IMPLICATIONS OF ANALYTIC APPROACHES TO MIND-BODY PROBLEM

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Certain trends in modern philosophy lead inevitably to a metaphysical and realistic philosophical position as the only possible epistemological approach which can explain realities such as human knowledge and the mind-body interrelation. Recent work in linguistic and analytic philosophy has demonstrated that all knowledge and experience cannot be reduced to the knowledge and experience derived by the scientific method. Linguistic and analytic philosophy by concentrating on meaning, logic and everyday experience has moved beyond empiricism and at the same time exposed the weaknesses of an idealistic epistemology.

By showing that all reality can neither be reduced to the measurable nor restricted to the mind, these philosophers have, according to the hypothesis of this thesis, implicitly proven that reality can be grasped by a philosophical understanding derived from sense experience, which does not negate the empirical but yet is more universal and basic. This is shown by many of their positive arguments and by the fact that they have exposed the problem to the point that metaphysical realism is the only possible alternative position.


This thesis then elaborates some of the social and educational implications in terms of both knowledge and conduct of adopting a metaphysical realism as a basic philosophical position.

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF LINGUISTIC AND ANALYTIC APPROACHES TO THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

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In Memory Of

Lionel A. Ryan L.L.B., Barrister and Solicitor

Born 1905 St. Kitts British West Indies Died 1943 Halifax Nova Scotia

PREFACE

Despite the fact that many of our present day values and much of our intellectual outlook can be called materialistic; there are certain tendencies in various disciplines to move beyond the narrow interpretation of materialism which predominated in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, to re-discover or at least re-consider other categories of reality which had been too hastily repudiated. Such repudiation was all too frequently based on prejudice, reactions to extreme positions, a degeneration of valid principles by misrepresentation (often by discipline), and practical effects of certain attitudes and intellectual movements on the values and thinking of society.

One of the complications of considering divisions of reality beyond the <u>directly</u> observable is the fact that matter is the category of reality which produces a direct and concrete impact. Matter is the object of the senses, as well as that which provides what C.S. Peirce calls the force or resistance of our direct experience. Because of this fact, what is scientifically certain will become a definite aspect of the knowledge of reality, whether of man or of his world. However, from this valid position it is much too easy, given

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a strong naturalistic prejudice, to declare that scientific certainty is the sum total and exclusive knowledge of reality. Empirical knowledge is equated with knowledge as such, while presuppositions which are not empirically verifiable are accepted only as postulates. When using such a method, any discoverable aspect of reality must of necessity be measurable.

The theory of Behaviorism is one such example of restricting man's capacities of understanding. Behaviorists, like Skinner, have been able to ascertain with great precision the observable aspects of speaking, listening and learning, but as a theory of meaning behaviorism has shown itself to be extremely limited.

Recently there have been a number of tendencies to move beyond the materialistic restrictions of a strictly scientific approach.

Psychologists like Bruner and Piaget have been moving away from a psychological position limited by early naturalistic interpretations. They are re-discovering, in the growing child a developing capacity for abstraction. They realize, at the very least, that any description of the thinking processes involves a much more metaempirical explanation then the behavioristic account would presently allow. Any account of knowledge, meaning or understanding which tends to contradict the common sense account of knowing cannot be bolstered merely because it is labeled scientific.

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It was because of his awareness of man's ability to solve the practical problems of his environment which prompted pragmatists like Dewey to reject the older materialistic reduction that thought was "nothing but" brain activity. He underlined the fact that man's thinking capacity considered as an instrument for problem solving was capable of producing the great changes which had reconstructed American industry and society, and would produce the social and industrial progress of the future.

In his book <u>The Ghost in the Machine</u>,¹ Arthur Koestler has accused the universities of corrupting the minds of generations of youth because of their almost exclusive preoccupation with a narrow empiricism. Thus, they have neglected to provide the leaders of humanity with a basis for human conduct.

Literature however, has always tended to plumb the depths of human feelings. On many occasions and in many places, it has stood almost alone, as a meta-empirical dimension which offered a glimpse of something more than that offered by the social sciences.

Recently a controversy was brought to light in the field of linguistics between those who would reduce language to the imitation of sounds and others, who realize that words indicated an understandable, non-observable meaning which is expressed by signs denoting universals.²

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This amounts to a conflict between a philosophical and a strictly empirical interpretation.

A major contemporary philosophical movement which opposes the reduction of man and reality to what is empirically verifiable, is existentialism. This movement is concerned with man as a totality, -a unified self, condemned to freedom in a world without meaning. They accept religions' areas of concern with some accepting and some rejecting religions' answer. An existential concentration on man as a subjective person, conscious of his own awareness of internal happenings, or happenings associated with the other, results in an emphasis on the intuition of the specific situation, together with a deep suspicion of logic, empirical or philosophical. Ortega y Gasset has, like Koestler, emphasized the fact that the proper study of mankind is man and that the main concern of the university should be to develop principles of conduct.

Peter Winch in his book <u>The Idea of a Social Science</u> states: "I want to show that the notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts which is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanations offered in the natural sciences."³

A.I. Melden declared in his work <u>Free Action</u> that, "absolutely nothing about any matter of human conduct follows logically from any account of the physiological condition of bcdily movement."⁴

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But even from within the circle of those trained in the intellectual discipline of science and nurtured by the empirical approach, a growing tendency has developed to subject empiricism and its basic premises to a rigorous scrutiny and a critical analysis. These tendencies have stemmed for the most part from the movement generally known as Linguistic Analysis and more especially from the Ordinary Language Logic branch of this movement, often categorized as the Oxford or Cambridge movement. The extra scientific tendencies of this group make all the more impact when one realizes that the movement has developed, and is still in the process of developing, from logical positivist roots.

Man's control of his environment has changed our world; technology has even brought the planets within our grasp. Empirical knowledge has discovered and partially measured the secrets of atomic matter. Yet, man realizes that the truly basic questions are non-empirical ones. Even our educational objectives can only be placed in a hierarchy of values by non-empirical principles. There is a growing uneasiness that man and life should receive our closest attention lest we cease to be at all.

It is the unified universal knowledge which we crave. To Plato, this knowledge was wisdom.

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¹N.Y.: MacMillan Co., 1968.


2<u>Time</u> Magazine, Feb. 16, 1968, p. 45.

³Quoted by Anthony Flew, "A Rational Animal", <u>Brain and</u> <u>Mind</u>, editor J.R. Smithies, p. 113.

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INTRODUCTION

The background history of the mind-body problem must be seen in relation to the three epistemological positions regarding the nature of man's knowledge. These are the basic positions on the existence or non-existence of mind. The philosophy of Existentialism however, does not possess a definite or distinct epistemological position. When concerned with meaning and perception at all, it is concerned with these dimensions only as aspects of the individual's unique awareness of himself and the other.

Existentialists are restricted in the number of epistemological positions they are able to adopt. If they carry the individualness and uniqueness of "knowledge" to an extreme, then they will fall into solipsism and become existential relativists. This is often the aspect of existentialism that appeals most to the student. However, if they attempt to objectify knowledge then they must either restrict themselves to individual, particular, experience, or admit a non-material intellectual knowledge or meaning either innate or intuitive. If they adopt the latter position they would be returning to an idealism from which they originally sprung. In the case of the intuition implicit in the views of existential theologians, knowledge comes via an

"existential leap" by means of faith or belief. Any objectification of knowledge would return the existentialists to a traditional position. In the final analysis, knowledge must be restricted either to the empirical, or be intellectual and innate with perceptual knowledge playing a lesser role as in Kant, or be intellectual and derived from sense perception as in metaphysical realism. The only other possible positions are skepticism; an unexplained innate feeling or knowing called intuition; or an ignoring altogether of the actual problems by concentrating on meta-epistemology as the analysts do. Existentialism moves between idealism and immediate experience. Most existentialists are concerned with questions of authentic personality and commitment to ideals and world situations. They reject any philosophic relevance to rationalism and the scientific method, yet are concerned with questions similar to those of the social sciences. Existentialists provide a view of self which is individualistic and subjective like the idealistic person but with no rational explanation of what the essence of this self would be, because their view relies on man by his free actions moulding his own nature and the nature of man in general. Such a view of man, as free existing and knowing but with no essence, either depends on a view of knowledge or simply ignores any rational basis for its position.

Analysis growing from positivist and linguistic roots claimed, at least in its ordinary language form, to be ontologically neutral.

It developed as a logical tool to clarify the many problems left by traditional philosophy - problems which they claimed were due to misunderstandings and the misuse of language propositions.

A.J. Ayer restricted all meaningful propositions by means of the principle of verification to synthetic judgments, - the empirically verifiable statements. However, analysis has moved beyond the principle of verification, to a position where empirical knowledge by its nature is restricted to only certain divisions, viz. the measurable.

Gilbert Ryle in his attacks on the traditional Cartesian "ghost in the machine" is behavioristic in his methodology and positivistic in his attitude. Yet despite Ryle's behavioristic approach he does not believe that reality can be reduced to mechanistic laws or be explainable in mechanistic terms only.

Analysts like Jerome Shaffer and Norman Malcolm in their attacks on the Identity theory have demonstrated that it is utterly incomprehensible and meaningless to identify a thought, meaning or mental realization with material brain processes. In this matter they are certain that there is a difference between a dimension of reality that is measurable, specific and subject to the laws of mechanics and a dimension that is meaningful, psychological and non material in its manifestations.

Charlesworth states that no analyst of note today accepts Ayers' view that the principle of verification can eliminate metaphysical propositions. He states rather that:

> From the point of view of the history of the movement of analysis too, the failure of the verification principle pointed several important lessons for the later analysts. First of all, it made it quite clear that analysis neither assumes, nor necessarily leads to an empiricist or positivist view of the world. Second, it showed, once and for all, that any attempt to find analysis upon a "principle", or to formulate it as a cut-and-dried technique, was self-defeating... And thirdly, since the failure of the verification principle seemed to show that there can be no one absolute criterion of verification, and so of meaning, the Oxford philosophers were to draw the conclusion that each kind of proposition has its own kind of "logic".¹

All in all, it is evident that the analysts have moved beyond materialistic reductionism and beyond empiricism, to describe dimensions of reality which, because they restrict themselves to linguistic logical analysis, they are unable to grasp as philosophical principles.

On the other hand, despite the fact that analysts like Ryle do not seem to understand what idealists mean by intellectual knowledge, concepts, or ideas, they take a unified view of individual man, as in Strawson's position, and have ably refuted the idealist argument for any kind of innate knowledge, especially by their elimination of false arguments against the validity of sense perception and by their accurate descriptions of human activity.

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Without adopting a metaphysical realist approach, analysts have by their own methods demonstrated that since idealism is based on a false dichotomy which no realist, whether analyst, empiricist or aristotelian would accept, it is an invalid approach to knowledge, reality and the mind. Metaphysical realists consider this a dichotomy between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge.

The main thesis in this treatise will be derived as a necessary conclusion from two factors. Factor one, idealism postulates an invalid relationship between sense and intellectual knowledge and hence a false split between mind and body. Factor two, by analytical logic the linguistic and analytical philosophers have shown clearly, that reality cannot be described solely in empirical terms or encompassed solely by empirical propositions.

These two factors leave the way open for a realistic philosophy which accepts man as a unit and accepts the fact that reality is not only perceived but possesses intelligible, understandable dimensions, as the only possible solution to the problem of knowledge and mind. This can be accomplished only philosophically by a method based on man's ability to know basic principles of all knowledge and reality, like the principles of contradiction, identity and causality. These are not empirical judgments and yet are understood to be valid. The kind of knowing and meaning which man possesses demands for its

explanation a metaphysical realist approach based upon common sense.

Many philosophers since Plato have realized that intellectual knowledge is the only knowledge that is meaningful, necessary, universal, and eternal but the error of the idealists was to assume that it must be unconnected to the world of experience. It was Aristotle who realized that this knowledge is grounded ultimately on the ordinary common sense comprehension of man.

Since all the tendencies in this mind-body controversy lead inevitably to a metaphysical realism, the final chapter consists in an elaboration of the educational principles implied in a metaphysical realist philosophy. These principles will be analyzed to show that they incorporate all that is empirically validated and yet add aspects which empiricism has failed to elucidate. These principles provide a balance between the educational principles derived from the extreme spiritualism of idealism and those restricted to the naturalism of empirical method.

Throughout this thesis some terms have been used interchangably. Such terms as 'being' are used interchangably with terms like 'existence', 'reality', 'what is', and 'to be'. Essence, nature and substance are interrelated terms applying to the same reality but from different perspectives. Essence refers to a whatness or kind of thing, nature to the essence as the source of activity and causality, and substance

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as that which exists as an entity in itself and not as a quality of some entity.

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¹Maxwell John Charlesworth, <u>Philosophy and Linguistic</u> <u>Analysis;</u> pp. 148-149.

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CHAPTER I

GENERAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL BACKGROUND TO THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

1. Man an Immaterial or Dual Substance: Intellectual Knowledge, the Sole Knowledge of the Real

It was the Greeks, with their penetrating insight into reality and human knowledge, and more particularly Plato, who showed that there was a distinction between the report of reality which one receives from the senses and that which one receives from the intellect. The intellectual climate was such that the Greeks were able to develop through various stages: the theocentric, where problems of nature became personifications of inanimate forces; the cosmogonic, where they sought for a basic underlying, transcendental substance like earth, air, fire or water; the anthropological, where, beginning with the Sophists, they turned their attention to the more practical problems of man in his world. Philosophical understanding evolved from the opposition between the philosophy of Farmenides and that of Heraclitus into the syntheses achieved by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Plato realized, as did Parmenides, that man understood things in a unified way. The more unified a concept was, the greater the insight into reality. The idea 'cat' could be predicted in a

judgment of a great number of individual things but the idea 'animal' could be applied to still more. Knowledge of the ultimate principles of reality was wisdom, and beauty was the principle of all order, including intellectual and moral order. Knowledge as wisdom was necessary, universal, immaterial and eternal. To possess wisdom was to know reality in a most unified and understandable way. The universal ideas contained the essence of those realities which for Plato were identical even to their universality, with the reality itself. These realities could be explicitly expressed in a definitional judgment which signified the reality in terms of interrelated genus and species.

What was the reality of the individual? To Heraclitus the particular world was a place of constant flux and unending motion and change. This was the only reality. For Parmenides change was only an illusion. The intellectual report was the only reality. Plato tended to take his stand on intellectual knowledge while admitting that particulars in their changing flux were mere copies of the universal realities.

This knowledge could be equated with human understanding and meaning while sense knowledge could not. It was immaterial because it was generalized, resisting any reduction to specific parts or extension. It was eternal because the meaning and essential definition

would always <u>be</u>; the meaning man, for instance, would always and everywhere remain the same. The universal essences were the unified and spiritualized basis for the intellectually known absolutes of the one, the true, the good, and the beautiful.

Given these truths concerning intellectual knowledge, Plato realized that there must be a sharp distinction between the mind and the body. The mind resided in the body, ruling over it but there was also the distinct possibility that the mind could exist both before and after its residence in the body.

Augustine accepted the Platonic view that the seeds of knowledge were innate within the individual while particular sensed reality became the occasions for the reminiscence of universal natures. For Augustine these universals were part of the whole process of The Divine Illumination of the mind.

It was left for Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, to develop a systematic theory of the nature and interrelationship of mind and body. He rejected the teleological and animistic features of the Aristotelian view of body to develop a mechanistic view based on homogeneous matter and local motion consistent with the physics of his time. Both mind and body were separate substances only accidentally connected like a horse and rider. Mind is unextended and characterized by thought. It is a thing, "... which doubts, understands,

conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels".¹ This concept of substance as a kind of spirit stuff, an unextended spirit or soul, was to give the idealists trouble later on and became a difficult position to describe and defend.

Locke and Berkeley further confused the notion of idea and hence confused the notions of mind and substance. Locke reduced the idea to the particularized images from sense perception and the internal manipulations of these sense images. This was the basis of Locke's empiricism. He repudiated Cartesian innate ideas and although as an empiricist he is not part of the idealist tradition, he postulated a representational view of knowledge and other subjectivist tendencies which become influential in modern philosophy. Berkeley denied the existence of material substance and reduced all reality to spirit. Everything is spirit or mind in which we immediately perceive sensations or ideas whose essence is to be perceived.

Emmanual Kant, the transcendental idealist, is classified by some as a realist because he admits the existence of the concrete particular world, as well as its phenomenal effects on man. Kant's theory of knowledge however, is in no way realistic. There is the same dichotomy existing between particular sense phenomena and the eternal, universal, immaterial, meanings and causes known in intellectual knowledge. All the categories of meaning are subjective structures imposed by the mind upon the phenomena of sense knowledge. These categories are innate and transcendental. Hence all the categories including time, space, causality and the universals come from within the individual rather than from external reality. The universality and necessity of judgments come from these categories of pure reason while God and morality are justified by logic and practical reason which for Kant was equivalent to will. By using these a priori categories Kant justifies the synthetic a priori propositions of arithmetic, geometry and metaphysics.

Idealists of whatever school, whether monists or personalists, dualists or transcendentalists, basically distrust the reality presented in sense experience. Ultimately, the material is either denied or declared to be unknowable in itself. This is well stated by Mary Whiton Calkins in her credo:

> The Universe contains distinctively mental realities; it may or may not also contain non-mental entities, but in any case irreducible mental realities exist.

Mental realities are ultimately personal ... the mental phenomena which I directly observe are not percepts, thoughts, emotions, and volitions in unending succession, but rather perceiving, thinking, feeling, and willing self or selves.

The universe is through and through mental in character... all that is real is ultimately mental, and accordingly personal, in nature.

The universe literally is one all-including (and accordingly complete) self of which all the lesser selves are genuine and identical parts, or members. By Absolute Self as absolute I understand, in the first place ... all-including self: no shred of reality, however base, can be outside of it.

The Absolute Person as self I describe as a conscious being; and by "conscious" I must mean essentially what I mean when I describe myself as conscious. In other words I must hold that the Absolute Self genuinely perceives, thinks, feels, and wills.²

Idealist educational theory has logically been centered around absolute ideals and the concept of the student as person. The process of education is seen as a drawing out to fruition of the seeds of knowledge innately contained within each individual. Imitation of the ideals as embodied in the teacher as well as reflection about the concepts contained in words either written or spoken, are essential educational influences. Belief in the exclusiveness of mind along with absolute intellectual, moral and educational objectives, are the foundations for the strength of the idealistic philosophy of education for both the religious believer and the political absolutist. Because the idealist's position places him outside the realm of empirical scientific knowledge he is unable to utilize much of the physiological scientific evidence which has been derived in the modern era. Even his objectives tend towards a black or white certainty in areas where certitude cannot be achieved. This leads to absolutist political theories. In idealism nothing is tentative, corresponding to the actual weakness of man and his gropings toward truth. The man guided by the idealistic absolute hardly resembles the existential man faced with

agonizing uncertainty and objective evil, - the man of the twentieth century. And yet it is the idealist who clings to the world of intellectual wisdom and the higher goals of human ideals which distinguish man from the brute animal.

2. Man a Unified Substance with Both Mental and Physical Potentials: Intellectual Knowledge an Immaterial Reception of Reality Dependent upon Sense Contact

It was the father of science and logic, Aristotle, the Stagirite, who rejected the philosophical view of his teacher Plato in order to reconcile the insights of both Plato and Heraclitus. Thus he acknowledged that both change and permanence are factors in reality. To Heraclitus he points out that actual existents remain comparatively stable and similar, even when changing. To Plato he indicates that change too is real because it belongs to the intrinsic constitution of particular things. Stability for Aristotle was not located in a separate realm of essences known only by the intellect but as a principle inherent in the constituted forms of actual things. Essences are shared by many individuals because these individuals possess the same form. The ideas or meanings of the mind then, are universal comprehensions abstracted from the intelligible forms shared by material things. Aristotle was a metaphysical realist who accepted intellectual knowledge as distinct from sense empirical knowledge. He believed that by intellectual comprehension man could derive a

knowledge of essences together with the principles which are the ultimate causes of reality. Aristotle solved the problem of change by discovering that between the actuality of essences and nothing, there is another dimension which is real but not yet actual. These are the potentialities of an essence. It is by means of this distinction between act and potency that the metaphysical realist solves the problems of unity among multiplicities in reality. The problem of substantial change, the problem of the many sharing the same essence, the relationship between mind and matter, are all explained as an act-potency relationship. Man then is a single unified substance, knowing reality both empirically and philosophically. Both sense and intellectual knowledge begin as potencies or powers which are actualized by concrete reality and which result in sensations, images, conceptual meanings, and ideas.

When Europe was under the influence of neo-Platonism, metaphysical realism was kept alive in the early middle ages by the Arabs and Jews. It burst forth with renewed vigor in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, resulting in the realistic syntheses of Aquinas and Scotus.

The modern era because of its early rationalism and especially through Descartes and Kant, had become solely preoccupied on the one hand with idealism and on the other with an empiricism influenced by

the developing scientific orientation. Today, metaphysical realism is represented mainly by neo-Thomists who are often badly misunderstood even by reputable philosophers. Scholars, with no philosophical background other than that resulting from Cartesian-empiricist struggles, tend to read an idealistic rationalist interpretation into all metaphysical realist terms or to reject the system out of hand because of its associations with theology and religion.

Thomas Aquinas believed that philosophically Aristotle's view of reality was truer to all the facts, than was the materialism of Heraclitus and Democritus or the idealism and exaggerated realism of the Platonists, including Augustine. However, Aquinas carried the principles of Aristotle even further. Against the essentialism of Aristotle which equated the real with various essences, Aquinas proposed that the most important clue which a sensible thing gives to its reality, is not that it changes substantially or accidentally but that it actually exists. Existence truly explains the individual even before it is considered as a certain essence. To be real is to possess the actuality of being. In the first place, 'to be' means to exist even though a thing must exist as a horse or flower or something. Aquinas' doctrine of participation in existence is a further extension of Aristotle's co-principles of act and potency. With regard to the theory of knowledge, Aquinas accepts Aristotle's explanation of how intellectual concepts or meanings are formed but his acknowledgment of the dependence

of the intellectual powers on sense contact with the concrete world is much more explicit. Aquinas' principle of intellectual dependence on the senses illustrates his view of the close union between these two powers of the unified substance man. Every meaning which we read in a text, must depend <u>ultimately</u> upon some sense perception. His position differs from empiricism in that the sensed reality is not just known as sensed but it is also understandable in a non particulized way.

In fact, reality is knowable far beyond the way in which it is sensed or perceived. All the necessary and universal knowledge defined by Plato, all the comprehensions and meanings are derived from, and are aspects of, the concrete particular world. Many realities such as the mind itself is known only indirectly from its effects.

On the basis of this theory of knowledge there is no Cartesian split, no innate ideas and no real mind-body problem as such, even though the actual processes of knowing may never be known. Tom Jones touches, sees, and hears the computor running, but he also understands that it is a computor and comprehends the theory behind its operation and use. The intellect depends on sense knowledge not only as it is perceived, but also as retained in imagination and memory. Since reality can be known in its ultimate causes as well as in its particular measurable causes, then metaphysics as philosophical knowledge is possible.

Metaphysical realism philosophizes as an extension of common sense knowledge. It would be in wholehearted agreement with G.E. Moore's defense of common sense certitude and the ordinary meanings of common statements. Yet, it also accepts the fact that reality can be metaphysically known in terms of its nature. It seeks its principles in the reality of being as known by everyone. It is not a fixed system based on subjective or innate logical principles like those of Kant and Hegel. It is not restricted to mere descriptions of behavior or measurable elements in matter. But even science itself is supported by the basic principles of reality as presented by metaphysical realist philosophy. It presents a knowledge of the real world as sensed and understood by real men, not by beings who are basically either spirits or merely extended organic structures.

The educational view of metaphysic realism reinforces many of the learning techniques stressed by the psychological movement in education, since anything validly proven by scientific techniques is considered as valid knowledge. The difference between a Montessori and a Froebel is basically the difference between a realistic based system which is Montessori's, and an idealistic based system such as Froebels. The former system stresses the importance of beginning with things and sense training, while the latter position is more concerned with intuitions and symbolic knowledge gained by contact with shapes, movement etc. Montessori does not believe however in

sense training for its own sake but for sense training as a basis for the development of concepts and reasoning.

Metaphysical realism in its moral, social and political values is not as absolutist as idealism. Idealistic values based on the one, the good and the true, tend to be more fixed and unchanging. There is much more flexibility to realist ethics and social theory because no judgments in these areas can be labelled absolute. Only the first epistemological principles and perceptual judgments are absolute; all other judgments, including those in ethics and politics, have varying degrees of certitude. Further implications of a metaphysical realist educational view will be considered in Chapter V.

3. Man a Natural Material Organism: Empirical Sense Knowledge, the Only Verifiable Knowledge of Reality

Democritus and Heraclitus could be considered as forerunners of this position. The former proposed a monistic materialism basic to all naturalistic philosophies while the latter developed an evolutionary relativism which could be considered the pragmatism of the ancients. Most philosophers in this category are empiricists; all depend in one way or another on empirical knowledge.

Pragmatists do not equate knowledge and science as do the positivists but their pragmatic justification of truth depends ultimately on sense experience and scientific knowledge as the sole

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basis for its relativistic truth. Whether naturalists are logical positivists, pragmatists, or classical empiricists, they all acknowledge that, "sense experience may be regarded as a necessary condition for confirming or establishing the truth of our ideas about matters of fact, regardless of where these ideas may have originated."³

In a word, naturalists do not believe in a mind. There is no soul or immaterial substance as they imagine it would have to be, so there is no world of intellectual or philosophical knowledge. Naturalists use the same words as do the idealists in their everyday speech and writings but these are explained as labels for common perceptions as they are remembered, as linguistic usage, or as observable behavior. Universals considered as understandable natures which can be defined are rejected in favor of a nominalistic interpretation of universal words. The reason is quite clear.

> Naturalism is polemically defined as repudiating the view that there exists or could exist any entities or events which lie in principle, beyond the scope of scientific explanation.⁴

Extreme materialists look upon knowledge as a passive absorbtion of what is poured into us from reality. This rules out what is contributed by the imagination and abstractive capacities of man. What passes for mental activity is merely a device for arranging sensations.

Empiricists like Locke believe that complex relational and general ideas are created from the simple ideas reflected from reality by sensation.⁵ He repudiated Descartes view of innate ideas. Locke's ideas however, are equivalent to sense images; the concrete particular representations of sense experience. Even his complex ideas are combinations of various sense images. Philosophers in the naturalist tradition always tend to interpret the meaning of the word idea as an image.⁶ Like Gilbert Ryle the linguistic analyst, they tend to consider Cartesian and idealistic ideas as ghostly replicas of sense images. This shows a lack of comprehension of what philosophers mean by an immaterial concept. Because of the history of modern philosophy no one in the empirical or linguistic tradition has come to grips with the metaphysical realist tradition. Naturalists usually confuse this position with idealism since many of the terms used are the same, while on the other hand, idealists usually confuse metaphysical realism with empiricism,

> It is customary to use the label empiricist in refering, among others, to the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, to the medieval philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas and to the trio of modern British philosophers Locke, Berkeley and Hume.⁷

John Locke was an empiricist in roughly the same sense that Aquinas was \dots^8

This is a slip-shod comparison. Locke, Aquinas, and Kant are all realists in the sense that they believe in the real world which exists without being known. Locke and Aquinas both believe that all

knowledge stems from sense experience but for Locke all ideas are images that are supposed to <u>represent</u> reality. For Aquinas sense perception is a direct contact with reality while sense images are retentions of this reality in the imagination, and ideas or concepts are intellectual meanings as they are for Plato and the idealists. This is a far cry from empiricism. This is even more clearly seen when it is realized that for Aquinas the most basic form of philosophy is metaphysics. This kind of knowledge is denied by empiricists. Just as Kant's transcendental idealism includes an empirical dimension, so too Locke's representative view of knowledge inclines towards subjectivism. With this dualism, man could never really know reality for certain. Besides, for Locke all secondary qualities such as sight and sound are subjective. Most empiricists however, emphatically reject the architectonic and ultra spiritual logical view of idealism, as an 'a priori' construction.

Naturalists reduce philosophy to science or to a generalized study which coordinates scientific knowledge. There can be no metaphysics, no general principles of reality like the principles of Identity, Noncontradiction and Causality unless they are merely postulates. There are no general judgments other than synthetic judgments which can be scientifically verified by observation and there can be no universal ideas. They cannot accept the possibility that some analytic judgments, both philosophical and mathematical, can

be derived ultimately from intelligible experience. As we have seen, even Aristotle is looked upon as a precursor to empiricism.⁹ But the Aristotelian categories of substance and the nine accidents, are categories of a reality which is knowable intellectually in all its forms and relations, making possible an intellectual knowledge distinct from sense knowledge, even though dependant on it.

An analytic judgment like, 'a thing cannot be and not be at the same time', is innate and necessarily known to the idealist by means of an interior logic; it is a postulate or expresses a relationship between words to naturalists; and it is self-evident and known implicitly in the very act of knowing and judging about real existants to the metaphysical realist. Metaphysical realists do not agree with Kant and the empiricists that all judgments are either analytic 'a priori' or synthetic 'a posteriori'. They reject the idealistic interpretation of 'a priori' to claim that there are basic necessary propositions which are first principles of reality, implicit in common sense knowledge and made explicit by philosophy. They are necessary somewhat as the judgment, 'you are sitting there', is a first synthetic judgment of experience.

If positivism with its restriction of truth propositions represents an extreme anti-metaphysical slant, pragmatism and critical naturalism represent the more flexible brands of naturalism. Peirce's

pragmatism reduces what is meaningful to what can be scientifically discovered by the community. Dewey's reflective knowledge amount to practical judgments which can be verified by achieving solutions to problems. Critical naturalists believe that the complex world of knowledge and meaning cannot be easily reduced to matter or material principles. These naturalists claim that mental activity is a psychological function encompassed by the natural but which is not material in the way that previous materialists had claimed.

> It agrees with idealism in pointing to mind as an important fact; but it defines mind in terms of nature, not nature in terms of mind. Like materialism, it denies the existence of final causes taken as one kind of efficient cause or force; yet it finds room for the notion of ends and teleology which it interprets as one among other kinds of relation in the natural world.¹⁰

Critical naturalism has an open ended view of what can be included in the realm of the natural. It accepts both cognitive and non-cognitive experience as well as art and religion. How then does it nevertheless exclude the hypothesis of any supernatural being or a supernatural dimension? The reason is because it acquires its essential character not so much from a set of permanent principles as from the method which it employs. This is the scientific method.¹¹

Even this more flexible naturalism receives little sympathy from metaphysical philosophers. They see all naturalists as refusing to accept many aspects of reality in order that they can cling to a

scientific naturalism.

Empiricism is no longer the naive sensism of the English empiricists in which true thought is filtered out. The new-empiricism ... does by approximation what the old empiricism thought it had done absolutely - the elimination of the metaphysical content of judgment ... The modern empiricist has recognized the fact of meaning which is quite different from the mere presence of a subjective state with objective connections. It is however, very interesting to see that he deals with meanings as if they were only semantic symbols, which is a full return to the old nominalism which denied that there was any truth to a general class concept. There are no true universal realities.¹²

What then is mind to a naturalist? Behaviorists who rely on scientific knowledge reduce all meaning to observable activity or activity which was observable in past learning situations. Locke reduces it to representative ideas, i.e. images and functions of the internal faculties. Critical naturalists, pragmatists and many linguistic philosophers stamp it as a psychological function of nature which ultimately must be equated with matter. The non-material world of meaning and intellectual knowledge for all naturalists must ultimately be an effect of matter. The immaterial has no epistemological reality nor philosophical dimension for them.

Naturalistic education relies heavily on the scientific method and the scientific verification of results. All knowledge is tentative, open-ended and non absolute. In fact, for pragmatists like Dewey, it is relative to environmental problem solving and cultural changes. All subjects including education itself are reduced to the scientific method, e.g. I.Q. tests, educational research, political science, the social sciences, etc. Values are naturalistic where what is moral is reduced to what is scientifically expedient or what can be shown statistically to be a social need. Ethics is utilitarian where social need and social consequences become the criterion for what is morally correct.

Naturalistic educators rely heavily on the social sciences for their perspectives. Even educational objectives can be derived only on the basis of the best scientific knowledge available. Objectives change with frequently changing viewpoints and theories promulgated by scientifically minded theorists.

Knowledge is concerned with the real world to be known and it is the teachers role to help the pupil to discover and perfect his scientific knowledge of the world and himself. The metaphysical realist although he accepts sense training and experimentation as necessary to education, would tend to agree with the idealists that the most important things are learned directly on the intellectual level from books and teachers rather than discovered by experimentation. They would also agree with the idealist that much learning requires effort and that some actions should be performed because they are right not because



they are pleasant or interesting. However realists of all kinds will concentrate on many areas of knowledge, which represent probable and possible truth and which are not inflexibly absolute.

¹René Descartes, <u>A Discourse on Method</u>, <u>Meditation</u> II, p.89.

²J. Donald Butler, <u>Idealism in Education</u>, p. 47.

³Robert G. Olson, A Short Introduction to Philosophy, p. 44.

⁴Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Volume V, p. 448.

⁵Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, p. 501.

⁶See Chapter IV, Section 1, on William Alston's attack on the ideational theory of meaning.

⁷Robert S. Olson, <u>op. cit</u>. p. 44.

⁸Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 501.

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⁹John Herman Randall Jr. and Justus Buchler, <u>Philosophy</u>, An <u>Introduction</u>, p. 227.

¹⁰Ibid, p. 226.

¹¹Ibid, p. 227.

¹²Gustave Weigle and Arthur G. Madden, <u>Knowledge: Its Values</u> and Limits, p. 78.

CHAPTER II

ORDINARY LANGUAGE LOGIC AND THERAPEUTIC ANALYSIS

1. The Attack on Idealism

Wittgenstein and Ryle following in the footsteps of G.E. Moore, continued the positivistic role of exposing metaphysics to be nonsense. For the Analysts of the Linguistic school no less than for Ayer, Russell and The Vienna Circle, the primary and fundamental fault of the metaphysician is that he asserts the existence or occurrence of things unseen and defends these assertions with purely philosophical and conceptual arguments. The language analysts however, claim to know specifically why the metaphysicians went astray and how to dissolve their problems which were only pseudo-problems in the first place. Of course the metaphysics with which they were familiar and against which they took violent exception, was the Hegelianism of British philosophers like Bradley, Bosanquet and McTaggart.

In spite of the fact that Ryle does not understand what an idealist means by an idea, for he seems to give a ghostly concretization to mental entities as a para-mechanical parallel to physical entities, he succeeds in his book The Concept of Mind in demonstrating the

fact that man's cognitive and affective activities are intricately bound up with his bodily behaviour in a unified and intimate fashion.¹ This does not mean to say that Ryle succeeds in his task of eliminating the concept of mind or showing that the mind-body relationship is a pseudo-problem. This he has failed to do. In many places he finally is forced to admit the existence of the interior and the mental.² Ryle shows his positivistic prejudice when he implicitly equates any kind of entity or existence as similar or analogous to the existence of physically extended objects.

Yet Gilbert Ryle and others of his school, have succeeded in showing the untenable position of idealists and dualists who adopt an intellectually conceived position that tends to contradict common sense facts. Dualists who conceive of the mental as involving a separate if unextended substance, have placed themselves in the difficult position of trying to explain the nature of this separate substance and what relation it bears to the body and bodily contact with reality. In example after example, Ryle shows that this view of man and therefore of knowledge is contrary to our awareness of human reality involving as it does such dynamic reactions with its environment. He shows clearly the untenability of postulating a separate world, even though a causal connection between the "ghostly" activity and the physical one may be admitted. It is the person who acts and the action is a unified activity for which the person is

responsible and aware in a unified way.

The acceptance by all men of such things as the external world of reality, sensations of objects and other minds make of idealism and exaggerated dualism a textbook doctrine based on theoretical difficulties of explaining the interrelationship of mind and body and the process of knowing. Because of this fact, Ryle's analysis of sensation as something felt rather than observed has the force of common sense appeal against the idealistic tendency to explain sensation as the knowledge of a mediate inner object of sense, rather than the awareness of the exterior object itself. Sensations are not facts about a person's mind as Ryle has stated but they do involve knowledge by one being of other existing beings distinct from himself. Sensation is not an internal immanent activity as idealists claim. It is an awareness of exterior reality as Ryle shows but it certainly involves a mental dimension and a relationship which needs to be philosophically explained. Ryle is on much stronger ground in demolishing the idealist and dualist view of sensation than he is in his explanation of thought and reason. Of course his opponents would claim, and rightly so, that he has not provided a philosophical refutation of their position. Ryle's realism provided him with endless examples of man's conscious awareness of reality but his behaviorism and his equating of thought with words and sentences, ghostly or overt, leaves him open to severe criticism.

The debate over private language and the existence of other minds is a linguistic follow-up to the position taken in The Concept The idealists realized, that if all I know immediately are of Mind. the internal modifications of my consciousness, then how can I know if there are other minds. This is the problem of solipsism which all idealists must face because of their sense-scepticism. Wittgenstein attacked the traditional philosophers by showing that words have meaning only because of their public usage and can be learned only in a public situation.³ For proper use of language it is necessary to appreciate the pattern, in order to grasp some sort of insight into a unique set of relations. However it is difficult for idealists to explain how a child learns language if language is not a publicly usable convention. The whole question of "privileged access" is brought by this behavioristic interpretation of language, in Wittgenstein and Ryle, to the scrutiny of public knowledge. It is difficult, using strictly empirical methods, to prove the existence of other minds or even a mental dimension. For this reason it is much easier for empiricists and analysts of this leaning, to deny the mental and reduce it to purposeful, thoughtful behavior, or to struggle endlessly with arguments from analogy.⁴ The linguistic philosopher who considers all reality to be discoverable in and by language is in a much more flexible position than the positivist, yet even he is limited because there is nothing beyond behavior and language by which he can ascertain the existence of other minds. If

words were to come from a tree, it would then have to be placed in the same category as man. The whole question of private language associated with private feelings like pain, etc. becomes more absurd when all meaning is equated with language. If all meanings are public and learned as Wittgenstein states, then there is no problem regarding private language. I may not be able to communicate my feeling but I can communicate a meaning. If meaning is equated with language which is understood as a one-to-one association with a private referent, then the whole problem becomes insoluble. Pain and colour could be known only if we experience them but language communication of these sensations is done in public situations. Some analysts have managed to integrate the first person and third person accounts to show that both elements must be involved in solving the problem.⁵ Linguistic analysis has been able to show that a dualistic account of man, despite its philosophical arguments, cannot be true to the facts of common experience.

2. Opposition to Materialistic Reduction and the Principle of Verification: an Ultra-Empirical Approach

Ordinary Language Philosophy is an approach which is in some ways extremely flexible; its methodology leads it to the far corners of reality where meaning is involved, while its rigorous logic and common sense realism combines with language as it is used to create a

tool based on human communication which can point the direction for the solution of many traditional problems. It is growing beyond the bounds of its positivistic birth to a point where it is as diverse as Existentialism. Ryle is a logical behaviorist; Shaffer is now an avowed dualist.⁶ J.J.C. Smart and U.T. Place are materialists; G.E. Anscombe is influenced by Wittgenstein and Aristotle. M.A.E. Dummett and P.T. Geach are both Catholics, the latter greatly influenced by the metaphysical realism of Aquinas.

Linguistic analysis is not tied down to the empirical method or the data of experimentation but it is ambivalent since many of its practitioners restrict themselves implicitly to empirical verification while others have not yet been able to transcend the empirical philosophical traditions. After all, it was created as a means of showing that all philosophical problems were due to category mistakes based on a misuse of language. Metaphysics was nonsense precisely because it did not understand how words should ordinarily be used.

Gellner, commenting on this flexibility states:

Linguistic Philosophy ... claims ... to reinstate everything that the soul desires in its old place, and yet to do it in a way which seems as hard-headed or rather more so - as the preceding Logical Positivism.⁷

and again:

Linguistic Philosophy can be used to attack religion or accept it depending on whether it is the part that



is left as it is, or as philosophy to be eliminated.⁸

Another author commenting on post-war British philosophy in general, declares:

In reality the practice of contemporary British philosophers, whatever the form in which they cast their reflections, shows on the whole a return to a conception of philosophy wider than was fashionable in the recent past and closer to the practice of traditional philosophers. In the end there does not seem to have been a philosophical revolution but rather a period of regression followed by a renewed tendency to expansion.⁹

Even metaphysics, the dragon which had to be slayed, does not appear in too badly a light after linguistic analysis has repudiated, at least explicitly, Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism. One analyst has no difficulty in putting Aristotle and Ryle together as representing the functional view of mind.¹⁰ From the very beginning linguistic analysis has rejected the reductive fallacy. John Wisdom in 1934 showed that the arguments put forth by analytic materialism rested ultimately on a simple materialism which could only end up by denying the existence of mental facts.¹¹ He concludes his argument by saying that, "(a) there are mental facts and (b) these mental facts are not reducible to material facts."¹²

It was natural that linguistic analysis would move beyond these positions because their very concentration on language was, in the final analysis, a concentration on meaning, and meaning is the stumbling block for materialistic theories which denied the mental. Theoretical Behaviorism is another form of reduction which despite Ryle, has been criticized by many analysts. These critics trace the development of a sensation from the outside stimulus through the stimulation of the sense organs to the brain centers. But it is the consciousness of the object, feeling or emotion that the analysts realize is a psychological fact of awareness. It is a state of consciousness which is neither an external behavior nor a physiological material reaction. It is significant that many analysts begin their articles with a criticism of Ryle's <u>Concept of Mind</u> and disassociate themselves from his view of consciousness and the mental.¹³

The whole application of the language game view was to eliminate philosophy as a theoretical study and to show where it had not been true to ordinary usage. Language games however, can cut many ways. As we have seen, this approach tends also to open up areas of thought which have hitherto been considered taboo. Wittgenstein repudiated his earlier attempts, along with Bertrand Russell, to reduce logic to a perfect language which would provide a fixed form for meaningful propositions and so bypass the inexactitudes and confusions of common language. In explicitly repudiating this idea of a proper logical form linguistic analysis was in fact repudiating

the Logical Positivists' Principle of Verification. Linguistic analysts have been in the forefront of the attack on the Principle of Verification and have exposed the weaknesses of its various formulations. In its original formulation, the principle verified as the only kinds of sentences which have truth value, those which are empirically verifiable and those which are analytically true or false. The Positivist held the view that all other propositions did not have a truth value but were meaningless. The analysts were quick to realize that the greatest weakness of the principle was that it was self destructive, for the principle itself was neither analytical nor empirically verifiable. They were able also to bring forward numerous examples that did have meaning but which could not be verified as true or false. This meaning existed in usage apart from the truth value of the proposition. The changing of the principle to Verifiability to include statements where the method of verification was evident or to Confirmability to include statements that would count for or against a proposition, did not save the principle from the rigorous analysis of the ordinary language logicians. They knew that the flexibility of language and meaningfulness included value statements, personal experiences, questions, imperatives, exclamations, analytical statements and even metaphysical propositions.¹⁴

It was John Austin who did much to attack the weaknesses of

of the Principle of Verification:

... one of the important results of Austin's work was to undermine the principles of logical positivism, and thus to free analytic philosophy from its connection with that rather militant form of empiricism

It is partly because of the influence of Austin that the trend of linguistic philosophy in England in the past twenty years has been a trend away from anti-metaphysical dogmatism. Several practitioners of analytic philosophy ... have recently written books of a definitely metaphysical character. Even A.J. Ayer ... described his Philosophical Essays as being concerned with "problems in logic and metaphysics." Austin had no particular wish to reinstate metaphysics. But one effect of his work was to prepare the way for its revival, by removing the foundations on which most objections to metaphysics were based. He took the carpet from under the feet of all those who were saying with such joyful confidence that "metaphysics is nonsense."¹⁵

Metaphysics could not be eliminated by an 'a priori' attempt to classify all its statements as meaningless. Each problem would have to be proven or disproven on its own merits with regard to the evidence produced.¹⁶ As Professor Wisdom declared, the principle of verification can be reformulated to read: "Every kind of statement has its own kind of verification."¹⁷ Like the Thomistic principle of sufficient reason, it could then underline the fact that a proposition to be meaningful must be supported by the evidence appropriate to it; "for an empirical statement to be meaningful it must be supported by empirical evidence; for a logical statement to be meaningful it must be supported by logical evidence and for a metaphysical statement to be meaningful it must be supported by metaphysical evidence."¹⁸

It is quite evident that linguistic analysis has moved far beyond its original confines. Analysts have realized the limitations in Hume's view of causality and have ended by pointing the way to a view of causality which is not tied to a strictly physical or empirically verifiable method:¹⁹

> Much of the difficulty doubtless stems from an unduly narrow concept of causality. If you assume that C cannot cause E without C acting on E, you will remain uncomfortable about mind-body body-mind causality because one thing cannot literally act on another unless they are both physical things. But why must all causality be of the acting on variety? Even in the physical realm, there are cases of causality in which it is difficult or impossible for us to see how the one entity acts upon the second. ... There are many cases in which all we can say is that the causal relation does occur...²⁰

Analysts have re-discovered the existence of non-empirical dimensions of reality beginning with thought and meaning itself. P.F. Strawson in his book <u>Individuals</u> has reaffirmed a position which asserts the unity of the common human nature and the individual by means of his concept of Persons. By linguistic analysis of statements Strawson realized that a certain class of predicates, the "P-Predicates", could not be predicated of bodies or disembodied minds but only of unified persons and so it was the person who knew, felt and sensed, not a cartesian "ghost" or a physiological machine.²¹

G.E.M. Anscombe adopting an Aristotelian-Thomistic view of truth and goodness as related to knowing and willing, analyzes Aristotle's concept of good in the whole question of intention, which she believes Wittgenstein did not understand, and declares:²²

> Can it be that there is something that modern philosophy has bluntly misunderstood: namely what ancient and medieval philosophers meant by practical knowledge? Certainly in modern philosophy we have an incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge.²³

With regard to the empirical theories of psychology, R.S. Peters makes the case that they are all merely giving part of the story with regard to questions of desire and motivation. Basically all these theories fail in coming to grips with the reality of the rule-following purposive model in explaining human behavior:

> ...explanations of the purposive, rule-following type, occupy a sort of logical ceiling in explaining human actions. They cannot be deduced from more general postulates of a mechanical type...²⁴

Thus all explanations of motivations must, to be adequate, include an account of a person's conscious reasons.

There is a linguistic position which moves even closer to the Thomistic position on concepts in the philosophy of P.T. Geach. Geach distinguishes between images and concepts (ideas), rejects

Locke's view of substance with the corresponding empirical abstraction, and reaffirms the belief that mental concepts refer to features of reality, but not in a one to one correspondence. This view tends to reinforce the metaphysical realist view of a concept as a grasp of the intelligible in reality.²⁵ According to Geach, by trying to reduce mental acts to behavior, Ryle was in effect destroying the objectives of science.²⁶

All analysts at this point, accept the fact that the psychological conscious aspects of sensation, feelings of pain, and sudden realizations, constitute a mental reality which is distinct from the physical. Most of the leading analysts, reject the Identity position which would see the mental and the physical as two faces of the same reality - a micro-macro set of descriptions of the one and the same material process. They categorically accept the non-empirical nature of consciousness as it reveals itself in our private awareness.²⁷ Even the linguistics of the situation show that the psychological aspects of human awareness can in no way be reduced to physical language. Sentences which depend on my psychological awareness (psi sentences) such as, 'I feel pain', 'Tom feels pain', 'the dog feels pain', cannot be reduced to statements like, 'I am five feet tall', which can be verified in a public empirical way.²⁸ Wittgenstein himself went beyond Ryle in distinguishing between the mental and the

physical, yet Ryle also clearly admitted the existence of the non-empirical dimensions. 29

The fear that theoretically minded persons have felt lest everything should turn out to be explicable by mechanical laws is a useless fear. And it is baseless not because the contingency which they dread happens not to be impending; but because it makes no sense to speak of such a contingency. Physicists may one day have found the answers to all physical questions, but not all questions are physical questions. The laws that they have found and will find may, in one sense of the metaphorical verb, govern everything that happens, but they do not ordain anything that happens... Laws of nature are not fiats.³⁰

He illustrates this point in the examples of the chess game and Gibbon's <u>Decline and Fall</u>. There is an empirical dimension to the chess moves and the use of words in the book but this does not explain the other very obvious category of purposeful tactics in the one example, or meaning in the case of the other.³¹

Linguistic analysis as a system is certainly ready for the adoption of a realist metaphysical method which is already tacitly implied in the final positions of many of its proponents.

3. Linguistic Analysis and the Theories of Mind-Body Interrelation

Since the analysts by and large accept the existence of the mental, they tend to support an interactionist view of mind-body relation.

This means they believe that a person is such a close union of the mental and the physical that the physical affects the mental and the mental affects the physical. Mental events as well as physical events can therefore act as causes in the causal chains involving both dimensions.

Most of the argumentation on the question has occurred over the Identity Theory as supported by Smart, Place and positivists like Feigl. Other positions have shown themselves to be inadequate in accounting for mental and physical occurrences and their causality. Parallelism is unacceptable to most linguistic analysts because, stemming as it does from the two substance views of Descartes and Leibniz, it possesses all the weaknesses of idealism; it denies the data of common experience and ultimately depends on a 'Deus ex machina' for a solution. Epiphenomenalism does not account for common sense facts; it cannot explain the historical influence of men's minds on the world, yet admits of non-observable effects while refusing to admit non-observable causes. There would have to be, even from a scientific point of view, two different kinds of causal laws which needed explaining because of what Feigl calls these "Nomological Danglers" which are the non-observable effects.³²

The Identity Theory while admitting that the mental and the physical have two different sets of characteristics claims that in fact they are one and the same thing, just as the molecular account and the common sense account of a gas are different, or just as lightening differs from its description as electrical discharge, or the meaning Scott differs from the meaning of the author of Waverly. There is a difference of meaning or logical difference but the referrents are the same.³³ Many linguistic analysts, using logic and their familiarity with a variety of meaningful human situations, have vigorously attacked the Identity theory. Malcolm concentrating on sudden thoughts, remembering and realizing, as being distinct from the physiological process, exclaims laconically:

My first inclination when I began to think on this topic, was to believe that Smart's view is false, that a sudden thought certainly is not a brain process. But now I think that I do not know what it means to say that a sudden thought is a brain process. 34

Malcolm goes on to show, that it makes no more sense to situate a thought in the brain than in any material place. Then too, the fact that consciousness involves outside extra-mental social circumstances means that it cannot be identical with brain process. Many mental manifestations could not be events at all. Belief, anxiety and intention are not events but are conscious mental dimensions of human interaction with environment and understanding of reality. Other surroundings are a necessary condition for the applicability of mental concepts. Joking is really a matter for



humour, not brain-cell processes.³⁵ A blind man could understand the physical aspect of sensed objects without understanding the conscious awareness aspects of sensation.³⁶

With regard to sensations as such, Quinton feels that impressions and bodily sensations are suspect as categories of the mental even though they fulfill conscious and introspective criteria for the mental.³⁷ Even the Greeks had no modern mind-body problem because, "from Homer to Aristotle, the line between mind and body, when drawn at all, was drawn so as to put the processes of sense perception on the body side."³⁸ It could be added that the Greeks did not have a mind-body problem because they were not restricted to an extreme dichotomy involving an empiricism on the one hand and a subjectivism on the other:

> In the present philosophical atmosphere there is an almost reflex hostility to inquiries of this kind into the nature of the traditional technical terms of philosophy.³⁹

Quinton believes that even though you cannot locate the mental in a place, that it can be individuated only if ascribed to where the body of the person-is. He sees no difficulty with indeterminate location because heat, noises and smells, also have indeterminate locations.⁴⁰

In considering Brentano's view of the intentional, Quinton admits that all conscious intentional acts are mental but goes on to show that some acts of consciousness are their own objects.⁴¹ Certainly, if the Identity Theory were correct, then even feelings like pain would either be public affairs, where the mental would be known when the physical was known, or the exact opposite for mental awareness would have to be specified and the reasons why such feelings are private explained.

All in all, in its analysis of the relation between the mental and the physical, the Identity theorists are "deplorably vague".⁴² However, even if the identity were established empirically, this would merely compound the problem. We would still be left with what Shaffer calls "irreducibly non-physical aspects".⁴³ Materialism, even enlightened naturalism,would be utterly inadequate as an explanation of reality and limited in the truth it could ascertain. Feigl himself is accused of acknowledging that his own double language version of the Identity theory requires an extension of the ordinary meaning of denotation.⁴⁴

When all is said and done, the Interactionist theory of the mental and the physical, even on empirical data, is accepted as most probably correct as far as The Ordinary Language Logic school of philosophers is concerned. If a man goes to the dentist because of a toothache or to a doctor because of angina pain, "the action is deliberate, goal-directed and determined by the pain."⁴⁵ Some

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predicates which are truly applicable to the physical do not even make sense when applied to the mental.

Thus the very least that we would have to say if we are going to discuss substance at all, is that there are two radically different kinds of material substancethe one involved in ordinary processes, and the one involved in certain brain processes - which is hardly more parsimonious then saying that these are two different kinds of substance.⁴⁶

The exact nature of the interraction may never be known but the problem could still profit from a philosophical as well as a purely empirical approach.

4. The Limitations of Linguistic Analysis

Paradoxically, although linguistic analysis is a flexible approach which moves in the realm of meaning to the realities beyond the reach of scientific empiricism, it is still heavily restricted by empirical methods, empirical traditions and empirical prejudices. In fact the problems which absorb the focus of attention have all been dictated by empirical philosophy and positivism in its reactions to Descartes and neo-Hegelianism.

In addition to this problem of empiricism, which will be considered mainly in the next chapter, linguistic philosophers have been restricted, by the limits and contradictions inherent in the language game viewpoint of Wittgenstein. Some still believe that

the source of all philosophic problems lies in improper use of language involving category mistakes; that language will provide the therapy necessary to show that these are really pseudo-problems; and that the role of philosophy lies in its being a second level study which is ontologically neutral.

Linguistic analysis reduces philosophy to an activity rather than a doctrine because there is no room for specifically philosophical propositions; hence, it reduces reality positivistically to specific and absolute ordinary language usage. In some ways their method is a revolt against a perfect language or formal logic, yet the analysts themselves in their argumentation are forced to use the truths of logical inference with their implied ontological premises e.g. principles of contradiction etc. Wittgenstein's method is a descriptive one which cannot provide any idealogical criteria or direction. It lacks a basis of principles for its method because it is nothing but a logic, much of it negative rather than positive. Wittgenstein realized that all words and sentences did not refer to objects but he gives no essential meaning to language other than the similarity of language-games, e.g. "enough", and "sufficient", can be identically used because they have the same meaning.⁴⁷

The language game involves very arbitrary categories and the utilization of this approach by linguistic philosophers involves

them in contradictions. A proper use of language demands that an individual understand some unity in a complex set of relations the coherent way in which a set of terms integrate. It involves some sort of intellectual insight rather than a mere description of words as many analysts seem to hold. In any language a word is a conventional sign for a meaning. If the meaning were identical with the word as a specific written symbol or sound, then we would be communicating nothing but the sound or symbol in any language or to know the symbol in any language would be automatically to know the meaning. The repeating of sounds like a parrot would be all that there is to the communication of meaning. The question of meaning cannot be evaded by referring to the whole verbal context of use for the whole context still involves meaning. This problem is especially acute in Ryle's <u>Concept of Mind</u> where his concentration on language rather than meaning could end only in a behaviorism.

Linguistic philosophers see their analysis as eliminating general or universal notions but to grasp the functions of words in various language games they must generalize. They claim that new usage can involve a new language game or that technical language is correct within its own sphere or game but there is no criteria for new moves in language. Right or wrong usage can have meaning only within the context of a language game. Each language system is "enclosed ... within discrete language games beyond which there is

no appeal."⁴⁸ Since they reject the use of right or wrong applied to the language game, yet they apply that criteria of ordinary language to show which language is nonsense, they are being extremely arbitrary. Language is an expanding thing where agreement on the use of many words allows communication but there is a constant attempt to understand some sentences, to reject other propositions on the basis of evidence other than language, and to accept new propositions as being valid because of evidence and reasoning and not because of ordinary usage:

There cannot be a language game for each person. Rational discourse implies the search for agreement but the very nature of the language game places it beyond other criteria. A good move within one game could be a bad move within a larger one. What are the limits or boundary lines? Wittgenstein's categories are so broad that they can include many diverse elements so that the category becomes far too comprehensive.⁵⁰ Against Warnock and Austin, the linguistic philosophers admit that there is no criteria for the perfect. This contradicts the fact that ordinary language in its own usage is taken as perfect.

Wittgenstein himself was contradictory, for even though all criteria for correct usage lie within language games, he himself describes the whole linguistic endeavor from <u>outside</u> the system.

Because of these ambivalences the analysts of language get involved in numerous contradictions. On the one hand, there is a naturalistic reduction of concepts to rules of verbal behavior, yet on the other hand, there is a denial of reductions in virtue of a flexible, polymorphous application of language. Then too, things can be known by direct contact, yet since all meaning is wrapped up in language things cannot be known unless spoken about.⁵¹

Gellner eliminates linguistic philosophy in the following way. First he shows that Urmson and Flew admit that the linguistic method is irrelevant to normative problems and then he concludes that since this method is concerned with norms of how terms and concepts should be used, it therefore eliminates itself.⁵² Commenting on this confusion one critic declares:

> There is something very odd about a theory which views sense making as public, denies the legitimacy of one's own case as a basis for learning anything about mental processes and then claims to recognize the private dimension of language. They are really only paying lip-service to a realm which they reject as meaningless.⁵³

When linguistic philosophers move away from Wittgenstein's



criterion or rather non criterion of meaning, they must fall back upon some traditional position. P.T. Geach falls back upon a traditional view of meaning for words and sentences making them dependant on conceptual understanding. Such a position goes far beyond Wittgenstein.⁵⁴ Linguistic analysis is capable of being all things to all people:

> By looking at language games we hunt with the empiricist naturalistic hounds; but by accepting their contents, we run with the transcendental hares, or any others we care to run with.⁵⁵

Yet analysis becomes safe from science because it is second order and safe from transcendentalism because language is (usually) naturalistically interpreted and the principle of verification which is overtly refuted is utilized in a disguised fashion:

> Linguistic Philosophy absolutely requires and presupposes Positivism, for without it as a tacit premise there is nothing to exclude any metaphysical interpretation of the usages that are to be found and allegedly taken as they are, in the world... It is parasitic on the Positivism which it also destroys.⁵⁶

Even while it denies this limitation by its method and the attitude of most of its practitioners it, "conveys, insinuates, insists on a naturalistic view of the world".⁵⁷ The fact that the analyst allows the specialized use of language, admits the possibility of new meanings and uses, and yet classifies metaphysics as nonsense is the direct result of this prejudice. Wittgenstein held that only



propositions that say something can be true or false. These he equated with empirically verifiable statements; "it is an 'a priori' definition of meaning and significance in terms of empirical verifiability."⁵⁸ This implied empiricism is evident in Ryle's attack on the ghost in the machine:

> By some extremely curious mental behavior Ryle persists in claiming that he is employing the metaphysically neutral method of ordinary language analysis while admitting that his work will undoubtedly be stigmatized as "behaviorist". He readily recognizes that the methodology of Behaviorism consists in describing specifically human doings exclusively by respectable and publicly checkable observations and experiments, in short exclusively by the methods of the empirical sciences. Whatever cannot be so described, nor reduced to such description, Ryle classes as a myth. It is more than difficult to believe that Ryle and his followers take themselves, or rather their readers, seriously in claiming ontological neutrality while they explicitly admit to denying the existence of non-physical realities and processes solely on the dogmatic positivistic presupposition that only physical bodies and processes really exist.⁵⁹

Since most of the weaknesses of the linguistic method are evident in Ryle's <u>Concept of Mind</u>, most of the exposés have been written in rebuttal against Ryle. One reason why controversy over the Identity Theory increased was because of the acknowledge failure of Ryle and Hampshire to dissolve the mind-body problem by reducing the mental to functions and dispositions.⁶⁰ Many of the points which Ryle makes are extremely questionable. He tries to eliminate

the mental but is forced to postulate entities like "frames of mind", "purpose", "expectations", "dispositions", and "attributes".⁶¹ He abhors dualism yet he admits of doing sums in the head and private reasoning. He reduces the question of abstract ideas to the absurd, yet does not apply the same criteria to imagination . and memory.⁶² Ryle was, "looking for the wrong sort of thing in the wrong sort of way".⁶³ By restricting himself to descriptive analysis, he could not grasp clearly what Descartes meant by the mental. Ryle's attacks a false view of consciousness as a parallel to sense perception. This is why he can talk of an infinite regress of conscious minds with the mind knowing itself knowing etc. He does this also with ghostly acts of attention and volition:⁶⁴

> There is little point in suggesting that neither Descartes nor his followers did think of 'res cogitans' as like 'res extensa' since the writers in the anti-ghost movement are not really concerned with the historical accuracy of their problems. But it might be in order to remark that it was just the disparity between mind and matter which gave rise to Descartes' difficulties with the mind-body problem. It is rather startling to be told that Descartes understood mental processes to be like physical processes when he laboured so long for their radical differences. Descartes clearly viewed thinking as a process in or of an immaterial substance... Imagination for him belonged to the body and was quite distinct and different from understanding, an intellectual process. But if thinking is a process, how are we to conceive of it, since so the anti-ghost writers say, the only processes we are acquainted with are physical and mechanical? Their answer - but not Descartes' - has been that it must be conceived as some sort of physical process although a somewhat mysterious and ghostly one ...

I would like to suggest that it has been the antighost movement itself that has generated the paramechanical model for thinking; that its members constructed this model because of their inability to conceive of any other way of understanding Descartes (and the whole tradition of philosophers they attack.)⁶⁵

The foregoing is certainly a serious indictment of the linguistic philosophers who accept Ryle's position. Wisdom accuses Ryle of "befuddlement", of employing a myth to disprove a myth while Beloff declares with righteous indignation that for Ryle to write a complete defense of behaviorism and then, "in the final chapter of your book to disclaim with scorn the imputation of mechanism and materialism seems now, more than ever, a case of double-talk".⁶⁶ Ryle does not realize that not all the data of consciousness was considered as mental or rather, as belonging to the intellect in ancient and medieval philosophy. Sensation, imagination and memory were considered as aspects of sense knowledge which was common to all animals. Reason was something else again.⁶⁷

Strawson too is limited in developing the notion of a person by his linguistic method. He believes that we can have no experience of self unless we expressly are involved in public contrast with others.

> ... when Strawson presents his own work as 'descriptive metaphysics' one wonders whether the vaunted new metaphysics is but the old antimetaphysical philosophy in disguise.

Of course Lewis is highly idealistic in his philosophical view and for this reason does not see the truly excellent possibilities in Strawson's person, which is basic to the Thomistic view as well.

Because of the influence of Wittgenstein and Kant, the linguistic analysts are unable to solve the problem of universals. Since it is word usage rather than meaning which is important they cannot get outside language to discover the realities of the situation; hence all attempts to solve this problem amount to a circular argument:

> the Linguists substitute flat denial for reasoning; and I submit that we have seen ... continuous evidence that their flat denials are deeply and knowingly rooted directly and indirectly in the empiricism of Hume and Kant.⁶⁸

It is evident that linguistic analysis cannot stand as an adequate method for discovering the nature of reality or the solution of problems which will always be metaphysical but it is in the process of breaking the limitations of its birth and has already pointed to the existence of the non-physical, intelligible aspects of reality.

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¹John W. Yolton, <u>Thinking and Perceiving</u>, p. 46. Maurice Cranston, <u>Philosophy and Language</u>, p. 50-51. A.C. Ewing "Professor Ryle's Attack on Dualism", <u>Proc. Arist. Society</u>, Dec. 1952, p. 71.

 $^{2}\text{Ryle},$ Concept of Mind, p. 252, 277, 299, 301; p. 262, 269-220, chapter V.

³N. Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations", in Philosophy of Mind, editor V.C. Chappell, pp. 74-100.

⁴N. Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds" in <u>Philosophy</u> of Mind, editor V.C. Chappell, p. 155, 156.

⁵Jerome Shaffer, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 28-29.

⁶Jerome Shaffer, "Persons and Their Bodies", <u>Philosophical</u> <u>Review</u>, Vol. 75, No 1, p. 59.

⁷Ernest Gellner, Words and Things, p. 88.

⁸Ibid, p. 246.

⁹D.J.B. Hawkins, Crucial Problems of Modern Philosophy, p. 78.

10Alan R. White, The Philosophy of Mind, pp. 46-55.

¹¹John Wisdom, Problems of Mind and Matter, pp. 53-58.

¹²Ibid, p. 58.

¹³Jerome Shaffer, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem", <u>American Philosophical Quaterly</u>, Vol. II, No. 2, 1965, p. 84, 3 e.g.

¹⁴John Hospers, An <u>Introduction to Philosophical Analysis</u>, p. 272. William Alston, <u>Philosophy of Language</u>, pp. 63-83.

¹⁵Maurice Cranston, <u>op. cit</u>. pp. 56-57.

16 John Hospers, op. cit. p. 273.

¹⁷Quoted in Maxwell John Charlesworth, <u>Philosophy and</u> Linguistic Analysis, p. 148. 18_{Ibid}.

¹⁹Jerome A. Shaffer, Philosophy of Mind, p. 62.

²⁰John Hospers, <u>op. cit</u>. pp. 392-393.

²¹P.F. Strawson, <u>Individuals</u>, pp. 87-116; reprinted in V.C. Chappell (ed.) - <u>The Philosophy</u> of Mind, pp. 127-146.

²²G.E.M. Arscombe, Intention, p. 6, p. 72, p. 76.

²³Ibid, p. 57.

²⁴R.S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, p. 150.

²⁵Peter Geach, Mental Acts, p. 21, p. 40-41, p. 108.

²⁶Ibid, p. 6.

²⁷e.g. Shaffer, Malcolm, Flew, Wisdom, Warnock, Geach, Hospers, Quinton, Anscombe, Alston, Frankens, Cornman, Lehrer.

²⁸R.I. Aaron, "Dispensing with Mind" <u>Proc. Arist. Society</u>, May 1952, p. 241.

²⁹C.A. Van Peurson, <u>Body, Soul, Spirit</u>, p. 154; John Wisdom, "The Concept of Mind," <u>Proc. Arist. Society</u>, p. 189, vol. 52, June 1950.

30Gilbert Ryle, op. cit. p. 76.

³¹Ibid, pp. 78-79.

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³²Herbert Feigl, "Mind-Body, Not a Pseudoproblem" in <u>Dimensions of Mind</u>, editor, Sidney Hook.

³³J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes" <u>The Philosophical</u> Review, No. 68.

³⁴Norman Malcolm, "Scientific Materialism and Identity Theory" <u>Dialogue</u>, 1964, p. 115.

³⁵Elmer Sprague, "The Mind-Brain Problem" in <u>Dimensions of</u> <u>Mind</u>, editor, Sidney Hook, p. 72. ³⁶Richard B. Brandt, "Doubts About the Identity Theory" in Dimensions of Mind editor, Sidney Hook, P. 64.

³⁷Anthony Quinton, "Mind and Matter" in <u>Brain and Mind</u> editor, J.R. Smithies, p. 210.

³⁸Wallace I. Watson, "Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Ancient?" in <u>Mind, Matter and Method</u>, editors Feyerbend and Maxwell, p. 101.

³⁹Anthony Quinton, <u>op. cit</u>. p. 203.

⁴⁰Ibid, p. 212, 213.

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⁴¹Ibid, p. 220, p. 226.

⁴²Jerome Shaffer, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem" American <u>Phil.</u> Quarterly Vol. 2 No. 2, 1965, p. 96.

⁴³Jerome Shaffer, "Mental Events and the Brain", <u>Journal</u> of <u>Philosophy</u>, 1963, p. 161.

⁴⁴Joseph Margolis "Brain Processes and Sensations", <u>Theoria</u>, pp. 134-135.

⁴⁵Michael Scriven "The Limitations of the Identity Theory", in <u>Mind, Matter, and Method</u>, editors, Feyerbend and Maxwell, p. 195, 196, 197.

⁴⁶J.T. Stevenson, "Sensations and Brain Processes: a Reply to J.J.C. Smart", <u>Philosophical Review</u>, 1960, p. 510.

47 Maurice Cranston, op. cit., p. 39.

⁴⁸David Pole, <u>The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein</u>, p. 95.

⁴⁹Ibid, p. 92-93.

⁵⁰Maurice Cranston, op. cit. p. 37.

51Ernest Gellner, op. cit. p. 164.

⁵²Ibid, pp. 41-43.

⁵³John W. Yolton, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 60.

⁵⁴Peter Geach, op. cit. p. 12, 14.

⁵⁵Ernest Gellner, <u>op. cit</u>. p. 167

⁵⁶Ibid, pp. 95-96.

57_{Ibid}, p. 115.

⁵⁸Robert G. Miller, <u>The Philosophy of Language</u>, p. 21.

⁵⁹Ibid, p. 23-24.

⁶⁰Jerome A. Shaffer, "Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem" <u>American Philosophy Quarterly</u>, vol. II, No. 2, 1965, p. 85.

⁶¹Gilbert Ryle, <u>op. cit</u>., chapter V.

⁶²Ibid, p. 302, p. 262, pp. 269-270.

63A.C. Ewing, <u>op. cit</u>. p. 73.

⁶⁴Ibid, p. 57, 58.

⁶⁵John W. Yolton, <u>op. cit</u>. p. 46.

⁶⁶John Wisdom, "The Concept of Mind" <u>Proc. Arist. Society</u>, 1950, p. 194. John Beloff, "The Identity Hypotheses: A Critique" in Brain and Mind, editor, J.R. Smithies, p. 41.

⁶⁷This point noticed by Raziel Abelson, "A Spade is a Spade, So Mind your Language" in <u>Dimensions of Mind</u>, editor, Sidney Hook, p. 241.

⁶⁸Robert G. Miller, op. cit. p. 51.

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS AND THE DISCOVERY OF MIND

Reaffirmation of the Immaterial Mind: Dualism and Substantial Unity

In his book <u>The Mind and Its Place in Nature</u>, written in 1925, C.D. Broad defended a representative theory of man's knowledge of external reality. More recently, there are philosophers who, having come to grips with the mind-body problem since Ryle's work in 1949, have unapologetically defended a view of mind other than a materialist, a behaviorist or an identity interpretation. Some of these philosophers falling back on Locke, Broad and the Cartesian tradition, adopt a dualist representative position. Others, cognizant of the weakness in this position exposed by modern analytic philosophy and modern psychology, have come to the realization that the relationship of the mind to the body is a much more integrated and unified one embracing the mental, the physical and the behavioral aspects of man.

John Beloff concentrating on the data of modern science regarding sense perception and the finite velocity of light takes a vigorous stand against direct realism which he compares with mysticism.¹ He takes this stand in opposition to Ryle's direct realism. Against modern Psychology he observes that it has never been able to integrate two conflicting aspects of behaviour; the reactions of an organism to a specific physical stimulus on the one hand, and the actions a person makes to a meaningful situation on the other.² He feels that Psychology is in a "chaotic state" where it escapes to a world of "means, medians and correlations, a fetish for laboratory paraphernalia, a plethora of experimental papers and a wealth of data whose outstanding characteristic is mutual contradictoriness, mainly because it desperately attempts to avoid fundamental problems which lead to philosophy".³

The mind-body problem for Beloff, is not a purely scientific issue, for it is partly empirical and partly conceptual.⁴ If we need any concepts which cannot be analyzed in terms of the concepts used in interpreting physical events to explain human behaviour, then we are, "clearly committed to some form of dualism."⁵

Beloff considers linguistic analysis as one way of approaching problems with ordinary language but he is savage in his criticism of attempts to explain away the mind-body problem and to limit philosophy within the confines of the language game:⁶

> Certainly I cannot believe we shall extricate ourselves from our deeper philosophical perplexities by coining phrases. Those who take seriously the existence of mind are often taunted with being worried by a 'ghost in the machine'; I suggest it



is high time we refused to let our critical faculties be paralyzed any longer by this pert gibe.⁷

For Beloff, minds, mental entities and mental phenomenon exist. Hence some form of interactionism must be correct, with the result that materialism in all its guises must be incorrect.

Another dualist Arthur O. Lovejoy, using the same scientific arguments and giving a detailed analysis of perception, gives also his "refutation" of direct realism.⁸ Ayer and Russell he contends, since they are uncompromising epistemological dualists, must logically fall back upon the psychophysical dualism of Descartes.⁹

Lovejoy believes that realists lost the battle to the dualists in the first instance because they were forced to admit the scientific facts on which dualism rested.¹⁰ Once the realist admitted an epistemological dualism then he should, according to Lovejoy, become a thoroughgoing philosophical dualist. Because of the time lapse involved, Lovejoy believes that all knowledge is really remembering. If Descartes had followed his "cogito ergo sum" with "memini ergo fui" then the history of modern philosophy would have been considerably changed.¹¹

> Some current misconceptions would perhaps have been avoided if we had made a practice of saying that science is based upon the experienced, that is to say, upon the remembered.¹²

Philosophers like Beloff and Lovejoy conclude from their study of the mind-body problem that there is a mind and it is separate to the point of being a separate substance. But it is much more surprising to find modern philosophers who realize that the mind is related to the body in a union where both elements are intricately entwined. This position is very similar to the one substance Thomistic view of man.

Curt Ducasse, an eminent member of this group, refutes Ryle by giving counter examples which clearly involve the mental rather than either the dispositional or overt behaviour. When a person moved by our behaviour uses statements like: 'Now don't be so angry', or 'Don't you <u>see</u> that bird?'; or 'What were you dreaming just before I woke you?'; or 'You are wondering at my appearance today', his words do not denote our behavior but denote, "the mental state itself which we are subjectively experiencing ... and which, irrespective of how ... it may be <u>connected with</u> our behaviour at the moment is ... not that behaviour itself but something radically different and inherently private."¹³

Both materialistic reductionism, including the Identity Theory and radical idealism, are invalidated by the same kind of absurdity, which is the denial of some categories of fact, either the physical or the psychical.¹⁴ These positions are often difficult to refute



because they are similar to a statement that iron is made of wood.¹⁵ Ducasse takes all facts into account when he uses a functional explanation to explain mind and substance:

> The term 'a substant' will designate anything; whether mental or material, whose nature consists wholly of a more or less well-integrated set of capacities. Some of the material things commonly called substances '-e.g. glass, lead, water, would be substants as just defined; but so would a tree, a table, a human body, which on the contrary would not in ordinary usage be called 'substances'.¹⁶

In another work Ducasse concludes by saying:

Interactionism, then as presented in what precedes, though not as presented by Descartes, is a perfectly tenable conception of the relation between some mental events and some brain events, allowing as it does also that some brain events have bodily causes, and that some mental events directly cause some other mental events. It conceives minds as consisting, like material substances, of sets of systematically interrelated dispositions, i.e. of capacities, abilities, powers and susceptibilities, each of which can be analyzed as a causal connection ...¹⁷

The mind exists then when one or more of its capacities are being exercised. It exists, "only in so far as it has a historyits history being the series of such exercises as its capacities have had, are having, and will possibly have".¹⁸ It may consist of interrelationships among the psycho-psychical, psycho-physical and physico-physical capacities which together constitute a thoroughly integrated personality.¹⁹ Ducasse realizes that the term 'capacity' like its equivalent terms power and faculty is out of favour today but he believes that this is because it had been destroyed by misuse.²⁰ Like the Thomists, Ducasse explains sensation not as a form of acting like looking, listening or sniffing but as an undergoing, the passive pole of the mental which is the Thomistic passive potency.²¹

The Humean view of causality as empirical regularity of sequence is attacked in the following way:

The continuing employment of it by philosophers often at crucial points in their arguments notwithstanding that, without a valid analysis, their idea of causality is then perforce only nebulous, might therefore well be termed the great modern scandal of philosophy.²²

Other philosophers too adopt a mentalistic yet integrated view of man. John Yolton gives a view of thinking and perceiving which he declares, "is grounded in psychological theory and experimentation as well as philosophical reflection":²³

> Once we grant the importance of the distinction between spectator and actor and once we criticize the sign theory of symbolization for reducing actor meaning to spectator meaning, we would seem committed to the use of a mentalist analysis of thinking.²⁴

Thinking then for him is not tandem which is the view Ryle attacks, but it is "two-fold".²⁵ Yolton clearly adopts the same position on concepts or ideas as the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophers. He equates concepts with meaning, realizing that the only reason Conceptualism is suspect is because it cannot be supported by empirical evidence. The meaning of a symbol, as common sense would dictate, cannot be inspected but it can be understood and interpreted:²⁶

> If we could talk of meanings I would say that concepts are meanings. To talk this way is to ontologize, but it is the only way I know of to give an adequate account of the mental side of thinking. To react by understanding or interpreting the meaning of some stimulus is to employ concepts. Certain symbols are understood and not seen, heard or imagined ... even sensible symbols must be understood before they can be symbolic.²⁷

Yolton distinguishes between the concept itself, "understanding is always of a meaning", and the memory disposition to recognize or recall a certain concept.²⁸ R.I. Aaron realizes that the mind-body problem is a problem of the human person:

> If mind and body were indeed parts of me as heart and liver are parts of my body there would be no difficulty. The trouble is that mind and body are not parts of me in that sense; it would perhaps be truer to say that my mind is the whole of me and my body is the whole of me. And yet how can the whole of me be both body and mind? It is as if there exist two orders of being of such a nature that I can say that the whole of me is body and the whole of me is mind.²⁹

J.N. Finlay in his article, also repudiates a dualistic

interpretation for a substantial unity. His approach is linguistic:

The empirical facts being what they are, it would be obviously strained to speak in terms of two agents, a mind and a body, in somewhat casual and external relations to each other ... We must in fact endorse that perfectly ordinary manner of speaking which treats a person as an amphibious being, combining both a fleshly and a ghostly side. It is, in fact, neither proper to confound our lives, nor to divide our person.³⁰

A.C. Ewing, in his excellent article on Ryle's position, after distinguishing the characteristics of psychological events and bodily movements, finally concludes:

> Whether or not we hold the mind and the body to be different "substances", we must admit as an empirical fact a radical dualism between their qualities, which can be obscured only by confusing the psychological qualities themselves with the criteria we have for ascribing these qualities to other men.³¹

Thus one can easily see that there is a strong movement in both linguistic and non-linguistic analytic philosophy to accept the existence of the immaterial mental dimension in man. The direct realism of Wittgenstein, Ryle and their followers, in spite of its unphilosophical bias, is also providing a strong stimulus to regard man as a single, acting and thinking being.

2. Limitations of Empirical Knowledge

The re-discovery of the mind inherent in much of recent analytic philosophy is the result of painstaking attention to data all the data surrounding the phenomenon of man. It involves the realization that certain activities of man are public while others are private but communicable in the form of meaning. It also involves the realization that something is given in common sense which cannot easily be denied by philosophic erudition or by equating all common sense awareness with unsophisticated empirical errors like believing that the earth is flat. Finally, it involves the realization that the empirical scientific method, as sophisticated and productive as it is, cannot be equated with the whole of knowledge. Meaning itself rises beyond the empirical method. Science is dependent on philosophy, not for its own method or formal object, but for the more basic and total realities which can be understood, including the first principles which are presupposed by any scientist before he enters a laboratory. It would never occur to a scientist to mention what some call phenomenal facts when describing their observations. "Why, then, should we expect natural science to discover phenomenal facts when it studies the behavior of systems in inanimate nature? Obviously, natural science would not be aware of them even if they were present."³²

The desire to be true to empiricism has placed a severe strain on many philosophers. This has often lead to contradictory tendencies in explanations of mind-body interrelation. On the one hand, behaviorists attempted to reduce all mental realities to observable external behavior and pre-dispositions to act while other empiricists on the other hand, attempt to reduce the mental to something interior - a brain state. The latter group interpret perception as interior "raw feels", sense data, etc. Dependent solely on empirical method and without a philosophical starting point or approach, naturalists are caught in the circularity of trying to prove knowledge by using knowledge. Linguistic analysis camouflaged this circularity by assuming direct realism, by refusing to allow the terms needed to challenge the argument, and by restricting philosophy to a second level logic opposed to the intellectual and social dangers of philosophizing.

An empirical approach quite evidently cannot investigate certain matters without becoming non-empirical. The meanings of things like thought, realization, pain, memory and belief, could never be physiologically investigated without assuming the introspective, meaningful and subjective aspects as existing. Otherwise, how could you know what you were investigating in the first place?

Considering empirical prejudice and at the same time the tendency of empiricists to consider the immaterial world of meaning and consciousness as a ghostly model of the physical, Finlay states:

> There used to be a Verbot, now happily breaking down, against talking about anything that one couldn't hope to show to other people, in the same sense in which one could show them a pen wiper or an inkwell ... and there has been a speech, not wholly intelligible to me, that if we say there is anything ghostly under the smooth surface of our outward saying and doing, we shall be then forced to locate a second ghostly process under the first, and so on indefinitely.³³

If a person is aware of something when he has a thought, a realization, a pain or after-image and he does not notice any physical feature, then he must be conscious of something other than a physical feature.³⁴ Beloff comments that although physics is true, "it cannot possibly be the whole truth, even about the material world, because all its terms in the last resort are relational ones."³⁵ Even though these properties are expressed in terms of concepts like mass, length and time, these cannot in the final analysis be the intrinsic qualities or nature of reality.

In setting up guidelines for the study of the philosophy of mind, Alan White cautions readers that they, "should not expect from it any new information of an empirical kind, nor should one reproach it for not using the experimental and observational methods

of the practicing psychologist."³⁶ But others are much more categorical about the matter, for they realize that, "the approach of scientific empiricism to philosophical problems such as this is logically self-defeating."³⁷

> For the mind-body problem ... is not like the problem of whether or not heavy smoking causes lung cancer, nor like that of whether light is made up of waves or particles. It is not a problem to be settled by the discovery of new data, nor by the construction of a systematic theory that accounts for all the known facts. Even the most enterprising experimental scientist will never succeed in isolating the meeting point of mind and body in some kind of cloud chamber, nor in devising a microscope under which mind-body interaction can be observed.³⁸

It is understandable that the scientific philosopher wants to make the scientific method an all embracing method which will solve all problems and encompass all the knowledge that man is capable of achieving. "The natural scientist may think himself forced to acknowledge the presence of mind in the field which he studies, yet whilst everything else in that field can be studied by him, mind cannot."³⁹

The restriction of investigation to the empirical method has caused many to dismiss the data of consciousness which is the data of common sense. Not all common sense questions are matters of incorrect description. As one philosopher puts it:



... against difficult cases of introspection and the mistakes about oneself pointed out by the psycho-analyst may be set the very numerous cases where we know so well what we are experiencing that in ordinary life no one but a madman would think of questioning it.40

The main restriction of the scientific method is its inability to grasp the understandable totalities of which we are conscious in meaning. These meanings give us a grasp of exterior reality in the form of universals and relationships e.g. justice, freedom, democracy, etc. The empiricist tradition is forced by its method to deny causality and to equate mind with the content of consciousness. Thus, it is unable to comprehend for instance, how anything as intangible as a volition can actually bring about an overt response.

Commenting on the existence of human freedom and its relationship to empirical psychology Beloff declares:

... regardless of our estimate of the extent of freedom in human behavior ... we must part company with those who, like Hebb, declare that we cannot be determinists in physics and chemistry and mystics in psychology. For psychology, if it is to be at all comprehensive, cannot ignore our moral experience; physics and chemistry can. If this be mysticism, we can only retort: better such mysticism than a presumptuous scientism.⁴¹

Are the conclusions of empirical science better established than the facts about mind? Certainly much has been written about



the part that subjectivity plays in the development of scientific theory and hypotheses. It has been clearly established, that the physiological process of perception tends ultimately to a <u>psychological</u> awareness of an object. This is sense knowledge or sense awareness.

> ... these non physical particulars are indispensable means to any knowledge of physical realities. Repellent as this conception still is to many scientific men, there is no conclusion of empirical science about the physical world which is better established...42

Man has a wide range of undisciplined common sense knowledge by which he is aware of many facets of his life and existence around him. Some of these things, as G.E. Moore shows, are known for certain. Not all common sense knowledge can be reduced to foolish generalizations or old wives tales. Any generalization which needs specialized proof cannot be believed on the common sense level but propositions based on common experience are another matter. In the next section it will be shown that there are some principles which are not derived by the scientific method but which can be known with certainty, through philosophical reflection of common experience.

1John Beloff, The Existence of Mind, pp. 66-69.

²Ibid, p. 17.

³Ibid, p. 51.

⁴John Beloff, "The Identity Hypotheses, A Critique" in <u>Brain and Mind</u>, editor, J.L. Smithies, p. 41.

⁵Ibid, p. 42.

⁶John Beloff, <u>The Existence of Mind</u>, p. 15.

⁷Ibid, p. 12-13.

⁸Arthur O. Lovejoy, <u>The Revolt Against Dualism</u>, Chapters VIII and IX.

⁹Ibid, p. 40.
¹⁰Ibid, p. 75.
¹¹Ibid, p. 381.
¹²Ibid, p. 384.

13C.J. Ducasse, <u>A Critical Examination of the Belief in a</u> Life after Death, p. 48.

¹⁴Ibid, p. 66, p. 68.

¹⁵Ibid, p. 63.

16C.J. Ducasse, "Minds, Matter and Bodies" in <u>Brain and</u> Mind, editor, J.R. Smithies, p. 82.

¹⁷C.J. Ducasse, "In Defense of Dualism" in <u>Dimensions of</u> <u>Mind</u>, editor, Sidney Hook, p. 89.

¹⁸C.J. Ducasse, "Minds, Matter and Bodies" in <u>Brain and</u> <u>Mind</u>, editor, J.R. Smithies, p. 81.

¹⁹C.J. Ducasse, <u>A Critical Examination of the Belief in a</u> Life After Death, p. 55. ²⁰Ibid, p. 52.

²¹C.J. Ducasse, "Minds, Matter and Bodies" in <u>Brain and</u> <u>Mind</u>, editor, J.R. Smithies, p. 94.

22Ibid, p. 83.

23John W. Yolton, op. cit., p. 117.

²⁴Ibid, p. 87.

25Ibid, p. 64.

²⁶Ibid, p. 110.

²⁷Ibid, p. 104-106.

²⁸Ibid, p. 105.

²⁹R.I. Aaron, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 226.

³⁰J.N. Finlay, "Linguistic Approach to Psycho-Physics", Proc. Arist. Society, February 1950 p. 57.

31A.C. Ewing, op. cit., p. 78.

³²Wolfgang Kohler, "The Mind-Body Problem" in <u>Dimensions of</u> <u>Mind</u>, editor, Sidney Hook, p. 32.

³³J.N. Finlay, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 43.

³⁴J. Shaffer, "Mental Events and the Brain", <u>Journal of</u> <u>Philosophy</u>, p. 163, 1963.

³⁵J. Beloff, The Existence of Mind, p. 69.

³⁶Allan R. White, <u>op. cit.</u> p. 13.

³⁷Raziel Abelson, op. cit., p. 239.

38Ibid.

³⁹R.I. Aaron, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 226.

⁴⁰A.C. Ewing, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 49.

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⁴¹J. Beloff, <u>The Existence of Mind</u>, p. 163.

⁴²Arthur O. Lovejoy, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 398.

CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS: A VINDICATION OF METAPHYSICAL REALISM

 Philosophizing in the Context of a Realist Epistemology

Idealism, as we have seen, has been discredited by a practical, scientific, modern world. Yet, as a system which stresses the existence of the immaterial it will never be completely eliminated because it will always be able to point to human knowledge and consciousness as dimensions beyond the reach of empiricism.

The weaknesses of naturalism are becoming more and more evident as its inadequacies are exposed by various systems of thought and by the helplessness of its method in the face of growing social problems. Science will always be a powerful tool whose main justification will be its spectacular success in controlling the physical world but since it cannot come to grips with basic problems it will never replace philosophy, nor will it be able to justify or explain its own knowledge.

Idealism as a method, is self defeating because to restrict your first contact with reality to thought is intellectual suicide

for even the most brilliant minds. Naturalism, as we have seen, is limited to building upon the successes of scientific sense knowledge with its hypotheses, generalizations and theories dependent upon observation and measurement. What then is a proper philosophical method? How, in fact, does the common sense mind know certain things which cannot be scientifically ascertained, as G.E. Moore and the analysts have so ably shown?

The common sense man we are told, is a "naive" realist. The ordinary language philosophers are also criticized for their "naive" realism. If this criticism is valid then idealists would be justified in accepting as their first judgment, 'thought is', and Russell and others would be justified in adopting a dualistic, representative, view of knowledge.

The metaphysical realists repudiate the arguments against a direct realism. They believe that man does have a contact with reality and that some knowledge is certain.

Against the idealist, the metaphysical realist takes his starting point in common sense knowledge and everyday awareness. It is by our consciousness that we are aware of thoughts, feelings and external objects. By our consciousness, we are more aware of objects external to us than we are of ourselves. We have direct conscious awareness of objects and feelings but our consciousness of

ourselves is only indirectly known by reason of the fact that we are knowing. It is an arbitrary position to declare that consciousness justifies my thoughts and feelings but does not justify the existence of external objects. Consciousness after all, is the only criterion and final arbiter for the existence of both.

External objects are not only sensed but they are also perceived in categories and understood as universals which are the basis for the meaningful categories.¹ These intelligible universals along with our understandings of abstractions and relations, are usually classed as ideas or concepts. There is only one substance, man, who senses, understands, and then judges and reasons on the basis of what he understands and on what he can imagine. The first judgment for a metaphysical realist is not, 'thought is', but 'being is' which is equivalent to saying 'existence is', or 'reality is', or assuming the analogical use of being, 'things are'.

The metaphysical realist by asserting direct realism does not mean to deny that there is any process either physiological or psychological or that there cannot be any time lag involved in the process of knowing. To deny these facts would be naive realism of the Hobbesian type.

He would admit that in the case of memory there is a temporal sundering of the content given and the reality known, that because of the finite velocity of light there is a time lapse in seeing stars, and that the senses are limited in their presentation of reality which results in distortions like perspective, refraction, etc. But these arguments do not show that the object is not given in sensation. They refute an extremely naive realism which denies any sort of intermediary process but those who use these arguments fail to take into account the fact that it is the same man who senses and understands. An oar looks bent in the water because of the limitations of light which is the stimulus for the organ of sight, but it does not take a man long to understand that the oar only looks bent when it is placed in the water. Before long, through physics, he is able to explain in some detail why this happens. It is surely no reason to doubt The physiological process is not the psychological sensation. awareness of the object. The linguistic philosophers have shown that the physiological process of sensation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for conscious sensation. To the metaphysical realist, the bare sensation itself is an infallible contact with reality, given the fact that a person is not in an abnormal state. Perception of course, may involve the psychological expectations and prejudices of a person. Our

consciousness though is aware of the difference between dreams and feelings on the one hand and sensed objects on the other because in the latter case the fact is that it is the external object which fills our consciousness. We take a person who has hallucinations for treatment because we <u>understand</u> that he is not normal.

Naturally the metaphysical realist does not explain intellectual, conceptual knowledge as a one-to-one correspondence. The universal categories and other concepts are understandings of reality, and hence are in the immaterial realm of meaning. Reality then is not only sensible but also intelligible. A person can understand the common element or meaning of a group of objects we call plants, men, students, teachers etc., or he can understand the qualities, whiteness, ripeness, hardness etc., the quantities 3, 4, 5, or the relations father, cousin, freedom, justice etc. When a person steps into a room he may see, hear and smell certain things but he can also understand what is going on there because it is intelligible. This intellectual grasp of reality depends upon our sense contact with reality. One of the main principles of the metaphysical realist position is that there is nothing in the mind which does not come somehow through the senses. Concepts based on direct contact with objects like man, dog, tree, flower, etc. - the universals, are the same for

everyone and cannot be wrong as such. Like sensation, they are a given from our contact with reality. These intellectual simple apprehensions and uncategorized sensations are neither true nor false but presentations of reality which of necessity are what they are. Because of this fact communication is possible among all peoples. Concepts such as soul, intellect, God, philosophy, science etc. are derived indirectly by inference from reality and hence the same unanimity cannot be established.

One error of those who accept a representative view of knowledge lies in assuming that all signs must have a content of their own and hence must represent indirectly. The phantasm of perception retained by imagination and the concept of the intellect in metaphysical realism are explained as pure signs. Pure signs may be the means by which reality is known but they are no more than the <u>way</u> in which the object is <u>presented</u> to consciousness. This vehicle by which reality is presented does not have a content of its own other than the content of the image or meaning which is reality itself as sensed and understood. Remove the content and there is nothing that remains in our consciousness.

Representationalism cannot explain sensation and so must fall into some form of idealism regarding both sense and intellectual

knowledge. With regard to the particular impressions or images of external objects that inhere in us they must admit that its physical presence is its noetic presence or deny knowledge. Yet to admit this is to accept the fact that any physical inherence is equivalent to knowledge. Ultraviolet rays in us or heat in inanimate objects would result in knowledge. Both this position and the position which rejects any kind of mediation cannot be defended. Five different factors are necessary for sensation.

> ... first, some quality capable of producing a similar physical effect on some transmitting medium in contact with the sense organ; second, the transmission of the physical species to the organ via the medium; third, the abstraction of this form from its matter by the sense faculty in the organ; fourth, the sensible species thus abstracted (the sound middle C, the color yellow, the taste of sweetness); and fifth, the material object which is made immaterially present or known by this species.²

Both sense and intellectual knowledge are explained as capacities for specific actualities - the Aristotelian-Thomistic act-potency relationship. Man has potencies to see, to hear etc. as well as to understand and to will. The objects of reality have sensible capacities to be sensed and intelligible capacities to be understood. These capacities are actualized when the objects are known. Because the intellect is an immaterial capacity, reality is received in an immaterial way as a meaning.

Knowledge then is not a physical event, as some naturalists since the time of Democritus would have it, or a practical instrument which admits of only practical judgments, as Dewey and the pragmatists would hold, but an intentional union between the knower and the known. Since we cannot be physically united with the thing known, all knowledge, including sense knowledge, must involve a certain level of immateriality. In knowing we retain our own mode of being while the object known retains its own reality but there is now a new relationship by which man becomes intentionally united with the object.

> ... if knowledge were nothing more than a physical "event" there would be no way of explaining how a knower in knowing something else could know it is something else, since he would become "part" of that which he knows. In general if the object known were "in" the knower by a mere physical mode of presence, it would be in the knower in the same way as it exists in itself, which is to say according to the limitations of matter.³

Realist epistemology does not add up to the infallibility of man. For the metaphysical realist, error, as well as truth, lies in the judgment. It is not sensation or simple apprehension which is false in what it gives us, it is incorrect predication. If on the basis of sensation we make the judgment, 'the oar is really bent while it is in the water', we have erred. Similarly, if I interpret the object on the stump as a rabbit

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when it is really a branch, my sensations have not failed me. Sensation is limited by what it is. On the basis of a sensation, perhaps under less than ideal conditions, I have made a judgment, too hastily no doubt, which was incorrect. It is of course even easier to make mistakes when one generalizes in a judgment like, 'all Russians are Communists'.

The universals or basic concepts are what is known when we use the words. When we use the words man, plant, or gun, in conversation they are immediately understood by the listener if he has had some sense contact with the particular reality. It is the meaning grasped when we hear the word meaningfully. The more popular use of the words concept or idea is a wider use involving a complete understanding of the term in all its known relations. In this sense the concept or idea of 'man' possessed by a psychologist or historian is far more elaborate than the concept of man of an elementary school child. The psychologist and historian understand man on the basis of multiple relationships based on a lifetime of judgments and inferences as well as reading. Reading of course, is knowledge derived directly on the intellectual level rather than directly discovered by experimentation and perceptual observation.

The critic of direct realism is involved in the impossibility of trying to prove knowledge with knowledge. You can give some justification for knowledge but you obviously cannot give a proof for it. For the metaphysical realist there are two kinds of certain judgments, those that are demonstrated or proven, and those that are self-evident. What is demonstrated must be demonstrated from something prior. What can be prior to perceptual judgments like, 'I see an ink bottle', or, 'you are sitting in front of me', or to first theoretical judgments like, 'a thing cannot be and not be at the same time'? In fact, the critic of direct realism is saying that even though he has knowledge and lives in terms of this knowledge, since he cannot understand the process, then knowledge must be doubtful. Knowledge is given. To doubt it is to be a sceptic and this is destructive of all science or philosophy. The correct questions should concern how to distinguish truth from error and how to establish criteria for valid evidence. First principles and perceptual judgments where the limitations of the senses are not involved, cannot really be doubted.

The mind then, for a metaphysical realist, is a number of interrelated capacities or potencies, as it was for Ducasse. This is, as Ducasse claims, a valid view of faculty and not the obviously indefensible view of the faculty psychologists whose

views were justly condemned even though their opponents did not have a defensible substitute. These potencies include such capacities as sensation, plus the formation and retention of sense images in the function of memory and imagination on the sense knowledge level. Intellectual level capacities include, the simple apprehension of concepts, the formation of judgments, the capacity to make inferences including inductive and deductive reasoning and intellectual memory. Dynamic functions include sense appetite and volition. The close integration of these capacities in the same person is evident in the constructive imagination involving both intellect and imagination, which is so valuable for science and invention and the close connection between the intellect and will in motivated human activity.

Against most psychologists, metaphysical realists would defend the position that the difference between animal sense knowledge and human intellectual knowledge is a difference of kind, not merely a difference of degree. This, of course, applies only when the term intelligence denotes the formation of concepts, the making of judgments and the process of inference.

Because of the nature of mind, the introspection of the data of consciousness becomes a valid method and by this method

the metaphysical realist can show that the reason why I make the judgments, 'the tree is higher than the house', or 'the leaf is green', is because reality itself is the criterion of truth. Reality itself is the reason why my mind makes a perceptual judgment. Certainly, under specifiable conditions a person can be mistaken but he has means of verifying his judgment and of correcting or making further judgments.

The intellect has both an active and passive dimension. As an active potency or power, it gives to all intellectual knowledge its immaterial characteristic. This function is often called the agent intellect. Thus, the content of the intellect is determined by reality while the immateriality of the concept exists because of the immaterial nature of the intellect itself. It is this seeming impossibility of passing from sense to intellectual knowledge which the idealists could never accept in their theoretical positions. So they become trapped by an immanent view of all knowledge. Maritain explains intellectual knowledge in this way:

> ... one understands how, in the act of intellection ... all the vitality comes from the faculty or the subject, all the specification comes from the object, so that the intellection proceeds entirely from the intellect and entirely from the object, because, at the instant when it knows, the intellect is, immaterially, the

object itself; the knower in the act of knowing is the known itself in the act of being known; before knowing, our intellect is like a formless vitality, waiting to be shaped; as soon as it has received from the senses, by means of its own abstractive power, the intelligible impression of the object, the intellect becomes that object, while carrying it, through the concept it produces of it, to the ultimate degree of formation and intelligible actuality.⁴

This is what Yolton meant by the concept as an "understanding" and what Geach seems to mean by mental concepts.⁵ What the intellect grasps is not its own idea but the thing itself <u>by means of</u> the idea or concept, where the self as subject, is known obliquely in the very act of knowing other reality.⁶

Since the intellectual function is able to abstract and is actualized by what is intelligible in reality as first sensed, it is able by focussing attention upon differing, intelligible aspects of reality to acquire different levels of knowledge by different kinds of abstraction. Maritain explains these levels in great depth in his work, <u>The Degrees of Knowledge</u>. Mathematics is one kind of abstraction but metaphysics is the most abstract level because it is derived by abstracting from all material considerations in order to reach an understanding of existence i.e. being itself, and its basic principles, in a unified way.

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It is evident that things can not be understood as multiple as when they are sensed but can be understood only under some kind of unified aspect as when we understand a category or being itself. A thing as seen, heard or felt is not understood at all inasmuch as it is only sensed, because there is nothing intelligible or understandable about an individual thing as such.

We have seen how many analytic philosophers are forced to admit the existence of the immaterial dimensions of reality and meaning and so admit the existence of mind. Many linguistic philosophers assuming a direct realism admitted the existence of mind, with some adopting a rather integrated view of man and a conceptual rather than a nominalistic view of knowledge. However, it was also evident that analysis, including linguistic analysis, is limited by the methodology and viewpoints of the empirical tradition. With a Humean view of causality there is no possibility of developing a genuine philosophical approach such as a metaphysical realism.

Introspection certainly leads one away from behaviorism or Identity Theory, but this was not the only factor which lead to the admission of the non empirical immaterial world. The use of meaning and argumentation in logical and everyday discourse

together with an examination of these aspects, was bound to lead beyond empiricism to the much vaster world of common sense experience and realization. Ryle knew that reading involved more than the empirical dimensions, just as he knew that playing chess involved more than the concrete moves.⁷ Any detailed and honest analysis of knowledge is bound to cast serious doubts on any kind of naturalism for even the more refined naturalistic positions are forced ultimately to redefine matter in such a way that it must include the immaterial.

Yet the empirical limitations of modern analytic philosophy continue to inhibit. One evident example of this can be found in William Alston's analysis of theories of meaning. After demonstrating the weakness of a referrent and behavioral theory of meaning Alston considers the ideational theory of meaning whose classic statement he believes has been given by Locke.⁸ This marks the limits of his consideration of ideas from the very outset since Locke did not distinguish sense images from intellectual concepts or meanings. Alston ably demonstrates that we do not have ideas (i.e. images) for every word we utter in a meaningful sentence, that we do not have ideas (i.e. images) for words like "when", "in", "becomes", that he cannot identify ideas (i.e. images) by themselves or when we use words in various contexts, that we have different ideas

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(i.e. images) from time to time for words like "dog", "stone", "book", and that we have words with no specific ideas (i.e. images) such as "mammal", "organism" etc.⁹ In one example Alston shows that a man giving a speech uses various words and sentences to convey his meaning. He may even change his word structures, from what he had originally planned. Evidently he does not have an idea (i.e. image) for each word he utters. Alston even admits that there is a use of idea where it is sensible to say that an idea is involved in every bit of intelligible speech.¹⁰ He gives examples like, 'he isn't getting his ideas across', 'I have no idea what you are saying', 'I get the idea'. He concludes by stating, that this sense of the word idea is derivative of 'meaning' and 'understanding', whereas an idea must be an, "introspectively discriminable item in consciousness".¹¹

Why does Alston restrict the ideational theory and refuse to consider the obvious possibility that the idea is a meaning? This would be a view in keeping with philosophic traditions existing long before Locke. As a linguistic philosopher, Alston believes meaning is a function of use. This function is specific and given an empirical background the content of consciousness must be very specific, like the objects which they represent. Hence an ideational meaning can only refer to



a very specific, "discriminable", Lockean image. Alston like so many others is hidebound by the empirical tradition and unable to conceive of idea in anything but para-mechanical terms as does Ryle. As we have seen, many other linguistic philosophers have already moved far beyond this position.

It is evident then that a materialistic epistemological view and its consequent nominalism leads to scepticism.

The consistent materialist must conclude his philosophizing in a state of complete scepticism. Various reasons support this view: (a) The materialist, who admits only sense knowledge, has no cognitive faculty capable of justifying its own validity, since material senses cannot perfectly reflect upon themselves to realize their own natures. (b) Without the admission of universal ideas, the materialist can acknowledge no laws, no causality, no deduction or induction, and consequently no systematic body of knowledge whatsoever. He can know merely the empty fact that he is having sensations, and nothing more. This ... amounts to total dispair in all philosophic inquiry, which has been characterictic of all universal sceptics.¹²

Metaphysical realists are accused of accepting their first principles as unproven postulates. To say this is to stand on the view that everything can and must be proven, or else it is a postulate. The realists counter this by claiming that if a proposition is true it cannot be a postulate. A postulate is an arbitrary proposition where the opposite could be stated without contradiction but a true proposition of the kind, 'John Brown is a professor', cannot be classed as a postulate, nor can any true proposition. Any attempt to "prove" knowledge leads to a denial of the data of epistemology and a destruction of its own raison d'être. Any description or explanation of epistemological phenomenon presupposes a firm recognition of their genuineness.

Common sense experience is to metaphysical realism what the results of special investigation and experimentation are to science. Mortimer Adler sees communication as universally possible because of a core of common experience which includes such things as change of seasons, day and night, living and dying, eating and sleeping, losing and finding, getting and giving, standing still and moving in space, pleasures and pains, doubts, fears, misgivings, memories of the past, anticipations of the future, sensing and knowing, waking and dreaming, growing old etc.¹³ He believes that this is the same data referred to by Santayana, Whitehead, C.I. Lewis and Dewey, although they describe it with a variety of terms.¹⁴ "Philosophy by its very nature is directed to the examination and explication of commonsense opinions, and it undertakes to defend those opinions or beliefs which require and deserve defense."¹⁵ Even a child uses the principle of contradiction without being able to either make it explicit or examine its implications. The criticism and

correction of common-sense opinions, according to Adler, comes mainly from science.¹⁶ Philosophy, for Adler, is Knowledge, "in the high or strong sense", which includes self-evident principles and conclusions demonstrated from them.¹⁷ Since the self-evident principles of the metaphysical realist are basic, first and implied in all perceptual judgments, his deductive philosophy must not be confused with any subjective, architectonic intellectual structures like those produced by idealists e.g. Hegel. Adler calls this knowledge "episteme" which he compares to "doxa" which is science. Science then, is knowledge testable by reference to evidence which is special rather than common experience and its conclusions become either corrigible, rectifiable or falsifiable on this basis.¹⁸ Some questions then, have no meaning for the scientist, nor has he the method to attempt an answer. Maritain gives examples of such questions as, "I am or I love my country, or Plato was a great philosopher, or questions like Is man endowed with free will? or Does our intellect attain reality? or Does the human being possess rights?"¹⁹ These questions are strictly philosophical.

The intellect has the capacity to make practical judgments which when followed by action can be verified by future effects and events. It also has the capacity for theoretical truth.

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What is the very first of the first principles and how is it derived? What is the logical status of these first principles? The first basic principle is the Principle of Identity which can be verbalized as, 'being is being', 'each being is undivided in itself', or 'each being is undivided within the multitude of undivided beings or ones'. Considered from a purely logical point of view, this principle admits of no intrinsic variations being applied in a purely univocal fashion and so would be considered a tautology. However, when we realize that the concept of being or existence is intrinsically analogous, then we realize that it is a metaphysical principle stating that reality is composed of knowable units which are distinct from other units, yet which can be one in terms of some understood relationship. Reality can be both one and many depending upon the frame of reference as known by either the senses or intellect and also depending upon the level of abstraction. Metaphysical unity applies to all existence. It is analogously applied which distinguishes it from the mathematical 'one'. Each thing or reality has its own kind of unity according to its nature or essence. Metaphysical unity respects the differences and changes which exist in the unities of reality. The unity of a loaf of bread is not the same kind of unity as that of the man who eats the bread.²⁰ This principle of unity

allows many distinctions such as the distinction between the accidental unity of a computor or car and the substantial unity of a man, tree or fish. "Whenever we say of something that it exists, it must in some sense exist as one, and this same principle holds for our knowledge of being."²¹ Since Aristotle was a metaphysical realist his categories are categories of reality and knowledge, whereas the categories of Kant, although almost identical, are subjective categories which the mind imposes on phenomenon.

The Identity principle is the positive aspect of the Principle of Noncontradiction which can be verbalized as, 'a being cannot be and not be at the same time', or 'being is undivided in itself and is in no way to be identified with nonbeing'. Hegel and other evolutionists denied the validity of this principle in the real order of things but accepted it as a logical principle. The reason for this is that if the principle is applied univocally it amounts to a denial of change. But, since this principle is analogously applied to all being, a substance may be 'one' yet contain within itself the possibility of becoming 'other'. It is actually <u>one</u>, but potentially <u>other</u>.

The first principles are implied in the very understand-

ing which the mind has of existence or being. Existence is not derived by simple apprehension as are the universals but an examination of every perceptual judgment reveals the implied notion of existence or being which the mind is able to comprehend. Against Russell and Kant, the metaphysical realists believe that existence is not just a copula but also an implied existential statement of being. Existence is knowable and can explicitly be made a predicate in its own right. If I judge, 'the leaf is green', or 'that is a cat', the reason why I judge so is because the reality compels it, and this real existence is involved in every perceptual judgment a person makes. The leaf exists; greeness exists in the leaf; the cat exists. The first principles are implicit in the notion of being itself. Inasmuch as it is known, it is known as some kind of unity and it cannot be and not be at the same time under the same aspect. We must affirm or deny of something in every judgment.

These principles are analytic in the sense that they cannot be verified as synthetic judgments are verified, by direct experience. Yet, they are not merely arbitrary tautologies. If 'a priori' meant only necessary, analytic, and promulgated by the intellect, then the first principles could be called 'synthetic a priori' judgments, but to use this would confuse the issue since Kant used this nomenclature for judgments dependent

upon subjective categories.

As Adler classifies it, philosophy stands with mathematics as having no need for the data of the special experience of specialized investigation as science does.

> Like mathematics, it does not appeal to special experiences to test its theories or to falsify positions taken or conclusions reached. To this extent, philosophy, like mathematics, is armchair thinking, for which the common experience of mankind suffices.²²

Yet, on the plane of first-order questions, philosophy stands with history and science but not with mathematics, as a discipline whose conclusions can be tested by appeal to experience including experience as intellectually understood.²³ On the second-order plane, philosophy is equivalent to logic and semantics.

Idealism and dualism have faulty starting points which reduce them finally to a world of immateriality. Material reality for these philosophers has a dubious existence as phenomena or sense data. If idealism is invalid, then some form of realism must be the valid approach to man and his knowledge of reality. Realism however, can be represented by either a naturalism or a metaphysical realism. If naturalism is the valid epistemological position, then the only grasp of

reality which man has is by means of empirical knowledge. As a result we would in fact have no philosophical knowledge of reality; philosophical questions would be unanswered or inadequately considered. Man could depend on science only and second-order logical studies of propositions. Science predominates under naturalism, even in the social field, and philosophy is relegated to an analytical role. Many thinkers, dissatisfied with these limitations and concerned with human values, have sought refuge in some form of existentialism. Some have even returned to the dualism of traditional philosophy. Yet the existence of the immaterial world of knowledge itself and conscious, psychological realization, is obvious to everyone. How can Ryle know that reading has a non-empirical dimension or other analysts realize that men are motivated by conscious choices and purposes for which they often provide reasons which are meaningful but immaterial? They are aware of these aspects which they fully realize are not derived by empirical observation and generalization. This fact, that reality is understood in a way other than the way in which it is sensed, is the basis of the metaphysical realist approach, which can be the only valid philosophical approach to reality. Reality derived in this way provides the principles which are assumed by the scientific method. It takes nothing away from science itself, only from an exaggerated

scientism which claims that all problems can and will be solved by the scientific method. The basic principles of being are realistically known as ontological principles of the real world, not just the logical world. This fact subtracts nothing from the valid insights which an existentialism may provide, except where existentialism takes an anti-intellectual approach and denies the existence of true philosophical and scientific knowledge. Realism is metaphysical when it achieves a knowledge of reality by understanding via concepts derived from sensed reality and developed by reflection. Metaphysical realists, along with Ryle and all other realists, would repudiate Descartes and idealistic inner metaphysics but with the idealists they would reject the view that empirical knowledge represents the sum total of all possible knowledge, that a positivistic approach even in linguistic logic will solve philosophical problems, or that all reality is physical and hence measurable.

2. First Principles: Sufficient Reason, Causality and Finality

The basic validity of our act of knowing can not be proven but is justified by a philosophical analysis of the act of knowledge. By our intellectual introspection and reflection we are able to see that our intellect is in contact with being

through the data of sensation. Being then is the norm of the truth or falsity of a judgment.

The first principles of human knowledge and reality such as Identity and Noncontradiction are called principles because they are the beginnings from which all other knowledge flows, either mediately through argumentation or immediately through analysis. They are first, not in point of time, for all persons begin with a knowledge of some sort of external reality, but because they are implied in every existential judgment which is made. There is nothing simpler or more evident to which they can be reduced. When they are analyzed we realize that they provide their own justification. They are not innate but derived by intellectual insight into what we have called being or existence - what <u>is</u>. If we deny the principles of Identity or Noncontradiction we destroy all knowledge, including science, so that we would have no choice but to become sceptics.

Logically, the principles of Identity and Noncontradiction are the foundations upon which the other self evident first principles of Sufficient Reason, i.e. Intelligibility, its corollary Causality, and Finality rest. Philosophical knowledge depends upon the application of these principles to the data of experience.

The principle of Sufficient Reason like all the first principles is known when we make explicit and definite what we know when we know being. It does not mean that we can know automatically why anything is. It means that, 'every being has that by which it is or exists', or 'every being has that by which it differs from non-being'. Reality is knowable inasmuch as it is, and from this realistic viewpoint the principle can be worded, 'every being to the extent that it is, i.e. exists, is sufficiently reasonable, true or intelligible.' This does not mean that reality is known to its full extent at any given time but only that its intelligibility correlates with its being or existence, so that the continuous unfolding of its reality will be a continuous unfolding of its being. This is certainly reinforced by the fact that science by its methods continues to discover aspects of a beings' physical reality. The potency of the senses or intellect is moved by a thing inasmuch as it is. The intelligibility or sufficient reason for the 'to be' of a thing must follow as an exclusive property of being or else it would depend on non-being. This would violate the principle of contradiction.

A being, i.e. existent, has its intelligibility either within itself or its sufficient reason depends on something outside itself. Either a being is completely intelligible, i.e.



self-explanatory, or it must be contingent upon being outside itself for the reason why it exists rather than not. This leads to the principle of Efficient Causality which can be worded, 'every being that begins to be must be caused', or 'every contingent being must be caused'. Coming-to-be implies change and so all change must be caused, as well as all initial coming-into-existence. Being cannot depend on nothing; from nothing, nothing comes.

The term cause as used by metaphysical realists is used in a much broader way than it is used in empirically based philosophies. A cause is anything which contributes to the being or reality of a thing. It is a principle which supplies a reason for the existence of some other reality.

When we apply the principle of Causality to the data of experience we realize that, nothing can be both patient and agent in one and the same respect, or no patient can be its own agent, that whatever is moved must be moved by another, that every agent as such is in act with respect to the perfection which it causes, and that the actions or effects of a cause must follow from and cannot be greater than the being of the cause or causes. The existence of mind ceases to be a problem when these philosophical principles are applied. Since 'action follows

being', it is quite evident that since human communication involves meaning which is immaterial in itself, then it follows that immateriality is a necessary dimension of the cause of these actions, namely human nature. It is the principle of Causality which justifies the fact that knowledge is received after the manner of the nature of the knower. Hence reality which is concrete and particular is intellectually known in a necessary, universal and sometimes abstract way. On the basis of Causality it follows that human intellectual knowledge differs in kind rather than degree from animal sense knowledge and therefore that human nature must possess dimensions which animals do not possess. Most of the problems surrounding mind-body interraction and the problems of other minds develop from the fact that the analysts are restricted by a Humean view of causality from being able to solve the original problems they inherited from the idealists. They must approach these problems then with the restriction of being unable to reason concerning cause-effect relationships in any but a narrow frame of reference. This amounts mainly to testing the logical consistency of arguments and looking for empirical facts which do not fit into a given theory.

Yet analytical philosophers like Shaffer, by this process of elimination and refutation have arrived at an interractionism



which points the way to causal activity beyond traditional naturalistic confines.²⁴ Cornman and Lehrer, after rejecting all other theories of mind-body relationship, conclude by stating:

On the other hand, although there is an objection to interactionism it is not sufficient to reject the theory. Mind-body causation would be a unique and mysterious kind of causation, because neither minds nor bodies seem to have characterictics relevant to causality affecting the other. But, as Ducasse points out, if by mysterious we mean unexplained then it is no more mysterious than any other case of proximate causation.²⁵

If Malcolm applied the principle of Causality he would realize that he had a problem with a talking tree since such an effect would need a cause which possessed, at least implicitly, the perfection which it causes. Malcolm dismisses the problem by rejecting talking trees, as well as computors, as being unable, in a behavioral sense, to perform actions appropriate to the meanings used.²⁶ Malcolm could have approached the matter differently if he could apply the fact that the effect cannot be greater than the cause or causes and that immaterial effects demand an immaterial cause.

The Final Cause, sometimes called the cause of causes, is explained in the Principle of Finality. It can be stated,

'every being acts to perfect itself', 'changeable being in potency must move to perfect itself in actuality', or, 'every being desires its end, completion or perfection'. Finality does not mean that every being's ultimate raison d'être can be ascertained. It does mean that every imperfect being inasmuch as it acts, acts for its own perfection. The causality of the final cause is evident in human activity, for there it is the attraction or motivation of the conscious purposes for which persons act to achieve some good or satisfy some need. Thomists consider that this principle applies analogously, to all things. Thus, an animal moves for an end which he knows but it is an end not freely chosen as an end or understood as an end. Substances like water, sodium and chloride, act under varying conditions in determinate ways. According to Thomists, if finality were not operative, then there would be no reason why a substance should act in a determinate way. Actions to be intelligible must have a sufficient reason for their being and the fact that they are one kind of action rather than another, is conditioned by the final cause. Chance could never apply, except where there is a fortuitous happening which is the result of overlapping activities, either determinate or the result of human reasons.

When R.S. Peters comes to the conclusion that human activity cannot be explained by appeal to mechanical causal explanations but only by an appeal to the reasons why an action is performed, then he is underlining one application of the principle of Finality.²⁷ G.E.M. Anscombe goes even further by condemning, "a great deal of absurd philosophy" in connection with the concepts of 'wanting' and 'good'.²⁸

> The cause of blindness to these problems seems to have been the epistemology characteristic of Locke, and also of Hume. Any sort of wanting would be an internal impression to these philosophers.²⁹

Human finality involves a knowledge of the end which is sought, as well as an estimation of the desireability of the end and the choice of the means to the end. Thus the causality of the final cause is that towards which a being moves. It does not cause in the same sense as an efficient cause. In human terms, it is the 'reason why' of an action. Anscombe, relying on the metaphysical realism of Aristotle, finds that, "the notion of 'good' that has to be introduced in an account of wanting is not that of what is really good but of what the agent conceives to be good".³⁰

> Aristotle would seem to have held that every action done by a rational agent was capable of having its grounds set forth up to a premise containing a desireability characterization and

(3)

as we have seen there is a reasonable ground for this view wherever there is a calculation of means to end or of ways of doing what one wants to do.31

Benignus, in his explanation of finality declares, that a teleological cause correctly understood, does not deny or eliminate mechanical causation. He believes in fact that, "they are reciprocal and mutually complementary".³² He also does not believe that evolution can be substituted for finality since evolution is not a cause but a process that is gone through which when examined would lead us back to the question of finality.³³

Thus, once philosophy is accepted as a valid method, there are mountains of scientific data which corroborate the existence of final causes.

3. Nature of Reality, Man and Beyond

It was one of the achievements of Aristotle to show in contradiction to Plato that the changing physical world bears within itself an element of stability which can serve as the object of true knowledge. In solving the problem of change, he analyzed reality into being-in-act and being-in-potency. Potency is always related to some specific actuality. These

interrelated aspects of reality showed Aristotle how various principles of material existants must be interrelated. Material existants are composed according to Aristotle of two such sets of principles, substance and accidents, and matter and form. With regard to the former, he realized that the unity of the parts was different from the unity of the whole. The substance is that totality which exists in itself and is more than the sum of the parts or accidents which make it up. Even though a substance is actual, it is potential with regard to the accidental changes which perfect it. All the changes which a being undergoes while still retaining its identity are accidental changes which are perfections of the substance.

The problems of substantial change and the ability of many specific individuals to share the same material essence, led Aristotle to explain that material essences must be composed of a determining principle and a determinable or limitating principle. The first he called form and the second, matter. This first matter was a purely indeterminate principle that existed in all material essences, explaining their ability to change. It was pure potentiality related to various forms as its actuality.

To the question, 'what does it mean to be real'?, Aristotle

would reply that it means to be an essence - a kind of thing. Like Plato before him, Aristotle could not get away from an essentialist view of reality. Essences exist in the actual forms that are shared by individuals. Aristotle substituted the Unmoved Mover and the eternal physical world for Plato's world of universal essences.

Aquinas would answer the same question by stating that to be real a thing must exist. He accepted Aristotle's analysis of the principles underlying material essences but, realizing that Aristotle had missed a fundamental distinction between essence and existence, he added the principle of being or esse the act of existence. Everything exists because it possesses an act of existence which is proportionate to the nature of the thing. It is related to a potential principle which is none other than the essence of the thing itself. So each class of things participates in existence as a certain kind of being. Essence is a potency or limit to the actuality of existence a thing possesses. Potency has not only a positive aspect but also plays a negative role as a limit to a perfection. Every kind of thing exists according to the kind of essence which is actualized. For every kind of being an analogy of proportion exists which is the proportion between the act of existence and its limiting essence.

The act of existence places the stress on the individual substance which in human terms is the person, rather than on the essence. On the basis of this emphasis one philosopher was inspired to title his work, <u>A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism</u>.³⁴ Maritain takes pains in one of his works to distinguish this existential realism from modern existentialism.³⁵ In concrete terms the existence of a plant must be exercised in this or that place, through a definite cell-structure, with particular requirements of light, moisture and soil. This is what Aquinas means by the act of existing being exercised according to a certain mode or being determined by a certain essence. For Aquinas, Aristotle's form and matter do not exist separately but as the matter and form of some reality that is.

Any living form is called a soul. As far as human nature is concerned the body-soul relationship is a matter-form relationship. The soul then is reducible to a positive principle of human nature, the determining factor behind all its living activity, both bodily and mental. The human soul is not a separate entity only accidentally connected with a body, any more than the form of a tree is accidentally connected with the material tree. The living form or soul makes a thing an organized distinctive reality. The human soul provides the basis

for its rational nature with its intellectual and volitional capacities, as well as for animal and plant capacities and functions which take place in man.

Without a concept of human nature in the philosophical sense of nature and burdened by a Lockean substratum view of substance, the empirical analysts were doubly limited in their investigation of the mind-body problem. White considers Aristotle and Ryle together as representing the functional view of mind without recognizing the difference that Aristotle's mental functions stem from potencies inherent in a nature which is the source of man's activities.³⁶ Substance for science is homogeneous matter. To Locke it was an unknowable reality hidden beneath the primary and secondary qualities. First substance to the metaphysical realist is the individual unified reality, a person, on the human level, existing in itself and not in something else as do accidents like qualities and quantities. Since the substance is the unified whole which is greater than its parts, then it would be ridiculous to search beneath the qualities to discover the substance. Second substance is the essence or nature which is shared by many individuals of the same kind. Hume was forced to consider the self as being nothing more than the states of consciousness - a stream of experiences.

In their refutations of the existence of mind, empiricists continually look at mind as a spiritual, invisible prototype of material substance in the scientific sense of the word. Ryle, as we have seen, does this, while others like Hospers ask the question, what possibly could be meant by "mental substance"?37 Empiricists, and many linguistic analysts, are unable to consider an entity as a unity because they lack the concept of a principle of unity. They deal continually with a sum of parts, behavioral manifestations, linguistic use, etc. Strawson, with his concept of person, is able to achieve this unity but since he arrives at this position linguistically he does not possess the theoretical basis necessary to defend his stand against criticism. One author commenting on the soul believes that, "we are worse off than the Greeks, and even then our early modern predecessors, for we are convinced that command is not a distinct kind of action ... How does a sensation push or pull, or get pushed or pulled, by a nerve tissue?; and this problem, not surprisingly, is insoluable. Some philosophers think the way out is to be Humean about causation, but such evasive tactics have nothing to recommend it.³⁸ Quinton in considering problems of rational trees, conversational matchboxes, and soap bubbles, asks on what basis we predicate "mentality" of individuals.³⁹ He mentions that, "men hope to last seventy years and many of them do. But

mentality is not denied to a child that dies at the age of two."⁴⁰ These questions are considered also by Hospers in discussing problems relating to the search for a criteria of personal identity, and problems of bodily and memory continuity.⁴¹ This matter is especially acute when one considers questions of human rights and morality. If rights are contingent on human nature and it is decided that an infant, an idiot, a comatose person and a foetus possess human nature, then it follows that they possess human rights.

A metaphysical realist system of morality bases its norm for moral and immoral actions upon human nature in all its facets and relationships as understood by human reason. Conscience is not completely subjective even though it is supreme in the final analysis. Conscience as a judgment of practical intellect, must make its decisions on the basis of what objective moral truth is discoverable by reason, with its own capacity, as well as reason considered in a given social environment. Knowledge of morality based on natural law or human nature may also come historically from the "jus gentium" of many nations and peoples. Objective morality must be based on moral obligation. Frankena, by his linguistic analysis of morality, realizes that the first judgment in the practical moral syllogism must be, 'do good and avoid evil', but he does not know how this principle is derived.⁴²

Metaphysical realists believe that this principle is selfevident in the moral order because it is discoverable by our understanding of an appetitive nature in a being which has free choice. A being which has an appetite must perform actions to acquire perfections which it does not already possess because an appetite is necessary for the continuing perfection of its being. If a being has an infinite number of choices with regard to 'goods' which move the appetite, then 'seek the good and avoid the evil' is a necessary principle which must govern the affective life of man.

Freedom of the will for metaphysical realists means that man, under certain conditions, is able to choose and hence is responsible. However, freedom is dependant on knowledge. Freedom is not something absolute and causeless, for the desired good is what moves the will as a final cause. Not all acts of man, e.g. reflexes, are free.

One important application of natural law in the area of social ethics is the demonstration that man is a social animal and the conclusions based on it. By reasoning about the fact of human communication, human psychological need for others, and human needs for intellectual, social, emotional, and educational development the metaphysical realist argues, that

man is by nature social. From this he derives, by further demonstration, that the family and civil society are both natural societies whose authority is natural and not arbitrarily created by other individuals.

Most philosophical compendiums written by naturalists or linguistic analysts give a faulty interpretation of the five metaphysical proofs for the existence of God, usually relying heavily on the views of Hume and Kant. All of these proofs are based on a metaphysical and realistic view of causality. If one of the proofs were summarized it could be explained like this: since the act of existence for all contingent beings is caused, then ultimately it must depend on a necessary source of existence whose essence is to be. Those who are religiously inclined but who cannot be contented with the anti-intellectual tendencies of existentialism must fall back, for a reasoned theoretical position, upon either some form of idealism or metaphysical realism. Most Protestant theologies until recently, relied on a Kantian philosophy with its denial of a reasoned approach to a Transcendental Cause. Catholics for the last four or five hundred years have been influenced mostly by Aristotelian-Thomistic realism and before that by the neo-Platonism of Augustine.

Regardless of the ultimate conclusions we might reach, unless we admit of an intellectual comprehension of man and reality we will be forced to rely on a value system based on social expediency derived from the descriptive and statistical techniques of the social sciences and the attitudes of modern psychiatry. The first priority however, should be to return man to his natural unity by dissolving the mind-body problem.

> In short by returning body to bodiliness and soul to mind we are able once more to envisage the concrete man in a meaningful co-relationship with the world towards which he orients himself. In that context bodiliness and mind are given together, as an identical datum.⁴³

Man the unified individual substance or person, is aware of the concrete material things around him which he is able to understand in their meaning and interrelationship. To reduce knowledge to sense awareness only and then defend this view intellectually by using meaning, is to blind oneself to man's total awareness.

¹Gustave Weigel and Arthur G. Madden, <u>Knowledge its</u> <u>Values and Limits</u>, Chapter 2.

²John Wild, <u>Introduction to Realistic Philosophy</u>, pp. 413-414.

³Robert J. Kreyche, <u>First Philosophy</u>, An Introductory <u>Text in Metaphysics</u>, p. 144.

⁴Jacques Maritain, <u>The Range of Reason</u>, p. 14.

⁵See Chapter II.

⁶John Peifer, <u>The Mystery of Knowledge</u>, p. 43. D.J.B. Hawkins, <u>Approach to Philosophy</u>, Chapter IV.

7Gilbert Ryle, op. cit. p. 79.

⁸William Alston, <u>op. cit</u>. Chapter 1.

9_{Ibid}.

¹⁰Ibid, p. 24.

¹¹Ibid, pp. 24-25.

¹²Joseph Hassett, Robert Mitchell, and Donald Monan, The Philosophy of Human Knowing, p. 66.

13Mortimer H. Adler, The Conditions of Philosophy, p. 121, p. 124. 14Ibid, p. 124. 15Ibid, p. 134. 16Ibid. 17Ibid, p. 23. 18Ibid, p. 23. 19Jacques Maritain, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 6. 20Robert J. Kreyche, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 172. ²¹Ibid, p. 177.

²²Mortimer J. Adler, <u>op. cit</u>. p. 112.

23_{Ibid}.

²⁴Jerome Shaffer, <u>Philosophy of Mind</u>, p. 65.

²⁵K. Lehrer and J. Cornman, <u>Philosophical Problems and</u> Arguments: An Introduction; p. 266.

²⁶Norman Malcolm, "Knowledge of Other Minds", <u>The</u> Philosophy of Mind, editor V.C. Chappell, p. 155.

27_{R.S.} Peters, <u>op. cit</u>.

²⁸G.E.M. Anscombe, <u>op. cit</u>. p. 77.

29Ibid.

³⁰Ibid, p. 76.

³¹Ibid, p. 72.

³²Brother Benignus, Nature, Knowledge and God, p. 98.

³³Ibid, pp. 96-97.

³⁴By Leo Sweeney.

³⁵Jacques Maritain, <u>Existence and the Existant</u>.

36Allan R. White, op. cit. pp. 46-55.

³⁷John Hospers, <u>op. cit</u>. p. 409.

³⁸Wallace I. Matson, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 98.

³⁹Anthony Quinton, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 216.

40_{Ibid}.

⁴¹John Hospers, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 414-415.

⁴²William K. Frankena, <u>Ethics</u>, pp. 37-38.
⁴³C.A. Van Peursen, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 172-173.

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CHAPTER V

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

1. Knowledge Objectives: The School and Its Priorities

Education in the broadest sense of the word involves some sort of change in an individual. Most animals are born with all the physical and psychological equipment necessary for their survival. They have a ready made instinctive structure which controls what food they will eat, when they will reproduce and how they will avoid or fight dangers to their life. Man however develops from infancy where he is wholly dependent upon a few basic reflexes and the experience and knowledge of mature adults, to a point where it is necessary that he become involved in a continuous process of learning the knowledge, skills and attitudes requisite for survival, for human progress, and for human enlightenment.

The vital questions of what changes are educational rather than detrimental and what knowledge should be acquired, depend largely upon how the philosopher of education views the nature of man. All aspects of education from objectives to

means will depend on whether man is individual, social or asocial; whether man is an emotional, a physical or rational creature or some combination of these; whether man is in constant evolution in all ways or whether he has a human nature which remains the same; whether man can know reality only in the concrete or as universally and intellectually understood, or whether he knows only himself.

If after being dissatisfied with the weaknesses of naturalism and idealism we conclude that metaphysical realism provides the only valid epistemological view of reality, then the educational philosophy should follow from the principles derived intellectually from a realistic contact with an intelligible reality. Philosophy will provide a knowledge of the nature of man and his capacities while science will supply the physical, descriptive and measurable aspects of individual, particular reality obtained by means of experimentation and disciplined observation.

Any realistic position ultimately depends on man's sense contact with reality. Sense experience is a necessary prerequisite for our concepts and intellectual awareness of nature. The broader and more extensive our sense experience is, the more subtle and more varied will be our concepts of

reality. The effects of such experience on our practical understanding is most obvious but even our more theoretical and metaphysical understandings will be clearer in their applications, implications and relationships as a result of a richer experience.

This distinction between practical knowledge and speculative or theoretical knowledge is a vital one for education. Since the theoretical knowledge of pure reason is man's most unified, comprehensive grasp of reality, then certainly philosophical truth is an educational end in itself. Knowledge of the essential nature of man and reality cannot change because it is precisely a grasp of being or existence as opposed to sense knowledge, the knowledge of carticulars, which differs with every instrument used and every new dimension considered. Man is meant to know and to search for more and more knowledge not merely because it can be utilized to build a better bridge or even to produce a work of art but because by knowing he is perfected in his being. Philosophical knowledge is basic to all other knowledge and essential to all man's social and ethical values. Even on the level of scientific knowledge and mathematics, theory must come first before any application is ever found in engineering or practical physics. Since man then is by nature a rational animal one of his greatest perfections

will be his knowledge. He should be educated to acquire truth because he has a need to know and ultimately his actions depend on what he knows.

Man's ultimate end, according to Aristotle, is happiness and happiness is the reason why he is moved by any specific good. All particular 'goods' are means to an end, happiness alone is desirable for itself. The desire man has to be completely satisfied in all ways, is something he can understand and want, even though he has never experienced it. All the choices man makes of various objects of desire should be judged in accordance with whether they actually contribute to man's perfection. Since this cannot be judged always in retrospect, they will depend for their norm on a reasoned understanding of the nature of man. Much of this will depend on proper values being inculcated somewhere during the educational process. A realistic understanding of the nature of man can give us some knowledge of the good life, while the history of man gives us corroborating evidence from the mistakes men have made and from their most sublime views of law. But it is reason comprehending man which decides the hierarchy of values that should be followed, what is virtue and what is vice, and hence what is ultimately compatible with the perfection of man's nature.

Theoretical knowledge then supplies the basis for our comprehension of man's nature while man's nature, with reason, provides the basis of how man should act.

First principles may be intuited in all man's perceptual judgments but the bulk of man's theoretical knowledge depends upon reasoning. Man must be actively thinking to synthesize a total comprehension of the universal. Active understanding is derived by discursive reflection by a person in contact with an intelligible world and not by a rationistic contemplation of thought. Dewey's reactions against the spectator theory of knowledge applied to the idealism and the kind of realism which provided the basis for essentialist educational theory. In this view knowledge is the result of re-presenting reality which in turn leads educationally to presenting material in fragmented form. This correspondence theory of knowledge concentrates on transmitting laws, facts, events and causes, as discrete elements of reality. This concentration has resulted in a mechanical view of mental discipline and transfer of training, an exclusively subject-centred curriculum, and a concentration on rote memory. Of course, Dewey's antidote to these faults was to deny the existence of any kind of theoretical philosophical knowledge. He reduces all knowledge to tentative practical judgments which provide the foundation for man's reconstruction of his environment on the basis

of experience and science. The only truth possible under these circumstances is a truth verified by practical effects - the pragmatic sanction. This instrumental view of knowledge is a dynamic one oriented to the future. There are no absolute hallowed principles or values for the pragmatist. Thought cannot look to the past for justification since all beliefs can be only working hypotheses. Even the terms 'knowledge' or 'mind' for Dewey denotes a passive instrument which assumes a mind-body dualism. When an individual reacts to a novel situation which poses a problem and then decides on an action which successfully solves his problem, this process is pragmatic knowledge.

But knowledge corresponding to the nature of reality is philosophical knowledge which grasps things as they are in their essences and relationships. Science provides us with sense knowledge of observed and measured particulars as well as generalized laws and theories. The understandable aspects of reality presented by philosophy is <u>not</u> experience, as perceived or remembered. The spectator view itself concentrates on the mental absorption of <u>particular</u> elements and this kind of stress is the result of the empirical influence in modern education. As far as idealists are concerned, particulars provide the occasion

for the internal mental development of the seeds of knowledge, so they too can be essentialist with regard to sense training. Observational knowledge naturally changes with changes of observation. If man is restricted to the colours he sees, the sound waves he hears and the chemicals he tastes or smells, he can never know what a thing is, for what a thing is is bound to be universal, unchanging and necessary. If the universals which provide the basic comprehension of reality, and the first principles including causality which provide the method are intelligible elements of the reality we see and hear etc., then we are back to Aristotle and Aquinas. If they are something innate and remote from sensed reality we are back to Plato, Berkeley, Descartes and Kant. If these universals are nothing but words standing for perceptions and remembered perceptions then we are back to Locke, Ryle, Dewey and Russell. When the universals are unknown or denied, then the nature of things is unintelligible. Hence we can have no essential knowledge of reality, no certain principles for education and no basis for ethics or political rights.

Richard Weaver in his book <u>Ideas Have Consequences</u>, traces the development of all the confusion in the modern world to the denial of universals and hence the denial of the possibility of non-empirical knowledge. If we can have necessary knowledge

that man by nature is a rational animal whose knowledge capacity transcends animal sense knowledge, then we will have a philosophical knowledge of man, the consequences of which are enormous. Philosophy, by utilizing the principle of causality, can discover the nature of the intellect, the emotions and love but it cannot tell us on what problem we concentrated yesterday, how we felt when we were angry or afraid, or what it was like or is like now to experience love. Existentialists often condemn philosophy on this account but philosophy cannot be anything more or less than its methods warrant. One cannot condemn mathematics because it cannot tell us about the nature of love or recall the experience of love to us. Philosophy provides the vital principles and values necessary for the educational process. It provides the principles and values necessary for human social and political action. What it cannot provide is the knowledge of pupil individual differences or an immediate norm for specific class techniques. Differences between the learning rate of a slow learner and an exceptional student cannot be discovered philosophically but only by specific sense experience and scientific techniques. Specific results can be measured only in the concrete, i.e. scientifically, but these same results should be related to objectives which are philosophically derived. To promote an education geared to speculative knowledge which shows that man is

free willed and hence responsible and that man has a moral obligation to be just, is to lay down principles of education which depend on philosophy. A system based solely on science will flounder without the requisite knowledge of man and knowledge and without the principles for social action which alone can provide the basic absolutes to direct human activity. Yet, an educational system relying solely on philosophy would be unable to provide the feed-back on practical means and individual differences necessary to help achieve educational objectives.

All learning both intellectual and moral involves habits. A habit to Aristotle, is really like a second nature. Following Aristotle, the speculative intellectual virtues are wisdom and science while the practical intellectual virtues are prudence and art. Thinking then, is in some ways a mental skill. People are born with varying potentials for different intellectual skills. We know that some students tend to have a more practical rather than a speculative "mind" which means that it is easier for them to develop one type of intellectual habit over another.

It is almost impossible to deny the educational fact of mental discipline when it is properly understood. Earlier in this century the arguments centered around a false view of faculty as analogous to physical capacity. But understanding is the key to transfer of training. Without an understanding of the elements



in a given study or situation it is impossible to attempt problem solving in this area. Ability in reasoning and applying principles to new situations improves with the development of the intellectual habits.

Dewey's explanation of the steps in thinking explains roughly the process of induction but his view of man and knowledge is such that the emphasis is given to practical problems growing out of the environment, e.g. forked road type problems, while the resulting knowledge is strictly practical knowledge since it can be neither true nor false until proven so by practical results. Judgments of the kind, 'I can get the apples off the tree by climbing', or 'we can improve this industry by making these changes', are products of intellectual habits, classified as practical intellect by metaphysical realists.

Considering the difference between knowledge as information and knowledge as formation, the metaphysical realists lean on the side of formation as far as education is concerned. Subject matter facts do not have the same importance as far as human development is considered, as the habits of thinking do. When many of the facts of a subject are forgotten, the basic principles are remembered and a renewed ability to "handle" material of this type remains. Metaphysical realists are more concerned with formation from the point of view of the persons' growing perfection in the educational endeavour. Facts should be learned in relation to other facts, in judgments, theories and systems. Understanding and truth begin only in judgment. Unconnected facts are merely at best verbal symbols for meaningful ideas. One could get the effect of learning facts by memorizing a list of meaningful words.

The metaphysical realist does not accept learning as the development of a disembodied intellect where contemplation is considered as the workings of an interior mind using ideas divorced from reality. The Cartesian rationalist gloried in the achievements of a human mind rather than of an integrated person. When translated into teaching this approach led to an attempt to mould the student from outside in a somewhat mechanical fashion so that he would somehow acquire the best ideas of the world. Metaphysical realists, like Maritain, heartily approve of the pragmatist-progressive protest against such a rigid system. The advantages of this movement stem from its concern for action, the practical life, and psychological learning through sense activity. However, the pragmatist view of knowledge as a result of the interraction between man and his environment, based on a view of activity which they do not clearly define, plus their evolutionary relativism and goalless education, make it in the long run a

more detrimental system, resulting ultimately, in anarchical effects on society and education. For these reasons and because of the excessive permissiveness of progressivism, many scientists who originally applauded this experimentalism, later abandoned the position.

Metaphysical realism in stressing the psychosomatic unity of man is constrained to view the development of the whole person as the main aim of education. Its stress on knowledge for the sake of knowing as being more fundamental than knowledge for the sake of action while admitting its interrelatedness in the functions of a unified 'person', leads this philosophy to regard knowledge of man, his place in the universe, and human moral values, as the most important knowledge. But it is the knowledge of an individual person who lives a bodily existence yet makes decisions in a society with others and who must work, play, and enjoy, in a real world where he should live according to the precepts of a rationally examined life. Contemplation in such a system is not a contemplation of ideas in a separate immaterial entity but a contemplation of the being of people and things; a contemplation never far removed from action.

The liberal education advocated by Maritain and Hutchins, centers around the person. Various subjects are important because they elaborate different facets of man. Man is the meeting point, of all these subjects either as subject or object. Hence their utilization should lead to a growing self-realization. Subjects like literature, history, social science, politics, economics, logic and for Maritain even the natural sciences and mathematics provide the curriculum for a liberal education.² Philosophy, with its basic principles and permanent knowledge, provides the core for such a system. Although philosophy as the core for all human insight should be accepted by most people in a society, providing needed stability and common ultimate ends or objectives, the more tentative and controversial aspects of human knowledge will be developed from this basis of first principles, enabling constant re-adjustment to the problems engendered by continuing social evolution.

Modern education which is empirically oriented does not possess the necessary elements for stability because it can neither handle certain problems, nor provide principles by which man can live with himself and others. The latest fads in thinking change almost as often as clothing styles. Without philosophical knowledge there is no knowledge of existants as they are understood but merely of how they are described in their specificity. Without philosophically based principles there is no basis to evaluate academic subject matter, nor any criterion for educational aims. Psychologically based learning theories like behaviorism

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and the S-R mechanism of Thorndike, are hopelessly inadequate to explain <u>human</u> knowledge. Gestaltism brings a more total perspective but can not derive the diverse nature of sense and intellectual knowledge from the total "field" presented by reality and the subject.

> Thus, ... the empiricist theory of knowledge is of a nature inevitably to warp, in the long run, the educational endeavor, and this happens in a rather insidious way. For if it is true in actual fact, that reason differs specifically from the senses, then the paradox with which we are confronted is that empiricism, in actual fact, uses reason while denying the specific powers of reason, on the basis of a theory which reduces reason's knowledge and life, which are characteristic of man, to senseknowledge and life, which are characteristic of animals. Hence, there are confusions and inconsistencies which will inevitably reflect on the educational work. ... What he speaks of and describes as sense knowledge is not exactly sense knowledge, but sense knowledge plus unconsciously introduced intellectual ingredients; that is the empiricist discusses sense-knowledge in which he has made room for reason without recognizing it.³

If unified philosophical understanding of man and reality should predominate as an educational objective providing the principles underlying all practical knowledge and values, how will this be translated into the objectives of the school as an agency of education?

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The most important kind of education is liberal education,

not based as some have considered on education for men who have much leisure but based on the need to develop the human person according to a reasoned understanding of his nature. This education would be liberal in that it would provide a freedom based on what man is as comprehended by philosophy and, being a free willed animal, on what man can become, through his actions and decisions. The school always exists in a specific culture and hence must at all times, be concerned with the transmission of this specific culture along with the practical knowledge and skills which prepare a man for a definite vocation or profession in society. These aims however will always be secondary to the liberal development of the individual. Unless it is guided by wisdom and values philosophically derived all practical education and even science itself can become a monstrous technology with a deadly efficiency which in the end can destroy a nation or even the so-called civilized world, as recent history has already shown. No nation can survive unless its institutions and its policies are founded on basic principles which are true to the nature of man as philosophically understood. These essential principles will be unknown in a society completely dependent on knowledge derived from scientific description and measurement. A too diverse pluralism in regard to basic principles leads almost inevitably to anarchy. In such a society, accepting a moral relativism, there

is no way that the efforts of educational institutions can be directed towards common objectives. The key questions in this situation are, 'who's to say?', 'who can dictate values?'

Necessary humanistic values cannot be derived from pedagogy, psychology or any other social science as is all too evident today. Without human principles there is no basis for a hierarchy of values applied to curricula. A course in, 'How to Read a Newspaper', becomes just as important in the objective scheme of things as, 'Epistemology'.

The ceaseless reconstruction of educational means and ends results ultimately in educational anarchy. Pragmatism, falling back upon science and evolution, had the advantage over essentialism of stressing the involvement of the whole organism in the educative process. Yet, its immediate aims of relevance to life, adjustment to society, and psychological growth, were based on rather nebulous criteria derived from social science. Recently, sociologists like Riesman, Whyte, and Fromm, have stressed the dangers of conformity resulting from the "life adjustment" curriculum with its group dynamics. "Academic authoritarianism" was being replaced by the "authority of the social mass, where a phony conformity deadened the curiosity, faith and idealism of the young." The ultimate danger is that, "approval itself, irrespective

of content becomes almost the only unequivocal good", even to the point of adults seeking child approval.⁴ An intellectual conformity combined with a contempt for authority and all traditional value is a dangerous mixture.

The exclusively scientific orientation has lead to a quantitative and measurable view of learning which in turn has lead to a lack of concern for knowledge itself. Modern students are much more concerned with marks, grades, credits, and courses than they are with understanding and thought. This same mentality has been reinforced by teachers who, in attempting to make education a science, have devised numerous devices for testing everything from I.Q. to attitudes. One writer declared that since educators and social scientists lack a dependable measuring device for measuring variables involved in human activity and in fact are unable to identify and control these variables, that much of what passes for experimentation is really "mysticism". Naturally such an orientation tends to reduce everything to measurable units. This leaves many students with the latest theories and a concern to acquire their diploma or degree by passing a number of hurdles which are placed in their way. When most of the vital educational questions are non-empirical ones dependent on philosophically derived values, then too great a concentration on the testing and measurement aspects of learning leads to a

situation where education is disintegrating around our ears while too many educators are preoccupied with "scientific" devices.

The educational conclusions of Aristotelians and "rational humanists" like Hutchins, Adler, Weaver, Foerster, Buchanan, Nef and Van Doren, although based on a metaphysical realism, differ on some points of emphasis, from the position of Aquinas and neo-Thomists like Maritain, Gilson, Newman, Shuster, Cunningham and Donohue. The former group accepts an unmodified, intellectual, educational stress which has resulted in a 'Great Books' curriculum like that at St. Johns College. The educational philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, although accepting the primacy of intellect over will, lays a greater stress on the total integrated person, on vocational education, and even on manual labour.

> If St. Thomas could remark that contemplation is man's greatest joy, still he did not say that this is the only human joy. Indeed he pointed out that none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure. Then too, to cite another instance, men need to work. On several occasions St. Thomas, underscored this in quite modern and even instrumental and evolutionary terms...

This union in man of reason (ratio) and hand (manus) was characteristically emphasized by St. Thomas, perhaps because it neatly mirrors man's composite condition. For as contemporary Thomists have pointed out work means an idea has been embodied in matter and it is therefore, an activity peculiarly proper to man...⁶

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This is the reason why, on the practical level, some of the approaches of the progressive educators against the essentialists were accepted by metaphysical realists. They could accept the sense training and activity but not as an end in itself, nor as oriented to something as vague as social adjustment.

Even the most hardened agnostic must admit that Christianity has had a great influence on the thinking and values of the western world. For Thomists, it is the religious influence which tempers the intellectualism of Aristotle because religion always possesses an existential dimension which tends towards an interpretation of man as a dynamically living and acting being, as well as a knowing one. This orientation broadens the educational outlook to embrace all of humanity while a two exclusive intellectual stress must necessarily restrict education to an elite few who have high intellectual ability. How can we reconcile these diverse tendencies?

Maritain believes that only the few can develop an intelligence scientifically perfected by the intellectual virtues of wisdom and science. Hence, the development of these abilities should become the objectives more especially of the graduate school.⁷ High school and undergraduate college should be mainly concerned with a universal liberal education on the level of what Maritain calls natural intelligence, equivalent to what Plato calls right opinion. The majority at these levels will be unable to acquire <u>in any depth</u> an understanding of the methods and interrelated principles of the various intellectual disciplines. The undergraduate college would be concerned with a mature level of natural intelligence, "with its full natural aspirations to universal knowledge," plus preparation for a particular, vocational field of activity.⁸ "During high school years, the mode of teaching would be adapted to the freshness and spontaneous curiosity of budding reason, stirred and nourished by the life of the imagination."⁹

The school then is concerned with three levels of knowledge objectives, the practical levels oriented to the skills, social interraction and the world of work; the level of natural intelligence concerned with the liberal arts; and the level of science, philosophy and theology concerned with truth, ultimate principles, and pure theory. In addition, of course, the teaching of the school must provide an atmosphere which reinforces rather than detracts from moral values. The elementary and high school should be concerned with providing the basic skills necessary for the acquisition of knowledge. At these levels, teaching should be concerned with the development of

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interest, curiosity and love of learning rather than the sterile memorization of verbal formulae which is later regurgitated for the edification of the teacher. The school should escape from the encyclopaedic inculcation of too many subjects and masses of detail which it has inherited from the essentialist position. The student can not acquire the necessary development if he is faced with pressure to absorb a bewildering pattern of facts and subjects. The pedagogical principle that exhorts teachers to begin where the learner is, is to a great extent ignored. Pupils must possess certain abilities and background before they are able to acquire integrated understanding in any area. The experience of basic skills and attitudes provides a basis for gradual comprehension while a drilled pattern of verbalized information bypasses real learning. Of course, the whole question is complicated by the vastness of universal education itself and the prejudices of progressive influenced teachers against homogeneous class grouping. Recent concerted attempts to have grouping within the classes seems to mock the argument which protests that there is no such thing as a homogeneous group. It depends on your frame of reference.

It was the uncritical acceptance of a naturalistic philosophic prejudice which led psychology to create the fiascos associated with the controversies over transfer of training,



child rearing, sight reading, reading readiness and teaching methods.

Thinking men are beginning to realize that certain theories which were largely in vogue during the nineteenth century were in reality but narrow prejudices lacking in objective value. There was, for example a prejudice in favor of a scientific psychology, in the positivistic meaning of the phrase. It was maintained that natural science was the only science, to the exclusion of metaphysics. Yet when a science has man for its object, it comes into the category of the sciences of values. To eliminate personality with its system of values is to deny the very nature of these departments of knowledge and of life. ... To be sure psychology is one of the fundamental bases of education; yet the knowledge of that subject is but one presupposition of the science of education. It is clear that the teacher must adapt himself to the child, but education properly so called does not begin until the child adapts himself to the teacher and to the culture, the truths and the systems of value which it is the mission of the teacher to transmit to the child. If Psychologism, now generally abandoned, still influences the field of pedagogy, it is to the greatest detriment of sound notions of education.¹⁰

To rely on experimental psychology to provide anything but a confused notion of human learning is to expect that the nature of knowledge can be derived by specialized empirical observation and scientific generalization.

Thomistic metaphysical realism provides a total view of the nature of knowledge derived from philosophical method and based ultimately on common sense knowledge. It places thinking about things based upon experience in and of the world, well ahead of thinking about words. "Because man is corporeal as well as spiritual, he is necessarily laced into the context of space and time where he interacts with his environment."¹¹

Truth derived by reflection from first principles and man's common experience about man's nature as a material, social, rational, living, organism - a unified person, is the first priority of the school.

2. Conduct Objectives: Values, Teaching and Society

Socrates and Plato believed that knowledge was power and virtue but Aristotle and Aquinas realized that on the level of imperfect human knowledge a man is capable of choosing a moral evil towards which he is inclined, even when he knows and believes that it is a moral evil. This Socratic optimism has its counterpart in the modern belief that if the scientific facts are known there would be no crime, no war, or any other human ills. Much of the pressure to convey the bare facts in sex education stems from this notion. There was a time when gory movies on childbirth were shown to adolescents in order

that they should learn the "truth". Much of the violence and lurid sex in some present day "literature" results from a concern for a "realism" to tell things as they are. Human dimensions and values such as love and the personal respect epitomized by Martin Buber's 'I-Thou' relationship are missing. Human values, unknowable by a scientific approach to reality, cannot be part of present day realism which is as cold and stark and material, as a lump of protoplasm.

Human actions, as we have seen, follow upon certain values and values depend upon the beliefs and principles held by an individual person. Morality is a concept of order like religion. It must be recognized, understood, willed and served. Idealism has left the modern world with a subjective view of morality and conscience, while empiricism has substituted utilitarian social need as the sole basis of law and objective "morality". This, coupled with relativism has led to a splintering of social values which bodes ill for the very democracy which fosters its development.

Democracy has always been treated in the history books as a political destiny achieved when a people reach the apex of a long period of social evolution. But the appeal of democracy, as well as the shadow of dictatorship, will always exist as

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long as freedom and authority are polarized realities in human affairs.

Western democracy was the product, on the theoretical level, of the Judeo-Christian tradition, modified by certain tendencies promulgated during the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Its expression in the American Constitution and the French Revolution rested on the absolute value and dignity of the human person and on his absolute right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Now, the whole foundation of democracy has been undermined by the rise of subjectivism and science. Basic concepts such as 'freedom', 'liberty', 'democratic civil rights', 'academic freedom' etc., have been completely changed, to the point where the original founders of modern democracy would be appalled by their interpretation and application in the twentieth century. The founders of democracy understood the difference between freedom and license because they realized that government authority together with the use of lawful force was a necessary aspect of human affairs if anarchy and subversion were to be avoided and the public welfare protected. Relativism and existentialism have changed the situation to such an extent that freedom and liberty are promulgated as absolutes in themselves, with nothing but expediency remaining to limit man's freedom to act in any way

he pleases.

With the rise of the social sciences, the right of authority has come to have no real meaning. The pragmatic family or state, influenced by Rousseau and Dewey, is merely an arbitrary, conventional grouping of individuals. Parents, governments, and hence teachers possess an authority based only on a power establishment rather than on a natural right.

These positions lead to a great ambivalence in the attitudes of modern liberals. Modern liberalism is in reality more of a series of attitudes based on certain traditions rather than a position based on principles. Most questions are decided by the model of the authoritarian power supressing the individual. This model is applied to all situations from family affairs to international politics. Modern liberals can condemn war, censorship, and capital punishment regardless of expediency because these things violate the dignity of man while, at the same time, they are pushing for abortion, euthanasia, and control for hate literature on the basis of "scientific" social need. Certainly it is difficult to understand how the criterion of expediency and social need can be applied exclusively to one set of problems yet refused with other problems where an "unscientific" view, of the dignity of man is applied. Metaphysical realists believe that philosophy provides the principles needed to guide individual and social action. Despite the great differences which are brought about by social evolution, man possesses the same common traits stemming from the same nature, and hence the basic principles will remain the same even though the pressures of varying situations will change from era to era. Disciplined philosophical study of the kind of creature man is, along with study of the events of history, can help to make these principles with their limits more obvious.

For the metaphysical realist man is a rational, social, animal. If any society can be proven to be a natural society, then it must possess a natural authority. The family, civil society and the state are examples of natural societies. This view does not militate against a democracy, but only against a Rousseauean and relativistic view of democracy which is obviously self-defeating because, instead of anchoring itself on principles essential to human nature, it must permit what would destroy it. Such a situation violates even a pragmatic criterion of life. However, even though state authority is natural, the person or persons who exercise this authority must be chosen, tacitly or otherwise, by the citizens of the state.

Modern liberalism promulgated the relativistic educational

view that all viewpoints must be presented objectively so that the individual student can choose for himself whatever system he prefers. Aside from the practical impossibility of doing this fairly and adequately there is no guarantee even for the most optimistic that the individual student would choose a democratic and liberal view rather than an authoritarian one. It was over this issue of indoctrination that Boyd Bode and George Counts broke with the progressive educators.¹² In practice, most liberals promulgated an exclusively liberal view and their so-called objectivity was a facade. There are grounds to believe that even from a pedagogical point of view attempts to present material in this fashion rarely results in adequate learning.¹³ The linguistic analysts of course have come full circle to the point where they consider that, since all education is directed to producing ideal changes in behavior, then all education is moral education. Thus, linguistic education must of necessity be verbal indoctrination.

In the nineteen sixties the progressive liberal view gave way slowly to the existentialist and socialist position that education should involve a definite commitment. Now, many faculty and students are demanding that the university commit itself by taking a definite stand on social issues. This is a

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far cry from previous demands for an aloof scientific objectivity.

For the metaphysical realist there can never be absolute freedom of action on the practical level. Society can and must change, but basic principles and rights cannot change, so any practical attempt to destroy the basis of society would have to be repulsed. On the other hand theoretical freedom demands that men be free to examine all concepts and systems in order to examine the truth that they may contain. In practice it is difficult to reconcile the practical imperative to defend social public welfare with the demand for theoretical freedom. Certainly, it would be too much to demand that in a situation such as that which existed in Nazi Germany during Hitler's rise to power that a person should feel obliged to treat National Socialist views as a strictly academic question, to the point that he would be unjustified in opposing Nazi attempts to change German society unless he spent years of research on the question.

There can be no real autonomy unless it is guided by a freedom which is true to what man is essentially. Sometimes, in practice, objective factors are utilized in spite of the subjectivity of moral values. When certain religious sects

refuse to allow their children to receive blood transfusions, there is sometimes an appeal to an objective standard of truth, for a decision which overides the wishes of the parents.

The educational system should attempt to reinforce the values which lead man in society to a process of liberation based on some definite principles. Developing youth need both guidance and authority to become well developed and balanced persons. How can this be accomplished unless there is at least a basic view of what is good and of what ought to be? It cannot be accomplished, by an assumed "democratic", broad-mindedness which is based on nothing more than an <u>absolute</u> view that all values are relative. Based on this perspective, any teaching from a viewpoint is branded as indoctrination. There are signs that this position at best merely creates a vacuum by making students resentful and suspicious of so-called traditional views but leaves them highly receptive to current popularized clichés and attitudes promulgated by demagogues.

Philosophy shows that the rights of man are necessary for man to fulfill his nature. Logical positivist and pragmatist views of human rights as based solely on positive law and custom do not provide anything but an arbitrary, tentative basis for the value of a person. This has lead to the ambivalence of

a liberal society extremely concerned with its democratic rights which are based, according to current belief, on nothing more than positive law. The state, according to metaphysical realists, is not just a magistrate to protect absolute rights to property, wealth, etc., nor is it totalitarian in its power. It does possess authority to use measures to achieve the common good which means that when individual rights like property and wealth conflict with the common good they are limited at that point by the greater good. Yet the state exists for the people, it is not an end in itself. A society of free men implies agreement between minds and wills on the basic tenets of their common social life. As Allan Tate puts it:

> The general intelligence must not be committed to the illiberal specializations that the nineteenth century has proliferated into the modern world: specializations in which means are divorced from ends, action from sensibility, matter from mind, society from the individual, religion from moral agency, love from lust, poetry from thought, communication from experience, and mankind in the community from men in the crowd. There is literally no end to this list of dissociations because there is no end, yet in sight, to the fragmenting of the western world.¹⁴

Metaphysical realists believe that man's actions should be guided by the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. All other virtues as elaborated by Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics down to virtues like friendliness and loyalty are based on these cardinal virtues.

Aristotelians and Thomists realize that virtue cannot be taught directly. Values can be taught as knowledge but the teacher cannot give values to the students. Many other factors such as the reinforcement of values by the school atmosphere which depends on the values exhibited by the teachers and the presenting of values in all humanistic studies, contribute to the inculcation of virtues. Children tend to look for others to imitate. It is at this point that they should come into contact with heroes in literature and history. The teacher himself as a subject for imitation cannot be overlooked, nor his conscious and unconscious attempts to present values in his daily interpretation of man. On the university level, knowledge should play a bigger role in influencing the values of the student but the absorbing of attitudes is a factor even on this level.

Education then is not exclusively child-centered, teacher-centred or subject-centered. All of these orientations are involved. Since the principal agent of learning is the student himself, all teaching must respect the individuals' natural powers by appealing to the intelligence and free will of the young. The teacher is a secondary but important instrumental agent of the student's learning. Metaphysical realists compare

the teaching process to the use a physician makes of nature in helping to heal a sick patient. The teacher teaches a subject but in such a way that the student is able to understand and so acquire this knowledge for himself. Montessori made good use of this approach with an added emphasis on silence and personal effort. Interest is important but it must be developed as part of the love of learning. Direct attempts to teach values without due regard for the learner or the mechanical forcing of values into areas where they do not belong, merely hinders the true acquisition of values. This is especially true when the values "learned" in the schools are not reinforced by the environment in which the pupil lives. There has been some disappointment in Catholic circles about the results of attempts to inculcate virtues in their students. Of course universal education has placed an almost impossible burden on attempts to teach virtue because of large classes and the mediocre level of too many teachers.

Education is not a pumping in of knowledge. Mechanical drill and memorization of ready made formulae lead to hatred of knowledge. Yet the same empiricism which lead to the progressive reaction to essentialism has also provided the basis for the promulgation of animal learning with its emphasis on drill and conditioned reflex.

It is a tragedy of contemporary society that so much of democratic social theory reaches us in the language of 'drive', 'stimulus' and'response'. This is not the language of freedom, it is the language of slaves. The language of freeman substitutes for these words respectively, end, choice and discrimination.¹⁵

Today, even practical values are not being taught too successfully in the schools. Many youth are being isolated from the world of work in which their fathers and mothers labour by the nature of modern society and by the school system itself. It is impossible to motivate students to work towards a certain occupation when experience with the dynamics of the economic world and a gradual integration into this society where they can interact, are necessary prerequisites for motivation.

Theodore Brameld criticizes perennialism for being anti-democratic, aristocratic, authoritarian and dependant on truth which cannot be experimentally demonstrated.¹⁶ For Brameld, all knowledge must be empirical and all progress dependant on an extreme pragmatic and absolute view of democracy with its evolutionary values. Surely Brameld would not find that the absolute metaphysical certitude of the principle of non-contradiction was subversive of democracy. It seems that he believes perennialists treat the whole area of social, political and moral concern as being self-evident. Naturally, any such view would be a threat to freedom as well as to the dynamic aspects of knowledge. Brameld accepts science as the sole basis for learning, without proving this to be so, while his view of democracy is a product of the social prejudices of the milieu in which he lives, just as Aquinas' understanding of the actual workings of society was conditioned by the medieval, social systems in which he was immersed. Brameld's criticism of the perennialists' view of mind, significantly, is not based on whether this view is true or false but whether it can be verified by science, and whether it reinforces or detracts from a levelling view of democracy.¹⁷ When Brameld asks the question, 'self-evident to whom'?, one could also make the same demand of the first principle which justifies the scientific method. We have seen the results when this was applied to the principle of verification.

However, there is value in Brameld's exposition of the aristocratic nature of an educational system that leads to the creation of an intellectual elite. But, if knowledge on the level of the intellectual virtues of wisdom and science is the most necessary and worthwhile knowledge, then nature itself indicates the capacities of those who can acquire these perfections.

Unless you believe, as some do, that all people by heredity have an equal capacity to learn if only the right environment can be found, then the practical realities will dictate that some will learn and others will not. This is more of a problem for the Aristotelian and "rational humanist" group because their emphasis is placed on intellectual development and because the highest Aristotelian virtue is <u>justice</u> - the reinforcing virtue of authority. For Aquinas and the neo-Thomists, following Christianity, <u>charity or love</u> is the greatest virtue, with the result that they consider all men. regardless of their learning to have the same dignity and value as all other human persons. Even those who are mentally retarded have the same basic rights. Thus Christianity softens the rigors of intellectualism. One author commenting on this whole controversy declares:

> This philosophy is classified by Brameld as "perennialist" on the grounds that it discusses "perennialist truths". What Brameld appears to miss is that it is the perennial problems with which Adler deals rather than solutions that are perennially held.¹⁸

Adler tends however to be over optimistic about the capacity of individuals to profit from the Great Books program. He does not seem to take into account the range of individual differences discovered by modern psychology. We can see that the theoretical and practical ramifications of the mind-body problem, however the term is taken, encompasses the complete range of human existence. As Chesterton once remarked, there is nothing more important than a person's philosophy of life.

3. Conclusion

All human problems, values, progress, science, world views and solutions rest upon a foundation of human knowledge. Ultimately then, what anyone believes and does, other than, things done on the instinctive, emotional level, depend implicitly, or explicitly, upon an epistemological position. Basically there are only three general epistemological positions. Other positions like existentialism, linguistic analysis and many pseudo-philosophical and religious world views, attempt to ignore or by-pass an epistemological position, but their belief about man and his world must, in the final analysis, if they are consistent and rational, rest, upon some basic view of man's knowledge. Some systems attempt to avoid this by being intuitive, non-rational and unsystematic, but even this in itself must take into consideration man's everyday experience, if man is to live in a world, where some kind of knowledge is

indeed derived. Even a sceptic must presuppose knowledge in order to give reasons why he is sceptic.

If a man begins his philosophical reflections with the internal awareness, and modifications of his eqo, he will become an idealist or dualist, who must prove, that the practical life he leads, is being lived in a world of real material objects, and not a world of shadows. The other two epistemological positions, firmly anchor themselves in man's everyday experiences. The naturalist, however, insists that the world as he senses, measures and describes it is the total reality, while the metaphysical realist declares that even common sense human knowledge, involves the understandable, intelligible elements of reality and that some knowledge intellectually comprehended, involves by its very nature, basic certitudes, which encompass the nature of things, and the elements of being. Meaning is the point of contestation between empiricists and metaphysical realists. Is it particular as sensed, or universal as understood?

These epistemological tensions are admirably illustrated by the conflicts surrounding the mind-body problem, as it has developed since Descartes. The evolution of linguistic analysis indicated, as we have seen, a growing, wider perspective; a

concentration on meaning, that has exposed the vulnerability of both the idealistic escape, from man's unity and experience, and the self-defeating, anti-metaphysical nature of positivism.

As has already been shown, important elements, in the whole analytic tradition, have reaffirmed, the existence of mind, as distinct from the material body. What is also evident is that many analysts, like Jerome Shaffer, do not know any other position on mind, to fall back upon, other than a dualist or idealist one. The reasons for this are mainly historical.

This paper maintained the thesis, that once the nonempirical dimensions of meaning and mind are admitted, then the only possible valid epistemological starting point, is a realistic and philosophical one, i.e. a metaphysical realism. Not only is this maintained by a process of elimination, but much of history, scientific fact, meaning, and common sense experience, can be explained, only in terms of a realism of this type. Any other position, leads to a truncated view of man, as either divorced from life, as it is lived, or as life, divorced from the non-material, understandable dimensions of meaning, and reasoning. Either of these views leads ultimately to scepticism. However, metaphysical realism integrates the truth in both idealism and empiricism. It does not negate either existential experience, mathematics, or science but provides a firm foundation for these and all other branches of knowledge.

Philosophical knowledge provides the only basis, other than unscientific, common certitude, for human morality, education and politics. If the metaphysical realist approach is utilized, then the true nature of mind and matter is discovered, and the modern mind-body problem disappears. What remains is the natural mystery of the causal interraction of mind and matter, and the exact steps, by which we acquire knowledge.

Thus, the trend of linguistic analysis, in regard to the mind-body question, is leading inexorably in the direction of perennial truth.

Educationally, the greatest contribution offered by metaphysical realism is the promulgation of necessary, speculative principles on which philosophical knowledge is based. This is the knowledge which is worth most, and ultimately conditions the nature of all teaching and learning. True freedom, human rights and virtues depend intrinsically upon this kind of knowledge. This is the only kind of knowledge, which can grasp the <u>nature</u> of man, rather than some particular facet of his material structure. ¹Donald and Idella Gallagher, editors, <u>The Education</u> of Man: <u>The Educational Philosophy of Jacques Maritain</u>, Chapter 2.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. pp. 45-46.

⁴Willis Rudy, Schools in An Age of Mass Culture, p. 58.

⁵Bartky, John A. <u>Social Issues in Public Education</u>, pp. 191-192.

⁶John W. Donohue, "The Scholastic: Aquinas", <u>The Educated</u> <u>Man</u>, editors, Paul Nash, Andreas Kazamias, Henry Perkinson, p. 129.

⁷Jacques Maritain, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 72-73.

⁸Ibid., p. 73.

⁹Ibid., p. 72.

10Ibid., p. 40.

¹¹John W. Donohue, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 126.

¹²John L. Childs, <u>American Pragmatism and Education</u>, p. 222.

13Paul Nash, Authority and Freedom in Education, p. 98.

¹⁴Quoted by Jacques Maritain, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 100-101.

¹⁵Allan Tate in Jacques Maritain, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 100.

¹⁶Theodore Brameld, <u>Philosophies of Education in Cultural</u> <u>Perspective</u>, Chapter 12.

17For a recent critique of the instrumentalist influence in modern education read, Stanley R. Moore, "Modern Teacher Education: Some Reflections on Its Ideological Base", <u>The</u> Journal of Teacher Education, Vol. XX, no. 4, 1969.

¹⁸Michael Belok et al., <u>Approaches to Values in</u> <u>Education</u>, p. 150.

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