while he fails to exceed you and stand outside your position and keeps away from it. The Commander of the Believers found al-Hasan b. Muḥammad b. Naṣr (Bahā' al-Dawla's courier) - may Allāh protect him - endorsing your description with his task, implementing your praise and fulfilling what you have qualified and appointed him to do in travelling in his service and to carry out the orders which are assigned to him. The Commander of the Believers knew that you did not give orders to meethim save with the most trustworthy of your special followers and the most amply endowed among them. Therefore, the Commander of the Believers appreciates your reliance on him and includes him in the rank of his ideal predecessors. May Allah perpetuate His support of you and reward your good habits and lofty conduct in deputyship. The Commander of the Believers ends his letter and looks forward (to an answer) if Allah will. Peace be upon you and the blessing of Allah and His grace (indicating the close of the letter). This letter was written on Saturday night, 27 Shaban 381/7 November 991.43

This is a quite long letter which basically contains a justification of Bahā' al-Dawla's measures against al-Ṭā'i' and the caliph's appreciation of the sultān's trust in his ability to assume the office of the caliphate. However, such a long letter contains also exaggerated praise for the sultān and illustrates the caliph's dependence on him and his weakness. In addition, al-Qādir's remarks that the deposition of al-Ṭā'i' was based on the consensus of all Muslims, the common people and the elite is not true. None among the chroniclers mention that Bahā' al-Dawla's decision to seize al-Ṭā'i' was made after the amār had consulted the dignitaries and the elite, except for his consultation with his commanders of the army. The abdication of al-Ṭā'i' was actually witnessed by some scholars and judges to get their legitimacy. It is true, as we will see that at the beginning of his rule, the caliph was much more subservient to the sultān, having no administrative

<sup>43</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 159-161.

powers assigned to him. But under Bahā' al-Dawla's successors he enjoyed more liberty of action.

It is said that before al-Qādir received the news of his appointment as caliph and received the letter from Bahā' al-Dawla, he saw a dream. The story of his dream was related by Hibbat Allāh b. 'Īsā, secretary of Muhadhdhib al-Dawla, the ruler of the Batāḥa during al-Qādir's sojourn in the region. According to the story, he saw the Ṣalīt river widen to many times the width of the Tigris. There stood two solid piers on both sides. While he was wandering along the river he saw someone on the opposite side and asked him if he wanted to cross. When he said yes, the man's hand stretched out and led him to cross. Surprised by this act he asked the man who he was, receiving the reply that he was 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, who told him that sovereignty belonged to him and asked him to be kind to the 'Alids.44

There are two points which render this story suspect: first, the disguised aims behind the story, e. g. the chronicler's desire to raise the stature of the caliph and strengthen his position by claiming that he was destined to assume the caliphate thus preventing the possibility of another 'Abbāsid's claim; secondly, the story displays a Shī'ite character, implying that 'Alī as the first imām was always concerned about his descendants and partisans, thus justifying the Shī'ite political cause. The author of the story must have had Shī'ite loyalties and for that reason tried to show that al-Qādir's good relations with the 'Alid *sharīfs* and the Buwayhids had something to do with this dream.

When the abdication of al-Ṭā'i' came through, al-Qādir was in Baṭīḥa, 45 where he had gone two years and eleven months previously after quarrelling with his cousin al-

<sup>44</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 6, 219.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Al-Baṭīḥa (the marshland) is applied to a meadowlike basin which is exposed to inundation and is therefore swampy. It is particularly applied by the Arab authors of the 'Abbāsid period to the very extensive swampy area on the lower course of the Euphrates and the Tigris between Kūfa and Wāsiṭ in the north and Baṣra in the south. It is sometimes adjoined to Baṭīḥa Kūfa, Wāsiṭ or Baṣra. M. Streck [Ṣaleḥ al-ʿĀlī], "Baṭīḥa." E.I., new ed., vol. 1, 1093. It seems that Ṣalīq and Baṭīha mentioned here are names for the place,

Tā'i' and where he took refuge with Muhadhdhib al-Dawla. 46 He was forced to flee on Monday, 22 Jumādā al-Ākhira 379/989, when al-Ṭā'i' fillāh sent Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Ḥājib al-Nuʿmān, his secretary, to al-Qādir billāh in order to take him prisoner. The reason for this was that when Isḥāq b. al-Muqtadir the father of al-Qādir had died, al-Qādir got into an argument with his sister, Amīna, a daughter of Muʿjiba⁴7, over a state-owned estate and this problem became the cause of an endless feud between them. During this time al-Ṭā'iʿ had fallen sick, and yet on his recovery, Amīna led al-Qādir to al-Ṭā'iʿ and said, "He tried to take over the caliphate when you were sick and made correspondence with the leaders of the state." Al-Ṭā'iʿ assumed that the story was true and became displeased with him. He then sent Ibn Ḥājib b. al-Nuʿmān and Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī Tammām al-Zaynabī with a group of people to seize al-Qādir in his residence in the Ḥarīm al-Ṭāhirī (The Palace of the Ṭāhirīd family)⁴8. Fortunately, al-Qādir was able to escape in time and travelled in disguise to the Baṭīḥa (Muhadhdhib al-Dawla's domain).⁴9

After Bahā' al-Dawla and his soldiers agreed to appoint al-Qādir as caliph, he sent his deputy Abū 'Alī Muḥammad b. Naṣr and some of his men to bring him to

where the caliph took refuge and where the palace of Muhadhdhib al-Dawla was located.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> He was 'Alī b. Naṣr Abū al-Ḥasan, the ruler of the Baṭīḥa (the Swamp/Marsh) and was originally a chamberlain who usurped the throne from the hands of the successors of 'Imrān b. Shāhin, the founder of the Baṭīḥa in 373/983 and received his title from Sharaf al-Dawla, the Buwayhid amīr (see Kabir, The Buwayhid Dynasty, 84). He married the daughter of Bahā' al-Dawla and ruled the Baṭīḥa for thirty two years and several months and died in 409/1018 at the age of 72. He was famous for his benevolence and faithfulness and the Baṭīḥa under his rule was prosperous so that it became a refuge for persons in hardship, particularly due to the political crisis. (See Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 290-291).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> There is no more mention about this woman in either Miskwayh or Ibn al-Jawzī. We may speculate that she was one of al-Muqtadir's slave women.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> The Tāhirids were a dynasty founded by Tāhir b. al-Ḥusayn, a Persian mawlā, who rose to prominence during the reign of al-Ma'mūn. The latter appointed him commander of the army in the civil war between al-Ma'mūn and al-Amīn in 194/810. After the fall of Baghdād, he became governor of that city and of al-Jazīra. Finally, he wa appointed governor of Persia and the east, where for about fifty years the governorship of the province was in the hands of his descendants. Bosworth, *Islamic Dynasties*, 99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 3, 149; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 147- 148.

Baghdad to assume the caliphate. Knowing that the caliph would leave the Batiha, Muhadhdhib al-Dawla made special preparations for the occasion of his departure just as he had done when he arrived. He provided him with a large amount of money, clothing and goods worthy of a caliph, assigning him a barge for his own use and accompanying him on the way till he felt satisfied to make his farewell and then sent Hibbat Allah b. 'Isa along as a special escort to him. When he reached Wasit there was a gathering of attendants demanding accession money so that negotiations were conducted with them to the effect that they were promised that they would be treated like their counterparts in Baghdād. After settling this matter to their satisfaction, al-Qādir continued his journey, and when he arrived at Jabbul, 50 Bahā' al-Dawla, the chief Daylamites and the most distinguished of the people came down to meet him and paid an oath of allegiance. On Saturday night, 12 Ramadān 381 (Nov, 22, 991) al-Qādir entered the Dār al-Khilāfa (caliphal palace). The following morning he held a public audience and received congratulations on his accession when eulogies were recited, of which we might cite the verses of al-Radi (the 'Alid sharif' who was among the courtiers), which begin as follows:

This day ye sons of 'Abbās, Abū al-'Abbās has renewed the glory of the caliphate.

This one's hand has exalted its lofty fabric; the other it was who laid the foundations.

The peak has been kept in store by time from that firm crag.51

<sup>50</sup> Jabbul was a small town between Na'māniyya and Wāsit on the east and lay on the eastern bank, nine leagues below Jarjaraya, where there were government bake houses during the third century as witnessed by Ibn Rustah. "It was then a large hamlet, having a Friday mosque standing in the market place, and Mukaddasi descibes it as of the size of Dayr Aqul; but Yakut wrote, Jabbul had sunk to the size of a big village." (see Yāqūt, Mu'jam al-Buldān, vol.2, 102); G. LeStrange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, 38.

<sup>51</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib, vol. 3, 217.

Some of the goods that had been taken from the caliph al-Ta'i's palace were transferred to al-Qadir, and a secretary, chamberlain and ministers were assigned to him exclusively from among the partisans of Bahā' al-Dawla:52 Abū al-Fadl Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Daylamī was his secretary and 'Abd al-Wāḥid b. al-Ḥasan al-Shīrāzī became his chamberlain.53 Al-Qādir then restored the ministers of the preceding court to their places. On Thursday, 21 Shawwāl (381/991) the *sharīfs*, qādīs and witnesses gathered in al-Qādir's palaceto listen to his oath of fidelity and sincerity to Bahā' al-Dawla after the latter's oath of allegiance to the caliph.54 In Dhū al-Qa<sup>c</sup>da of this same year the latter then gave Bahā' al-Dawla another title, Ghiyāth al-Umma, in addition to the ones he already had. And perhaps to strengthen the relationship between the caliph and the amir al-umara, in 382/992 or 383/993 al-Qadir married the daughter of Baha, al-Dawla with a dowry which amounted to one hundred thousand dinārs, but she died before being transferred to the caliph's palace. 55 There is no information as to who first proposed this arrangement. We can only assume that it is the *amīr* who planned it in the hope that a descendant of his daughter could be a future caliph had she borne a male heir. Bahā' al-Dawla followed in the steps of his predecessor 'Adud al-Dawla, who had given his daughter to al-Ta<sup>3</sup>i lillah in 369/979 with a dowry of 100, 000 dinārs. 56 But up to her death this woman did not bear a son.

There is little information about the relationship between the caliph al-Qādir and Bahā' al-Dawla and between the two and the deposed caliph al-Tā'i' before al-Qādir assumed the caliphate, except as illustrated in the earlier letter and account of al-Ṭā'i's attempt to seize al-Qādir and the latter's treatment of al-Ṭā'i', the deposed caliph.<sup>57</sup> In

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Ibid., 219.

<sup>53</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 161.

<sup>54</sup> Thid

<sup>55</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 101; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 172.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vo. 5, 454.

<sup>57</sup> There is no account on whether al-Qādir's treatment of al-Ṭā'i' was consistent or not since the latter had been brought to the palace of the caliph up to his death, except the report as mentioned on page 5. Similarly there was no account that al-Qādir treated him

considering al-Ta'i's relation with Baha' al-Dawla, Ibn al-Jawzi mentions that there was correspondence between both. First, when Sharaf al-Dawla died in 379/989 and the emirate was transferred to his brother Abū Naṣr (Bahā' al-Dawla's kunya), the latter sent a letter to al-Ta'i, the content of which was not mentioned and neither was the text of the letter preserved by the chroniclers. However, since Bahā' al-Dawla sent the letter to al-Ta if after his troops had demanded accession-money and declined his offer of five to six hundred dirhams a head, we assume that he might have asked financial help from the caliph, the withholding of which would have earned the amir's displeasure. However, the correspondence ended with mutual oaths of sincerity and fidelity towards each other.<sup>58</sup> There was another letter from al-Ta'i to Bahā al-Dawla containing consolations for his father's death. And on Saturday, 10 Jumādā al-Ūlā 379/989, Abū Naṣr came to the palace of al-Ṭā'i' for the ceremony of investiture, on which occasion he was given the title Bahā al-Dawla wa-Diyā al-Milla. 59 This does not indicate that there was any enmity between al-Ta'i and Baha' al-Dawla which led to the former's deposition. However, since the caliph refused to offer financial help to Bahā' al-Dawla as mentioned above, this probably caused his displeasure.

#### II. Political career of al-Qādir billāh

In the following section we will discuss the political career of al-Qādir in an attempt to look at how far he showed his determination to restore the caliphate and to know whether his political action was assertive or submissive, and whether it can be regarded as successful or in vain. The discussion of al-Qādir's political career will be divided into internal and external measures. The former covers his relations with the Buwayhids and local amīrs, his positive actions. In addition, we will elucidate his attempts at maintaining his right to appoint his administrative and religious assistants,

badly.

<sup>58</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 148; Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 6, 158

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 148; Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 6, 160.

and more importantly his endeavour to appoint his successor. In discussing al-Qādir's external relations we will look at his initiative in maintaining his caliphate and his influence upon foreign dynasties which emerged within the Islamic empire. It includes his relations with the Fāṭimids, Sāmānids, Qarākhānids and Ghaznavids.

## A. Al-Qādir's internal political affairs

### 1. Al-Qadir's relations with the Buwayhids

Since the arrival of the Buwayhids in Baghdād, the effective power of the 'Abbāsid caliphatewas in the hands of the *amīr al-umarā*'. The caliphs had no power to organize the empire, having neither their own army to lead a holy war nor bureaucrats to depend on in administering the state, serving only as titular or nominal rulers without real power over their subjects. It was the *amīr al-umarā*' who managed and organized the state according to his inclinations and competency.

The transfer of caliphal power into the hands of the *amīr al-umarā* had already begun, as mentioned earlier, during the time of the caliph al-Rādī (323-329/934-940). But the root of this process lay in the Sāmarrā crisis from 247-256/861-870 during which time four caliphs succeeded one another in rapid fashion, of whom three were subsequently assassinated. The office of the Commander of the Faithful was no more than a "plaything in the hands of rival military factions" leading to the paralysis of the central government and allowing disaffection and disintegration to flourish freely in the provinces. 60

The caliph, according to E. Tyan, no longer had, in fact, any ministers in his service except a secretary, or  $k\bar{a}tib$ , in the way of a steward charged with the administration of his personal fortune. 61 The sultan 62 or  $am\bar{a}r$  al-umara  $\bar{a}$  took into his

<sup>60</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 6, 197.

<sup>61</sup> Tyan's remark that the caliph had no longer ministers except a secretary is misleading because up to the time of Buwayhid period, when the caliph was undermined by the Buwayhid amīrs, he still had officials; al-Qādir's secretary was Ibn Hājib al-Nu'mān, and his chamberlain was 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Ṣamad Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shīrāzī.

hands all public responsibilities, particularly all the functions of a civil or military character as governor of Baghdād.<sup>63</sup> This was even true during the reign of al-Qādir, in spite of the fact that Buwayhid power had began to decline as a result of internal conflict and the increasing power of the principalities in the neighbouring regions. The rivalries between Turkish and the Daylamite troops within the Buwayhid army coupled with sectarian conflicts aggravated the situation.

The accession of al-Qādir took place shortly after that of Abū Naṣr Fayrūz Khwashad, who bore the title Bahā' al-Dawla, son of 'Aḍud al-Dawla. Al-Qādir succeeded his cousin al-Ṭā'i' in 381/991, for which he was indebted to the amīr Bahā' al-Dawla, who had succeeded his brother Sharaf al-Dawla in Baghdād in 379/989. If the reign of Bahā' al-Dawla, as we will see, marked the beginning of the collapse of the Buwayhids, the reign of the caliph al-Qādir marked the restoration of the 'Abbāsid caliphate if not in terms of real power at least in those of prestige. To restore the real power of the 'Abbāsid caliphate was almost impossible because when the Buwayhids became masters of the territories under 'Abbāsid rule, the empire was on the verge of anarchy. Due to the confusion following the death of the caliph al-Muqtadir and the incessant rivalry that characterizedthe rule of the various amīrs al-umarā', the remarkable

<sup>62</sup> The word sultān has its root in the Qur'ān: xiv.12. 13; xiv.26; xv. 42; xvi. 101, 102; xviii.67; xxx: 20 in its general meaning of power. The earliest tradition of the term we heard is, al-sultān zill Allāh fi al-ard: "Govermental power (ruler) is the shadow of Allāh upon earth." In the following centuries we find several 'Abbāsid caliphs called sultān i.e., al-Manṣūr (Ṭab. iii, 426), al-Muwaffaq (Ṭab. iii. 894) and al-Qādir (al-'Utbī, Kitāb Yamīnī, 265). The title of sultān was also given to the great usurpers of the power of the caliph beside the laqab amīr al-umarā'; the Buwayhids. Ibn al-Athīr (ix. 92) says that Maḥmūd of Ghazna obtained the title of sultān from the caliph al-Qādir. The first Ghaznavid on whose coins the title appears is Ibrāhīm (1053-1099). The Fāṭimids also used the epithet Sulṭān al-Islam (Ibn Yūnus, Leiden MS); the Saljuq Tughril Beg in 1051 was given the sultan by the caliph al-Qā'im and was called al-Sulṭān Rukn al-Dawla (al-Rawandī, Rāḥat al-Ṣudūr, G.M.S., p. 105; Tughril Beg was also the first Muslim ruler whose coins bear the epithet or rather title Sulṭān al-Mu'azzam (Lane Pool, Cat. of Oriental Coins in the Brit. Mus, iii,28). This fact makes it very probable that the Saljuqs were the first for whom Sulṭān had become a regular title for a ruler and it was adopted by later rulers. J.H. Kramers, "Sulṭān," in E.I., first ed., vol. 4, 543-546.

<sup>63</sup> E.Tyan, Institutions du droit public Musulman, vol. 2 (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1956), 87.

administrative machinery which had been built up by a generation of capable rulers and ministers had to a great extent broken down. In addition, since the time of the Buwayhid rise to power there had appeared many *amūs* of municipalities within the empire, so that Buwayhid control of the central government (or western caliphate) had shrunk so much as to consist of no more than 'Irāq itself.

The territory of the north-west of 'Irāq, the province of Jazīra and Aleppo (North Syria) were in the hands of the Ḥamdānids (293-394/905-1004). Baḥrayn and Yamāma and part of the Baṣra and Kūfa districts were all under the control of the Qarmaṭians. Egypt and Southern Syria were ruled by the Ikhshīdids, before they were seized by the Fāṭimid al-Mu'izz li-dīnillāh two years later. Such was the political situation when Mu'izz al-Dawla died (356/966) and was succeeded by his son Bakhtiyār.<sup>64</sup> During the reign of Bahā' al-Dawla there rose three dynasties in the vicinity of Baghdād: the Marwānids under the leadership of Ḥasan b. Marwān, who controlled Diyār Bakr, Khillat and Malāzgird;<sup>65</sup> the Mazyadid dynasty which was founded by Abū al-Ḥasan b. Mazyad of the Banū Asad tribe who controlled the lower reaches of the Euphrates with its main cities Jāmi'ayn and Hilla;<sup>66</sup> and finally, the Uqaylid dynasty founded by Muḥammad b. al-Musayyib, who took Mawṣil and the surrounding areas of al-Jazīra from Bād and the Kurds in 379/989.<sup>67</sup>

In addition, the reigns of Bahā' al-Dawla and his successors were marked by internecine quarrels and frequent troop rebellions in Baghdād. The Buwayhids were always short of money to pay the soldiers so that the latter on many occasions rose in rebellion when the *amīr* failed to satisfy their demands. Bahā' al-Dawla himself was faced on his accession with a serious rebellion of the troops who demanded accession-

<sup>64</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 14.

<sup>65</sup> Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties, 53; Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 83.

<sup>66</sup> Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties, 51; Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 84.

<sup>67</sup> Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties, 56; Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 83.

money. Since the treasury was empty, he had all his gold and silver plates melted down and the troops paid with the coins minted from them, thereby quelling the uprising.<sup>68</sup>

Bahā' al-Dawla became amū al-umarā' for twenty-four years from the date of his accession in 379/989 to his death in 403/1012. His lengthy reign, however, was barren of great events and similar in many respects to the reign of Bakhtiyār, which was marked by the rise and fall of viziers and administrators in quick succession and rivalry.<sup>69</sup> On many occasions the amū was involved in the intrigues designed to eliminate a vizier and seize his treasury. The official explanation of this practice is in many instances not entirely clear, but the result was usually the seizure of much-needed wealth. For example, in 385/995 Bahā' al-Dawla arrested his vizier al-Faḍl and seized his fortune, then transferred the vizierate to Sābūr b. Ardashīr. The latter remained in his post for two months, and then fled to the Baṭīḥa, as a consequence of which Bahā' al-Dawla appointed Abū al-'Abbās b. Sarjis as his vizier.<sup>70</sup>

The first four years of his reign were chiefly spent in fighting his brother Samṣām al-Dawla for the possession of Fārs, as mentioned above. He then left Baghdād in 384/994 and held his court in Wāsiṭ and Baṣra for the next six years, while the remaining fourteen years of his rule he spent in Shīrāz, entrusting the administration of Iraq to his deputies. He chose Shīrāz probably because he loved the city, but also he was aware that he could not satisfy the demands of his troops in Baghdād, who constantly rebelled against him. The *amīr*'s absence in Baghdād gave al-Qādir more liberty to assert himself.

Regarding the relations of al-Qādir with Bahā' al-Dawla after the latter had returned to Shīrāz, the chroniclers recorded two important events. First, the caliph's sending an envoy to the *amīr*, demanding him to punish the governor of Mawṣil,

<sup>68</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 148.

<sup>69</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 77.

<sup>70</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 128.

<sup>71</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 78.

Qirwāsh b. Abī Ḥasan, who paid allegiance to the Fāṭimids (will be discussed later in the caliph's relations with the Fāṭimids) and the caliph's rejection of Bahā' al-Dawla's appointment of al-Mūsawī to assume the office the qāḍī al-quḍāt (the details of this issue will be discussed later).

In Jumādā al-Ākhira 403/1012 Bahā al-Dawla died in Arrajān at the age of forty two. His rule had lasted for twenty four years. 72 Before his death, Bahā' al-Dawla had sent a letter to Fakhr al-Mulk in Baghdad, nominating his son Abū Shujāc (Sultan al-Dawla) as his successor and asking him to secure allegiance for Abū Shujā from the army. Sultān al-Dawla proceeded from Arrajān to Shīrāz and entrusted the government of Başra and Kirman to his brother Abū Ṭāhir Rukn al-Dawla (later known as Jalal al-Dawla) and Abū al-Fawāris, respectively.73 To arrange for his investiture and official recognition from the caliph, Sultān al-Dawla sent Fakhr al-Mulk, the vizier to Baghdād. The latter came to the caliphal palace on Thursday 1 Rabī al-Awwal 404/1013 being welcomed by Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī (b. 'Abd al-'Azīz) b. Ḥājib al-Nu mān. He kissed the ground before the caliph several times followed by the chamberlains who accompanied him. The contract of investiture and the granting of the title for Sultan al-Dawla were read by Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz.<sup>74</sup> According to Kabir, the titles given to Sultān al-Dawla were quite long, even perhaps the longest ever given to a sultān: 'Imād al-Dīn Sharaf al-Dawla Muayyid al-Milla Mughīth al-Umma Ṣafī Amīr al-Mu'minīn.75 When the reading of the contract was finished the caliph put his signature on it and the robes of honour were presented (seven in number as usual) along with a black turban, a crown embellished with jewels, two bracelets and a necklace, all made of gold. Two horses with two saddles of gold and two banners were handed over by the caliph himself. Finally the caliph gave a sword and said to his servant, "Help him put it on, it

<sup>72</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 264.

<sup>73</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 92.

<sup>74</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 266-267.

<sup>75</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 93.

signifies pride for him and for his descendants and with which he becomes conqueror of the East and the West." <sup>76</sup>This splendid ceremony, however, had unfortunate consequences, for Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin objected to the caliph's use of the phrase, "conqueror of the East and the West," <sup>77</sup> because he regarded this to be his privilege, and only his, and he sent a letter of protest to this effect. The caliph al-Qādir had therefore to apologize and mollify Maḥmūd by sending him presents. <sup>78</sup>

Sultān al-Dawla, according to his promise, came to Baghdād towards the end of the year 408 or 409/1016 or 1017. Having settled there, he insisted on having the drum beaten five times at his gate signalling five times for prayer, although the caliph protested to him. His arrival to Baghdād was in answer to the request of the Turkish troops. However, less than a year was to pass before he failed to satisfy the demands of his troops for their wages. In 411/1020 the army rose in revolt and decided to depose him in favour of his youngest brother Abū 'Alī (later known as Musharrif al-Dawla). There had been a war between Sultān al-Dawla, the ruler of Ahwāz and Fārs and Musharrif al-Dawla, the ruler of Wāsiṭ and Baṣra over the right to claim supreme power as armīr al-umarā'. The war ended in an agreement to the effect that Iraq would remain in the hands of Musharrif al-Dawla, while Ahwāz and Fārs would continue to be controlled by Sulṭān al-Dawla, with both swearing oaths not to transgress each other's domains. 80

In accordance with these stipulations, Musharrif al-Dawla entered Baghdād in 414/1023 and asked al-Qādir to meet him on the way. Accordingly, and in defiance of all tradition, the caliph set out on a barge to greet him. Their meeting took place on 28 Muḥarram 414/1023, the caliph being accompanied by both princes Abū Ja°far and Abū al-Qāsim, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, al-Murtaḍā Abū al-Qāsim al-Mūsawī,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Ibn al-Jawzî, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 266-267.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 93

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 305.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 230; Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 98.

Abū al-Ḥasan al-Zaynabī, the chief judge Ibn Abī al-Shawārib, various other 'Abbāsids, the judges, Qur'ānic reciters and jurists. Musharrif al-Dawla stepped from his vessel accompanied by his entourage and kissed the ground twice in front of the caliph. After exchanging questions about each other's health, Musharrif al-Dawla then entered into the Dār al-Mamlaka (Palace of the Sulṭān).<sup>81</sup>

Musharrif al-Dawla had been in Baghdad for a year when he heard about Sultan al-Dawla's death as a result of a drinking bout in Shīrāz in 415/1024 at the age of thirtytwo years and five months. His son Abū Kālījār was in Ahwāz and had been asked by Abū Muḥammad b. Mukram al-Awḥad to succeed his father, while the Turks wanted his uncle Abū al-Fawāris b. Bahā' al-Dawla, the ruler of Kirmān. They wrote him urging him to come to Shīrāz too, but Abū Kālījār was slow to move, so that his uncle Abū al-Fawāris preceded him and became the sultān in Shīrāz.82 When the news of Sultān al-Dawla's death reached Baghdād the vizier Abū Qāsim al-Maghribī summoned the Turks and the Daylamites and others to swear allegiance to Musharrif al-Dawla. He called upon al-Murtadā (the 'Alid naqīb), Abū al-Ḥasan al-Zaynabī (the 'Abbāsid naqīb), the chief judge Abū al-Ḥasan b. Abī al-Shawārib and a group of witnesses to be present at the gathering, where they paid allegiance to him. 83 This measure was perhaps taken because a section of the army and the people till then had regarded Sultān al-Dawla as the real amir al-umara since he had been the nominee of his father the late Sultan Bahā' al-Dawla.84 The caliph however felt that this oath of allegiance was somehow directed against him. He therefore forbade others from doing the same and summoned al-Murtada, al-Zaynabī and the chief judge to the caliph's palace. A carriage was prepared for the caliph to leave the city and he showed his determination to climb aboard it. News of this reached Musharrif al-Dawla who was at first startled, but he then

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol.8, 12.

<sup>82</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol.9, 337.

<sup>83</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 15-16.

<sup>84</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 99.

realized that the caliph must have heard about the swearing of allegiance. A correspondence between the caliph and Musharrif al-Dawla took place. The latter sent several letters denying any disguised intention. The affair ended with mutual oaths of loyalty; Musharrif al-Dawla first swore allegiance to the caliph on Thursday 11, Ṣafar before the chief  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  Abū Ja $^{c}$ far al-Simnānī, which was then followed by the caliph's oath to Musharrif al-Dawla.

The above incident indicates that the caliph was so disturbed by Musharrif al-Dawla's measure that he showed his reaction by leaving the city, a move which brought a positive result. Realizing that he could not oppose the sultan by force, he thought this move as the best test whether his authority was still heard or not. The sultan, who was afraid of losing his legitimacy, was quick to act by corresponding with the caliph, denying bad intentions and agreed to make reconciliation through a mutual oath of allegiance.

According to Ibn al-Athīr, the reason for the original swearing of allegiance to Musharrif al-Dawla by the Turks was that there was enmity between al-Athīr, (an eunuch in the personal service of the late  $am\bar{x}$ ) and the vizier Ibn al-Maghribī on the one hand and the Turks on the other. This enmity was so intense that al-Athīr and the vizier had asked the sultān to seek refuge in any place that could be deemed secure. The sultān agreed to join them. They went together, accompanied by the Daylamite leaders to Sindiyya where Qirwāsh lived and continued on to 'Awāna. The Turks were surprised and agonized by their plight and sent Abū al-Ḥasan al-Zaynabī and al-Murtaḍā and their leaders asking forgiveness to the sultān. The vizier wrote them saying that he would like to come to Baghdād if the Turks provided him an amount of money. Receiving no response from the Turks and fearing their mischief, he fled to Qirwāsh while the sultān

<sup>85</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 16.

and al-Athīr and the Turkish leaders who called for them returned to Baghdād. After they arrived in Baghdād they all swore allegiance to the sultān.86

Musharrif al-Dawla enjoyed the emirate of Baghdad only one more year after this oath-taking, dying in Rabī al-Akhir 416/1025. The choice of amīr al-umarā was now in the hands of the Turkish soldiery, who hesitated to choose between Jalal al-Dawla and Abū Kālījār, the son of Sultān al-Dawla.87 First it was decided that Jalāl al-Dawla should be amīr al-umarā and accordingly his name was read in the khutba while he was still in Başra; Sharaf al-Malik Ibn Mākūlā was appointed as his vizier with the title Alam al-Din Sa ad al-Dawla Amin al-Milla Sharaf al-Malik. According to Ibn al-Jawzī, he was the first who adopted this title, the longest ever granted to the vizier. Jalāl al-Dawla delayed his journey to Baghdad since he had no money to satisfy the demands of the army. 88 Instead, he went as far as Wāsit and stayed there for some time, then returned to Baṣra. 89 The army's commanders went to the caliph's palace and appealed to him, saying that because Jalal al-Dawla had disregarded their demands and neglected the organization of their affairs, they intended to choose Abū Kālījār as being the nominee of Sultan al-Dawla, whom Baha' al-Dawla had appointed over all the others. At first the caliph gave no answer; but on a return visit to the caliph, he told them, "We incline to what you have already chosen." Eventually, the khutba was in Abū Kālījār's name on Friday 16 Shawwal (416/1025).90 Meanwhile, Abū Kālījār, who was ruler of Khūzistān and was at war with his uncle Abū al-Fawāris, the ruler of Kirmān, resided in Fārs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol.9, 355; Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn al-Athīr give different versions about the oath of allegiance paid to Musharrif al-Dawla. According to Ibn al-Jawzī, it was the vizier al-Maghribī who summoned the people to pay allegiance to Musharrif al-Dawla and he does not mention the reason, while Ibn al-Athīr mentions the reason and that when the taking of allegiance took place al-Maghribī was out of Baghdād. If we take the view of Ibn al-Athīr, it was not al-Maghribī who summoned the people, but another person. On the other hand, if we take Ibn al-Jawzī's view, the reason for the swearing of fidelity was not known. But Kabir (BuwayhidDynasty, 99) seems to support Ibn al-Jawzī's view.

<sup>87</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 100.

<sup>88</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 31.

<sup>89</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol.9, 346.

<sup>90</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 21.

When Jalāl al-Dawla was informed about this matter he proceeded to Baghdād from Wāsit, but the troops from Baghdād were determined to resist him and met him in Sīb, a district of Nahrawān. They drove him back, but he held out; in the end, they poured arrows on his troops and plundered his belongings, forcing his return to Baṣra. They wrote to Abū Kālījār asking him to come to Baghdād to be crowned. He promised to come but failed to do so because he was engaged in war with the ruler of Kirmān. 91

In the two years following his proclamation as sultan, Abū Kālijār had not yet come to Baghdad. The Turks and their officers were fed up with waiting for him, especially as the country was on the verge of ruin as a result of the destruction and plunder committed by the Arab tribesmen, the Kurds and the bandits. 92 So in the month of Rabī° al-Akhir 418/1027 the army's commanders (*isfahsalāriyya*) and the Turks came to the caliph appealing to him; "Truly you are lord over our affairs. At the death of Musharrif al-Dawla we chose Jalāl al-Dawla expecting that he would look after our interests but he neglected us. We then chose Abū Kālījār on the grounds that he could accomplish what he had promised to us, but still we are worse off than we were in first place. Therefore, you have to look after our affairs." The caliph replied, "You are children of our state. The first thing that we want of you is that your words be unanimous. First you chose Jalal al-Dawla but you asked us to cancel it and we helped you to do so even though it was shameful both on your and our part. Then you changed your mind and swore allegiance to Abū Kālījār; an oath which it is improper for us to break again without good reason. We are bound by our contracts with the Buwayhids ( wa li-bani buwayh fī riqābinā 'uhūd') which it would be unlawful for us to betray. Therefore, will you give us time so that we may send a letter to Abū Kālījār and know his views?" 93

<sup>91</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 346.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Ibid, 361.

<sup>93</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 8, 29.

The caliph then wrote to Abū Kālījār reminding him of his duty to put the situation in order and to come to Baghdād quickly, since otherwise he might lose his power. When there was no reply from him, the troops came back to the caliph and demanded that he undertake to proclaim the *khuṭba* for Jalāl al-Dawla Abū Ṭāhir. They then read the *khuṭba* in his name.<sup>94</sup>

The army deputation to the caliph regarding the choice of the amīr al-umarā' showed that despite the fact that the caliph did not possess the real power, and the amīr al-umarā' in reality held the reins of the caliphate, his final words were still accepted and respected by the army commanders. The Turks and the Daylamite officers could not appoint themselves the amīr without asking legitimacy and permission from the caliph. Their respect for the authority of the caliph was clearly shown in their remark that the caliph was their lord over their affairs.

On Saturday 3 Ramaḍān 418/1027 Jalāl al-Dawla met with the caliph on the bank of the Tigris river, where the latter had gone out on his barge accompanied by the prince Abū Ja far and other high ranking officials. The caliph approached the large tent of Jalāl al-Dawla, who upon seeing the caliph stepped forth and kissed the ground before him several times and then proceeded to the palace of the Sultān (Dār al-Mamlaka), while the caliph returned to his palace. Jalāl al-Dawla ordered that a drum be beaten at his gate five times a day as was the custom during the emirate of Sultān al-Dawla. Under Musharrif al-Dawla this had been altered to the traditional three times a day, also at selected hours of prayer. 95 This had also been the practice in the days of 'Aḍud al-Dawla, Ṣamṣām al-Dawla, Sharaf al-Dawla and Bahā' al-Dawla. Jalāl al-Dawla's action met with an objection from the caliph because it signified equal rights

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 29; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 361; Ibn Kathir, al-Bidāya vol. 12, 24.

<sup>95</sup> The Shi ites perform prayers three times: before sunrise, noon and afternoon are put together, evening and the night prayers are also united (see Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi ism, 178.)

with the caliph. The caliph carried on a correspondence on this issue with Jalāl al-Dawla, but the latter kept referring to Sultan al-Dawla's tradition. 96 The caliph argued that it was without any ground, that it had been done and without his permission and that the number of times the drums were beaten should never be equal to that of the caliph. Eventually Jalal al-Dawla decided to stop beating the drums altogether. The caliph then permitted him to have the drums beaten during the times of prayer after all. Another measure taken by Jalal al-Dawla in that same year that he took an oath of loyalty and sincerity to his troops and to the caliph.<sup>97</sup>

Although at the end the caliph was obliged to fulfill Jalāl al-Dawla's demand that the drum be beaten five times at his gate, the caliph first showed his determination and openly rejected Jalal al-Dawla's insistence and reference to his predecessor and regarded his action groundless. He did not want his very privilege to be equal with his amīr alumara, which can be inferred as humiliating him. The caliph's reaction of Jalal al-Dawla's demand indicates a growing courage of the caliph to challenge the Buwayhid amīr al-umarā. In the case of Sultān al-Dawla who insisted on having the drums beaten five times, the chroniclers only mention that the caliph protested to him but they do no mention any action made by the caliph.

On Sunday 12 Muḥarram 419/1028 the Turks held a rally at which both soldiers and their commanders swore an oath of unanimity and set up their tents, refusing to return to their quarters. On Saturday 18 Muḥarram they marched to the caliph's palace with a letter in which they said,"We are the slaves of the Commander of the Faithful. This sultan is addicted to pleasure and has failed to look after our affairs. We want you to suggest to him that he return to Başra and invite his son as his agent to come and take control of our affairs." 98The caliph answered and promised to write to Jalal al-Dawla.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Sultān al-Dawla insisted on having the drum beaten five times, although the caliph protested him ( see p. 55).

97 Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam , vol. 8, 30.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 35-36.

He therefore sent al-Murtadā, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Zaynabī and Abū Naṣr to the sulṭān, bearing a letter containing the army's complaint. Jalāl al-Dawla admitted his fault and neglect of their affairs and, after making an apology to them, promised to look for any means to fulfill their demands. When they received Jalal al-Dawla's answer and promise, they said that they would be loyal to him, but that they wanted his promise to be executed quickly before they returned to their barracks. An agreement was reached according to which Jalal al-Dawla agreed to produce more than one hundred thousand dirhams in gold and silver coins but still this did not satisfy them. They started plundering the house of the vizier Abū 'Alī b. Mākūlā and some houses belonging to the members of sultan's entourage, leading to wide-spread rioting and lawlessness. Some of them even plundered the houses of ordinary people, while others came to the gates of Dar al-Mamlaka and prevented food and water from entering the palace, forcing those who were inside to eat whatever fruit and drink water directly from the well. The sultan then made another promise to fulfill their demands, but the Turks rejected this offer and demanded that he leave. There occurred small skirmishes between the Turks and the supporters of the sultan. To calm the troops and the Turks, Jalal al-Dawla produced gold and silver articles, even ornaments belonging to his women, as well as clothes, carpets, and other items. All this, however, did not satisfy them and so they went to the vizier and told him that they intended to kill Jalal al-Dawla. He begged them not to, insisting that the sultan was innocent. 99 They then sent a representative to the caliph and asked him to make a settlement with their leaders. He met them and managed to effect a reconciliation between them and Jalāl al-Dawla. They took an oath and kissed the ground in front of the caliph and then returned to their houses and tents, having distributed the money among themselves to their satisfaction. 100

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 366.

Once more the caliph al-Qādir played a role as mediator between the Turkish and Daylamite soldiers and the *amīr al-umarā* and succeeded in effecting the reconciliation, preventing the soldiers from uprisings and rioting. This also tells us that he had power and his authority was still acknowledged by both the soldiers and the *amīr al-umarā*. The soldiers remark that they were slaves of the caliph, shows that they respected the dignity of the caliph. Therefore, Ibn al-Athīr's statement that the caliph had such dignity (*hayba*), as we have seen in several instances above, to some extent was true.

After this event, we have little information about al-Qādir's relations with Jalāl al-Dawla, except for his reaction to the caliph's appointment of his successor al-Qā'im billāh in 421/1030, as will be discussed later. Jalāl al-Dawla held power up to the year 435/1043 during the reign of al-Qā'im billāh. Despite his long emirate, Jalāl al-Dawla's reign was marked by an endless series of rebellions and military uprisings, and on some occasions he was forced to leave his palace. We will not, however, discuss the rest of Jalāl al-Dawla's reign or those of his successors, or even al-Qādir's successor, since this is outside the scope of our research.

From the above elucidation of al-Qādir's relations with the Buwayhids we can see that in many instances that the caliph was not passive and submissive to the control of the Buwayhid amīrs. In some occasions he raised a protest against them, forced them to abide by his order, and in others succeeded in making reconciliation between the troops and the amīral-umarā. In some instances, however, he yielded to the demands of the amīral-umarā in an attempt to keep good relations and to maintain a balance of power between them. In the following section we will see his growing power, independence and initiative in defending his privileges.

#### 2. Al-Qādir's relations with the amīrs of local principalities

During al-Qādir's time, a great many local rulers held power, both those who declared themselves independent from the caliphate and those who acknowledged his

suzerainty. However, there is little information regarding al-Qādir's relations with these amīrs of local principalities. What few accounts we do have speak of how these amīrs approached the caliph to demand investiture from him legitimizing their control over a given region, on the one hand, or of the caliph's attempts to exert his authority in the areas under their control, on the other.

An example of the caliph's attempt to exert his authority was that when a Bedouin ruler, Uṣayfir al-ʿArabī, who was dedicated to ensuring the security of pilgrims traversing his lands, came to Baghdād in 382/992, the caliph demanded that he mention his name in the *khuṭba* from Yamāma to Baḥrayn. Ṣafr (al-Uṣayfir) al-ʿArabī complied with the caliph's order and therefore was given robes of honour, a standard, money, and much else. 101

In 388/998 the caliph held a reception for two envoys, one from Abū Ṭālib Rustam b. Fakhr al-Dawla [the Buwayhid] and the other from Abū Najm Badr b. Ḥasanawayh [Ḥasanawayhid]. 102 Abū Ṭālib was given in addition to his kunya (patronymic) the title of Majd al-Dawla wa-Kahf al-Umma, while Abū Najm was given that of Naṣr al-Dawla. The former was given the contract for Rayy and its dependencies; a banner was tied for him and a complete set of royal robes given him in recognition of this office. The latter, on the other hand, was given a contract for his territories in the Jibāl and a set of fine robes of honour. Majd al-Dawla was happy to put on the robes and accepted his new title; Badr, however, had requested the title Nāṣir al-Dawla, and when he was offered Naṣr al-Dawla instead, he rejected it. However, his request was afterwards fulfilled and he was granted the title of Nāṣir al-Dīn wa-al-Dawla (Helper of

<sup>101</sup> Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol.11, 332; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 170.

102 Badr b. Ḥasanawayh was a Kurdish ruler who controlled the territories of

Sabūr Khwast, Dīnawar, Nihāwand, Asadabād, Barudjird and several districts in Ahwāz as well as Kirmishin, Ḥulwān and Sharazur. Cl. Cahen, "Ḥasanawayh," in *E.I.*, new ed. vol. 3, 258; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 271.

the Religion and the Empire), 103 which he used thereafter in his correspondence. 104 This investiture was held at the request of Bahā al-Dawla and his secretaries. 105

In 403/1012 al-Qādir received Abū Naṣr (Aḥmad) b. Marwān al-Kurdī and gave him a diploma of investiture for the territories of Āmid, Mayāfāriqīn and Diyār Bakr. He was endowed with a royal necklace and ring and afforded the title of Naṣīr al-Dawla. Two years later (405/1014) al-Qādir gave a diploma of investiture to 'Alī b. Mazyad for the territories of the Banī Dubays in the Jazīra al-Asadiyya. The Mazyadids were an Arab dynasty of central Iraq, descended originally from the Asad tribe and established in the area between Kūfa and Hīt, which flourished in the 4th-6th/10th-12th centuries. 108

The 'Uqaylid, Muqallad b. al-Musayyib also received from the caliph al-Qādir (c 386/996) a contract of investiture for Mawṣil, Kūfa, Qaṣr and Jāmiʿayn, and was given the title of Ḥusām al-Dawla. 109 For this he had to send a tribute one million Giyāthī dirhams, in addition to an immediate payment of 10,000 dīnārs. However, he only made the immediate payment and never sent the annual tribute. Moreover, after annexing Daqūqa and Khānījār to his possessions, he conducted secret correspondence with some of the Daylamite chiefs of Baghdād in an attempt to occupy the city. But he was assassinated by one of the Turkish slaves and was succeeded by his son Qirwāsh (Abū al-Manī'). 110 In 396/1005 he was conferred by the caliph al-Qādir the title of Muctamid al-Dawla and was confirmed in all his possessions. 111

<sup>103</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 202.

<sup>104</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 6, 332.

<sup>105</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 8, 35-38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> Ibid., vol. 7, 262.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> Ibid., vol. 7, 270.

<sup>108</sup> Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties, 50.

<sup>109</sup> Hilāl al-Ṣābī, *Tārīkh* in Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, 372; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān*, trans. de Slane, vol.3, 416.

<sup>110</sup> Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-A'yan, vol. 3., 389-392.

<sup>111</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 230.

In 410/1019 al-Qādir invested Abū al-Fawāris b. Bahā' al-Dawla with the title of Qawām al-Dawla and gave him authority over the territory of Kirmān. 112 Before he asked the investiture from the caliph he had seized Fārs from his brother Sulṭān al-Dawla and occupied Shīrāz in 407/1016, but he was soon defeated by the latter who expelled him from Kirmān. With the help of Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, he recaptured Kirmān and occupied Fārs, which had been abandoned by Sulṭān al-Dawla for Baghdād. Once more Sulṭān al-Dawla succeeded in defeating him, forcing him to flee to Kirmān in 408/1017. The troops of Sulṭān al-Dawla pursued him and finally took Kirmān. Qawām al-Dawla at first took refuge with Shams al-Dawla b. Fakhr al-Dawla, the ruler of Hamadhān, and then later turned to Muhadhdhib al-Dawla, the ruler of Baṭīḥa. After a long correspondence discussing the matter, Sulṭān al-Dawla finally agreed in 409/1018 to restore Kirmān to Qawām al-Dawla, provided that the latter declared his loyalty to him. 113

Perhaps we are now in the position to understand the motives behind the *amīr's* requests to obtain investiture from the caliph. We know some of the *amīrs* had already ruled in their regions and thus their authority was not challenged by other claimants. In other words, even without any formal investiture from the caliph, they could have still retained control over their subjects. According to Tyan, it was the principle of legitimacy and the dignity of the caliph which constituted the basis for the need for such kinds of investiture. But H. A. R. Gibb maintains that the diploma of investiture served two purposes:

One was of internal order: to legitimize the proceedings of the law courts and the decision of the  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}s$  and other religious officials appointed by the local rulers, as well as marriages, inheritances and bequests. The other was political: to check

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Ibid., 284.

<sup>113</sup> Munaymanah, *Tārīkh*, 152; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 284; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 7, 294.

<sup>114</sup> Tyan, Institutions, 83.

the spread of  $Sh\bar{\imath}^c$ ism and the resurgence of the Bedouins in those areas where the caliph's forces were themselves unable to intervene. 115

The second function mentioned by Gibb was not entirely true, since those who requested investitures from the caliph were not all Sunnite rulers; many of them were Shī<sup>c</sup>ites, as already mentioned above. To obtain formal legitimacy from the caliph seems to have been the most important motive. This means that the caliph was still recognized as legitimatehead of the majority of the Muslim *umma* (community), whatever the external events undermining the caliphate. In other words, the demand of investiture by the rulers of principalities from al-Qādir's point of view served as acknowledgement of his authority.

Based on the above explanation, Tyan seems to disagree with the general conception that the caliph during the period of the sultanate onwards had only what is called spiritual power and no longer held any real authority. According to him, the caliph remained the only holder of this authority, both temporal and religious, given that these almost inseparably tied together. The caliph was always the only head of the Islamic Empire on the grounds that he still maintained his religious and civil privileges such as the right to have his name mentioned in the *khuṇba*, his right to the *sarīr* (throne) and the right to the *sikka* (inscription) of his name which was struck on the coins in all territories of the empire. Although it was the sultān or the *amīr* who dispensed justice, raised revenues and ran the administration of the empire, yet he still needed the delegation, or 'nomination,' originating from the caliph'. Moreover, the formal procedures of the exercise of authority had to emanate from the same caliph and had to bear his signature and his personal seal. Ibn Khaldūn mentions the fact that among the rights reserved to the caliph was the affixing of the seal on letters and documents. 117 Similarly,

<sup>115</sup> H.A.R. Gibb, "The Caliphate and the Arab States," in Kenneth M. Setton ed., The History of the Crusades: Vol. I the First Hundred Years (Madison: The University of Wisconsin, 1969), 84.

<sup>116</sup> Tyan, Institutions., 89.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> Ibid.

in public performance as well as in official affairs, the obligatory obedience of subjects with regard to the agency of the authority only existed if this agency (sultanate) received an investiture from the caliph. 118

Tyan in his argument maintains further that the sultān had to express to the caliph the same signs of respect and submission that his subjects owed to him. When the Buwayhid and the Seljuq sultāns appeared before the caliph, it was in front of majesty that they appeared, *yamshūna ilā ḥaythu al Jalāla muqūna*: they had to prostate and kiss the ground many times. Even before taking a seat, the sultān had to kiss the cushion or seat which was presented to him while the caliph sat on his throne behind the curtain which was only removed on his order.<sup>119</sup>

With the institution of the sultanate, the authority of the caliph over the inhabitants of the empire, the troops and the military commanders retained its original character; he continued to wield political sovereignty; all the individuals in their relations to the caliph remained in the condition of the subjects. When, for example, under the sultanate of Jalāl al-Dawla [as mentioned above], there were grave disturbances in the city, the distraught Turkish troops came to the caliph and asked him to intervene, they said to him. "You are the master and we are your slaves." 120

Tyan realizes that what has been mentioned above does not correspond to the practical reality. According to the formulation of Ibn Khaldūn, among the caliph's privileges was that of appointing all agents and of signing all documents, etc." all of which "however, depended on the mercy of the sultān, the master of the state "kullu dhālika taw u al-qā im alā al-dawla." But he continued in the role of caliph, who was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Ibid., 91-92.

 $<sup>^{120}</sup>$  Ibid., 93. This event occurred as we will see during the reign of Jalāl al-Dawla and Abū Kālījār

considered as the holder of the political authority, but also as a necessary condition of the effective exercise of this authority. <sup>121</sup>

The 'Abbāsid caliphate under the Buwayhid tutelage was at the lowest ebb of decline, especially under the greatest Buwayhid amīr 'Adud al-Dawla (367/978-372/983). The caliph was by then no more than theoretical head of the Muslim world, whose existence was only necessary to give legal life and value to the state over which the sultān basically exercised the prerogatives and responsibilities of public authority. And yet changing circumstances sometimes allowed the caliphate to be more independent and to seek to regain a part of its lost prerogatives. <sup>122</sup>

Under the regime of the sultans, the caliphate seldom exhibited a uniform character. For example, the condition of the caliphate during the reign of al-Ṭā'i' lillāh was different from that of al-Qādir's. In the former, the caliph could not do much to exert his authority, whereas in the latter, the caliph actively intervened. Accordingly, Tyan suggests that there were two different periods or situations as far as the 'Abbāsids were concerned during the Buwayhid sultanate. The first period corresponded to one in which the sultanate in general territorial provinces exercised effectively its natural attributions. The second represents the period when the sultanate lost a great deal of its original vigour at different times towards the end of the Buwayhid dynasty and towards the end of the Seljuqids as well. The condition of the caliphate during these periods and later ones appears to have been more or less the same, whereas the sultanate disappeared in general provinces. 123

Perhaps it was the principle of legitimacy combined with his religious character and sanctity that permitted the 'Abbāsid caliph not only to maintain position concurrently with the sultān, but also to survive within the same institution. The Buwayhid and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> Ibid., 94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

Seljuqid dynasties disappeared due to ordinary factors which brought down the institutions of government. These factors did not entirely prevail over the caliphate because the institution consisted of elements which could not be taken away altogether.<sup>124</sup>

In addition, throughout the whole period of the decline of the caliphate up to the death of Must asim (d. 657/1258) the caliph was in the eyes of all orthodox Sunnis the Commander of the Faithful, and as successor of the Prophet he was considered as the source of all authority and the fountain of honour, at least in theory. Therefore, it was natural that the caliph though he had no real political power, could still claim to be the head of the whole Muslim *umma* (community). This claim was also supported by the Sunni theologians and legists who expounded the doctrine regardless of whether the course of external events might be undermining the caliphate. 125 Accordingly, a contract of investiture together with a robe of honour given by the caliph or a title of honour conferred by him, would satisfy the demands of Muslim scholars and the minds of the subjects of an independent prince or sultan, though the ruler himself might remain entirely autonomous and feel no obligation to obey the caliph. Since the caliph was still theoretically the head of the Muslim state, any other ruler who took power into his own hands might still find it politically wise to recognize the caliph as the theoretical source of all authority. 126This can be seen in the attitude of the Buwayhids, who, though they were themselves Shī ites, and the Abbāsid caliphate power was in their hands, did not think to overthrow the dynasty since it was clearly to their advantage, and instead they behaved as though they were Sunnite princes. The Buwayhids, however, only maintained the 'Abbasid caliphate for Machiavelian reasons. As evidence of this, a chronicler relates an anecdote that a certain Buwayhid sultan had the idea of

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 77-78.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924), 76.

overthrowing the 'Abbāsid caliph and proclaiming in his stead the Fāṭimid caliph of Cairo, but he was diverted from his plan by one of his counsellors, who said to him," You now have an 'Abbāsid caliph whose legitimacy neither you nor your followers believe in. If you ask them to kill him, they will do so without any scruple, whereas if you proclaim an 'Alid caliph there will be those among his subjects who will share the same belief as you and your followers do in the validity of his caliphate. And if he orders them to kill you they will surely do so." 127

The above anecdote seems to be meant by the chronicler to indicate the intimate relationship that the Buwayhids had with the "Abbāsid caliphs. In fact, had the situation been conducive, it is quite possible that one of the Buwayhid sultāns or other amīrs such as in the case of Qirwāsh (which will be discussed later) would have tried to proclaim an "Alīd or Fāṭimid caliph in the heart of the empire. One such figure was the Buwayhid general al-Basāsirī, who towards the end of the Buwayhid rule worked as an active propagandist for the Fāṭimids and raised the standard of revolt against the "Abbāsid caliphate and even succeeding in having the name of the sovereign of Cairo proclaimed in the mosques of Baghdād. It was only due to the intervention of the Seljuqs under Tughril Beg, that the movement was suppressed, much to the satisfaction of the population. 128

The attitude of the Buwayhids in maintaining the 'Abbāsid caliphate was not as a simple as mentioned above. Yusuf Ibish puts forward four important reasons encompassing political, administrative, economic and religious aspects. <sup>129</sup>First, politically the Buwayhids were afraid of a possible revolt of the Sunnites. Since Baghdād was occupied peacefully, there was no reason to provoke the majority of its inhabitants. At the same time, the Ḥamdānids, Barīdīs and the Qarmatians presented

<sup>127</sup> Tyan, Institutions, 83; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol.8, 162.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Ibish, Political Doctrine, 43-44

themselves serious challenges to the Buwayhids. Second, administratively they did not want to lose the sympathies of the bureaucracy which was largely Sunnite in its composition. Third, the revenues of the Crown estates were retained by the Buwayids and the caliph received a modest pension for his household needs. If they rendered the caliphate to a Shi te caliph, they would have not been able to do that. Fourth, from a religious point of view, if they dethroned the Sunnite caliphate and restored that to the Shi te caliph, this would lead to at least two problems: a) it was risky for the above mentioned reasons; b) a new Shi te caliph would have been by necessity a descendant of the Alids, not a Buwayhid. This meant that they would have created a rival to their own power which would have been very dangerous because of the existence of other rival Shi te principalities, whereas the Sunnite caliphate was under their control so that there was no reason to change the situation. We can, therefore, safely assume that the Buwayhids were moved by practical motives to continue emptying the caliphate of what remained of its temporal powers.

Tyan's opinion that the caliph was still the holder of political sovereignty can only be accepted in the sense that he still retained political authority, not political power, since authority and power, according to Jacques Maritain in his book entitled *Man and the State*, quoted by Makdisi, are two different things. "Power is the force by means of which you can oblige others to obey you. Authority is the right to direct and command, to be listened to or obeyed by others. Authority needs power. Power, without authority is tyranny." <sup>130</sup> Maritain further explains this distinction as follows,

All authority, in so far as it concerns social life, demands to be completed by power, without which it threatens to become useless and inefficacious among men. All power which is not the expression of authority is iniquitous. Practically, it is normal that the word authority should imply power, and that the word power should imply authority. In so far as it has authority, power is raised to the moral

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> G. Makdisi, "Authority in the Islamic Community," *History and Politics in 11th century Baghdād* (Hampshire: Variorum, Brookfield, 1990), 118.

and legal order. To separate power and authority is to separate force and justice." <sup>131</sup>

In other words, authority and power ideally should not be separated if a system is to work properly, because "authority implies power and power implies authority." <sup>132</sup> We can also say that authority needs power and power needs authority, and that therefore "there is a magnetic attraction between the two." According to Makdisi, this distinction and the two concepts can be found in the caliphate and the sultanate and in the teaching and guiding authority, the *magisterium*. <sup>133</sup>

The caliph was the one who possessed the authority, and when he had the means, he also had the power. The authority rested in him by virtue of his being the caliph. But it is not the same concerning power, because to have power he had to have a well-paid army, a treasury filled continuously with the booty acquired through conquests and also through a good administration of the conquered territories. This ideal condition existed during the golden age of the Rāshidūn, the Umayyads and the early 'Abbāsids, until the rise of the amīr al-umarā' in around the 9th century, according to Makdisi. 134 Whether this was true or not is debatable, but it is the case that the caliphs during these centuries wielded both authority and power. Afterwards, they came to lose their power, without entirely losing the authority that had belonged to them. 135 As Makdisi states: "The power passed on to the supreme amīr, called amīr al-umarā' and later sultān. But authority to legitimize his power came from the caliph." 136 This applied especially in those regions where the majority of the subjects were Sunnites, whereas among the Shīrite communities, the amīrs did not need authority of the caliphs, but of the Imāms.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> G. Makdisi, Iba 'Aqīl, 70.

<sup>136</sup> Idem, "Authority," 119.

During the rise of the amīr al-umarā' and under the sultanate that followed then there was always tension between caliph and sultan because each wanted what the other possessed. The caliph wanted to recover the power that was once part of the caliphate, whereas the sultan wanted that authority without which his power would not be legitimate. The sultan wanted to seize authority from the hands of the caliph since the latter could play one dynasty of sultans against another to his own advantage. They were aware that stability could only be achieved with the possession of both authority and power. 137 However, this tension did not always come to the surface, nor did it rise very frequently to the surface resulting in conflict between the caliph and the sultan. Both sultans and caliphs seem to have admitted that they lacked something that the other could provide. This was especially apparent under al-Qādir and his successors with the Seljuqs, since the latter were Sunnites. Tensions obviously emerged whenever one of the rulers (sultan or caliph) felt powerful enough to oppose the other such as at the beginning of the Buwayhid regime and the peak of its power, namely during the emirate of 'Adud al-Dawla. Therefore, Tyan's overall perception of the dynamic existing between the 'Abbasid calips and the Buwayhid amirs is that the caliph still held political authority, but not political power.

### 3. Al-Qadir's attempt to appoint his own successors

The long reign of al-Qādir and the increasing weakness of Buwayhid power gave him the chance to appoint his successors. Al-Qādir may have been aware of his being dominated politically by the Buwayhid amīrs, but he never relinquished his rights or his legitimate claim to be the Amīr al-Mu minīn (The Commander of the Believers) or to appoint his successors. This act indicates his courage, power and dignity, which were acknowledged and respected by both the Buwayhid amīrs and his subjects.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

The desire of the caliph to maintain the caliphate and to pass it on to his own line of successors caused him to be very wary of any threat to his authority coming from his own family members, though he seems not to have felt undermined by the Buwayhid amīr. In 387/997 or 388/998 'Abdullāh b. Ja'far better known as Ibn al-Waththāb, escaped from confinement in the caliph's palace. He was a close relative of the caliph al-Tā'i'138 and had stayed in his palace. When al-Tā'i' was arrested and deposed, Ibn al-Waththab fled and after wandering about he took refuge with Muhadhdhib al-Dawla. Al-Qadir wrote about him to the latter, who consequently expelled Ibn al-Waththab from the country. He then went to Mada'in, but al-Qadir, who knew of his whereabouts, sent men to arrest him. Perhaps al-Qādir was worried that Ibn al-Waththab would plot against him in an attempt to restore al-Ta'i or seek revenge on the latter's behalf. He was then imprisoned in a dungeon. Finding an opportunity to escape, he took it and went to Jilan where he claimed that he was al-Tā'i' lillāh and gave certain proofs of identity which he knew through his familiarity with the palace. The people of Jilān accepted his claim and exalted him, and one of their princes, Muḥammd b. al-'Abbās, married him off to his daughter, supported him and propagated his claimin his town. The people of other areas also declared themselves loyal to him and paid him a tithe according to their tradition of paying a certain amount to their religious leader. 139 A group of people from Jilan however went to the court of al-Qādir in Baghdād where they were informed about the truth of the matter and were ordered to clear up the misunderstanding. This, however, did not cause Ibn al-Waththab any damage because of his firm position and the strong support of his father-in-law. The inhabitants of Jīlān used to refer their religious and legal questions to the qādī Abū al-Qāsim b. al-Kājj, who had a great influence upon them. A letter was sent to him from the caliph's palace in which he was ordered to write

139 Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 203-203.

<sup>138</sup> The sources do not mention clearly his relationship with al-Ṭā'i'. He was "muntasib li al-Ṭā'i'." (He was related or affiliated to al-Ṭā'i'). We do not know wether he was his relative (brother, uncle, cousin etc.) or just close friend.

and try to resolve their problem with 'Abdallāh b. Ja'far. He did as he was told, and succeeded in persuading them to go to 'Abdallāh and ask him to leave their country, which he promptly did. 140

Another important political undertaking by al-Qādir was his initiative in appointing his son Abū al-Faḍl <sup>141</sup> as his successor, giving him the title of al-Ghālib billāh (Conqueror through God) in 391/1000 in the presence of the Khurāsānīs who had just returned from the pilgrimage in Mecca. The document for this appointment was read out to an assembly composed also of dignitaries, witnesses and jurists. His son was at this time just eight years old. Al-Qādir then sent orders to the provinces to mention his heir's name in the *khuṭba* after his own. <sup>142</sup> Not only was the name of al-Ghālib billāh mentioned after that of the caliph but also the prayers for the former were offered as follows:

O God, cause him to attain his hopes in his son Abū al-Fadl al-Ghālilb billāh, his successor over the Muslims. O God, befriend those of Thy servants who befriend him and war against them who war against him throughout the regions and countries. Grant unto those who support him truth and right judgment, and abandon such as abandon him to error and contumacy. O God, establish his empire and his motto, and declare war against such as defy the right and its supporters. 143

According to the sources, the reason for this precipitate decision was the claim advanced by 'Abdullāh b. 'Uthmān al-Wāthiqī, one of the descendants of al-Wāthiq billāh (the ninth 'Abbāsid caliph), to the succession. He was both witness (*shāhid*) in the court and preacher (*khātib*). Ibn al-Jawzī and Miskawayh mention that there was

<sup>140</sup> Miskawayh, Tajārib., vol. 3, 307.

<sup>141</sup> He was Muḥammad b. al-Qādir billāh, born on Sunday night 23 Shawwāl 382/992; his mother was a slave called 'Alam (see al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 169-170). In the year of his appointment as heir-apparent, another son of al-Qādir, Abū Ja'far 'Abdullāh was born on 18 Dhū al-Qa'da. He would be the future heir, replacing his brother and called al-Qā'im billāh (Ibid, 214). He was the only son of al-Qādir who survived; another son of al-Qādir, Abū al-Qāsim, died in 419/1028 and the caliph was very much depressed by his death (Ibid., vol. 8, 34).

<sup>142</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7215.

<sup>143</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 6 420.

enmity between him and the qādī Abū 'Alī b. Muḥassin al-Tanūkhī. 144The reason for this enmity, according to Miskawayh, was that al-Wāthiqī used to intrigue against al-Tanūkhī's deputy qādī Ṣadaqa and had tried to displace him. The latter drew up a memoir together with the people of Niṣībīn in which they charged al-Wāthiqī with bad character. The memoir was presented to al-Tanūkhī who approved and endorsed it with official confirmation and then issued it. Al-Tanükhī's next step was to summon al-Wāthiqī to Baghdād and imprison him. However, he was released with the help of one of his fellow townsmen who interceded for him. 145 When it was suggested that he reconcile with al-Tanükhī, al-Wāthiqī said," I am wondering instead how to extinguish the light of this monarch and appropriate his realm." He then went to Khurāsān and crossed the river (Oxus) to take refuge with Hārūn b. Ilik Bughrākhān (Qarākhānids), accompanied by Abū al-Faḍl al-Tamīmī. The latter claimed that he was an envoy from the caliph to Hārūn and asked him to pay allegiance to this al-Wāthiqī because he was his successor. According to another version, the two of them forged a letter in the name of the caliph appointing him as his successor. Hārūn Khāqān responded positively, paid allegiance to him and instituted a khutha for him, (a prayer offered for him after the name of the caliph was mentioned) throughout his domains. He also provided him with material support. The caliph learned of this and became angry with him, and sent a letter to Hārūn Khāqān regarding al-Wāthiqī. Hārun Khāqān, however, did not comply with the caliph's letter. When he died and was succeeded by Ahmad Qarākhāqān, the caliph sent another letter on the issue demanding that he disassociate himself from al-Wathiqi. He also wrote to the princes of Khurāsān and other members of the Khān dynasty charging al-Wathiqi with falsehood, "declaring him to be a man of bad character, and asserting that his claims were baseless."146

<sup>144</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 215.

<sup>145</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol.6, 420.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> Ibid

It was also at this time that the caliph appointed his son as his heir-apparent and likewise sent letters to this effect to all corners of the empire. This correspondence had the desired effect of forcing al-Wāthiqī to leave Aḥmad Qarākhāqān and come to Baghdād, concealing his identity. When the caliph learned of this he ordered his arrest. Al-Wāthiqī then moved to Tuhtah, where he was interviewed by numerous jurists upon whom he bestowed lavish presents, but his identity was revealed and he was forced to flee to Baṣra, Fārs, Kirmān, and finally to the country of the Turks. Still feeling insecure, he went on to Khawārizm where he stayed for a time. He then went to Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, who seized and imprisoned him in a fortress, where he remained in honourable confinement and received generous treatment till he died. 147

The caliph's initiative in appointing his successor surprisingly met with no objection from the Buwayhid sultān. Usually the appointment of any caliph or successor had to be done in consultation with or at least approved by the sultān, who held the reins of the state. Even during the Sāmarrā period, the appointment of a caliph or a successor was in the hands of bureaucrats and army commanders. Probably, as Kabir maintains, it was the absence of the amā (Bahā al-Dawla) from Baghdād and the fact that he stayed for the most part in Shīrāz that gave the caliph a certain measure of liberty to act. In addition, the caliph was emboldened to take this action because he had found a supporter and defender of his caliphate from the East, namely Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, at the time when the Buwayhids were in a state of decline.

On Thursday 22 Sha<sup>c</sup>bān 399/1008 the mother of al-Qādir Dumnā or Tumnā, died and on Saturday 24 Sha<sup>c</sup>bān the body was brought to Ruṣāfa and buried there. 148 One year after her death al-Qādir himself fell very seriously ill in Ramaḍān, rumours of which began spreading swiftly among the people. Perhaps to silence the rumours, he attended the Friday prayer wearing the *burda* (mantle of the Prophet) and held the sceptre

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 165-166.

<sup>148</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 244.

of state, accompanied by Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī and Abū al-Ḥasan b. Ḥājib al-Nuʿmān. The latter asked the caliph to read some verses of the Qur³ān so that the people could hear him speak. The caliph then loudly read the following Qur³ānic verse: "If the hypocrites and those in whose heart is a disease and the agitators in the city do not cease, We verily will urge thee on against them, then they will be your neighbours in it but for a little while. Accursed, they will be seized wherever found and slain (fierce) slaughter." <sup>149</sup> Upon hearing this the people cried out, prayed for him and dispersed. <sup>150</sup>

As mentioned earlier, al-Qādir had appointed as heir apparent his son Abū al-Faḍl entitled al-Ghālib billāh, but he died in 409/018 at the age of 27,151 and another son of the caliph called by his *kunya*, Abū al-Qāsim, who was a poet, died in 418/1027. Al-Qādir was depressed by his death and the beating of drums were stopped for days as a sign of mourning. Therefore, the caliph had to give thought to appoint another successor and the only heir. After contemplating the matter, the caliph, held a reception for dignitaries and the common people on Sunday 18 Jumādā al-Ūlā 421/1030. This event took place after the people complained against him and spread rumours about his death. There he announced the appointment of the prince Abū Ja'far, his son, as his successor. Even before this event, many had heard about the appointment of Abū Ja'far in spite of the caliph's silence, especially when there were allusions made to it in Dhū al-Ḥijja the same year, in which supplication was offered to the caliph in the following words: "O God bless him with the treasures of the religion which are expected for his

<sup>149</sup> Qur°ān xxiii: 61-62.

<sup>150</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 242; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 220.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 8, 34; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 26.

<sup>152</sup> We do not know exactly why the caliph had to wait for three years to appoint another successor. Probably he thought that Abū Jaʿfar at the death of his brother was not mature enough or he waited for the best time to appoint his successor.

<sup>153</sup> Perhaps people complained against him about a serious riot between the Shī ites and Sunnites, in which many people of both sides were killed and many shops were burnt. The caliph fell seriously ill this year so that rumours spread of his death (see Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.8, 42, Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 30)

heir apparent over the Muslims." <sup>154</sup> This was interpreted as a reference to his successor Abū Ja<sup>c</sup> far without mentioning his name and without drawing up a contract. The reception was attended by Abū al-Ghanā<sup>c</sup> im Muḥammad b. Muḥammad (the chief of police) and the Turks who congratulated the prince and prayed for his appointment as heir-apparent. Abū Ja<sup>c</sup> far sat next to the caliph and received congratulations and supplications from the Muslims present. On Friday, 23 Rabī<sup>c</sup> al-Ākhir 421/1030 the new title of the heir apparent al-Qā<sup>c</sup> im billāh, was mentioned in the *khuṭba* on all pulpits in the mosques of Baghdād and was struck on coins and on documents. <sup>155</sup>

Jalāl al-Dawla reacted to the appointment of al-Qādir's successor by sending a letter to the caliph asking about it, which was read out in an assembly. The letter begins with Jalāl al-Dawla's praising al-Qādir for his good initiative in appointing his successor in an attempt to preserve the interests of both the elite and the common people so that he would not be asked by God about his neglect of responsibility on the day of judgement. Jalāl al-Dawla also states that the caliph's appointment of the prince Abū Ja°far as heir apparent was at the right time after his long reign. He then prays to God to perpetuate the successor's life and expresses the hope that with this arrangement the caliphate will be strong and that the Muslim community will be under the guidance of the future caliph. 156 When al-Qādir died in 422/1030, his successor al-Qā°im billāh was appointed caliph.

From what has been explained we learn that the caliph al-Qādir showed his determination and his attempt to maintain the caliphate and pass it to his descendants. Al-Qādir can be said successful in passing the caliphate to his successor whereas his predecessors who were also under the grip of the Buwayhids failed to do so. Except for the caliph al-Mustakfi who reigned for a very short time (less than two years), his successors al-Mutī<sup>c</sup> and al-Ṭā'i<sup>c</sup> ruled for a quite long time. Al-Mutī<sup>c</sup> reigned for about

<sup>154</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazām*, vol. 8, 48.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 49.

twenty years (335/946-364/974) and al-Ta<sup>3</sup>i became the caliph for seventeen years (364/974-381/991). The chroniclers do not mention that both caliphs tried to appoint any heir. We do not know exactly what the problem was. We can only speculate that they might have no male heirs, or they had no time to appoint their successors because they were busy maintaining their power from the encroachment of the Buwayhid amins, or they might have no courage to appoint their successors because they were afraid of being rejected by the Buwayhid amirs. In addition, al-Qadir was successful in suppressing the pretenders to the 'Abbāsid throne coming from other members of the 'Abbāsids. We are not certain whether by virtue of his dignity or the support rendered him by the Turkish soldiers within the Buwayhids that twice he appointed his successor without being challenged by the commanders of the army or the Buwayhid amīr al-umarā. However, there are three possibilities: first, since a part of the Buwayhid soldiers were Turks whose religious affiliation was generally Sunni, the latter no doubt supported whatever action taken by the caliph. Second, in the case of Jalal al-Dawla, whose reign was in significant decline, he had no power to oppose the caliph who relied on the Turkish soldiers. Third, Jalal al-Dawla seems to have no intention of interfering with the caliph's initiative to appoint his successor, for he was very much concerned with the upkeep of the emirate, which was constantly undermined by his soldiers.

Al-Qādir's relations with the Buwayhids in general were established quite well. However, we find one instance of deterioration between Musharrif al-Dawla and the caliph in regard to the former's initiative to summon his soldiers to renew their allegiance to him and another between the caliph and Jalāl al-Dawla in the case of beating the drums. It is interesting to note that the caliph had never been humiliated by the Buwayhids physically, nor was his dignity degraded in front of the public. If we look back to the reign of his predecessors, al-Mutī° and al-Tā'i°, we find that both caliphs were humiliated by the Buwayhids. For example, al-Mutī° was forced to go with

Bakhtiyār during his fights against 'Adud al-Dawla and he even had to leave Baghdād with the amīr' during his war with the Ḥamdānids. Adud al-Dawla demanded the caliph al-Muṭī' that his name be mentioned together with the caliph in the khuṭba, and the former openly declared his support of the Fāṭimids in front of him and the audience, when an envoy from the Fāṭimids came to Baghdād. 'Adud al-Dawla also demanded that the caliph allow him to use the title Shāhanshāh (King of Kings). Al-Ṭā'i' was forced to abdicate his office by Bahā' al-Dawla in favour of his cousin, al-Qādir, and was dragged from his throne by Bahā' al-Dawla's soldiers and then taken to the amīr's palace.

# 4. Al-Qādir's attempts to appoint his own officials within the administration, judiciary, religious establishment, etc.

As stated above it is clear that the caliph had no real power in the sense that he was only involved in a figurative sense in the management of the state because it had been taken over by the Buwayhid amūrs who made up the majority of the ministers and the soldiers. What remained in the hands of the caliph was his spiritual power in the sense that he was still recognized as the Commander of the Faithful (Amīr al-Muʾminīn), Defender of the Faith and the orthodox caliph. Parallel with this, the caliph was concerned now more and more with religious affairs. This, however, does not mean that the caliph was never involved in political affairs or that he was not concerned with the welfare of his subjects. As we have seen, he was able to exert his authority, and was known to have intervened in the conflicts between the sultān and the troops, and we will also see later that he was involved in the religious controversies between the Sunnite and the Shi<sup>5</sup>ite communities. In addition, his official recognition and investiture were still required by the Buwayhid and other amūrs who acknowledged his caliphate and associated themselves with him as his vassals or allies. Therefore, there are many

occasions referred to in the sources when the caliphreceived in his palace the Buwayhid amīrs and others seeking investiture and regal titles.

Despite the fact that the caliph was deprived of political power, he still had certain other areas in which he was able to assert himself. For instance, the khutba as a sign of the empire's sovereignty was still read in his name, even though the ruling amir sometimes had to be associated with that of the caliphin the text. 157 He also had his own assistants or officers and religious functionaries whom he himself appointed such as secretary, chamberlain, judge etc. Among the officers of the caliph as distinct from those of the state, we find frequent mention of the following: the secretary, chamberlain ( hājib), judge ( qādī), chief judge ( qādī al-qudāt) and agent ( naqīb) of the 'Abbāsids. 158 There were still other functionaries who are mentioned as having been active during al-Qādir's reign, namely the tax collector ( jābī al-kharāj) involved in the collection of the jizya (poll tax) and taxes from his fiefs; the market investigator (muhtasib); and the person who was in charge of the security of the city (ma una). In addition, there were religious functionaries who established close relations with the caliph such as prayer leader (imāms) in the Jāmi mosques (great mosques) of Baghdad, the khuṭaba a (preachers), jurists (fuqahā') and Muslim scholars ('ulamā'). Furthermore, he was still legally the head of all administration, and all appointments including those of the amirs were made in the name of the caliph. At formal receptions the caliph appeared before the assembled gathering in all pomp and grandeur suitable to his dignity. The amir was expected to make a show of veneration by humiliating acts such as kissing the ground many times in front of the caliph. 159 Moreover, the caliph still had exclusive control over the jizya (poll-tax), levied on the Ahl al-Dhimma (People of the Covenant) i.e.

<sup>157</sup> The inclusion of the name of the Buwayhid amīr in the *khutba* started during the reign of al-Muṭī', when the name of 'Adud al-Dawla was mentioned after that of the caliph. But during the reign of al-Qādir, we do not find any account that he allowed the name of the Buwayhid amīr to be mentioned in the Friday *khutba*.

<sup>158</sup> Mafizullah. Kabir, "The Function of the Khalifah during the Buwayhid Period (946-1055 AD)," Journal of Asian Society of Pakistan 1-3 (1956-1958): 179.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> Ibid., 177-179

Christians and Jews. In spite of his being undermined by the Shī°ī amūs, the caliph used to issue directives on religious matters in his function as the champion of Sunnī orthodoxy. <sup>160</sup> In the following section we will discuss al-Qādir's attempt and privilege to appoint his own assistants for administrative and religious affairs.

### a) The appointment of administrative officials

Al-Qādir began his reign by receiving the secretary and chamberlain assigned to him by Bahā' al-Dawla and chosen from among the latter's followers, but later on the caliph independently selected his assistants. Thus, on Sunday, 2 Shawwāl 386/996, al-Qādir appointed Ibn Ḥājib al-Nuʿmān as his secretary (kābb). 161 Before entering into the service of al-Qādir, Ibn Nuʿmān had served as secretary to al-Ṭā'iʿ lillāh and then continued his service under al-Qādir billāh in 386/996. His service to the two caliphs lasted for forty years. He was a fluent speaker and an eloquent writer and became al-Qādir's closest assistant, proving to be influential in state affairs. 162 However, on Saturday 29 Ramaḍān 388/998 al-Qādir arrested Ibn Nuʿmān and put in his place Abū Aʿlā Saʿīd b. al-Ḥasan b. Tarīk. The latter was in the caliph's service for only seventy days or so before Ibn Nuʿmān was restored to his post. 163 The chroniclers do not provide us with any information about the reason for his arrest. His restoration to office, however, indicates that Ibn Nuʿmān was the only person suitable for that job. This is borne out by the fact that he held the office until his death in 421.164

The duty of the *kātib* (secretary) is usually related to drafting and writing letters and despatches. The institution of *kitāba* in this sense is a very old one and corresponds

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> Ibid., 178.

<sup>161</sup> Ibn Ḥājib al-Nu'mān was born in 340/951. He learnt *ḥadīth* under the guidance of Aḥmad b. Salmān al-Najjād, Abū Bakr al-Shāfi'ī, Ibn Muqāssim and Muḥammad b. Ja'far al-Haytham al-Anbārī. His father was in the service of Abū 'Umar al-Muḥallabī when the latter became vizier (See Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 187).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>162</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 410; al-Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, vol. 12, 31.

<sup>163</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 52.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

to the diwan al-rasa il (board of correspondence or chancery office). The rank of the secretary is as old as the origin of the seal (khātim), which had been considered as a royal insignia from earliest times. 165 The diwan al-rasa il 166 during the 'Abbāsid period was considered among the most important diwans of the state, the holder of which held almost the same rank as the vizier. His responsibility was to prepare official letters and diplomas and to edit government documents after having consulted with the caliph and then seal them with his seal. The sāḥib al-dīwān, the holder of the dīwān, or the secretary, sometimes accompanied the caliph to the court to supervise the mazālim and put the seal of the caliph on court decisions. 167 But much of the role of the kātib had already diminished during the Buwayhid period since the political activities of the caliph were restricted and taken over by the amīr; moreover, the caliph no longer sat on the court of appeal. This responsibility was delegated instead to the qādī or to the naqīb, and since the caliph had no longer any vizier, the kātib acted as vizier for the administration of the caliph's affairs which were outside the religious sphere, since the latter was exercised by the religious functionaries.

Another important officer whom the caliph appointed himself was a chamberlain  $(\hbar \bar{a}jib)$ . The chamberlain was responsible for guarding the door of access to the ruler so that only approved visitors might approach him. He was also the one who introduced into the sovereign's presence friends and visitors and supervised the organization of the solemn audiences, "at which those present formed themselves into two groups on either sides of the hall, leaving the centre vacant for those who were admitted to address the caliph." <sup>168</sup> Basically, the  $\hbar \bar{a}jib$  often appeared as a superintendent of the palace, a chief

<sup>165</sup> S.B. Samadi, "Some Aspects of the Theory of the State and Administration under the Abbasids," *Islamic Culture*, vol. 29, no. 1 (January, 1955): 129.

<sup>166</sup> Under the Fātimids this *dīwān* was called *dīwān al-inshā*. See Samadi, "Some Aspects, " 74.

<sup>167</sup> Hasan Ibrāhīm Hasan and 'Alī Ibrāhīm Hasan, al-Nuzum al-Islāmiyya (al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Miṣriyya, 1939), 182-183.

<sup>168</sup> D.Sourdel, "Ḥādjib," in *E.I.*, new ed., vol. 3, 47.

of the guard, sometimes even as a chief minister or head of the government. He might also occasionally be ordered to dismiss by violent means persons who had displeased the caliph. However, with the decline of the caliphate during the Buwayhid period, the role of the hājib also declined. He was no longer as powerful as before and his main duty was to regulate access to the caliph and act as master of ceremonies.

According to Miskawayh, as soon as al-Qādir assumed the caliphate he received a chamberlain appointed by Bahā al-Dawla. But Miskawayh does not mention his name. It was Ibn al-Jawzī who mentions that 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Samad Abū al-Hasan al-Shīrāzī, called Ibn Abī 'Alī, became al-Qādir's chamberlain in 389/998. 170 He served in this role up to his death in 412/1021. It is reported that when riots broke out in Baghdad in 408/1017, he came to the caliph's palace to announce his retirement and he then declared this in a formal gathering. Al-Qādir then appointed Abū Muqātil. In an attempt to quell the riot, he tried to enter the al-Karkh quarter but its inhabitants rejected him. He then burnt the shops, leaving them a hill of ruins. Then Ibn Abī 'Alī returned to his post in 409/1018. He killed those who were involved in the riot from among the Sunnites and the Shī'ites and exiled the Shī'ite faqīh Ibn al-Mu'allim together with a group of the Sunnite preachers who were charged with inciting the riot. When Abū al-Qāsim al-Maghribī became vizier he seized the wealth of Ibn Abī 'Alī, which amounted to five thousand dinārs Maghribī. 171 The latter was accused of being in close contact with bandits and so was murdered at the street of al-Dizajin the middle of Rajab in 412/1021. His was replaced in his post by Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad Ghulām b. al-Ḥudhud. 172

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> We have no information on al-Qādir's chamberlain from 381/991 up to the appointment of Ibn Abī 'Alī in 389/998. The appointment of al-Qādir's chamberlain by Bahā' al-Dawla has several meanings: first, the amīr al-umarā' perhaps wanted by this arrangement to watch the action of al-Qādir; second, this indicates that the caliph during his early years was submissive to the policy of the Buwayhids; third, the caliph did not reject the chamberlain appointed by Bahā' al-Dawla because the caliph's accession to the caliphate was owing to Bahā' al-Dawla's seizure of al-Ṭā'i'.

<sup>171</sup> dīnārs Maghribī were dīnārs produced by the Fātimids who ruled the Maghrib (North Africa).

<sup>172</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol.8, 19.

In addition to these two formal officials of the caliph, there were also various religious functionaries such as judges ( $q\bar{a}d\bar{a}s$ ), witnesses ( $shuh\bar{u}d$ ), and  $khutab\bar{a}$  (preachers) whom the caliph appointed and who were also in close relation with him. The relations of the caliph with  $ulam\bar{a}$  (scholars),  $fuqah\bar{a}$  (jurists) and other outstanding religious figures will be discussed in Chapter 3.

## b) The appointment of $q\bar{a}d\bar{i}s$ and other religious functionaries

Among the religious functionaries who played a very important role and had a close connection with the ruler were the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{a}s$ . Their importance, however, extended beyond their usefulness to the ruler himself to his role in the Muslim community because he was responsible for the application of the shart a. For the ruler, the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{a}$  was representative of the authority invested in the power of administrative justice ( $qad\bar{a}^2$ ). If the caliph was the holder of all powers, at least in theory, the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{a}$  was his direct delegate if appointed by the caliph himself, and indirect if nominated by an intermediate representative such as a vizier or the governor of a province. In all cases, however, the delegator still had the power to do justice in person. 173 Due to their significant position, the Arabic sources usually provide ample information about the  $qad\bar{a}s$ , their appointments, dismissals and deaths.

Usually one  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  was appointed in the capital and one in the leading town of each of the great territorial divisions. "But each of these can appoint direct delegates. This  $k\bar{a}q\bar{t}s$  justice has always been exercised by a single  $k\bar{a}q\bar{t}$ ." <sup>174</sup> In theory, his competence was general and encompassed both civil and penal cases. The religious nature of his office though led to the accretion of the administrative functions of the same nature, such as the supervision of mosques and waqfs (religious endowment).

<sup>173</sup> E.Tyan, "Kāḍī," in E. I., new ed. vol. 4, 373.

<sup>174</sup> Thid

However, his scope of power in penal matters was by contrast limited to the enforcement of the *sharr* a and to the very few crimes described by that law. 175

In addition to the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$ , there was another religious functionary whose rank was even higher than that of the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$ , namely the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  al- $qud\bar{a}t$  (judge of judges or chief judge). Some of the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}s$  by virtue of their competence in the sphere of law, their uprightness, long experience and support to the established government were promoted to this rank. While the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}s$  al- $qud\bar{a}t$  was above all a judge, he was also delegated the judicial administration, i.e. the nomination, control and dismissal of the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}s$ , whereas special jurisdictions (shurta, hisba,  $qad\bar{a}^s$  al-sakar and  $maz\bar{a}him$ ) were outside his authority. The authority of the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}s$  al- $qud\bar{s}t$ , however, did not over the course of time always follow the same pattern. During the 4th/10th century, the  $sal-qud\bar{s}t$  in the 'Abbāsid caliphate did not exercise his authority in his own name. Thus the contract of nomination of  $sal-q\bar{t}s$  was issued by the caliph himself. The  $sal-q\bar{u}d\bar{s}t$  was empowered only to nominate candidates. 176

The first qāḍī who seems to have been appointed by the caliph al-Qādir was Abū Muḥammad 'Abdullāh b. Muḥammad al-Akfānī, the Shāfī 'ite. In the month of Muḥarram 383/993 the latter received the Ḥanafite Abū al-Qāsim 'Alī b. al-Muḥassin as his witness (notary) and in the month of Rajab he accepted the testimony of Abū Bakr b. al-Akhḍar. Another qāḍī who was appointed by the caliph in the early years of his reign was Abū 'Abdillāh al-Dabbī. The latter in Ṣafar the same year received Abū al-'Alā' Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Ya'qūb al-Wāsitī as his witness. 177 Some of these qāḍīs or witnesses were promoted to higher ranks or given more responsibilities. For instance, in 390/999 al-Qāḍī Abū 'Abdillāh al-Ḥusayn b. Hārūn al-Dabbī served as qāḍī for al-Karkh, Kūfa and both sides of the Euphrates, while the qāḍī Muḥammad 'Abdullāh b.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup> Ibid., 374.

<sup>177</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 174.

Muḥammad al-Akfānī was appointed qāḍī for al-Ruṣāfa and its surroundings. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Kharazī was appointed as qāḍī for the Tigris and Khurāsān regions, Mukharrim, the ḥarīm (precinct) of the caliph's palace and Nahrawānāt. Finally Abū Khāzim Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Wāsiṭī was appointed as qāḍī for Wāsiṭ and its surrounding regions. The contracts of all these qāḍīs were read out in the caliph's palace. 178

The importance of the position of the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{a}s$  for the caliph was that they acted not only as delegates of the caliph in religious matters, but also in some instances they functioned as his extended hands in the political sphere. For example, in 390/999 al-Qadir sent a letter to Muḥammad b. 'Abdillah b. al-Ḥasan the qaḍī of Jīlan. It was a quite a long letter in which he explained several points to the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$ , which we may summarize as follows. First, besides his main duty as judge, he was asked to lead the daily prayers and those of 'Ids ('Id al-Fitr = The Feast of Breaking the Ramadan Fast or Lesser Bairam and 'Id al-Adhā=The Feast of Immolation or Greater Bairam), prayers for eclipses ( khushūf al-qamar wa al-shams ) and prayers for rain ( istisqā ° ) and give the khutba on Friday, and watch over congregational prayers (salāt al-jamā'a). Secondly, he was asked to read and study the Qur'an, to exert the people to keep physically and mentally pure. Thirdly, he was ordered to be beneficent in giving counsel and to make adequate investigation before he gave any advice. Fourthly, he was asked to remind people on as many occasions as possible of the authority of the Commander of the Faithful and to be loyal to the 'Abbasids. Fifthly, he was instructed to apply the laws of Islam (sharī a). Sixthly, it was suggested to him that he spare time in the mosques to discuss litigation.<sup>179</sup>

Among the six points, the fourth one is of the greatest interest for us here. Al-Qādir realized that in the beginning of his reign the people in Jīlān did not readily accept

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup> Ibid., 208.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 209.

him as caliph, even though the *khuibas* in many areas were read in his name. He feared that the Muslims in this and other remote areas, whence many Buwayhid followers came, would give their allegiance to another ruler. Secondly, al-Qādir knew that even though he did not hold the reins of the administration of the state, at least his recognition as the orthodox Sunnī caliph had to be maintained. This attitude was also encouraged by the continued support accorded to him by the Ghaznavids in the east, who were now the new rulers in this region.

As noted above some of the  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}s$  by virtue of their competence, uprightness, lengthy experience in judgeship and their close relations with the caliph were promoted to higher rank. Por instance, in 396/1005 al-Qādir appointed Abū Muḥammad al-Akfānī as chief judge ( $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  al- $quq\bar{t}$ ) over the whole of Baghdād. He held this position till he died in 405/1014 at the age of eighty-five. He was then replaced by Abū al-Ḥasan b. Abī al-Shawārib who was selected by the caliph from among several candidates proposed to him. Before taking up the post of  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  al- $quq\bar{t}$  which he held until his death in 417/1026, Abū al-Ḥasan b. Abī al-Shawārib had been the  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  of Baṣra during the time of Bahā al-Ḥasan b. Abī al-Shawārib had been the  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  in place of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shawārib until 420/1029 when he appointed Abū 'Abdillāh al-Ḥusayn b. 'Alī Mākūlā (the Shāfī te). He was the last  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  whom al-Qādir appointed before his own death in 422/1030. However, this does not mean that al-Qādir did not appoint also any ordinary  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$ . In fact, in 412/1021 he appointed the  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  Abū Ja far al-Simnānī for al-Ruṣāfa and Bāb al-Ṭāq. 185

<sup>180</sup> As early as the time of al-Muqtadir, the office of qādī al-qudāt was sold. It is said that the vizier Ibn al-Furāt began to sell the office and the qādī Abū 'Umar was the first to obtain the office through this way. After his death, al-Muqtadir offered the office to Ibn Abī 'Umar with the price of one hundred dīnārs. Saʿāda, Tārīkh, 95.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 230.

<sup>182</sup> Before that he was appointed as  $q\bar{a}d\bar{i}$  of Madinat al-Manṣūr, Bāb al-Ṭāq and the Sūq al-Thulāthā' (Tuesday Market). His tenure in court lasted for forty years either as  $q\bar{a}d\bar{i}$  or deputy  $q\bar{a}d\bar{i}$ .

<sup>183</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 270.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> Ibid., vol. 8, 25-26.

<sup>185</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 341.

There were still many  $q\bar{a}d\bar{i}s$  and witnesses whose dates of appointment and jurisdictions are not clear to us since the chroniclers provide very little information about them. The sources usually inform us that such and such a person was a  $q\bar{a}d\bar{i}$  or witness and that he died in such and such year. We do not know whether they were appointed by the caliph al-Qādir or had been in office since the time of al-Ṭā'i' lillāh. Therefore, there is little point in discussing them here.

Regarding al-Qādir's attempt to appoint imāms in mosques we likewise do not have much information. In fact, the caliph seems to have felt no obligation to appoint imams in all mosques throughout the empire, only the most important ones, in particular those in Baghdad. However, there are some accounts related to the appointment of imam. Two years after the caliph al-Qadir assumed the caliphate, he began constructing a mosque in the Harbiyya section and provided its coverings and made it a masjid jāmi (a mosque which can be used for ordinary prayers and the Friday khutba). According to Hilāl b. Muḥassin, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Hāshimī built the mosque in the Harbiyya section during the time of al-Muti lillah, with the intention that it should be used for the Friday *khutba*, but al-Muți<sup>e</sup> prohibited the *khutba* from being delivered there. This is how it remained until the accession of al-Qadir billah. He consulted the jurists on this matter and they decided that it was valid to hold the Friday service there. Al-Qādir then determined to rebuild, decorate, supply its necessary coverings, fix a pulpit and appoint an imam to lead the Jum'a prayers there. The renovation of this mosque began in Rabī al-Akhir 381/991. The mosque in the Ḥarbiyya section was among the mosques which survived up to 451/1059 and were visited by Abū Bakr al-Khaūb (al-Baghdādī). According to his account, he even joined the Friday prayers held in all mosques found in Baghdād, i.e., those in the city (*Madīnat al-Mansūr*), al-Ruṣāfa, the caliphal palace, Barāthā, Ummu Ja'far and the Harbiyya section. All these mosques survived except the Barāthā mosque which was neglected and no prayers were held

there. 186 Ibn al-Jawzī, however, mentions that in 402/1011 al-Qādir ordered the construction of al-Kaff mosque in al-Daqīq section. It is said that the caliph participated in fixing the railing of the mosque. 187

Al-Qādir's concern with the construction of the mosque might have been prompted by several reasons. First, he must have been aware of the significance that a mosque holds in Islam. Secondly, his awareness of being the Imām of the Faithful may have encouraged him to concern himself with the important aspects of religious life which could in turn earn the sympathy of Muslim scholars and the common people alike. Finally, he had in his mind a political aim, meaning that the building of a mosque meant the installation of an imām to lead the prayer and to deliver the *khuṭba*. The imām whom he appointed could become his spokesman or an extension of his authority, and would always support his claim to this latter and would disseminate his messages.

Though al-Qādir appointed an imām for the new mosque as indicated above, the name of the imām is not mentioned by Ibn al-Jawzī and Miskawayh. There is mention of the appointment of two imāms 386/996, namely Abū 'Abdillāh b. Ja'far b. Muhtadī billāh¹88 for al-Manṣūr mosque and Abū Bakr al-Tammām b. Muḥammād b. Hārūn (b. al-Muṭṭalib) for al-Ruṣāfa mosque.¹89 Some of the  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}s$  functioned also as imāms in the mosques where their courts were located; for instance, in Shawwāl 390/999 al-Qādir appointed the  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  Abū 'Abdillāh al-Ḥusayn b. Hārūn al-Ḍabbī as imām for the mosque of al-Manṣūr, while the  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  of Jīlān, Muḥammad b. 'Abdillāh b. al-Ḥasan, was also asked to lead the prayers and deliver the Friday *khuṭba*.¹90

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>186</sup> Ibid., 174.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>187</sup> Ibid., 255.

<sup>188</sup> He was also a witness and *khāṭib*. According to Ibn al-Jawzī, he made the same *khutba* every Friday. When people listened to his *khuṭba*, they cried and were touched by his voice. He died in 418/1027. See Ibn al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntazam*, vol.8, 31-32.

<sup>189</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 187.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>190</sup> Ibid., vol. 7, 209.

After the imams, another important official whom the caliph himself appointed was the naqib (agent). The naqib was among the closest assistants to the caliph on formal occasions. In Dhū al-Ḥijja of 384/994 al-Qādir appointed the Sharīf Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Abī Tamām al-Zaynabī as an agent for the ʿAbbāsids, 191 replacing his father Abū al-Qāsim al-Zaynabī, who had been the naqīb under al-Tā'i'lillāh in 372/982 and had just died. 192 Four years later (389/998) he was appointed as chief agent (naqib al-nuqabā") and a robe of honour was conferred upon him; 193 later in 397/1006, he was given the title of al-Riḍā Dhū al-Hisbayn.<sup>194</sup> The function of the nagib, as explained by al-Māwardī, was to deal with genealogical, financial and moral matters. He was responsible for keeping a register of nobility, in which he was to record their births and deaths, and for preventing false claimants from intrusion into the corps of the ashrāf (Hāshimite and 'Alid nobility) as well as forbidding women of noble blood to marry men not their equals in nobility. He was commanded to enforce the financial claims of the ashraf, in particular on the state treasury concerning their pensions. Furthermore, he had to watch over the proper administration of endowments established for the ashrāf. With regard to morality, the naqīb was liable to supervise the conduct of the ashraif, to restrain them from extravagance and to urge them to avoid anything harmful to their prestige. 195

In most cases, the 'Abbāsid *naqīb* during al-Qādir's period accompanied the caliph to meet the Buwayhid *amūrs* the first time they came to Baghdād, and he also attended the formal audiences and ceremonies. Sometimes, the caliph sent him as representative of the 'Abbāsids to meet the *amūrs*; for instance, in 419/1028 Abū al-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup> Ibid., 174.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> Ibid., 113; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol., 9,105.

<sup>193</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 206.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> Ibid., 234.

<sup>195</sup> A. Havemann, "Naķib," in *E.I.*, new ed., vol. 2, 927. (see also al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya wa al-Wilāyat al-Dīniyya*, taḥqīq Khālid 'Abd al-Laṭīf (Beirūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1994), 171-172.

Hasan al-Zaynabī was despatched by the caliph together with al-Murtaḍā, the 'Alid naqīb', bearing a letter of complaint of the army and that of the caliph to Jalāl al-Dawla. 196 The 'Abbāsid and 'Alid naqībs' were often summoned by al-Qādir following serious conflicts between the Shī 'ites and Sunnites, especially when religious issues were involved. For example, following the incident in the Barāthā mosque in 420/1029, when a khārib sent by the caliph was injured by the Shī 'ites, both Abū al-Ḥasan al-Zaynabī and the Sharīf al-Murtaḍā were summoned by the caliph together with the qāḍā Abū Ṣālih, the vizier Abū 'Alī b. Mākūlā and the army commanders to have a royal proceeding regarding this incident. 197 The details of this incident will be discussed later.

As for the 'Alid naqībs, the caliph al-Qādir did not appoint them since they were usually appointed by the Buwayhid amīs. As soon as he entered Baghdād, Mu'izz al-Dawla separated the 'Alids from the jurisdiction of the 'Abbāsid naqīb and appointed the first 'Alid naqīb al-Kawākibi, a descendant of Zayn al-'Ābidīn. 198The functions of the 'Alid naqīb were not singled out by al-Māwardī. It is very probable that both the 'Abbāsid and 'Alid naqībs had more or less the same duties. Of the twelve tasks of the naqīb mentioned by al-Māwardī, 199 we have no account of their actual application in particular during the reign of al-Qādir. Perhaps duties number six and seven which related to their tasks to restrain them (the 'Abbāsids and the 'Alids) from committing evil and blasphemous actions and to prevent them from oppressing common people caused both the 'Abbāsid and 'Alid naqībs to be mentioned in the sources since during the Buwayhid rule in Baghdād both the Sunnite and Shī'ite communities were very often involved in clashes and riots. The more famous 'Alid naqībs were of the Mūsawī family. Abū Aḥmad al-Ḥusayn b. Mūsā al-Mūsawī was first appointed as an 'Alid

<sup>196</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 35.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 41; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 26.

<sup>198</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 204.

<sup>199</sup> Al-Mawardi, *The Ordinances of Government*, trans. Wafaa H. Wahba (Reading: Center for Muslim Contribution to Civilization, 1996), 107-109.

naqīb in 354/965.200 When Abū al-Fadl al-'Abbās b. al-Husayn al-Shīrāzī became a vizier of 'Izz al-Dawla (Bakhtiyār) in Ṣafar 370/980, al-Mūsawī was removed and replaced by Abū Muḥammad b. al-Naṣr al-ʿAdawī. He then returned to his office when 'Adud al-Dawla died in 376/986. One day when he felt sick his *niqāba* (agency) was taken over by Abū al-Hasan 'Alī b. Ahmad b. Ahmad b. Ishāq, then by Abū al-Fath Muhammad b. 'Amr. When the latter died leaving the 'Alids without a naqib for some time, Abū Ahmad al-Mūsawī returned to his office and was put in charge of the mazīlim (tribunal court) and the pilgrimage in 380/990; and at the same time both his sons, al-Murtaḍā Abū al-Qāsim and al-Raḍī Abū al-Ḥasan became his deputies.<sup>201</sup> In 384/994 Abū Ahmad al-Mūsawī and both his sons were removed from office.<sup>202</sup> Another 'Alid, Abū al-Hasan b. al-Husayn al-Zaydī, was appointed as a *maqīb* for the 'Alids.<sup>203</sup> In 394/1003 Bahā' al-Dawla appointed the Sharīf Abū Aḥmad al-Husayn b. Mūsā al-Mūsawī as chief judge (qādī al-qudāt), head of pilgrimage and mazālim and agent of the 'Alids. His appointment took place in Shīrāz, where the sultān sent the contract for those positions to him, giving him the title al-Tāhir al-Awḥad Dhū al-Manāqib. The caliph al-Qādir rejected his appointment as chief judge but retained him for the rest of his offices. Much correspondence took place on the issue but this ended in silence.<sup>204</sup> (The issue of this appointment will be discussed in chapter 3). In 397/1006 Bahā' al-Dawla appointed Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī as an agent for the 'Alids and head of the pilgrimage and gave him the title al-Rādī Dhū al-Hisbayn and his brother Abū al-Qāsim was given the title al-Murtaḍā Dhū al-Majdayn.<sup>205</sup>Al-Rāḍī later on was promoted to the position of chief agent of the 'Alids in all of the empire in 403/1012 and the contract for this was read in the palace of Fakhr al-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol 7, 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>201</sup> Ibid., 152.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>202</sup> Ibid., 174.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> Ibid., 247.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> Ibid., 226-227.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>205</sup> Ibid., 234.

Mulk on occasion attended by dignitaries,  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}s$ , 'ulamā' and soldiers. He was given the black robe of honour, making him the first 'Alid to wear this colour. However, he enjoyed the respect deriving from his position for only three years since he died in 406/1015. Al-Qādir then appointed al-Murtaḍā to replace his brother and transferred to him all the posts held by al-Rāḍī. <sup>206</sup>

Here is an exceptional instance where the caliph himself appointed the 'Alid naqīb. We have no information why this happened. Presumably, since Bahā' al-Dawla died in 403/1012 and his successor Sulṭān al-Dawla failed to come to Baghdād quickly (he came to Baghdād in 409/1018), the caliph took this initiative, indicating that his religious power became increasingly stronger and his concern with the welfare of the community was obvious. There is no account that he first consulted the Buwayhid amīr for this measure.

Now we come to the office of *hisba* (market supervisor's office), which was still maintained during the time of al-Qādir. The holder of this office was called *muhtasib* (market supervisor). The origin of the office of *hisba* and of the *muhtasib* himself is not clear; both terms were not even used originally; instead the term *ṣāḥib* (or *ʿāmil*) al-sūq (market investigator) was used. The appearance of the term *hisba* and *muḥtasib* may have first occurred at the time of the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn. The *ṣāḥib al-sūq* was replaced by the *muḥtasib*, a private individual who practiced the virtue of *hisba* ( acted as overseer of market and morals). The basic and permanent duty of the *muḥtasib* was the control of the markets<sup>207</sup> to prevent commercial fraud and to establish religious principles and public morals. He was to see that the proper weights and measures were used in the markets, to deal with cases of fraudulent sales and non-payment of debts, to check gambling, usury and the sale of wine.<sup>208</sup> In other words, he had to combat all

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> Ibid., 276.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> C. Cahen and M.Talbi, "Hisba." in E.I., new ed., vol.3, 487.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> S.M. Imamuddin, 'Arab Administration (622-1258) (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1984),76-77.

problems, including dishonesty, which came with the manufacture and sale of commodities. In regard to the religious sphere, the *muḥtasib* had to supervise the performance of religious obligations, such as daily and Friday prayers, (the fasting of Ramaḍan), the proper use and maintenance of the mosques, the socially accepted behaviour of the sexes in the streets (and the baths) and finally the application of discriminatory measures against the *dhimmīs*. <sup>209</sup>

During al-Qādir's reign we find very little information about the individuals who assumed the office of *hisba*. Ibn Kathīr mentions that the *qāqī* Abū Ja<sup>c</sup>far al-Simnānī took on this post and the supervision of inheritances in Baghdād, and was also put in charge of the Sawād areas.<sup>210</sup> In 419/1028 he was sent by the caliph with a letter to Qirwāsh to stay away from al-Maghribī,<sup>211</sup> the ex-vizier of Musharrif al-Dawla who took refuge with Qirwāsh when conflict occurred between him and the Turkish troops.

Finally we deal with the office of the so-called *ma'ūna*, whose original meaning was support or assistance, but then the word developed a wider sense. It sometimes meant a donation paid to those who did not receive a stipend, sometimes an additional bonus to these stipends and sometimes an annual payment given to those who received a stipend and rations alike. Its plural form, *ma'ūnāt* is even used as a general term for private income from public funds. The term *ṣāḥib* or *'āmil al-ma'ūna* was used in this period ('Abbāsid) for a fiscal officer, especially as he was in charge of the *kharāj* as well, or of the civil administration in general, but it is possible that he was an officer responsible for the maintenance of law and order.<sup>212</sup>

From the 3rd/9th century onwards it is generally understood that the leader of the *ma una* was charged with police duties. He may have been identical with the leader

 $<sup>^{209}</sup>$  Cahen and Talbi, "Hisba," in E.I., new ed. vol.3, 487; see also al-Mawardi, Ordinances, 260-261.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol.9, 336.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> P. Crone, "Ma<sup>c</sup>ūna," in *E.I.*, new ed. vol. 4, 848.

of the *shurta* (police) or with the military governor.<sup>213</sup> Probably the difference between the *ma ʿūna* and the *shurta* was that the latter's primary duty was to maintain and restore peace within a big city, whereas the *ma ʿūna* were soldiers who were responsible for maintaining peace in the smaller cities. At night they made the rounds looking out for thieves and other malefactors. In times of war or unrest the *ṣāḥib al-ma ʿūna* had to organize the main body of the troops.<sup>214</sup>

Al-Ṣābī mentions that Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ibn Abī ʿAlī was appointed ṣāḥib al-ma ʿūna in 389/998, following the death of the chamberlain Abū ʿAbdillāh Muḥammad b. ʿAlī who was in charge of the ma ʿūna and was murdered by the 'ayyārūn. 215 Ibn Abī ʿAlī probably continued his service up to the year 421/1030, when Abū Muḥammad b. al-Nasawī who was called al-Nāṣiḥ (adviser), was appointed to the office on Monday 24 Rajab this year and given the robe of honour. On this occasion, the 'ayyārūn were invited and aides were appointed for them as well as keepers of arms. 216

## B. Al-Qādir's external relations

Discussions in the sources regarding al-Qādir's foreign relations tend to focus primarily on his dealings with his two most powerful neighbours, i.e. the Fāṭimids to the west and the Ghaznavids to the east. His relations with other rulers, particularly those in the eastern part of the empire, such as the Sāmānids and Qarākhānids, are rarely dealt with in the same sources, and so there is little to be said of them. The greater attention paid to the Fāṭimids maybe accounted for by the fact that they promoted an Ismā¹īlī Shī¹ite ideology which differed from and even conflicted with the Sunnī ideology of the 'Abbāsids on many points. The Ghaznavids on the other hand, under the leadership of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>214</sup> Imamuddin, 'Arab Administration, 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup> Hilāl al-Ṣābī, *Tārīkh*, in Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, vol. 3, 338.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>216</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.8, 49.

Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin and his successor Masʿūd b. Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, defended and even encouraged, Sunnī ʿAbbāsid ideology.

Al-Qādir's relations with the Fāṭimids never actually took the form of direct contacts of envoys to each other's court; nor even was there any formal letter ever exchanged between them. Their relations took the form of a cold war. The Fāṭimids sent their missionaries into the heartland of the 'Abbāsid empire and tried to attract supporters for their claims. For his part, the 'Abbāsid caliph tried to suppress the spread of these missionaries and to supplant their claims through the moulding of public opinion against the Fāṭimids and through the support of Sunnī and Shī'ī scholars. As for al-Qādir's relations with the Ghaznavids even though they never seem to have made direct contact, both rulers maintained formal correspondence and the sending of envoys. The following section is an elaboration on these relationships, starting with the Fāṭimids.

## 1. Al-Qādir's relations with the Fātimids

As mentioned above the caliph al-Qādir's relations with the Fāṭimids consisted less in maintaining diplomatic relations than in attempting to crush the Fāṭimid propaganda organization in Baghdād and to protect the 'Abbāsid caliphate from the threat of extinction. Al-Qādir's measures in dealing with the Fāṭimids, as we will see, indicate to some extent his political determination on the one hand, and show how the Buwayhid *amūrs* and the Shī<sup>\*</sup>ites complied with his policy on the other.

The emergence of Fāṭimid propaganda in 'Irāq during the fifth/eleventh century was not a new phenomenon, for this propaganda can be traced back to the end of the second/eighth century when the early Ismā'īlī missionaries operated secretly, avoiding any danger and harm from the 'Abbāsids. Among these missionaries was 'Abdullāh b. Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ, who propagated the claim of the Imām 'Abdullāh b. al-Raḍī b. Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl b. Ja'far al-Ṣādiq.<sup>217</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> Fāḍil al-Khālidī, *al-Ḥayāt al-Siyāsiyya wa Nuzum al-Ḥukm tī al-ʿIrāq khilāl al-Qarn al-Khāmis al-Ḥijrī* (Baghdād: Dār al-Adīb, 1969), 69.

When the 'Abbāsids in Baghdād found out about this they ordered their governors in all districts under their rule to arrest Ibn Maymūn, who along with another missionary known as al-Ḥusayn al-Ahwāzī, had been able to flee to Salamiyya, which they made their headquarters for despatching the dā is to 'Irāq and other districts. He was succeeded by his son Aḥmad. The latter sent al-Ḥusayn al-Aḥwāzī to 'Irāq where he succeeded in spreading Ismā 'Ilī propaganda in the Sawād of Kūfa and thus in turn cleared the way for the emergence of the Qarmaṭians in the lower regions of 'Irāq (their propaganda in many ways resembled that of the Ismā 'Ilīs). Eventually, the Ismā 'Ilī missionary movement was established in many districts in the second half of the third/ninth century. During this period many well-known Ismā Ilī leaders emerged: Ibn Khawshab in Yemen, Abū Sa Id al-Jannābī in Bahrayn, Abū 'Abdillāh al-Shī I in the Maghrib and Abū 'Alī al-Dā I in Egypt. 221

When the Fāṭimids were finally successful in establishing a caliphate in North Africa (298/910), they sent their missionaries ( du āt) to many districts under 'Abbāsid control; even 'Ubaydillāh al-Mahdī, the founder of the Fāṭimid caliphate sent his du āt (missionaries) to Baghdād, who provided him with information on the 'Abbāsids' activity. These missionaries worked hard in spreading their propaganda. In spite of the fact that the 'Abbāsids were aware of their activities and dealt severely with those whose loyalty to the 'Abbāsids was suspected, the Fāṭimid missionaries in turn took precautions themselves and used to assemble in the Barāthā mosque. Some of the Qarmaṭians were found wearing the rings on which was inscribed:" Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Imām al-Mahdī, the friend of Allāh," these rings were made of white clay by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> Ibid., 70.

 $<sup>^{219}</sup>$  The death of 'Abdullāh b. Maymūn seems to have been obscure; even S. M. Stern who writes on 'Abdullāh b. Maymūn does not mention the date of his death. He only mentions that 'Abdullāh b. Maymūn belongs to the middle and second half of the 2nd/8th century. S. M. Stern, "'Abdullāh b. Maymūn," in  $\it E.I.$ , new ed., vol. 1, 48.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> Maqrīzī, *Itti az al-Ḥunafā bi Akhbār al-A immat al-Fāṭimiyyīn al-Khulafā* (al-Qāḥira: Dār al-Fikral-ʿArabī, 1948), 25-28, 30

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>221</sup> Al-Khālidī, al-Hayāt al-Siyāsiyya, 70-71

al-Ka $^{\circ}$ k $\bar{i}$ , the leading Shi $^{\circ}$ ite who propagated Qarmațian ideas. They were arrested by the  $^{\circ}$ Abbāsid authorities. $^{222}$ 

The Fātimid caliph al-Mu<sup>°</sup>izz li-dīnillāh (341-365/953-975) expressed his ambition to extend his rule in 'Irāq to the Byzantine ambassador who came to Egypt before his death in 365/975, saying:" Do you remember when you came to me as a messenger while I was in Mahdiyya, and I told you, 'You surely will see me when I am a king in Egypt?'The messenger said, 'Yes.' Al-Mu<sup>°</sup>izz then said,'I tell you that you will surely see me in Baghdād, when I became caliph there." <sup>223</sup>

Al-Mu°izz's successor, al-°Azīz billāh (365-386/953-996), took whatever steps were necessary to realize the Fāṭimid goal of spreading the da wa in 'Irāq and eliminating the 'Abbāsid caliphate. When in 372/982 Bakjur rebelled against Sa dal-Dawla b. Ḥamdān and announced his allegiance to the Fāṭimids, he sent a letter to the Fāṭimid caliph, pointing out the importance of the occupation of Aleppo, whence the Hamdānids ruled over the region, saying that, as a corridor, its occupation would facilitate the taking of 'Irāq. Al-'Azīz billāh then sent letters to the governor of Tripoli and to other governors of Syria, demanding that they send an army to Bakjur to occupy Aleppo. 224

Al-ʿAzīz billāh's concern with the missionary activity, which consisted in spending a considerable amount of money, had enabled him to win over the Arab *amīrs* in the northern regions. In Muḥarram 382/992, Abū Dhuwwād Muḥammad b. al-Musayyib al-ʿUqaylī, the ruler of Mawṣil, declared his allegiance to the Fāṭimids, and pronounced a *khuṭba* in Mawṣil in the name of al-ʿAzīz billāh and had it inscribed on standards and coins.<sup>225</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> Ibid., 73-74; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 237-238.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> Al-Khālidī, *al-Ḥayāt al-Siyāsiyya*, 74; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Nujūm al-Zāhira*, vol. 4, 226-228.

<sup>224</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 85.

 $<sup>^{225}</sup>$  Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira, vol. 4, 116-117; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-A'yān, trans. de Slane, vol. 3, 528.

When al-ʿAzīz billāh died in 386/996 and was succeeded by his son Abū ʿAlī Manṣūr with the title of al-Ḥākim bi-amrillāh (386-412/996-1021), he followed his father in spreading Fāṭimid propaganda in ʿIrāq and in other Islamic lands, taking advantage of the Buwayhid decline and the frequent clashes between the Sunnites and the Shī ʿites in ʿIrāq. In 398/1007 during a riot between the Sunnites and the Shī ʿites, some of the latter called for support of the Fāṭimid caliph al-Ḥākim bi-amrillāh and shouted, "Yā Ḥākim yā Manṣūr," causing the caliph al-Qādir much annoyance. <sup>226</sup>

During al-Qādir's reign the Fāṭimid propaganda showed its effect in the disloyalty of the 'Uqaylids to the 'Abbāsids. In 401/1010 Abū al-Māni' Qirwāsh b. Muqallad, who bore the title Mu'tamid al-Dawla, the chief of the 'Uqaylid tribe and ruler of Mawṣil, Madā'in, Anbār and Kūfa,<sup>227</sup> declared before the people of Mawṣil and them his loyalty to al-Ḥākim, the ruler of Egypt, expressing his determination to establish da'wa on his behalf. Qirwāsh also struck al-Ḥākim's name on the coinage and raised his banners throughout his principality.<sup>228</sup> The people responded as subdued subjects ordinarily did and hid their aversion. Qirwāsh b. Muqallad then presented them with a new preacher (khāṭib) on Friday 4 Muḥarram 401/1010, bestowing upon him a robe of honour and gave him the text of the khuṭba to read. The central message of the khuṭba was a supplication to God to bless the first 'Alid Imām 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and his descendants as well as the rulers of Egypt, beginning with al-Mahdī to al-Ḥākim bi amrillāh.<sup>229</sup>The khuṭba clearly justified and acknowledged their claims to the caliphate.

Finding no response from the people of Mawsil, Qirwāsh went to al-Anbār demanding the *khāṭib* there to comply with his wishes, but the *khāṭib* fled to Kūfa so

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 237-238.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>227</sup> Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Mohammedan Dynasties* (Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabiyyat-i-Delhi, 1977), 116; Sadik A. Assaad, *The Reign of al-Hakim bi amrillah (386-996-411/1021): A Political Study* (Beirūt: The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1974), 111.

<sup>228</sup> Assaad, Reign of al-Hakim, 111.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>229</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 248.

that Qirwāsh himself pronounced the *khuṭba* for al-Ḥākim there on Friday 2 Rabī al-Awwal. From there he went to al-Qaṣr (Qaṣr Ibn Hubayra) and Madā in where he again delivered the *khuṭba* seven days later. He was not accepted, however, and was even seriously opposed by the people so that he was left with no choice but to seek relations with the sulṭāns. Those who did not agree with him among the Alids and the Hāshimites left Kūfa and fled to Baghdād. When they told the caliph of these matters he was astonished because it had only been five years since he had received Qirwāsh b. Abū al-Ḥasan, given him the title Muʿtamid al-Dawla and confirmed his emirate (of Mawṣil). The caliph consequently sent a letter to Amīd al-Juyūsh and despatched Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī (the theologian) with a letter to Bahā al-Dawla. As the caliph's representative, Ibn al-Tayyib al-Bāqillānī recited to the sulṭān a long speech, saying,

I swear to Allāh that our concern about this affair is greater than that of the Commander of the Faithful because the corruption which will befall us is greater. We have sent a letter to Abū 'Alī [Bahā' al-Dawla's kunya] proposing that he give us one hundred thousand dīnārs which can be used for the expense of the army. If the situation forces us to go on campaign, we are the first who should take action on behalf of the Commander of the Faithful.<sup>233</sup>

Bahā' al-Dawla then wrote a letter to 'Amīd al-Juyūsh ordering him to fight Qirwāsh and supplied him with one hundred thousand dīnārs to provision the army.<sup>234</sup> 'Amīd al-Juyūsh and the army marched to Mawṣil, where Qirwāsh consequently excused himself and renounced his allegiance to al-Ḥākim, promising the caliph that he would never again plot against him. The caliph was satisfied with his renunciation and promise, and the khuṭba in the name of the caliph al-Qādir was restored. At the same time, al-Ḥākim had sent an envoy with thirty thousand dīnārs to buy Qirwāsh's loyalty. When the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>230</sup> Ibid., 251. Ibn al-Jawzī's statement is not clear on which sultāns Qirwāsh contacted to gain support for his propagation of the Fāṭimid claim.

<sup>231</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol.9, 223.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>232</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol,.7, 230.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>233</sup> Ibid., 251.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 223/.

envoy was on the way to Mawsil, he heard that the *khuṭba* for al-Ḥākim was no longer to be pronounced in Raqqa. On informing al-Ḥākim of these events, the latter commanded him to "leave what is in your hands with the governor of Raqqa," <sup>235</sup> a Fātimid vassal.

Qirwāsh's inclination to al-Ḥākim, according to Ibn al-Jawzī, was due to the assiduity with which al-Ḥākim sent agents and letters to him, urging him to switch allegiance to the ruler of Egypt. Ibn al-Jawzī's explanation is insufficient, however, to account for Qirwāsh's denunciation of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. There must have been much more behind his decision than this. He fails to point out, for instance, that Qirwāsh came from a family which professed Shī'ite doctrine and that his father, al-Muqallad, was known as a Shī'ite extremist. As mentioned above, his uncle Abū Dhuwwād Muḥammad b. al-Musayyib, as soon as he took over the governorship of Mawṣil, had acknowledged the Fāṭimid caliphate and denounced 'Abbāsid suzerainty. 236 Moreover, Ḥusām al-Dawla Abū al-Ḥasan Muqallad b. al-Musayyib, before his death in 391/1000, had intended to take possession of Baghdād. 237 Qirwāsh's proclamation of his loyalty to the Shī'te caliph of Cairo was aimed at enhancing his prestige amongst the Shī'ites in 'Irāq in the hope that they might even turn to him for leadership since the popularity of the Buwayhids had begun to fade. 238

One year following the incident involving Qirwāsh, the caliph al-Qādir seems to have perceived it to be necessary to combat the propaganda of the Fāṭimids. Therefore, in the month of Rabī<sup>c</sup> al-Ākhir 402/1011 he issued a document which was read in the caliphal palace denouncing the pedigree of the rulers of Egypt and their beliefs. The document was signed by dignitaries,  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}s$ , pious men, honest persons, trustworthy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>235</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol, 7, 251.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>236</sup> Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-A yān, vol. 3, 528; Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira, vol.3, 116-117.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>237</sup> Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-A'yān, vol. 3, 528; Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol. 6, 417

<sup>238</sup> Assaad, Reign of al-Hakim, 112.

individuals and representatives who claimed to know the pedigree of the Dayṣāniyya. The following document was claimed to be based on their knowledge.

The rulers of Egypt were descendants of Daysan b. Sa'id al-Khurrami and belonged to the party of infidels and Satans. They all attested that the astrologer of Egypt, i.e., Mansur b. Nizār (al-'Azīz billāh), who was called al-Hākim and who ruled in the name of Allah, may Allah befall him perdition, destruction, disgrace and punishment, was the son of Mas'ūd b. Ismā'īl b. 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Sa<sup>t</sup>īd (May God make him unhappy). When he travelled to the West (North Africa), he was renamed 'Ubaydillah and adopted the title al-Mahdi. His ancestors were stained with dirt, impurity and the curses of Allah and were actually Khawārij impostors who shared no genealogy at all with the son of 'Alī b. Abī Tālib and had no relations with him through any means. 'Alī was free of their falsehood and lies and thus their claims for affiliation were false. They did not know that one of the house of the 'Alids did not acknowledge them.<sup>239</sup> This rejection and their falsehood, together with their claims spread in Mecca and Madina at the beginning of their rule in the West (North Africa), were so widely dispersed that their lies were prevented from being received and acknowledged. This astrologer who lived in Egypt and his ancestors were infidels, evil doers, sinners, adulterers, atheists, free thinkers and Mazdaists. They transgressed the limits of the Shari'a, permitted adultery and wine-drinking, shed blood, blasphemed the prophets, cursed the pious ancestors and claimed divinity. 240

The above document was written in the month of Rabī al-Ākhir 402/1011 and was signed by many of the Alids such as al-Murtaḍā, al-Raḍī, Ibn Azraq al-Mūsawī, Abū Ṭāhir b. Abī Ṭayyib and Muḥammad b. 'Umar Ibn Abī Ya'lā. Among the qāḍīs who signed were Abū Muḥammad b. al-Akfānī, Abū al-Qāsim al-Kharazī, Abū al-Abbās al-Sīrī, among the jurists Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī, Abū Muḥammad al-Kashfūlī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Qudūrī, Abū 'Abdullāh al-Ṣaymarī, Abū 'Abdullāh al-Bayḍawī, Abū 'Alī b. Hamkān, and among the witnesses Abū al-Qāsim al-Tanūkhī. The document was also read in Baṣra and signed by many other people.<sup>241</sup>

We have no information on how the 'Alids were persuaded to join with the Sunnites to support the caliph al-Qādir in denouncing the Fāṭimid caliph of Cairo. We can, however, speculate on some possible explanations. First, the 'Alids of Baghdād, being a minority surrounded by the Sunnite majority who were the loyal subjects of the

<sup>239</sup> This statement is probably referred to the Twelver Shi ites.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>240</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 256.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

caliph al-Qādir may have felt that they had to comply with a policy instituted by their ruler if they did not want to be banished; nevertheless, we have no evidence of the caliph's exerting pressure upon them. Second, if we trace the imamate back to the time of the Imām Ja<sup>e</sup> far al-Ṣādiq (d.146/765), he is reported to have denied the claim of his son Ismā<sup>r</sup>īl<sup>242</sup> to this inheritance, thus justifying the Twelver Shī<sup>c</sup>ite position. Third, both the Buwayhids and the 'Alids of Baghdad did feel threatened by the increasing power and popularity of the Fatimids, which would have had an impact on territorial domination and economic interests.

The document contains many more charges and curses than reliable facts about the pedigree of the Fatimids. In addition, it seems to have been a conscious attempt to confirm the real founder of the Fātimids to have been Ibn Dayṣān, the celebrated syncretist heresiach of Edessa, who actually lived about four centuries before Islam was born. The Dayṣāniyya, who attributed their doctrines to Ibn Dayṣān, regarded light and darkness as the primal elements and saw them as sources of good and evil respectively, "with the distinction that light was active, living, perceptive and endowed with the fundamental attributes of life, knowledge and power, as against darkness which was purely passive, devoid of these attributes and endowed merely with existence." <sup>243</sup> In former times, the followers of the Dayṣāniyya had lived in the regions known as al-Baṭā'iḥ (the Marshes), and scattered communities of them were also found in China and Khurāsān. 244

Al-Qadir and his supporters most probably derived their information about Ibn Daysan from the work of Akhū Muhsin,245the first, according to al-Maqrīzī, who

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>242</sup>Ismā'il was the eldest son of the sixth Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, who was nominated by the latter as his successor, but having learned of his son's intemperance, changed his decision and appointed Mūsā, his second son as his successor. C1. Huart, "Ismā tīlīya," in E. I, 1st ed., vol. 4, 549.

243 A. Abel, "Daysāniyya," in E. I, new ed., vol. 2, 199.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>244</sup> Ibn al-Nadim, al-Fihrist: A Tenth Century Survey of Muslim Culture, ed. and trans. Bayard Dodge, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 806.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>245</sup> He was an 'Alid who lived in the second half of the fourth century and was a contemporary to the Fatimid caliph Mu'iz lidinillah.

challenged the genealogy of the Fāṭimids. Another work containing information on the lineage of the first Fāṭimid caliph was al-Fihrist of Ibn al-Nadīm, who was alive for some years during this period, dying in 387-8/997-8. Ibn al-Nadīm maintains that it was Ibn Razzām who first wrote a repudiation of the Ismāʿīliyya. According to him, the Ismāʿīliyya were the descendants of Dayṣān, whom he describes as a proponent of Dualism (al-Thanawiyya). This Dayṣān had a son named Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ,²⁴6whose followers were called the Maymūniyya and were regarded as an extreme sect. Maymūn had a son called ʿAbdallāh (ʿAbd Allāh). The latter was far more wicked than his father and had a greater store of tricks. He taught a multitude of deceptions and treacheries to destroy Islam. He was conversant with all religions and traditions and had a wide knowledge of sects. He preached a program of seven stages of missionary activities through which a man proceeded from one stage to the other until he ended in the hereafter. He did not adhere to any religion nor did he believe in anything except licentiousness; he hoped for neither reward nor punishment. He claimed to be on the right path and that others were misguided.²47

The manifesto also attributed the founding of the Fāṭimids to the Khurrāmiyya, the adherents of which were dispersed among the mountain regions of Adharbayjān, Armenia, the Daylam country, Hamadhān and Dīnawar, as well as the areas between Iṣfahān and al-Ahwāz. Originally, they were Magians, but later their own sect became

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> There are many contradictory views on the reality of Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ as well as the origin of the founder of the Fāṭimids. The Sunnī writers reject the affiliation of the Fāṭimids to ʿAlī and Fāṭima and assign their origin to Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ. While the Ismāʿīli traditions, of course, confirm the verity of the Fāṭimid descent to ʿAlī and Fāṭima. Even among the Orientalists there is no agreement on this question. Ivanow (Ismaili Tradition Concerning the Rise of the Faṭimids) and Bernard Lewis (The Origins of Ismāʿīlism) have tried to solve the problem of the origin of the Fāṭimids. Although both seem to support the view of the Ismāʿīlites or the supporters of the Fāṭimids, their conclusion is still not convincing. F. Dachraoui in his article "ʿUbaydillāh al-Mahdī" says that "the documentation currently available is insufficient to provide a conclusive answer." (see E.I. new ed., vol.5, 1242-1244)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>247</sup> Maqrīzī, *Itti az al-Hunatā*, 25-28. According to Abd al-Qāhir b. Tāhir al-Baghdādī, the emergence of the Bāṭiniyya was credited to Ḥamdān Qirmit (or Qarmat) during the time of al-Ma'mūn and to Abdullāh b. Maymūn. The Bāṭiniyya was not among the sects of Islam, but was Mazdaist. Al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, 22.

established. Their master, the former Mazdak, allegedly taught them to live for pleasure, to seek carnal satisfaction, food and drink, social intercourse and mixing together and to share their women and families, as none of his followers was barred from enjoying the woman of another nor did he himself withhold his own woman. <sup>248</sup>Their first appearance in Islamic history was after the execution of Abū Muslim of Khurāsān in 136/753. Some of them denied his death and expected his return to "spread justice in the world." Others maintained the imāmate of his daughter Fāṭima, whence they were called Muslimiyya and Fāṭimiyya. Like the Dayṣāniyya, the basis of their system was the duality of light and darkness. It is reported that they had mosques in their villages and that they read the Qur³ān, but secretly they held no religious dogma but licentiousness ( ibāḥa). Thus some of them permitted promiscuity where the women consented to this <sup>249</sup>

Perhaps the strongest charges brought against the Fāṭmids were that they were infidels and atheists. They were accused of infidelity while they claimed themselves to be Muslims and acknowledged the Prophet Muḥammad as His Messenger and basically, they believed in the principles of faith, besides exalting the descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fāṭima. This kind of charge was commonly used by authorities and a group of Muslims to accuse their adversaries as infidels in order to isolate them from their circles. But their reproach that the Fāṭimid ruler, al-Ḥākim biamrillāh, claimed divinity was mentioned by some Sunnite chroniclers and was also connected with the rise of a sect called the Drūz, who believe in al-Ḥākim's divinity. On this respect, Kennedy says: "Towards the end of his reign he is alleged to have neglected the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, vol.2, 817.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>249</sup> D.S. Margoliouth, "Khurrāmīya," in *E.J. Brill First Encyclopaedia of Islam* 1913-1936, vol. 4, 974-975.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>250</sup> When some people criticized and rose against the established government whether Umayyads or 'Abbāsids, they were charged with infidelity or *zindiq*. Likewise when a group of people opposed the opinion of the majority, whether Sunnites or Shī'ites, they were accused of making innovation and heresy. This is particularly clear in the field of theology.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> One important point of the Drüz teaching is that the physical manifestation of the divine form was revealed in the person of al-Hākim. He was absolutely and completely God incarnate. Assaad, *Reign of al-Hakim*, 162, 165.

conventional demands of religious law entirely, to have become increasingly ascetic and considered himself divine." <sup>252</sup>Vatikiotis also suggests that al-Ḥākim was the only Fāṭimid to claim himself to be a divinely appointed monarch. <sup>253</sup>

It is interesting to note that, according to P. K. Hitti, al-Qādir's document of 402/1011 rejecting the Fāṭimid claim of descent from the Prophet's daughter was the first of its kind. 254 It is equally interesting to note that it took a century after the establishment of the Fāṭimids that an 'Abbāsid caliph felt the necessity to challenge their claim and the truthfulness of their origins. We might therefore legitimately ask: What were the real reasons behind the caliph's decision to issue the manifesto and what was the reaction or outcome of the manifesto on the part of the Fāṭimid caliph al-Ḥākim?

While there is no record of how al-Ḥākim reacted to the manifesto, we can safely assume that it did not go unnoticed. The next year (403/1012), however, al-Ḥākim sent a letter to Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, the powerful prince of the Ghaznavids, asking the latter to join the Fāṭimid da wa and paying allegiance to al-Ḥākim. Maḥmūd, as we will see later, did not accept al-Ḥākim's offer; he even sent the letter to the caliph al-Qādir. 255

As the outcome of the manifesto, Vatikiotis maintains,"The importance of this manifesto lies in its psychological warfare value at a time of Fāṭimid crisis." <sup>256</sup>Al-Ḥākim after all had no sooner ascended to the throne than he was faced by external and internal problems. The external problem was that at the beginning of al-Ḥākim's rule, the Byzantines had succeeded in conquering Antioch and other ports and had encouraged rebellion against Fāṭimid authorities in various parts of Syria. As far as internal affairs were concerned, al-Ḥākim had to face the rebellion in the Maghrib led by a certain Abū Rakwa, who, by 395/1005 had been able to occupy Barqa and challenge the central

<sup>252</sup> Kennedy, Prophet, 332.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid

<sup>254</sup> P.K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (London: Macmillan, 1964), 617.

<sup>255</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 262.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>256</sup> P.J. Vatikiotis, "Al-Hākim bi amrillāh: the God-king idea realised," *Islamic Culture* 29-30 (1955-1956): 2.

authority in Cairo.<sup>257</sup> The long-term consequence of the manifesto however was that since its launching by the caliph al-Qādir, "it created a doubt over Fāṭimid descent which up to the present time historians have failed to resolve." <sup>258</sup>

The answer for the first part of the latter question is that there were several reasons for the caliph al-Qadir's decision to issue the manifesto. First, as mentioned above, during the riot which had broken out following the controversy between Sunnites and Shī ites over the issue of Ibn Mas ūd's mushaf (Qur ānic recension) in 398/1008, several Shītites shouted, "Yā Ḥākim yā Manṣūr." This fact was relayed to the caliph and caused him great annoyance.<sup>259</sup> Since the cry had emerged in the heart of his empire, he must have sensed that the Fatimid missionaries had already encroached on his authority from within and expected that al-Hakim would be their saviour. The second event which prompted the caliph to take the initiative of issuing the manifesto was the affair of the amir Qirwāsh, as mentioned earlier. Despite the fact that the affair ended with the triumph of the caliph and his name restored to the khutba, he seems to have been incensed by his vassal's inclination to the Fatimids. It may have been a sign to him of the strength of the influence of the Egyptian ruler upon his subjects. Third, it is said that before summoning people to sign the document, al-Qadir called into his presence qadis, dignitaries, jurists and witnesses (including the father and brother of al-Raḍī: al-Mūsawī and al-Murtada) in order to show the alleged verses of al-Radi in which the latter complained of being humiliated by the 'Abbāsids and spoke how he expected to be in the service of the Fatimids. These verses read as follows:

I should not live in disgrace for I have a sharp tongue and a protected nose 260

My rejection of an injustice is surrounding me like a wild bird flying around

What is wrong for a young man with his noble sword

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

<sup>258</sup> Assaad, Reign of al-Hakim, 113.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>259</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 237-238.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>260</sup> Al-Radī perhaps meant with this phrase that he belonged to noble ancestry.

to gainglory (in other lands) if he is humiliated (in his own country).

I am degraded in the country of my enemy while in Egypt an 'Alid caliphrules

Whose father is my father and whose master is my master if the distant past

embraced me

My descent is united with his to two masters of all people: Muhammad and 'Alī My hunger in that region will be satisfied and my thirst in that shelter will be satisfied

Like someone who walked during the dark night but the light of the crescent guided him. 261

According to al-Maqrīzī, the *ḥājib* <sup>262</sup> (Abd al-ʿAzīz b. al-Ḥājib al-Nuʿmān) said to Abū Ahmad, al-Radī's father,

Ask your son, what kind of humiliation he receives while he lives with us? What kind of injustice does he meet from us? What disgrace is inflicted upon him in our empire? What service will he receive from the ruler of Egypt if he takes refuge with him? No one has ever treated him better than we do? Haven't we appointed him as an agent (for the 'Alids)? Haven't we put him in charge of mazālim? Haven't we deputized him over Ḥaramayn, Ḥijāz and made him the chief of pilgrims? Did he ever obtain from the ruler of Egypt more than this? The only thing that will happen - if he succeeds in obtaining a place with the ruler of Egypt-is that he will become one of the 'Alids whom people do not recognize. 263

Abū Aḥmad, the 'Alid agent, denied that the verses belonged to his son and said that it was not impossible that one of al-Raḍī's enemies attributed them to him. Upon this answer, al-Qādir said to the *naqīb*," If it is the case, a *maḥḍar* (official report) should be written containing a vilification of the genealogy of the rulers of Egypt, and ask Muḥammad (al-Raḍī) to sign it." <sup>264</sup> The document in question was written and attested by people attending the assembly, among them Abū Aḥmad the *naqīb* and his son al-Murtaḍā. The manifesto was then brought to al-Raḍī by his father and brother in order

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>261</sup> Magrīzī, Itti az al-Hunafa, 38-39; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 281.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>262</sup> Maqrīzī seems to have misquoted about the function of 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Ḥājib al-Nu'mān. The latter was not a *ḥājib* (chamberlain) but secretary of al-Qādir.

<sup>263</sup> Magrīzī, Itti az al-Hunafā', 39.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

that he might sign it. But al-Radī refused to do so, fearing the Egyptian missionaries, although he did deny that the verses were his own and wrote a note that he did not compose them. His father forced him to write his name on the document, but he kept refusing to do so, citing his fear of the missionaries of Egypt and their penchant for assassination, as they were famous for committing such crimes. His father said, "How strange! You fear someone who is as far away from you as six hundred *farsakhs* (parasangs), but you do not fear someone who stands one hundred cubits away." <sup>265</sup> Abū Ahmad and al-Murtaḍā swore not to tell the caliph about this decision, opting to practice *taqiyya* <sup>266</sup> out of fear for al-Qādir's mischief and as a way of soothing him. When the report reached al-Qādir he said nothing; nevertheless some days later, al-Radī was removed from the office of *naqīb* and Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-Nahrsābusī installed in his place. <sup>267</sup>

Muslim historians are not in agreement on the question of the legitimacy of 'Ubaydillāh al-Mahdī's claimto Fāṭimid origin. They are in fact divided into two camps. There are at least eight different versions of the Fāṭimid genealogy provided for him by his supporters and enemies alike. Some of the latter even go so far as to accuse him of being the son of a Jew. Among the supporters of his legitimacy are Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Khaldūn and al-Maqrīzī, while among those who suspect or deny the pedigree of Saʿid and regard him as an impostor are Ibn Khallikān, Ibn al-Idhārī, al-Suyūṭī and Ibn Taghrībirdī. 268

In an attempt to balance the views of the Sunnites' rejection of the genuineness of the Fāṭimid pedigree, we present in brief the opinion of Ibn al-Athīr, one of the Sunnī

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>265</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>266</sup> Taqiyya - original meaning is fear, caution, prudence. In the Shī'ite tradition, it means dissimulation about one's religious beliefs. Based on the Qur'ān xvi: 106 the Shī'ites practiced taqiyya and they consider it lawful in situations "where there is overwhelming danger of loss of life or property and where no danger to religion would occur thereby." Momen Moojan, Introduction to Shī'ī Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 183.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>267</sup> Maqrīzī, *Itti az al-Ḥunafā*, 40.

<sup>268</sup> Hitti, *History*, 617.

chroniclers, on the Fāṭimid descent. According to him, the first to assume the caliphate of the 'Alid empire (Fāṭimids) was Abū Muḥammad 'Ubaydillāh. It was said that he was Muḥammad b. 'Abdillāh b. Maymūn b. Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl b. Ja'far b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn b. 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. Others held that he was 'Abdullāh b. Maymūn al-Qaddāḥ. Still another view maintained that the founder of the Fāṭimids was 'Ubaydillāh b. Aḥmad b. Ismā'īl II b. Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl b. Ja'far al-Ṣādiq. 269

Ibn al-Athīr goes further in stating that the Muslim scholars disagreed on the genuineness of Abū Muḥammad 'Ubaydillāh's pedigree. However, he and other historians who confirm his imāmate maintain that his descent was true and that they do not doubt it. Many 'Alids who knew about genealogy supported their views. The verity of these opinions is also attested by the verses of al-Raḍī (already quoted above). According to Ibn al-Athīr, al-Raḍī did not disavow his verses due to fear, and his signature on the document which contained a denial of their ancestry cannot be taken as proof, because feelings of fear could encourage someone to do even more than this. Ibn al-Athīr also includes the story of al-Qādir's envoy to al-Raḍī asking about the verses and the bad treatment he received from the 'Abbāsid as described above with a slightly different wording. Al-Raḍī's refusal to make an excuse and to write verses denying the pedigree of the Fāṭimids, according to Ibn al-Athīr, was a strong proof of the genuineness of their descent. In addition, when he asked some of the 'Alids about the pedigree of 'Ubaydillāh they did not doubt it. But others held that his lineage was interpolated and false.<sup>270</sup>

Ibn al-Athīr also quotes the account of al-Qādir's manifesto and mentions the names of those who were present at the assembly. According to him, those who maintained the truth of 'Ubaydillāh's lineage held that the scholars who were present in the assembly and signed the manifesto actually did so because of their fear, choosing to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>269</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol.8, 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>270</sup> Ibid.

avail themselves of *taqiyya*. And those on the other hand who did not have knowledge about the genealogies cannot be relied on.<sup>271</sup>

From what has been elaborated above, we know that al-Qādir's political measures show his determination to maintain his caliphate from the increasing threat of the Fāṭimids. And in this respect he was successful in forcing the Buwayhid amīr to comply with his order. With the manifesto against the Fāṭimid's origins, he was also able to widen the division between the Twelver Shī ties and the Ismā tlites under the aegis of the Fāṭimids and the most important measure of the caliph is that he had created lasting doubt about the genuineness of the Fāṭimid descent among the Muslims up to this day. At the same time, his release of the manifesto which was agreed to by both the Sunnite and the Shī ties, indicates to some extent his political power in the sense that he succeeded in subjecting these conflicting communities to one important undertaking, which was in fact for the benefit of the Sunnite caliph. If he had not been strong enough, his controversial policy would have been rejected by the Buwayhids as well as the Shī ties scholars.

## 2. Al-Qādir's relations with the Sāmānids and Qarākhānids

The Arabic sources mention very little about al-Qādir's relation with the Sāmānids. Although the caliph al-Qādir was contemporary with the last four Sāmānid amīrs, namely, Nūḥ II (366/976-386/997), 'Abd al-Ḥārith Manṣūr II (387/997-389/999), 'Abd al-Malik II (389/999) and Ismā'īl Muntaṣir (390/1000-395/1005), there is no record of relations or correspondence between al-Qādir and this dynasty. The only account that Miskawayh and Ibn al-Athīr offer about al-Qādir's relation with the Sāmānids was that in 383/993 the caliph held a reception for the Khurāsānīs on their return from the pilgrimage. On this occasion they were addressed on the subject of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>271</sup> Ibid.

having the Friday prayer offered in the caliph's name, and the Khurāsānīs undertook to bear a message and letters to the ruler of Khurāsān on the subject.<sup>272</sup>

Actually, the relations between the 'Abbasids and the Samanids had been established as long ago as the beginning of the latter's rise to power in 261/875. It was the caliph al-Mu<sup>\*</sup>tamid in fact who recognized the Sāmānid state and sent an investiture to Naṣr b. Aḥmad for all of Transoxiana. 273 Aḥmad's successor Ismā'īl maintained this connection, but there is no evidence that he or any of the Samanid rulers paid tribute or taxes to Baghdad. Nevertheless, they sent gifts and reports of their activities to Baghdad, and struck coins in the names of both the caliph and the ruling Sāmānid, and both names were also mentioned in the daily prayers at least until the rise of the Buwayhids.<sup>274</sup> When Naṣr II succeeded his father in 301/914-331/943, the caliph al-Muqtadir granted him the governorship of Rayy in 314/926.<sup>275</sup> Frye says:"...the relations between the Sāmānids and the caliphs continued to be correct though formal to the end of the dynasty. All of the Sāmānid rulers are called amīrs in the sources, which in that age meant something like 'viceroy' of the caliph who himself was amir of all the Muslims."<sup>276</sup> In addition, the relations of the 'Abbāsids with the Sāmānids were strengthened by the link of religious sentiment since the latter were Sunnites of the Hanafī persuasion.<sup>277</sup> However - for reasons that are unknown to us - when al-Qādir was appointed caliph, the Sāmānids kept paying allegiance to the deposed caliph al-Ţā°i°. This continued for about eight years until 389/999, when Mahmud succeeded in subjugating the Samanids and forcing them to acknowledge the caliph al-Qadir. Maḥmūd's campaign against the Sāmānids will be discussed later.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 6, 255-266; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 100-101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>273</sup> R. N. Frye," The Sāmānids," in *Cambridge History of Iran*: *The Period from Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs*, vol. 4 (Cambridge: University Press, 1975), 137.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>274</sup> Ibid., 140.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>275</sup> C.E. Bosworth, "Sāmānids," in EI, new ed., vol. 8, 1027.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>276</sup> Frye, "The Sāmānids,:" in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 4, 140.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>277</sup> Ibid, 153.

Although the Sāmānids remained loyal vassals of the 'Abbāsids during their tenure, they twice ceased to pay homage to the 'Abbāsid caliphs. First, under the reign of Nūh b. Naṣr, the Sāmānids refused to recognize the caliph al-Muṭī for a full nine years, and instead continued to strike the name of al-Mustakfī, who had been deposed and blinded by the Buwayhids, on the coins in all the territories of the Sāmānids. However, the new ruler of Khurāsān, 'Abd al-Malik b. Nūḥ, who succeeded his father in 343/954, after making peace in 344/955 with Rukn al-Dawla, sent a representative to the caliph al-Muṭī', requesting that the latter grant him the deed of investiture for the government of Khurāsān. The caliph delivered the robes of honour to the envoy for 'Abd al-Malik and tied a banner in his honour.<sup>278</sup>

The second breach of relations between the 'Abbāsids and the Sāmānids occurred during the last five years of the reign of Nūḥ II and during the reigns of 'Abd al-Ḥārith Manṣūr II (387/997-389/997) and 'Abd al-Malik II (389/999). During this period the Sāmānids chose not to recognize the caliphate of al-Qādir, but instead offered prayers for the deposed caliph al-Ṭā'i' and inscribed the latter's name on coins. In both instances, the humiliating treatment meted out to the caliphs by the Buwayhids, and the attempt to break their relations with the Buwayhids, may have been at the root of the Sāmānids' temporary breach with the 'Abbāsids.<sup>279</sup> Nevertheless, as Siddiqi maintains, the Sāmānids had a great regard for the institution of the caliphate and had never been persuaded to adopt the high-sounding and flattering titles as commonly borne by the Buwayhids. They were content with the title "Wālī (helper) of the Commander of the Faithful", a title which had been granted to them by the caliphate itself. <sup>280</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>278</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 6, 172-173.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>279</sup> A.H. Siddiqi," Caliphate and Kingship in Medieval Persia, " *Islamic Culture*, 9 (April 1936): 260-261, 264-265.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>280</sup> Ibid., 265-267. This title was probably used in formal correspondence with the 'Abbāsids, since the sources as mentioned above call them *amīrs* too.

The Qarākhānids of Transoxania also declared themselves to be "clients" of the Commander of the Faithful from the earliest years of their rule (393/1003) and coins were accordingly struck in the name of the caliph al-Qādir.<sup>281</sup> However, we have no report of the caliph sending a diploma of investiture and robe of honour to the Qarākhānids. This may have been due to the fact, as al-Bayhaqī states, that the caliph had entered into a treaty with Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, by which the caliph bound himself not to enter into direct relations with the Qarākhānids. Any title or robe of honour bestowed on the latter was to be conferred through the agency of the Ghaznavids.<sup>282</sup> In the incident of al-Wāthiqī, which we have described above, al-Qādir sent several letters to the Qarakhānids repudiating the claim of al-Wāthiqī.

The Qarākhānid dynasty (382-607/992-1211) rose from the ruling house of the Qarluq Turks, a group which had contributed to the earlier history of the steppes; their affiliation to this tribe is not entirely proven but it seems likely. The Qarākhānids were converted to Islam in the middle years of the tenth century, and their head, Satuq Bughrā Khān, adopted the Muslim name of 'Abd al-Karīm. His grandson Hārūn or Ḥasan Bughrā Khān, attracted by the vacuum of power caused by the decline of the Sāmānids of Transoxania, marched southwards and occupied Bukhārā in 382/992, and a few years later he and Maḥmūd of Ghazna finally eliminated the Sāmānids. <sup>283</sup>It was Hārūn and his successor Aḥmad whom al-Qādir asked to expel al-Wāthiqī, the pretender to the caliphate, from their territories.

Unlike the Qarākhānids the ruler of Khawārizm, Abū al-ʿAbbās Ma'mūn b. Ma'mūn (Ma'mūn II), received from the caliph al-Qādir in 406/1015-16 a robe of honour, together with a diploma of investiture, a standard and the title 'Ayn al-Dawla wa

<sup>281</sup> V.V. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion (London: Luzac,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>282</sup> Bayhaqī, *Tārīkh Bayhaqī*, tarjamahū [min al-Fārisiyya] ilā al-ʿArabiyya Yaḥyā al-Khashshāb wa Ṣādiq Nashiʾat ([al-Qāhira]: Maṭbaʿat al-Anjlū al-Miṣriyya, 1957), 195

<sup>283</sup> Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties, 112.

Zayn al-Milla (Eye of the State and Ornament of the Religious Community). <sup>284</sup>It is reported that Ma'mūn II chose not to accept openly the robes of honour or assume the title granted to him for fear of offending Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, as they had been received without his intervention. <sup>285</sup> Ma'mūn II may have learnt of the treaty between the caliph al-Qādir and Maḥmūd binding the 'Abbāsids with the Qarākhānids. He perceived that the caliph al-Qādir's grant of title and investiture would have to be made in consultation with Maḥmūd.

The rulers of Khawārizm were also called Ma³mūnids since Abū ʿAlī Ma³mūn I was the founder of the ruling house in the region after he seized power from the Afrighids of Kāth Abū ʿAbdillāh Muḥammad in 385/995. The Ma³mūnids or Khawārizm-Shāhs ruled the region for about twenty-three years (385-408/995-1017) before they were extinguished by the Ghaznavids. Though their rule was brief, "it was not without its achievements; great scholars like the philosopher Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and the *littérateur* Thaʿālibī flourished under their patronage."

## 3. Al-Qadir's relations with the Ghaznavids

The relations of al-Qādir with the Ghaznavids were based on mutual interests and took place mostly through correspondence, although in certain cases each of them sent envoys. Never did the caliph and Maḥmūd of Ghazna have any direct contact. Some scholars, e.g., Makdisi and Laoust, <sup>287</sup> maintain that the emergence of the Ghaznavids was associated with the revival of Sunnism in eleventh century Baghdād. At a time when the 'Abbāsids were in decline under the grip of the Buwayhids, the Ghaznavids

<sup>284</sup> Barthold, Turkestan, 275.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>285</sup> M. Nāzim, *The Life of Sultān Maḥmūd of Ghazna* (Cambridge: At The University Press, 1931), 37; see also al-Bayhaqī, *Tārīkh*, 838.

<sup>286</sup> Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties, 108.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>287</sup> H. Laoust," La profession de foi d' Ibn Batta, " in Ibn Batta's *Sharh al-Ibāna* (Damas, 1958), xcii; G. Makdisī," Sunnī Revival," in D.S. Richards (ed). *Islamic Civilization 950-1150* (Oxford: The Near Eastern Centre, University of Pennsylvania, 1973), 156.

acknowledged and even raised the stature of the 'Abbāsids and encouraged the caliph to exert himself vis-à-vis the Buwayhid amūs. In addition, Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin's defense of the 'Abbāsid caliphate throughout his rule constitutes one of the factors which prolonged al-Qādir's reign.

With the rise of Mahmud b. Sabuktagin to power in 389/998 after subjugating the Samanids of Khurasan, he compelled them to pay allegiance to al-Qadir and caused the khutba to be read in the latter's name from all pulpits in that regions. After his victory over the Samanids, Mahmud found it necessary to acquire a legal title to rule the country which he had already conquered, and to obtain authority delegated by the caliph to carry on the administration of justice in accordance with the Sharī a. Thus Maḥmūd, in his relations with the 'Abbāsid caliph, was guided by political as well as religious motives. His recognition of al-Qādir, instead of the deposed caliph al-Ṭā'i', was not because he considered the former as the rightly elected caliph, but because otherwise he could have obtained neither the legal title to rule the country nor the delegated authority to administer justice in accordance with the Sharra. Therefore, the first thing Mahmud did was to send a formal request to the caliph al-Qadir in the most humble terms, calling himself and his brothers slaves of the Commander of the Faithful, offering prayers on his behalf and ascribing every possible virtue to him. 288 He states in this letter that the sole cause of his campaign against the Samanids was that, unlike the founder of the Sāmānids who obeyed the 'Abbāsid caliph, their successors disobeyed the caliph, threw off their allegiance to al-Qadir and ceased to mention his name in the pulpits of Khurāsān. He tried first to bring Manşūr b. Nüh the Sāmānid back to the straight path, but the latter did not listen to him, instead marching with his allies against Maḥmūd from Bukhārā. Declaring himself and his troops loyal subjects of the Commander of the Faithful, Mahmud and his forces marched towards the territory of the Samanids until

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>288</sup> Siddiqi," Caliphate," 268- 269.

they reached Marv on Tuesday, 3 Jumādā al-Ūlā 389/998. His arrival in this place Maḥmūd later compared with the beginning of the 'Abbāsid propaganda which had deposed the Umayyads. In the same report he mentions the strength of his army and the battle which ensued and the victory which was gained by his army. The rest of the Sāmānid army was killed, captured, pillaged and their houses emptied of precious goods. Now, Maḥmūd said to the caliph, that the territory of Khurāsān was open to the Commander of the Faithful and his name was read in all pulpits of the region, he awaited the orders of the caliph as a basis of his further action. He also expected that the caliph would enjoy the benefit of this victory and that he might be granted the caliph's grace to serve him and defend his household.<sup>289</sup> After describing his victory as the victory of the Commander of the Faithful, Maḥmūd made out his case for the emirate of Khurāsān and outlying provinces already conquered.<sup>290</sup>On receiving Maḥmūd's letter, al-Qādir granted him a contract of investiture and a crown, and confirmed him in all territories which he had already seized. The caliph also bestowed him the title of Yamīn al-Dawla wa-Amīn al-Milla.<sup>291</sup>

Maḥmūd had already ordered the caliph's name to be mentioned in the *khuṭba* throughout his territories as shown in his above letter; furthermore, when the caliph asked him to recognize his son, al-Ghālib billāh, by conjoining his name with that of the caliph in the *khuṭba*, he considered this as an obligation, and in all festivals and congregations had these two names mentioned in the *khuṭba*. <sup>292</sup>The name of al-Ghālib billāh was also put on the coinage minted in Nīshāpūr. <sup>293</sup> On the relations of Maḥmūd with the caliph al-Qādir, Siddiqi says,

Besides serving his own political ends Maḥmūd, by recognizing the 'Abbāsid caliphate, helped its cause a great deal, raised its prestige in the eyes of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>289</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 6, 368-370.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>290</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>291</sup> Utbī, *Tārīkh*, trans. Reynolds, 243.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> Siddiqi, "Caliphate", 270.

Muslim world and revived its authority in Persia. The acceptance of a deed of investiture by Maḥmūd in 389/999 and another diploma in 417/1026 confirming him in possessions newly conquered re-established not only the religious but also the political supremacy of the caliphate, which had broken down at the end of the Sāmānid period.<sup>294</sup>

Maḥmūd maintained a respectful attitude towards the 'Abbāsid caliphate, and always considered the caliph supreme in all religious matters. He did his best to protect the caliphate from any threat and tried to eliminate the caliph's enemies. This attitude can be seen clearly in the case of the Sāmānids above. We have another example besides this of Maḥmūd's measure for the maintenance of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. In 391/1000/1 al-Wāthiqī, the pretender to the caliphate, escaped from confinement and came to Khurāsān to invoke Maḥmūd's help. Instead, the latter had him arrested and imprisoned him in a fortress where he remained till his death. It was reported that al-Ghālib billāh was appointed the caliph's successor in the same year following the caliph's repudiation of al-Wāthiqī's claim.<sup>295</sup>

The greatest service, however, that the Ghaznavids rendered to the 'Abbāsid cause was in counteracting the active missionary of the rival Fāṭimid caliphate; and it was only through Maḥmūd's full support of the 'Abbāsid caliphate that the Fāṭimids, in spite of all their efforts, could not secure any following in Persia.<sup>296</sup> When in 403/1012-13 al-Hākim, the Fāṭimid caliph, sent a letter to Maḥmūd, perhaps to attracthis allegiance, and the latter sent the letter to Baghdād to be publicly burnt. Even before sending it, Maḥmūd spat on it and had it burnt.<sup>297</sup> Ibn Kathīr adds that this harsh response by Maḥmūd was witnessed by the envoy of al-Ḥākim.<sup>298</sup>A little later in the same year a messenger called Ṭahartī was despatched by the Fāṭimid caliph to Maḥmūd's court with the same object. At the same time the caliph al-Qādir sent a letter upon the subject of Ṭahartī, asking

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>294</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>295</sup> Miskawayh, *Eclipse*, vol. 6, 424.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>296</sup> Siddiqi, "Caliphate," 271.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>297</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 262;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>298</sup> Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol. 12,

Maḥmūd to seize and execute him. Maḥmūd complied with the caliph's order and had him arrested and brought to the court for the investigation by eminent theologians. In compliance with their decision and the caliph's order, Maḥmūd ordered Ṭahartī to be put to death.<sup>299</sup> Following the execution of the latter, which indicated the sulṭān's devotion to the caliph, al-Qādir further bestowed upon him the title of Nizām al-Dīn.<sup>300</sup>

In 414/5/1023/4 Abū Ḥasan al-ʿAzīzī and Ḥasanak, the latter a friend of Maḥmūd, went to Mecca along with several others. On their way back from their pilgrimage, they were given robes of honour and other gifts by the Fāṭimid caliph al-Zāhir (li Iʿzāz dīnillāh). They went to ʿIrāq, but Ḥasanak did not enter Baghdād because he feared that the caliph would reject him. This greatly annoyed the caliph, who even suspected that it was done with the knowledge and consent of Maḥmūd. The caliph then sent a letter to Maḥmūd in which he charged Ḥasanak with Qarmaṭian beliefs and demanded his execution. After much consideration Maḥmūd decided that the robe of honour which Ḥasanak had received, and the presents which he had received from the Egyptian caliph, had to be sent to Baghdād to be publicly burnt before the Nūbī Gate. 302

The same Ḥasanak was stoned to death by the order of Mascūd, Maḥmūd's successor, who had a grudge against him on account of his arrogant behaviour and opposition to Mascūd's succession to the throne. In order to eliminate him, the old charge of heresy by the caliph al-Qādir was brought up against him once again; and to make the people believe in its truth, two men were dressed up as messengers coming from Baghdād, bearing a letter from the caliph, explaining that Ḥasanak was Qarmaṭian and therefore should be executed and stoned to death, so that no one else, in defiance of the caliph, might dare to accept a robe of honour from the Egyptian caliph. When Ḥasanak was being executed, the following message from Mascūd was delivered to him, "This is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>299</sup> Utbī, *Tārīkh*, 443-444

<sup>300</sup> Nāzim, Sultān Mahmūd, 164-165.

<sup>301</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 16.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid.; Bayhaqī, *Tārīkh*, 193-194; Siddiqi, "Caliphate," 272.

your own wish, for you desired me to bring you to the scaffold whenever I became king.

I wished to have mercy on you, but the Commander of the Faithful has written that you have become a Qarmatian and by his order you are led to the scaffold."303

It seems that the Fāṭimid caliph al-Zāḥir did not give up propagating his mission in Sunnite territory and was unimpressed by Maḥmūd's blatant rejection as well as the caliph's denounciation of his pedigree. Therefore, in 416/1025 he sent a robe of honour to Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin through Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Rashīdī (called Zayn al-Quḍāt), who came to Baghdād to meet the caliph. The latter held a reception on Thursday, 21 Jumādā al-Ākhira, after summoning judges, witnesses and representatives to attend. Abū al-ʿAbbās presented what he had received from the ruler of Egypt and produced Maḥmūd's letter, explaining that he was a sincere servant who saw loyalty as an obligation and that he had no intention of opposing the ʿAbbāsid empire. The inevitable result was that the robes were brought to the Nūbī Gate where they were thrown into the fire. Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, the chamberlain and the masses watched the event. Afterwards, someone brought silver coins amounting to about four thousand five hundred and twenty-six dirhams, which were then distributed to the poor among the Hāshimites.<sup>304</sup>

The mutual assistance between al-Qādir and the Ghaznavids indicates that calls for help did not always came from al-Qādir's side. Maḥmūd also sometimes asked the caliph for help. For example, when Maḥmūd was displeased with Mas'ūd and wished to transfer the succession to another son, Muḥammad, he asked the caliph to give precedence to Muḥammad's name over that of Mas'ūd in official correspondence. When Mas'ūd learnt of this, he declared," The sword is a truer authority than any writing." 305

<sup>303</sup> Bayhaqi, Tārikh, 195-200; Siddiqi,"Caliphate," 273

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>304</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 8, 22. According to Ibn al-Athīr's version, the people found within the robes golden coins which were then distributed to the poor of the Hāshimites. (see *al-Kāmil*, vol. 9, 350).

<sup>305</sup> Siddiqi, "Caliphate, " 274.

This remark was proved by Mas'ūd shortly after the succession of his brother Muhammad, who summarily arrested him.

Maḥmūd not only demonstrated a deep loyalty to the caliph but also wrote him a number of letters (more than eight letters) each time he won a victory. Almost every year Maḥmūd sent these letters to the caliph, in which he expressed his firm allegiance to him and described his success in combating infidels in India and elsewhere. 306

The following are accounts of some of the letters as recorded by Ibn al-Jawzī. The significance of these letters is that they make us aware of a continued relationship between the caliph and Maḥmūd. Moreover, they indicate Maḥmūd's attachment and support for the caliph and his pride as a Sunnite champion in the holy wars he engaged in against infidels. They also show us how, by notifying the caliph of his victories over the infidels, Maḥmūd was able to enhance on the one hand his prestige in the eyes of the Buwayhids, his political rivals at Baghdād, and on the other, the prestige of the caliphate itself which began to feel more secure than before in spite of being in the control of the Buwayhids.<sup>307</sup>

The first letter that Maḥmūd sent to the caliph al-Qādir was despatched following his victory over the Sāmānids, as mentioned above. The second letter reached the caliph in 402/1011 and contained an account of his struggle against the infidel enemy consisting of a great army of soldiers and hundreds of elephants. Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin was nevertheless given victory over them and took their wealth and returned to his country. Maḥmūd completed this campaign after fighting the infidels of Ghūr, a district which was near Ghazna. 309

 $<sup>^{306}</sup>$  Ibn al-Jawzī in al-Muntazam, vol. 7- 8 records several letters of Maḥmūd of his holy wars in India and Rayy.

<sup>307</sup> Siddiqi, "Caliphate, " 275.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>308</sup> Ibid., 257; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 256. Ibn al-Jawzī does not mention the name of the country invaded by Maḥmūd. Nāzim, however, mentions that about this year 401/1011 or 402/1012/3 Maḥmūd connquered Ghūr or Ghūristān, a country situated to the east and south-east of Herāt and south of Gharshistān and Juzjānān. Nāzim, Sultān Maḥmūd, 70.

<sup>309</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 221.

In 404/1013 Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin invaded India with a great army and much weaponry. As he was approaching the area, the Indian troops waited on a mountain where they fortified themselves. After receiving reinforcements from other districts of India, they descended from the mountain to face the Muslim troops. The battle was so fierce that many people from both sides were killed, but the Muslim army finally won the battle. They seized much booty, weapons, captives, elephants and many other articles. When Maḥmūd returned to Ghazna, he sent a latter to al-Qādir, asking the caliph to grant him a contract to rule over the province of Khurāsān and other districts which were already under his control. 310

When in 408/1027 al-Qādir banned all discussions of Muctazilism, Shīcism and Ashcarism, and demanded the Ḥanafī jurists to renounce Muctazilism and make public retraction, Maḥmūd followed the caliph's order in all his domains in Khurāsān and other provinces to persecute the Muctazilites, Rafiḍites, Ismācīlites, Qarmaṭians, Jahmites and Anthropomorphists (*Mushabbihāt*). Some of them were crucified, some imprisoned, others exiled and the curses on all of them were read in pulpits throughout the land. 311

Maḥmūd's compliance with the order of the caliph in persecuting the Qarmatians, Bāṭinīs <sup>312</sup> and Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilīs, besides helping the caliph in all matters of religion and state, served the political motives of the sulṭān in rooting out all those elements which were perceived as endangering the peace and safety of the country. Of all these deviant sects, the Bāṭinīs were most ruthlessly persecuted by Maḥmūd. Thousands of them were hung,

<sup>310</sup> Ibid., 224; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 276

 $<sup>^{311}</sup>$  Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam ,vol.7, 287; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 7; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil , vol. 9, 305.

<sup>312</sup> The term Bāṭinīs (Bāṭinīya) was derived from bāṭin, inner. The Bāṭinīya are therefore those who seek the inner or hidden meaning of the Scriptures by way of the so called ta wīl as opposed to those who take it literally. The Arab authors apply the name Bāṭinīs to several quite different sects, almost all of which have played a significant role in history. The most important of these sects are the Khurrāmites, the Qarmaṭians and the Ismāʿīlites. B. Carra de Vaux, "Bāṭinīya," in E.I., new ed., vol. 1, 673.

stoned to death, or carried in chains to Ghazna. A hundred camel-loads of books dealing with their heretical beliefs were cast into the flames. 313

On 15 Muḥarram 410/1019 al-Qādir received a letter from Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin explaining that he had left Ghazna on Saturday 13 Jumādā al-Ūlā with a great army amounting to about one hundred thousand men in an attempt to conquer India. During this campaign he took many fortresses and found many palaces and houses of idols containing a considerable amount of gold. Thousands of Indians were killed, more than ten thousand were converted and the city <sup>314</sup> was destroyed. He and his troops left the city carrying a booty worth of one million *dirhams*, hundreds of elephants and thousands of slaves. <sup>315</sup>

In 414/1023 another letter from Mahmūd came to al-Qādir in which he spoke again of his war against the Hindus and the fact that he had penetrated far into their country and found a fortress where about six hundred idols were located. The fortress<sup>316</sup> was capable of accommodating five hundred thousand men, five hundred elephants and twenty thousand animals with sufficient forage and food. He was successful in exerting sufficient pressure on them until they requested protection which he gave to their kings and confirmed their domains on which the *kharāj* (land tax) was fixed. He was granted a considerable number of gifts and elephants.<sup>317</sup>

In 418/1027 al-Qādir received another letter from Maḥmūd in which he explained that he had conquered the country of India and destroyed the idol known as

<sup>313</sup> Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kāmil*, vol.9, 262.

<sup>314</sup> Probably the city mentioned here was Kālinjar, which was under the control of the Indian king, Ganda. The date in this letter was correlated with Maḥmūd's campaign against Ganda and his ally, the new Rāja of Kanauj and Bārī in 410 (October 1019). Nāzim, Sulṭān Maḥmūd, 110-111.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid, 292-293; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 9.

<sup>316</sup> The fortress or fort of the city of Kalinjar, which was once again raided by Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin since Ganda, the ruler of the city had not been subdued during the expedition of 410/1019. Nāzim, Sultān Maḥmūd, 113.

<sup>317</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 13; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 17; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 333-334; Nāzim, Sultān Maḥmūd, 113-114.

Somnāth. 318 This was reputedly the greatest idol in India, one which attracted over one hundred thousand Hindus who made pilgrimage to it during the nights of lunar eclipses. 319 Each time Maḥmūd made a conquest in India and destroyed idols, the Hindus said that Somnāth was displeased with them; otherwise it would have destroyed whoever intended them ill. When Maḥmūd heard of this he wished to destroy it in consideration of the possibility that if the Hindus lost it and realized their false faith, they would embrace Islam. 320 In Shaʿbān 416/1025 he marched with 30, 000 cavalry and took paths which were more dangerous than what had been described to him. He reached the country of the idol and was able to subjugate the country, pull the idol down and set it on fire, breaking it into pieces and killing thousands of people in the process. 321 He found both on it and inside it a great number of jewels, tools, gold and precious stones. 322 The wealth which had been seized from the temple is said to have amounted to 20,000,000 dīnārs. 323

The destruction of Somnāth was one of the greatest military achievements in the history of Islam. The news of this victory was welcomed all over the Muslim world with much rejoicing. The delighted caliph awarded Maḥmūd the title of Kahf al-Dawla wa al-Islām, while titles were also bestowed on his sons and his brother. 324 Nāzim says, "Like

<sup>318</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.8, 29.

<sup>319</sup> Based on a belief in incarnation, they held that souls when separated from bodies, returned and inhabited this idol. The idol itself gave souls to those it wished. Even the sea worshipped it through the mud left on it after the water had ebbed away. They made costly sacrifices to it so that its religious endowments amounted to about ten thousand villages and its treasuries were full of wealth and about one thousand people devoted their services for it. Three hundred people cut the hair of its pilgrims; three hundred and fifty people danced and sang at its gates. Ibnl al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 342; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 29.

<sup>320</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 343.

<sup>321</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 29-30.

<sup>322</sup> Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 24-25; Ibn al-Athīr mentions that the name of the area where Somnāth was located in Anhalwāra and the distance between the Somnāth and the Gangga river was about two hundred parasangs (see al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 342.)

<sup>323</sup> Nāzim, Sultān Mahmūd, 118.

<sup>324</sup> Mas'ūd received the title Shihāb al-Dawla wa-Jamāl al-Milla, Muḥammad, Jalāl al-Dawla wa-Jamāl al-Milla and Yūsuf, Adud al-Dawla wa-Mu'ayyid al-Milla. Nāzim, Sultān Maḥmūd, 120.

many other heroes, sulțăn Maḥmūd became transformed into an almost mythical figure and generations of enthusiastic authors surrounded his name with a huge literature of fanciful stories which are intended to glorify him as a king and a warrior." 325

The last letter from Maḥmūd to the caliph was written on the 1st Jumādā al-Ākhira 420/1029 from his headquarters in Rayy. He told the caliph of his successful campaign against the infidels, innovators and adulterers in Rayy and Khurāsān. In these regions the Bāṭinīs, Muʿtazilites and the Rāfiḍites had joined together and stood against the Book of Allāh and the *Sunna*, openly vilifying the Companions and adopting the beliefs of the infidels under the leadership of Rustam b. ʿAlī al-Daylamī (Majd al-Dawla, the Buwayhid). Maḥmūd and his troops succeeded in subduing Rustam b. ʿAlī and his most important followers. Though they confessed their sins and admitted their infidelity and repented, the jurists whom Maḥmūd consulted issued a *fatwa* (legal decision) stating that they had to be killed, crucified or exiled according to the degree of their crimes because they had abandoned loyalty (to God and the caliph). Maḥmūd also found that one area outside of Rayy had become a centre of the Magians who had adopted Islam but later publicly abandoned all ritual obligations and the prohibition against eating corpses. They and the followers of the Bāṭiniyya, therefore, were crucified in one of the city's streets. 326

Rustam b. 'Alī together with his sons, a group of Daylamites and the leading personalities among the Mu'tazilites and the extremists of the Rāfidites were brought to Khurāsān. From Rustam's possession Maḥmūd seized more than two hundred thousand dīnārs, many golden and silver wares; thousands of clothes and fine fabric; fifty loads (sacks) of books other than those on Mu'tazilism and Rāfidism which had already been burnt. The city was thus made free of the Bāṭinīs' missionary efforts, as well as of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>325</sup> Ibid., 120.

<sup>326</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 39-40.

prominent Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and Rāfiḍites. Maḥmūd thus described the *Sunna* <sup>327</sup> as victorious and His servant as having attained the true sense of what God had done for the helpers of the victorious empire.<sup>328</sup>

On Thursday, 23 Rabī' al-Ākhir 420/1019 Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin died at the age of sixty-three of diarrhoea from which he had suffered for two years, and in spite of his doctors' advice that he should leave public affairs; 329 nevertheless he did not retreat from jihād (holy war) or political activities. Near the end of his reign, Maḥmūd seems to have been determined to rid the caliphate of the Buwayhids. Mas'ūd, when left in Rayy in 420/1029, was instructed to conquer Iṣfahān and then to release the caliph from the bondage of the Buwayhids, but before Maḥmūd's plans could materialize, he died. 330

His achievement in conquering India and his campaign against the infidels were unparalleled among Muslim rulers.<sup>331</sup> Maḥmūd's numerous raids (17 in number, according to Nāzim), into the Indian subcontinents earned him a reputation as "hammer" of the heretical Ismā<sup>c</sup>īlīs in Multān and other centres of Sind, but above all of pagan India.<sup>332</sup> However, according to Bosworth, "the prime motivation of Maḥmūd's raids was financial greed rather than religious zeal." <sup>333</sup>The booty he gained from the treasures and proceeds of the temples of India which he destroyed was used to beautify mosques and palaces in Ghazna, but above all to maintain the central bureaucracy and the pay of a multi-national professional army. <sup>334</sup> Regardless of whether his genuine motive was material or religious, Maḥmūd's contribution to Islam was great for through his inexhaustible campaigns in India, many Indian pagans became Muslim.

<sup>327</sup> It is not clear whether the Sunna meant here the Sunna of the Prophet or the Sunni creed, since he was Sunni, but most probably he meant by this is the true path of Islam as he conceived.

<sup>328</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 40.

<sup>329</sup> Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol.9, 398.

<sup>330</sup> Bayhaqī, Tārīkh, 83, 359; Siddiqi, "Caliphate," 275.

<sup>331</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 53.

<sup>332</sup> Nāzim, Sultān Mahmūd,

<sup>333</sup> Bosworth, "Mahmūd b. Sabuktagin," in E.I, new ed., vo. 4, 65.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

At the death of Maḥmūd, the dynasty was contested by his two sons, Muḥammad and Masʿūd. The latter, however, due to his political career, experience in war and influence among his followers, succeeded in eliminating his brother. He then became master of the Ghaznavids in 422/1030, and ruled over Khurāsān, Ghazna, several Indian districts and Sind, Sijistān, Kirmān, Mukrān, Rayy, Iṣfahān, Jibāl and many others.<sup>335</sup>

Al-Bayhaqī mentions that while Mas'ūd was still in Rayy, preparing to go to Ghazna, he received a letter from al-Qādir, expressing the latter's condolences on the death of Maḥmūd. This was in fact a reply to the letter sent to the caliphby Mas'ūd from Iṣfahān, informing him about his father's death, his determination to go to Khurāsān, and his request for a royal standard, a contract of investiture and a *laqab* (title), considering himself heir of the late Sulṭān Maḥmūd. The letter contained the caliph's confirmation of the regions which had been in his control, such as Rayy, Jibāl, Iṣfahān; Mas'ūd was however also asked to proceed to Khurāsān in order to avoid any uprising in the region. The caliph also promised to send an agent bringing the standard, contract of investiture and honourable gifts 336 and the title of al-Nāṣir al-Dīn Allāh.337The copies of the letter were then sent to Iṣfahān, Ṭarīm, the districts of Jibāl, Jurjān, Ṭabaristān, Nīsābūr and Herāt in an effort to convince the people that he was the successor of the late Sulṭān Maḥmūd.338

On Monday, 20 Sha bān, the messenger, bearing this letter, Abū Muḥammad al-Hāshimī, one of the closest relatives of the caliph, arrived at Nīsābūr. Mas ūd asked the people of Nīsābūr to prepare a splendid celebration to welcome the messenger of the caliph. The court entourage, army commanders, *qāḍīs*, jurists, scholars, high ranking

<sup>335</sup> Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 398-400.

<sup>336</sup> Bayhaqī, *Tārīkh* , 17.

<sup>337</sup> Ibn Khalliqān, Wafayāt al-A yān, vol. 3, 519.

<sup>338</sup> Bayhaqī, Tārīkh, 17.

officials met with the messenger of the caliph. 339 After three days of rest, the messenger was brought to the court of the sultān, where a splendid procession took place, showing the greatness of the Ghaznavids. Abū Muḥammad al-Hāshimī presented the contract of investiture, royal standard, crown, necklace, sword, robes of honour and many other precious gifts from the caliph. For his part, Mas'ūd gave his guest 20, 000 silver dirhams, a horse with a golden saddle, 50 items of precious clothes and many other gifts. Abū Hāshim was then permitted to leave for Baghdād at the end of the month of Sha'bān 422/1030. 340

The good relationship that existed between the caliph al-Qādir and the Ghaznavids from Maḥmūd's rise to power in 389/998 up to his death in 421/1030 was of great advantage for the caliph. The Ghaznavids were the only powerful Sunnite dynasty during this period, whose control was extended over most important eastern regions of the Muslim world, at the time the 'Abbāsid power was confined to Baghdād. Maḥmūd's stout support for the Sunnite caliph was crucial to the latter's survival. He raised and upheld the caliph's prestige in all districts under his control; moreover, he executed the caliph's policies against deviant sects. For this reason, the rise of the Ghaznavids, played a very important role in the Sunnite revival in the fourth and fifth centuries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>339</sup> Įbid., 43.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid., 45-46.

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#### CHAPTER THREE:

## AL-QADIR'S RELIGIOUS POLICY OF SUNNITE RESTORATION

### I. Religious movements

Before we discuss al-Qādir's role in the Sunnite restoration, it is important to deal first with the upsurge of the Shī te and Hanbalite movements during al-Qādir's reign. The Shī tes, whose position was strengthened with the coming of the Buwayhids, were challenged by the Sunnites who felt threatened by their ascendancy. However, it was not the Sunnites, strictly speaking, who reacted against the Shī tes, but the Hanbalites. These two movements are worthy of note because both the Buwayhid amīr al-umarā and the caliph al-Qādir were either directly or indirectly involved at different times. In addition, during al-Qādir's reign, Sunnite and especially Shī te literature flourished; indeed many scholars in all branches of Islamic knowledge emerged during this period. In this section we will also analyze some of the figures who played a very important role in the development of Shī and Sunnism during al-Qādir's reign. Finally, we will deal with other scholars of different schools who established close relations with the caliph and contributed to the maintenance of the Sunnite caliphate and Sunnism itself.

#### A. The Shi ite Movement

When the Buwayhids were well established in Baghdād the Shī ites had already become a distinct community in the capital. It is difficult to trace the origins of this community. During the first century of 'Abbāsid rule the 'Alids themselves experienced many changes of fortune, but their cause suffered a crushing blow when al-Mutawakkil, in the year 235/849 adopted an anti-Mu tazilite policy 2 and showed his hatred for the

<sup>2</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 202

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This is meant that not all the Sunnites of the four schools of law significantly participated in the movement, but mostly the Hanbalites because they made up the majority of the populace of Baghdād.

'Alids by cursing 'Alī from the pulpits and destroying the tombs of his descendants.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, al-Mutawakkil appointed an officer to watch over the interests of the 'Alids, whose loyalty was not suspected.<sup>4</sup> Thirty years later the caliph al-Mu'tadid in his reverence for the 'Alids allowed Muhammad b. Ziyād of Ṭabaristān, the 'Alid ruler, to send money freely to the 'Alids of Mecca, Madīna, Kūfa and Baghdād.<sup>5</sup> He also drew up a decree to be recited from the pulpits impugning the Umayyads, a practice which he only abandoned after he was informed of the political danger of this move. It would appear then that by this time the Shī 'ites were considered a factor to be reckoned with. <sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, we do not hear much of the Shī te community in Baghdād before the reign of al-Muqtadir (295-320/907-932). By that time, they used to attend congregational prayers and to curse the companions of the Prophet at the Barāthā mosque. When al-Muqtadir learnt about this in 313/925 he arrested those who were performing Friday prayer in the mosque and gave an order to have it demolished. Though it was rebuilt in 328/939 by *Amīr* Bajkam for Sunnite worshippers, subsequent incidents show that the local Shī tes must later have regained control of it. We may accordingly consider the Barāthā mosque as the first Shī te stronghold in Baghdād.

At the same time al-Karkh, a quarter in western Baghdad, became a centre of Shī tie power. It is always referred to by the early historians as a business centre and had come into being as a result of al-Manṣūr's removal of the markets that originally formed part of his Round City to al-Karkh. Though al-Ṭabarī mentions rebellions in al-Karkh

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Suyūtī, *Tārīkh*, 392; Kennedy, *Prophet*, 169; Grunebaum, *Classical Islam*, 94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 202

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Tabarī, *Tārīkh*, vol. 10, 41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The decree had been drawn, but before it had been recited in the puplpits of the mosques, the qādī Yūsuf b. Yaʻqūb warned the caliph of a possible mass disturbance stimulated by the decree, so he cancelled it. Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 202; Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, vol. 10, 54-62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 202-203; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 6, 195.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 6, 317.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ibid., 203; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 6, 317, 195, 395; 8, 41-44.

arising from economic and political factors, <sup>10</sup> there is no reference to the Shī<sup>e</sup>ite character of the quarter until the time of the Buwayhids. When Mu<sup>e</sup>izz al-Dawla came to Baghdād al-Karkh had already been the major Shī<sup>e</sup>ite stronghold; and riots between its inhabitants and the Sunnites started only four years later in 338/949. <sup>11</sup>

The Shī tites in Baghdād made considerable progress under the reign of the Buwayhids, Mu al-Dawla (334-356/945-966), Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiyār (356-367/966-977) and Adud al-Dawla (367-372/977-982). Mu zz al-Dawla and his son Izz al-Dawla undertook a series of actions that were to be of great importance for the later development of the two movements (Shī te and Sunnite). Mu zz al-Dawla sanctioned in 352/963 celebration of the Day of Āshūrā, the tenth day of Muḥarram, when al-Ḥusayn, son of Alī, was killed in Karbala during the fight against the caliph Yazīd b. Mu wiya in 60/680. This event became a great day of mourning for the Shī tes who celebrated it by performing pilgrimage to their sacred places, particularly that in al-Ḥā ir, an enclosure where the tomb of al-Ḥusayn was found in Karbala.

During this day the markets were closed, all trade ceased, people were forbidden to take water from the Tigris. Domes were erected everywhere (each of which symbolized the tomb of al-Ḥusayn, the martyr of Karbala); and these domes were covered with pieces of mourning cloth. The women were to come out with disorderly hair, blackened faces, tearing their clothes and beating their faces in lamentation in memory of al-Ḥusayn. <sup>14</sup> The idea for "such national mourning" among the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites may have come from Daylamite customs of mourning which may have inspired Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla. <sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., Tabarī, Tārīkh, vol. 3, 197, 323-324; 392-393.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 6, 363.

<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 15.

<sup>13</sup> Makdisi, Ibn Aqīl, 313.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 15.

<sup>15</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 205.

This Shī te celebration of the Day of 'Āshūrā' announced on the first days of the year (352/963) was followed by another celebration which was declared at the end of the year. This innovation of the Shī tes was inaugurated on 18 Dhū al-Ḥijja. This was the commemorative ceremony for "The Day of Ghadīr Khumm," or "Yaum Ghadīr Khumm." Khumm, situated between Mecca and Medīna, was the place where the Prophet stopped during his return to Mecca in the year 10 of the Hegira, the year of Farewell (Hijjat al-Wadā'). On this occasion, according to the Shī te version, he had adopted 'Alī as his brother and designated him as his successor. The Shī tes attached great importance to this tradition. Among the details of this celebration was the erection of three statues made of bread and filled with honey, representing the first three caliphs. These statues were stabbed so that the honey seeped out, symbolizing the blood of the usurper caliphs. 16

The main details of the Day of Ghadīr Khumm which are preserved by the chroniclers are as follows. On the eve of the Day of Ghadīr Khumm, 352/963, the Shī tes erected tents and set bonfires, and the celebration began with the sounding of trumpets and beating of drums. The following morning, they visited the cemetery of the Quraysh. Here were buried two Kāzims (al-Kāzimayn): Mūsā: the seventh Shī te imām and his grandson, Muḥammad al-Taqī, the ninth imām. In contrast to the celebration of Āshūrā, the Day of Ghadīr Khumm was celebrated with general rejoicing and the shops and market-places were kept open even at night, as was the custom for Sunnite festivals. In

The celebration of these two commemorative ceremonies in Baghdad, the capital of the 'Abbasids, was inaugurated under the aegis of the first Buwayhid, Mu'izz al-

<sup>16</sup> Makdisi, Ibn 'Agīl', 313.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 549; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ibid., 313-134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 205; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 16; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 397.

Dawla, the champion of the Shī'ites. These two ceremonies were celebrated each year during the rest of his reign, and during the first years of the reign of his son 'Izz al-Dawla, for nine consecutive years, from 352/963 to 361/971. These festivities and rituals seem not to have incited a reaction from the Sunnites, when they were introduced. However, there had already been violent confrontations between the two camps in the preceding years, notably in 349/960, the year when many people had been killed and a great fire was set in the Shī'ite quarter of Bāb al-Tāq.<sup>20</sup>

Some later chroniclers, such as Ibn al-Athīr, claim that the Sunnites were not able to stop the Shī te celebration due to the great number of Shī tes and the support of the Buwayhids. It is also possible that the Sunnites had been taken off guard in 352/963. In 353/964 a serious fight occurred during the ceremony of the Day of 'Āshūrā' between the Shī tes and Sunnites in the quarter of Ummu Ja far and on the road to the graveyard (*maqābir*), at which time many were killed. This was the only riot cited during the first consecutive ten years of the Shī te celebrations, a period during which the 'Āshūrā' and the Day of Ghadīr Khumm became solidly established as Shī te traditions.

The Shī<sup>c</sup>ite festivals became a trigger for the communal tension between both communities from the reign of Mu<sup>c</sup>izz al-Dawla onwards. Serious incidents occurred which would cause future antagonism between the Sunnites and Shī<sup>c</sup>ites, and sometimes lead to bloodshed. The breach between the two great communities of the same religion, which was caused by these endemic incidents, sometimes became more profound than that which separated Islam from Christianity and Judaism. <sup>24</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Makdisi, *Ibn 'Aqil*, 134; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 397.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 549.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 19.

<sup>23</sup> Makdisi, *Iba 'Aqīl*', 315.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 44.

Mu<sup>°</sup>izz al-Dawla's championship of the Shī<sup>°</sup>ites was obvious from the beginning. As soon as he entered Baghdād, he separated the 'Alids from the jurisdiction of the 'Abbāsid *naqīb* and placed them under their own *naqīb*; the first 'Alid who filled the office was al-Kawkabī, a descendant of Zayn al-'Ābidīn.<sup>25</sup> Mu<sup>°</sup>izz al-Dawla's successor, 'Izz al-Dawla, was also described by the Sunnite historians as a zealous propagator of Shī<sup>°</sup>ism.

As a result of the Shī<sup>c</sup>ite ascendancy under the Buwayhid *amīrs* and as a result of these annual celebrations, clashes became frequent between the Sunnites and Shī<sup>c</sup>ites, and violence raged openly in the 'Abbāsid capital. One of the most characteristic traits of the medieval history of Baghdād was this Sunnite-Shī<sup>c</sup>ite antagonism and sectarian riots. By 364/974, the 'ayyārūn armed bands, both Sunnites and Shī<sup>c</sup>ites, appeared in Baghdād, where, taking advantage of the political instability of the time, they became one of the main evils of the 'Abbāsid capital. <sup>26</sup>

The reign of 'Adud al-Dawla (d.372/982) was accompanied by a certain confessional lull without any major hindrance for the progress of Shī 'ism. 27He favoured the construction or the reconstruction of the great Shī 'ite sanctuaries of Najaf, Karbala, Kāzimayn and Sāmarrā '. 28 In 367/986, upon his entry to Baghdād, 'Adud al-Dawla banned the activities of anti-Shī 'ite preachers, accusing them of troubling the life of the city with their public lectures. The most well-known among them, Ibn Sam 'ūn, (d.387/997) refused to comply with the order, although he was not punished. 29

This policy to a certain measure bore fruit. The reigns of Ṣamṣām al-Dawla (372-376/982-986) and Sharaf al-Dawla (376-379/982-989) were not marked in Baghdād by

<sup>25</sup> Kabir, Buwayhid Dynasty, 204.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 44.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid 45

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Dominique Sourdel, "Les conceptions imāmites au debut du XIe siècle d'après le Shaykh Mufīd," in D.S. Richards ed., *Islamic Civilization*, 188.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 45

any grave incidents between the two communities.<sup>30</sup> In addition, the reigns of Ṣamṣām al-Dawla and Sharaf al-Dawla marked the beginning of decline of Buwayhid rule in Baghdād.

The situation changed with Bahā' al-Dawla (379-403/989-1012), whose reign was marked by the reinforcement of the missionary efforts of Imāmite Shī'ism and an upsurge of religious agitations. In 383/994 the vizier Sābūr b. Ardashīr founded in al-Karkh quarter the Dār al-'IIm', The House of Knowledge. The house was provided with a rich library and its management was entrusted to members of the Shī'ite nobility. This was the first madrasa which possessed important waqfs, working towards the development of a religious ideology and the work of Shī'ite missionaries. At his death in 403/1012 Bahā' al-Dawla passed his power on to his son, Sulṭān al-Dawla (403-415/1012-1024), a thirteen year old, who received investiture from the caliph (al-Tā'i'). 32

During the reign of Sultān al-Dawla and his successors, Musharrif al-Dawla (415-416/1024-1025) and Jalāl al-Dawla (418-435/1027-1043), the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites and the Sunnites resumed their conflicts. Many riots were recorded during their reigns because at this time, controversial debates or discussions were often held and attended by both Shī<sup>c</sup>ite and Sunnite scholars and the preachers of both sides often delivered provocative public sermons. There also emerged many polemic works of scholars from both sides.

Under the aegis of the Buwayhid *amīrs*, Twelver Shī<sup>c</sup>ite literature flourished and several scholars appeared and contributed to the development of Shī<sup>c</sup>ism. Two of them who were active during the early years of the Buwayhid era were important for their contribution to the development of the Shī<sup>c</sup>ite canonical books. First, Abū Ja<sup>c</sup>far Muḥammd b. Ya<sup>c</sup>qūb al-Kulaynī al-Rāzī (d.329/941), the author of *al-Kātī fī ʿIlm al-*

<sup>30</sup> Idem, "Hanbalisme," 85.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

Dīn; the second was Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. Babawayh al-Qummī, called al-Ṣadūq (d.381/991), author of Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh.33

Al-Kulaynī, whose birth date is unknown to his biographers, is regarded by the Shi cites as a "renewer" (mujaddid) who appeared at the beginning of the fourth century,<sup>34</sup> and as the first and highly esteemed scholar of the great Shī<sup>c</sup>ite traditionists.<sup>35</sup> He came from the village of Kulin (or Kulayn) near Rayy, where he transmitted traditions from several scholars, among them his maternal uncle Muhammad b. al-Kulaynī al-Rāzī, known as 'Allān. He also studied traditions of several scholars of Qumm. Perhaps around 301-311/913-923/ he went to Baghdad, where he lived and taught at the Dārb al-Silsila near the Bāb al-Kūfa on the west bank of the Tigris.36 He died in Baghdad shortly before the coming of the Buwayhids, and his tomb was venerated as that of an Imam. 37Al-Kulaynī's religious thought was focused on Traditions and dogmatic theology. His voluminous work, al-Kātī fī 'Ilm al-Dīn', which took him twenty years to write, consisted of two parts: one on the foundations of belief ( uṣūl), the other on the Imamite law (furū'). The final part or volume of al-Kāfī is the Kitāb al-Rawdat, containing miscellaneous traditions and dealing mostly with moral improvement. In this work al-Kulaynī laid down a systematic doctrinal treatise for the Imamites. It is also a collection of more than 15, 000 Traditions, each provided with an isnād (chain of authority) of an imām. The Imāmites in making their own collections of Traditions, seem to have adopted the established Sunnite practice.<sup>38</sup> Al-Tūsī describes him as a trustworthy traditionist who was preeminent in akhbār. He also mentions al-Kulaynī's other works, all of which are lost, namely: Kitāb al-Rasā îl (The Book of

<sup>33</sup> Kraemer, Humanism, 65-66; Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>35</sup> Donaldson, Shi'ite Religion, 284.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Madelung, "al-Kulaynī," in E.I., new ed., vol. 3, 362-363.

<sup>37</sup> Kraemer, Humanism, 66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Ibid., Watt, Formative Period, 278; Madelung, "al-Kulaynī," in E.I., new ed., vol.3, 363; Laoust, Les schismes dans IIslam, 149-150; al-Ţūsī, al-Fihrist, taḥqīq Maḥmūd Ramyār (Masyhad: Masyhad University, Press, n.d.), 161.

Letters), Kitāb al-Radd alā al-Qarāmita (The Book of Refutation of the Qarāmita) and Kitāb Tafsīr al-Ru vā (The Book of Interpretation of Dreams).

Al-Kulaynī's successor, Ibn Babawayh al-Ṣadūq, was born in Qumm (c.306/991) and then together with his family moved to Rayy, which was then one of the largest cities in Iran, known for producing many outstanding scholars. He belonged to a well-known scholarly family, famous in the field of hadith and its sciences. Many members of his family settled in Rayy, taking careers as jurisprudents, transmitters of hadith, scholars, men of letters and theologians. 40 He himself was universally regarded by the Shi ites as one of their foremost doctors and the second of the great Shi ite traditionists after al-Kulaynī.<sup>41</sup> Al-Ṭūsī describes him as a great scholar, a leading traditionist, knowledgeable in the science of Hadith, unrivaled by the people of Qumm as regards his memory and knowledge. Al-Najāshī says that Ibn Babwayh was a very distinguished scholar, faqth (versant in the science of jurisprudence) and thiqqah (trustworthy) in the science of Hadīth. 42 In 355/966 he came to Baghdād, where the leading scholars of the sect (Shī tites) heard traditions from him while he was young.43 Among the Shī ite traditionists who transmitted *hadīth* on his authority were Shaykh al-Mufid, Muḥammadb. Aḥmadb. al-Qummī, known as Ibn Shādhān, and Abū Jafar b. Muhammad al-Dawristi, and many others.44

Ibn Babawayh was a contemporary of Rukn al-Dawla. The *amīr*, who, attracted by Ibn Babawayh's reputation, invited him to his palace in Rayy, where he was asked to hold debates on the issue of imāmate. Ibn Babawayh's argumentation and explanations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Al-Tūsī, *al-Fihrist*, 161.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Ibn Babawayh, *The Shi ite Creed*, translated by A.A.A. Fyzee and introduced by Muhammad Rida al-Jafari (Oxford: Islamic Research Association Series, no. 9, 1942), xxxiii-xxxiv.

<sup>41</sup> Donaldson, Shi ite Religion, 285; A.A.A. Fyzee, "Ibn Babawayh," in E.I., new ed., vol.3, 726.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Al-Najāshī, *Rijāl* (Qumm: Mu'assasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1407), 119.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Khwānsārī, Rawdat al-Jannāt fī Aḥwāl al-'Ulamā' wa al-Sādāt (Beirūt: Dār al-Islāmiyya, 1991), vol. 6, 136.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Ibid., 140.

brought the *amīr's* satisfaction. Ablad-Tawhīdī mentions that the Ṣāḥib 'Ibn 'Abbād expelled him from Rayy, but no reason was given for this. However, since the Ṣāḥib was accused of Mu'tazilism inclinations, his action might have been motivated by Ibn Babawayh's open hostility to *Kalām*. This attitude was expressed in his dogmatic works, (particularly in his *Risālat I'tiqād al-Imāmiyya*), in which he mentions Traditions on the authority of Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq condemning theological argumentation (e.g. concerning God and predestination). Perhaps at the end of his life or after the death of the Ṣāḥib Ibn 'Abbād, Ibn Babawayh returned to Rayy, where he died in 381/991.

Ibn Babawayh was a prolific author, whose works amounted to about 300 books according to his biographers.<sup>47</sup> Al-Khwānsārī, the author of *Rawḍāt al-Jannāt*, however, maintains that most of Ibn Babawayh's works were lost and that only seventeen works survive. His important extant books are six: (1) *Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh*, containing 4, 496 traditions. This is one of the "Four Books" venerated by the Shī ties; (2) *Risālat al-I tiqādāt*; (3) *Ikmāl al-Dīn*; (4) *Kitāb al-Āmālī* (5) *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd*; and (6) *Uyūn Akhbār al-Ridā*. \*48

The doctrinal literature of the Twelver Shī ites reached its golden era during the reign of al-Qādir and the early years of his successor. After al-Kulaynī (d.329/940) and the Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d.381/991), Shī ites came to recognize several other great theorists of Imāmism: al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) sometimes called Ibn al-Mu allim; the Sharīf al-Radī (d.406/1015); his elder brother, the Sharīf al-Murtadā (d. 436/1044); and Abū Ja far al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), who lived slightly later, i.e. during the reign of al-Qādir's successor, al-Qā im.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Fyzee, "Ibn Babawayh," in E.I., new ed., vol.3, 726-27.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Al-Ţūsī, al-Fihrist, 285; Ibn Shahrāsūb, Ma'ālim al-'Ulamā' fi Fihrist Kutub al-Shī'a wa Asmā' al-Muşannifīn Minhum Qadīman wa Ḥadīthan ( Tehran: Maṭba'at al-Fardayn, 1383), 99; Aghā Buzurgh al-Ṭihrānī, Tabaqāt ʿĀlam al-Shī'a (al-Najaf: al-Maṭba'a al-ʾIlmiyya, 1954), 287.

<sup>48</sup> Fyzee, "Ibn Babawayh," in E.I., vol. 3, 727; Donaldson, Shi'ite Religion, 286.

The Shaykh al-Muña (Abū 'Abdullāh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Nu mān) (d. 413/1022) was considered as the theologian par excellence of Imāmite Shī ism in the first half of al-Qādir's reign. Born near 'Ukbāra in 338/949, he was described by al-Tūsī as one of the leading theologians of the Imāmites, the most prominent Shī ite scholar of his time, who possessed brilliant intelligence and quick-wit. His father, al-Muʿallim, brought him to Baghdād, where he studied with many teachers, both of Sunnite and Shī ite inclination, including Ibn Babawayh. His teacher in fight (jurisprudence) was Ja far b. Muḥammad b. Kuluya of Qumm (d. 369/979-80). In theology, his main teacher was Abū al-Jaysh al-Muzaffar b. Muḥammad al-Balkhī al-Warrāq (d.367/977-8). Among his Shī ite teachers were the Shī ite theologian Abū 'Alī al-Iskāfī, Abū 'Abdillāh Marzubānī, 53 Abū 'Abdillāh al-Baṣrī and Abū Ḥasan b. 'Īsā al-Rummānī. Among his disciples were the two sharīfs, al-Radī and al-Murtadā, and Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Sh

Al-Mufīd taught and held discussion sessions in the Barāthā mosque. Ibn al-Nadīm, his contemporary, described him as a leading Shī te theologian and a spokesman for the Imāmiyya. 56 According to al-Tawhīdī, who also knew him personally,

<sup>49</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 46.

<sup>50</sup> Al-Tūsī, al-Fihrist, 186.

<sup>51</sup> Kraemer, Humanism, 67.

<sup>52</sup> Madelung, "al-Mufid," in EI, new ed., vol. 6, 312

<sup>53</sup> His name was Muḥammad b. 'Imrān b. Mūsā b. Sa'īd b. Ubaydillāh. He was born in 297/909 in Baghdād, but his family came from Khurāsān. He was a famous author of akhbār and the leading Mu'tazilite of Baghdād. He wrote Akhbār al-Mu'tazila and Akhbār al-Shu'arā' and many other works. He was sympathetic to Shī'ism and was the first to collect the verses of Yazīd b. Mu'āwiya b. Abī Sufyān. He learnt hadīth from 'Abdullāh al-Saymarī, Abū al-Qāsim al-Tanūkhī, Abū Muḥammad al-Jawhar. He died in 384/994. Ibn al-'Imād, Shadharāt al-Dhahab, vol. 3, 111.

<sup>54</sup> Al-Rummānī was born in Baghdād in 276/889, but his family came from Sāmarrā'. He was a leading scholar of Arabic and syntax (al-Naḥwī =grammarian). He combined in his works Arabic and theology (kalām) and his works amounted to about one hundred books, which included Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm. He mastered a variety of Islamic sciences such as fiqh, grammar, Mu'tazilite kalām and Qur'ānic commentary (tafsī). His teachers were Ibn Durayd, Abū Bakr b. al-Sirāj etc. He died in 384/994. Ibn al-'Imād, Shadharāt al-Dhahab, vol. 3, 109; Yāqūt, Mu'jam al-Udabā', vol. 4, 191.

 $<sup>^{55}</sup>$  Madelung, "al-Mufīd," in E. I., new ed., vol. 6, 312

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 252; al-Ṭūsī, Fihrist, 186-187; Khwānsārī, Rawdāt, vol. 6, 153.

he was eloquent and skilled at argumentation and persistent against his opponents. His polemical zeal and proficiency were well-known to later authors.<sup>57</sup> He taught in his house in the quarter of al-Karkh and often held controversial sessions not only attended by the Shī ites, but also by the Sunnites. His works, numbering about two hundred, were known only by title and dealt mainly with Shifte doctrine in the domain of kalām and figh, and also more than fifteen works refuting his opponents on the issue of the imāmate. 58 However, al-Majlisī said that when he started writing Biḥār [al-'Ulūm], he found eighteen works of al-Mufid which he had at his disposal.<sup>59</sup> Two small treatises of his allow us to look at his thought closely: first, the Kitāb al-Irshād, an apologetic history of Twelver Shitism, showing a very hostile attitude towards the first three caliphs; second, the Kitāb al-Awā il, which places Imāmism among the existing schools of thought. An avowed adversary of al-Ash arī and Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā ī, al-Mufīd in the last work wanted to disentangle himself from Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism as well as from Sunnism. 60He, however, adopted some of the major tenets of Mu<sup>o</sup>tazilism, preferring the Baghdad to the Başra school, since the Baghdadians were considered closer to the Imamī position.<sup>61</sup> The problem of the imamate, to judge from both his pamphlets and by the number of treatises which he devoted to the subject, was his major concern. 62 His ideas on the imamate can be seen in his surviving work, Kitab Awa'il al-Maqalat fi al-Madhāhib al-Mukhtārāt, which has been reviewed by Dominique Sourdel. 63 In this work the author views successively different questions by pointing out which sect he is in accord with and which one he disagrees with. He starts with a general definition of Shī ism and more particularly Imāmism, in which he underlines the existing difference

<sup>57</sup> Kraemer, Humanism, 67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Al-Tūsī, al-Fihrist, 186-187; al-Najashī, Rijāl, 311-316.

<sup>59</sup> Al-Khwānsārī, Rawdāt al-Jannāt, vol. 6, 155.

<sup>60</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 46.

<sup>61</sup> Kraemer, Humanism, 68.

<sup>62</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 46.

<sup>63</sup> Sourdel, "Les conceptions, 190.

between Twelver Shī'ism on one hand, and Zaydism and Mu'tazilism on the other. He was especially concerned with clarifying his position as regards Mu'tazilism, (Twelver Shī'ism and Zaydism), because all defend the principle of 'adl', divine justice, while also sharing matters of theodicy and morals.<sup>64</sup>

Al-Mufīd was often involved in debates with other groups such as Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and Ash<sup>c</sup>arites. His debates with the Ash<sup>c</sup>arite theologian, Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, and the leading Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite, the Qādī <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Jabbār, when the latter visited Baghdād, were famous. Al-Mufīd's encounter with <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Jabbār, whom he defeated in debate, had earned him an invitation to the court of <sup>c</sup>Aḍud al-Dawla, who highly respected him and granted him considerable gifts. <sup>65</sup> However, due to his provocative lectures, al-Mufīd was three times expelled from Baghdād in the wake of civil strife between Sunnites and Shī <sup>c</sup>ites (in 392/3/1002, 398/1007 and 409/1018). <sup>66</sup> Despite his extreme militancy and his instigation of several riots, his prominence was acknowledged by the caliph al-Qādir. Together with other Imāmī leaders, he signed a document drawn up at the order of the caliph al-Qādir in 402/1011-1012, which questioned the genealogy of the Fāṭimid caliph. <sup>67</sup>

The successor and student of al-Mufīd, the Sharīf al-Raḍī (d. 406/1015), Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Abī Aḥmad al-Ḥusayn b. Mūsā, was born in Baghdād in 359/970 into a well-known and well-educated family. His lineage was traced back to al-Ḥusayn b. 'Alī through Mūsā al-Kāzim, the seventh imām; hence his *nisba* (attribution, affinity) al-Mūsawī al-'Alawī. 68 Bahā' al-Dawla awarded him the title al-Raḍī Dhū al-Ḥisbayn and appointed him *naqīb* (agent) of the 'Alids. 69 Al-Raḍī's teacher in Shī'ite theology was Shaykh al-Mufīd. He also studied under the guidance of other distinguished

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Al-Khwānsārī, Rawdāt al-Jannāt, vol. 6, 159.

<sup>66</sup> Kraemer, Humanism, 68; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 220; vol. 8, 19.

<sup>67</sup> Mokhtar Jebli," al-Sharīf al-Radī," in E. I., new ed., vol. 9, 340.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 279.

distinguished scholars of the time, such as the grammarian, Abū 'Alī al-Fārisī (d.377/987), the writer Abū 'Abdillāh al-Marzubāmī (d.384/994), the Mālikite Abū Isḥāq al-Țabarī al-Muqrī (d.393/995), the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite qāḍt<sup>c</sup>, <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Jabbār (d.415/1024) and the philologist and grammarian Ibn Jinnī (d.399/1002).70 He learnt the Qur'an by heart in quite a short time at the age of thirty and began to write poetry at the age of ten. 71 It was Ibn Jinnī who encouraged him to pursue his career as a poet. 72 Al-Tha ālibī describes him as the most prolific scholar of his time, the noblest leader of 'Iraq, the most productive poet of the 'Alids, even the best poet of the Qurayshites in terms of quality and quantity. There were other proficient Qurayshite poets, but their verses were scarce, and while some exceeded him in terms of quantity, their verses lacked quality. Al-Radī combined quality and quantity in his verses. His father Abū Aḥmad al-Mūsawī was appointed agent, head of the tribunal court, and amir (leader) of the pilgrimage, and al-Radī was given these posts in 383/993 when the former's health deteriorated. 73 A writer and scholar versed in various disciplines, he was most appreciated in his role as a poet.<sup>74</sup> Among his works were *Majāzāt al-Qur ān* and *Ma āni al-Qur ān*; a collection of 10,000 verses which survive in several compilations dated to (374-405/985-1015), including ones by his son Ahmad and Abū al-Hakim al-Khayrī; al-Majāzāt al-Nabawiyya, Rasā'il al-Sābī wa al-Sharīf al-Radī and Khasā'is Imām 'Alī. But his most important and celebrated one is the Nahj al-Balāgha, an anthology of sayings, discourses, sermons and letters traditionally attributed to Alī, which he compiled in 400/1010.75 The Nahj al-Balāgha, together with al-Kāfī of Kulaynī, became one of the

<sup>70</sup> Jebli, "al-Sharīf al-Radī," in E.I., new ed., vol. 9, 341.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 340; Tha'ālibī, *Yatīmat al-Dahr fī Shu'arā Ahl al-'Aṣr*, vol. 3 (Damasqus: Maṭba'at al-Hifruyya, n.d.), vol. 3, 136; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol 7, 279.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid

<sup>73</sup> Tha alibī, Yatīmat al-Dahr, 136-137; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-A'yān, vol. 4, 414-420.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Jebli, "al-Sharīf al-Radī," in *E. I.*, new ed., vol. 9,341; Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt al-Dhahab*, vol. 3, 182-184.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Ibid., 342.

Radī's distinct style and the brilliant thought apparent in the *Nahj al-Balāgha* contributed to the success of Shī°ism as well as to the development of its religious systems and politics. <sup>76</sup> In addition, according to Kabir, al-Radī is said to have built an academy called *Dār al-ʿIlm*, House of Knowledge [the same name as that built by Sābūr b. Ardashīr in 383/993], <sup>77</sup> and appointed a treasurer to supply the needs of the scholars he patronized. <sup>78</sup>

According to Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, al-Radī from an early age nurtured political ambitions and even aspired to the highest authority in the state, namely the caliphate; some of his verses clearly show this. His close friend Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣābī, seems to have encouraged him and built up his hopes. This idea, which he entertained throughout his youth, could not be materialized because he could not find supporters. Many of his poems reveal a sense of disappointment, deep despair and pessimism. He finally accepted the reality, being content with the honour lavished on him by the Buwayhid amīr, Bahā al-Dawla. 9

Al-Raḍī's influence within the entourage of the caliph was challenged by the Sunnite *sharīfs*, the most important of whom were the Sharīf Abū 'Alī (d.428/1036) and Abū Ja'far (d. 470/1077).<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, the Sharīf al-Raḍī, whose official career began under Bahā' al-Dawla's reign and continued under Sulṭān al-Dawla (d. 403-413/1012-1022), was well-known as one of the greatest authors of his time.<sup>81</sup>He maintained good relations with both the caliph al-Ṭā'i' and his successor, al-Qādir. He dedicated numerous laudatory poems to both caliphs. But his affection and respect were

<sup>76</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī, "46.

<sup>77</sup> Seen from the similarity of the name and the date of its founding, we can assume that Kabir is probably confused with that built by Sābūr b. Ardashīr. In addition, Ibn al-Jawzī does not mention that al-Radī built the same House of Knowledge.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Mafizullah Kabir, "Cultural Development under the Buwayhids," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan* I (1956), 41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Jebli, "al-Sharīf al-Radī, " in *E.I.*, new ed., vol.9, 342; Al-Khwānsāri, *Rawdāt* al-Jannāt, vol. 6, 191-192, 204.

<sup>80</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 46.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

greater for the caliph al-Ṭā'i than for al-Qādir. He continued to dedicate poems to al-Ṭā'i even after the caliph's death twelve years later in 393/1002. But his relations with al-Qādir were not always favourable. On some occasions he wrote eulogies addressed to him, though without much conviction, and on others he composed courageous, rude and provocative poems which sometimes incited the anger of the caliph, especially when he compared himself to the latter:

"Alas, Amīr of the Believers!. We are equal, at the summit of glory.

"Only the caliphate, of which you hold the reins, separates us." 82

Another Shī ite scholar who was influential during the reign of al-Qādir was al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī Aḥmad al-Ḥusayn b. Mūsā b. Muḥammad b. Mūsā. Like his brother, al-Raḍī s line was traced back to Mūsā al-Kāzim b. Ja far b. al-Ṣādiq and finally to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. He was born and died in Baghdād (355-436/967-1044). He studied under the guidance of Shaykh al-Mufīd and some of the latter's teachers, such as Abū ʿAbdillāh Muḥammad b. ʿImrān al-Marzubānī, Ibn Nubātah al-Adīb (the author) and al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. Babawayh, the brother of Shaykh al-Ṣadūq. Many of his disciples became prominent Shī ite scholars such as Abū Ja far al-Ṭūsī, Abū Ya lā Salār b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Daylamī and Abū al-Ṣalāḥ Taqī b. Najm al-Ḥalabī. He became the leading Imāmī theologian, a grammarian, a writer and a poet. Bahā al-Dawla bestowed on him the title "Dhū al-Majdayn" and appointed him naqīb, head of the tribunal court, and amīr for the pilgrimage of 406/1015, posts which had been held by his brother al-Sharīf al-Raḍī who died in this year. His eminence in Imāmī circles earned him the title of ʿAlam al-Hudā.

The Sharīf al-Murtadā (d.436/1044) was not only famous in Baghdād for the important function he exercised as Shī<sup>t</sup>ite agent after the death of his brother al-Radī, but

<sup>82</sup> Jebli, "al-Sharīf al-Radī," in E.I, new ed., vol. 9, 342.

<sup>83</sup> Aghā Buzurgh al-Ţihrānī, *Tabaqāt ʿAlam al-Shīʿa*, vol. 2, 121; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-Aʿyān*, vol. 3, 443; al-Khwānsāri, *Rawḍāt al-Jannāt*, vol. 4, 299.

<sup>84</sup> C. Brockelmann, "Al-Sharīf al-Murtadā°," in EI, new ed., vol. 8, 634.

also for his literary works. In 413/1022, with the death of al-Mufid, he became a leader of the Shifte community and found himself often engaged in political life. Poet and prose-writer, he was also one of the great theorists of Imāmism. His most famous work on this topic was the *Kitāb al-Shāfī fī al-Imāma*, in which he refuted the political doctrine of the qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d.415/1024). Abū Jaffar al-Ṭūsī, who maintained that the *Kitāb al-Shāfī* was unparalleled in its material, tried to summarize it (his *Talktīsṣ al-Shāfī*) in order to give it wider circulation. 85 His works were abundant and more than fifty were listed by Kwānsārī and Ibn Shahrāsūb. But Carl Brockelmann maintains that his work survives only in part and is not easily distinguished from that of his brother al-Radī. 86 There is some controversy over the *Nahj al-Balāgha*, it may have been compiled by both brothers, according to Ibn Khallīkān. 87 There are about fifteen extant works of al-Murtaḍā noted by Brockelmann which have been published and edited by many subsequent scholars. 88

The relations which had already been established between al-Radī and the caliph al-Qādir were maintained by al-Murtadā. His position as 'Alid naqīb and deputy naqīb under his father al-Mūsawī brought him into close contact with the caliph. Twice he was present among the dignitaries who met the Buwayhid amīrs arriving at Baghdād, namely Musharrif al-Dawla in 414/1023 and Jalāl al-Dawla in 418/1027.89 He also came to the caliph's palace when the latter issued a manifesto defaming the Fāṭimids in 402/1011.90 Following an incident at the Barāthā mosque, when a Sunnite preacher was injured by Shī'ite worshippers in 420/1029, al-Murtadā, together with other dignitaries, was summoned by the caliph to his palace to write a letter of protest to the court of the

<sup>85</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 47.

<sup>86</sup> Brockelmann, "Al-Sharif al-Murtada"," in E. I., new ed., vol. 8, 634.

<sup>87</sup> Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-A'yan, vol, 3, 313.

<sup>88</sup> Brockelmann, "Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā," in E.I., new ed., vol. 8, 634.

<sup>89</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol.8, 12, 30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Ibid., vol. 7, 255.

Buwayhid amīr (Jalāl al-Dawla). Al-Murtadā along with the leading personalities of the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites of al-Karkh came to see al-Qādir during Dhū al-Ḥijja the same year, requesting forgiveness from the caliph for the incident at the Barāthā mosque, and asking him to have the *khuṭba* (Friday prayer) resumed, as it had been dropped in the wake of the incident. 92

Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Raḍī and al-Murtaḍā were among the Shī tie leaders during the reign of al-Qādir whose works contributed to strengthening and defending the faith of the Shī tie community, spreading their propaganda, and whose speeches to some extent encouraged the Shī ties to participate in controversial debates and physical clashes with the Sunnites. They also became rallying points for the Shī ties of Baghdād. The relationship between the caliph al-Qādir and the two *sharīfs* was in general good. Even though the Sunnites and Shī tie masses were often involved in clashes, al-Qādir seems to have maintained a good relationship with both *sharīfs* and imāms, al-Raḍī and al-Murtaḍā. His attitude may have resulted from two factors: first, his respect for the Alid family; second, his attemptto avoid a conflict with the Buwayhid *amīrs* whose devotion to the imāms was unquestionable. However, there was a temporary breach between the caliph and al-Raḍī when the latter refused to sign his name on the above mentioned document defaming the Fāṭimids.

## B. The Hanbalite movement

The Ḥanbalites were the most active school of law in Baghdād. They were in opposition to the Shī tes as well as to the theologians and philosophers, in short, to sectarianism and innovation of every type. They were numerically superior in Baghdād to other religious groups and their influence was felt by all. Being superior to other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Ibid., vol. 8, 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>93</sup> Kraemer, Humanism, 60.

schools of law in number, the Hanbalites were most critical of any vice committed by the people of Baghdād and did not hesitate to take action against it.

Against the Shī tite preference for Alī, the Ḥanbalites upheld the superiority of the first three caliphs. They opposed the Mu tazilite doctrine of the created Qur an with their own tenet of its uncreatedness. Both the Shī tites and the Ḥanbalites were well-organized and strongly motivated. The backbone of the latter's support came from the urban masses, often called *āmma* in the chronicles among which the Ḥanbalites are specifically mentioned. The Ḥanbalites were the only Sunnite school who constituted a juridical-theological and social movement. During the Buwayhid period they played the role of "a politico-religious opposition party." 94

Before we discuss the Hanbalite movement during the reign of al-Qādir, it is necessary to trace back a little further in order to be able to see the roots of the movement. For this purpose we need to present some figures who played a very important role in the Hanbalite movement or those who opposed the Shī ties before the Buwayhid ascendancy. One of the most important personalities was al-Barbahārī (d. 329/941), traditionist and jurisconsult and disciple of Abū Bakr al-Marwadhī (d. 275/888) and Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 283/896), the founder of the Sālimiyya school. He

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.; Makdisi, Ibn 'Aqīl', 325.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> He was Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī b. Khalaf, a leading Ḥanbalite jurist of his time, the most active against the supporters of innovation by word and deed. He was highly respected by the caliph. He was the contemporary of many companions of Imām Ahmad, including al-Marwadhī and Sahl al-Tustarī. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol. 2, 18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> He was Aḥmad b. al-Ḥajjāj b. 'Abd al-'Azīz. His mother came from Marv (Marwadh) and his father came from Khwārazm. He was a leading jurist, traditionist and author of many works. He was the most respected and closest friend of Imām Aḥmad for his piety and merit. The latter used to be in his company and when the Imam died, al-Marwadhī closed his eyes and washed his body. He related many hadīths on the authority of Imām Aḥmad and related masā'il from the latter. He died in 275/888. Ibn Abī Ya'lā, Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol.1, 56-63; Ibn al-'Imād, Shadharāt al-Dhahab, vol. 2, 166.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> He was Sahl b. 'Abdillāh b. Yūnus b. 'Īsā b. 'Abdillāh b. Rāfi' and his nickname was Abū Muḥammad. He was one of the leading scholars and shaykh of Sūfism. He befriended his uncle Muḥammad b. Sawwār and met Dhū al-Nūn al-Miṣrī when he departed for pilgrimage. He made himself a chain of authority (isnād) in hadīth He died in 203/818, and others said that he died in 270/883, but according to al-Sullamī, the first date was more probable. Al-Sullamī, Tabaqāt al-Sūfiyya, 199.

was in the forefront of the Ḥanbalite preachers, who, in the fourth century of the Hegira, fought tenaciously against Shī and Mu tazilism and for the reformation of the Sunnite caliphate. 98

Al-Barbahārī was the first Ḥanbalite to set the tone of violence. His influence among the Sunnite population, especially among the lower classes, was tremendous, contributing greatly to civil unrest. From 309/921 until his death in 329/939, al-Barbahārī exploited urban convulsions and popular grievances, inciting the mob against suspected violators of religious law. His influence on the masses' hostility towards the historian and the Qur³ān commentator al-Ṭabarī, cannot be doubted; the latter was a victim of militant Ḥanbalites who charged him with Shī⁵ite leanings in regard to *kalām* (speculative theology). 99 Al-Ṭabari died in 310/922 and had to be buried secretly in the court of his own house¹00 because the Ḥanbalites prevented his burial during the day, accusing him of being a Rāfiḍite. According to Ibn Kathīr, this accusation of the Hanbalites originated with Abū Bakr Muhammad b. Dāwūd al-Zāhirī.¹01

The Ḥanbalite agitation forced the caliph al-Muqtadir to have the Barāthā mosque destroyed in 313/925 as punishment for the cursing of the Prophet's companions by its Shī tie worshippers and other acts of disloyalty to the caliph. The caliph al-Qāhir yielded to Ḥanbalite pressure by adopting an anti-Shī tie policy. When his chamberlain Alī b. Yalbak had Mu āwiya and Yazīd cursed in mosques, and then attempted to arrest al-Barbahārī, the caliphissued an order to have Ibn Yalbaq seized and executed. Al-Qāhir then followed the spirit of Ḥanbalism, banning wine, music, and slave singers. The words of al-Barbahārī helped to channel popular sentiments, and numerous popular riots

<sup>98</sup> Laoust, "Hanbalisme," 81.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>100</sup> Kraemer, *Humanism*, 61, see Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-Udabā'*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, vol. 6,423.; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 8, 98-99; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, 10, 132, 145-146.

<sup>101</sup> Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol. 11, 157.

<sup>102</sup> Kraemer, Humanism, 61; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 204; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 11, 172.

broke out in Baghdād between 309/921 and 329/940 with which his name and those of his disciples were associated.

Al-Barbahārī wrote many works, but his only surviving work was a commentary on the *Kitāb al-Sunna*, which is a famous profession of the Ḥanbalite faith and also essentially a combative work, denouncing numerous politico-religious sects whose growth was great at the dawn of the fourth century of the Hegira. He regarded those who followed these sects as infidels, including the Shī°ites. His hostility towards *kalām* led him to oppose Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash°arī (d.324/935). It is reported that the latter composed his *lbāna* after discussions with al-Barbahārī. According to Laoust, a comparative study of al-Barbahārī's creed and that of al-Ash°arī confirms such a hypothesis and helps to explain why al-Ash°arī put his creed under the patronage of Ibn Ḥanbal.<sup>103</sup>

After al-Barbahārī, another important Ḥanbalite scholar was Ibn Baṭṭā al-ʿUkbārī (d. 387/997). Born in ʿUkbāra in 304/915, he was a jurisconsult and traditionist, who wrote a number of Ḥanbalite works defending the positions of his masters. His main masters were the Ḥanbalite traditionists: Abū al-Qāsim al-Baghāwī (d.317/929), Muḥammad b. Makhlad al-ʿAṭṭār (d.331/942), Abū Bakr al-Nīsābūrī (d.317/929) and al-Barbahārī (d.329/940). Ibn Baṭṭa attended al-Barbahārī's sessions of exhortation and knew the latter's *Kitāb al-Sunna*. He was also a student of Abū Bakr al-Najjād (d. 348/959) and Abū al-Qāsim al-Khirāqī (d.334/945), from whom he was familiar with the *Mukhtaṣar*. 104

Ibn Baṭṭa did not follow in the footsteps of his two contemporaries, al-Barbahārī and Ibn Sam'ūn, in their public interventions for the sake of ordering the good and preventing evil, nor was he a brilliant preacher. He was trained in Baghdād and made several trips in search of knowledge to Mecca. He had established a friendship with Abū

104 Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibn Abī Ya<sup>c</sup>lā, *Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, vol.2, 18; Laoust, "Hanbalisme," 82.

Bakr al-Ājurī in Syria on the Byzantine border and in Baṣra. Around the age of forty, Ibn Baṭṭa returned to his birthplace and led a quite life of pious meditation, writing books on [Ḥanbalite] doctrines and teachings. It was reported that he isolated himself in his house for forty years, during which no one saw him in the market or break his fast except on the days when fasting were forbidden. Io6

His *Ibāna al-Ṣughrā*, which has come down to us in the form of an abridgement of a more copious work which was often cited and unfortunately lost, appears as a profession of popular belief and is addressed most particularly towards young people and non-Arabs. Containing no hostile tone and showing the author's energy, it is a critical work on the current situation, in which he expects to bring all those who had already gone astray in their doctrines and beliefs back to the path [sunna] of the Prophet.<sup>107</sup>

The direct influence of Ibn Baṭṭa was to be found among many Ḥanbalite doctors such as Abū Ḥafṣ al-ʿUkbarī and Abū Ḥafṣ al-Barmakī, Abū ʿAbdullāh b. Ḥāmid, Abū ʿAlī b. Shihāb and Abū Isḥāq al-Barmakī. The first two of his disciples need special mention. The friendship between Ibn Baṭṭā and his compatriots Abū Ḥafṣ al-ʿUkbarī (d. 387/997)<sup>108</sup> was so close that the latter was given the title of Ṣāḥib Ibn Baṭṭa, the friend of Ibn Baṭṭa. While Abū Ḥafṣ al-Barmakī, (d.387/997)<sup>109</sup> was a faqīh (jurist) and zāhid

<sup>105</sup> Laoust, "Hanbalisme," .92; Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, vol. 2, 144; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Muntazam*, vol. 6, 193.

<sup>106</sup> Ibn Abī Yaclā, *Tabagāt al-Ḥanābila*, vol. 2, 144.

<sup>107</sup> Laoust, "Hanbalisme," 92.

<sup>108 &#</sup>x27;Umar b. Ibrāhīm b. 'Abdillāh was called Ibn al-Muslim. He was a disciple of Abū 'Alī al-Sawwāf, Abū Bakr al-Najjād, Abū Muḥammd b. Mūsā and Abū 'Amr b. al-Sammāk and Dalaj. His birth was unknown to his biographers. Among his works were al-Muqni', Sharh al-Khirāqī, al-Khilāf bayna Ahmad wa Mālik. He travelled to Kūfa and Baṣra and many other countries and took hadīths from the the scholars of both cities (Baṣra and Kūfa). He established a friendship with many Ḥanbalite jurists such as 'Umar b. Badrān al-Maghāzalī, Abū Bakr b. 'Abd al-'Azīz, Abū Ishāq b. Shāqila, but most of his time was spent with Ibn Baṭṭa. Ibn Abī Ya'lā, Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol. 2,163-166.

<sup>109</sup> He was 'Umar b. Ahmad b. Ibrāhīm, one of the leading jurists and ascetics who gave a lot of fatwās and wrote many works, including al-Majmū' and a commentary on al-Kausaj. He heard hadīth from Ibn al-Sawwāf, al-Khaṭabī, Ibn Mālik and many others. He was a contemporary of 'Umar b. Badr al-Mughāzalī, Abū 'Alī al-Najjād and Abū

(ascetic) in Baghdād, he wrote abundant doctrinal works; his *fatwā* was an authoritative work which was often cited by the school of Ibn Taymiyya, in particular by Ibn al-Qayyim in his *Kitāb al-Fatwā* (*The Book of Formal Legal Opinion*). 110

The great name, however, which dominated the history of Ḥanbalism in Baghdād during the first half century of the Buwayhid supremacy was Ibn Ḥāmid (d. 403/1012),<sup>111</sup> who is said to have won the love of the caliph al-Qādir and whose works were constantly cited by later authors. He was above all a teacher and *muftī*, who died in 403/1012 after he had returned from performing the pilgrimage to Mecca. Many of his teachers were Ḥanbalites of Baghdād: e.g., Abū Bakr al-Najjād (d.348/595), Abū ʿAlī al-Ṣawwāf (d.359/969) and Abū Bakr al-Qaṭīʿī (d.368/978).<sup>112</sup>

Ibn Ḥāmid's most famous work is *Kitāb al-Jāmi' fī ikhtilāf al-fuqahā'* on the divergences of opinions between the scholars of law. The work, judging from the remark of the *qāqī* Abū Ḥusayn [b. Abī Ya'lā, the author of the *Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*], seems to have been both a work of history and doctrine: it is historical in the sense that Ibn Ḥāmid reported the divergences which divided the *fuqahā'* on different problems; and doctrinal in the sense that he tried to show how he was ready to resolve the different interpretations of Ibn Ḥanbal's views. Through analogy with Shāfi'sism, Ibn Ḥāmid distinguished between the ancient doctrine of Ibn Ḥanbal (*qadīm*, 'atīq) reported by his son Ṣāliḥ, and the new one (*jadīd*) transmitted by another son Shaykh 'Abdullāh. He maintained that the new doctrine should not necessarily be considered a good one, but in

Bakr 'Abd al-Azīz. His date of birth is unknown, but he died in 387/997. Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, vol. 2, 153-155).

<sup>110</sup> Laoust, "Hanbalisme," 93.

<sup>111</sup> Al-Ḥasan b. Ḥāmid b. ʿAlī b. Marwān, Abū Abdillāh was the leading teacher of many Ḥanbalite scholars and the most learned jurist of the time. It is reported that Ibn Ḥāmid held a debate session with Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī on the obligation of fasting on a cloudy night [when Muslims failed to see the moon] in the palace of the caliph al-Qādir in which the caliph listened to him and granted him gifts, but he only took what he needed. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol. 2, 171-177; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 263-264.

<sup>112</sup> Laoust, "Hanbalisme," 93.

the name of the Qur'an and the Sunna, it was important for him to make a division between these two doctrines.<sup>113</sup>

The Kitāb al-Jāmi fī ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā, which became an essential text of the school, was not the only work of Ibn Ḥāmid. His biographers attributed to him a commentary on the Mukhtasar of al-Khirāqī and two dogmatic treatises which were also often cited: Kitāb Uṣūl al-Dīn and Kitāb Uṣūl al-Fiqh. 114

Hanbalites coming from Baghdād or at least attracting them to the great 'Abbāsid metropolis with the fame of his knowledge. One of them was Abū Bakr al Rushnānī (d.401/1010)<sup>115</sup>, who also followed the teaching of Ibn Baṭṭa. But the disciple par excellence of Ibn Ḥāmid, whom he designated as his successor on the eve of his departure for Mecca in 402/1011, was the qāḍī Abū Yaʿtā b. al-Farrāʾ (d.458/1063), whose personality was to dominate the history of Ḥanbalism during the next half-century. Habāba al-Qāsim b. Ḥabāba, 'Abdullāh b. Aḥmad b. Mālik al-Bayʿ, 'Alī b. Maʿrūf al-Bazzāz, 'Alī b. 'Umar al-Ḥarbī and many Ḥanbalite traditionists, 117 but above all he was a student of Ibn Ḥāmid. To the latter's knowledge of the doctrine of the school and the divergences of its doctors (madhhab wa khilāt), Abū Yaʿtā al-Farrāʾ added knowledge of Hadīth, the essential subject of all Hanbalite education. 118

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> He was Aḥmad b. Mūsā b. 'Abdillāh b. Ishāq and was also called al-Rushnānī. He came from Miṣrāthā, a village near Kalwadhā. His teachers were Abū Bakr b. Mālik al-Qāṭi'ī, Abū Muḥammad b. Māsī, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Mufīd. Al-Khāṭib who wrote his biography in his village, desciribed him as pious, meritious, devout and ascetic (zāhið). He never went out from his house, which was next to the mosque, except for the congregational prayer. He was a friended of Ibn Baṭṭa, Ibn Ḥāmid and many other leading Ḥanbalite scholars. He wrote al-Mukhtaṣar tì Uṣūl al-Dīn min Kitāb Abī 'Abdillāh b. Ḥāmid He died in Miṣrāthā in 401/1010. Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol. 2, 179-180).

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, vol. 2, 256; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 243.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Ibid., 97.

Abū Yaʿlā was the most celebrated and distinguished Ḥanbalite scholar of his time, namely during the reigns of al-Qādir and his successor, al-Qāʾim, and he established good relationships with both caliphs. <sup>119</sup> He was a leading jurist whose works on the Hanbalite school were abundant and his students and friends among the Ḥanbalite school were wide-spread. <sup>120</sup>Upon his return from pilgrimage in 415/1024, he started a long career in teaching. In 422/1030 at the request of the *sharīf* Abū ʿAlī al-Hāshimī (d.428/1036), <sup>121</sup> Abū Yaʿlā accepted the appointment of legal witness (notary) to the Shāfiʿite *qāḍī* Ibn Mākūlā (d.447/1055) and Abū ʿAbdillāh al-Damaghānī (d. 478/1085). He was present at the solemn reading of the Qādiriyya in 433/1041 with the shaykh Ḥasan al-Qazwīnī (d. 442/1050), and the new creed, in 445/1053. In 447/1055, following the death of Ibn Mākūlā, he was appointed *qāḍī* in Baghdād although with some reservations and stipulations. He taught Ḥadīth in the mosque of al-Manṣūr and his teaching activity continued in parallel with his court activities. <sup>122</sup>

Most of the works of the qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā are lost. 123 Two of his surviving works are Kitāb al-Muʿtamad and al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya; 124 the former, according

<sup>119</sup> Ibn Abī Yaclā, Tabaqāt al-Hanābila, vol. 2, 193.

<sup>120</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 244.

<sup>121</sup> His name was Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Mūsā. Born in 345/956, Abū 'Alī established good relationship with both caliphs, al-Qādir and al-Qā'im, and was highly respected by both. He became a disciple of many Ḥanbalite teachers, among others was Abū Aḥmad b. al-Muzaffar. He held his sessions in the mosque of al-Manṣūr. His friends were many Ḥanbalite shaykhs, in particular Abū al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī. His works were al-Irshād tī al-Madhhab and a commentary on al-Khirāqī's Mukhtaṣar. Ibn Abī Ya'lā, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol. 2, 182-186.

<sup>122</sup> Laoust, "Hanbalisme," 97.

<sup>123</sup> Ibn Abī Ya<sup>°</sup>lā mentions more than fifty works attributed to his father on various subjects, but only two have survived: *Kitab al-Mu<sup>°</sup>tamad* and *al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya*, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, vol. 2, 205.

<sup>124</sup> There is still a controversy over which one appeared first as the possibility of plagiarism made by either author since the contents of both works indicate many similarities. Some scholars who discuss al-Māwardī's al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyya, such as Laoust, Cahen, John Mikhael and Qomaruddin Khan, claim that Abū Ya'lā copied al-Māwardī's work. This is based on the consideration that since Abū Ya'lā was younger than al-Māwardī, the former must have copied the latter's work, not otherwise. Prof. Donald P. Little however, rejects their views and maintains that since "the difference in age" of both authors is not great, it is not impossible that al-Māwardī (sixty-years old) copied from the work of Abū Ya'lā (fourty-four years old). And despite the fact that Abū Ya'lā was younger than al-Māwardī, Prof. Little suggests that Abū Ya'lā (Ibn al-Farrā') may have written the Ahkām first. Both works also reveal some differences in

to Laoust, was more famous than the latter. As indicated by the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  Abū al-Ḥusayn and a number of references found in later authors, Abū Yaʿlā's works were quite considerable in number. The *Muʿtamad* tries to clarify and defend Ḥanbalite doctrine in regards to the contemporary schools, namely, the Muʿtazilite, Ashʿarite, Karrāmiyya, Bāṭiniyya, Rawāfiḍ and Sālimiyya. His most frequently cited works are his commentary on the *Mukhtaṣar* of al-Khirāqī, his *Kitāb al-Mujarrad* on the methodology of law, his *Kitāb al-Ikhtilāf al-Kabīr* on the doctrinal divergences among *fuqahā* '(jurists) and his *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, which is the only abridgment of them which has survived. The last mentioned work was constructed on the model of a treatise of *kalām* and deals with the doctrine of the caliphate and can be contrasted with the works of Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) in his *al-ʿAqīda al-Nizāmiyya* or al-Ghazālī in *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Itiqād*, which deals with the same problem. 125

The qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā knew the work of Ibn Baṭṭā and was inspired by it. Therefore, like the latter, he also led a vigorous campaign against the progress of kalām. He had many great Ḥanbalite disciples who became well-known during the second half of the fifth century of the Hegira and who were all unrelenting adversaries of Ashʿarism: the Sharīf Abū Jaʿfar (d.470/1077), 126 Abū al-Faraj al-Shīrāzī (d.486/1093) who spread

methodology and substance as the opening chapters of both works demonstrate. Ibn al-Farrā', according to Prof. Little, "gives a relatively straight forward presentation of the Ḥanbalī stand on the issues arising from the selection of the imām." His aim was to provide a manual of Ḥanbalī laws based mainly on the dictates of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and on other reliable sources. On the other hand, al-Māwardī does not rely on debatable views of a single school, but he often puts forwards several different views. Al-Māwardī "often has recourse to the historical precedent of the Rāshidīn, Umayyad and 'Abbāsid caliphates, even at times to poerty when it contains an appropriate sentiment, and often to common sense and expediency." In addition, al-Māwardī places more emphasis than Ibn al-Farrā' on rational faculty. In regards to the content of the works, Prof. Little also reveals that they do not agree on all issues. Donald P. Little, "A New look at al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya," *The Muslim World* vol. 64 (January 1974): 1-15. As for some similarities in the contents of both works, they may be due to the fact that the Sunnites, whether Ḥanbalites or Shāfi'ites, share many of the same views on the Sunnī caliphate or Imāmate.

<sup>125</sup> Laoust," Hanbalisme," 98.

<sup>126</sup> He was 'Abd al-Khāliq b. 'Īsā b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. 'Īsā b. Aḥmad. His ancestor was traced back to al-'Abbās b. 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib. Born in 414/1023, he was a student of several Ḥanbalite scholars, among whom was Abū Ya'lā b. al-Farrā'. It is said that when the caliph al-Qā'im was dying, he asked Abū Ja'far to wash his body and he

Hanbalism in Palestine and Syria, Abū al-Khaṭṭāb al-Kalwadāmī (d.510/1116) and Ibn 'Aqīl (d.513/1119). 127

Like the *Kitāb al-Sunna* of al-Barbahārī and the *Ibāna* of Ibn Baṭṭā, the *Muʿtamad* also constitutes a strenuous work denouncing various sects which had already been condemned by his great precursors and to whom the *qāḍī* devoted particular refutations. Among the sects which appeared to be most dangerous during his time were the following: the Rāfiḍite theory of the caliphate and its principal thesis are denounced; the Muʿtazilite theodicy, eschatology and morals are criticized; the Karrāmiyya he associates with the Murji a; against the Sālimiyya he enumerates its suspected positions; finally, the Ash arites he criticizes at length in his explanation of the Sunnite creed, its theodicy, morales and politics. 128

The Mu tamad 129 gives special attention to the doctrine of politics, and on the whole, it is constructed around the theory of the caliphate, and explains a profound sentiment for caliphal legitimism, as is to be expected of a Hanbalite theologian who devoted all his life to the service of the 'Abbāsids. In the doctrine of the caliphate the qāḍī Abū Ya'lā often cites 'Abdūs b. Mālik al-'Atṭār, 130 a reporter of the masā'il (issues), who spent his life in studying the political ideas of Ibn Hanbal, and also those of Ibn Baṭṭa, especially the latter's work, the Ibāna al-Kubrā. Abū Ya'lā maintains the necessity of the caliphate, not only based on ijmā' (consensus) but also on the texts (naṣṣ of the Qur'ān) and Ḥadīth entrusting this charge to the Qurayshites. Together with Ibn Baṭṭa, he based his theory on the ijmā' of the Companions, the legitimacy of the

did, but he rejected the gifts of the caliph's family. Abū Ja far died in 470/1077. Ibn Abī Ya lā, Tabaqāt al-Hanābila vol. 2, 237-241; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 126-127.

<sup>127</sup> Laoust, Sharh al-Ibāna, c.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> Ibid., ci.

<sup>129</sup> The Mu'tamad is possibly Abū Ya'lā's basic work on the theory of the caliphate, which he develops and elaborates later in his Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya.

<sup>130</sup> Ibn Abī Ya'lā mentions this name and describes his doctrines in some detail, but surprisingly, he does not mention when 'Abdus b. Mālik al-Aṭṭār was born and when he died. Probably he was a contemporary of Ibn Hanbal or one of his disciples. Tabaqāt al-Hanābila, vol. 2, 241-246.

caliphate of the Rāshidūn (rightly guided caliphs), but he was more reserved in placing 'Alī in the hierarchy of merits (taldīl). 131

He argues in principle that the designation of the caliph should be based on the free choice of the doctors of the law (ahlal-hall wa al-'aqd'), but he also recognizes the caliph's right to designate his successor, even among his close relatives, under certain restricted conditions. And the thesis which is defended in the Mu'tamad' appears to confirm this. The theory of the bay'a, the oath of allegiance given to each designated caliph is natural to justify the existence of the caliph, and the amīr or sultān, on condition that the latter was a loyal associate. But the vigilance of the doctors of the Law and their supreme right to arbitrate do not lessen their necessity to ordering good. This al-amr bi al-ma'rūf is incumbent upon them in a particular way, while the masses are obliged to follow the definition of the creed. 132

Some of the Ḥanbalites doctors, who were close to the  $q\bar{a}q\bar{t}$  Abū Yaʿlā and lived in Baghdād, were men of the first generation (of the Ḥanbalite scholars) between 403/1012 and 458/1065. Abū ʿAlī al-ʿUkbārī (d. 428/1036), a disciple of Ibn Baṭṭa, was a philologist, author and jurist who was very hostile towards Shīʿism. Abū ʿAlī al-Hāshimī (d. 428/1036) was the author of a profession of faith, part of which has come down to us. Abū Ṭālib al-Baqqāl (d. 440/1048),<sup>133</sup> a disciple of Ibn Ḥāmid, taught at the mosque of al-Mansūr. Abū al-Tamīmī (d.444/1052)<sup>134</sup> belonged to a family who

<sup>131</sup> Laoust, Sharh al-Ibāna, ciii.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., civ.

<sup>133</sup> His name was Aḥmad b. 'Abdullāh b. Sahl and was called Ibn al-Baqqāl. He was a disciple of Abū al-'Abbās b. 'Abdullāh b. Mūsā al-Hāshimī (Abū Ja'far), Abū Bakr b. Shādhān and many others. His teacher on jurisprudence was Abū 'Abdillāh b. Hāmid (Ibn Hāmid). He held his sessions in the mosque of al-Manṣūr and at the palace of the caliph. His famous remark he mentioned in the dīwān of the caliph under the vizier Ḥājib al-Nu'mān, was that the caliphate was a tent and the Ḥanbalites were its ropes. If the ropes were cut off, the tent would fall down. Ibn al-'Imād, Shadharāt al-Dhahab, vol.4, 264-265.

<sup>134</sup> He was al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. Wahb b. Shiblī Qurra and was called Ibn al-Madhhab. He was born in 355/965. He was a disciple of Abū Bakr b. Mālik al-Qāṭi'ī, Abū Muḥammad b. Māsī, Ibn Shāhin, al-Dāruquṭnī and many others. He was a transmitter of the Musnād of Ibn Ḥanbal. He died in 444/1052. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 155; Ibn al-Imad, Shadharāt al-Dhahab, vol. 4, 271.

contributed to Hanbalism many renowned theologians. Abū 'Alī al-Kattānī (d.453/1063)<sup>135</sup> taught for fifty years in the Umayyad mosque in Damasqus. 136

Like many other Muslim scholars, the *qādī* Abū Ya°lā founded a long dynasty of savants and theologians. Among his three sons, the first Abū al-Qāsim, died in Baghdād in 469/1076 during the *fitna* of Ibn al-Qushayrī. The second, Abū al-Ḥusayn (d. 526/1131) was the author of the *Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*; the third son Abū Khāzim (d. 527/1132) was a respected jurisconsult, whose son was as well-known as the young Abū Ya°lā (d. 560/1164) and was an equally respected author, but these persons belonged to a later period of this school.<sup>137</sup>

The half-century which followed the death of Ibn Hāmid in 403/1012 marked a long period of Sunnite restoration to which Hanbalism made a considerable contribution. In 408/1017 an exceptionally grievous incident occurred between the Sunnites and Shīʿites. A solemn lecture was given in this year at the caliph's palace involving a profession of the Hanbalite creed, and it was violently hostile towards Muʿtazilism and Shīʿism. This "Qādiriyya creed" was brought by numerous pilgrims to the provinces. The death of the caliph al-Hākim in 411/1020 marked the beginning of the Fāṭimid decline. Fāṭimid authority was soon contested in Palestine and in Syria. In the following years, Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin (d.421/1030) continued his conquests in India and the support he gave to the Karrāmiyya was accompanied by vigorous hostility towards Muʿtazilism and Shīʿism. The caliph al-Qādir in 420/1029 took measures to crush the

<sup>135</sup> His complete name was Abū 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Mubashshir al-Kattānī al-Dimashqī al-Muqrī, the Qur'ānic reciter. He learnt hadīth through the Kitāb al-Ma'ānī of Ibn al-Nuhās, and al-Nāsikh wa al-Mansūkh of the same author. He related hadīth also from Ibn Sarī al-'Aṭṭār and from Ibn Abī al-Zamzam al-Farāiḍī and from his teacher, al-Iskāfī al - Muqrī and others. He died in 453/1063 at the age of ninety. Ibn al-Farrā' Tabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol. 2, 193.

<sup>136</sup> Laoust," Hanbalisme," 98.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 287.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 287.

Mu<sup>°</sup>tazila and the Rāfiḍa (Shī<sup>°</sup>ite extremists), in particular in Baṣra, where he dismissed Shī<sup>°</sup>ite preachers. <sup>140</sup>

Sunnite opposition to the Shīcite movement did not occur except after the rise of the Ḥanbalite school, which constitutes a religious movement capable of facing the Shīcites on socio-religious grounds. However, the historical sources do not note all the details which are needed to make a deeper study of the Sunnite movement; but it does seems possible for us to see the outlines. 141

The Hanbalite movement had a flexible organization and tactics as a result of the general character of its goals. These goals were popular with the public, especially with the traditionists in general and the members of different legal schools, who did not adhere to Mu'tazilism or Ash'arism. Likewise, in their opposition to moral vices, such as prostitution, alcohol, music and dance, this movement won sympathy and even assistance from all good Muslims, and its anti-Shī'ite policy earned the sympathies of the Sunnites in general. Its attraction for the scholars who had traditionalist tendencies resulted from its struggle against the Mu'tazilites, the Ash'arites and the anthropomorphists. 143

Although there had been fights as a result of Shī te practices, especially their festivities, according to Makdisi, it was not through rioting that the Sunnites sought a solution for their problems. They seem to have understood the socio-psychological value of these Shī te ceremonies. Therefore, in 389/998, the Sunnites inaugurated two commemorative ceremonies corresponding to those of the Shī tes. In reaction to the Shī te 'Āshūrā', they devised the visit to the tomb of Mus ab b. Zubayr, ziyārat Zubayr, which was fixed on Muḥarram 18th, eight days after the ceremonies of the Shī tes. This day, according to their belief, was the day when Mus ab b. Zubayr was killed. The tomb

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 95; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 20.

<sup>141</sup> Makdisi, *Iba Aqi1*, 317.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> Ibid., 317.

of Mus<sup>c</sup>ab was at Maskin, to the north of the western side of Baghdād, a little farther from Qutrabbul. It was visited during great festivities, in the same way the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites visited the tomb of al-Ḥusayn. <sup>144</sup>

In response to the Shī'ite ceremony of Yaum Ghadīr Khumm, the Sunnites invented the Day of the Cave, Yaum al-Ghār, commemorating the day when the Prophet took refuge in a cave accompanied by Abū Bakr, the first caliph. They chose the date of 26 Dhū al-Ḥijja, just eight days after the Shī'ite feast. Again, the celebration took place in a great ceremony similar to that of the Shī'ites. 145

According to Ibn Kathīr, the Sunnite celebration of the Day of the Cave was based on ignorance because it actually occurred during the first week of Rabī<sup>c</sup> al-Awwal of the Hegira. The Prophet and Abū Bakr stayed in the cave for three days, and when they came out and proceeded to Madīna, they entered it after eight days or more. Their entry to Madīna occurred on 13 Rabī<sup>c</sup> al-Awwal, a date which had already been commonly accepted. Therefore, the Sunnite celebration of the death of Mus<sup>c</sup> ab b. Zubayr on 18 Muḥarram was an example of countering *bid*<sup>c</sup> a with *bid*<sup>c</sup> a. *Bid*<sup>c</sup> a, according to Ibn Kathīr, cannot be challenged with *bid*<sup>c</sup> a, but only with sound Sunna. <sup>146</sup>

Regardless of the inaccuracy of the dates of both ceremonies, this Sunnite solution was effective. They now had their own commemorative ceremonies which provided psychological support. Later chroniclers mention the celebration of these ceremonies by Sunnites and Shī<sup>c</sup>ites.<sup>147</sup> However, according to Makdisi, it would be a great mistake to consider these historical facts as being simply a result of historical curiosity and these riots as having no significance on the political and cultural life of the period. He believes that there must be some figures (perhaps the leading Hanbalite

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 315; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 206.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> Ibid., 316.

<sup>146</sup> Ibn Kathir, al-Bidāya, vol. 9, 349.

<sup>147</sup> Makdisi, Ibn 'Aqil', 316.

scholars) who understood the environment of Baghdād. <sup>148</sup>To institute a commemorative ceremony and to have it taken up by the people, it needed, above all, believers and an organization to direct it. It is this phenomenon that enables us to see the background to the fights of this period between the Shī ties and the Sunnites. The riots in Baghdād in the fourth/tenth century originated with the Ḥanbalite and Shī tie movements. <sup>149</sup>

The ideology of the movement revolved around the politico-religious creed of the Hanbalites, the 'aqīda 150 Written in a clear and succinct way, the 'aqīda explains the aims, values, ideas and obligations that its members had to fulfill and the sanctions that were to be applied against those who failed to fulfill them. In this sense, the 'aqīda was the fundamental law of the movement, the source from which the movement drew its purpose, its doctrines, its means of action and its disciplinary principles. This movement was also described as necessary for the support of the government. The proof of this was the adoption of this 'aqīda by the two caliphs, al-Qādir and al-Qā'im, and also the periodical campaigns for moral reform carried out in Baghdād. 152

The constitutive elements of the movement were different from its goals, which were more general. The Hanbalite school was the core of the movement. Around this core were grouped other elements of the population of Baghdād: ascetics, traditionists, jurists, Hāshimite sharīfs and masses of disinherited Baghdādīs, among whom were para-military elements necessary for implementing the program of the movement. The para-military elements were represented by the 'ayyārūn', who were organized along military lines. They recruited young men who were interested in material gain and they were the cause of many riots and fires and much looting in Baghdād. Having been

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> The Hanbalite 'aqīda was first formulated by Ibn Hanbal in his Kitāb al-Sunna, and then in the Kitāb al-Radd 'alā al-Jahmiyya wa al-Zanādiqa. This original 'aqīda of Ibn Hanbal has been elaborated by several Hanbalite scholars, including his disciples. Laoust reveals six version of the 'aqīda in the Tabaqāt al-Hanābila of Ibn Abī Ya'lā al-Farrā'. Laoust, Le premier profession de foi Hanbalite, 12-13.

<sup>151</sup> Makdisi, Ibn 'Aqil', 317.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> Ibid.,318.

organized along military lines, they represented a source of power, and could be roused easily to violently political contest and religious issues. The 'Alid 'ayyārūn were involved in commemorative ceremonies; while the Hāshimite 'ayyārūn played a similar role in the staging of Sunnite commemorative ceremonies. 153

The Ḥanbalites were present in several localities, including Ḥarrān, Mawṣil, Herāt, Damascus, as well as Baghdād. The main centre was in Baghdād, and Ḥanbalite leaders outside this city sought inspiration and organizational ideas from there. The most important persons were the jurisconsults. The solidarity among the different elements of the movement was a result of different interests for each group found in the movement: for the faithful, scholars and the common people, it was the development of their creed; for the poor and the disinherited among the masses, it was a chance for loot gained during riots; for all it was to share the heroism of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and the other great leaders who succeeded him. <sup>154</sup>

# C. The Sunnite-Shī tite conflicts and al-Qādir's interference in them

After discussing the Hanbalite and Shī te movements, it is necessary to note here the conflicts between them. The existence of these opposing movements, no doubt, resulted in many conflicts which, in turn, had repercussions on social and political life in Baghdād. On the social level, the conflicts often caused material and human losses. For example, as we will see, people fought each other and burnt the houses and markets of their adversaries. On a political level, the conflicts quite often involved the authorities, whether the caliph or sultān, and these conflicts were used by them to assert their authority or change the balance of power. Moreover, these communal riots weakened the central administration, be it the caliphate or sultanate. The conflicts between the Sunnites

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

and the Shi ties occurred almost from the moment the Buwayhids entered Baghdad until the end of their reign.

According to Laoust, the years between the ascension of the caliph al-Qādir in 381/991 and the death of the sultān Malikshāh in 485/1092 can be considered a "transition period" in regard to the religious as well as the political institutions of the Islamic world. 155 The numerous agitations which shook Baghdad were much more than simple local incidents which involved violent popular confrontations and quarrels among theologians and preachers. These communal riots were in reality due not only to the conflicts between the Sunnites and Shīcites, but also were the product of some of the problems which faced the formulation of Sunnism or those who questioned the nature of its power. 156

It was the Hanbalites which represented the Sunnites in Baghdad in the conflict between the two sects. Among the Sunnite legal schools, it was only the Hanbalite school which really constituted a socio-religious movement. In contrast to the other Sunnite schools, the Hanbalites constituted the only school which possessed qualities which corresponded to those of the Shī ite movement. In the conflict against Shī ism, the Hanbalites did not hesitate to make use of all of the potential of Sunnism. When Sunnism did not have any means to respond to some Shī ite tactics, the Ḥanbalite school developed such means. The correspondence between the Shītite commemorative ceremonies of 'Āshūrā' and of Ghadīr (Khumm), and the "new" Sunnite celebration of the Ziyārat Mus'ab and the Day of Ghār has already been noted. 157

The conflict between the Sunnites and the Shī tes dated to the first civil war, following the murder of 'Uthmān. It continued during the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn, who launched the inquisition (milma), which subjected Ahmad b. Hanbal to humiliation and

<sup>155</sup> Laoust, "Les agitations religieuses à Baghdad aux IVe et Ve siècles de l'Hégire," in D.S. Richards ed., Islamic Civilization, 169.

156 Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

raised Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism and Shī<sup>c</sup>ism to supremacy. During this time the caliph al-Ma<sup>2</sup>mūn proclaimed the doctrine of the creation of the Qur<sup>2</sup>ān and declared publicly the superiority of <sup>c</sup>Alī to Abū Bakr and <sup>c</sup>Umar, ideas which are cherished by the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites. In general, it might be said that the opposition of the Sunnites to the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites was a political question involving the caliphate, connected to the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites, over the question of the creation of the Qur<sup>2</sup>ān. At the head of the Sunnites there were always the Ḥanbalites, tireless defenders of the political principles of the caliphate against Shī<sup>c</sup>ism and the uncreated Qur<sup>2</sup>ān against Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism.<sup>158</sup>

The political question of the caliphate and the religious question of the createdness of the Qur'ān involved very particularly the Ḥanbalites. In the first half of the fourth /tenth century (in 321/933) there was an anti-Ḥanbalite action launched by the amīr 'Alī b. Yalbak, who had the caliph Mu'āwiya condemned from the pulpit. At the same time, he ordered the arrest of the great Ḥanbalite al-Barbahārī. 159

The ascendancy of Shī'ism increased during the fourth/tenth century, but afterward, it declined. We are not able to attribute this reversal to the Seljuqs, who had not yet come on the scene, although this is sometimes done. It would be more correct to credit it to the influence of the Ghaznavids. However, the primary interest of the military commanders was in obtaining and maintaining power, and it was the caliphs who had to maintain an equilibrium of power between the amīrs, while the 'vlamā' dealt with religious concerns. And in Baghdād, it was the Ḥanbalite movement, guided by the 'vlamā', who led the battles against Shī'ism, Mu'tazilism and Ash'arism; all these movements were condemned in epistles and by the profession of the Qādirite creed, as will be discussed later. 160

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> Ibid., 327.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid.

As early as the year 351/962 an inscription was placed on the walls of the mosques of Baghdād, cursing Mu°āwiya b. Abī Sufyān, those who had confiscated Fāṭima's estate at Fadak, those who had excluded 'Abbās from the committee of consultation, those who had exiled Abū Dharr al-Ghiffārī and those who prevented the burial of al-Ḥusayn next to his grandfather. After complaints from the Sunnites, the inscription was changed to a curse on those who made injustice to the family of the Messenger, and none were cursed except for Mu°āwiya. This was the first sign of an open Shī°ite challenge, initiated by the Buwayhids, against the Sunnites, which would trigger clashes between both communities in the future.

The chroniclers recorded about fourteen clashes involving Sunnites and Shī<sup>c</sup>ites during the reign of al-Qādir. We will only mentions the most serious ones which involved the caliph's intervention. In 381/991 as soon as al-Qādir became caliph, clashes between the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites and Sunnites broke out during the celebration of Ghadīr Khumm. Many people were killed and the Sunnites of Bāb al-Baṣra overwhelmed the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites and burnt the standard of the sultān. Many people who were accused of involvement in the riot were killed before order was restored. 164

The invention of Sunnite ceremonies in reaction to those of the Shī ites heightened the already tense situation between the two communities. The popular agitation which resulted from the Shī ite and Sunnite ceremonies led in 392/1002 to armed confrontation in the streets of the capital between the ayyaran of both parties. As a result, all public celebrations were banned the following year. And Bahā al-Dawla, to establish peace, sent his deputy Amīd al-Juyūsh to Trāq to carry out an energetic campaign of repression against brigandage in Baghdād. He persecuted equally both the Alid and Abbāsid ayyārān as well as the rebellious Turkish troops; the Shī ite jurist

<sup>161</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 7; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 11, 256.

<sup>162</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 8, 542.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 164; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 11, 330.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 91.

Ibn al-Mu<sup>\*</sup>allim was banished from the city. We are not quite sure who actually issued the order of exile, al-Qādir or 'Amīd al-Juyūsh, because Ibn al-Jawzī only states that a Shī 'ite *faqīh* (jurist) was exiled. It is quite possible, however, that the caliph with his powerful role in religious affairs, issued the order. 'Amid al-Juyūsh's initiative was also possible since his concern was the peace and security of Baghdād.

Another serious conflict between the Shī ties and the Sunnites occurred in Rajab 398/1007. This was the affair of the recension of the Qur and, the *mushaf* of Ibn Mas tid. It started when some of the Hāshimites from Bāb al-Baṣra (a Sunnite stronghold) proceeded towards Ibn al-Mu allim in his mosque in Riyāh street, where a controversial meeting with him was being held. The meeting led to a riot between the Sunnites and the Shī ties. They called upon the people of al-Karkh and marched on the house of the Shāfī tie qādī Abū Muḥammad al-Akfānī and the shaykh Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī, blaming them and other Sunnite jurists (fuqahā ). Violence could not be avoided between the Sunnites and the Shī ties. The latter then presented a mushaf of Ibn Mas tid, which was believed to be different from that of the Sunnites (the mushaf of Uthmān). A committee of Sunnite jurisconsults under the leadership of the Shāfī tie Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī condemned the recension and had it burnt in front of them. 166

The tension became more serious when a Shī tie was murdered on the orders of the caliph. The man was reported to have cursed those who had burnt the *muṣḥaf* when he visited the tomb of al-Ḥusayn in al-Ḥā ir during Sha bān. The people of al-Karkh who knew that the victim was a Shī te took revenge and attacked the Sunnites. Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī had to hide to escape from the Shī te aḥdāth (militia) During this riot they shouted the name of the Fāṭimid caliph, al-Ḥākim. This annoyed the caliph so he sent his servants to help the Sunnites. With the help of the Turks they defeated the Shī ties and set fires to their houses next to the Dajjāj river. After the incident subsided

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> Ibid., 220.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 237.

the nobles and the merchants marched to the caliph's palace, asking his forgiveness and attributing the evil deeds to the foolish. Despite the fact that the caliph forgave them, the Shī te faqīh, Ibn al-Mu allim, was sent into exile. The order was then issued that Shī te and Sunnite preachers were allowed to function on condition that they did not incite riots. 167

From the above incident we see that al-Qādir showed his partiality for the Sunnites, while the Buwayhid amīrs did not provide any support for the Shīcites, who consequently sought aid from the Fāṭimid ruler, al-Ḥākim. The caliph's approval of the burning of the mushaf by the Sunnites and his order to execute a Shīcite show clearly that he was involved in the conflict between both communities; yet the nobles and the merchants asked his forgiveness. This indicates that his authority was still respected.

In 406/1015 fighting resumed in Baghdād as a result of the quarrel between the Sunnites and the Shī tes during the celebration of the Day of 'Āshūrā' at the Bāb al-Shā ir, a Sunnite quarter. Fakhr al-Mulk, successor of 'Amīd al-Juyūsh, who died in 402/1011, did not allow the Shī tes to wear mourning clothes on the Day of 'Āshūrā' or to mourn for al-Husayn. 168 The next year (407/1016) clashes occurred again, during which shops belonging to Shī tes and Zaydites in Wāsit were plundered and burnt. Consequently, prominent Shī te 'Alids took refuge with Ibn Mazyad (Mazyadids). 169 This incident was aggravated by a series of fires which occurred mysteriously in several places, e.g., in the mausoleum of al-Ḥusayn in Karbala, in Baghdād in Nahr Ṭabiq, in the mosque of Sāmarrā' and in the Ka'ba. These incidents coincided with the fall of a wall in front of the tomb of the Prophet in Medīna and the collapse of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. 170

<sup>167</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, Muntazam, vol. 7, 220; Laoust, "Les agitations," 171

<sup>168</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 276; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 11, 3; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 263.

<sup>169</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 283.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 12, 5; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 395.

Communal riots were so endemic that Abū Al-Ḥasan al-Shīrāzī known as Ibn Abī 'Alī , the chamberlain (appointed in 389/998), came to the palace of the caliph in 408/1017 and publicly resigned. He was replaced by Abu Muqātil, but he could do nothing to prevent conflict. In fact, he made it worse by burning the quarter of al-Karkh when the people refused him entry. Therefore, Ibn Abī 'Alī returned to his job in 409/1018 and killedthose Shī ties and Sunnites who were involved in the riots. Ibn al-Mu allim, the Shī tie faqīh, 171 along with a group of preachers, including Sunnites who were charged with causing the riots, was expelled from Baghdād, so that order and caliphal dignity were restored. In this conflict, which claimed many victims, the chroniclers do not mention any action taken by the caliph al-Qādir. We do not know exactly why he was silent. However, we may assume that he approved the measures taken by his chamberlain or that the latter was in fact acting of his orders.

It is interesting to note here that from 409/1018 until 419/1028 no communal riot was recorded by the chroniclers, and during this period Ibn al-Jawzī does not provide us with any information on the Shī'ite ceremonies of 'Āshūrā' and Ghadīr Khumm. Whether this meant they stopped the festival or they held it as usual, or whether the chroniclers lost interest is not clear. It is possible that the Shī'ites were exhausted from the continuous clashes with the Sunnites, which had caused a considerable loss in material and lives. If this is true, this period of Shī'ite weakness coincided with the decline of the Buwayhids. The clearest sign of the loss of support of the Buwayhids was the previously mentioned incident of Ibn Mas'ūd's mushaf, when the Shī'ites shouted the name of al-Ḥākim, the ruler of Egypt. Another possibility is that both communities feared being executed by the Buwayhid vizier if they were involved in conflict as had happened to Ibn Abī 'Alī in 409/1018. Perhaps minor disturbances occurred which did not attract the attention of the chroniclers.

<sup>171</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 19.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, 307.

After a lapse of about ten years, conflict was renewed in 420/1029, following the incident in the Barāthā mosque. The preacher (khātāb) of this mosque was rebuked for giving a speech which was very favourable to the Shī ites. The caliph had him arrested and then sent another preacher, Abū Manṣūr b. Tamām al-Khatīb, to take his place. He performed his khutba according to the Sunnite tradition and said a prayer (dv ā) which was contradictory to the Shī ite faith. The crowd in the mosque pelted him with bricks. The caliph heard about this incident and summoned the Sharīf Abū al-Qāsim al-Murtadā and Abū al-Hasan al-Zaynabī (the Abbāsid naqīb) and the qādī Abū Ṣāliḥ. He also sent letters to the Buwayhid authorities, the vizier Abū Alī b. Mākūlā and the iṣfāhṣalāriya (military officers), in which he placed blame for the incident on a Shī ite preacher. However, this agitation continued and the khutba in the Barāthā mosque was terminated for some time. The ayyārūn of both parties aggravated the situation. The affair finally ended through a compromise: the caliph designated a new preacher on condition that he avoid sermons which might rouse the sensibilities of either communities. The

Two years later (422/1030) serious riots resumed between the Sunnites and the Shīcites. The reason for this incident was that one al-Khazlajī, called the Ṣūfī, declared his intention to make a holy war and asked permission from the caliph. A letter and a standard were sent to him from the caliph and a lot of people joined him. After performing prayer in the mosque of al-Madīna and having read out the letter, they passed by the Bāb al-Shacīr, and then went to Ṭāq al-Harānī accompanied by armed people. Some of their followers shouted the name of Abū Bakr and 'Umar and they said," This is the day of holy war," 176 but the people of al-Karkh drove them away and pelted them

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., vol. 8, 41-45; Laoust, "Les agitations," 173.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., 39-40; Laoust, "Les agitations," 173.

 $<sup>^{175}</sup>$  It is not clear from Ibn al-Jawzī's account who was the enemy of the Sūfī who encouraged him to make the holy war.

<sup>176</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 55.

with stones. Violence could not be avoided; the houses and caravanserais of the Jews were plundered as they were accused of helping the people of al-Karkh. The next morning, Sunnites from the eastern and western sides of the city gathered and the Turks joined them, marching towards al-Karkh. They burnt it and destroyed its markets, placing the people of al-Karkh in a very critical situation. The caliph wrote to the sultan and the islahsaläriyya expressing his strong objections to this incident, and accusing the Shī ites of burning the standards brought by the warriors and demanding that criminal punishment be enforced. During the incident, many people of al-Karkh were killed; the Turks plundered their houses and set fires to their shops. The vizier then passed a regulation that forbade people to fight each other and to set fires.<sup>177</sup> This incident of communal violence was followed in Jumādā al-Akhira by one which was more dangerous and wide spread, as it involved not only the Shī ites and the Sunnites of Bāb al-Başra and al-Karkh, but also many inhabitants of other quarters in Baghdad such as the people of Nahr Tabiq, the bakers, people of the Suq al-Silah (market of arms), the Sūq al-Thulāthā" (Tuesday market), Bāb al-Ṭābiq, Sūq Yaḥyā (Yaḥyā market) and even Christian clergymen. The bridge which separated the people of the west and those of the east of the city was cut. During this riot the former chief of the police, al-Kalālakī, was killed by the masses, while the 'ayyārūn' entered Baghdād and attacked the house of Abū Muḥammad al-Nasawī, the chief of police, at Zabraj street. During the day, the bandits disappeared, but they launched many raids at night. 178

Although Makdisi did not construct a confessional map of the city, the riots which took place there between the Sunnites and the Shī ties allow us to assign some quarters at least in a general way, to one or the other of the opposing camps. 179

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

On the west side, the Sunnites who participated in the riots resided in the following quarters: Bāb al-Baṣra, Bāb al-Shaʿīr, Qatīʿa al-Rabīʿ, Sūq al-Qalāʾīn, Bāb al-Arḥa, al-Ḥarbiyya, al-Nāṣiriyya and Shāriʿ Dār al-Raqīq. Their Shīʿite adversaries were settled in the following quarters: al-Karkh, Nahr al-Dajjājj, Sūq al-Daqqāqīn, Nahr Tābiq and Bāb al-Dair. In the eastern part of the city, the Sunnites dwelled in the Sūq al-Thulāthāʿ, Sūq Yaḥyā and Darb Sulaymān; and the Shīʿite rioters, in the Sūq al-Ṣilāḥ, Bāb al-Ṭāq and al-Furda. The quarters which were most often described as Sunnite were Bāb al-Baṣra and Sūq al-Qalāʾīn facing the Shīʿite al-Karkh, to the west; and the Sunnite quarter of Sūq Yaḥyā opposing Shīʿite Bāb al-Ṭāq, to the east.¹80

From what has been said about the conflicts between the Shī tes and the Sunnites, we can note the role of preachers from both communities in sparking riots (for example over the issue of Ibn Mas to version of the mushaf). In addition, clashes between both parties were common over the innovations of the Shī te and the Sunnite commemorative ceremonies. However, when the ceremonies were periodically banned, conflicts tended to subside. On several occasions, the caliph al-Qādir showed clearly his defense of the Sunnite community and blamed the Shī tes and sent letters of protest to the Buwayhid amīrs, who had not done anything to solve the problem of communal riots. No significant reaction came from the Buwayhid amīr al-umarā over the caliph's stance in solving the problem of the communal riots, which tended to benefit the Sunnites.

# II. Al-Qādir's role in the Sunnite and caliphal restoration

#### A. The beginning of the Sunnite reaction.

Before we discuss further the role of al-Qādir in the Sunnite and caliphal restoration, we shall trace the period before his ascension, when, according to some scholars, the Sunnite restoration had already begun. We do not hear about what is called

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

"the Sunnite restoration" or "the Sunnite revival" <sup>181</sup> during the previous centuries of the Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid caliphate, because the Sunnites or Sunnism during these periods seems to have not been threatened or faced encroachment from non-Sunnite communities, although many sects within Islam had already emerged. It was after the rise of Shī 'ite dynasties, more specifically the Fāṭimids and Buwayhids, that Shī 'ites became powerful and the Sunnite caliphate was placed in danger.

As we know, under Buwayhid rule the caliphatewas undermined and its means were limited. However, as early as 363/4/974/5, following the forced abdication of the caliphal-Muṭī¹, a Sunnite movement of protest was conducted by the Turk Sabuktagin, a former chamberlain of Mu²izz al-Dawla, with the support of the amīr Alftagin. During the fight between Sabuktagin and 'Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiyār, the Sunnites and the Turks backed Sabuktagin, while the Shī¹ites and the Daylamites rallied around Bakhtiyār.¹82 The threat was so great that 'Aḍud al-Dawla had to come from Shīrāz to help Bakhtiyār with the hidden motive of ousting him. For fifty days, in Baghdād, the name of the caliph al-Ṭāʾiʿ was omitted from the khutba. 'Aḍud al-Dawla was accused of having prepared a false contract of investiture (conferred on him by the caliph). The conflict ended through the intervention of Rukn al-Dawla, who asked his son ('Aḍud al-Dawla) to return to Shīrāz; the caliph later married Bakhtiyār's daughter.¹83

This movement of Sunnite reaction, after starting in 'Irāq, spread to Damascus, where Alftagin, who led a force comprising of the Daylamites, Turks and Bedouins from Palestine- in particular the Banū Jarrāḥ- succeeded in spreading his authority to Sidon. Alftagin was beaten in 368/978 at Ramla, but he remained in Damascus for

<sup>181</sup> Laoust describes the "Sunnite Restauration," as a persistent resistance to Shī'ism and Mu'tazilism [during the Buwayhid period]. Laoust's introduction to Sharb Ibāna of Ibn Batta, pp.cxii. Makdisi maintains that the "Sunnī Revival" "was a religous revival in which forces of Traditionalism fought against the forces of Rationalism of all shades." He further holds that it was "not simply Sunnī, it was traditionalist." Makdisi, "The Sunnī Revival," in D. S. Richards ed., Islamic Civilization, 154, 157.

<sup>182</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 68; see also Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 50.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid; Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 50.

twelve years and succeeded in stopping the advance of the Fāṭimids with the help of the local militia (aḥdāth), which took control over the peasantry of the Ghouta and Qassām Turāb. After taking Damascus in 378/988 the Fāṭimids succeeded in occupying Homs, Hamā and Shayzar, but they failed to take Aleppo in 383/993 from the Byzantines, who feared that the Fāṭimids would establish on their frontiers a vast empire encompassing the Maghreb, Egypt and Syria and possibly Mesopotamia and 'Irāq. 184

A new crisis, however, helped the caliphate. In 381/991 a violent conflict broke out between al-Tā'i' and the Buwayhid Bahā' al-Dawla, whose soldiers removed the caliph and imprisoned him in the palace of their master. The palace of the caliph was ransacked by soldiers. Bahā' al-Dawla forced the caliph to abdicate in favour of al-Qādir, a grand son of al-Muqtadir. In Baghdād the ashrāf ('Alid and Hāshimite notables) and the qāḍīs were invited to witness the act of abdication. 185

Many historians have long attributed the Sunnite restoration of the fifth/eleventh century to the Seljuqs. But the Seljuqs, according to Laoust and Makdisi, only appeared on the scene in the later half of the century, when the restoration was well under way. Their presence in the 'Abbāsid empire was only felt after their victory in 431/1039 against the Ghaznavids, who had long been champions of Sunnism. The Seljuqs, themselves Sunnites, were interested in seizing power from the hands of preceding dynasties: Sunnite as well as Shī'eite, the Ghaznavids and Buwayhids. The Sunnite restoration can be explained rather by the decadence of the Buwayhid dynasty and by a great movement of Sunnite traditionalism. As for the Seljuqs, they were totally absent during this period. The addition, the role of the Sunnite scholars, particularly the Hanbalite preachers, was very significant. "The teaching and preaching of men like Ibn Batta led at the beginning of the eleventh century to what Laoust called 'Sunnite

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> Ibid., 51; see Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, vol. 10, 282 and 292-293.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

restoration." <sup>188</sup>The preachers had implanted in the hearts of the common people a greater consciousness of their identity as Sunnites, and this in turn encouraged popular opposition to rival Shī<sup>c</sup>ites. <sup>189</sup>

## B. Al-Qādir's attempt at a Sunnite restoration

With the accession of al-Qādir (381-422/991-1030), an active movement of Sunnite restoration emerged under his leadership. In 383/993, al-Qādir founded a new mosque, the Ḥarbiyya (in addition to the five great mosques which already existed), and the *khuṭba* was made in his name; all this was part of a reorganization of preaching services.<sup>190</sup>

Al-Qādir's attempt at a Sunnite restoration was not through material power which the caliphate lacked, but through religious, juridical and moral force. He presented himself as the holder of sovereignty and the true successor of the Prophet. He knew how to defend obstinately and often successfully the essentials of his prerogatives: the mention of his name in the *khutba*, the nomination of the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{a}s$ , the investiture of the governors of the provinces and the Buwayhid  $am\bar{a}rs$ , and, in general, the preeminence of the caliphate as the source, at least in theory, of all functions pertaining to religious and temporal matters. <sup>191</sup> It was in this framework that the caliph sometimes sent recommendations (wasiyya) to some of his agents, or he himself gave lectures (on the Qādirite creed as we will discuss later) in his palace and in the mosques, concerning the interference of the caliphate in the fundamental problems of the credo. This attitude caused him to constantly collaborate with the doctors of the Law and the organization of Sunnite  $d\bar{a}$  is (missionaries). The caliphate found its most effective agents in the circle of theologians (mutakallimun), jurisconsults ( $fuqah\bar{a}$ ), popular preachers (wu  $\bar{a}z$ )

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy: An Extended Study* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1973), 100.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>190</sup> Laoust, "Hanbalisme," 87; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 171.

<sup>191</sup> Idem, "al-Māwardī," 52.

and ascetics  $(zuhh\bar{a}d)$ . <sup>192</sup> His relations with the doctors of Law and other scholars will be discussed later.

The politics of the caliph al-Qādir benefited from the support of Sultān Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, who had overthrown the Sāmānids of Bukhārā and Samarqand in 389/998, and tried to conquer North India in 392/1001. In 408/1017 Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin took Khiwas, and at the end of his reign (420/1029) he subjugated the Buwayhids of Rayy and Iṣfahān. 193 Maḥmūd himself was a Shāfi tite, but in matters of theology he followed the Karrāmiyya. According to Nāzim, Maḥmūd first adhered to the Ḥanafite school of law, but shortly after his rise to power he changed to the Shāfi tite school. Nāzim further maintains that this change was due to the fact that he had "a spirit of inquiry in religion." 194 Maḥmūd, however, presented himself as defender of Sunnism against Mu tazilism, Imāmism and Ismā tism, and mentioned the name of the caliph al-Qādir in the *khutha*. 195

The first action of al-Qādir's independence took place in 394/1003 when he reacted to Bahā° al-Dawla's nomination of the Sharīf Abū Aḥmad al-Mūsawī (d. 400/1009), the father of al-Raḍī and al-Murtaḍā to the post of the qāḍī al-quḍāt, head of the pilgrimage, tribunal of abuses (maṣālim court) and the agency (miqāba) of the Alids. 196 The letter of appointment which was sent from Shīrāz was not accepted by the caliph. If the appointment had been accepted, according to Laoust, it would have carried away from the caliph the right of nominating the grand qāḍī (qāḍī al-quḍāt) and the possibility of the caliphate itself falling into the hands of a man, who, by virtue of his prestigious genealogy and the important functions, could eclipse him. 197 Al-Qādir gave his agreement for the other three posts, but he refused al-Mūsawī's judgeship. The

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.; Laoust, "La profession de foi d'Ibn Batta," xcvi, note 225.

<sup>193</sup> Nāzim, Sultān Mahmūd, 82-85.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>195</sup> Laoust, al-Māwardī, 52.

<sup>196</sup> Idem, "Ibn Batta," xcv.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> Ibid.

incident was vigorously criticized, but Bahā' al-Dawla had to give up and each post (except for the judiciary), was restored. 198

Al-Qādir's rejection of al-Mūsawī's appointment as qādī al-qudāt has several meanings. First, as maintained by Laoust, he feared the loss of his right to appoint the grand qadi, and most importantly, his caliphal power because it is very probable that once an 'Alid gained a high position in the court, he would try to oust him from the caliphate. Second, the caliph realized the importance of the qādī al-qudāt and the very important privilege of nominating him. The qadi al-quda, beside his religious functions, was relied upon for his opinions, which were often sought by the caliph as well as by other functionaries, such as the vizier and the army commander. 199 In addition, in the formal audiences held in the palace of the caliphate, the qādī al-qudāt was among those in attendance. The relationship between the  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  al-qudat and the caliph, therefore, was quite close. If this very important position was taken by the Shī ites, any religious decisions or matters which needed his approval would be to the advantage of the Shi ite community or might contradict the caliph's interests, and this, no doubt, would not be accepted by the majority of the Sunnite community and the caliph would lose their sympathy. The caliph's actions in regard to this issue were part of his attempts to defend Sunnism. Al-Qadir's determination to defend Sunnism is also clearly shown during the affair of the Mushaf of Ibn Mas ud mentioned earlier. In addition, the caliph took up the leadership of a politico-religious opposition and found himself at the vanguard of the ideologies which were developed or established for the defense of Sunnism. He represented a source of obedience to the Sunna against Shī ism and Mu tazilite speculative theiology ( kalām). 200

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>198</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 64-65; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7. 237-238; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol.11, 338-339.

<sup>199</sup> Saʿāda, Tārīkh, 102

<sup>200</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 87.

The Ḥanbalite school was, however, not the only school to defend the Sunna. During this period other schools began to exert themselves and the attitude of the caliph varied towards them. Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d.386/996) founded the Sālimiyya school, which was greatly influenced by Ḥanbalism, as he himself had been influenced by it. The Karrāmiyya under the caliph al-Qādir witnessed a renewal of activities under the leadership of Ibn Hishām. Ash arism began to constitute a school with the Mālikite Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d.403/1012), Shāfi ism with Ibn Furāq (d.406/1015) and Traditionalism under al-Ḥākim al-Nīsābūrī (d.404/1013).

From what has been explained above, Laoust is right when he maintains that there are three factors which contributed to the Sunnite restoration. The first is to be sought in the politics of Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, who, in 387/997, overthrew the Sāmānid dynasty, then took control over Khurāsān, and claimed to be a defender of the Sunna. His campaigns in India in 392/1001 were presented as a brilliant victory of Sunnism, and when the news reached Baghdād, it was followed by violent disorders during which the populace attacked Christians, and seized Jews, identifying them as beneficiaries of the Shī te regime. Sultān Maḥmūd also appeared in the traditional historiography as a model sovereign whose only political goal was the triumph of the Sunna. He had the *khuṭba* read with the name of the Abbāsid caliph, but he did not show his support for the traditionalists and the jurisconsults. 202

Some chroniclers maintain that Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin was a follower of the Karrāmiyya sect. There may have been a connection between his championship of Sunnism and the doctrine of the Karrāmiyya. Bosworth holds that the Karrāmiyya can be included among the Sunnite groups who were active in defending a central position against both the Mu'tazilites and the Ahl al-Hadīth. Later authorities like al-Maqrīzī

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>201</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>202</sup> Laoust, "Ibn Batta," xcii-xciii.

helds that the Karrāmiyya opposed mainly the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites.<sup>203</sup> Like the traditionalists who relied for the most part on the literal meaning of the Qur<sup>2</sup>ān, the Karrāmites naturally opposed the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and other sects considered deviant from the mainstream of the Muslim community ( the *Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā<sup>c</sup>a*). Sultān Maḥmūd's measures against these deviant groups were not different from the other actions of the Sunnites and his stout allegiance to the <sup>c</sup>Abbāsids was in the framework of defending the Sunnite caliphs. The doctrines of the Karrāmiyya themselves were not a unique reason for Sultān Maḥmūd to champion Sunnism. It is also probable that his claim to be champion of Sunnism was a means to legitimize the extension of his domain by punishing his enemies and rivals.

The second factor in this restoration lay in the upsurge of popular and very violent agitation which was manifest in 'Irāq. Already in 389/998, the bloody battle which broke out in Baghdād at the celebration of 'Āshūrā' marked a brutal awakening of this latent hostility.<sup>204</sup> New conflicts broke out again in 398/1007 when the Shī tes publicly made a case for the Qur'ānic recension of Ibn Mas ūd, as noted above.

From 406/1015 onwards extremely serious tensions developed when the Sunnites stopped the Shī tites from celebrating their feasts. In 407/1016 a series of fires was set simultaneously in many sacred places in Baghdād, and battles broke out in Mecca, Medīna and Jerusalem. Disorder reached such violence in 408/1017 that this year was identified by the Sunnite historians as the year of the great riot or *fitna*. It was also considered to have marked the beginning of the great movement for a Sunnite restoration which was symbolized in 447/1055 by the arrival of the Seljuqs in Baghdād, and in 567/1180 the re-establishment of the Abbāsid *khutba* in Egypt. 207

<sup>203</sup> Bosworth, "Karrāmiyya," in E. I., new ed., vol. 4, 668.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 206; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, vol. 11; Laoust, "Ibn Batta," xciii.

<sup>205</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 276; Laoust, "Ibn Batta," xciv.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> Ibid., Laoust, "Ibn Batta," xciv.

<sup>207</sup> Laoust, "Ibn Batta," xciv.

The last factor which explains the first successes of this restoration can be found in the politics of the caliph al-Qādir, who tried to get rid of the tutelage of the Buwayhids and to take on more personal authority. The wasiyya which he addressed in 390/999 to the new qādī of Jīlān was only a gesture, but it revealed an anxious wish to remind his agents of their responsibilities and obedience to him and of his lofty mission. In 394/1003 (as mentioned earlier) he refused to recognize the nomination of a Shī te to the post of the qādī al-qudāt. At the same time he carried out a battle against the Fāṭimids, which was supported by some Sunnite scholars, for example, the Mu tazilite, Alī b. Sa ta al-Iṣṭakhrī (d.404/1013), who composed for him a refutation of Bāṭiniyya, and the Ash tarite al-Bāqillānī (d.403/1012), who also attacked the Fāṭimids in his Kashī al-Asrār 209 and in his Tāmhīd, where he defended the caliphate of the Khulafā al-Rāshidūn against Shī te attack. The qādī al-qudāt Abd al-Jabbār wrote in his Mughnī a section defending the right of the Qurayshites to the caliphate and the position of the Rāshidūn caliphs. In this regard, Abū Mansūr al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) in his Usūl al-Dīn defended the legitimacy of their leadership of the Muslim community.

# C. Al-Qādir's decrees against Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism, Rāfidism and all deviant sects

In the first years of the fifth /eleventh century, before the decline of the Buwayhids, a first sign of an official Sunnite restoration manifested itself with al-Qādir's decrees denouncing Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism and Rāfiḍism. In 408/1017, the caliph demanded that the Ḥanafite-Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite jurisconsults make public renunciations; he banned them from holding public discussions on Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism, Rāfiḍism and any other doctrines identified

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 208.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., xcv.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī ", 58.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> Ibid., 61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Istanbul: Maṭba<sup>c</sup>at al-Dawla, 1928), 281- 287.

by the caliph as anti-Islamic. He asked them to sign a pledge to this effect under the threat of corporal punishment and exile for the recidivists. The Ghaznavid Maḥmūd followed the caliph's example. This prince pursued the Muctazilites, Rāfiḍites, Ismāʿīlites, Qarmaṭians and the anthropomorphists (*mushabbihāt*). He crucified some of them, imprisoned others and sent others to exile. He also gave orders to curse these heretics from the pulpits of the mosques.<sup>213</sup>

It is worth noting that the Bahgdādian Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites who were obliged to make public retraction were mostly Ḥanafite jurisconsults. When the great Ḥanafite jurisconsult Abū <sup>c</sup>Abdillāh al-Saymarī became a legal witness in Rabī <sup>c</sup> II 417/1026, he had to publicly renounce the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism of which he was accused. The chroniclers observe that such public rectractions become a rule.<sup>214</sup>

Demand for public retractions was not al-Qādir's only official measure in the restoration of Traditionalist Sunnism. The events of the following year, 409/1017, were reported in more detail. On 17 Ramaḍān of that year, an epistle which he had composed was read publicly in the quarter of Dār al-Khilāfa, on a solemn occasion. The epistle adopted Traditionalist Sunnism, according to the chroniclers, who cite the following passage:" Whoever says that the Qur³ān is created is an infidel whose blood is allowed to be shed."215This clearly shows the Traditionalist character. Unfortunately, the integral text of this epistle cannot be found in the chronicles. But the account of al-Qādir's epistle, especially the *Muntazam*, was more explicit in 409/1018 than in 408/1017, and the one issued at the end of his reign was more detailed.<sup>216</sup>

In the years which followed the proclamation of the above epistles, Sunnite ideology made a great deal of progress. The death of the caliph al-Ḥākim in 411/1020 marked the beginning of the Fāṭimid decline. In one letter which reached Baghdād in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 287.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>214</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 58; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 7, 289.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>216</sup> Ibid., 301.

418/1027, Sultān Maḥmūd, who placed his conquests in India under the standard of Sunnism, declared himself to be a protector of the 'Abbāsid caliph, and in 420/1029, in a new message, he declared his intention to lead the war against the Bāṭiniyya and the Rawāfiḍ. Reacting to this message, the caliph al-Qādir took severe measures, in particular in Baṣra, from where Shī 'ite preachers were exiled.217

In 420/1029 the caliph al-Qādir wrote three independent epistles in the same genre.<sup>218</sup>The first cited epistle was read on Monday 18, Sha<sup>c</sup>bān. There was a convocation of the notables, judges, witnesses and jurisconsults in the palace of the caliph. Ibn al-Jawzī says that the epistle was long, containing remarks of admonition, the excellence of the Sunnite orthodox and a condemnation of Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism, supported by citations of numerous Ḥadīths. <sup>219</sup>

The second convocation which took place in the next month, Thursday 20 Ramadān, was read by his vizier Abū al-Ḥasan b. Ḥājib al-Nuʿmān to a similar audience. It seems that this epistle was developed from the preceding one in terms of content. The epistle contains traditions about the death of the Prophet and the main questions of religion and its prescriptions. It condemns as fāsiq those who professed the createdness of the Qurʾān with reference to a conversation which took place between ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Makkī and Bishr al-Mārisī on this subject. The conclusion of the epistle was an appeal to the application of the principle of ordering the good and preventing evil. Those who were present at the convocation attested their presence through their signatures and a written declaration to have heard the reading of the epistle. <sup>220</sup>

The third convocation was held on Monday 1, Dhū al-Qa'da, Ibn al-Jawzī says that the epistle of al-Qādir which was read this time was very long. The audience remained there till night fall when they signed the document, attesting their presence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> Laoust," Ibn Batta," xcvi-xcvii.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> Makdisi, *Ibn 'Aqīl*', 301; Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 8, 41

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> Ibid., 302; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 41.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 41.

during the reading and acknowledging their understanding of its content. The document enumerated the merits of Abū Bakr and 'Umar, Traditions on the death of the Prophet and condemnation of those who professed the createdness of the Qur'ān. It included the dialogue between 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Makkī and Bishr al-Mārisī on the subject of the Qur'ān. It terminated with an admonition and an appeal to the application of the principle of ordering the good and preventing the evil. <sup>221</sup>

When Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, the Sunnite champion, died in 421/1030 and the caliph al-Qādir died in 422/1031, a Sunnite restoration had already taken shape. The new reading of the Qādiriyya was made in the palace of the caliph by the caliph al-Qā $^{\circ}$ im, at the moment when the new Sunnite dynasty, that of the Seljuqs began to extend its domination over the eastern provinces of the caliphate.  $^{222}$ 

## D. The profession of the Qadirite Creed

This profession of the faith came down to us through the Ḥanbalite Ibn al-Jawzī in his *Muntaṣam*, on the authority of his teacher, the great traditionist Muḥammad b. Nāṣir (d.550/1155), who studied with Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Farrā', son of the great master of the Ḥanbalites.<sup>223</sup> This text was included by Ibn al-Jawzī among the events of the year 433/1041-42. In the *Tabaqāt* [ al-Ḥanābila] of Abū al-Ḥusayn Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, the original transmitter says, "It was the preceding year (432/1040) which was given as the date of the reading." <sup>224</sup> In any case, this profession of the Qādirite faith was read frequently during the reign of al-Qā'im, son of al-Qādir, as reported and witnessed by the historian of Baghdād, al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. ʿAlī). <sup>225</sup> According to Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, the Imām al-Qā'im bi amrillāh proclaimed after the year 430/1038 the profession of the Qādirite faith which had been

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>221</sup> Ibid., Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> Laoust, "Ibn Batta, " xcvii; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol.7, 287.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 109-110; Makdisi, Ibn 'Aqīl', 303.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>224</sup> Ibn al-Farrā', Tabagāt al-Hanābila, vol.2, 197: Makdisi, Ibn 'Aqīl, 303.

<sup>225</sup> Makidsi, Ibn Aqil, 303.

read by al-Qādir himself. It was read in the *dīwān* in the presence of ascetics and *'ulamā'*. Among those who were present was the great traditionalist, the Shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī b. 'Umar al-Qazwīnī, who refused at first to sign. However, after some jurisconsults said to him: "It is the profession of the faith of the Muslims: whoever opposes it becomes a sinner and an infidel," he agreed. <sup>226</sup> The following is the text of the Qādirite creed according to Ibn al-Jawzī, as translated by Adam Mez and Khuda Bakhsh:

" It is necessary for man to know that there is one God who has no companion, who neither begets nor is begotten, who has no equal and has accepted none as His son or companion and who has no co-ruler of the universe with Him. He is the first and, as such, He has always been. He is the last for He will never cease to exist. He is all powerful (He needs nothing). When He wishes a thing, He has only to say, "Be" and it is there. He needs nothing. There is no God save Him, the Living, the Eternal. No slumber, neither sleep overtakes Him. He gives food but does not take it Himself. He is alone and yet never feels lonely. He is the self-sufficient of anything. He is friendly with none. Years age Him not! and how can they affect Him for He is, indeed, the Author of the year and time, day and night, light and darkness, heaven and earth, and all the creatures that are therein, of land and water and all that is within them and, verily, of all things, living and dead or inanimate being. Our Lord is unique, there is nothing beside Him. No space encloses Him. By His power He has created every thing. He has created the throne though He does not need it. He is on the throne because He so wills it, and not like human beings, to rest on it."

"He is the Director of heaven and earth and of all things there and of all things on land and water. There is no director save Him and no protector either. He provides them (with the means of subsistence). He makes them ill and well again, makes them die or keeps them alive. All creatures are weak, including Angels, Prophets and Apostles. He is powerful through His power. He is knowing through his own knowledge. Eternal and incomprehensible is He. He is the hearer who hear through his hearing and the Seer who sees through His sight. He knows Himself the qualities of these both attributes. There is none of His creatures who attained the knowledge of these two substances."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> Ibid., 304.

"He speaks (with word) but not with (created) organs like those of human beings. Only those attributes should be ascribed to Him which He has Himself ascribed or those which His Prophet has ascribed to Him and everyone of the attributes which He has Himself ascribed is a real attribute of His being, not a metaphorical one."

"Man should also know: the Word of God is not created. He has spoken through Gabriel and has revealed it to His Prophet. After Gabriel had heard it form Him - he repeated it to Muhammad, Muhammad to his Companions, his Companions to the community. And, therefore, mere repetition by man does not make "the Word" created for it is the very Word of God and the Word of God is not created. And it remains "uncreated" whether repeated or retained in memory, written or heard. He who asserts that it is in any way "created" is an unbeliever whose blood it is permissible to shed - should he refuse to repent of his error when called upon to do so."

"One should also know that Faith is speech, action, and thought: Speech with the tongue, action with the members (arkān) and the limbs (jawāriḥ) and internal confirmation (taṣdīq). Faith may become greater or smaller - greater by obedience, smaller by disobedience. It has different stages and divisions. The highest is the confession: "There is no God but Allāh!" and the lowest is preventing a danger on the street. Self-control is part of faith and patience is to faith what the head is to the body. Man knows not what is recorded about it with God and what is sealed there with Him. And for this reason precisely we say: "He is believing if God wills: and I hope, I am believing." There is no other resource save hope. Let him not, therefore, despair because he is striving for something which lies hidden in the futures. He should honestly carry out all laws and directions and do acts of supererogation for all these are part of faith. Faith never reaches an end, since supererogatory works never attain a limit."

"One must love all the Companions of the Prophet. They are the best of human beings after the Prophet. The best and noblest of them after the Prophet is Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, next to him 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, next to 'Umar, 'Uthmān b. 'Affān, and next to 'Uthmān, 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. May God bless them and associate with them in paradise and have compassion on the souls of the Companions of the Prophet. He who slanders 'Ālsha has no part or lot in Islam. Of Mu'āwiyya we should only say good things and refuse to enter to any controversy about him. We should invoke God's mercy for all. God has said:

"And they who have come after them into the faith say, O, our Lord, forgive us and our brethren who have proceeded us in the faith, put not into our hearts illwill against them who believe. O, our Lord! Thou verily art kind and merciful." And He said of them: We will remove what is in their breasts of rancour as brethren face to face on couches. We should declare no one an unbeliever for omitting to fulfill any of the legal ordinances except the prescribed prayer; for he who neglects to pray without due cause is unbeliever even though he does not deny the duty of praying as the Prophet said: Neglect of prayer is of unbelief, whoso neglects it is an unbeliever, and remains so until he repents and prays. And were he to die before repentance he will awake on the day of judgment with Pharaoh, Hāmān, and Korah.' The neglect of other injunctions does not make one an unbeliever even if one is so criminal as not to admit the duty. Such are the doctrines of the Sunna and of the community! He who stands by them stands in the clear light of truth, is under right guidance and on the true path. For such a one we may hope for immunity from hell-fire and admission into paradise, God willing. Some one asked the Prophet: towards whom one should be of good will? And he said: Should a warning come from God to manthrough religion - it is but an act of God's mercy. Should he pay heed to the warning - it will be profitable to him - Should he not - it will be a witness against him. But by refusal (to pay heed) he multiplies his sins and draws down upon him the wrath of God. May God make us thankful for his favours and mindful of His mercies! Let Him make us defenders of pious practices and let Him forgive us and all the faithful."227

# E. The meaning and scope of the profession of al-Qadir

The Qādirite profession not only opposed the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites, but also the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites and the Ash<sup>c</sup>arites, among others. It is, no doubt, a profession of Hanbalite traditionist inspiration, <sup>228</sup> particularly as it follows the formulations of Ibn Baṭṭa, though it differs in order. <sup>229</sup> However, the Ḥanbalite scholar who was directly responsible for inspiring al-Qādir to adopt the Ḥanbalite creed was probably Ibn Ḥāmid because he had

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<sup>227</sup> Mez, Renaissance of Islam, 207-209; Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, vol.8, 108-

<sup>228</sup> Makdisi, Ibn 'Aqil', 309

<sup>229</sup> Watt, Political Theory, 100.

Hanbalite type of creed would be the most effective means of strengthening Sunnite views among the masses." <sup>231</sup> Adoption of Hanbalite ideas can be seen clearly in several points. For example, the question of the throne and the <code>istiwā</code> was presented against the anthropomorphists (<code>mushābiha</code>), notably the Karrāmiyya. The attributes of God (<code>sifāt</code>) are presented according to the views of those who affirmed them (<code>ithbāt al-sifāt</code>), and against those who annulled them. The latter included the Imāmites and the Ismāʿīlites, who say that God knows without knowledge, and is powerful without power, and the Muʿtazilites who annulled the attributes (<code>ibṭal al-sifāt</code>), who stripped them of power (<code>taˈtil</code>) or subjected them to rational interpretation(<code>taˈwil</code>). The problem is also posed against the Ashʿarites who distinguished between real attributes (<code>sifāt haqīqa</code>) and metaphorical attributes (<code>sifāt majūziyya</code>), whereas the profession of the Qādirite qualified as real all the attributes His Apostle attributes to Him.<sup>232</sup>

The opposition of anti-Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and anti-Ash<sup>c</sup>arites is clearly seen in the controversy over the attribute of the *Kalām* of God. Against the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites, it affirms that the *Kalām* of God is uncreated. In opposition to the Ash<sup>c</sup>arites, the *Kalām* of God is uncreated in all aspects: recited, retained in the memory, written or heard. Thus there is no Ash<sup>c</sup>arite distinction here between the uncreated *Kalām* of God and its created "expression." Also in the Qādirite creed there is a condemnation of the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite thesis and that of the Ash<sup>c</sup>arites under the threat of death, unless a public retraction is made.<sup>233</sup>

The profession of the Qādirite creed, says that belief (*īmān*) is composed of the formula (*qaul*), work (*ʿamal*) and intention (*niyya*). *Īmān* is variable, capable of increase and decrease; that one should use the conditional formula or of expectation by saying: "I am believer" and adding "if it pleases God," or "I expect it." This concept

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>230</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>231</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>232</sup> Makdisi, *Ibn 'Aqīl*, 309.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

which corresponded to that of the Shāfi ites and Ibn Ḥanbal opposed that of Mu tazilism which identified *īmān* with Islam (it was thus purely exterior to the formula and the deed). It was also opposed to the anthropomorphists and the Shī ite extremists who felt that obligation and meritous acts were not necessary for salvation; initiation was sufficient. Similarly, it was against the Ash arites who felt that the profession of creed could be invariable. According to the latter, works were not limited and that it was not obligatory to use the formula of condition and expectation. 234

The excellence of the companions after the Prophet was put in chronological order, beginning with Abū Bakr, followed by 'Umar, after that 'Uthmān and finally 'Alī in contrast to the Shī'ites who accorded highest excellence to 'Alī after the Prophet. A similar attitude is seen in the prohibition of the slander of 'Āisha or Mu'āwiya. The definition of an unbeliever (kāfir) is directed towards the Shī'ite extremists, the Rāfiḍites and the Ismā'īlites, who rejected the value of ritual obligation.<sup>235</sup>

Received with reserve, if not with hostility, by the theologians whose compromises with Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite *kalām* were evident, the Qādiriyya remained in the eyes of most moderate Ḥanbalite doctors as a model *par excellence* of the Sunnite 'aqāda' (creed). This attachment of the Ḥanbalites to the Qādiriyya was understood without doubt, first of all, as a reaction against Shī 'ism and Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism, but also against the growing rise of Ash 'arism, which was poised to become the official credo of the empire, especially since the foundation of the Nizāmiyya in 459/1066. Ḥanbalism, on the other part, represented at the time in Baghdād, under the caliphates of al-Qādir, al-Qā 'im and al-Muqtadī, a party of 'Abbāsid legitimism anxious to defend the established caliphal authority against the numerous infringements on his responsibilities and his mission as the *sharī* 'a defined them. The Ḥanbalite theologian Ibn al-Baqqāl (d.440/1048) was

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>235</sup> Ibid., 310.

happy to compare the 'Abbāsid caliphate to a tent whose most solid stakes were the Hanbalites.<sup>236</sup>

The profession of al-Qādir's creed, according to Makdisi, played a great role at the time as well as during the reign of his son and successor al-Qā'im. To see how far this Qādirite creed played its role, we can compare it to al-Ma'mūn's policy of the *milma* (inquisition) and his promotion of Mu'tazilism and Shī'ism.<sup>237</sup>

As we have already seen, the caliph al-Qādir wrote four epistles: the first in 409/1018, and three others in 420/1029, all within four months (from Shaʿbān to Dhū al-Qaʿda). Likewise, two centuries before, al-Maʾmūn had written four epistles, all in one period. The epistles of al-Maʾmūn preached a doctrine which was essentially Muʿtazilite in nature and was also favourable to Shīʿism in its public declaration of the superiority of ʿAlī over Abū Bakr and ʿUmar. The epistles of al-Qādir preached a doctrine not only diametrically opposed to Muʿtazilism and Shīʿism, but also against every movement whose principles contradicted those of the Traditionalists. Thus they represented a victory of the traditionalist movement to which Ḥanbalism belonged; and the Traditionalists were its avant-garde. Here we find again the profession of al-Qādir proclaimed in the later period not only against the Muʿtazilites, but also against the Ashʿarites, in other words, against the Mutakallimūn (theologians).<sup>238</sup>

But there is an important distinction to make regarding the two periods, those of al-Ma'mūn and of al-Qādir. During the period of al-Qādir and his son al-Qā'im, the presence of a sultān undermined the caliphate and reduced the caliph to be a mere figure head of the community. At the time of al-Ma'mūn, the sultāns did not exist. Therefore, it is easy to understand that al-Ma'mūn had liberty to lead a Mu'tazilite-Shī'ite policy; afterward al-Mutawakkil, on the contrary, led a policy of rigid orthodoxy. The existence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>236</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>238</sup> Ibid.

of the independent caliphate and the caliph himself explains the success of this policy. But how to explain the appearance of a Sunnite movement that was intransigent, bold and, in particular, anti-Shī ite? This happened because this movement rose in opposition to a Buwayhid dynasty which still reigned in Baghdād and was a traditional champion of Shī ism 239 and probably it was also opposed to the Fāṭimids.

### F. Al-Qadir's relations with Sunnite and Mu'tazilite scholars

It is convenient to discuss the relationships between the caliph and scholars according to the group or school to which they belonged. This will shed light on the influence of al-Qādir's policy on Sunnite scholars and their contributions to the 'Abbāsid caliphate. In dealing with these scholars we will begin with the Ḥanafite, Mālikite, Shāfi 'ite, Ḥanbalite schools²40 and the theological school of Mu 'tazila. All the scholars of these schools who lived during the reign of al-Qādir and who produced considerable works on various branches of Islamic sciences will not be examined in detail; our concern is to deal with those who had good relations with the caliph and who helped him to sustain his caliphate through their works and services. We will also discuss some individual scholars who strengthened his caliphatethrough their works.

#### 1. The Hanafites

Ḥanafism was very influential in Baghdād, where it provided the state with many high functionaries who were divided between loyalty to the position of traditionalism in terms that the Ṭaḥāwiyya had defined and the attraction of the *kalām* or Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism.<sup>241</sup> Many great names in the history of the Ḥanafite school appeared during this period, including Abū Bakr al-Khawārizmī (d.403/1012), who enjoyed good relations with the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>239</sup> Ibid., 312.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>240</sup> Since we have discussed most of the Hanbalite scholars in the Hanbalite movement, we will not present them here except for one of the most significant of them, namely Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā' because he cooperated with other Sunnite scholars in defending the Sunnite imāmate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 57.

caliph.<sup>242</sup> He used to teach at al-Manṣūr's mosque where rumour had it, a hostile inscription against the companions was written on the walls and doors of the mosque. Very attached to the *salaf* (preceding generations) tradition, he refused all compromises with the *kalām*.<sup>243</sup>

Next to Abū Bakr al-Khawārizmī in importance was Abū al-Ḥasan al-Qudūrī (d.428/1037),<sup>244</sup> who, after the death of the former, became a well known master of the Ḥanafites in Baghdād. His most popular work was *Mukhtaṣar* (abridgment) followed by a voluminous treatise, the *Kitāb al-Tajrīd* which focused on the divergences of the Ḥanafite and Shāfi ite schools.<sup>245</sup> No account describes the relations between al-Qādir and al-Qudūrī, but the latter was one of the scholars who were close to the 'Abbāsid court. He was one of the Ḥanafites who was asked by the caliph to write an abridged work on Ḥanafism together with three scholars from the other schools. He also participated in signing the manifesto denouncing the Fāṭimids.<sup>246</sup>

Another Ḥanafite scholar who lived during the reign of al-Qādir and became a qādī and continued to hold his tenure up to the reign of al-Qā'im was Abū 'Abdillāh al-Ṣaymarī (d.436/1045).<sup>247</sup> He studied Ḥadīth under the direction of al-Dāruquṭnī (d.385/995) and the Ḥanafite traditionist Abū 'Alī al-Bazzāz (d.426/1034), who

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>242</sup> He was Muḥammad b. Mūsā b. Muḥammad, the shaykh of *ahl al-ra'y* (people of speculation) of the Ḥanafites. He learnt *hadīth* from Abū Bakr al-Shāfi'ī, and *fiqh* from Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Rāzī and then held the leadership of the Ḥanafite school. He was respected by the caliph and sulṭāns. Among his students were al-Raḍī and al-Ṣaymarī. Ibnal-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 266.

<sup>243</sup> Thid

<sup>244</sup> He was Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Ja'far and was born in 362/972. He learned hadīth from 'Ubaydillāh b. Muhammad al-Hawshī, excelled in *fiqh* and led the Hanafite scholars of 'Irāq. He died on 5 Rajab 428/1036. Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 8, 91.

<sup>245</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 256.

<sup>247</sup> He was Ḥusayn b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. Ja'far Abū Abdillāh al-Saymarī (a name of one of the rivers in Baṣra). He was born in 351/962 and became a well-known Ḥanafite jurist and a qāḍī of Madā'in and then of al-Karkh. He learned ḥadīth from Abū Bakr al-Mufīd, Ibn Shahdān and Ibn Shāhin and many others. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntazam, vol. 8, 119.

followed the Ash arite doctrine. He was also present in al-Qādir's palace when the manifesto was declared in 402/1011. Accused of adhering to Mu tazilism, al-Ṣaymarī had to make a public retraction in 417/1026. But this did not prevent him from conducting a burial prayer (salāt al-ghā ib) for the deceased Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, a Mu tazilite. He laid down the history of Ḥanafism and commented on the work of al-Ṭaḥāwī.

#### 2. The Malikites

Laoust observes that Mālikism as a school of law began to decline in Baghdād in the second half of the fourth century, although he does not give reasons for this decline. However, during the reign of al-Qādir, we find one Mālikite scholar who was well-known for his abilities as *mutakallim* (theologian) and as a *faqīh* (jurist), namely Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013). His full name was Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Tayyib b. Muḥammad b. Ja°far b. al-Qāsim al-Bāqillānī al-Baṣrī. He was also known as al-Qādī Abū Bakr and was born in Baṣrā of an obscure background; the date of his birth and his early life are unknown to any of his biographers. However, 'Imād al-Dīn Aḥmad Ḥaydar, the editor of al-Bāqillanī's *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*, maintains that he was born in 338/950.254 Having moved to Baghdād and having taken up residence in al-Karkh, he studied *uṣūl* (theology) under the Ash°arite Abū Bakr b. Mujāhid al-Ṭā'ī (d.370/980) and *fāqh* under Abū Bakr al-Abharī (d.375/985), the leading Mālikite of Baghdād.255 He studied Ḥadīth with the Ḥanbalite Abū Bakr b. Mālik al-Qaṭī'ī and other traditionists of Baghdād.256 He was as an excellent disciple and became a leading

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 57

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>249</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 256.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>250</sup> Ibid., vol. 8, 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 57.

<sup>252</sup> Ibid.

<sup>253</sup> Third

<sup>254</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf edited by Imād al-Dīn Aḥmad Ḥaydar, 7.

<sup>255</sup> Ibish, Political Doctrine, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>256</sup> Al-Baghdādī al-Khatīb, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, vol. 5, 379.

exponent of Ash arism: "the best of Ash arite theologians unrivalled by any predecessors and successors among them." 257 He was nicknamed Shaykh al-Sunna (the leader of the Sunnites) and the tongue of the *umma*, meaning that he was the most learned and respected scholar and defender of the Sunnites. In this respect Abū Imrān al-Fāsī says, "He was the sword of the Sunnites in his time and the imām of the *mutakallimūn* in our time." 258 This ephitet was possibly in accordance with his inexhaustible defense of Sunnism through his works of refutation against Rāfidites, Mu tazilites, Jahmites and Khārijites and other deviant sects of Islam. 259

Al-Bāqillānī's works are abundant, amounting to more than fifty titles as mentioned by al-Qāḍī Abū 'Alī al-Ṣadafī.²60 But of his works only six have survived namely: al-Inṣāf, I'jāz al-Qur'ān, Manāqib al-A'imma, al-Intiṣār fī al-Qur'ān, al-Mu'jizāt and al-Tamhīd.²61 Only three have been published, namely: I'jāz al-Qur'ān, al-Tamhīd and al-Inṣāf. Yusuf Ibish says,"The extent and variety of his intellectual activities strongly suggest that he was fully aware of the major intellectual and theological developments of his time, and that he took it upon himself to meet the challenges and to defend Sunnism." ²62

Al-Bāqillānī was known as the Mālikite qādī at 'Ukbāra and Baghdād but very little is known about his actual juridical activities.<sup>263</sup> His high position as a theologian and jurisconsult helped him to be highly respected not only by the common people but also by the Buwayhid amīrs and the 'Abbāsid caliph. The Buwayhid 'Adud al-Dawla

<sup>257</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd fī al-Radd 'alā al-Mulhida al-Mu'attila wa al-Rāfida wa al-Khawārij wa al-Mu'tazila edited by Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Khuḍarī and Muḥammad 'Abd al-Hādī Abū Rayda ( Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1947), 243.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>258</sup> Al-Qāḍī 'Iyāḍ, "Tartīb al-Madārik wa Taqrīb al-Masālik li Ma<sup>\*</sup>rifat Madhhab Imām Mālik," in al-Bāqillānī's *Tamhīd*, 241.

<sup>259</sup> Al-Baghdādī al-Khatīb, Tārīkh, vol. 5, 379.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>260</sup> Al-Ṣadafī al-Sarqastī, "Fihrist Kutub al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-Ṭayyib," in al-Bāqillānī's *Tamhīd*, 257

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>261</sup> Ibish, *Political Doctrine*, 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>262</sup> Ibid., 16-17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>263</sup> Ibid., 20; al-Bāqillānī, *al-Tamhīd*, 243; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A 'yān*, vol. 1, 480.

delegated him as envoy in 371/981 to the court of the Byzantine Emperor Basil, <sup>264</sup> and in 401/1010 al-Qādir sent him to the court of Bahā' al-Dawla in Shīrāz, asking that the *amīr* march against b. Muqallad, who had expressed his loyalty to the Fātimid caliph, al-Hākim. <sup>265</sup>

Al-Bāqillānī was a zealous debater with his opponents, the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites. His debates with the Shī<sup>c</sup>ite leader, Ibn al-Mu<sup>c</sup>allim (al-Mufīd), were well known. His biographers mention some anecdotes connected with his debates with Ibn al-Mu<sup>c</sup>allim and with the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites in the palace of 'Adud al-Dawla, and with the Christian theologians in the palace of the emperor Basil of Byzantium on matters concerning Islam and Christianity.<sup>266</sup> In all these debates al-Bāqillānī's biographers always mention his brilliance and skill in argumentation and his success in defeating his enemies.

Al-Bāqillānī died on Saturday, Dhū al-Qa'da 21, 403/June 6, 1013 in Baghdād. Later on his corpse was removed to the cemetery of Bāb al-Ḥarb and buried next to the tomb of Imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal. The following lines were engraved on his mausoleum:" This is the tomb of the blessed imām, the pride of the *umma*, the tongue of the *milla* (religious community), the sword of the Sunna, the pillar of religion, the protector of Islam, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ṭayyib al-Baṣrī, may God have mercy on him." 267

Al-Bāqillānī served the caliph al-Qādir and devoted most of his works to the problem of the caliphate. For example, in the *Kitāb al-Tamhīd* he defends the caliphate of the Rāshidūn (first four caliphs) against the attack of the Shī ties and maintains the theory of *ikhtiyār* (election). On the orders of the caliph, he composed two polemical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>264</sup> Al-Baghdādī al-Khatīb, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5, 379,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>265</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 251.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>266</sup> Ibish, *Political Doctrine*, 20-21; al-Baghdādī al-Khatīb, *Tārīkh*, vol. 5 379; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tabyīn al-Kadhib al-Mustarā tī mā nusiba ilā Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī* (Damasqus: al-Qudsī, 1347H/1928), 219,

<sup>267</sup> Ibish, Political Doctrine, 24.

treatises: one was directed against the Bāṭiniyya (Kashf al-Asrār fī al-Radd 'alā al-Bāṭiniyya = Revealing the Secrets of the Refutation of the Bāṭinīs), and the other was intended to establish the legitimacy of the 'Abbāsid caliphate (Kitāb Imāmat Banī 'Abbās = The Book of the Imāmate of the 'Abbāsids), thus preparing the way for the works of Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādī, al-Māwardī and al-Ghazālī. 268 Although both works seem to have been lost, their main ideas are perhaps included in the Tamhīd, in particular regarding the 'Abbāsid or Sunnite imāmate.

The Tamhīd, according to its editor, Richard J. McCarthy, is the most complete manual of Ash arite theology and resembles in many respects the Kitāb al-Luma of al-Ash arī, dealing as it does with practically the same issues and points. In fact, the Tamhīd differs from the Kitāb al-Luma in that the former assigns about one third of the book to the problem of the imāmate. Therefore, Ibish rejects McCarthy's opinion that the book is some sort of uṣūl, arguing that in accordance with the complete title of the book, al-Tamhīd fī al-Radd alā al-Mulhīda al-Mu atila wa al-Rāfīda wa al-Khawārij wa al-Mu tazila (Introduction to Refutation of the Atheists, the Shī tes, the Khārijites and the Mu tazilites), the contents and topics of discussion are in line with the title of the book, and hence, it is surely a work of refutation (radd) of the various views held by certain schools. It is natural that when al-Bāqillānī refutes the arguments and the positions of these schools, he puts forward the position of his own school, the Ash arite. 270

As a work of refutation, *al-Tamhīd* can be regarded as a current and combative work in which al-Bāqillānī "proposes to denounce all innovation (*bida*) and to condemn the position of their holders."<sup>271</sup> Although he mentions Khārijites and atheists, the main enemies of al-Bāqillānī were the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and Rāfiḍites. The Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>268</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 58.

<sup>269</sup> Ibish, Political Doctrine, 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>270</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>271</sup> Ibid., 25.

despite having lost power by the time of al-Bāqillānī, were still active and strongly influenced many theologians and jurisconsults. Their rationalism was still influential in the fields of politics and theology. Besides the Muctazilites, al-Bāqillānī also refutes "the Rawāfiḍ because Shīcite literature and activities constitute a great challenge to Sunnism and al-Bāqillānī took up arms to combatthem." <sup>272</sup>

To understand how al-Bāqillānī defended the Sunnite imāmate and the Rāshidūn caliphate against the attacks of the Sunnite adversaries, in particular the Shī ties, we will elaborate his ideas in the following section. And in accordance with his discussion of the two important issues, we will examine: (i) his doctrine of the imāmate; (ii) his defense of the imāmate of the Rāshidūn caliphs.

# a) Al-Bāqillānī's doctrine of the imāmate

Like his predecessors, al-Bāqillānī defended the Sunnite imāmateby formulating its doctrine based on the Sunnite or Ash arite teachings. The Sunnite jurists who were called sinners by the Khārijites and the Shī tes because they paid allegiance to the Sunnite caliphs, whom the latter considered usurpers, were obliged to defend this historical development. They firmly maintained that the establishment of the Muslim community was based upon the Shārī a and that its historical development was divinely guided, because as the Tradition says, "The Muslim community will never agree upon an error." Therefore, the Sunnite jurists "could not admit the principle which might lead to the conclusion that the Jamā a, the Muslim community, had fallen into sin, with the corollary that all its religious and judicial activities were void." 273 Since ijmā (consensus) was actually in practice restricted to "ulamā", they were aware of their responsibility not to lay down rigid principles or situations that were without precedent. Consequently, political ideas among the Sunnite jurists are flexible and highly adjustable to changing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>273</sup> H. A. R. Gibb, "Al-Māwardī's Theory of the Caliphate," *Islamic Culture*, xi (1937): 294-295.

circumstances. According to the Sunnite jurists, loyalty of the *umma* was not to the caliph-imām, but to the sacred law (*Sharī'a*), and the institution of the caliphate was maintained simply because through it the *Sharī'a* was transformed from "the sphere of potentiality to the sphere of actuality. Therefore, the caliphate-imāmate became a symbol of the supremacy of the *Sharī'a* which the jurist sought." <sup>274</sup>

We can divide al-Bāqillānī's discussion on the imāmate into eleven headings: (i) the refutation of designation and the affirmation of selection as a method whereby the imāmate is established; (ii) the means whereby the imāmate is established; (iii) the number of actual electors of the imām; (iv) the oath of allegiance (bay'a); (v) the invalidation of the imāmate of an imām for no cause that calls for his deposition; (vi) the number of imāms at one time; (vii) the qualities of the imām; (viii) the impeccability of the imām; (ix) the necessity of the imām; (x) the forfeiture of the imāmate; (xi) the imāmate of the less excellentimām.

(1) The refutation of designation as a means whereby the imamate is established in office

Although the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites were among the sects who were refuted, al-Bāqillānī's doctrine of the imāmate was much more directed at the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites. This is because during al-Bāqillānī's time the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites were gaining power and it was certainly under the influence of the Shī<sup>c</sup>ite resurgence in the 4th/10th century that the main problem al-Bāqillānī had to face was the method whereby the imāmate is established. He holds that Muslim scholars disagree whether it is established by designation (nass) or by election (ikhtiyār), but they agree that either method is sound. Based on the premise that rejecting one way means accepting the other, al-Bāqillānī refutes the Shī<sup>c</sup>ite doctrine of <sup>c</sup>Alī's designation. His refutation is based upon the following arguments:

(a) If the Prophet had actually appointed 'Alī as his successor and ordered the Muslim community to obey him, he would have said," This is my successor and the imām

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

after me, listen to him and obey him." <sup>275</sup>This remark would have been proclaimed in the presence of some or many of his companions. If the Prophet had announced it and had it circulated among them, it had to be transmitted to the Muslim community so that it became widely heard like other obligatory rituals such as prayers, fasting, pilgrimage. On this matter there is no disagreement among the Muslim *umma*. Particularly if the imāmate is one of the obligatory duties for every Muslim, designation by the Prophet was of foremost importance to the Muslim community, as they knew the Prophet's appointment of Zayd b. Ḥāritha, Usāma b. Zayd and <sup>6</sup>Abdullāh b. Rawāḥa and many others as commanders. <sup>276</sup>

- (b) If the Prophet's designation of an imām was generally known, as claimed by the Shī<sup>t</sup>ites and it was more important than the appointment of commanders and judges and the reasons to have it transmitted were many, it was also necessary that it be transmitted to many people. And it had to be transmitted from predecessors (salaf) then by their successor down to our time.<sup>277</sup> It is logically unacceptable for the Muslim community to have known minor assignments made by the Prophet, like those of judge and commander, and yet to have been uninformed about the nomination of his khalīfa (successor). If there was such a designation it would logically have been transmitted to the present time.<sup>278</sup>
- (c) The Traditions upheld by the Shī ties on the appointment of Alī, according to al-Bāqillānī, are not based on authoritative (successive) reports (*khabar mutawātir*) which came down to us from different truthful companions, but are based on dubious authority (*khabar wāḥid* or *fī manzilatal-āḥād*). 279

<sup>275</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 165.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>276</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>277</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>278</sup> Ibish, *Political Doctrine*, 88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>279</sup> Ibid.; al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 166.

- (d) The Shī ties believe in the designation of Alī by the Prophet when he said, "Whoever recognizes me as his mawlā, will know Alī as his mawlā." But al-Bāqillānī argues that the word mawlā has several meanings. It means: "supporter", "paternal cousin", "place and dwelling", "manumitter patron", "the manumitted", "neighbour", "son-in-law" and "client". None of these meanings can be understood as that of imām to whom submission is obligatory. Al-Bāqillānī refers to QS 4: 66 which indicates that the word mawlā means supporter: God, Gabriel and the pious Muslim are all supporters of the Prophet. 280
- (e) The claim of the Shī tes that the Prophet had appointed Alī when he said to him: "You are to me what Aaron was to Moses, but there is no prophet after me" 281 is refuted by al-Bāqillānī, arguing that the Tradition meant that Alī was to be charged, in the absence of the Prophet during the raid of Tabūk to take care of the Prophet's family and to oversee the affairs of al-Madīna. This Tradition certainly does not mean that Alī was the khalīfa of Muḥammad; he was simply delegated for him during his absence in the same way Aaron was delegated for Moses when the latter was absent. In regard to "but there is no prophet after me," al-Bāqillānī holds that this does not mean "after the death" of the Prophet, but signifies only "no prophecy during or after the prophecy of Muḥammad." Accordingly, he concludes, Alī was temporarily charged for specific reasons like other designations (of companions) made by the Prophet during his lifetime. Alī

<sup>280</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 171.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>281</sup> Ibid., 173

When Moses was called on to talk with God. This does not mean that Aaron was to be Moses's successor after his death because Aaron died several years earlier than Moses. While the successor of Moses after his death was Joshua. Therefore, this cannot be likened with the Prophet's condition, but he meant that "You are to me what Aaron to Moses," namely," You are my brother from my father and mother, you do not succeed me after my death," because this was not Aaron's position to Moses. It is clear that the Prophet meant, "You are my khalifa in regard to my family and the affairs of Madīna when I marched to this battle as Moses charged Aaron to look after his people when he (Moses) went to speak with God. Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 174.

<sup>283</sup> Ibid., 172-173; Ibish, Political Doctrine, 90.

Against the Shī tie argument that the Prophet, after his return from Tabūk, did not remove Alī, al-Bāqillānī argues that the return of the Prophet to al-Madīna and his taking over the administration of the affairs of the Muslims indicate the intrinsic removal of Alī and the discontinuation of his office.

(f) The Shī ites also hold that the Prophet had nominated Alī when he said to him, "You are my brother (akhī) and successor (khalīfa) in the affairs of my family and the qāḍī in my religion." Once more, al-Bāqillānī rejects this claim and maintains that there is nothing in this Tradition that guides one to contend that Alī was appointed as imām after the Prophet. The Prophet addressed Alī as his brother to show a deep respect for him, and designated him his successor in the affairs of his family, namely Fāṭima and her children; and in addressing him as qāḍī in his religion he was referring to the earlier post held by Alī during the Prophet's absence at Tabūk. 285

Al-Bāqillānī carries on the discussion and mentions a number of *hadīths* in favour of Abū Bakr and 'Umar and holds that if the Shī ties reject these Traditions because they are " *fī manzilat al-āḥād*" (from doubtful authorities), the Shī ties would be arguing against their own case. If they take them, they would counteract the grounds of their discord with the majority (the Sunnites). <sup>286</sup>

(2) The means whereby the imam is established in office.

Having refuted designation as the means whereby the imām is established in office, al-Bāqillanī maintains that one becomes imām by means of election contracted to him by the best persons among the Muslims who are *ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd* (those who loosen and tie) and are entrusted with this task.<sup>287</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>284</sup> Ibid., 175

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>285</sup> Ibid., 175-176.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>286</sup> Ibid., 177.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>287</sup> Ibid., 178.

### (3) The number of electors.

The imāmate is validly contracted on behalf of one who is qualified for the imāmate by the contract of a single man qualified to be "ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd." Al-Bāqillāmī holds that it has been established that the best people of the Muslim community are qualified to contract the imāmate and there is no proof that it has to be contracted by all of them or by a certain number of them. Since there was neither evidence nor mention in the Sharī'a, he argues that it is not obligatory for all qualified electors of all cities to make a contract for the imāmate. And it has been established that the predecessors did not take into consideration the presence of all ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd in the Muslim cities nor in al-Madīna to elect Abū Bakr and three other orthodox caliphs. Abū Bakr validly contracted the imāmate to 'Umar, while 'Umar rendered it to six people only, even though there were other people who were qualified to be electors. Therefore, al-Bāqillānī concludes that there is no fixed number of qualified electors in legalizing the contract of the imāmate. 288

#### (4) The oath of allegiance (bay a).

Al-Bāqillāmī holds that a group of Muslims must be present at the time the contract of imāmateis made. As with the electors, there is no limitation for those who are present at the investiture. If a group of Muslims are present at that time, the contract is valid. However, some hold that their number must be at least four in addition to one person who makes the contract and one who receives it (so in all, corresponding to the six members of 'Umar's Shūrā (consultative body). But this is not obligatory because 'Umar did not intend to limit the Shūrā to six people as a condition for investiture. He actually appointed them because they were the best (afādil) men available around him.<sup>289</sup>

<sup>288</sup> Ibid., 178-179.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>289</sup> Ibid., 179.

# (5) The invalidation of the imamate for no cause that calls for deposition.

Al-Bāqillānī maintains that the *umma* have no right to invalidate the office of the imām without any reason that necessitates such a deposition. The examples of those who have rights to make contracts but are not allowed to cancel them in *Sharī'a* are countless. For instance, a guardian who validly makes a contract of marriage cannot invalidate it; a seller has the right to sell his goods, but once the contract of sale is validated he cannot legally violate it; a man has the right to emancipate a slave of his, but cannot legally withdraw the contract of emancipation. Therefore, al-Bāqillānī concludes, subjects cannot rise against an imām and remove him from office for no reason. <sup>290</sup>

# (6) The number of imams at one time.

Al-Bāqillānī argues that if some groups of the qualified electors contracted the imāmate in different countries and all of those involved are fitted for the imāmate, the contracts have to be investigated and the prior one must be validated and the rest dismissed. If they refuse, they are rebels and have to be fought. But if priority cannot be ascertained or if the contracts are made at the same time, all contracts must be annulled first and then renewed in favour of one of them or some other person. If they still refuse, then the people must take arms against them. If the contract is made in favour of someone else, the newly contracted imām has to make war against them until they are subjected and returned to obey him. Here again al-Bāqillānī draws analogies from marriage contracts and says that if the guardians (wulāt) of a woman, each separately and validly contracted marriage for her, the prior contract is the valid one. But if priority cannot be established then the contracts must be renewed in favour of one of them or of some other person, and al-Bāqillānī concludes that "so is the case of the imāmate."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>290</sup> Ibid.

Obviously, al-Bāqillānī rejects the possibility of two or more imāms at one time to whom submission is incumbent.<sup>291</sup>

# (7) The qualities of the imām.

Regarding the qualifications of the imam, al-Baqillani mentions the following: (a) the imam has to be a descendant of the Quraysh and must be a genuine Qurayshite (min al-samim) and not a client (mawla). This is based on four reasons: first, the Prophet said to his companions,"Imams are of Quraysh"; second, Abū Bakr and 'Umar's argumentation on that Tradition against the Ansār's claim during the Saqīfa meeting; third, the report ascribed to al- Abbas that he commanded the Muslim community to entrust the leadership to the Quraysh; fourth, the consensus of the Muhājirīn and the Ansar in the early years of Islam on the belief that the imamate was not valid except in the hands of Quraysh after conflict broke out between the two groups.<sup>292</sup> With this statement al-Baqillani rejects the Kharijites' allegation that the imamate might be legitimately invested for a Muslim of any race on condition that he is righteous and can execute his responsibilities properly. Similarly, al-Bāqillānī refutes the arguments maintained by the Dirārīs who argue that the imamate of a non-Qurayshite is lawful.<sup>293</sup> He also declines the Shī ite claim that the imamateis rightly held only by a particular clan of Quraysh, that is the House of 'Alids, as the Tradition itself does not specify any clan of Quraysh;294 (b) the imam must possess knowledge (religious knowledge) which qualifies him to be qadi, since the imam must nominate judges and examine their decisions and all matters related to their affairs; he will not be able to do this unless he knows as much as they do if not more. In addition, it has been a consensus of the umma that the imam must examine justice and laws himself and must not delegate them to a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>291</sup> Ibid., 180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> Ibid., 182.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> Ibish, *Political Doctrine*, 97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>294</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, *al-Tamhīd*, 184.

qāḍī as long as he is able to dispense justice himself; <sup>295</sup> (c) he must possess good judgment in matters of combat and organization of armies; he must guard the boundaries and protect Islamic territory and the Muslim community, prevent oppression and remove the grievances of the oppressed and do the best for its welfare; (d) he must have good judgment in matters of administration because he is to conduct the affairs of the *umma*; (e) he must have fortitude in war and severity in the implementation of legal punishments and in punishing criminals; (f) he must be the best possible candidate (alafḍal), yet it is legal to invest the imāmate to the best available (al-mafḍūl) candidate if there is anomalous condition (disorder or civil strife). <sup>296</sup> Al-Bāqillānī bases his argument on the Traditions in which the Prophet says," The *umma* must be led by the best person among them," and," Your leaders are your intercessors with God, give precedence to the best among you." <sup>297</sup>

# (8) The impeccability of the imam.

Al-Bāqillānī rejects the claim of the Shī tites that the imām has to be sinless and has to know esoteric meanings and possess all knowledge of religion so that nothing can escape his attention. He argues that the imām is appointed to enforce Islamic law (Sharī a) and to execute legal punishments (iqāmat al-hudūd) and everything that the Prophet had laid down. The umma already knows the Sharī a and the imām only acts on behalf of the umma. The umma is obliged to turn him from error (tasdīdīhī) and to guide him to the right path, and to remind him (idhkārihī) and to take privileges away from him if necessary. When he commits an act that leads to his deposition, allegiance is given to another. All this does not necessitate the imām to be sinless, nor do his officers, judges, tax collectors, consultants, assistants and guards have to be sinless either. 298

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>295</sup> Ibid., 183.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>296</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>298</sup> Ibid., 184-185.

Al-Bāqillānī also refers to the Rāshidūn caliphs, who did not claim themselves to be sinless. Abū Bakr is reported to have said: "Obey me as long as I obey God, but if I disobey Him then I have no claim on your obedience to me." 'Umar is also reported to have said," God bless the man who draws our attention to our mistakes. "Therefore, al-Bāqillānī maintains that the ancient generation had admitted the possibility of committing mistakes and did not claim to be immune from sin. <sup>299</sup>

Al-Bāqillānī is reticent concerning the 'adāla (proper conduct) which revokes the contract of the imāmateif it is made by an "evildoer". However, al-Bāqillānī's silence on this issue is easily understood when one realizes that the caliphate was under the control of the Buwayhid regime. The caliphate was "made" by the *amīrs* who most probably did not strive for 'adāla. 300

# (9) The necessity of the imamate.

The reasons that necessitate the imāmate or the appointment of imām, according to al-Bāqillānī, are the following: (i) to administer the army and protect borders; (ii) to curb oppressors and to remove the grievances of the oppressed; (iii) to enforce and maintain law or legal punishments; (iv) to divide the revenues of conquests (al-fay') among Muslims; (v) to secure the pilgrimage and to dispatch troops against the enemies of Muslims. Therefore, al-Bāqillānī, according to Ibish, "has admitted the necessity of an imām on the same fundamental reasoning as the necessity of law. His arguments if pushed to their logical conclusion would lead to the Ash'arite principle that the imāmate is obligatory by revelation, not by reason." 302

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>299</sup> Ibid., 185.

<sup>300</sup> Ibish, Political Doctrine, 99.

<sup>301</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 185-186.

<sup>302</sup> Ibish, Political Doctrine, 102.

### (10) Forfeiture of the imamate.

After discussing the purpose of the office of the imāmate, al-Bāqillānī explains the reasons that call for the deposition of the imām. The reasons that lead to the removal are the following: (i) change from belief to unbelief; (ii) abandoning prayer and not encouraging it; (iii) sinfulness and acts of injustice such as seizing someone's possession illegally, striking people, committing murder, neglecting rights and hampering the execution of legal punishments; (iv) madness and loss of discretion and maturity which will harm the Muslims, when recovery is not expected; (v) physical infirmities such as deafness, muteness and senility or other accidents which hinder the ability to look after the affairs of Muslims and performing the duties of the office; (vi) loss of liberty in imprisonment when release is not expected anytime soon and the *umma* is in trouble. If these infirmities happen, the imam has to be deposed and the imāmate has to be given to another. If he is released or regains consciousness or recovers from his sickness his office is not restored to him because another imām has already been established when he has been deposed and he can no longer retain his rights.<sup>303</sup>

Al-Bāqillānī admits, however, that ahl al-ithbāt (jurists) and ahl al-hadīth (traditionists) maintain that the imām cannot be deposed or disobeyed for the above mentioned reasons (i, ii, and iii), but that the people (more specifically ahl al-hall wa al-faqd) are responsible for counselling him, reminding him and disobeying him when he asks them to commit sins (ma āṣī). They support this opinion by referring to the Traditions attributed to the Prophet and the Companions on the obligation to obey the imāms even when they are unjust and appropriate people's possessions. <sup>304</sup> In this respect Ibish says, "Al-Bāqillānī implicitly supports this view not only for the sake of logical consistency, but also he has fears that stem from the possibility that the

<sup>303</sup> Al-Bāqillāni, al-Tamhīd, 186-187.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid., 186.

Buwayhids might establish a Shī ite caliph in Baghdād - as they actually contemplated this possibility at the time when al-Bāqillānī wrote his *Tamhīd*." 305

### (11) The imamate of the inferior imam.

Al-Bāqillānī does not consider that the imām has to abdicate his office in favour of a "better" imām (alfal). He maintains that finding a better imām does not necessarily lead to the forfeiture of an imāmate which is validly contracted. His argument is based on reports from pious predecessors that the imām who commits sin after he is established in office should not necessarily be deposed. But if the sinfulness of the imām has been found at the beginning of the contract, the contract must be annulled and the imāmate must be given to someone else. The examples of this are many in the Sharī'a, such as when one who makes tayammum (ablution with sand, instead of water) and finds water before he starts praying, one cancels the tayammum and should make ablution (wvdv) using water. 306

# b) Al-Bāqillānī's defense of the Rāshidūn caliphate.

The Ṣaḥāba, "the ten to whom Paradise was promised" (al-ʿAshara al-mubāshara), were the most outstanding followers of Muḥammad and the closest to him. The most distinguished of the ten were the first four caliphs: Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān and ʿAlī. 307

The Sunnites hold that the degree of excellence (tafqii) amongst the Rāshidūn caliphs is exactly the same as their chronological order of succession. But the Shī°ites sharply reject this view and restrict the excellence (faqii) and the imāmateto ʿAlī and his descendants to the exclusion of the rest. The Shī°ites oppose the ijmā of the umma as a means by which the imām is appointed, and maintain that "the imāmate is on the authority of God and the Apostle and is not to be determined by the agreement or choice

<sup>305</sup> Ibish, *Political Doctrine*, 103.

<sup>306</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 187.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid., 109.

of men."308 The Shī°ite endeavour to prove their point in theory and in practice lead them to repudiate, denounce and even insult three of the most respected companions: Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān. This has always become the main target for an attack on Shī°ism in the eyes of Sunnite Muslims.<sup>309</sup>

Having rejected the Shi te claims for the 'Alids, the egalitarian anarchism of the Khārijites and in conformity with his Sunnite juristic tradition of justifying the *ijmā* of the *umma*, al-Bāqillānī goes on to discuss and to defend the legitimacy of the imāmate of all four caliphs.<sup>310</sup>

In an attempt to defend the imāmate of the Companions, al-Bāqillānī always mentions three important points: first, the means whereby each of them was established in office; second, his personal qualifications, and third, the way he exercised his power. In each discussion of the four caliphs, we will always refer to the first two points. We consider it unnecessary to deal with the last point since it emphasizes historical aspects of the caliphs after they had legally been appointed imāms or caliphs rather than basic arguments of their being appointed imāms. The following is al-Bāqillānī's defense of the Companions, beginning with Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān and 'Alī.

### (1) Abū Bakr

i) The means whereby he was established in office.

According to al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr was the most qualified man of his generation for the imāmate and those who contracted it to him at Saqīfa were the best men (afāḍil) or "those who loosen and tie" (ahl al-ḥall wa al-ʿaqd) like ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and ʿUbayda b. al-Jarrāḥ, who were themselves qualified for the imāmate. Also the contract was made in the presence of Bashīr b. Saʿd, Usayd b. Khuḍayr, ʿImrān b. Ḥusayn and other Anṣār and some Muhājirīn. This contract was thus made in the

<sup>308</sup> Ibid.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid., 110.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid., 111.

presence of the majority of the companions and *ahl-al-qidwa* (people of noble character who deserve to be followed) and the oaths of allegiance were paid to him by all the Companions. Nobody denied him or rebuked him, but all Muslims (of Madīna) paid allegiance to him. 'Abbās and Zubayr were absent, but upon their return they did not hesitate to pay allegiance to him. <sup>311</sup>

Al-Bāqillānī rejects the tradition that 'Alī, 'Abbās and Zubayr b. 'Awwām delayed in paying allegiance to Abū Bakr because the report was based on *akhbār āḥād* (doubtful authority), and because their delay in paying allegiance was sinful and rebellious, and it is impossible to ascribe disobedience to the Companions, especially when Abū Bakr demanded that they obey him and uphold the unity of the *umma* and forbade their delay in paying allegiance. Al-Bāqillānī further maintains that those who claimedthat 'Alī, 'Abbās and Zubayr were late had lied.<sup>312</sup>

# ii) The personal qualifications of Abū Bakr

Al-Bāqillānī argues that Abū Bakr was the man best fitted for the imāmate because of his unique personal qualifications. These were: (a) he was [after Muḥammad's wife, Khadīja] the first to believe in Muḥammad's message ( Taṣdīq al-Rasūl) and was surnamed "al-Ṣiddīq" on account of his reaction when the Meccan infidels called the Prophet a liar; (b) he was the first to "strive in the way of God" ( jihād fī sabīl Allāh) with the Prophet and assisted him with all his personal power and wealth; (c) he accompanied the Prophet in the cave [during his migration to Medīna, to escape from the Meccans]; (d) he built a mosque, where he ardently called the Meccans to Islam; among those who embraced Islam through his da wā were 'Uthmān, Ṭalḥa, Zubayr and most of the companions; (e) he bought and manumitted some tortured slaves who converted to Islam; (f) the Prophet always gave space to Abū Bakr on his right

<sup>311</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 188-189.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid., 188.

because of the respect he had for him and for consultation and advice; (g) in the year 9/630 the Prophet appointed Abū Bakr to the very important office of conducting the pilgrimage.<sup>313</sup>

- (2) 'Umar b. al-Khattāb.
- i) The means whereby he was established in office.

Al-Bāqillānī maintains that 'Umar was the second greatest imām in Islam. Abū Bakr bequeathed the imāmate to 'Umar by testament and by first consulting the Companions and demanding that they look for someone who was fitted for the imāmate. But they asked his opinion on the matter. He told them that he would let them know his candidate for successor. He then made a famous *khutba* (speech) in which he mentioned 'Umar's qualities. The 'ahd' (bequest of the imāmate) took place in the presence of a group of Companions and other Muslims who all accepted Abū Bakr's testament and approved his decision. Talḥa first resisted the nomination of 'Umar explicitly because 'Umar, according to him, was rude and vicious but later he accepted it and admitted Abū Bakr's wisdom in bequeathing the imāmate to 'Umar. 15 Ibish, however, maintains that Abū Bakr's wise decision was based on three main arguments:

- a) Good motives. Abū Bakr was always concerned with the welfare of the umma, its well being and its prosperity. When he was aware that "his days were numbered," he wanted to perpetuate the policies. Therefore, al-Bāqillānī is convinced that there is no reason to doubt Abū Bakr's motives. 316
- b) Logical choice. Al-Bāqillānī, referring to the statement of Ṭalḥa, 'Uthmān and 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Awf to Abū Bakr, maintains that 'Umar was fitted to follow Abū Bakr.<sup>317</sup>

<sup>313</sup> Ibid., 187-189.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., 197.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid.

<sup>316</sup> Ibish, Political Doctrine, 110.

<sup>317</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 198.

c) The legality of Abū Bakr's action. Al-Bāqillānī argues that it is lawful for the imām (Abū Bakr) to bequeath the imāmate to his successor ('Umar) by testament. Starthermore, Abū Bakr's bequeath of the imāmate to 'Umar followed the same pattern as giving the contract to him because it was contracted in the presence of the Companions and the majority of the Muslims. They then confirmed his testament and endorsed his opinion and nobody rejected him. Moreover, al-Bāqillānī says, "If the imāmate is validly contracted on behalf of one who is fitted for it by the contract of a single pious man who is qualified to be a judge, then the imāmate of 'Umar is valid, for who is more qualified than Abū Bakr to be an elector ('āqid'). And who is more fitted, after Abū Bakr, for the imāmate than 'Umar."

# ii) Personal qualifications of 'Umar.

Al-Bāqillānī holds that 'Umar was the man most fitted for the imāmate after Abū Bakr because of his personal qualifications. He enumerates many sayings of the Prophet and mentions the merits of 'Umar and his qualities.<sup>321</sup> Ibish concludes al-Bāqillānī's defense of 'Umar as follows:

(a) 'Umar was of the Sahāba and of "the ten to whom Paradise was promised"; (b) the Prophet himself was impressed by 'Umar's personal abilities and leadership and appointed him over the Sadaqāt of Quraysh; (c) he was with the Prophet at Badr and Uhud and took part in Jihād; (d) he was of high moral character and possessed great personal initiatives and strength of will; (e) he was the closest to Abū Bakr and therefore had knowledge of the affairs of the umma. 322

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>318</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>319</sup> Ibid.

<sup>320</sup> Ibid., 202; Ibish, Political Doctrine, 117.

<sup>321</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 200.

<sup>322</sup> Ibish, Political Doctrine, 117-118.

- (3) 'Uthman b. 'Affan
- i) The means whereby he was established in office.

Al-Bāqillānī defends the imāmate of 'Uthmān by asserting that he was the third imām, after Abū Bakr and 'Umar. He became imām when 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Awf contracted the imamate to 'Uthman in the presence of all of the "people of consultation" (ahl-al-shūrā) except for Talha. But the latter took the oath of allegiance soon after. 'Uthman was then elected by ahl-al-shūra who were appointed by 'Umar to choose his successor. Al-Bāqillānī justifies 'Umar's appointment of a six-men council consultation (shūrā) by the following argument:(a) 'Umar did not want to follow Abū Bakr's precedent of bequeathing the imamate to anyone because he feared trouble and disorder; (b) Umar appointed six men to the council because they were the best ( atādil) in the umma and hence were the best "electors"; (c) to take precautions, to insure the interest of the umma, to avoid chaos and to prevent an unfitted aspirant to this office, Umar considered that a consultative body was necessary to elect his successor. 323 Nevertheless, al-Bāqillānī argues that the justification of 'Umar's shūrā has nothing to do with the validity of the imamate of 'Uthman. He holds that if 'Umar's appointment of the shūrā is considered a mistake, this does not matter, because the imamate was validly contracted to 'Uthman by 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Awf who was one of the qualified electors and therefore it was obligatory upon the rest of the ununa to give him allegiance.324

ii) The personal qualifications of 'Uthman.

Al-Bāqillānī argues that 'Uthmān was the Companion most fitted for the imāmate after Abū Bakr and 'Umar because of his personal qualifications. After comparing the same qualifications of 'Uthmān with the early two caliphs, al-Bāqillānī goes on to give the following specific qualifications of him: (a) he contributed materially to the cause of

<sup>324</sup> Ibid.

<sup>323</sup> Al-Bāqillānī, al-Tamhīd, 202-203; Ibish, Political Doctrine, 121.

Islam; (b) he was very close to the Prophet because he was a companion and son-in-law; (c) he was one of those who had extensive knowledge of the Qur³ān and the ordinances of Islamic law; (d) he was the army musterer (of the 'usra'), the buyer of the Rūma well and the one who enlarged the Prophet's mosque. 325

(4) Alī b. Abī Tālib.

i) The means whereby he was established in office.

Accepting the traditional order of the Rāshidūn caliphs in which 'Alī was put at the end of the succession, al-Bāqillānī, like other Sunnite scholars, maintains that 'Alī was the fourth and last of the great Rāshidūn caliphs and the best fitted for the imāmate after Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān. The justification of 'Alī's imāmate is based on the following arguments. When 'Uthmān was killed and the rebels led by al-Ghāfiqī who controlled al-Madīna intended to kill its inhabitants, the companions urged 'Alī to assume the office of the imāmate since he was the person whom the rebels regarded him the only eligible candidate for it. But at first 'Alī refused the offer fearing any suspicion of complicity in the murder of 'Uthmān and therefore, he offered the imāmate to other companions, like Ṭalḥa and Zubayr, but both rejected it. 326

When the threat of the rebels to kill the people of Madīna escalated, a group of Muhājirīn and Anṣār demanded that 'Alī accept the imāmate and they took the oath of allegiance to him. After thinking of the welfare of the *umma* and people's support of him and his own confidence that he was the most learned, the most meritorious and the most fit among the companions to lead the *umma*, 'Alī accepted the imāmate. They then contracted to him the imāmate and gave him the oath of allegiance. Among those present were Khuzayma b. Thābit, Abū al-Haytham b. al-Ṭayyihan, Muḥammad b. Maslama and 'Ammār. 327

325 Ibid., 202.

327 Ibid

 $<sup>^{326}</sup>$  Al-Bāqillānī,  $\it al\mbox{-}\it Tamhīd$  , 229.

Talḥa and Zubayr reluctantly recognized 'Alī's imāmate after they were forced to pay allegiance to him by the rebels under the duress of the sword. When Ṭalḥa and Zubayr returned to Baṣra they said, "We pay allegiance to you ('Alī) if you kill the killer of 'Uthmān," and 'Alī said," Both paid allegiance to me but discharged their obedience in 'Irāq." Nevertheless, al-Bāqillānī argues, the electors (who paid him allegiance) were competent men, the contract was legal and the imāmate of 'Alī was a true imāmate and obedience to him was incumbent upon all Muslims. The forced oath of allegiance of Ṭalḥa and Zubayr to 'Alī and their delay did not invalidate the imāmate of 'Alī, according to al-Bāqillānī, because the imāmate was completely contracted to him by many people (Muhājirīn and Anṣār) before both companions paid him allegiance.<sup>328</sup>

Al-Bāqillānī also argues that the statement ascribed to both Ṭalḥa and Zubayr that they paid allegiance to 'Alī on condition that he kill the killer of 'Uthmān was not authentic because the agreement of 'Alī, Ṭalḥa and Zubayr was a wrong agreement from a religious point of view. This story (nwāya) must therefore be rejected because contracting the imāmateto a man on the condition that he should kill a group of people was a wrong and forbidden act. In addition, the imām might have his own ipithād (personal judgment) and his ipithād might not lead him to kill people by his own hand. Al-Bāqillānī evidently suggests that 'Alī's main goal was to preserve the unity of the umma. Therefore, it was permissible for 'Alī to postpone the legal punishment and to examine the case thoroughly. This measure was better and more appropriate for the unity of the umma and for their protection from corruption. Nobody can contract the imāmate to one of the Muslims on condition that he has to establish a legal punishment and execute it based on the people's opinions, nor can he accept the imāmate with this condition. Therefore, the statement attributed to both Ṭalḥa and Zubayr should be rejected. If the statement was authentic and Ṭalḥa and Zubayr really had paid allegiance

<sup>328</sup> Ibid.

to this condition and 'Alī accepted it, they committed mistakes, but his imāmate remained valid. The mistake on this point made by an imām whose imāmate was valid, cannot be considered as moral depravity leading to his deposition and a loss of people's obedience to him. <sup>329</sup>

Al-Bāqillānī argues that although Ṭalḥa, Zubayr and ʿĀisha rebelled against ʿAlī, this did not invalidate his imāmate and there was no reason for their disobedience because his imāmate had been contracted to him. He could not be deposed as his imāmate was valid nor could he be deposed by other people because of his failure in the establishment of punishment. Their rebellion against ʿAlī came from their *ijtihād* as they were among the jurists. 330

Al-Bāqillānī also deals with those who were not subjects to the pressure of 'Alī's followers and left al-Madīna without paying him allegiance, like Sa'd b. Abī Waqqās, Sa'īd b. Zayd, 'Amr b. Nufayl and 'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar, Muḥammad b. Maslama (al-Anṣārī) Usāma b. Zayd, Salama b. Waqsh and others. Al-Bāqillānī argues that they declined to take 'Alī's side, not because they rejected his imāmate and considered it illegal, but because they did not want to fight their fellow Muslims and wished to avoid committing sin in supporting 'Alī in this conflict. <sup>331</sup>

# ii) Personal qualifications of 'Alī.

Al-Bāqillānī holds that 'Alī possessed the following personal qualifications with which made him fit for the imāmate: (a) he was one of the early believers in the message of Islam; (b) he was a great fighter in the cause of Islam and he "strove in the way of God" and in the protection of the Prophet; (c) he was of the closest companions to the Prophet and was the Prophet's son-in-law; (d) the Prophet appointed him his deputy in al-Madīna during his raid on Tabūk; (e) he was well versed in law and the Prophet

<sup>329</sup> Ibid, 232.

<sup>330</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>331</sup> Ibid., 233-234.

said: "The best  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$  among you is 'Alī"; (f) there are some traditions in which the Prophet showed a great respect for 'Alī and ordered the Muslims to give him respect as he said: "Whoever recognizes me as his  $mawl\bar{a}$ , will know 'Alī as his  $mawl\bar{a}$ ."; (g) he possessed knowledge and experience in the management of armies and the tactics of war.<sup>332</sup>

With these arguments and others already mentioned earlier, al-Bāqillānī ends his discussion of the Sunnite imāmate and his defense of the imāmate of the Rāshidūn caliphs, and thus ends his *Tamhīd*.

Ibish concludes his discussion of al-Bāqillānī's doctrine of the imāmateby saying that he has systematically refuted the following Shī'ite doctrines: (i) designation of 'Alī as Amīr al-Mu'minīn, imām and caliph; (ii) the exclusive imāmatein the house of 'Alī; (iii) the imām possesses an occult interpretation of the Qur'ān and a body of secret knowledge; (iv) the imām has interpretative functions and can define dogma: (v) the imām is himself the only authoritative source of doctrine: (vi) the sinlessness of the imām. 333 Furthermore, Ibish maintains that al-Bāqillānī was a consistent Sunnite jurist in his approach to political theory for his whole effort was to vindicate the ijmā' of the umma. Al-Bāqillānī formulated a theory which related to the possibility of an imāmate being maintained by force when Sunnites were living in a territory under the control of their enemy. He quickly referred to this possibility in his discussion of the problem of "different imāms for different sects" and to the "imām in captivity" and he decisively repudiated the validity of such an imāmate. He supported the election of a Sunnite imām to whom submission is obligatory. He was probably warning the Shī'ites in general and the Fātimids in particular that such an imāmate was illegitimate and would meet with

<sup>332</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>333</sup> Ibish, Political Doctrine, 106.

serious reaction. At the same time he must have been pushing the Sunnites to prepare themselves to repulse any effort made to terminate the Abbāsids. 334

### 3. The Shāfi ites

The majority of the Shāfi ties of Baghdād adhered tightly to the conservatism of the ancient pious generation for the formulation of the credo, without rejecting the legitimacy of kalām. Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī and al-Māwardī were included among the scholars of the law who did not condemn Ash arism, but did not adhere strictly to it and maintained their freedom of judgment. However, Shāfi ism (in Baghdād) had indeed found an ardent supporter in the personality of Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī (d.406/1015), 335 who attempted to make the Shāfi ite school an official credo of the caliphate and did not hesitate to launch attacks against the Ḥanafites and Mālikites. His student, al-Māwardī, did not share this exclusivism, and though he affirmed his preference to Shāfi ism, he gave the other three schools of law a place in his Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya, which he referred to and rendered to the caliph in the choice of his decision. 336

Abū Ḥāmid was born in 341/952 (in Isfarayn) and came to Baghdād in 364/974 when he was young. He studied *figh* with Abū al-Ḥasan b. Marzubān and with Abū al-Qāsim al-Dārikī and learnt Ḥadīth from some traditionists of Baghdād, including 'Abdullāh b. 'Adī.<sup>337</sup> He spent most of his life in Baghdād and devoted himself to attaining knowledge so that he became a leader of the Shāfī 'ites and was highly respected by the people and authorities alike. Fakhr al-Mulūk Abū Ghālib (the Buwayhid vizier) and other high ranking officials used to visit him and granted him alms tax and almsgivings which were to be distributed to the poor among his followers. He held his sessions in the mosque of Ibn al-Mubārak, which was located in the Rabī '

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>334</sup> Ibid., 106-107.

<sup>335</sup> Isfarayn was a village in Khurāsān, one of the districts of Nīshāpūr on the middle road to Jurjān. Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-A'yān, vol. 1, 72-73.

<sup>336</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 59.

<sup>337</sup> Al-Baghdādī al-Khatīb, Tārīkh, vol. 4, 368.

quarter, and it is said that his lecture used to be attended by about seven hundred jurists of different schools of law. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Qudūrī said, "None of the Shāfi tites (during his time) was the most learned except Abū Ḥāmid." Even al-Qudūrī went further by saying that al-Isfaraynī was more learned than Shāfi 1.338 And the qāḍī Abū Abdillāh al-Ṣaymarī when asked who was the most distinguished among the Shāfi tites, answered, "Abū Ḥāmid." 339 When he died, many people attended his funeral and mourned for him. 340

Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī made a commentary (ta'līqāt) on the Mukhtaṣar of al-Muzannī of 50 volumes in which he mentioned the divergent opinions of the scholars, their basis of opinions and their debates. He wrote Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 341 al-Ta'līqāt al-Kubrā and Kitāb al-Bustān fi Nawādir wa al-Gharā'ib. 342

His relationship with the caliph al-Qādir can be seen in the incident of Ibn Mas'ūd's *muṣḥaf* (resension), mentioned earlier, during which he appointed a committee of jurists to condemn the *muṣḥaf*. 343 He was also among the jurists who signed the manifesto, defaming the Fāṭimid caliph in the caliphal palace. 344 And when there was a rumour that the caliph was dying, he sat next to the caliph in the mosque during Friday prayer when the latter read some verses of the Qur'ān. 345 He was also appointed by the caliph as mediator between him and Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin the Ghaznavid. 346 However, there occurred a breach between the caliph al-Qādir and al-Isfaraynī on a *fatwā* 347 issued by the latter. The effect of this breach is that al-Isfaraynī

<sup>338</sup> Al-Subkī, *Tabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyya al-Kubrā* ([Egypt]: Maṭba'at al-Ḥusayniyya al-Miṣriyya, [1960]), vol. 3, 25.

<sup>339</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 277-278.

<sup>340</sup> Al-Baghdādi al-Khatīb, Tārīkh, vol. 4, 368.

<sup>341</sup> Ibn al-'Imad, Shadharāt al-Dhahab, vol. 3, 178.

<sup>342</sup> Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-A'yan, vol 1, 72-73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>343</sup> Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam*, vol. 7, 235.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>344</sup> Ibid., 256.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid., 246.

<sup>346</sup> Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Misr wa al-Qāhira, vol. 4 (Berkeley: University Press, 1909), 239.

<sup>347</sup> We have no account that explains which fatwā annoyed the caliph.

wrote a letter to the caliph, saying," You cannot depose me from my legal authority (walāyatī) that God has endowed upon me, but I can depose you by sending a letter to Khurāsān with just two or three sentences."<sup>348</sup> Unfortunately, we have no account which records the follow up of this threat to the caliph or how they were reconciled.

Another important Shāfi tie atim who established good relations with the caliph al-Qādir and contributed to strengthening his caliphate was al-Māwardī. He was a contemporary of both caliphs, al-Qādir and al-Qā'im (422/1031-467/1075). Al-Māwardī's complete name was 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb Abū al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī known as al-Māwardī and was born in 364/974. He lived in Baghdād and learned Ḥadīth from al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī al-Jaylī and some other traditionists. He died on 30 Rabī' al-Awwal 450/27 May 1058 at the age of eighty six. He was appointed qādī by al-Qādir at various places, including that of chief qādī of Ustuwa near Nīshāpūr, and was finally posted in Baghdād. He was among the distinguished Shāfi'ite jurists and wrote many works on uṣūl al-fāqh and its branches and on other fields of Islamic knowledge. He was one of the most important counselors of the caliph and was charged by the latter with the appointment and dismissal of other qādīs and was deputized by the caliph for his negotiations with the Buwayhids. 350

Al-Māwardī was first in the service of al-Qādir. The caliph one day summoned four jurists representing the four schools of law to write for him abridged legal works according to their schools (*madhhab*). The three jurists of the schools of law presented their own *mukhtaṣar* (abridgment) and al-Māwardī wrote *al-Iqnā*. The caliph, however,

<sup>348</sup> Al-Isnāwī, *Tabaqāt al-Shāfi iyya*, 58; al-Subkī, *Tabaqāt al-Shāfi iyya*, vol. 3, 26.

<sup>349</sup> Al-Baghdādī al-Khatīb, Tārīkh, vol. 12, 102.

<sup>350</sup> Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam: an introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: the Jurists (Oxford: University Press, 1981), 83.

recognized al-Māwardī's work as the best, and in appreciation of his merit appointed him as the  $aqd\bar{a}$  al- $qud\bar{a}t$  (the supreme  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$ ). 351

The association of al-Māwardī with this group of jurisconsults and theologians brought him into contact with his principal master, one of the most famous Shāfi°ite doctors, Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfaraynī, who enjoyed the confidence of the caliph. Abū Ḥāmid al-Isfraynī was often a mouthpiece of the Sunnites. On the death of al-Qādir in 422/931 al-Māwardī passed more directly and more openly under the service of the caliph (al-Qā°im) who appointed him as one of his regular functionaries. 353

Although al-Māwardī was a resolute Sunnite and a Shāfi'ite jurist, he was equally favoured by both the Buwayhids and 'Abbāsids. But the Shī'ite Buwayhids favoured him for political purposes since he was often successful in settling quarrels within the palace. In this respects, Yāqūt says, "He was highly respected by the Buwayhids sulṭāns who appointed him as their deputy to negotiate between them and their adversaries, and were satisfied with his mediation and confirmed his settlement." 354

Al-Māwardī was acknowledged as one of the most learned men of his time. He was not only a distinguished  $q\bar{a}d\bar{i}$  but also a famous author. Muṣtafā Sakkā in the introduction to the *Kitāb Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn* mentions fifteen titles of al-Māwardī's works, covering Islamic law, politics, morals ( $akhl\bar{a}q$ ) and Arabic literature. However, al-Māwardī's well known extant works are *Kitāb al-Ḥāwī*, al-Iqnā', Siyāsat al-Mulk, Qawānīn al-Wuzarā', Adab al-Dunyā wa al-Dīn, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya and Nuskat wa al-Uyūn, a commentary on the Qur'ān. 355

<sup>351</sup> Yāqūt, Mu'jam al-Udabā' (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1991), vol. 4,

<sup>314.

352</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>353</sup> Ibid.

<sup>354</sup> Qamaruddin Khan, Al-Mawardi's Theory of the State (Lahore: Bazm-i- Iqbal, n. d), 19.

<sup>355</sup> C. Brocklemann, "al-Māwardī," in E. I., new ed., vol. 6, 860.

Among the works mentioned above, his al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyya is the most well known. It concerns us here because it relates to our discussion of al-Qādir's relations with the Shāfi te scholars and his effort at maintaining the Sunnite caliphate. H.A.R. Gibb maintains that the caliph entrusted al-Māwardī to make negotiations with the Buwayhids and to restore Sunnism. 356 There is no account to indicate that he wrote the *Aḥkām* for al-Qādir or al-Qā'im. Laoust, however, makes an assumption that al-Māwardī wrote it between the years 437/1045-6 and 450/1058; therefore, he wrote it for the caliph al-Qa<sup>2</sup>im.<sup>357</sup> What is quite certain is that al-Mawardi wrote it upon the "demand of someone to whose loyalty is incumbent," 358 namely the caliph, whether al-Qādir or al-Qā'im. While it is possible that the  $Ahk\bar{a}m$  was assigned to al-Qā'im, it is equally possible that it was written on the request of al-Qadir. If one of the purposes of al-Māwardī in writing the Aḥkām was to preserve the caliphate from the encroachment of the Buwayhids, the question remains as to why he delayed in writing it after the succession passed to al-Qādir's son, al-Qā'im. Before the reign of al-Qādir the Buwayhids had already been holding the rein of the caliphate. It is quite possible that al-Qādir asked al-Māwardī to write the Aḥkām as he asked al-Iṣṭakhrī to write the Refutation of the Bātiniyya and al-Bāqillānī to write the Imāmate of Banī 'Abbās. It is more probable that al-Māwardī wrote al-Aḥkām during his service under al-Qādir because his master, with the help of Mahmūd b. Sabuktagin, tried to restore Sunnism, opposing the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites alike. In addition, the Shī<sup>c</sup>ite literature, especially that related to the doctrine of imamate, was elaborated during his time by both al-Mufid and al-Murtadā. As a Sunnite scholar who was in the service of the caliph, he must have been called on to defend the Sunnite imamate. Therefore, as Gibb maintains,

<sup>356</sup> Ibid.

<sup>357</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 15.

<sup>358</sup> Al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya wa al-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyya* (Egypt: Makatabat wa Maṭba at Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1973), 3.

the first step to restore it was through an authoritative work on the rights of the caliph which had been neglected. 359

Gibb further states that al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyya was written for political purposes in the rivalry between the caliph and the Buwayhid amīrs. This is because the caliphate, after having been acknowledged as the highest authority in temporal matters for the past three generations, was now being undermined by the Buwayhid amīrs. On the other hand, as a supporter of the caliphate, al-Māwardī tried to save or at least to delay the destruction of the 'Abbāsid caliphate during this political crisis. He also wanted to prove that the caliphate remained alive and could not be separated from the structure of Islam because it was ordained by God who had made it a strong basis for Islamic law to prevail in the world and for the welfare of the Muslim community. In addition, since the caliphate was in decline, al-Māwardī endeavoured to give legitimacy to the relationship between the weak caliph as spiritual leader of the Muslims and the free and strong amīr as deputy of the caliph. 360

Since al-Māwardī's discussion on the theory of the Sunnite imāmate is not very different from that of al-Bāqillānī, we consider it unnecessary to elaborate all of al-Māwardī's formulations except what has not been discussed or explained insufficiently by al-Bāqillānī. Al-Māwardī supplies ample explanation on the following points: (i) the responsibilities of the imām; (ii) inheritance and testament in regard to the imāmate; (iii) the forfeiture and seizure of the imām; (iv) the establishment of the emirate.

#### (1) The responsibilities of the imam.

Al-Bāqillānī does not mention the responsibilities of the imām as al-Māwardī does in detail. The former only discusses them when dealing with the necessities of the imāmate in which he mentions five duties of the imām. Al-Māwardī maintains that the

<sup>359</sup> Gibb, "al-Māwardī," 92.

<sup>360</sup> Ahmad Mubārak al-Baghdādī, al-Fikr al-Siyāsī inda Abī al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (Beirūt: Dār al-Ḥadītha, 1984), 116.

imām is required to carry out ten duties as follows: (i) to safeguard the established principles of religion and what has been propounded by the consensus of the ancient authorities; (ii) to execute judgement between litigants and to settle disputes between contestants; (iii) to protect the Islamic territory (al-bayda) and the household; (iv) to execute the legal punishment; (v) to strengthen the frontiers with provisions and forces; (vi) to fight those who refuse to embrace Islam after being invited to do so until they accept Islam or enter into a contract and become *clhimmīs*; (vii) to collect legal taxes and alms imposed by the *Sharī* a; (viii) to fix the stipends (a a a a and the allocations which must be made by the treasury appropriately; (ix) to look for trusted persons (a a a a and to appoint advisers who are sincere to perform the functions and take care of the funds; (x) to oversee affairs personally and to investigate the circumstances carefully. If the imām has performed all these duties he has the right to demand from the people their obedience and support as long as his own situation does not change.

Commenting on the public duties of the imam mentioned above Lambton says,

Al-Māwardī's discussion of the above public duties of the imām was possibly directed against the increasing contemporary conception of the caliphate as merely a religious and judicial office. The main problem occurred between the caliph and the Buyids (Buwayhids) had been their complete disregard of him in matters of administration. Al-Māwardī insists once the imām was recognized, it was the duty of the community to place in his hands all affairs of general interest and not to do anything without or against his orders, so that he could occupy himself with affairs and undertake the direction of the tasks entrusted to him. 362

### (2) Inheritance and testament in regard to the imamate.

Al-Bāqillānī does not explain in detail the issue of testamentary designation of the imām to his successor. He seems to have allowed this bequeath of the imāmate when he discusses the legitimacy of Abū Bakr's bequeath of the imāmate to 'Umar. Al-Māwardī maintains that the contract of imāmate by nomination of the reigning imām is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>361</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>362</sup> Lambton, State, 91.

permissible and legal according to general consensus on the basis of two precedents: the first was the appointment of 'Umar by Abū Bakr, secondly, the latter appointed a council, *shūrā* (of six people) to elect his successor ('Uthmān).<sup>363</sup> These precedents were used by al-Māwardī to validate the transfer of the caliphate (from one caliph to the other) within the 'Abbāsid dynasty.<sup>364</sup>

The imām cannot nominate a son or father until he consults the electors and when they judge his nominee suitable for the office, the allegiance is given to him. The second opinion is that he may also nominate both his son and father without consulting the electors because he is the sovereign whose word is command for the nation to obey whether believed to be in its interest or against it. The third opinion is that the imām may nominate his father, not his son, because by nature he will be more partial to his son than to his father. He may also appoint other members of his family or even a stranger without any agreement from electors.<sup>365</sup>

Once the imām has nominated a successor who is properly qualified according to the conditions necessary for the office, the nominee only needs acceptance for the appointment to take effect. The imām may simultaneously nominate two or more successors stipulating the order in which they can succeed him, in which case the electors have to choose one after the other. This argument is based on the Prophet's action when he appointed three commanders of the army for the battle of Mu³ta, namely Zaydb. Ḥāritha who was succeeded by Ja°farb. Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and then by Abdullāh b. Rawāḥa as one after the other was killed. Likewise, Hārūn al-Rashīd nominated three of his sons respectively, al-Amīn, al-Ma°mūn and al-Mu³tamin.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>363</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>364</sup> Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 33.

<sup>365</sup> Al-Māwardī, al-Ahkām, 10.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>367</sup> Ibid., 13.

If the imām dies and then is succeeded by his successor, the latter may choose his own successor without regard to the appointment made by the deceased imām because he was no longer bound by him. This ruling is based on the Shāfi ite doctrine and the opinion of the majority of jurists. <sup>368</sup>

Once the imām is invested either by selection or by testament, it is obligatory for all members of the Muslim *umma* to learn of this fact, but it is not necessary for them to recognize the imām directly or to know his name. Only the electors whose word is accepted by the one on whom the office of imāmate (caliphate) is conferred need to know him in person and by name. <sup>369</sup>This is clearly against the view of the Zaydites. <sup>370</sup>

Once the caliph is acknowledged, the whole Muslim community must entrust public business to him without interference or opposition so that he can execute his duties in safeguarding their interests and accomplishing their affairs. He is called caliph (vicar) because he is a vicar of the Messenger in ruling his *umma* and may be addressed as "Caliph of God's Messenger" or simply caliph. Some scholars maintain that he may be called "Caliph of God" on the ground that he oversees what is owed to God by his creation based on QS 6:165, "He it is Who has placed you viceroys on earth and has exalted some of you in rank above others." <sup>371</sup>

#### (3) The forfeiture and seizure of the imam.

Al-Bāqillānī has discussed the forfeiture of the imām and in principles he was in agreement with al-Māwardī, but the latter explains in more detail the imām whose liberty was curtailed by the enemy. The changes which lead to the forfeiture of the imāmate, according to al-Māwardī, are two things: first, lack of justice on the part of the imām as a result of sinfulness or heresy; secondly, physical disability. The latter is of three kinds:

<sup>368</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid.

<sup>370</sup> Gibb, "al-Māwardī," 297.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>371</sup> Al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām*, 15.

missing senses, missing organs and curtailment or loss of liberty.<sup>372</sup> The physical disability of the first two kinds need not to be discussed here. But the curtailment or loss of liberty is important to be dealt with. This relates closely to the problem of the caliphate at the time al-Māwardī was writing. The principal question is whether a caliph can still be considered an imām of the Muslim *umma* or not if the administration of the state has been taken by one of his assistants who claims to hold executive authority without publicly showing defiance to the caliph. Al-Māwardī answers affirmatively and skillfully on the relation between the caliph and the usurper, namely by reference to the Buwayhids *amūrs*.<sup>373</sup>

If the usurper acts in accordance with the laws of Islam and the demands of justice, he may be endorsed to manage the administration of the state and to implement its regulations in order to avoid any interception of religious duties that may put people in danger. If his acts deviate from the law of religion and the requirements of justice, he should not be invested and the seized imām must seek the help of those who will curb the usurper and remove him from power.<sup>374</sup> With this statement al-Māwardī may have intended to send a hidden threat to the Buwayhids, or if we agree with Laoust's assumption that the composition of al-Ahkām took place in later days, he may have intended to exhort the Seljuqs against the seizure of the caliph's powers; or he may have been determined to warn the competing groups of dissidents in Baghdād that the caliph might invite the Seljuqs to help him. <sup>375</sup>

Another form of the curtailment of the caliph or loss of his liberty is coercion, meaning that the imām becomes the captive of an irresistible enemy with no possibility of escape, whether he is seized by the infidel or a rebel Muslim; in this case the investment of the imāmate is prevented because someone in such a condition is unable

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>372</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>373</sup> Lambton, State, 92.

<sup>374</sup> Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām, 20.

<sup>375</sup> Lambton, State, 92.

to manage the affairs of the Muslims; accordingly, the community must elect someone else from among capable persons. If, on the other hand, the imam becomes captive after the imamate has been contracted to him, it is incumbent upon the whole community to solicit his release because he has the right to obtain their support so long as his rescue is possible either by war or by ransom. If there is no hope of his release, his captors have to be either infidels or rebellious Muslims. If his captors are infidels, his office is forfeited and the electors should resume to contract the imamate to someone else. If the imam nominates his imamate to someone else in his captivity there are some considerations to be taken into account. If the nomination made after his release is thought to be impossible, the nomination of a successor is invalid because the appointment is made after his leaving office. If an appointment of a successor is made while there is a possibility of his release the appointment is valid because he is still in power, and his appointment of a successor is valid once his imamate is made ineffective by loss of hope for his release. If his liberation happens after there is no hope to regain his liberty, he may not be reinstated, because he has left the imamate due to the impossibility of his release, and the imamate has been passed to his successor. If he is rescued, he remains in his office and the nomination of his successor is valid though the latter has not yet been invested.<sup>376</sup>

If the imām is in the hands of Muslim rebels he remains in his office as long as his liberation is expected. If there is no hope of his release, the rebels face two situations: they either have appointed an imām of their own, or they have not. Should they be in a such state of anarchy that they have not chosen an imām, their captive imām (in their hands) will retain his office since allegiance and obedience to him is incumbent upon them. In such a case the status of the imām is the same as he has fallen under the custody of his assistants. The electors have to appoint someone to act on his behalf if he cannot

<sup>376</sup> Al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām*, 20.

do so himself, but if he can he has a better right to do so than they. If the captive imām decides to step down or dies, such a deputy does not automatically succeed him because his deputyship to act for a living person ends with the death of that person.<sup>377</sup>

If the rebels have appointed an imām of their own, paying him allegiance and obedience, the imāmate of captive imām is forfeited due to the impossibility of his release because the captors have separated from the rest of the community with their own government and shifted their obedience elsewhere. Since the true Muslims (ahlal-ʿadl) have no hope for help from them and the captive in their hands has no power, the electors in the region where true religion prevails (dār al-ʿadl) have to contract the imāmate to a new ruler who enjoys their assurance. If the captive later obtains his liberty, he will not retain the imāmate because he has been deposed from his office. 378

In this discussion al-Māwardī seems to have attempted to maintain the continuation of the 'Abbāsid caliphate in the event of Fāṭimid control over Baghdād, or "to make provision for its continuation in the event of the caliph being captured by one of contenders for power in Baghdād and the neighbourhood."<sup>379</sup> In the latter event, perhaps he wished to insinuate that the seizure of the imām will be of no avail; if their treatment of him was injurious to his imāmate, the community, if they cannot release him, will nominate another in his place.<sup>380</sup>

# (4) The establishment of the emirate.

After discussing al-Māwardī's theory on the imāmate, what concerns us now is his views on the appointment of the emirate since this relates to the fact that the 'Abbāsids, when al-Māwardī wrote his *Aḥkām*, were undermined by the Buwayhid amīr al-umarā' who originally was an amīr or governor of a province. On the

<sup>377</sup> Ibid.

<sup>378</sup> Ibid.

<sup>379</sup> Lambton, State, 94.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid.

contrary, we do not discuss the vizierate because this institution during the Buwayhid period had been taken over by the Buwahid viziers, while the caliph had only his secretary. Therefore, it is not important to discuss it here.

Al-Māwardī divides provincial governorship into general and special<sup>381</sup>: The general governorsip is of two kinds: one is the imarat al-istikta and the other is imarat al-istīlā. The former is a governorship which is freely conferred by the sovereign and entails a particular territory and assigned areas of jurisdiction. The other is the imarat alistīlā, a governorship which is obtained by appropriation and accorded because of special circumstances. The usual practice for the imarat al-istikfa is that the caliph delegates authority to the amīr over a district or a province covering all of its inhabitants and the allocated sphere of government. The amīr of the imārat al-istiktā is responsible for seven duties as follows: (i) to organize the armies and despatch them to the different areas as well as determine their pay, but if the caliph has fixed it, the amīr merely has to dispense it; (ii) to administer justice and appoint judges; (iii) to collect the land tax and almsgivings, appoint officials to perform these functions, and distribute what has to be distributed; (iv) to defend the faith, protect the household and prevent the religion from innovation or heresy; (v) to establish the legal punishments as regard to the rights of God and men; (vi) to lead the Friday and congregational prayers until he appoints someone to do so; (vii) to arrange for the pilgrims from his province and those who pass through it to have all the help they need on the journey. If this district is a border adjacent to the territory of the enemy, an eighth duty is to fight the enemies crossing the border and distribute the spoils taken during the war, taking out the fifth share of the booty for its stipulated benefactors. The same obedience is accorded to the holder of the

<sup>381</sup> A special governorship is conferred to an amīr (governor) with limited powers. He is authorised only to manage the army, maintain public order, defend and protect the Muslim lands, but he is not allowed to administer justice and collect taxes. The prerequisites of this particular governorship are fewer than those applicable to the general in one respect, since a governor with full powers may administer justice while a governor with limited powers may not. Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām, 32-33.

imārat al-istikfā' as to the imām. The same qualities are required of him as of the vizier of delegation (wazīr al-taf wīd).382

The imarat al-istila, which is established by coercion, occurs when a leader acquires by force certain districts and then is invested by the caliph with the emirate and the latter delegates him their management and the maintenance of public order therein. By seizing power, the amir becomes independent in controlling political matters and administration, while the caliph with his permission becomes the executor of the religious laws, thus changing what is unlawful to lawful and what is forbidden to be permissible. In spite of the fact that the imam's measure does not stick to the prerequisites and rules of conventional appointment, his action sustains the canon law and its provisions cannot be disregarded. Thus, decisions that will normally be unlawful sometimes are permissible by reason of the difference between ability and inability.<sup>383</sup>

Al-Māwardī lays down seven aspects of religious law that are safeguarded by the investment of the emirate to a usurper; these must be performed by both the caliph and the usurper, but the pledge of the latter to them is the stronger: (i) the amīr must preserve the office of the imamate as khilatat al-nubuwwa (vicarship of prophecy) and its function of managing the affairs of the religious community so that what is laid down by the sharf'a with regard to its establishment may be upheld and the rights arising from it protected; (ii) the amir must show religious obedience (which is seldom the case with a recalcitrant and sinful amir ); (iii) he should make an agreement of friendliness and mutual assistance which will give Muslims authority over all others; (iv) all contracts dealing with religious authority should be conceived as legal and the verdicts should not be declared void owing to the invalidity of their selections or defects in their sanctions of nomination; (v) the taxes endorsed by the Shari'a should be collected legally so that the taxpayer knows that he has paid his dues and the beneficiary may receive them lawfully;

 <sup>382</sup> Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām, 30.
 383 Ibid., 33.

(vi) the legal punishment should be executed and implemented against those who deserve them because no believer is exempt from God's prohibitions; (vii) he must be pious and God-fearing and cautious of His prohibitions, commanding them to fulfill His rights if they are faithful and warning them to obey Him if they are disobedients.<sup>384</sup>

According to al-Māwardī, by observing these seven principles of the religious law the rights of the imāmate and the rules of the community are maintained, and it is for this purpose that the investment of the usurper is required. If he meets the requirements of selection, his investiture is obligatory in order to persuade him to obedience and to prevent him from rebellion and opposition. With authorization granted to him (by the imām) he has the power to manage both religious and worldly affairs and the regulations applied to him when he appoints a vizier or deputy as when the caliph appoints a vizier or deputy. He is permitted to appoint a vizier of delegation ( wazīr al-tafwīd) or a vizier of execution ( wazīr al-tantīdh) .385

If the usurper lacks some of the qualifications for the office, it is permissible for the caliph to announce his investment as a means of winning him over and putting an end to his defiance and resistance. The effectiveness of his administration of religious affairs and rights of the community depends upon the appointment of a qualified deputy by the caliph, so that the qualifications fulfilled by the deputy may compensate for the imperfection of the usurper, and the office may belong to the latter but the right of execution to the former. Although it is contrary to normal practice, this option is permissible for two reasons: (i) necessity dispenses with conditions which have to be fulfilled; (ii) fear of harm to public interest mitigates requirements which will not be mitigated in private affairs. 386

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>384</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>385</sup> Ibid.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid.

From what have been explained above, we learn that al-Māwardī in his exposition makes every attempt to show that the 'Abbāsid caliphate is the only legitimate caliphate while other imāmates, like the Fāṭimids and Umayyads, were illegitimate. In addition, al-Māwardī tries his best to demonstrate that the 'Abbāsid caliphate, despite the fact that it was in the grip of the Buwayhids and was in decline, must be maintained.

Another Shāfi tie scholar who contributed to the maintenance and defense of the Sunnite imāmate is 'Abd al-Qāhir b.Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad al-Tamīmī, Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādī known as al-Baghdādī. Although he was not directly associated with al-Qādir like al-Māwardī, he was contemporary with both and he was a great 'ālim (scholar) whose works show a broad knowledge of Islam. In the most important work, 'Uṣūl al-Dīn', he defends the Sunnite imāmate. For this reason we consider him worthy to be included here among the scholars who were inspired directly or indirectly by the caliph's attempt to maintain the Sunnite imāmate. It is equally possible that he, like other Sunnite scholars, felt the responsibility to defend the Sunnite imāmate against the attack of the Shī 'ites whose works prevailed during the Buwayhid reign.

Al-Baghdādī was a great and honourable imām, very learned in the following fields: jurisprudence, *uṣūl*, *'ilm al-farū'iḍ* (the science of the law and descent and distribution), arithmetic and *'ilm al-kalām* (the science of speculative theology). He was a well-known scholar and his far reaching reputation attracted many Khurāsānīs to study under his guidance. He learnt Ḥadīth from 'Amr b. Nājid and Abū 'Amr b. Ja'far b. Maṭar and others. He left Nīshāpūr during the rebellion of the Turkomen and fled to Isfarayn and died there.<sup>387</sup>

His birth and youth are unknown to his biographers. He came to Nīshāpūr with his father, Abū 'Abdillāh Ṭāhir, who left for his son considerable wealth. Al-Baghdādī spent most of his money on his teachers. He first studied under the guidance of Abū

<sup>387</sup> Al-Subkī, *Tabaqāt al-Shāfi iyya*, vol. 3, 238; Ibn 'Asākir, *Tabyīn al-Kadhib al-Muftarā*, 253-254.

Isḥāq (al-Isfaraynī) who appointed him to his position, which he held for years. Many great *'ulamā'* visited him and studied under his guidance, such as Nāṣir al-Marwadhī and Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī.<sup>388</sup>

Al-Imām Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his *Kitāb al-Riyāḍ al-Mu'niqa* says that Abū Manṣūr al-Isfaraynī refuted his opponents skilfully. Al-Rāzī further maintains that among his works, *Kitāb al-Takmila fī al-Ḥisāb*, was the best one. It is said that when Abū Manṣūr came to Isfarayn the people were very joyful of his coming but he stayed there for only a short time; he died in 429/1037 and was buried next to his master Abū lsḥāq.<sup>389</sup>

Among his works are Kitāb al-Tafsīr, Fadā'iḥ al-Mu'tazila, al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, al-Faṣl fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, Tafḍīl al-Fāqir al-Ṣābir 'alā al-Ghānī al-Shākir, Fadā'iḥ al-Karrāmiyya, Ta'wīl Mutashābih al-Akhbār, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, Nafy Khalq al-Qur'ān, Kitāb al-Ṣifāt, al-Īmān wa Uṣūlihi, Bulūgh al-Madā 'an Uṣūl al-Hudā, Abṭāl al-Qaul bi al-Tawallud, al-ʿImād fī Mawārith al-ʿIbād (the best work of this subject), Kitāb al-Takmila fī al-Ḥisāb, Sharḥ Miftāḥ Ibn al-Qas, al-Naqd mā 'Amalahū Abū 'Abdillāh al-Jurjānī fī Tarjīḥ Madhhab Abī Ḥanīfa, Aḥkām al-Waṭ' al-Tāmm or Iltiqā' al-Khitānayn. He also wrote on the meaning of al-Taṣawwuf (Ṣūfism) and al-Ṣūfī (Ṣūfī) and collected many current opinions of the Ṣūfīs. 390

Al-Baghdādī's formulation of the theory of the Sunnite imāmate in his  $Us\bar{u}l$  al-  $D\bar{u}n$  is more or less the same as that of the above mentioned scholars. Therefore, we will only mention al-Baghdādī's discussion on the imāmate which is not dealt with by al-Bāqillāmī and al-Māwardī, or differs from them in certain points, namely: (i) the circumstances of the appointment of the imām; (ii) the number of the imāms; (iii) the appointment of the imām after the death of the Prophet.  $^{391}$ 

<sup>388</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>389</sup> Ibid.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid., 239.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>391</sup> Al-Baghdādī, *Uṣʊl al-Dīn* , 271-291.

### (1) The circumstances of the appointment of the imam.

Al-Baghdādī states that the Sunnites maintain that the appointment of an imām is obligatory under every circumstance in which there is no manifest imām and rendering obedience to him is also compulsory if he is visible. The Sunnites do not allow for the possibility of a time when people are obliged to pay obedience to an imām who is concealed and not manifest, in opposition to the belief of various Shīʿite sects in the continued existence of concealed imāms. <sup>392</sup>

### (2) The number of imams at any one time.

Al-Baghdādī states that there is disagreement amongst those who hold to the necessity of the imāmate as to the number of imāms at any one time. According to his associates, it is unlawful to have two imāms at the same time to whom submission is required, but the imāmate of one imām is validly contracted at that time and the rest must be under his banner. If they rise against him without any cause that calls for his dismissal, they should be considered rebels unless there is a sea between two countries which prevents the inhabitants of each country from helping each other. In this case it is lawful for the people of each of the two lands to contract the imāmate for the inhabitants of that region alone. This view opposes those of the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites and the Karrāmites, although the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites permit the existence of two imāms on condition that one is the speaking imām and the other is the silent one. 393

# (3) The appointment of the imam after the death of the Prophet.

According to al-Baghdādī, there was disagreement among the community on the appointment of an imām after the death of the Prophet, in particular after the *fitna* (civil strife) which started with the death of 'Uthmān. The majority of Muslims uphold the validity of the imāmate of Abū Bakr and this was the view of the Islamic leaders for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>392</sup> Ibid., 273.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>393</sup> Ibid., 274.

many centuries. The Rāwandiyya argue that the imāmate after the Prophet was to be contracted for his uncle, 'Abbās. The Shī'ites defend the imāmate of 'Alī after the Prophet. The proof for those who support the imāmate of Abū Bakr is that the people at the time were divided into three groups: a first group who supported the imāmate of Abū Bakr, a second group who defended the imāmate of 'Alī and a third party who maintained the imāmate of 'Abbās. However, 'Alī and 'Abbās paid allegiance to Abū Bakr although they delayed doing so for days, when they finally joined all Muslims in paying homage to Abū Bakr. It is unlawful for one to claim that their inward intention in this allegiance was contradictory to their outward expression and those who maintain this view are no different from the Khārijites who claim that the bāṭin (inner feeling) of 'Alī when giving allegiance to the Prophet was different from his zāhir (outward expression). If this last argument is rejected, the imāmate which at that time was in favour of Abū Bakr and both 'Alī and 'Abbās had paid allegiance to him, the former's imāmate was valid and the obedience to him was incumbent. 394

#### 4. The Hanbalites

In this section we will not discuss all the Ḥanbalite scholars who established relations with al-Qādir, because they have been discussed earlier. We will present here only one important figure of the Ḥanbalites during the reign of al-Qādir, namely Abū Ya<sup>c</sup>lā. He is noted because he, like al-Māwardī, wrote a book which discusses the theory of the imāmate.

As his biography and his works have already been covered, we will only put forward here his ideas on the theory of the imamate based on the Hanbalite school of law. In many respects his theory of the imamate has some similarities with his predecessors, although there are some differences. Among the points which resemble those of his predecessors we mention the appointment of two qualified candidates, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>394</sup> Ibid., 282.

forfeiture and seizure of the imām, the duties of the imām, the duties of the *amīr* and the exigency of the appointment of *imārat al-istīlā* (governorship by seizure). Therefore, in this section we will elaborate the following topics: i) the necessity of the imāmate; ii) the prerequisites for the electors; iii) the prerequisites for the imām; iv) moral, physical and mental defects that call for the removal of the imām; v) the appointment of the imām; vi) the nature of the contract; vii) the nomination of the heir apparent; viii) the nomination of two more heir apparents; ix) the establishment of the emirate.

### (1) The necessity of the imamate

Abū Ya°lā maintains that the appointment of an imām is obligatory. He refers to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal's statement related by Muḥammad b. ʿAwf b. Sufyān al-Ḥimsā: "There will be confusion if there is no imām who governs the affairs of people." Abū Yaʿlā also refers to the event of Anṣār's assembly in the hall (Saqīfa) of Banī Sāʿida, where they said," There must be an imām from us and an imām from you," However, according to many accounts, Abū Bakr and 'Umar convinced them and said," Indeed, the Arabs do not obey except this tribe of the Quraysh." If the imāmateis not obligatory, the people would not be involved in debate and discussion on the matter. However, there is also an opinion that the imāmateis not obligatory. <sup>395</sup>

As regards the necessity of the imāmate, it is based on tradition or revelation because reason ( 'aq1') does not know whether something is obligatory or permissible, and whether it is lawful or forbidden. It is a collective obligatory and is addressed upon two groups of people: the first group are ahl al-ijūhād (those who are competent to make individual judgment) and the others are those who are qualified for the imāmate. 396

<sup>395</sup> Abū Ya<sup>c</sup>lā, *al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya* (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1983), 19.

396 Ibid.

### (2) The prerequisites for the electors

The prerequisites for the people who are qualified to choose the imām are three: i) probity; ii) knowledge by which they know who is qualified for the imāmate; iii) they have to be people of reason and organization. Ya Ta Tuther maintains that those who live in certain cities do not have a special privilege to initiate the election of an imām. But those who live in the city where the previous imām died have the right to contract the imāmate because they would be the first to know of the death of the imām and because the one who is qualified for the imāmate is usually found in the city where the ruling imām lives. 398

# (3) The prerequisites for the imam

The imām has to fulfill four prerequisites: i) he must be a genuine Qurayshite, namely be among the children of Quraysh b. Badr b. Naṣr. Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal in one report said,"One who is not a Qurayshite cannot be the caliph."; ii) he must have same qualities as those of a  $q\bar{a}d\bar{t}$ : freedman, mature, intelligent, knowledgeable and just.; iii) he must be capable of administering military and political affairs, implementing criminal punishment, showing no mercy to punish criminals and protecting the *umma* (Muslim community); iv) he must be the most excellent in knowledge and piety. <sup>399</sup>

Imām Aḥmad seems to disregard the necessity of justice, knowledge and excellence. 'Abdus b. Mālik al-Qaṭṭān relates that Aḥmad said," He who subjugates people with sword (by force) and becomes caliph and is addressed as *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*, it is not allowed for anybody who believes in Allāh and the Day of Judgment to sleep without knowing his imām, whether he is good or bad person; he is *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*." In *al-Muḥsinah* it is reported that Aḥmad called al-Mu'taṣim *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* on many occasions, whereas the latter asked him to believe that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>397</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>398</sup> Ibid.

<sup>399</sup> Ibid., 20.

Qur'an is created, and he was even beaten for his refusal; he also called al-Mutawakkil Amīr al-Mu'minīn, even though he was not among ahl al-īlm (those who were knowledgeable) and he was not the most excellent in knowledge among people of his time. However, there is another report that contradicts this story. Ahmad is reported to say," How great the calamity was when one became an enemy of Allāh and Islam; namely he mortifies the Sunna," meaning that he promoted the notion that the Qur'ān is created before al-Mutawakkil who then revived the Sunna. Abū Ya'lā interpreted Aḥmad's statement, reported by 'Abdus and others, that if there is an impediment for the appointment of a just, knowledgeable and excellentimām, it is permissible to appoint an imām (without these prerequisites) provided that most people are reassured by his imāmate and unanimous in support of him, and ignoring them will cause disorder. 400

(4) Moral, physical and mental defects that call for the removal of the imam

#### A) Moral defects

If the imām has the above-mentioned qualities during the contract of the imāmate and then loses them after the contract, the contract has to be evaluated. If there is a defect in his probity, namely sinfulness, it does not invalidate his imāmate, whether it relates to his actions such as he commits sins or it is related to his faith, such as he has dubious opinions which oppose the truth (of religion). This is clear from Aḥmad's opinion reported by al-Marwadhī regarding the amīr who drank wine and indulged in overeating, but when he went on campaign, these habits only affected himself. Aḥmad also addressed al-Mu<sup>\*</sup>taṣim as Amīr al-Mu minīn, even though the latter persuaded him to maintain that the Qur<sup>\*</sup>ān is created. 401

Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal related that during the reign of al-Wāthiq the jurists of Bahghād came to Abū 'Abdillāh and said,"This issue becomes aggravated and spread widely - namely they spread the idea of the createdness of the Qur'ān- we come to tell

<sup>400</sup> Ibid.

<sup>401</sup> Ibid.

you that we are not pleased with his sovereignty." He said, "Put your denial in your heart, do not disobey him and do not make the Muslim community disintegrate." 402

(B) Physical and mental defects

Abū Ya'lā explain the physical and mental defects that call for the removal of the imam. He maintains that if a defect is found in his body, this has to be examined. For example, if the imam suffers from any physical illness from which he is expected to recover, such as unconsciousness, this cannot impede the contract nor remove his imamate because this is a temporary illness. It is reported that the Prophet was unconscious when he was sick. When recovery from illness is not expected, such as madness and insanity, this sickness must be examined. If sickness continues, this hinders the contract of the imamate and its continuation, meaning that as soon as he suffers from it, he has to be deposed because he is barred from establishing legal punishment, fulfilling rights and protecting Muslims. If his illness sometimes comes and disappears and he recovers completely, this has to be evaluated. If most of time he is insane it is treated as complete madness. If most of time he is fine, there are some opinions: according to one opinion, the contract of the imamate is unlawful, but a question arises: does it remove his imamate? It is said that it impedes his appointment and terminates his imamate because in that condition he fails to properly administer. Others maintain that this does not forbid him from keeping his office although it is forbidden to contract to him the imamate because from the beginning of his appointment he must be in complete health, and once he has a major defect he has to be deposed. 403

Abū Ya<sup>c</sup>lā explains physical defects which may influence the imāmate. Since they are very detailed we will condense them and divide them into three categories: i) defects which forbid the appointment of the imām and remove his imāmate: loss of sight, loss of both hands and feet; ii) defects which neither impede the appointment nor

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>402</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>403</sup> Ibid.

terminate the imāmate: rupture of the penis and loss of testicles, stuttering, hardness of hearing, loss of ears, amputated nose and gouged eye; iii) defects which forbid the appointment but permit the maintenance of his imāmate: loss of sense of taste, deafness and dumbness. 404

Concerning a weak sighted-person, Abū Ya°lā maintains that if he recognizes persons when he sees them, he is allowed to be appointed imām, but if he sees persons but does not recognize them, he is not allowed to be contracted to the imāmate, nor can his office be maintained. 405

Abū Ya<sup>c</sup>lā also mentions external causes for the curtailment of the imām by one of his assistants. However, we will not elaborate it here because to a great extent it is similar to al-Māwardī's exposition on the issue.

## (5) The appointment of the imām.

The imamate is validly contracted by two ways: i) by the appointment of the qualified electors; ii) by nomination of the preceding imam. The appointment of the qualified electors is not valid except by agreement of majority of them. Ishaq b. Ibrahim reported that Ahmad said," The imam who is chosen by all of the qualified electors is the valid imam," meaning that the imamate is established by the election of the majority. 406

It is reported from the authority of Aḥmad that the imāmate may be established by force and victory and does not need a contract. 'Abdus b. Mālik al-'Aṭṭār reported that Aḥmad said," Whoever defeats them with force, until he becomes caliph and is addressed as *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* unlawful for anybody who believes in Allāh and the Day of Judgment to go to bed without knowing whether his imām is a good or bad imām. Another tradition of Aḥmad describes the obligation of performing Friday prayer with the one who is victorious. Aḥmad also refers to the tradition of Ibn 'Umar who

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>404</sup> Ibid., 21-22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>405</sup> Ibid.

<sup>406</sup> Ibid., 23.

prayed with the people of Madīna during a riot and said,"We are with the one who is victorious." 407

If qualified electors reach a consensus on the election they have to scrutinize the qualities of the people who are qualified for the imāmate. The contract for the imāmate is given to the most excellent of those who have the most complete prerequisites. If there is one person among the community whom they individually judge to be most entitled for the imāmate and he accepts it, the imāmate is conferred to him and allegiance has to be paid by all of the Muslim community. If he rejects the imāmate and does not accept it he must not be forced to accept and another person who is entitled to it must be appointed. If all of the people refuse to pay allegiance to him, two opinions arise as to whether this is a sin, and whether it is incumbent upon believers. Al-Marwadhī quoted Imām Aḥmad's statement," The Muslims are obliged to have a ruler, in order that the rights of the people are not lost."

The significance of Aḥmad's statement was that he made the administration of justice and testimony parts of the collective obligations (fard al-kifāya). Even though the Prophet had blamed the court, it is clear that the imāmate is a collective obligation. It is not detestable for someone to seek it or to accept it. The people of the consultative body (appointed by 'Umar) disagreed, but a seeker of it was not rejected because the people needed the imām to protect the territory of Islam and guard the households, execute punishment and protect their rights, so that their need for the imām was like their need for washing the corpse and bringing it to the graveyard, and the command to do good and forbid evil. 409

<sup>407</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>408</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>409</sup> Ibid.

#### (6) The nature of the contract.

The contract is to be pronounced," We pay allegiance to you with consent to establish justice and to execute the obligations of the imāmate." For this the clasping of hands is not needed. 410

### (7) The nomination of the heir apparent

If the imām nominates a man as heir apparent, he has right to remove the latter from the succession before he dies because the imāmate of the heir apparent is not yet established as long as the imām is still alive and remains in office. Since the imāmate of the heir apparent is not yet valid, the imām may exclude him from the succession. Similarly, a testator has right to exclude a legatee because a will is not in effect if a testator is still alive.<sup>411</sup>

According to Abū Yaʿlā, the heir apparent has to fulfill the prerequisites of the imāmate when the nomination is made and they have to be maintained after the ruling imām dies. If the heir-apparent is still young when he is nominated it is unlawful because even though the imāmate can be established after the death of the ruling imām, the prerequisites of the imāmate have to be fulfilled during the appointment. The prerequisites of the legatee are considered during the testament even though its validity is considered only after his death. 412

If he nominates a successor in his absence and this is known, this is lawful but it depends on his appearance. If the ruling imām dies and the successor takes time to appear the Muslims have to cancel the contract and the qualified electors must choose a deputy on the successor's behalf and they would contract to him a deputyship, not the imāmate. When the successor arrives the deputy is deposed. 413

<sup>410</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>411</sup> Ibid.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid., 25-26.

<sup>413</sup> Ibid.

If the imām renounces his imāmate whatever the reason, sovereignty is transferred to the heir apparent, his deposition being equated with his death. 414

### (8) The appointment of two or more heir apparents.

If the caliph nominates two or more heir apparents and their precedence is not decided and the electors select one of them after the ruling imām dies this is lawful. The principal rule in this appointment is that it must be rendered to the *ahl al-shūrā* (consultative body) not the electors. If the imām has to be chosen by the consultative body among some candidates- one of them has to be elected during the lifetime of the ruling imām to give his consent to the consultative body, because he is more entitled to the imāmate. If they fear disorder after his death they can ask his permission before his death. If the condition of the imām is a desperate one, this has to be evaluated. If his faculties are lost and his opinion is hampered, his condition is similar to his death regarding the lawfulness of the choice of a successor.<sup>415</sup>

There is a question as to whether it is lawful for the imām to nominate one of the qualified electors as he nominates his successor. One opinion states that it is lawful because it is one of his rights. But according to the opinion of the Ḥanbalite school of law this is unlawful for two reasons: first, the contract of the imāmate depends on a consensus of all qualified electors; second, the imāmate of the heir apparent is established after his death with appointment by the people of the time.<sup>416</sup>

If the imām says," I entrust the sovereignty to so and so, but if he predeceases me or his condition changes, the imām after him is so and so," this is lawful and is considered a nomination with conditions. If the first appointed heir lives and is healthy until the imām dies, he becomes imām, not the second named party. If he predeceases the imām or his condition changes for one of the aforementioned three reasons, the second

<sup>414</sup> Ibid.

<sup>415</sup> Ibid.

<sup>416</sup> Ibid

becomes imām. Similarly, if the imām says, "If the second heir dies or his condition changes, the imāmateis for so and so," it is lawful. 417

The grounds for nominating the heir apparents is a report related by al-Dāru Quṭnī regarding the Prophet's sending out troops to Mu²ta, he said," Zayd b. Ḥāritha is your leader, if Zayd is killed, then Jaʿfar, if Jaʿfar is killed, then ʿAbdullāh b. Rawāḥa." This tradition was also noted by other scholars.

If the imām nominates a man and then says,"If the heir dies after being investigated and rendered the imāmate, the imām after him is so and so," the heir whose name is mentioned and appointed first becomes imām after him. If the heir dies or is exiled for some reason, the one who follows him has no right for succession because the imāmateis rendered to the one that is nominated by the deceased or exiled imām. If the latter becomes imām, he has complete action, consideration and choice, and the nomination is given to the expected candidate. 419

If the heir who has been nominated by the imam as his successor changes in quality before the imamate is contracted to him, the imamate of the ruling imam remains. For this reason his nomination is given to someone else he sees as lawful. 420

Abū Yaʿlā has the same opinion as other scholars on the invalidity of addressing the imām as *khalīfat Allāh*; he bases his ruling on the same tradition which is adopted by other Sunnite scholars. Similarly, in regard to the duties of the imām, he mentions the same ten duties exactly as al-Māwardī, only differing in wording. Therefore, we will not mention them here.

<sup>417</sup> Ibid.

<sup>418</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>419</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>420</sup> Ibid.

#### (9) The establishment of the emirate

If the caliph appoints an <code>ammir</code> (governor) over a district or country, this has to be examined. If his emirate (governorship) is general, the caliph delegates him the authority over a country or a district and he has jurisdiction over all its inhabitants and regions he gains general control over them. The duties of this <code>ammir</code> are seven as already mentioned by al-Māwardī. The prerequisites for this emirate are the same as the vizierate of <code>talwid</code> (vizierate of delegation). The contract of this emirate has to be reviewed. If the caliph has appointed him, the vizier of <code>talwid</code> has the responsibility to supervise him and maintain him. If the caliph does not appoint him, he has to be deposed and he is not allowed to be transferred from one district to another. If the vizier has appointed the <code>amir</code>, this needs evaluation. If he appoints him on behalf of the caliph, it is not permitted to depose the <code>amir</code>, nor to transfer him from one district to another except with the permission of the caliph. If the vizier is deposed, the <code>amir</code> remains at his post, but if the vizier appoints the <code>amir</code> on his behalf, he becomes a deputy of his, and it is lawful to depose him and to look for a deputy as long as he makes an individual judgment in looking for a better person. <sup>421</sup>

If the vizier appoints the amīr freely and, there is no clear statement whether this is on the vizier's behalf or on the caliph's behalf, the amīr's appointment is on behalf of the vizier and he has a right to depose the amīr. When the vizier is deposed, the amīr is deposed too except when the caliph keeps his emirate, this is a limitation of the authority of the vizier and a resumption of the appointment, but he does not need to pronounce the words of contract as are usually required at the beginning of the contract of imāmate. The caliph would say," I appoint you as ruler over a province." In the beginning of such an appointment, the caliph has to pronounce," I invest you for such and such district as administrator over its subjects and over all of its affairs." 422

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>421</sup> Ibid., 34..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>422</sup> Ibid., 35.

If the caliph entrusts to him this emirate he does not deprive vizier of his control over it, and its maintenance. If the caliph invests him with the vizierate, it does not depose this *amīr* from his emirate. 423

If the *amīr* is appointed by the caliph, he cannot be deposed with the death of the caliph, but if he is appointed by the vizier, he must be deposed with the death of the vizier because the appointment of the caliph represents Muslims, while the appointment of the vizier represents himself. The vizier is deposed with the death of the caliph even though the *amīr* cannot be deposed, because the vizierate is an office representing Muslims. 424

Abū Yaʿlā then goes on to discuss in detail the rights and privileges of the amīr, beginning with his right to increase the salaries of the troops up to his responsibility for organizing the pilgrims to Mecca. It is unnecessary to present them here.

He divides the emirate into three categories: i) general emirate (imārat al-istiklā'), which is contracted by the caliph as mentioned above; ii) the specific emirate (imārat al-khāṣṣa), where the amīr is appointed by the caliph but his duties are limited to organizing soldiers, administering subjects, protecting Islamic territory and guarding households. He is not obliged to administer the affairs of justice, nor to collect taxes on land and charities; iii) emirate by seizure (imārat al-istīlā'), where the amīr takes over a district with force and then the caliph gives him its emirate and delegates to him its administration. We will not explain further this emirate because Abū Ya'lā's elaboration is similar to that of al-Māwardī in many respects.

The prerequisites for the amīr who holds the imārat al-istīlā are considered similar to those of the vizierate of tantīdh (vizierate of execution) along with two additional conditions, namely Islam and freedom, because the nature of sovereignty (wilāya) includes religious affairs which cannot be administered by an infidel or a

<sup>423</sup> Ibid.

<sup>424</sup> Ibid.

slave. There is no prerequisite of learning and scholarship, and if they are found, they only indicate merit. 425

As regards the prerequisites for the specific emirate, they are the same as those of the general emirate, except that one prerequisite is excluded from it, namely that the amir must have knowledge because one whose emirate is general has to make his own decisions, while the amir of a specific emirate does not. None of them has to inform the caliph of the manner in which he carries out the normal business of the province except by carefulness. In the case of an extraordinary event, they should act only after informing the caliph and obtaining orders from him. If they fear the spread of disruption if they deal with it, they should repel matters which cause enmity (between them) until the caliph's decision is rendered to them to solve their disagreement because the opinion of the caliph in times of disaster is effective through his control of general affairs. 426

### 5. The Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites.

Mu'tazilism during the reign of al-Qādir and his successor, al-Qā'im, still retained many partisans who were involved in politics as defenders of the caliphate and of Sunnism, and who were often also interested in *kalām*, *figh* and *hadīth*. Abū Sa'īd al-Iṣṭakhrī (d.404/1013), for instance, composed a refutation of the Bāṭiniyya at the behest of the caliphal-Qādir, who rewarded him and granted him an annual pension.<sup>427</sup> Unfortunately, his work seems to have been lost, so that we do not know the contents of it. In addition, we find very little information about this figure in biographical works.

Next to Abū Sa<sup>c</sup>īd al-Iṣṭakhrī is another Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite who played an important role during the reign of al-Qādir, namely the Shāfi ite *qāḍī* 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025). He was well known among contemporary Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites. In one section of *al-Mughnī*, he

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>425</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>426</sup> Thid

<sup>427</sup> Laoust, "al-Māwardī," 61.

discusses the issue of the caliphate, which he defends against  $Shi^{\circ}$  ism, namely the theory of *ikhtiyār*, the election of the imām and the legitimacy of the first four caliphs (*Khulafā* ' al-Rāshidūn') and the chronological order of succession.<sup>428</sup>

His full name is 'Imād al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Jabbār al-Ḥamadhānī al-Asadābādī, the *qādī al-qudāt* (chief judge). He was born about 323/935 in Asadābād, Ḥamadhān, moved to Baṣra and attended the sessions held by various scholars. It is not clear when he moved to Baṣra, but probably it was after he came of age. After he had attended many sessions and had been involved in debates he "discovered the truth" [Muʿtazilism] and embraced it. He studied with Abū Isḥāq b. 'Ayyāsh, 431 "a student and successor of the great Baṣran Muʿtazilite, Abū Ḥāshim." 432 He then went to Baghdād and studied under the guidance of Shaykh Abū 'Abdillāh al-Ḥusayn b. 'Alī (d.368/978) for a longer period until he became one of the most distinguished scholars of his time. It is reported that he wrote his book in the presence of the Shaykh. He probably taught in Baghdād, 'Askar and Ramhurmuz. 433

Probably the fame of 'Abd al-Jabbār had attracted the vizier of the Buwayhid amīr Mu'ayyid al-Dawla, Ṣāḥib b. 'Abbād. The latter invited him to Rayy and appointed him qāḍī in 360/970 and then about 370/980 he was made chief qāḍī of the regions of Rayy, Qazwin, Abhuzanjān, Suhraward, Qumm and Dinbawand. 434 is equally possible that Ibn 'Abbād met 'Abd al-Jabbār during the former's state business in Baghdād. 435 Upon the death of his patron, Ibn 'Abbād in 385/995, 'Abd al-Jabbār was deposed from his office by Fakhr al-Dawla, either because of an unfavourable remark he

<sup>428</sup> Ibid.

<sup>429</sup> Al-Balkhī, Fadl al-l'tizāl, 121.

<sup>430</sup> Al-Murtadā, *Țabaqāt al-Mu<sup>e</sup>tazila* (Selection) (Wiesbaden: Im Kommission bei Franz Steiner, 1961), 112.

<sup>431</sup> Ibid.

<sup>432</sup> Ibid.

<sup>433</sup> Al-Balkhī, Fadl al-l'tizāl, 121.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>434</sup> Ibid., 123.

<sup>435</sup> George Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism: the Ethics of Abd al-Jabbār* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 6.

had once uttered about the late vizier, as one chronicler says, 436 or more likely because his influence had faded after the death of his sponsor. He had hoarded ample wealth in Rayy, much of which was now seized by the amir, along with the much larger properties of Ibn 'Abbād. 437 There is no account about his restoration as chief justice after the death of Fakhr al-Dawla in 387/997. However, we may guess that he was reinstated since he was always referred to by later Mu'tazilite writers as the qāḍī and that he lived in Rayy until his death at a great age in 415/1024. 438 Though he was a Shāfī 'ite, in regard to theology (usūl), he was the leading Mu'tazilite of his time and belonged to the Baṣran Mu'tazilites and was among the followers of Abū Hāshim since he always defended the latter's view. 439 His fame attracted many students from various districts of the Islamic world to study under his guidance. 440

He left a considerable number of works on Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism and on *uṣūl al-fiqh*, but Ibn Kathūr observes that the greatest work of his is *Kitāb Dalāʾil al-Nubuwwa* (The Book of the Proofs of the Prophecy) in two volumes, which shows his deep knowledge and fine insight.<sup>441</sup> His works amount to more than twenty titles as listed by al-Murtaḍā in the *Tabaqāt al-Muʿtazila*, of which nine have survived. Among these the following works are significant: first, *al-Mughnī*, which is the longest and an exhaustive treatise on Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilsm; second, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsa* (Exposition of the Five Principles of Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite Theology) and a third is *al-Majmū<sup>c</sup> fī al-Muḥīṭ bi al-Taklīf* (Comprehensive summary of imposed obligation).<sup>442</sup> The last is the *Mutashābih al-Qurʾān* (Obscure

<sup>436</sup> He said," I did not have pity on him (Ṣāḥib b. 'Abbād) because I did not see him make repentance." He was blamed for this remark and this was seen as showing a lack of care. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu 'jam al-Udabā'* (Beirūt: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1991), vol. 2, 282; vol. 1, 240.

<sup>437</sup> Ibid.

<sup>438</sup> Hourani, Ethics, 6-7.

<sup>439</sup> Al-Balkhī, Fadl al-I'tizāl, 121.

<sup>440</sup> Ibn al-'Imad, Shadharāt al-Dhahab, 203.

<sup>441</sup> Ibid.

<sup>442</sup> Hourani, Ethics, 7.

verses of the Qur'ān), beginning with Chapter 23 of the Qur'ān. 443 His polemical work, Naqd al-Imāma, was lost, but perhaps its contents were included in the last two volumes of al-Mughnī.

We have actually no account that mentions any relation between 'Abd al-Jabbār and the caliph al-Qādir, but since 'Abd al-Jabbār lived in Baghdād for quite a long time during his studies and became a famous scholar it is quite possible that the caliph may have known him personally. In addition, we can assume that he was restored in his office by the caliph after the Buwayhid amīr Fakhr al-Dawla died or that he possibly had no authority and interest in the court of Rayy since the region was under Buwayhid control and too remote from the central government in Baghdād. But interestingly, even though 'Abd al-Jabbār's court was within the domain of the Buwayhid amīr of Rayy and his patron seems to have been Shi\*ite, he defended the Sunnite imāmate against Shī\*ite attack. This indicates his strong loyalty to the Sunnite caliphate. His tenure up to his death was contemporary with the reign of al-Qādir.

In the following section we will discuss some points of 'Abd al-Jabbār's theory of the imāmate as formulated in the last two volumes of al-Mughnī. In so doing we will not elaborate in detail what he puts forward in the Mughnī since this is almost the same as what al-Bāqillānī does in the Tamhīd, although al-Mughnī is much more detailed, more argumentative and philosophical. The title of the book is not a refutation of his adversaries, but he does refute them after presenting their opinions and then presents his own and those of his masters. What makes the book so long is that it tends to articulate as many arguments as possible whether they are put forward by his opponents or are his own arguments.

Like al-Bāqillānī, 'Abd al-Jabbār divides his elaboration on the theory of the imāmateinto two sections: first, his discussion on the theory of the imāmate in general;

<sup>443</sup> G. C. Anawati, R. Casper and M. El-Khoudry, "Une somme inedite de theologie Mutazilite: le Mughni du Qadi Abd al-Jabbar." *MIDEO* IV, 1957: 283.

second, his defense of the Rāshidūn caliphate. Since his views are more or less the same as those of al-Bāqillānī, al-Māwardī, al-Baghdādī and Abū Yaʿlā, we will discuss only the points which are not discussed by those scholars or which are different from their views, such as (i) his division between qualities; (ii) prerequisites required of the imām; (iii) the necessity of the contract of the imāmate and (iv) the qualities of electors.

#### (1) The qualities of the imam

Regarding the qualities that the imām must possess, 'Abd al-Jabbār argues that since it is already proven that the establishment of the imāmate is based on the *sharī'a*, the qualities of the imām thus must be religious. If it is qualified by the *sharī'a*, its qualities and prerequisites have religious characteristics and these qualities must refer to the *sharī'a*. What is fixed by revelation (religion) is ruled by it and what is not established lawfully should not be a prerequisites. Abd al-Jabbār then mentions some qualities which must be possessed by the imām: (i) he has to be capable of carrying out what is entrusted to him without error according to his abilities and he must have determination; (ii) he has to know the nature of the duties which are entrusted to him in order that he can carry them out based on what is lawful; he must be a good and erudite person in his field; (iii) he has to be trustworthy and feel tranquil when he executes what is entrusted to him. He must demonstrate merit and reliability; (iv) he has to be the most meritorious (excellent) among the *umma*; (v) he must be a descendant of Quraysh; (vi) he has to be an upright, 'add' (person of good reputation). 445

## (2) The prerequisites of the imam

Different from the above three scholars who mention only the qualities required of the imām, 'Abd al-Jabbār distinguishes between qualities and prerequisites. After mentioning the above qualities, he furthers discusses the prerequisites needed by the

<sup>444 &#</sup>x27;Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī fi Abwāb al-Tawhīd wa al-'Adl*, vol. 20, edited by 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd and Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li al-Ta'līf wa al-Tarjama, n.d), 198.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid., 198-199.

imām: (i) he must have probity (uprightness) because the imāmate of a sinful (fāsiq) imām is not permitted as it has been established that 'adāla' (probity) is needed to be a witness and judge. There is no disagreement that the imamateis higher than the office of both functionaries in regard to religious affairs. If sinfulness prevents someone from being a witness and judge, it is obvious that a sinful person cannot be imam; (ii) he must be a free man, the condition which is agreed upon in order that he can legitimately carry out what is entrusted to him; (iii) he must be an intelligent and able person to execute and understand a duty. This cannot be achieved unless he has intelligence; 446 (iv) he must be Muslim because it has been agreed upon that the imamate of an unbeliever is not valid as his position would be higher than that of a judge or an amir. If these are not allowed to be appointed unless they are Muslims, the prohibition of the imamate of an unbeliever is even more appropriate;<sup>447</sup> (v) he has to possess special knowledge. However, 'Abd al-Jabbar does not agree with the Shi tites that the imam has to have all knowledge of religion, even esoteric knowledge. He maintains that it is not necessary for the imam to possess knowledge which has nothing to do with his duties. He rejects the claim of the Shi tites that the imam has to know all languages, and all secrets of letters and the occult. This opinion is held by those who make it incumbent upon the imam to be both sinless and designated, something which has already been invalidated, 448(vi) he has to be alim (erudite, learned) or as good as a learned person who knows matters related to law and the sharfa, as these are the duties of a judge. The prerequisites of the judge become the prerequisites of the imam. 449

#### (3) The necessity of the contract of the imamate

'Abd al-Jabbar shares with al-Mawardi the view that one who has qualifications for the office of the imamate cannot automatically become imam, although some electors

<sup>446</sup> Ibid., 200.

<sup>447</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid., 208.

<sup>449</sup> Ibid., 209.

have appointed him imām and allegiance has been paid to him. In other words, one can become imām by a selection made by others and he must accept the contract given to him if he has all qualifications for the office. 450

The nature of the contract is that it must be invested in one who is qualified for the imāmate but is not the ruling imām and not the heir apparent of an imām and this contract must not be combined with another one for another person ( 'aqdan limithlihi') who is qualified for the imāmate. Because of these three factors the imām with this contract cannot become imām; this equally means that one who does not possess the qualifications for the imāmate cannot be appointed imām.<sup>451</sup>

Abd al-Jabbār does not mean that 'aqd' (contract) is bay'a (oath of allegiance), that is clasping of the hands, but is consent, obedience and a method of demonstrating both. This contract must be accompanied with the acceptance of him (imām) in order to become imām; because if he does not accept it he cannot become imām, his acceptance is an individual obligation but sometimes it also involves collective duties. 'Abd al-Jabbār does not intend by acceptance only the utterance of the word ( $qub\bar{u}l$ = acceptance) but also readiness to carry out what is requested and the demonstration of consent. 452

#### (4) The qualities of the electors

As for the qualities of the electors, 'Abd al-Jabbār suggests that they must fulfill the following three conditions: (i) they must be pious people and be among those who are entrusted in their counsels and actions for public welfare; (ii) they must be among the people who know to distinguish between one who is qualified for the imāmate and another who is not qualified for it; and (iii) they must be learned people who know the religious responsibilities (the burden of the religion) so that their knowledge of them is correct. 453 When they possess these qualifications they can be considered among ahl al-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>450</sup> Ibid., 250.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid.

<sup>452</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>453</sup> Ibid., 259.

ra'y wa al-fadl (the people of opinion and merit) and they must consist of six persons.

The contract of the imāmate on behalf of one of them and with the consent of the others is valid if the imām accepts it.<sup>454</sup>

Having elucidated the theories of the imāmate formulated by five scholars the question may be raised, to what extent have their works contributed to the maintenance and continuation of the Sunnite or the 'Abbāsid caliphate? On the other hand, we can ask, Were they influenced by al-Qādir to write their works? and also, what is the extent to which al-Qādir's attempt at the Sunnite restoration is related to the development of Sunnite theories of the imāmate?

It is hard to ascertain whether there is evidence of the influence of their works on the maintenance of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. Is the survival of the 'Abbāsids (though nominally) up to the sixteenth century (tenth century Hegira) really due to the expositions of those scholars or to many other aspects? In reality the 'Abbāsids did not retain temporal power, which was lost with the emergence of the *amīr al-umarā*' in the tenth century. They were only able to maintain spiritual power.

We can say that among the five scholars who write on the theory of the imāmate, namely al-Bāqillānī, al-Māwardī, Abū Ya°lā, al-Baghdādī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār, the first three were perhaps directly influenced by the caliph al-Qādir's policy or were encouraged by him to write their works, because they were in the caliph's service.

Al-Bāqillānī is said to have been asked by al-Qādir to write a work on the legitimacy of the imāmate of the 'Abbāsids. He wrote the *Imāmat Banī 'Abbās*, but the book seems to have been lost. However, ideas about the Sunnite imāmate, rather than the 'Abbāsids in particular, are included in his book, *al-Tamhīd*. Al-Māwardī, it is alleged, may have written *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya* at the suggestion of a caliph.

<sup>454</sup> Ibid.

As for al-Baghdādī, he must have been born in Baghdād because his kunya is al-Baghdādī; he then moved to Nīshāpūr. However, we do not know when he moved there because the chroniclers do not provide us with this information. Since he came to Nīshāpūr with his father, we can assume that he was at that time quite young and that he studied with Abū Ishāq al-Isfaraynī until he became a master of the Shāfi ites. No account mentions that he ever visited Baghdad after he became a famous Shafi'ite scholar. Therefore, we can probably say that he never met al-Qadir. The question may arise as to how he was influenced by al-Qadir's ideas or was called upon to write a work on the theory of the imamate. We can assume that although Nishapur was quite far from Baghdad, it does not mean that there was no communication and that al-Baghdadi had never heard the name of al-Qadir and about his attempts at a Sunnite restoration. As a famous scholar he must have been visited by many students from various districts of the empire, including perhaps students from Baghdad. It was his students who might have told him about the policy of al-Qādir. It is also possible that since al-Qādir sent out messages to various districts about the Qadirite creed and as this was often read out in the caliph's palace, al-Baghdadi perhaps heard about the caliph's policy and attempts at a Sunnite restoration. Therefore, he might have been called for to join others and to maintain the Sunnite caliphate by making an exposition on it in his *Uṣūl al-Dīn*. Another possibility is that as a scholar, al-Baghdadi must have been familiar with the theological debates among Sunnites and Shī'ites and among the Sunnites and the Mu'tazilites and must have known about the flourishing development of Shīfite literature, in particular that which related to the theory of the imamate. Therefore, he was commissioned to write an exposition on the subject in an attempt to reject the Shi ite view.

Regarding 'Abd al-Jabbār, we can make a stronger case that he was influenced by al-Qādir's policy. During his adulthood he lived in Baghdād until he became an *ālim* (scholar) and was invited by Ṣāḥib b. 'Abbād to come to Rayy in 368/978 where he

stayed until his death. When al-Qādir launched his Sunnite restoration in 408/1016 'Abd al-Jabbār was already in Rayy. However, 'Abd al-Jabbār had a different career from al-Baghdādī in that he was qādī al-qudāt of Rayy, whose patron was Ṣāḥib b. 'Abbād, the vizier of the Buwayhids. He must have established close relations with the Buwayhid court, and therefore, he must have had more information on what happened in Baghdād due to existing political relations between the Buwayhids in Baghdād and those in Rayy. In addition, when he stayed in Baghdād, among his students were both al-Raḍī and al-Murtaḍā. The latter wrote a work on the Shī'ite imāmate and refuted many of 'Abd al-Jabbār's ideas on the Sunnite imāmate. 'Abd al-Jabbār on the other hand, refuted many of the Shī'ite views in his Mughnī, in particular their attacks on the Sunnite imāmate and the three Rāshidūn caliphs. It is obvious that 'Abd al-Jabbār was influenced indirectly by al-Qādir's policy of the Sunnite restoration and he might also have known the caliph personally.

What is interesting here is that whether al-Qādir's influence on those scholars was direct or indirect the appearance of five scholars during his reign who simultaneously wrote on the theory of the Sunnite imāmate indicates the extent of his influence. Probably the Shī tie resurgence during his reign was so strong that its effects were felt by Muslim communities in different districts, including the regions where the scholars mentioned above lived. Never before in the history of Islam did a group of scholars try to formulate the theory of the Sunnite imāmate in the same period or under one caliph. Later some scholars who wrote on Islamic politics such as al-Ghazālī, Ibn Jamā and Ibn Taymiyya (these last two being contemporary), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Faḍl Allāh b. Ruzbahān al-Khunjī, tended to lived in different times and under different caliphs. Never before has there been such a united intellectual movement.

It is also difficult to prove that their works contributed to the maintenance of the 'Abbāsid caliphate, that without their works, the 'Abbāsid caliphate might not have

survived, even nominally up to 10/16th century. As long as the majority of the Muslim community were Sunnites they would support the 'Abbāsid or other Sunnite dynasties. We can also maintain that since 'Abbasid caliphs failed to regain their temporal power, their expositions did not help al-Qadir's attempt at the Sunnite restoration. Contrarily, we can say that although the 'Abbasid caliphate failed to regain their lost power, the sultans and the amīrs who held the reins of the 'Abbāsid caliphate( except the Shī'ite dynasties and the Umayyads of Spain) could not exterminate the legitimacy of the 'Abbasids, since they kept attaching their power to the house of the 'Abbasids in Baghdad and, without the investitures awarded to them, they did not feel their own authority legitimate. Except in some cases the names of the 'Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad were not mentioned in the khutba during the Friday prayers and on formal occasions. It has already been noted that even the Buwayhids asked for al-Qadir's investiture for their authority over the districts under their control. This may be the result of the exposition of the scholars who maintained that these amirs or sultains must respect and show their loyalty to the 'Abbasid or Sunnite caliphate and they must act as the viziers of tafwid who exercised power in the name of the 'Abbasid caliphs.

Al-Māwardī's exposition and Abū Ya'lā's work were perhaps the most important factors in keeping good relations between the 'Abbāsid caliphs, the amīr alumarā' and the sultāns. Both scholars justified this relationship during the era of the 'Abbāsid degradation, between the weak caliph and his powerful assistants, the sultāns and amīrs. It is clear in their discussion of the imārat al-istīlā' that this emirate was tolerated as long as the amīr did not hamper the execution of Islamic laws and the implementation of its rituals and as long as he maintained good relations with the caliph and assisted him, while respecting the legitimacy of the caliphate, protecting Islamic territory, the Muslim community and the dhimmīs as well as any other requirements which had to be fulfilled by the amīr of imārat al-istīlā'. These "amīrs of coercion"

were regarded by al-Māwardī and Abū Yaʿlā as identical to the vizier of tafwīḍ, the vizier of delegation. It was perhaps due to these principles governing relationships between the caliph as the holder of legitimacy and the sultāns as the holders of the power that they lived in harmony for so long a time. Violent rivalry between them was rare, despite the fact that the 'Abbāsids had no real power. It is possible to see then that these scholars maintained and raised the sanctity of the 'Abbāsids.


We cannot deny that the reign of al-Qādir was the peak period of the exposition of the theory of the Sunnite imāmate. Before this time, we find it in brief and fragmentary form in some works, for example in the Fiqh Akbar, allegedly of Abū Ḥanīfa, in al-Ash°arī's al-Ibāna, Abū Yūsuf's Kicāb al-Kharāj and the 'Aqīda of Imām Aḥmad. However, it is during the time of al-Qādir that we find the formulation of the Sunnite caliphate in a more elaborate, more focused and more complete form, in particular in al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya of al-Māwardī and the work of Abū Ya°lā because they discuss fully Islamic politics and public administration. The defense of the Sunnite scholars against the attack of the Shī°ites was demonstrated by 'Abd al-Jabbār, al-Bāqillānī, and al-Baghdādī. In particular, 'Abd al-Jabbār notes all kinds of attacks (maṭāˈin) launched by the Shī°ites or Sunnite adversaries about the legitimacy and the validity of the historical Sunnite imāmate or caliphate. The later scholars who wrote on Islamic politics kept referring to their predecessors, in particular those who lived during the time of al-Qādir and in some cases they developed their ideas and invented new ones based on this new situation.

There are some principles which are consistently defended by the Sunnite scholars which contributed to some degree to the maintenance of the Sunnite caliphate and weakened the Shī te claim to the imāmate. These principles are as follows: (i) the principle of ikhtiyār (election). They agreed that the imām is established in office by election of one or more electors, rejecting at the same time the theory of designation

held by the Shī tites, in particular the designation of Alī by the Prophet Muhamamd; (ii) the validity of transferring the imamate by testament. This view rejects the Shi tite's only method of designation and divine appointment. With this theory, Sunnite scholars justify the transfer of the imamate by inheritance and testament, the practice which was adopted by the Umayyads and 'Abbasids; (iii) the validity of the imamate of the Rashidun caliphate and the legality of the contracts given to them by the companions. They were qualified for the imamate and their degree of excellence was demonstrated in their order of succession. This rejects the ideas of the Shī'ites who regard the caliphs Abū Bakr, "Umar and "Uthman as usurping the right of 'Alī b. Abī Ṭalib. It repudiates equally the Khārijites who regard 'Alī and 'Uthmān as unbelievers; (iv) the exclusive privilege of the Quraysh to the imamate. However, they deny any particular Qurayshite clan (such as the 'Alids) as having exclusive rights. At the same time they repudiate the Khārijite (and those of some of the Mu<sup>e</sup>tazilite views) that non-Qurayshite descent could lawfully assume the leadership of the Muslim community. The requirement of Qurayshite descent for the imam is perhaps the most important aspect of the Sunnite imamate which is defended by the Sunnite scholars. The caliphate was successfully maintained in the hands of the Qurayshite tribe under the Umayyads and 'Abbāsids; (vi) their rejection of the Shi tites claim that the imam has to be sinless; his knowledge of the occult interpretation of the Qur'an and his identification as the only authoritative source of doctrine; (vii) their objection to the existence of two or more imams at the same time. This was perhaps directed at the Fatimids of Egypt and the Umayyads of Spain. Although during al-Qādir's time and his successors the 'Abbāsids could not destroy the Fāṭimids, the Ayyūbids who were loyal to the 'Abbāsids succeeded in eradicating their power. The Umayyads remained in power in Spain up to the time of the emergence of petty Muslim dynasties.

Perhaps the most lasting influence of the Sunnite scholars who formulated the theory of the Sunnite imāmate was the legitimacy of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. In spite of the fact that the 'Abbāsids were in decline and temporal power was in the hands of sultāns and amīr al-umarā', the latter did not regard their power as legitimate without receiving the investiture of the caliph. The subjects under the control of the sultāns or amīr al-umarā' did not pay respect to a ruler who did not show his loyalty to the Sunnite caliph of Baghdād, except in rare cases in which the majority of the subjects were Shī'ites. The latter regarded the Sunnite caliphate as illegitimates that they did not need to ask for legitimacy from the caliph in Baghdād. However, not all Shī'ite rulers disregarded the 'Abbāsid caliphs in Baghdād; for example, the Buwayhids, even though they could have removed the caliphs from power, kept them in office and showed them respect and loyalty.

Another important contribution of the Sunnite scholars to the maintenance of the 'Abbāsid or Sunnite caliphate was their defense of the Rāshidūn caliphate. All Sunnite scholars, in particular those who discussed the theory of the caliphate or imāmate claimed that all four caliphs were true caliphs and their caliphates were true caliphates. Their imāmates were validly contracted and they were all qualified for the imāmate. Despite the fact that during the reign of 'Uthmān and that of 'Alī there occurred incidents which darkened the history of the early caliphate such as civil wars between 'Alī and 'Āisha and between him and Mu'āwiya, the rebellion against 'Uthmān and his assassination, all these incidents did not impede the fact that they could be called the divinely guided caliphs (al-Khulatā' al-Rāshidūn). The Sunnite scholars consistently and vigorously defended them against the attacks of the Khārijites and the Shī 'ites.



### CONCLUSION

The decline of the 'Abbāsid caliphate during the Buwayhid period, in particular during the reign of al-Qādir, can be traced to the reigns of his predecessors. Most modern Arab historians maintain that the decline or disintegration of the 'Abbāsid empire had already begun with the reign and murder of al-Mutawakkil. From his reign onwards the 'Abbāsid caliphate steadily declined and could not be restored except for a brief revival during the reign of the caliphal-Mutadid (278/891-902). The decline of the 'Abbāsid caliphate encouraged the emergence of new rulers and dynasties in remote districts of the empire. In the centre of the caliphate, the 'Abbāsid power was gradually reduced by the interference of the amūrs and army commanders in the politics so that the Turkish or Daylamite commanders were freely able to appoint, depose and even kill the caliph. The successors of al-Mutawakkil could not ascend to the throne except with the help of the army commander or courtiers. In addition, there were always rivalries among the 'Abbāsid family. Therefore, most caliphs ruled only briefly except for al-Muqtadir, who was able to reign for twenty-one years. The rapid change of rulers is one of the factors which weakened the 'Abbāsid caliphate.

The most important change which reduced the power of the caliph was the introduction of the office of amīr al-umarā during the reign of al-Muqtadir and reached its climax during the reign of al-Rāḍī billāh who appointed Ibn Rā iq, the governor of Wāsiṭ and Baṣra, amīr al-umarā (commander of commanders) in 324/935 and gave him full responsibility for leading the army, collecting taxes, overseeing state lands and maintaining public security in all regions under the control of the 'Abbāsids. From this time onwards, the role of the vizierate was reduced because Ibn Rā iq and his secretary held the real power and the resources of the districts found their way into the treasury of the amīrs, who spent them as they liked. Therefore, most chroniclers describe the

disintegration of the Muslim empire reached its peak during the reign of al-Rādī billāh or when most of the regions in the east and the west were in the hands of the new rulers. The only land remained in the hands of the caliph al-Rādī and his amīr al-umarā was Baghdād and some of the Sawād.

The decline of the caliphate can also be traced to the policy of al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tasim in regards to military institutions. He recruited an army of young Turkish slaves to replace his Khurāsānī mercenaries and encamped the former in Sāmarrā<sup>2</sup>. At the beginning the caliph benefited from the military excellence of the Turks, and he succeeded in several campaigns against the enemies of the 'Abbāsid caliphate: the Khurrāmiyya, the Zutts, the Byzantines and more importantly the Zanj. However, after some of the Turkish commanders came to occupy important posts within the caliphate, they in turn worked to its disadvantage; many caliphs became victims of their intrigues for power and wealth.

The take over of 'Abbāsid power by the Buwayhids in 334/945 marked another change in the political and economic situation of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. The rule of amīr al-umarī' was continued by the Buwayhids but was different in nature from the previous period since the office was upheld by the same members of the Buwayhid family for about one century (945-1055). Except for the very brief reign of al-Mustakfī (about one year), who was deposed by Mucizz al-Dawla, his successors enjoyed better treatment under the Buwayhid regime and reigned for quite a long time; while during the previous period of the amīr al-umarī' the caliphs ruled for a very short time because of rivalries among the amīrs al-umarī' who were not of the same family. Some caliphs were appointed and deposed rapidly and were treated cruelly, but the attitude of the Buwayhids towards the 'Abbāsid caliphs was much better. They showed more respect to the caliphs than the Turkish commanders did. However, as regards the administration of the caliphate, they were not much different from the previous amīr al-umarī'. The caliphate was in their hands, real political power was held by the Buwayhids.

The appearance of the Buwayhids did not in general improve the condition of the 'Abbāsid caliphate; if anything it got much worse. In addition, the revenues of the empire steadily decreased because the empire was divided among members of the Buwayhids. Moreover, they were also faced by recurrent rebellions of their soldiers, who demanded increases in salary and asked their delayed pay. This indicates that they were always short of resources and this forced them to have recourse to the sale of the office of vizier, meaning that it would be offered to those who would promise to give the amīr al-umarā' a certain sum of money. This sale of the office of vizier often caused violent conspiracies among those who aspired to this office.

Although they were of the same family, the Buwayhids were often involved in rivalries among themselves to take control of Baghdād or other rich regions like Fārs, Ahwāz and Shīrāz. These rivalries often led to civil wars such as occurred between Bakhtiyār and 'Aḍud al-Dawla in 367/977, and between Sharaf al-Dawla and Ṣamṣām al-Dawla in 376/987.

Another problem which disturbed the political situation under the Buwayhids was the continuous conflicts between the Turkish and Daylamite soldiers within the Buwayhid army. The former were usually Sunnites and the latter were Shī tes. This partisanship was utilized by Sabuktagin for the first time during the reign of Bakhtiyār in his attempt to assume the office of amīr al-umarā by exploiting religious sentiments. He obtained the support of the Turkish soldiers together with the Sunnite masses while the Shī tes and the Daylamite soldiers backed the Buwayhid amīr al-umarā. Both groups were then involved in a violent civil war (fitna) which is said to have been the worst that Baghdād had ever witnessed. The civil war between the two sects would have continued and Sabuktagin would have won the battle if Adud al-Dawla had not come to Baghdād and crushed the rebellion.

The economic condition of the 'Abbāsid caliphate in the fourth/tenth century was also in serious decline. This is indicated by economic depression, inflation and devaluation of the dīnār. Chroniclers also mention that a large number of people died of starvation because of a scarcity of food and a rise in price. The revenues of government derived from taxes and agriculture decreased because most lands had been ruined. Consequently, the amīr al-umarā' or the sulṭāns were forced to seize the caliph's estates and his other economic assets.

There were some important factors leading to this economic decline. In the first place, for about a century the caliphate neglected investment in irrigation and renovation projects in the most productive province. In addition, the economic decline of the caliphate was also due to the malpractices of the authorities and government officials. Furthermore, civil wars between al-Amīn and al-Ma²mūn (195/811-198/813) and between al-Mustacin and al-Muctazz in 251/865 had had destructive effect on the city itself (Baghdād) and its citizens. During the civil wars, the supplies of food stuff were cut off and the dīnār was devalued.

Another factor leading to the decline in economy were uprisings, which usually led to burning of houses, looting of goods and destruction of agricultural land. There were two famous uprisings in the history of the 'Abbāsids: first, the revolt of the Zanj (Negroes) from 256-319/869-931. Second, the uprising of the Qarmatians. The Zanj rebellion had disrupted trade routes for too long, forcing merchants to find other ways via Sīrāf in southern Iran; Baṣra and southern 'Irāq in general experienced a long period of decline. The long war between the Zanj and the 'Abbāsids paved the way for some countries formerly under the 'Abbāsids to separate themselves from the central power of the empire. Moreover, the Zanj revolt caused damage to agriculture in the Sawād and weakened the political and military system of the caliphate.

The Qarmatian rebellion, which lasted for more than thirty years, weakened settled communities, a process which was to continue for a century and a half. They also damaged the trade of the Persian Gulf and the trade between Arabia and Iraq, causing the latter to suffer a decline in international trade.

The economic decline of the caliphate was also accelerated by the introduction of the military  $iqt\bar{a}$  in the fourth/tenth century. The first effect of its introduction was that the farmers had no motivation to maintain rural productivity. The soldiers who held the  $iqt\bar{a}$  did not care for the maintenance of the lands; they even exploited them until they could no longer be cultivated. In addition, they did not send anything to the state treasury but took advantage as much as possible of their  $iqt\bar{a}$  without taking care to improve and reclaim the land. The military  $iqt\bar{a}$  resulted in damage to cultivated land in particular, and the decline of economy of the 'Abbāsid caliphatein general.

The last factor which destroyed the economy of the 'Abbāsids was the activity of the 'ayyārūn (bandits). They took part in the looting of property, burning buildings and killing many people in Baghdād, causing a great loss of material and life. They incited insecurity in the centre of the caliphate. This, in turn, discouraged economic growth in the capital city because many merchants who feared to trade or invest their capital in Baghdād went to other cities of the empire. In addition, the 'ayyārūn incited sectarian conflicts between the Sunnites and the Shī 'ites as many of them belonged to these groups.

Against all these economic problems, the Buwayhids did not do much to improve the economic condition of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. Most of them even worsened the situation by awarding the soldiers lands to tax-farm. The exception to this pattern was the Buwayhid *amīr al-umarā* 'Aḍud al-Dawla. He first followed the method of collecting land taxes at the New Year of al-Mu'taḍid in order to accord with the harvest time. Secondly, he restored the irrigation system, repairing many canals which irrigated

the city and surrounding areas. Consequently, during his reign Baghdād was prosperous, state revenues were sufficient and economic conditions were improved.

The political and economic weakness of the 'Abbāsid caliphate continued during the reign of the caliph al-Qādir (381/991-422/1030), who ruled during the middle and the end of the Buwayhid reign. In the beginning of his reign, he was very much subject to the whims of the amīr al-umarā', Bahā' al-Dawla, since the caliph owed much to him for his ascension to the caliphate. There was no difference between political and economic conditions during his reign and that of his predecessors. The amīr al-umarā' took into his hands all public responsibilities, particularly all the functions of a civil and military character. Nevertheless, the reign of Bahā' al-Dawla marked the beginning of the collapse of the Buwayhids, while the reign of al-Qādir marked the restoration of the 'Abbāsid caliphate, if not in terms of real power, at least in terms of prestige. To restore the real power of the 'Abbāsid caliphate was almost impossible, because when the Buwayhids became masters of the territories under 'Abbāsid rule, the empire was already weak and disintegrating.

From the reign of Bahā' al-Dawla until the coming of Musharrif al-Dawla to Baghdād in 414/1023, the chroniclers do not mention any internal political actions made by the caliph. However, when Musharrif Dawla came to Baghdād in 414/1023 he held a meeting and demanded the soldiers and others to renew the oath of allegiance to him. The caliph reacted strongly to this meeting because he had not been informed. He summoned the Shītite *naqīb*, the Sunnite *naqīb*, al-Zaynabī, and the chief judge to reject the paying of allegiance to Musharrif al-Dawla. The caliph was prepared to leave the city, but realizing the caliph's attitude, Musharrif al-Dawla sent a letter apologizing to the caliph and finally the issue was resolved by a mutual oath of allegiance.

Upon the death of Musharrif al-Dawla in 416/1025 and the failure of Jalāl al-Dawla as his successor to proceed quickly to Baghdād the soldiers appointed Abū Kālījār and asked permission for this to the caliph. He approved their demand and Abu Kālījār's name was mentioned in the *khuṭba*. However, although two years had passed since his proclamation as *amīr al-umarā*, he had not yet come to Baghdād. This caused the soldiers to be fed up with waiting for him and the city was destroyed by the Arab tribesmen. Therefore, in the month of Rabī al-Akhīr 418/1027, the army's commanders and the Turks came to the caliph, appealing to him to resolve the problem. The caliph demanded Abū Kālījār come to Baghdād, or otherwise the emirate would be given to Jalāl al-Dawla. He then sent a letter to Abū Kālījār asking his responsibility, and when he did not give any response, the caliph allowed the name of Jalāl al-Dawla to be mentioned in the *khuṭba*. In this respect the caliph successfully acted as mediator between the soldiers and the Buwayhid *amīr*, indicating that his final word was still counted and his authority was still respected.

As soon as Jalāl al-Dawla arrived in Baghdād and entered Dār al-Mamlaka, the palace of the sultān, he had the drum beaten at his gate five times a day. The caliph reacted strongly to Jalāl al-Dawla's initiative and regarded Jalāl al-Dawla's action as humiliating him and signifying that he was equal to the caliph. Since Jalāl al-Dawla insisted that his predecessors had been given this privilege and the caliph kept rejecting him, a dispute over this issue took place. Jalāl al-Dawla's insistence, however, finally softened the heart of the caliph and won his approval. The caliph's reaction to Jalāl al-Dawla's demand, although finally he had to yield to his request, demonstrates a growing indication that the caliph could challenge the Buwayhid amīr al-umarā.

Once more the caliph acted as mediator between the soldiers and the Buwahid amīr in 419/1028 when they complained to him about Jalāl al-Dawla's indulgence in pleasure and his neglect of the affairs of state. The soldiers suggested to the caliph that Jalāl al-Dawla's son act as agent for the amīr, and demanded him return to Baṣra. The caliph sent his agents to Jalāl al-Dawla with a letter of complaint from the soldiers. Jalāl

al-Dawla had produced more than one hundred thousand *dirhams* in gold and silver coins, yet the Turks were not satisfied with this. They began to plunder the houses of the vizier and the sultān's entourage, leading to small skirmishes between the Turks and the supporters of the sultān. The *amīr al-umarā* turned over all his wealth and that of his harem, yet this still could not satisfy the demand of the Turks; they even intended to kill him. However, before taking further action, the Turks once more appealed to the caliph to make a settlement between them and the *amīr al-umarā*. He met them and effected successfully a reconciliation between them and Jalāl al-Dawla.

Besides the Turkish soldiers of the Buwayhids who respected the authority of the caliph, the local principalities also acknowledged this authority. This is proven by their demands of investiture to the caliph. Among those who needed his investiture were the 'Uqaylid, Muqallad b. al-Musayyib, in 386/996, the Ḥasanawayhid, Abū Najm Badr, in 389/998, the Marwānid, Aḥmad b. Marwān al-Kurdī, in 403/1012, and the Mazyadid, 'Alī b. Mazyad, in 405/1014. Their demands for investiture meant that they still needed the caliph's legitimacy and that the caliph was still recognized as the legitimatehead of the majority of the Muslim *umma* (community) regardless of whether events undermined the caliphate.

Al-Qādir's political determination can also be seen in his attempts at eliminating any pretenders to the caliphate. For example, he thwarted Ibn al-Waththāb's pretensions to be the caliph with the name al-Ṭā'i' before the people of Jīlān. The caliph sent a letter to the qādī of Jīlān in 388/998, contradicting Ibn al-Waththāb's false claim.

Another important political actions taken by al-Qādir was his appointment of his son, Abū al-Faḍl, with the title al-Ghālib billāh as his successor in front of the Khurāsānīs in 391/1000. The appointment of al-Ghālib billāh, according to Miskawayh, was a reaction against another pretender to the caliphate from one member of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Miskawayh, Eclipse, vol.6, 420.

'Abbāsids, 'Uthmān b. al-Wāthiq, one of the descendants of al-Wāthiq billāh. He claimed to be successor of al-Qādir in front of the Qarākhānids. The caliph then sent some letters to the Qarākhānids rejecting his claim and demanding them to disassociate from al-Wāthiqī. Unfortunately, al-Ghālib billāh died in 409./1018, and another son of al-Qādir, Abū al-Qāsim died too in 418/1-027. Therefore, al-Qādir appointed Abū Ja'far with the title, al-Qā'im billāh as his successor in 421/1030.

In both appointments of the heirs-apparent, the caliph did not meet any objection from the Buwayhid amīr; Jalāl al-Dawla even appreciated the caliph's initiative in appointing Abū Jaʿfar as his successor. In this respect, al-Qādir showed his determination and attempt to maintain the caliphate and pass it to his descendants. He was successful in transferring the caliphate to his successor whereas his predecessors, who were also under the tutelage of the Buwayhids, failed to do so, even though they reigned long enough. For example, al-Muṭīʿ reigned for twenty-eight years (946-974), and al-Ṭāʾiʿ ruled for seventeen years (974-991), except for al-Mustakfī who reigned less than two years.

Regarding al-Qādir's external relations we note some important political events. First, when the 'Uqaylid, Qirwāsh b. Muqallad or Mu'tamid al-Dawla, the ruler of Mawṣil, Madā'in and Kūfa, expressed his loyalty to the Fāṭimids in 401/1010, the caliph was able to bring him back to acknowledgment of the authority of the 'Abbāsids. To subdue this deviant servant, the caliph ordered the Buwayhid amīr, Bahā' al-Dawla, to despatch his troops to Mawṣil and forced Qirwāsh b. Muqallad to abide with the 'Abbāsid caliph. The Buwayhid amīr fulfilled the caliph's order and succeeded in bringing Qirwāsh back as an ally of the 'Abbāsids and Buwayhids.

Following the subjugation of Qirwāsh b. Muqallad, al-Qādir issued a document denouncing the pedigree of the Fāṭimid rulers of Egypt and their beliefs in 402/1011. The document, which was signed by the Sunnite and Shī<sup>t</sup>ite scholars, rejected the claim

of the Fāṭimid rulers to be descendants of Fāṭima, a daughter of the Prophet Muḥammad and wife of 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. With the launching of this defamation document the caliph has created lasting doubts among Muslims up to this day about the genuineness of the Fāṭimids.

A significant event in al-Qādir's political career was the appearance of the Ghaznavid, Maḥamūd b. Sabuktagin, in 389/998 and the establishment of a close relationship between him and the 'Abbāsid caliphate. From the beginning of his rule, he raised the stature of the caliph and encouraged him to exert himself in face of the Buwayhid *amūrs*. The Ghaznavids were the only Sunnite dynasty strong enough to defend the Sunnite caliphate; it is not an exaggeration to say that Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin helped to prolong al-Qādir's reign. As soon as he assumed power, he subjugated the Sāmānids of Khurāsān, who had paid allegiance to the deposed caliph al-Ṭā'ic, and caused them to acknowledge al-Qādir.

Furthermore, Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin tried his best to protect the 'Abbāsid caliphate from outside threats and to eliminate the caliph's enemies. However, the greatest service of the Ghaznavids rendered to al-Qādir was their vigorous attempt to counteract the active missionary of the Fāṭimids in the east. They prevented the Fāṭimid dā 'īs' (propagators) from gaining any following in Persia. He persecuted the Qarmaṭians, Bāṭinis, Mu'tazilites and other deviant sects whom he found in the regions under his control. These measures were taken as response to the caliph's prohibition of discussing and teaching Mu'tazilism, Rāfiḍism, Ash'arism and all other disputed teachings. Before his death in 420/1029 Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin was successful in eliminating the Bāṭinis, Mu'tazilites and Rāfiḍites in Rayy and Khurāsān. And at the same time, he was able to subjugate the Buwayhid amīr, Rustam b. 'Alī (Majd al-Dawla) and his followers and brought them to Khurāsān.

Maḥmūd's stout support for the Sunnite caliph was significant for the latter's survival. He lifted the caliph's prestige in all districts under his control and eliminated the Sunnites' adversaries, in particular, the Bāṭinīs and the Rāfiḍites. For this reason, the rise of the Ghaznavids had much to do with the Sunnite revival in the fourth and fifth centuries vis à vis the Shī te resurgence and its movement during this period.

Besides facing the economic and political problems, al-Qādir had to overcome the sectarian conflicts between the Sunnites and Shī ties. The conflicts between both communities dated back further to the first civil war after the murder of 'Uthmān and more recently during al-Ma mūn's regin. During the *mihna* (inquisition) the caliph declared the superiority of Alī over Abū Bakr and Umar. During the Buwayhid rule of Baghdād the first event leading to conflicts between both communities was the cursing of the companions in the mosques in Baghdād in 351/962. From this time onwards up to the end of the reign of al-Qādir in 422/1030, the chroniclers recorded about twelve events of conflicts between both communities. The invention of the Sunnite ceremonies of the Ziyārat Maqbar Zubayr b. Mus ab (the pilgrimage to the tomb of Zubayr b. Mus and the Day of the Cave as reaction to those of the Shī te ceremonies of the Day of 'Āshūrā' and the Day of Ghadīr Khumm increased the already then prevailing conflicts between the two communities. These sectarian conflicts disturbed social and political life in Baghdād and caused material and human losses.

However, the sectarian conflicts during the reign of al-Qādir had encouraged a movement of a Sunnite restoration which was led by the caliph himself. His attempt at a Sunnite restoration was not through material power, but through religious, juridical and moral forces. He maintained his office and claimed himself to be the holder of sovereignty and to be the true successor of the Prophet. In addition, he defended the essentials of his prerogatives, such as the mention of his name in the Friday *khuṭbas*, the nomination of the qādis, the investiture of the governors of the provinces and the

Buwayhid *amīrs*. In this attempt he was supported by Sulṭān Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin, who overthrew the Sāmānids of Bukhārā and Samarqand in 389/998.

The first independent action of al-Qādir, which can be interpreted as his defense of Sunnism, occurred in 394/1003 when he rejected the appointment of the Sharīf Abū Aḥmad al-Mūsawī (d.400/1009) to the post of the qāḍī al-quḍāt as had been proposed by Bahā al-Dawla. Nevertheless, the caliph accepted the other three posts suggested by the amīr, namely, the head of tribunal of the mazālim court, amīr (head) of the pilgrimage and naqīb (agent of the Alids). These three posts were perhaps perceived by al-Qādir to have no important political and religious implications for his caliphate.

Al-Qādir's rejection of al-Mūsawī's appointment as qādī al-qudāt was due to his fear of the loss of his right to appoint the grand qādī; most importantly he feared that al-Mūsawī would remove him from caliphate, and that it would be replaced with a Shī te caliphate. Therefore, his rejection showed his attempts to defend Sunnism and demonstrated his courage and independence. His determination to defend the Sunnite community was clear during the affair of the Ibn Mas ūd mushaf. He formed a committee to reject the mushaf and ordered the killing of a Shī te who had cursed the Sunnites for their burning of it. And in many conflicts which involved both communities, the caliph often sided with the Sunnites, blamed the Shī tes and complained to the Shī te agent and the Buwayhid authorities.

According to Laoust, there were three factors contributing to the Sunnite restoration: first, the support by Maḥmūd b. Sabuktagin of the Sunnite caliphate; second, the upsurge in popular agitation manifested in 'Irāq, and third, the policies of al-Qādir who tried to get rid of Buwayhid tutelage and presented himself as the leader of the politico-religious opposition party against the Shī'ite Buwayhids. At the same time the caliph carried out a struggle against the Fāṭimids by asking a Mu'tazilite al-Iṣṭakhrī

(d.404/1013) to compose a refutation of the Bāṭiniyya, and demanding that al-Bāqillānī attack the Fāṭimids and defend the Sunnite caliphate.

In his attempt at a Sunnite restoration, the caliph took a series of actions from the beginning of the fifth century up to his death. First, in 408/1017 the caliph demanded that the Ḥanafite-Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite jurisconsults and *qāḍīs* make public denouncements of Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism and forbade any public discussion and teaching of Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism and Rāfiḍism and all allegedly deviant doctrines. In the following year (409/1017) the caliph wrote an epistle and had it read out in the quarter of Dār al-Khilāfa (the caliph's palace). The epistle adopted Traditionalist Sunnism, stating that whoever maintained that the Qur'ān is created is an infidel whose blood is allowable to shed.

In 420/1029 the caliph wrote three epistles in the same genre and had them read out in the caliph's palace; in attendance were notables, judges, witnesses and jurisconsults. The first epistle was read on Monday 18, Shacbān, and contained an admonition and acknowledgment of the excellence of the Sunnite orthodox and a condemnation of Muctazilism. To support this, numerous hadiths were cited. The second epistle was read on Thursday 20, Ramadān. It contained Prophetic traditions and reports on the death of the Prophet and his sayings on the main issues of the religion and its injunctions. It also condemned those who professed the creation of the Qurcān as fāsiq (great sinner). The epistle ended with an admonition and appeal to order good and prevent evil. The third epistle was read out on Monday 1, Dhū al-Qacda, noting the merits of Abū Bakr and cUmar besides the same points mentioned in the previous epistle. All three epistles were later apparently put together and were called al-l'tiqād al-Qādirī (the Profession or Creed of al-Qādir).

The Profession of al-Qādir was no doubt inspired by the Ḥanbalite traditionalist ideas against anthropomorphists over the issue of God's throne ( 'arsh') and against the Mu'tazilites on the issue of God's attributes, God's knowing without knowledge, and

against Ash arism, which distinguished between the real attributes (sifāt haqīqa) and metaphorical attributes (sifāt majāziyya), whereas the Qādirite Profession qualified as real all these attributes.

The opposition to Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and Ash<sup>c</sup>arites is very clear concerning the controversial attribute of the *Kalām* (words) of God. Against the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites, it affirms that the *Kalām* of God is uncreated, and against the Ash<sup>c</sup>arites, it states that the *Kalām* of God is uncreated under all aspects: recited, retained in the memory, written or heard, while the Ash<sup>c</sup>arites distinguished between the *Kalām* of God uncreated and its created "expression".

In addition to the launching of the above creed, al-Qādir established relationships with scholars of the four schools of law, the Ḥanafites, Mālikites, Shāfi ites and Ḥanbalites, and the theological school of the Mu tazilites. Some of these scholars were qādīs, imāms or witnesses, but others did not have any special function except as scholars or jurisconsults. The caliph's good relationships with the other schools, other than the Ḥanbalites, indicate that he showed his openness and treated them with fairness. Among the four schools of law, the Ḥanafites seem to have had a less important role in helping with the Sunnite and caliphal restoration than the other three schools. The relationship of the caliph with the Ḥanafites was not as close as with the Ḥanbalites, Shāfi ites and Mālikites. It was among these schools that the caliph received great support for his caliphate because through their works they defended it. Among the Mālikites we find al-Bāqillānī, among the Shāfi ites we have al-Māwardī and al-Baghdādī, and among the Ḥanbalites there was Abū Ya lā al-Farrā and among the Mu tazilites we note al-Istakhrī and Abd al-Jabbār.

Al-Bāqillānī was well known as a zealous defender of Sunnism against Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilism and Shī<sup>c</sup>ism. He is said to have been asked by the caliph to write on the theory of the imāmate of the 'Abbāsids and a refutation against the Qarmatians and

Bāṭinīs. In his most famous work, *al-Tamhīd*, he defends the Rāshidūn caliphs against the attacks of the Shī<sup>c</sup>ites. He also elaborates the Sunnite imāmate and maintains the theory of *ikhtiyār* (election), rejecting Shī<sup>c</sup>ite doctrine of designation, in particular, 'Alī's designation as successor to the Prophet Muḥammad.

Among the Shāfi ite scholars who lived during al-Qādir's reign and contributed much to the caliph's attempt at a Sunnite restoration was al-Māwardī. The latter served al-Qādir and his successor, al-Qā'im (422/10131-467/1075). He assumed the post of qādī and wrote many works on usūl al-fiqh and other fields of Islamic knowledge. However, the most famous work of al-Māwardī is al-Aḥkām al-Sultāniyya (The Ordinances of the Government) because it is the first work which deals with public administration. Regardless of which caliph actually asked al-Māwardī to write al-Aḥkām, its significance is that it tries to maintain the existence of the 'Abbāsid caliphate and makes it an inseparable element of the structure of Islam. Moreover, since the caliphate was in decline, al-Māwardī tried to legitimize the relations between the weak caliph as a spiritual leader of the Muslim community and the strong amīr as deputy of the caliph.

Al-Māwardī maintains that the caliph can still be considered the imām of the Muslim *umma* even though the administration of the state has been taken by other as long as the usurper's acts are in accordance with the laws of Islam and the demands of justice. Al-Māwardī also justifies the seizure of power by the *amīr* or governor and suggests that the caliph has to give the *amīr* an investiture to legitimize his control over the district which are already controlled by him.

Although the caliph's measures do not rely on the prerequisites and rules of conventional appointment, his actions maintain the canon laws and its provisions and cannot be disregarded. Therefore, al-Māwardī lays down several duties which have to be performed by the *amīr* of *imārat al-istīlā*; the *amīr* must preserve the office of the

imāmate; he must show religious obedience and must have agreement and mutual assistance with the caliph. By observing these rules, the rights of the imāmate and the rules of the community are maintained, and it is for this purpose that an investiture given to the usurper is required.

Another Shāfi ite scholar who also played an important role in the defense of the 'Abbāsid caliphate during al-Qādir's reign was al-Baghdādī (d.429/1037). His main work which concerns us here is *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, in which he discusses the theory of the Sunnite imāmate. Basically al-Baghdādī's views are not very different from those of al-Māwardī and al-Bāqillānī. However, one interesting view of al-Baghdādī is that regarding the number of the imāms at any one time. He permits the existence of two imāms at the same time if they are separated by an ocean.

One of the Ḥanbalite scholars who established a good relationship with al-Qādir and was called to defend the Sunnite imāmate was Abū Yaʿlā. He formulated his ideas in al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāmiyya. As indicated by the title of the book, Abū Yaʿlā's elaboration of the Sunnite theory of the imāmate in many respects resembles that of al-Māwardī's. This is one of the reasons that modern scholars assume that either of the two scholars copied from the other. There is, however, a very significant difference. Abū Yaʿlā in dealing with his theory refers mostly to the opinions of his master, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and other Ḥanbalite scholars. Al-Māwardī, on the other hand, not only relies on the opinions of the Shāfiʿite scholars, but also refers to the scholars of the four schools of law.

One of the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites who supported the Sunnite imāmate was 'Abd al-Jabbār (323/935-415/1024). No doubt, in the theological field the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites did not agree with the 'Abbāsid caliphs, but on the political aspects, most of them agree with the Sunnite scholars and supported the Sunnite caliphate; 'Abd al-Jabbār was a case in point. 'Abd al-Jabbār left some works in particular on theology, two of which are well-

known: al-Mughnī and Uṣūl al-Khamsa. The former concerns us here since in the last two volumes of it he discusses the theory of the Sunnite imāmate. His elaboration of the imāmateis divided into two sections: one is his general theory on the Sunnite imāmate, and the other a discussion of the Rāshidūn caliphate. Though he was a Muctazilite, in matters of law he followed Shāficism. Therefore, his views on the Sunnite imāmate and the Rāshidūn caliphate are not different from those of the Sunnite scholars, but his defense of the Rāshidūn caliphs is more detailed.

Among the aforementioned scholars who wrote on the theory of the Sunnite imāmate, three were directly influenced by al-Qādir's policy and were encouraged by him to write, namely al-Bāqillānī, al-Māwardī and Abū Yaʿlā because they served the caliph. As regards al-Baghdādī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār, both were not mentioned by the chroniclers as having been directly influenced by the caliph and no relationship between them has been recorded. Therefore, their works may have been indirectly encouraged by the caliph's policy of a Sunnite restoration, his decrees and profession (al-l'tiqād al-Qādirī).

Regarding the cited works on the Sunnite imāmate, al-Māwardī's work is perhaps the most important one in its contribution to the Sunnite caliphate during its decline. On the one hand, he justifies the relationship between the caliphal-Qādir and the amīr al-umarā', on the other, al-Māwardī lays down the rules which have to be followed by the amīr, i.e., the amīr should show mutual assistance towards the caliph, respect the dignity of the caliphate and protect Islamic territory. The good and long established relationship between the caliph and the Buwayhid amīrs was probably affected by al-Māwardī's concept of this relationship. This is clear from al-Māwardī's division of tasks or responsibilities between the caliph as spiritual leader and the amīr as a holder of temporal power. The latter is likened to the vizier of tafwīrd (vizier of delegation). With this arrangement the caliph perhaps did not feel that his power was hampered by the

Buwahids since his responsibilities were delegated to them. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the caliph could maintain his position for about forty-one years.

The appearance of the above-mentioned scholars during the reign of al-Qādir at the same time and their elaboration on the theory of the imāmate shows how great the extent of the caliph's influence was. But it is quite possible that the Shī tie movement and its literary development during his reign attracted reaction from Muslims throughout the empire, in particular, from Muslim scholars responding to the developing conditions and in common defense of the Sunnite caliphate (imāmate). Nevertheless, it is hard to prove that their works contributed to the maintenance and survival of the Abbāsid caliphate. Contrarily, we cannot deny that their formulation of the theory of imāmate and their defense against attacks launched by the Sunnite adversaries, to some extent helped to sustain the Abbāsid caliphate and to raise its dignity.

Perhaps the most lasting influence of the Sunnite scholars who formulated the theory of the imāmate was the confirmation of the legitimacy of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. Despite the fact that 'Abbāsid caliphate was in decline and its temporal power was taken by the *amīrs al-umarā* or sulṭāns, the latter usually did not regard their authority as legitimate without receiving legitimacy or investiture from the caliph. Only in rare cases did the Shī te rulers not regard it as necessary to ask for an investiture from the caliph in Baghdād.


Another important contribution of the Sunnite scholars to the maintenance of the 'Abbāsid or Sunnite caliphate was their defense of the Rāshidūn caliphate. All the Sunnite scholars, in particular those who discussed the theory of the caliphate, claimed that all four caliphs were true caliphs and their caliphates were true caliphates even though there occurred some incidents which darkened early Islamic history, such as civil wars between 'Alsha and 'Alī and between the latter and Mu'āwiya and the events surrounding 'Uthmān's murder.

Based on the above elaboration we reiterate that al-Qādir was not a puppet caliph and weak as had been his predecessors. He showed his determination in many cases to restore the caliphate by trying to get rid of the tutelage of the Buwayhid amīr al-umarā and to exert himself, but he failed because he was not strong enough politically and economically to change the long established condition of the caliphate. When he became caliph, the economy of the caliphate had already been weakened during the time of his predecessors because of many factors mentioned earlier, in particular a decrease in revenues since the vast areas formerly under the control of the Abbāsid caliphate were now taken by new rulers and dynasties. The available revenues from the Sawād and surrounding areas came into the treasury of the amīr al-umarā. The caliph only received a stipend assigned by the amīr al-umarā.

In addition, the political condition of the caliphate had already become so vulnerable for so long that it could not possibly be repaired. The political decline of the caliphate had already begun during the reign of al-Mutawakkil and continued up to the coming of the Buwayhids. Among the factors which weakened the power of the caliphate was the emergence of many dynasties which divided the central administration of the empire, the intervention of viziers and courtiers in the policy of the government and the domination of the army commanders and their rivalries to gain supreme power, especially after the introduction of Turkish slaves into the army by al-Mu<sup>c</sup>tasim.

The weakness of the temporal power was compensated for by al-Qādir's role in spiritual power. His function as the imām of the Muslim *umma* was significant due to his attempt at a Sunnite restoration. In the face of the Shī ite resurgence inspired by the emergence of the Buwayhid Shī ite regime, the caliph led the politico-religious opposition against the Buwayhids and the Shī ites. He also in many instances demonstrated his defense of the Sunnites by supporting them in their clashes with the Shī ites and by issuing decrees denouncing Mu tazilism, Rāfidism and Bāṭinism and

other doctrines considered as having deviated from true Islam, and by writing the epistle which was called *al-I'tiqād al-Qādirī* (The Qādirite Creed), which represented Sunnite traditionalism. Furthermore, al-Qādir contributed to literary developments dealing with the theory of the Sunnite imāmate, by encouraging some Sunnite scholars to defend the Sunnite imāmatethrough their works, some of which have come down to us. The works of these scholars, to some extent, helped with the maintenance and survival of the Sunnite caliphate.



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