CHANGEMENT DE RESSOURCES ET FACTIONALISME DE VILLAGE DANS UNE COMMUNAUTÉ DES INDES ORIENTALES EN GUYANE

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PRÉCIS

Des recherches effectuées dans un village des Indes orientales dans la région de West Berbice en Guyane ont tenté d'analyser les factions et le factionalisme en tant que niveau de politique locale. Ces éléments ont été présentés dans une perspective historique à partir de la fondation du village en 1902 jusqu'à nos jours. L'étude avait comme but de traiter des "facteurs extérieurs" ou changements de ressources qui ont progressivement et sélectivement influencé les aspects suivants des factions et du factionalisme: les variations dans les structures des factions et le rapport clique/support; les variations dans les compétitions et les jeux entre les factions; la manière dont les factions et le factionalisme se limitent et s'affectent mutuellement dans le contexte plus général de l'évolution des jeux et des structures au cours du temps.

Les résultats obtenus révèlent que les structures, les types et les compétitions des factions subissent des variations. Celles-ci résultent du changement dans la structure des ressources du village au cours du temps, mais les structures, les jeux et les ressources doivent être considérés comme un processus interdépendant dans lequel ces trois facteurs sont intimement liés entre eux.

RESOURCE CHANGE AND VILLAGE FACTIONALISM IN AN EAST INDIAN COMMUNITY, GUYANA

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ABSTRACT

Research was carried out in an East Indian village, West Berbice, Guyana in an attempt to provide an analysis of factions and factionalism as local level politics. These were viewed from an historical perspective from the founding of the village in 1902 until the present. The aim was to deal with "external factors" or resource changes which progressively and selectively influenced the following aspects of factions and factionalism: internal variation in factional structures and the core/support ratio; variations which occur in interfactional competitions and games; and how factions and factionalism constrain and affect each other within the more general context of how games and structures evolve over time.

The findings indicate that variations exist in factional structures, types, and competitions. These are a product of the changing resource structure of the village over time, but structures, games and resources must be viewed in a feedback process in which the three variables are intimately related.

RESOURCE CHANGE AND FACTIONS: EAST INDIANS IN GUYANA

RESOURCE CHANGE AND VILLAGE FACTIONALISM IN AN EAST INDIAN COMMUNITY, GUYANA

by

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SECTION I: The Problem and its Context

Chapter 1: The Statement of Problem and Its Theoretical Implications.

(a) Introduction.

The problem for investigation in this dissertation can be succinctly stated as factions and factionalism. Building on the existing literature on how factions work in comparatively stable societies, this study deals with how factionalism changes its nature over time as the economic and social resources of a community change.

The research was carried out in a rural village in Guyana, South America. The village can best be classified as an overseas East Indian Community in which the economic base consists in the main of rice cultivation. The aim, however, was not to study the abstraction termed "peasant society," but to study what has been labelled "local-level politics" (Swartz et al., 1968) as exhibited through factional competition. The village thus provided the context for a study which is being viewed as a contribution to political anthropology.

This chapter will delineate the particular emphases associated with such an investigation; discuss the theoretical underpinnings; and set out a basis for a framework of analysis of the empirical material which was gathered in the fourteen months between March, 1969, and April, 1970.

(b) Basic Characteristics of Factions and Factionalism.

There are two basic attributes of factions that become immediately apparent from the literature. The first is that factions seem to proliferate

in peasant communities around the world. Secondly, in many of these cases, factions appear to persist over long periods of time.

In the first case, factions have been noted and/or studied in India (for example, Srinivas, 1955; Lewis, 1955, 1958; Beals, 1962; Beteille, 1965); in overseas Indian communities (Firth's symposium, 1957); on North American Indian reserves (Siegel, 1966; Dozier, 1966; Pandey, 1968); in Latin America (Lewis, 1951; Friedrich, 1965; Schwartz, 1969); in Asia (Spiro, 1968; Gallin, 1968); in the Middle East and in Africa (Turner, 1957; Colson, 1959).

In the light of this proliferation, a major contribution of Siegel and Beals (1966) was to point out, through the concept of pervasive factionalism, the fact that factions have great durability over time although "there is no detailed contextualization" and the "historical antecedents are lacking. . . . Although factionalist dispute or something like it can be seen to accompany some kinds of rapid cultural change, the external influences are inadequately described. The possibility that factionalism might emerge cyclically as part of the normal functioning of a society cannot be explored because there are few descriptions of such cycling" (1966: 159-160).

Proliferation and durability then seem to be almost universal characteristics of factionalism, while at the same time, the nature of the durability or perpetuation, and the factors contributing to it, have received little attention.

(c) A Definition of Factions.

Factions have assumed theoretical and empirical importance by virtue of the fact that they can be seen to be "expected alignments of personnel in certain political fields or one mode of organizing political relations under conditions of rapid social change" (Nicholas, 1965: 22).

The major problem associated with this crucial role which factions play in the political sphere however, has been to "distinguish them from other kinds of political groupings" (Ibid.: 23). To do this, Nicholas has suggested these attributes - that factions are political groups; conflict groups; and non-corporate groups recruited by a leader according to diverse principles (Ibid.: 27-29).

At the same time however, it has been noted that factional groups may solidify over time or disintegrate completely (Boissevain, 1964; Graham, 1968; Bailey, 1969). The issue thus seems to be - when is a "factional group" a faction?

There appears to be universal agreement on the "outside limits" of what can be termed a faction. For example, Boissevain states that "a faction is a group located between divided public opinion on the one hand and competing structural groups on the other" (1964: 1286). At the same time, Firth (1957) characterizes factions as loosely ordered groups with structurally diverse bases of recruitment which become activated on specific occasions.

The issue is thus the extent of solidarity which exists before a faction either becomes a corporate group or disperses into a mere expression of public opinion. This issue is in turn tied to the numerous ways in which the term has been used. For example, one of the first definitions given for factions was by Lasswell in which a faction was defined as "any constituent group of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies" (1931: 49). Later, the term came to refer to different structural entities for different writers. Murdock, for example, used the term to refer to opposing regional districts, tribal moieties, and enduring political divisions (1949: 90). Lewis (1954) labelled caste groups "factions," while as has been seen, Firth and Nicholas used the concept to designate impermanent groupings occurring in particular situations.

(d) The Issue of Internal Structure or Solidarity.

Now the data collected in Bush Lot village most definitely conforms to the general definition put forward by Nicholas. But within the uniform framework of factions being political conflict groups, the ... other characteristics of non-corporateness and recruitment by leaders on diverse principles leave wide scope for variation. Specifying the internal organization of factions, as implied by the latter three attributes, can and should be undertaken and should throw light on the issue of solidarity.

And this takes on further importance given the recent work which has been done in the field of social networks and in the field of politics as gamemanship.

The latter is represented mainly by the work of Bailey (1969) in which politics is viewed from the perspective of a competitive game such that political structure consists of the rules of a game which must continually adapt to an external environment which provides both resources for and constraints on the competition.

In delineating the rules and nature of the game, Bailey goes into much detail about the kinds of relationships possible between followers and leaders on the assumption that two of the major rules in a political structure define the personnel eligible to compete and the composition of the competing teams.

In the light of the personnel eligible to compete, "structures identify at least . . . three categories of personnel: (a) the political community . . . the widest group in which competition for valued ends is controlled" (Ibid.: 23); (b) the political elite, or "those within the community who are entitled to compete for honours and power" (Ibid.: 23); and (c) political teams which are products of rules "specifying broadly how those who are active in politics should organize themselves" (Ibid.: 23).

Secondly, the rules of the political structure "allocate authority within a team" (Ibid.: 27); that is, they define leadership, qualifications for leadership, procedures of appointment, and the rights and duties between leader and follower.

In addition, all these categories of personnel "as far as recruitment is concerned . . . are the same kind of phenomena appearing at different levels. . . . We have moved from the widest circle of the political community more narrowly to an elite, we have focused more closely on a team, and finally, we . . . came to the most selective unit of all, the leader. There is an evident continuity: a leader is part of a team and a team is part of an elite and an elite is part of a community" (Ibid.: 26).

In terms of the rules which define leadership and the relations between leaders and followers, Bailey points out several axes of variation. Most basic of these are within groups which are morally committed to a leader, thus forming "moral teams," as opposed to groups wherein the follower makes a contract to support the leader in return for some favour or service. These latter are "contract teams" based on individual transactions between leader and follower.

Secondly, contract support is easily subverted, or persuaded to change sides while a moral group is not. The axis of variation is such that the latter group is labelled a "core," and the former labelled a "following."

Now the difference between the two is "not one of kind, it is one of degree. . . . The hireling wants his keep and a salary besides; the faithful want only their keep. . . . The difference is the leader of a moral group has a higher credit rating than the leader of a band of hirelings" (Ibid.: 43-44).

Now these are ideal types, for the "actual relationship between a leader and his follower is likely to contain both a moral and a transactional element"

(Ibid.: 44). "A leader may have an inner circle of retainers whose attachment to him is moral, and an outer circle of followers whose attachment to him is transactional. The former are called his 'core'; the latter his 'following.' For a word that covers both categories, I will use 'supporters,'" (Ibid.: 45).

Bailey then goes on to state that "factional leaders . . . by definition have only followers and no core" (Ibid.: 45). For "there are two connected characteristics which mark out a political group as a faction: firstly, the members do not co-operate because they have a common ideology; . . . secondly, they are recruited by a leader with whom they have a transactional relationship. . . . The point of unity is the leader," and the followers "each separately have their own transaction. . . . Every faction has a leader, whether it be one man or a clique (core) of several men, each with their own followers" (Ibid.: 52).

"But continued transactions create friends" (Ibid.: 53). "The longer they hold together as a group, the longer they are likely to hold together. If at first the sole bond of allegiance lies in the pork barrel, later the credit built up by continued successes will carry the leader through one or two failures. When that point is reached, the faction is already developing a core and has ceased to be purely a faction. . . . From being a pragmatic device, it gains, by degrees, normative approval." By this time, "the hireling structure is likely to have been changed in two main ways." There will be first "a new found morality and a means of . . . replacing the transactional basis of recruitment. The second possible development . . . is the growth of a division of labour within a faction and the emergence of a bureaucratic structure" (Ibid.: 54).

Finally, Bailey maintains that "the introduction of any new political

resource is likely to bring on a period of factional experimentation" (Ibid.: 56), and further, "the faction which is most successful in the competition for the new resources develops a core and in time, the core expands to the point where a new kind of group which is no longer a faction, has come into existence" (Ibid.: 53).

Now several major points emerge from this discussion. First, Bailey's view of factions fits into the definition proposed by Nicholas. At the same time however, Bailey has specified more precisely the internal organization which he sees factions as taking. And this internal organization is such that the teams which emerge from the community and elite are based solely on individual transactional relationships with the leader. This logically leads to a second point - that factions are essentially ephemeral and passing phenomena which come into existence when new resources become available for exploitation, but change into another type of group the moment that the basic transactional nature changes; that is, the moment the faction begins to develop a core, or moral relations. Bailey's usage of the term faction is thus highly rigid, and allows the term to apply to no groups where there is more than a basic transactional element through which followers are recruited.

At the same time however, other writers are willing to allow for more variation in the internal structure while still keeping within the "outside limits" of definition implied by Boissevain, Firth and Nicholas.

For example, Siegel and Beals' (1960a) notion of "schismatic factionalism," although never discussed in great detail in terms of internal structure, would seem to allow for two continually opposing groups which split a community into two rather stable competing units. This implies greater solidarity, greater multiplexity of ties in that such factions endure for long periods. Bailey's concept of the pure transaction would probably be impossible to apply in such a situation.

In addition, Graham, who bases his conceptualizations on Bailey's, states that "the members of a faction may be divided into two categories; the leader or leaders composing its core and the followers composing its element of support. A faction has a direct structure when its secondary leaders are the lieutenants of the primary leader to whom the followers owe direct allegiance; it has an indirect structure when the secondary leaders have independent followings and the ability to secede - when in fact, a faction is a federation of minor factions. In practice, a faction combines direct and indirect features in its structure although the balance may vary" (1968: 324).

In short, by allowing for the existence of "secondary lieutenants" at the same time that the transactional relationship remains between primary leader and follower, Graham is allowing for the existence of a core in Bailey's terms, while utilizing the concept of faction.

Spiro also allows for a wider characterization of the internal structure in his discussion of factionalism in a Burmese village. "In Bailey's terms, the core of each faction consisted of a relatively homogeneous upper class while its support was socially heterogeneous, deriving from different social classes and moved by a variety of motives" (1968: 409). In short, the faction had a core consisting of a moral group and a following based on transactional relationships.

Spiro goes on to state that "the Burmese factions . . . exhibited the same attributes which seem to characterize factions in general. In addition, however, the . . . factions exhibited other salient features which are not identified by Nicholas (1965), and it is of interest to know whether they are also generic attributes of factionalism" (1968: 419). Distinguishing between interfactional as opposed to intrafactional relationships, Spiro, in terms of the latter type states that "an important variable [is] factional solidarity."

For in the Burmese situation, "the two factions were characterized by only a small degree of solidarity whether looked at in social, psychological or cultural terms. Socially, factional membership was fluid, factional realignments occurring not infrequently; psychologically, factional members exhibited little mutual loyalty whether in their factional or extrafactional relations; culturally, they shared no common ideology. . . . Here again is the important variable, factional solidarity, whose range of variation in all three of its dimensions must be discovered before we can describe the invariant characteristics of factionalism" (Ibid.: 420).

Finally, there is Bailey's article in Local Level Politics which seems to have foreshadowed Strategems and Spoils. Here Bailey analyzes factions in Bisipara and concludes that "the dolo are conflict groups made up of two relationships or three roles: leader, follower, dependent. 'Follower' and 'dependent' differ in that the follower does not, and the dependent can, change sides. . . . I shall refer to the collectivity of followers as a core and the collectivity of dependents as support. In this way, the structure of a conflict group [faction, dolo] can be expressed as a variable derived from the core/support ratio" (1968: 283).

At the same time that there has been this emphasis on the nature of core and support in order to characterize the internal structure of factions by further specifying the nature of leader-follower relationships, there has also been work which has derived from the concept of social network and oriented to the same problem.

Mayer's network analysis of the electoral campaign in Dewas resulted in two associated concepts being suggested - action-set and quasi-group. The former term referred to the networks which the candidates activated for vote-getting with the major characteristics being that "a wide variety of bases

for linkage" were "involved; . . . that the links" were not "based on group membership; and that the action-set is not a group . . . and could not exist without the ego around whom it is formed" (1966: 108-109).

At the same time, Mayer noted that "when successive action-sets" have been empirically determined such that "the same pattern of linkages . . . exists through a series of contexts . . . without any formal basis for membership" (Ibid.: 115), one has what can be termed quasi-groups. And one of the important features of the quasi-group is that "they can be found in many arenas of social activity. In politics for instance, a succession of action-sets . . . would add up to form a quasi-group which could be labelled a faction" (Ibid.: 116).

Yadava (1969) picked up these notions and concluded that "factions are quasi-groups . . . which in conflict situations become ego-centred action-sets" (1969: 908). And "once the specific goal is achieved a faction withers to become a quasi-group" (Ibid.: 909).

On the basis of Mayer's definitions then, Yadava is allowing the faction a more stable existence than did Bailey, and in addition, is providing the possibility for defining "core" in terms of networks.

In order to do this however, one has to argue in the opposite direction to Yadava - namely, that a faction is an action-set which becomes a quasi-group should it develop a core of membership. Core thus refers to a part of a faction determined when "successive action-sets" exhibit the "same pattern of linkages . . . through a series of contexts without any formal basis for membership" (Mayer, 1966: 115).

But as has been seen, Mayer uses this definition to characterize quasi-groups. But to do this leaves no method for characterizing "core" except as a clique. In addition, it ignores the fact that factions are "essentially

ephemeral" with "membership not always remaining the same" (Yadava, 1968: 909). At the same time, it obscures the essential definitional feature of factions as being recruited "by a leader on diverse principles" (Nicholas, 1965) and obscures Bailey's (1969) emphasis on transaction. In short, it obscures the actual membership fluidity and content of factional relationships.

It seems therefore more useful to view factions as activated networks (action-sets) for a given situation, and insofar as the same personnel constitute part of a given faction through several situations or contexts, these personnel constitute the quasi-group. The concept of "clique" can then be seen as the next logical step in defining internal solidarity, and can be used to refer to a core which has achieved a high degree of intra-group interaction, or in other terms, has a high network density (Barnes, 1968).

With factions thus defined in network terms as action-sets, we reach a fit with Bailey's (1969) narrow definition of factions as solely transactional. At the same time, we allow for the existence of a core as noted by Spiro, Graham, and Bailey (1968), but have refined it into two further types - the quasi-group and the clique.

In short, factions can be defined according to Nicholas' criteria (1965), but it is also possible to specify further variations in internal structures based on the elaboration of the notions of non-corporateness and recruitment by a leader on diverse principles.

In this light, the issue of factional solidarity or structure within the "outside limits" laid down by Boissevain (1964) is not an issue of absolute definition, but rather, is an issue relating to the internal organization of factions which are hypothesized to vary empirically. On the other hand, variation does not imply that the faction has changed to a "party" or "public opinion." Rather, within these parameters are to be found phenomena which can

be labelled factions. These vary in their internal organization in terms of the structure of the relationships which characterize leader and follower and which run along a continuum of what has been termed "degree of solidarity." The typology which results can be presented as follows:

A. Divided public opinion, (Boissevain, 1964).

---

1. Transactional relationship between a leader and all followers, (Bailey, 1969);
   or
   Action-set, (Mayer, 1966).
2. Group of leaders each with own followers on a transactional basis, (Bailey, 1969);
   or
   Indirect Structure, (Graham, 1968);
   or
   Action-sets with several egos in alliance, (Mayer, 1966).
3. "Core" and "Support" distinguishable,
   (a) Quasi-group, (Mayer, 1966);
   or
   Direct Structure, (Graham, 1968);
   (b) Clique, (Barnes, 1968).

B. Corporate Groups, (Nicholas, 1965).
"Partit," (Boissevain, 1964).

(e) Problem I: Intrafactional Variation.

The notion that factions can vary in their internal structure and the specification of the variability through the setting up a typology, immediately raises the issue as to why the variation occurs. This can be linked to what Siegel and Beals (1966) referred to as a lack of contextualization and historical antecedents in that factions appear to perpetuate for long periods. The answer as to "why" then, lies in being able to trace the evolution of

factional politics over a period of time such that variations in their internal structure become evident.

At the same time, it has been noted that political structures and factions respond to external influences. Bailey has stated that "to understand a political system is to construct verifiable hypotheses about the mutual dependence of a political structure and its environment" (1969: 17). Siegel and Beals (1960a, 1960b, 1966), although concentrating on the interfactional sphere, build their model of factionalism as being dependent on "external stresses" without which factions would not emerge. Finally, Sandbrook, a political scientist, states that "important questions I take to be those directed to the social, economic and political conditions . . . of this mode of behaviour" (1972: 116).

The issue of accounting for the variation noted in the internal structure of factions is thus a problem for historical description with an associated emphasis on the "environment" (Bailey, 1969) which provides the resources and context for factional competition.

Given then a definition of factions (Nicholas, 1965) and a typology of variations in internal organization, one of the emphases of the dissertation is to look at the regularities involved in how factions change their internal structure over time as a result of environmental or resource change.

(f) Problem II: Interfactional and Political Variation.

Given Nicholas' definition of factions as political conflict groups, a logical converse of the above problem is that resource change will also affect political or interfactional competition. This is the second problem for investigation in the thesis.

The issue which arises from this is how best to conceptualize political conflict. For this purpose, Bailey's "game analogy" will be utilized. As

mentioned previously, politics are viewed from the perspective of the rules which define the game. These rules are concerned with five basic subjects. They define what the prize of competition is; they specify who is eligible to compete for the prizes; they specify the composition of the competing teams; they specify how the competition is to take place; and finally, they specify control mechanisms to prevent breakdown.

In this conceptualization, Bailey makes a crucial distinction between "normative" and "pragmatic" rules. The former "express ultimate and publicly acceptable values" and the latter "are practical instructions about how to win" (1969: 4).

This distinction is especially important for the discussion of how political structures change. Bailey's major thesis is that "the ratio of normative to pragmatic rules . . . reach a critical point at which the normative rules can no longer be sustained" (Ibid.: 15), and at that point, what was pragmatic becomes normative and therefore, the political structure has changed.

Now these points become difficult when applied to factional politics. For factionalism has been noted by many (for example, Schwartz, 1969; Siegel and Beals, 1966; Firth, 1957) to be "normatively unacceptable" to the population and very often a breach of expected behaviour. Bailey also has this view of factionalism as "a pragmatic device" which may gain "normative approval. By the time it gains normative approval" however, "the faction is transformed" (1969: 54-55) into something else.

The distinction then between normative and pragmatic rules cannot be made in reference to factionalism except as this competition impinges on the formal political institutions of the society. As a result, the concept of rules will generally be utilized without this distinction, and interfactional

competition will be viewed as an independent political arena with its own rules for competition and conflict.

This immediately creates another problem. For given the way Bailey has defined political change, there is no way, in terms of factional politics, to deal with the issue of how people get from one game to another. That is, the assumption is being made that resource change affects the rules and competition of factional politics, and Bailey's model does not allow for these changes. A major aim of the thesis then is to carry out such an analysis.

And two further issues derive from this. First, Nicholas (1965), Siegel and Beals (1966) and others refer to the interfactional sphere as conflict; Bailey however, views politics as competition. At the same time however, Nicholas has noted the difficulty of utilizing the notion of conflict "for there are several instances of factions co-operating with one another, of factional 'coalitions' or 'alliances.' If the criterion of conflict is observed, there seems to be no way of accommodating alliances" (1965: 44). But "separate factions continue to be distinct from one another even when they are in alliance. The fundamental reason for this is that two faction leaders can never have identical interests; with resources as scarce as they are in Govindapur, men powerful enough to be faction leaders are always at least potentially in conflict" (Ibid.: 46).

In fact, Nicholas is viewing factionalism from Bailey's perspective of competition for a "prize" which by definition is a scarce commodity (Bailey, 1969: 21). Given the fact then that Nicholas' definition is being utilized, it becomes apparent first that Bailey's approach to politics should be applicable; and, secondly, that the terminology used in reference to the interfactional sphere should be "competition" as well as "conflict."

The second issue which derives from the emphasis to be placed on how resource change affects politics is that there is an intimate relationship

between this problem and the first problem outlined in Section (e).

For insofar as the major aim is to see how the internal structure of factions vary, the focus is on the external situation of resource change. At the same time, resource change affects politics according to Bailey who views the environment as composed of resources and constraints on political action.

In short, the thesis deals with a situation of resource change through an historical perspective, in order to see how this affects the political game. Conversely, the focus is on how factions change their internal structure. Both problems outlined above are intimately related by the common emphasis on resource change and the fact that changes in politics imply changes in factional structure and vice versa.

(g) Summary and Conclusions.

This chapter has set out the general problem which is to be investigated - factions and factionalism - and has delineated, within this broad category, the particular foci which will be emphasized. These are:

1. Given a definition of factions taken from Nicholas (1965); given the fact that within the limits set out for what constitutes a faction, there appears to be wide variation in internal structure; and given a typology of variation which was set out on the basis of the literature, one of the emphases is to see how factions change their structures over time as a result of resource or environmental change.
2. Given #1 above, the logical converse of the problem is how resource change affects factional politics as these are defined by Bailey (1969).

Chapter 2: An Overview of the Field Situation as a Product of Cumulative Change.

(a) Introduction.

Research on the empirical and theoretical problems outlined previously was carried out in Bush Lot Village located in the County of West Coast Berbice in the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, South America.

This chapter describes the general characteristics of these various units in order to delineate the setting within which field work took place.

Implicit in the description of the village as it was in 1969 is the view that the village is also an end product of progressive change and differentiation which has been occurring throughout its history. Given the fact that emphasis is to be placed on the historical perspective in order to deal with the problems under investigation, it is important to note that this end product, i.e., the village in 1969, exhibits within it processes which have been occurring throughout its history and structures that have cumulatively come into being as a result of this history.

From these perspectives the description which follows has three main aims: First, to describe the field setting; secondly, to point out that the static description represents the end result of progressive change and differentiation (the character and chronology of which are a major descriptive aim of the thesis; and finally, to note that many of the strategies and processes which emerge in this description, are also assumed to have been relevant throughout the history of the village. The historical dimensions of the thesis, that is the later chapters, will bring this aspect to the forefront.

With these aims the chapter begins with the largest unit of the field situation, the country. It then proceeds to a description of the village itself.


(b) The Co-operative Republic of Guyana.

Guyana[1] lies on the northeast coast of South America bounded on the east by Surinam, on the south by Brazil, on the west by Venezuela, and on the north by the Caribbean Sea (cf: Map 2.1). Its land area is approximately 83,000 square miles with a population of 638,000 persons[2] of mixed ethnic origins.


The country can be divided into four natural regions[3] with the coastal plain being the area in which 88% of the population is concentrated.[4] This population is strung out along a public road which runs the length of the coast. Three rivers traverse from north to south: the Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice, which serve as boundaries for the administrative districts or counties which make up the country. These divisions are presented on Map 2.2.

From an economic perspective, Guyana is part of the "third world" although it is near the top of this group of countries which have two-thirds of the world's population and one-seventh of the world's income.[5]

The occupation distribution of the population however, is not one of a traditional economy in that the agrarian sector is not of paramount importance in statistical terms.[6] However, there are major problems despite this. First, the high proportion of labour found in the secondary and tertiary sectors is engaged in such activities as handicrafts, domestic services and public work projects which are not socially valuable production but rather, wasteful duplication. These areas are in fact overcrowded and the large proportion of labour which they attract is not due to good opportunities, but rather is the result of the flight from the lack of opportunities elsewhere (Reubens, 1962).


LOCATION MAP
of the
REPUBLIC OF GUYANA
SCALE
0 20 40 60 80
MILES
Map 2:1
61°00'W
59°00'
57°00W
7°00'N
5°00'
3°00'
1°00'N
N7°00'
5°00'
3°00'
N1°00'
61°00'W
59°00'
57°00'W
ATLANTIC OCEAN
VENEZUELA
BRAZIL
BRAZIL
DUTCH GUIANA (SURINAM)
Kaburuma
Port Kaituma
Barima R.
Matthews Ridge
Barama R.
Charity
Pomeroon River
St. Cuthbert's
Parika
GEORGETOWN
Vlissingen
Mahaicony
Timehri Airport
Bush Lot Bath
New Amsterdam
Rosehall
Corriverton
Cuyuni River
Mazaruni River
Puruni R.
Bartica
Blairmont
Linden
Abary R.
Demerara River
Essequibo River
Kamarang
Imbaimadai
Issano
Tiboku
Ituni
Ebini
Canje Ck.
Berbice R.
Kwakwani
Orealla
Potaro R.
Mahdia
Kaieteur F.
Mt. Roraima
Corentyne R.
Orinduik
Monkey Mt.
Siparuni R.
Under Construction
Karasabai
Annai
Apoteri
Good Hope
NORTH SAVANNA
Lethem
KANUKU MTS.
SOUTH SAVANNA
Dadanawa
Rupununi R.
Rewa R.
New River
Oronoque R.
Corentyne R.
Essequibo River

Map 2:2


District Divisions
of
GUYANA
District Boundaries
1 : 1,584,000
Source: Richardson, B.C., The Rice Culture of Coastal Guyana: A study in Location and Livelihood. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis Univ. of Wisconsin, 1970.
ESSEQUIBO COAST
WAKENAAM ID
LEGUAN ID
WEST COAST DEMERARA
EAST COAST DEMERARA
EAST BANK ESSEQUIBO
WEST BANK DEMERARA
EAST BANK DEMERARA
Mahaicony R.
Abary R.
WEST COAST BERBICE
CORENTYNE COAST
WEST BANK BERBICE
EAST BANK BERBICE
ESSEQUIBO
DEMERARA
BERBICE

Secondly, within each of the sectors there can be found a skewness in terms of the amount of labour a given occupation employs as compared with that industry's contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For example, mining employs 2.5% of the labour force but provides 11.3% of the GDP and manufacturing employs 12% of the labour force, but produces only 3.2% of the GDP. One has to conclude then, that there are many occupations which are overcrowded and that the highest yielding industries employ few persons (Ibid.).

The effect of this skewness coupled with a large population growth of 3% per annum are indices of a lagging trend of employment together with high rates of unemployment and underemployment. In addition, statistics also reflect the seasonal nature of much employment, particularly in agriculture, as well as overcrowding on the land.

Finally, from the economic perspective, the primary sector produces all the goods for export.[7] This skewed emphasis throughout, as well as particular unique traits which characterize industries, have their antecedents in the colonial past. For basically, the history of Guyana is a chequered one in which a long period of colonization by European powers coupled with several exchanges of the colony between them,[8] resulted not only in exploitation of natural resources and the emphasis on the primary sector, but also resulted in the establishment of particular institutional bases which affect present socioeconomic structure.

The most important of these bases was the setting up of a plantation economy based on the production of sugar. This had the effect of bringing to political and economic power a plantocracy which maintained itself in that position until the 1920's.[9] The result was that all policy decisions within and for the colony were made for and by this group.

For example, the sugar industry required a labour force which could be tied to the land given the seasonal nature of work in the industry. Both the Dutch and British thus laid the foundations for Guyanese "pluralism" through the importation of African slaves.

Now an impetus to this slave traffic was brought about by another characteristic of the plantation system - the establishment of coastal plantations[10] which required major water control works. For the coastland "is not only uniformly flat, [but] lies some feet below sea level at high tide, and the first step in its utilization was its reclamation from the sea. This was accomplished not by any large-scale project engineered by the state, but by the efforts of the individual planter. . . . The work of reclamation was carried out by the erection of a substantial earthen embankment along the entire front of each plantation as a defense against the sea. A similar dam was needed at the back and one along each of the lateral boundaries to keep off the immense body of water that accumulated on the depressed coastland during the wet seasons and would otherwise have resulted in widespread flooding, but was let in as required for purposes of irrigation by way of a canal running along the centre line of the plantation for its entire depth. At the foot of these dams, on the inside, are to be found trenches twelve to eighteen feet wide and about five feet deep. These were the borrow-pits that provided earth for the embankments, but they were utilized in practice as the main drainage canals. Fed by a system of smaller trenches and open drains, they discharged into the sea through one or more sluices or 'kokers' as they are still called - the doors of which are opened as the tide ebbs and shut against the returning flood. . . . Effective drainage was vital to the existence of these low-lying plantations."[11]

As a result of the necessity for the upkeep of the drainage and sea defense works, the slave traffic and the need for a large supply of cheap labour in general, was one of the major priorities of the plantocracy.

Consequently, the impetus to the slave trade increased. With the abolition of slavery in 1833 coupled with the desertion of the plantations by the ex-slaves, the plantocracy made several attempts at bringing in indentured labour to fill the vacuum. First Portuguese, then Chinese, and finally East Indians were imported. The result of these policies created the "plural society" as seen in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Ethnic Composition of Guyana, 1964.[12]

Ethnic Group	Population
East Indian	320,070
African	199,830
Mixed	75,990
Amerindian	29,430
Portuguese	6,830
Chinese	3,910
European	2,420

In addition to pluralism, the effects of the plantation system is felt in two additional areas, in the layout of present day villages, and in the organization of the sugar industry.

In the first case free villages[13] were formed by ex-slaves after abolition on deserted plantation lands which were either bought from the government, which in turn had bought many plantations at execution sale for the non-payment of road dues,[14] or from the planters who were themselves going out of business. The result was that the layout of the villages

retained the physical characteristics of the former plantation. Lands near the foreshore were left empty to allow for the accretion and wearing away of the coastal area; houses were clustered along the public road which ran the width of the estate; and agriculture was placed behind the housing area. These residential patterns are presented in Diagrams 2.2 and 2.3.

Diagram 2.2: Dutch Sugar Estate on the Guyana Coast.[15]





Diagram 2.3: Layout and Water Control of Guyanese Villages.[16]



The result was that settlement patterns in Guyana remained concentrated on the coast along the road rather than dispersed the length of the plantation. This had an effect on "local government in the colony, for as a result each of the villages came into existence as a clearly defined entity, separated from its neighbours by dams and canals. This allowed for the growth of local patriotism."[17] In addition, "the depth of these villages was to prove a handicap to agricultural development since the distance between houselot and farmland in the rear could amount to several miles."[18]

Finally, the plantation economy still has organizational effects on the sugar industry. Peasant cane farming, as it is practiced in Barbados for example, is virtually unknown in Guyana. Rather sugar is today grown on large estates which provide 98% of the cane to the factories. These estates are foreign owned.[19] Now this method of organization is perhaps the most economical given the high costs required for water control. However, it has created enmity among the population because of the foreign control and because of the paternalistic social system perpetuated until recently by estate owners toward the workers as a rationalization for sub-standard living conditions.

In summary then, the economy of Guyana is one based on primary production which is foreign owned coupled with a skewness in the economic structure that indicates high rates of overcrowding in certain sectors, and high rates of unemployment and underemployment. One of the major sources for these problems is to be found in the colonial past with its emphasis on the plantation economy. This resulted in the laying of the foundation for the plural society; in the control of the economy and polity until recent times by a plantocracy; in the subordination of a large portion of the population to the paternalism and dependence on estate life; in the organization of major industries being vested in foreign control and ownership. In addition,

the colonial past laid the foundation for present geographic patterns - that is, population concentration on the coastlands and in pre-defined village structures. Lastly, it left a legacy of water control problems in terms of their continued existence and in terms of the concept that water control should be left in the hands of individual estates/villages.


(c) The Village.

(i) Introduction.

Bush Lot Village was founded by the colonial government in 1902 to serve as a land settlement scheme for former indentured East Indian labourers.[20] By 1969, the village had grown from a few scattered houses into one with a population of 3,158.

Located in the County of West Berbice,[21] the village is approximately fifteen miles from the mouth of the Abary River which marks the boundary between the counties of Berbice and Demerara, and approximately thirteen miles from Rosignol on the Berbice River across from the third largest town in Guyana,[22] New Amsterdam. This location places the village about fifty-six miles from the capital Georgetown, a journey of two hours by "hire car" along the well-paved road that runs along the coast.

The villages immediately adjacent to Bush Lot (cf: Map 2.3) are small by comparison and are mainly African in ethnic composition. In fact, for a radius of five miles, numerous small villages exist one next to the other[23] such that the size of Bush Lot in comparison receives notice from the local people. In addition to relative size, Bush Lot has become somewhat of an economic hub for this central area of West Coast Berbice. Bush Lot as a result, is known as a "prosperous village" - one in which "there is a tractor under every house" and in which the drainage system, unlike those of the surrounding villages, functions well enough to prevent flooding during the


Map 2:3
BUSHLOT LAYOUT
AND
ADJACENT VILLAGES
MILES
1 0 1
5,000 4 3 2 1 0 5,000
FEET
Abary Creek
B.G. Rice Development Co.
5257.23 Acres
8.5 Acs Local Authority of Bush Lot Village District
1277 Acs
Local Authority of Bush Lot
482.89 Acres Colony of B.G.
Colony Land
125 Acs. Props W½ Lovely Lass
125 Acs Props W½ Lovely Lass
133.30 Acs. Props E½ Lovely Lass
134.73 Acs. Props E½ Lovely Lass
379.58 Acs. V.C. Golden Grove V.D.
180 Acs. V.C. Golden Grove V.D.
Colony Land
250.64 Acs S. Maraj
300 Acs. Sookdeo Maraj
162.4 Acs. A.E. Sagor et al
183.7 Acs. Milton Heakumchand
J.W. Isaac et al
173 6.3 acs.
J.W. Isaac et al
169.44 Acs.
282.85 Acs T.E. Isaacs
V.C. Hopetown & Bel Air V.D.
163.18 Acs.
V.C. Hopetown/Bel Air V.D
256.78 Acs V.C. Hopetown/Bel Air Village District.
315.59 Acs.
V.C. Hopetown/Bel Air V.D
319.15 Acs.
V.C. Hopetown/Bel Air V.D.
21.63 Acs Amiralla
139.14 Acs Amiralla
94.41 Acs E.J. Baird et al
189.02 Acs. L. Baird et al
Hopetown V.C.
The Barbice Development Co. Ltd.
2288 Acs.
Wellington Coop Land Soc. Ltd.
1567 Acs.
105.95 Acs. Barbice Development Co. Ltd.
Hopetown Cooperative Land Society
2628.5 Acres Barbice Development Co. Ltd.
To Georgetown
To Rosignol
RAILWAY LINE
PUBLIC ROAD
Fort Wellington
ONVERWAGT
LOVELY LASS
GOLDEN GROVE
LOT
BUSH
ARMA DALE
BEL AIR
ST. JOHN
HOPETOWN
ONDERNEEMING
CATHERINA'S LUST
NAARSTIGHEID
BATH
EXPERIMENT
ATLANTIC OCEAN

spring tides and rainy seasons. It is a village with a large number of shops which attract people from some distance away, and a village in which there "are large houses and rich people."

(ii) The Physical Layout of the Village.


The physical characteristics are similar to those discussed previously as characterizing the "typical Guyanese" village. The village extends in width two hundred rods along the public road and stretches to a depth of seven miles south of the road to meet the Abary River which winds from its mouth fifteen miles away via the public road behind the villages of the west coast (cf.: Map 2.4).

The government surveyor laid out the village in 1900 such that houselots were placed on both sides of the public road and the village divided into eleven sections. With reference to Map 2.4, Sections A, B, C, and D are the housing areas with a middle dam running north to south thus dividing B, C and A, D and serving as a main thoroughfare.

To the rear of the housing area lies the cultivation lots (Sections E and F) which are divided into plots of land running lengthwise from east to west. Behind Section F is another small housing area, Section G, and behind lie four more cultivation areas - Sections H, I, J, and K - which meet the "Crown Dam" which was the original backdam of the village and the outer limits of the village as laid down in the original plan.

Individuals hold houselot and cultivation lot lands in freehold ownership. Originally, every houselot had associated with it a cultivation lot. Over the years however, the two types of lots have become disassociated from one another and a villager may own several houselots without the cultivation lots and vice versa.

Map. 2:4



LAYOUT OF BUSH LOT VILLAGE

1 0 1 MILES
5,000 4 3 2 1 0 5,000 FEET

Residential Areas

In addition, not all houselots are occupied by homes. Table 1.1, in Appendix I list the numbers of cultivation lots and houselots in each village section, and Table 1.2 gives the density of houses in each section. From this, several points become apparent. First, even though not all houselots have homes on them, the majority are owned by villagers who have their houses on other lots. These villagers use the additional lots as kitchen gardens, to house a machine shed, or as part of their children's inheritance. In addition, several lots have been subdivided thereby enabling two houses per lot with each half having a different owner. Secondly, the density of houses in each housing section of the village is variable. This is related to the fact that all the houses in Sections A and B are closer to the public road than the majority of lots in the other sections. In short, what has happened is that household clustering occurred as one neared first, the public road, and secondly the middle and sideline dams. This is obviously related to the fact that ingress and egress become easier along these main routes particularly during the rainy season when all dams revert to mud. As a result as well, the monetary value of houselots, depending on location, is extremely variable.

Beyond the Crown Dam and the area of freehold ownership lie Crown lands which were gradually leased by the village authority and rented to inhabitants. Since cultivation lots are only three-quarters of an acre in size, the existence of these additional lands is crucial to the economic base of the village. This Crown land area is further subdivided into what are generically labelled the New Lands (lying to the immediate rear of the Crown Dam), the New Expansion or New Empolder area (lying to the rear of the New Expansion), and the Creek Block area to the rear of the New Expansion. In addition, there is the Jib Land running in a narrow strip from the Abary Creek to the Crown

Dam west of the Creek Bloc, New Expansion and New Lands.

The acreage made available to houselot proprietors because of the addition of these lands amounted to approximately two thousand acres.[24] Every proprietor is entitled to a certain minimum in the area, and the manner in which these lands were taken up, the timing, and the method of allocation, form an integral part of the politico-economic development of the village.

(iii) Population Characteristics.

From a survey of the village done in 1969, the basic characteristics of the population can be described.

First, the ethnic composition of the village is, with the exception of two intermarried Chinese, totally East Indian as a result of the racial disturbances which took place in 1962 and culminated in the small minority of Africans moving out of the village. Table II.1 in Appendix II gives the ethnic distribution as it was in the 1960 census and can be compared with the 1969 distribution.[25]

Secondly, as mentioned, the total population in 1969 was found to be 3,158 with an age-sex distribution as found in Table II.2. As expected, the divisions between male and female are evenly distributed throughout the age categories. Of interest however, is the obvious youthfulness of the population. Over a third is under ten years of age; 52.1% are fifteen years or younger; 64.5% are twenty years or younger; and finally, 71.4% are twenty-five years or younger.

Now such a distribution is fairly typical for a Third World country and reflects the population growth that occurred between the census in 1960 and the survey in 1969. That is, the growth was due to an extremely high birth rate as evidenced in the numbers of children below the age of ten. Obviously the

implications of the youthfulness of population will, and has begun to, create economic difficulties for the village as well as the country.

This is compounded by the increasing educational levels reached as one associates educational level with age. Table II.3 in Appendix II presents the total distribution of educational achievement. Of the total population, 21.1% completed elementary school while 34.6% reached at least the penultimate year. The level of "no education" however, is high at 28.1%.

From Table II.4 however, it becomes apparent that the totals are intimately tied to the age groupings within the village. As age category increases, so does the probability that the persons in that category received no education. A similar relationship between age and education is also apparent in looking at the numbers of persons who completed elementary school (Standard 6) and Standard 5. These three graphs, Tables II.5, II.6, and II.7 are presented in Appendix II. Again there is an association between age and educational level. The younger the population, the more likely they received more education.

Now these results are predictable given the increasing availability of educational facilities over time and the increasing propensity of the village population to take advantage of these opportunities.

This latter aspect becomes evident in looking at the sex breakdown for age category and educational level reached as presented in Table II.8, Appendix II. Here it becomes obvious that in the past women were receiving less education than men. This is in keeping with traditional Indian culture in which schooling for women in particular was considered unimportant. The increasing proportion of women in the younger age groups who are beginning to catch up with and surpass the males, as well as the cumulative nature of the educational inferiority of women from age group to age group, indicates that

attitudes toward education are changing, and the desire to participate in the opportunities is increasing.

As mentioned as well, this is related to the increasing availability of educational opportunities within the village itself. Presently there is a primary school which is required by law to take in all students aged five and provide them with schooling until the age of fourteen. In Standard 3, entrance exams are written in which the students compete for the limited number of "places" in the country's secondary school system. Those who succeed are placed in secondary schools while the remainder continue in the primary school until they reach Standard 6 or age fourteen.

As well as this primary school, Bush Lot has a secondary school which services a large portion of the west coast of Berbice. In effect the school is merely located in the village as it is geographically a central location. Its presence however, has had the effect of opening up several hundred new places for students in West Coast Berbice, and has had the additional result in Bush Lot of encouraging female education by enabling girls to attend school beyond the primary level while still remaining under the watchful eye of their traditional parents.

Not all students who win places go to Bush Lot Secondary however. Depending on their grades, they may be permitted to go to a high school in Georgetown or New Amsterdam which are generally believed to provide a better education.

At the opposite extreme are those students who fail to win a place at any secondary school but still have educational aspirations. This has provided an opportunity for "educational entrepreneurs" to establish private secondary schools to prepare students for GCE exams. There are two such schools in Bush Lot, which, like the government secondary school, draw their

students from the villages surrounding Bush Lot as well as from the village itself.

(d) General Characteristics of the Village Economy.

(i) Introduction.

Bush Lot is known both locally and in a wider context as being " a prosperous rice farming village." To an extent this is true, but other factors are relevant within this characterization.

First, aside from rice farming, there are other methods of earning a living in the village and as well, many of the rice farmers engage in more than that one occupation.

Secondly, aside from this vertical differentiation of the population into numerous occupational groups, the population is also horizontally differentiated by annual income. Not all villagers in short, are prosperous.

Both these aspects of economic differentiation will be discussed in this section. It should be noted that both aspects are the results of differential access to resources, the history of which forms an integral part of the political and factional changes which are being discussed in the thesis.

(ii) Occupational and Resource Distribution.

Table 1 in Appendix III shows the occupational distribution of the population and is an index of the numerous employment possibilities open to villagers. In addition, noting that in the 1969 survey 586 persons[26] were employed in some capacity but that 929 occupational positions were filled according to Table 111.2, it is apparent that most persons engage in an average of two occupations. This patterning is related to four general factors.

First, historical factors have encouraged this occupational multiplicity from the inception of the village in 1902. At that time, the vagaries of rice

production and the uncertainty as to whether a crop would be obtained from one year to the next, encouraged villagers to diversify. An additional encouragement was the fact that nearby sugar estates hired casual labour during the harvesting and grinding season. In fact the village was purposefully located near such estates in order to provide a labour pool.[27]

Secondly, there is the often quoted statement in Guyana that the amount of work an East Indian puts into his padi fields amounts to thirty-eight days per year. This statement has been criticized, but it does point out the fact that rice production does not occupy the full time of a family's labour potential. Logically then families invested this time and labour into other occupations.

Thirdly, since 1902 the village has had a population which has been growing at a relatively steady rate.[28] This growing population needed services and the villagers began to provide them for themselves rather than depending on outsiders. This too contributed to the diversification such that a large variety of occupations became part of village life and a supplement to rice farming.

Lastly, the introduction of mass education noted previously and the effects of the mass media have created white collar aspirations and a desire for prestigeful jobs.[29] This accounts for the large number of persons who have become teachers and officials (clerks, police), although many of these still plant a few acres of rice as do the majority of persons in other occupations, or many live with their families who are rice cultivators.

Rice cultivation then, in the midst of this occupational diversification, remains the basic occupation of the village. Villagers cultivate approximately 4,580 acres in and around the Bush Lot area. This averages thirteen and three-tenths acres per farmer. In fact however, the amounts

cultivated are differentially distributed among this farming population. Table III.2 shows this allocation of acreage and indicates that the majority of farmers (55.4%) cultivate ten acres or less. It should be noted that of the farmers cultivating more than fifty-one acres, their acreage varies to an upper limit of three hundred and seventy-five. The amount cultivated then, is highly differentially distributed among the village population.

Now this distribution is in turn related to the location of an individual's land. Potential plots are distributed in seven different areas such that the majority of farmers have their land scattered and more importantly, given different tenure regulations in each area, the potential for acreage varies. Table 2.4 presents the locations of farmland and the numbers of persons planting there.

Table 2.4: The Distribution of Ricelands.

Location	Persons Planting
Bush Lot	215
Left Bank Abary River	119
Onverwagt Land Development Scheme	169
Armadale	7
Lovely Lass/Golden Grove	3
Hopetown	2
No. 6 Village	1
Total:	517

The Bush Lot plots include the cultivation lots of three-quarters of an acre each which an individual may hold freehold and the Crown lands leased by the village authority and rented to persons on the basis of two acres per proprietor/houselot owner. Now a family may have more than one proprietor

within it, or a family head may own more than one houselot. As such, every houselot, no matter the owner, entitles that owner to two acres. The more houselots a family own, the more acreage they can gather in this area.

In addition, there is much land within the Bush Lot area that is low-lying or with creek hands which prevent farmers from utilizing it in two acre plots because the costs of drainage and empoldering would be uneconomical and because successful drainage would still be problematic at best. As a result, the village authority, in order to collect rents from all possible land, will rent these areas in five to twenty-five acre blocks to anyone who has the capital and willingness to develop the land. It pays to develop such a large block, and any Bush Lot resident who has the capital can thus add immeasurably to his Bush Lot acreage.

The lands on the left bank of the Abary situated across the Abary River opposite the leased Bush Lot Crown land are Crown lands leased to individual tenants for twenty-one to ninety-nine years. This area began to open up after 1919 and Bush Lot residents applied for leases. The initial plots were generally five to ten acres located in the first depth. The Land Lease Ordinance however, gives priority to the lessee of the first depth for the leasing of subsequent depths. These were gradually taken up by villagers such that many families, as a result of holding first depth land, obtained ten to twenty acres in the second and third depths, and possibly several hundred in the later depths. Provided then that a family has the capital to develop this low-lying savannah land, the potential for expanding rice acreage is enormously great and has resulted in many of the disparities in the distribution of acreage noted previously.

The lands in Onverwagt are part of a land development scheme set up in the late 1950's and distributed to farmers in ten to twenty acre plots.

Renters are both Bush Lot residents and residents of the surrounding villages, and although the plots are generally of uniform size, not all applicants received land in this area. Rather, allocation was part of a political patronage system which will be discussed later. It is only important to note at the moment, that yet another area where Bush Lot residents farm was also differentially distributed.

The Armadale lands are privately owned and have been handed down for three generations within one family, some of whom are resident in Armadale, some in Bush Lot.

The lands in Lovely Lass, Golden Grove and Hopetown are rented from residents in these villages who in turn have rented them from their respective local authorities. Cultivation is done on a sharecropping basis, with the Bush Lot farmer paying 50% of his padi to the original renter. Given this system, the original renter will choose a Bush Lot farmer who is notably successful and thus give him high returns.

Lastly, the lands in Mahaicony and Number 6 Village are leased from government in extremely large blocks. As the Abary lands fill up, several Bush Lot residents are looking to these areas into which to expand. But again, an expansion requires capital to develop the land, and in addition, political "lines" to obtain such a lease in the first place.

In summary then, rice cultivation is the major occupation in a village economy that is characterized by much diversification and dual occupations. Rice acreage however, is distributed in differential amounts among Bush Lot families depending on such factors as the location of the land and its associated tenure regulations; the ability of a family to raise capital to develop undeveloped land; the family's political resources; familial relationships and economic options made by the family as early as 1919; the

houselots a family owns; and finally, a family's reputation as successful farmers.

As will be seen in more detail later on, there is definitely a cumulative nature about a family's ability to expand their rice growing potential. For example, the more capital which can be obtained, the greater the possibility of taking up undeveloped land which in turn, in time, enables more capital formation.

This cumulative characteristic is also related to the fact that rice production is highly mechanized, to the point of possibly being overly so. A third[30] of the farming population owns basic machinery - tractor, plough, harrow, trailer - and those who don't still have their land ploughed by machine. The alternative of utilizing oxen, found elsewhere in Guyana, is not available to Bush Lot residents partially because of villagers' commitment to mechanization, but more importantly, because there is no pasturage in the village to graze oxen. All available land has been converted to rice padis. Villagers without machinery pay persons to plough their fields and reap their crops. Some villagers actively rent out equipment and drivers as part of their economic activities (cf. Table 4.1), but for the most part, tractor and combine owners do hire work after their own work has been completed. There is no apparent underlying organization as to who ploughs whose land. Rather, it depends on whose tractor is nearby, although being a cousin or nephew of the owner might be an additional inducement for obtaining services. Another method is for the non-mechanized farmer to do part-time labour for a machine owner during crop time on the understanding that this entitles him not only to a wage, but also to having his land ploughed and/or reaped.

The result of this dependency on machinery by persons who do not own their equipment, means that their land may not be ploughed before the rains

come or that it will be ploughed too late for planting and growing to take place properly. This is particularly the case if the rains have come early - before owners have completed their own work - and it results in slow ploughing which further delays the planting for non-owners.


In short, the commitment to mechanization further debilitates the poorer farmer and feeds into the differential adaptation of families to rice cultivation.

This fact is further exacerbated by the drainage and irrigation facilities available to villagers. In the Bush Lot areas these are the responsibility of the village authority; in Abary and Mahaicony, provision and maintenance of these services are the responsibility of the lessee - the farmer; Golden Grove, Lovely Lass and Hopetown lands are under the jurisdiction of their respective village authorities; Armadale irrigation and drainage is the responsibility of the owners; and services at Onverwagt are provided by the government.

For the most part then, since the majority of farmland is in Bush Lot, Onverwagt and Abary, and since the latter two are adequately taken care of by the government or lessee, it is the Bush Lot water system which is the most relevant. This is further the case because it is here that the majority of smaller farmers cultivate given the limitations of their having obtained land elsewhere.

Map 2.5 presents the drainage and irrigation system as it should ideally function in the Bush Lot areas.[31] The trenches in the New Expansion are a recent addition, having been dug in 1958, although the scheme was never completed. It therefore does not function properly[32] and in addition, the old system does not provide irrigation facilities although it does manage to keep parts of the village drained - mainly the residential area and the area in front of the Crown Dam. The village then, depends solely on rainfall for the

Map. 5


North
Abary Creek
Creek Head
Creek Head
J
I
B
NEW EXPANSION SCHEME
NEW LANDS
Western Sideline dam and trench
Middle walk trench
Eastern Sideline dam and trench
Railway
Public Road To Georgetown
Sea sluice
Flow of irrigation water
Flow of drainage water
1 0 1 MILES
5,000 4 3 2 1 0 5,000 FEET

growing of crops and this has two major ramifications. First, the farmers can obtain only one crop per year unlike those in areas with successful irrigation schemes which enable two. Secondly, the production and success of any given crop becomes problematic in that it depends on rainfall - the right amount at the right time.

A farmer who thus loses his crop must wait until the following year to attempt to make up his losses. He cannot fall back on a second crop. Rice production in Bush Lot then, despite mechanization and seeming modernization, is still very subject to the vagaries which have plagued it for decades. It should also be noted that families with more land scattered in more places lose less in case of failure in Bush Lot. In addition, they are usually financially solvent such that total failure in any year does not mean total ruin or indebtedness.

This latter possibility, crop failure leading to indebtedness is a fairly typical pattern in the village, and the persons to whom the small farmer becomes indebted are the rice millers. As a result, in years of good crops, the farmer is forced to sell to the miller in case he needs credit in the near future. Selling in this manner however, gives the lowest returns of all possible methods of disposing of the crop.[33]

The differential distribution of rice acreage then, is also related to mechanization within the village and the problems of drainage and irrigation which further exacerbate what can be termed the differential adaptations of families to the major economic activity of the village.

Similar differences can also be seen when looking at the other occupational categories in which villagers engage. In the self-employed primary production category, returns are great for some families while at subsistence level for others. Cattle rearing for example, developed on a large scale as a result of

the opening up and subsequent expansion of Abary Lands. Given the lack of pasturage within Bush Lot, such lands are necessary for the development of large herds. Families without this land cannot expand.[34] Yet the returns on cattle are very high when they are sold, and they have the advantage of being somewhat of an insurance policy in that when capital is needed for any purpose - building a house, empoldering land, marrying off a child, etc. - cattle can be sold and the money raised.[35]

Even with Abary land however, there are again limitations for the expansion of herds. The savannahs provide very poor grazing and flood in the rainy season. An average of only one animal for every two acres can be grazed and high places must be built for the cattle during floods. Also, a large amount of cattle theft occurs and the cattle must be watched at all times. A family must thus invest in a watchman, or have an available son who can be sent to live in the Abary area.

As a result of these factors, land, labour and capital are all needed in order to raise even a medium sized herd. These facts are reflected in Table III.3 which shows that herd sizes range from a family owning one animal to those owning over two hundred.

The occupation of horse rearing is intimately tied to that of cattle rearing in that the former are required for large herds. This means that horse rearing, since the horse itself brings no returns, is the prerogative of the large cattle owner. This prerogative is further enhanced since the horses are used for racing. In fact, wealthier families may raise horses solely for this purpose. A family which owns horses is thus a wealthy family.

Another type of cultivation occurring is that of the growing of greens and provisions for sale. Again however, limitations are placed on the development of this cultivation since the majority of households have their

own kitchen gardens and do not need the resulting services. However, if labour and capital are invested in the growing of difficult crops, such as cabbage and tomatoes, a family can sell the produce in Georgetown because of the high prices which these vegetables command. As a result, this type of cultivation is characteristic of families which eke out a small cash return[36] as well as of the few families who invest much labour and capital in order to obtain extremely high returns.

The final occupation that involves primary production is that of fishing. This is done by poorer families for their own subsistence; part time by some who want extra cash;[37] and full time by others who make a major investment in nets and boats. This latter group earns substantial profits by selling the fish within the village, and although this can be extremely lucrative, the occupation is regarded as being of extremely low prestige. This cultural value limits the numbers of persons who engage in it as does the need for capital in order to begin on a full-time basis.

Primary production within the village then, employs 81.8% of the working population. In terms of profits however, it is characterized by extremes and results in much differentiation among the village population. This is the result of ecological factors, problems in capital formation and decision making, all of which dictate the relative success which a family has in these endeavours.

A similar pattern holds for those who are self-employed in the tertiary sector. Here selective factors mitigate against some families even attempting to engage in certain of the occupations. Such is of course the case in equipment rental, and hire car, bus and truck ownership. The capital needed to begin is great, and in looking at the families engaged in these services, it is apparent that all derived their initial capital from other economic

enterprises and invested later in the capital goods required.[38]

In the other services found within the village, it can be again noted the extremes and relative success with which they are carried out. This is particularly the case with shop owners. The types of shops vary greatly such that the only goods and services for which village residents must leave the village are specialized machine parts not generally stocked. The distribution of shop types is presented in Table III.4. It is the type of shop, its location in the village, and the initial capital investment that makes for the relative success which is so readily observable. For a shop can be, and is, generally opened under an individual's house. This can be done with a small investment required only for stock and minor alterations to the house. Then, depending on its location, on a main dam as opposed to a small side dam, and the services it provides, whether or not these are duplicated nearby, such a shop may grow to a rather large size.

Shops then run the gamut from small cake parlours employing no additional labour (31.0%) to those large businesses such as the rice mills which employ seven labourers.[39]

Depending then on the amount a person invests, the location he chooses or the location available to him, and the service he invests in, his returns will vary from a few dollars a day to several hundred. Shopkeeping in and of itself does not therefore imply "middle classness." Rather, like primary production, it is the investment of capital and labour in an enterprise that will vary in its returns.

The other services, for example cattle dealing, crafts and huckstering,[40] are generally small scale interprises. Crafts is the only service carried out full time although this varies according to the typical pattern in that the majority of craftsmen will also engage in other economic enterprises as well.

The types of crafts are presented in Table III.5 and it should be noted that the contractor and lumber dealer represent major economic enterprises as compared with the other categories.

Again then tertiary services as a general category like that of primary production does not imply uniformity in returns. Rather, crosscutting every category are the successful, the moderately successful, and the subsistence level families.

In the case of employed personnel, there is again the same general characteristics based on whether labour is full or part time and on the nature of the job being done. Table III.6 presents the distribution of permanent and part-time jobs; Table III.7 presents the job types; and Table III.8 presents the major employers of Bush Lot labour.

It should be noted that over 40% of the jobs are only part time and are therefore limited in returns. Further, the majority of these jobs involve unskilled labour or labour requiring a minimum of training. In addition, although the employers of this labour are diverse, they are limited in number. The largest employers are private persons within the village itself, such as the rice mills, the large farmers and cattle rearers.

Despite therefore the large number of villagers engaging in wage labour, the general pattern is that this labour is seasonal and/or casual and results in unsteady employment, fluctuating incomes and economic uncertainty. In addition, several of the employers are linked into a political patronage system which further limits employment opportunities for the labourer.[41]

With the exception of a few well-paid permanent jobs, the labouring population of the village is subject to economic uncertainty which in the majority of cases is mitigated by the fact that such persons also cultivate a few acres of rice to aid in subsistence. This is the general level of this

occupational group.

The final occupational type is the white collar worker. Here again job security and returns vary. In the case of teachers only half are fully qualified, with the rest being used by the Department of Education to fill immediate shortages. Job security for the majority then, is limited and this is exacerbated by the general feeling that teaching, like all government jobs, is part of the political patronage system.

However, in looking at Table III.9, the length of time teachers have been employed, it appears that a core of white collar personnel is being built up within the village to service the schools. As in-service training becomes available to the semi-qualified, this core should increase.

The same however cannot be said for the other two categories of white collar workers. The "clerk/official" category consists of three village rangers; two village overseers; two clerks working in the District Commissioner's office in Fort Wellington; three policemen attached to the Fort Wellington barracks; and two Justices of the Peace. This number is not likely to expand given the size of the village and the needs of the Fort Wellington compound.

As well, in the case of priests, the tendency has been to self-appointment with the consent of the community. None have received seminary training with the exception of the Presbyterian minister. As long as the religious communities do not fission into competing sects, the need for additional church personnel is limited.

White collar employment is therefore somewhat limited given the size and needs of the village and district. With the exception of the possible increasing need for teachers, mobility through this sphere is limited.

(iii) Differential Income Distribution.

The varying success with which families have adapted to the availability of resources and their exploitation, has resulted in the village being divided according to variations in annual income. The range falls from under $800 per annum to an upper limit of over $20,000.

Table 2.5 divides income into seven categories and presents the numbers of families which fall into each.

Table 2.5: Income Distribution within the Village.

Income	Number and % of Households	
$ - 900	109 households	20.1% of total.
$ 901 - 1500	127 "	23.4% " "
$ 1501 - 2000	101 "	18.6% " "
$ 2001 - 3000	86 "	15.8% " "
$ 3001 - 4000	45 "	8.3% " "
$ 4001 - 6000	33 "	6.1% " "
$ 6001 +	39 "	7.2% " "

From this table, it becomes apparent that there are sharp distinctions in the incomes which different families earn. The divisions presented in the table however, are not in visible terms, sharp ones. Rather there is in the village a gradual picture of the very poor through a continuum to the very rich. The picture emerges through differences in life styles, diet, house types, durable goods, machinery, etc. Although conspicous consumption is not encouraged in and of itself, the observer is immediately struck by these different styles which characterize the village.

In short, there are definite horizontal divisions within the community that are apparent to both members and outsiders. From the perspective of

income and differential adaptation, Bush Lot Village is most definitely a stratified community.

(iv) Summary.

The economy of the village is characterized from several perspectives as diversified and stratified into both horizontal and vertical categories.

Occupational groupings exhibit this diversity and the varying success of families in exploiting available resources both in the past and present has also contributed to the stratified and diversified structure of the village.

Rice cultivation is the basic occupation. It is characterized by being carried out with varying degrees of success by different families. This is the result of such factors as location of land and the associated tenure regulations; the ability of families to raise capital to develop undeveloped land; the family's political resources; the number of houselots owned; the economic options exercised by a family as early as 1919; differential efficiency in cultivation depending on machine ownership and the varying efficiency of drainage and irrigation in specific cultivation areas; differential returns depending on where padi is sold and the constraints on families in selling to specific places; and lastly, a family's reputation as a successful farming unit.

Now all these factors are intimately related. For example, efficiency is increased with machine ownership but initial efficiency was required in order to have the capital for investment in mechanized production. In addition, as will be seen, there has been a cumulative quality as to the varying degrees of success which families have had in the economic sphere. The same type of cumulative situation is apparent in all occupations found within the village. Occupation does not imply class or income; rather, all occupations are crosscut by these horizontal distinctions based on relative success.

These latter patterns of differential success are reflected finally in the great income disparities among the various households in the village.

From an economic perspective then, Bush Lot is stratified by cross-cutting groupings of occupation and "class." How this came about and the political implications are part of the subject matter for investigation.

(e) Kinship and Marriage.

The most important relationships an individual has within the village are those links with kin. Kinship is reckoned bilaterally and family genealogies are recalled to three generations with collateral extensions particularly among those families which have been resident in the village for that period of time. Affinal ties are utilized as resources to the same extent as consanguineal ones depending on particular strategies which a family is engaged in at any given time.

The typical household is composed of a nuclear family, although the ideal pattern of household organization is the patrilocal extended type. In reality however, such units tend to disintegrate before the death of the father, and sons and their wives move into their own homes often built on a houselot purchased by the father several years before in anticipation of the split.[42]

Table IV.1 in Appendix IV presents the distribution of household types within the village. Although it is apparent that the extended family does not persist as a unit beyond two adult generations, the role of kinship within the village as a political and economic resource cannot be underestimated. This fact is reflected in Table IV.2 in which household types, collapsed into the more general categories of "nuclear," "extended" and "other," is cross-tabulated with the annual income category of the household. The families in the higher income groups have a greater tendency to be of

the extended type. This is partially the result of the fact that there would be more wage earners in these households, but it also indicates that the extended type can be more efficient as a joint labour force co-operating in large scale enterprises. The wealthy keep their families together for longer periods; those who maintain the extended unit have a wealthier household. This of course is tied into the developmental cycle of families, and household organization in Bush Lot is no exception to this general principle.

As well as household composition being related to the strategies of different families, the same situation holds for the marriage patterns which can be utilized to establish resources for future use. Here the option available is between exogamy and endogamy. Traditionally, the East Indian pattern has been the former[43] and the pattern in Bush Lot exhibits this tendency. For 36.2% of the married female population was born in the village; 56.0% married into the village. The remainder migrated for reasons other than marriage.

Given the option then between exogamy and endogamy, the former is utilized by families wishing to extend their kinship network beyond the village. Jayawardena notes that this strategy was particularly crucial in that "migration was prevalent, especially between plantations, as people went in search of work and more congenial conditions. Changes of residence were effected chiefly through matrilateral and affinal links, and there is reason to believe that the maintenance of the custom of marrying out is related to the advantage of having contact with other plantations" (1963: 21).

On the other hand, the practice of endogamy reinforces or solidifies ties between families within the village and provides resources which are more immediately useful.

Depending then on the immediate objectives of a family, the tendency toward exogamy or endogamy will be preferred.

Now such strategizing is made possible by the fact that parents arrange marriages for their children. In the past this pattern was more strictly enforced and marriages were arranged such that the partners seldom met each other until the engagement or wedding ceremony. A variation on this theme seems to be occurring at present however. Children see each other at school in stores, etc., and often ask the parents to arrange a marriage. The parents may do so and the partners see each other, chaperoned, before the ceremonies. When parents do not agree to a match however, an elopement may take place. Otherwise, the traditional form or its variation remains the ideal method of marrying children.

Of the present marriages in the village, 54.2% were arranged in the traditional manner; 23% were arranged according to the variation; and 22.8% were the result of elopements. In addition, Table IV.3 indicates that the more recent the marriage, the more likely it would have been arranged through the traditional variation rather than according to strict tradition. The number of elopements however, having increased in number in recent years, seem to have occurred consistently.

Given then the manner in which marriages are contracted, familial control can be exercised over choices of partners, and strategies can be, and have been, played out through the marital patterns and choices available.

(f) Characteristics of Religious Affiliations.

The major religions of the Bush Lot population are Hindu, Muslim and Christian. The Hindu community is divided between two sects, the Sanatan and Arya Samaj; the Muslims are all members of the Sunni sect; and the

Christians are divided among eight churches and sects - Lutheran, Presbyterian, Anglican, Roman Catholic, Full Christian Gospel, Church of the Nazarene, Christian Catholic, and Pilgrim Holiness.

The distribution of the population is 48.2% Sanatan; 16.5% Aryan; 20% Muslim; and 14.8% Christian.[45] This distribution is what could be expected in terms of the Guyanese East Indian population and as such, Bush Lot in terms of religious affiliations, is typical of the East Indian population in general.

Within the village there is to be found a Muslim mosque; an Aryan temple; a Sanatan temple; and a Presbyterian church. The last is located on the public road near the middle dam, while the former three are located on the common land in the centre of the village. The physical proximity of the latter three given their different religious rituals such as the Muslim sacrifice of cattle, has often led to conflict for purely religious reasons between the churches.

More important perhaps are the particular roles which these churches provide for some of the village personnel, notably the role of minister or priest, which give such persons access to the religious community for use as a resource in political competition. In fact as will be noted, the major political protagonists quite often have leadership roles within their church. As a result of this overlapping of religious and political roles, potential splits in the village between the various churches become translated into part of the political process.

In this vein, it should be noted that the Aryan, Sanatan and Muslim priests are all villagers who have assumed this role. The Presbyterian minister is an outsider sent by his church to minister in the area while the Christian Catholic minister is also a local resident. The other Christian

churches are located in Armadale (Lutheran, Roman Catholic) or Fort Wellington (Anglican) while the Pilgrim Holiness Church holds meetings in a villager's house as does the Christian Catholic group which has been unable to obtain land in the village for its church. Finally, the Full Christian Gospel and the Nazarene Churches have no location or priest in Bush Lot, but hold revival meetings in a tent outside the village every few months.

The major religions then, which are of relevance to the political processes within the village, are those which have a physical presence with servicing done by local personnel who are also caught up in other social relationships. With these criteria, the Aryan, Sanatan, Mulsim and Christian Catholic churches become particularly relevant to the political sphere by overlapping with the political field and providing resources for political activity.

(g) Characteristics of the Political Structure.

The formal political structure of the village is set out by the Local Government Ordinances of 1907 and 1945 which lay down the rules and institutions for local government in Guyana. These ordinances provide for three types of local units - the village district, the country district, and unorganized areas. The former two types have councils which function as the local authority, while the latter type is governed directly by the central authority, the Local Government Board. As of 1936, Bush Lot has been classified as a Village District and has thus had a council in which two-thirds of the members are popularly elected and one-third appointed by the Board.

This council is "entrusted with the management of the administrative and financial business of the district and with its government generally."[46] Now this implies a very large series of prerogatives both as a result of the

specific powers delineated in the Ordinances and as a result of the large size of the village and the concomitant potential for control over persons and resources. For example, all property "belonging to the village district is vested in the local authority as are the rents and revenues from these properties."[47] The council thus manages and controls the properties and monies of the district. Now when these powers[48] are associated with the amount of property and monies which the village contains, the powers are in fact far-reaching. Appendix VI presents the village budget for the year 1970. Revenues and expenditures total almost $80,000.

At the same time that the council controls this income, it is also responsible for carrying out public works in the district, for example, the maintenance of dams, trenches, the outlet koker, and more generally, the drainage and irrigation works. Labour is required to do this, and as a result, the council becomes a major employer of casual labour. This is reflected in Table 9 of Appendix IV. In addition, the prerogatives of leasing Crown land, controlling industry, levying rates and putting properties up for parate execution sale in case of non-payment of rates or rents,[49] places the council in a position of having many important sources of patronage.

As a result of having power, authority and influence, the council is, and has been since 1907, the focal point of competition in that persons and factions vie for its control by attempting to gain the majority of its seats. The village council is thus a political arena.

A second aspect of the council's powers is that the body, in and of itself, can be used as a resource for other political and economic ends. From this perspective, the council is a resource to be used in other political strategies and arenas.

The council as an arena and the council as a resource are not however two mutually exclusive perspectives. Successful competition for the council and its control obviously means that such persons/factions may then utilize the council as a resource for consolidating their support base and thereby ensuring the maintenance of their position of control. At the same time however, the unsuccessful persons/factions use the shortcomings of the council's administration to gain support for their own position in the next election. It is not then merely the controllers of the council who can utilize it as a resource, but also other personnel in the village. And this use is intimately tied to the council as an arena of competition.

Now an added dimension to the political nature of the council is the fact that from the councillors a chairman and deputy chairman are elected. The former (or, in his absence the latter) exercises the "executive powers of the council between any two meetings."[50] The chairman also presides at all council meetings "in which every question is decided by a majority of votes. In the case of a tie, the chairman has the casting vote."[51]

Given these prerogatives, the positions of chairman and deputy are actively solicited by council members, particularly by the leaders of factional groupings. Like the council itself, the competition and the positions can be viewed from two perspectives. The competition to obtain election can be viewed as an arena, and the position, once obtained, becomes a resource for use in other situations.

In addition to the village council being an important part of the political structure, there are two further aspects which are relevant to local politics.

First, there is the fact that the council appoints persons to the positions of overseer, assistant overseer, clerk, and other official positions

which, according to the Ordinances, function in an administrative capacity. These persons carry out the day to day orders of the council and chairman. Now these appointments persist despite changes in the personnel of the council itself. At the same time, successful administration, for which the council takes the credit, requires the co-operation of the persons filling these offices. The groundwork is thus laid for conflict between the administrative personnel and the council. As a result there is again political manoeuvring from two directions. First there is competition to exert control over who is appointed to the offices. Secondly, there is the utilization of such persons as resources in other competition. The village officials then, despite the "civil service role" which the Ordinances have laid down, are very intimately drawn into local politics. This lack of differentiation between office and person which is implied in such a situation is largely due to the fact that the persons filling the offices are themselves villagers with their own alliances and interests. As a result, still another arena is generated by persons attempting to obtain appointments, and once appointed, they in turn can use the office as a resource for other goals.

The second aspect of the political structure which has relevance here is the fact that the local government of the village is enmeshed in a larger hierarchy of offices or levels culminating in the Prime Minister's cabinet through the Ministry of Local Government. Depending on the context or strategies utilized, the political field may expand to incorporate one, several, or all of these levels. This hierarchy is presented in Table 2.6 with the geographical location of the focal points.

Table 2.6: Hierarchy of Local Government Offices.

Level	Location
Minister of Local Government	Georgetown
Chairman, Local Government Board	Georgetown
Local Government Board	Georgetown
District Commissioner of West Berbice	Fort Wellington
Chairman of the Local Authority	Bush Lot Village
Council of the Village District	Bush Lot Village
Local population	

According to the Ordinances, the Local Government Board has the power to circumscribe the decision of the council, to alter or reverse them. All motions passed by the council have to be reviewed by the Board as are the village budgets. Further, complaints that the "continuance in office of the village council [or specific councillors] is prejudicial to the . . . village"[52] are made to the Board which carries out an investigation and determines the accuracy of the charges. Finally, the Board appoints persons to the non-elective seats on the council and can remove any member with cause.

An interesting fact however, is that neither the village council nor its councillors are permitted to communicate directly with the Board. Rather, all communication must pass through the office of the District Commissioner who, as a civil servant, serves as a formal intermediary between the Board and all the councils in his District. All money collected each week by the overseer as rates and rents must be transmitted to the District Commissioner who banks the money for the Local Authority. The paysheets listing weekly expenses and authorization for the payment of workers must be countersigned by the District Commissioner before payment can be made. Finally, the District

Commissioner may attend any council meeting and his role is generally one of advisor to the council.

In addition to the communications restriction between the council and the Board, the same restrictions are applied to all levels in the hierarchy. A villager for example, cannot approach the Board but must write to the council which forwards his letter to the District Commissioner via the council chairman, and the District Commissioner in turn, transmits the letter to the Local Government Board.

There are several results from this situation. First, attempts are constantly being made at the lower levels to circumvent the hierarchical pattern when it becomes convenient. The propensity to jump levels, to the point where villagers may attempt to communicate with Cabinet Ministers and succeed, forms part of the political gamesmanship of the village.

Secondly, partially as a result of the geographical proximity as compared with the upper levels, the District Commissioner is continuously drawn into the local village politics. He is courted to ensure partisanship and he is used as a resource for particular goals because of the communications nexus which he holds such that the Board often uses his opinions in order to arrive at decisions concerning the village. Again then political strategies in the case of the District Commissioner also exhibit two aspects. Like the overseer, the District Commissioner does not remain a passive party; rather, he too attempts to "politic" in order to get things done in the manner in which he feels they should get done. Another arena then, is opened up.

(h) Summary and Conclusions.

This chapter has presented a description of the field work context and the general characteristics of the village in which this work took place.

The aims of this chapter however, were not merely to provide ethnographic information, but to point out first, that the village represents an end product of the diversification and differentiation which have been occurring throughout its history. This is in keeping with the aim of the thesis in dealing with factional and resource change from an historical perspective. As a result, the numerous groupings within for example, the economic sphere of the village, are a product of cumulative change. How these changes occurred and why, as well as the nature of factionalism which accompanied these changes, are the problems for investigation.

Secondly, the aim has been when dealing with particular strategies in for example, the economic and social spheres, to enunciate the fact that such strategies have always formed part of village life and have been constrained merely by the availability of resources and/or options at particular times.


The ethnographic description is intended to be relevant to the village as an historical entity. What Bush Lot Village is today, is a result of the processes, changes and structures which have been a part of the village since its inception. This chapter has presented the end product of these processes.


Notes: Chapter 2.

1. The Colony of British Guiana became independent in 1966 with the Queen remaining as Head of State. In 1970, the country was declared a Republic and a President elected by the Legislature. Guyana however, has remained within the British Commonwealth.

2. Guyana Year Book, 1967.

3. The four natural regions are: (1) the coastal plain; (2) the sand and clay areas; (3) the highland regions; and (4) the interior savannahs. These are represented in the maps below.





4. Jayawardena, C., Conflict and Solidarity on a Guianese Plantation, LSE Monograph on Social Anthropology #25, Athlone Press, 1963, p. 1.

5. Reubens, E. P. & Reubens, B. G., Labour Displacement in a Surplus Economy: The Sugar Industry of British Guiana, Institute of Social and Economic Research, UWI, Jamaica, 1962, p. 2.

6. Reubens et al. report the following statistics: the primary sector produces 45% of the GDP and employs 40% of the labour force; the secondary sector provides 20% of the GDP and employs 24% of the labour force; and the tertiary sector accounts for 35% of the GDP and employs 30% of the labour force.

7. Sugar in terms of value accounts for 50% of the country's exports; bauxite for 25%; rice for 12%; and timber, diamonds and gold, for 13%.

   This economic description has been abstracted from Reubens et al., op. cit., pp. 2-7.

8. This chequered history began in approximately 1580 with the founding of a Dutch settlement in Essequibo. In 1666, the British took possession of Essequibo which had been suffering from raiding by the Spanish. The Dutch West India Company however, regained control until the colony was captured by the French in 1702. The Dutch again regained control and opened the colony to planters of any nationality with the result being an influx of British planters from the West Indies who added the Colony of Demerara to the already existing Essequibo Colony. In 1775, the two were united but captured by the British in 1781; then captured by the French in 1782; returned to the Dutch in 1784; and finally, capitulated to Britain for the last time in 1803.

   At the same time, the colony of Berbice was also handed to the British having been settled by the Dutch in 1627 and having developed independently of the other two colonies. Berbice colony was also captured by the British in 1781, then by the French and finally returned to the Dutch in 1784. Again, in 1796, the colony was captured by the British, returned to the Netherlands, and finally, taken over by the British for the last time in 1803.

   The United Colony of Essequibo and Demerara were administered separately from the Berbice Colony until they were united by the British in 1831 to form the Colony of British Guiana.

   For further historical material on the history of Guyana, the reader is referred to:

   Dalton, H. G., History of British Guiana, 2 Volumes, London 1885.

   Netscher, P. M., History of the Colonies Essequibo, Demerary and Berbice from the Dutch Establishment to the Present Day, Utrecht, 1888, Translated by W. E. Roth, Georgetown, The Daily Chronicle, 1929.

   Rodway, J., History of British Guiana from the Years 1668 to the Present, 3 Volumes, Georgetown, 1891, 1893, and 1894.

9. After the British conquest, under the Articles of Capitulation, Roman-Dutch rather than British Common Law became the Law of the land and had significant effect on the structure of government. It provided the already existent plantocracy with a constitutional charter such that

until 1928, Guyana had neither a Crown Colony Government nor a representative government, but rather, a government in which sovereign power was vested in the Crown while fiscal power was witheld from it and vested in the Combined Court - a product of Dutch rule. Through its control of the purse, the Combined Court could influence and shape the legislative and administrative policies of the Crown. The Combined Court was controlled by the planters, for as an elected body based on a limited franchise and high qualifications for election, only planters could be elected even after the franchise had been extended in 1849 and 1891.

The result was that the representatives of the sugar oligarchy controlled the structure of the colony's economy, and all economic development or planning was done in relation to the well-being of the sugar industry.

A new constitution imposed in 1928 finally gave Guyana Crown Colony government with an extended franchise and a situation whereby the government could enforce its own financial policy. (Depres, L., Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1967, pp. 33-41.)

10. In their original settlement pattern, the Dutch planters had settled upriver on the assumption that the land and soil in these areas were best for cane growing. By 1700 they had moved to the lower reaches of the Essequibo and the British planters, who were entering the colony at this time, took up lands along the Demerara coast rather than in the riverine areas.

11. Young, A., The Approaches to Local Self-Government in British Guiana, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1958, p. 2.

12. Guyana Year Book, 1967.

13. The nature of these free villages - their causes and effects - will be discussed more fully in a later chapter.

14. "The public road along the coastlands had been established by Dutch authorities by a simple process. Its maintenance had been arranged with equal simplicity. Each planter was required as a condition of his tenure to build and maintain a road across the front of his plantation as a public right of way. A breach of this condition, rendered the title liable to cancellation. . . . By 1826, more drastic measures had been found necessary. The mere failure to pay the fine or upkeep resulted in the parate execution sale of the plantation." (Young, op. cit., pp. 24-25.)

15. Source: Richardson, B. C., The Rice Culture of Coastal Guyana: A Study in Location and Livelihood, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970, p. 32.

16. Source: (1) Ibid., p. 17.
(2) Cummings, L. P., Geography of Guyana, op. cit., p. 43.

17. Young, A., The Approaches to Local Self-Government in British Guiana, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

18. Ibid., p. 3.

19. All sugar estates are owned and operated by two foreign companies - the Bookers Group of Companies and the Demerara Company. The former owns 100% of eight estates, 50% of two estates, and 25% of one estate. The latter company owns 100% of two estates. (Reubens et al., op. cit., pp. 94-95.)

20. The historical background to these land settlement schemes and Bush Lot in particular, will be discussed in a later chapter.

21. The county divisions within Guyana are located on Map 2.2. The district which is now Berbice was originally a Dutch colony (see footnote 8 above), and the history of this west coast area is only to be found in sparse and scattered references.

    It appears that between 1784 and 1806, the area was taken up for settlement and cotton became the major crop. This gradually changed to sugar production after the importation of slaves was halted and a labour shortage ensued. By 1832, thirteen plantations were operating on the west coast.* But with abolition of slavery and competition from the United States cotton industry, by 1849, no cotton was being grown, and only three plantations were in operation.** Planters left the area, and the county was populated mainly by free African villagers.

    The economic base for these villages appears to have been rather haphazard with an emphasis mainly on subsistence. By early 1890's however, East Indians began moving into the area as these former indentured labourers from Plantations Blairmont and Bath bought land near these two functioning sugar estates.

    Administratively, the west coast was tied to the larger County of Berbice until 1952 when it became its own administrative district with its own District Commissioner.

    * Directory of British Guiana, 1832.

    ** Dalton, H. G., Vol. 2: 508.

22. The three major towns in Guyana in order to size are: Georgetown, the capital at the mouth of the Demerara River; Mackenzie (now renamed Linden), the bauxite mining town 65 miles up the Demerara River; and New Amsterdam, the administrative centre for the County of Berbice.

23. To the west of Bush Lot lies Lovely Lass and Golden Grove - composed mainly of an African population such that the former, according to the 1960 census had a population of 279 and the latter, a population of 213. West of these is Onverwagt - formerly part of a land lease given to an American cattle company and presently, a land development scheme in which villagers rent additional land. There is no resident population.

    Immediately to the east of Bush Lot, is the village known as Plantation Armadale. It is ethnically mixed and its history is intimately tied to that of Bush Lot. Its population, together with that of the village to the east, Belair, is given in the 1960 census as 462.

To the east of Belair lie the villages of St. John and Hopetown. They are ethnically African, with the populations given as 345 and 994 respectively. Still further east, is Onderneeming, which is not a village but basically, an empty stretch of land housing sheds and offices for the Ministry of Works and Hydraulics which employs local labour for the public works projects carried out on the west coast. In addition, there is an Anglican school, serving mainly the Christian African population east and west of Bush Lot.

The next "village," about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles ast of Bush Lot, is the administrative centre for west Berbice, Fort Wellington - easily accessible by foot, bicycle or hire car. The compound houses the District Commissioner's office, a post office, a cottage hosiptal, a police barracks, a Magistrate's court and also serves as a housing area for the administrative personnel.

To the east of Fort Wellington, another empty stretch of land, once the plantation of Naarstigheid followed by Bath Settlement which is a recent and arbitrary creation along the road by the Bookers company, owners of Bath Estate. The villagers had lived inland from the road and had provided labour for the cane production. The company however, in an effort to end the paternalism of estate life, and because the cane fields were being cut back and moved closer to the Berbice River, moved the village to the frontlands, sold houselots, and divested itself of administrative responsibility. Given this history, the population is mainly East Indian and can be estimated at 1000 persons.

Bush Lot then, is the largest village in its immediate vicinity, and with the exception of Bath and villages immediately to the east of Bath, it is surrounded by an African population.

24. It is difficult to state precisely the amount of acreage available in these areas. The first source, government maps, do not differentiate between acreage which is farmable and the acreage utilized for dams, levees, trenches, polders, creek hands,etc. Secondly, the amount cultivated each year will vary depending on how many people apply for land, how many plant,etc. Finally, the area on the New Lands is not marked on maps. According to the maps however, the Jib area consists of 805 acres; the New Expansion of 1277 acres.

    The second source for this information, informants, indicates that given the areas used for levees, etc., the amount which can be or usually is cultivated is as follows: Jib lands, 299 acres; New Expansion, 1165 acres; New Lands, 363 acres.

    On this basis, an approximation of 2000 acres for the total area is taken.

25. All the statistics which follow on age, sex, educational distributions, etc., are based on those collected in the 1969 survey as opposed to those in the 1960 census.

26. This does not include the large numbers of persons unemployed at the time. This group would generally be looking for some type of wage labour or would be students having just completed school.

27. The early history of the village, why it was founded, by whom, etc., is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

28. The population statistics for the village for each of the census years is as follows:

Census Year	Population of Bush Lot
1911	632
1921	778
1931	1081
1946	1497
1960	2685

29. The emphasis on status and prestige have been noted by Jayawardena (1963) and as such, the aspirations for white collar occupations would be in keeping with East Indian emphasis in this social sphere.

30. More precisely, of the farming population - 32.2% own tractors; 9.9% own tractor-drawn combines; and 9.3% own self-propelled combines. Of those who own machinery, the majority have complete and unshared ownership. There are 6 cases in which two persons have joined together to buy equipment; 5 cases where three persons have joined together; and 1 case in which 4 farmers are sharing machines. In all these cases, the share-holders are close kin.

31. Ideally, excess water runs off the land into the various drainage trenches in the centre of the village lands. These then feed into the sideline trenches and the middle trench such that the water is carried to the sea dam from where it empties into the sea through the Armadale koker. At the same time, irrigation water should be taken from the Abary Creek which would serve as a fresh water reservoir and the water would be carried in the high level canals throughout the cultivation area. Farmers, with the two ends of their fields meeting two trenches - a drainage and irrigation trench - are then free to let in or let out water as they choose. Thus, in the New and Jib Lands, fields are laid out running east to west in narrow strips such that every field meets two trenches. Until 1969, fields in the New Empolder area were laid out in the same way.

For several reasons however, this system does not function, First, the kokers lying under the Crown dam have fallen into disrepair on the sideline trenches. Drainage water cannot pass from this area behind the Crown dam to the front, with the result that it cannot be eliminated through the sea koker. Instead, the water in the rear of the village backs up the drainage trenches and is eliminated into the Abary Creek through such informal means as passing through creek hands or the trench that is supposed to carry irrigation water.

As well, the sideline trenches are badly silted up and do not carry water freely in any direction. Even more drainage water is thus forced into the irrigation channel.

Finally, the sea channel in Armadale silts up when the coastland is in a process of accretion due either to natural cycles or the dredging of the Berbice River which is done periodically. As a result, the

drainage water cannot pass or moves extremely slowly. Constant cleaning of the channel is thus required.

At the same time, this channel drains Armadale and the west half of Belair as well as Bush Lot. The land in the former two villages is higher than that in Bush Lot with the result that Bush Lot is the last area to drain. If the channel is silted and the water is moving slowly, Bush Lot floods.

The irrigation system also has numerous problems. First, the village has always been irrigated by gravity - there is no pumping system available to pump water from the Creek into the high level canal. This limits irrigation potential because the Creek which is supposed to serve as a fresh water reservoir is lower than the land it is supposed to irrigate. Water cannot flow freely then from the Creek into the irrigation trenches since the water level of the Creek is seldom higher than the trench. In the rainy season, the level does reach the right height for intake, and theoretically water could be taken in at this time and stored in the irrigation trenches for future use. Stagnant water however, in the Guyanese climate, is not the best for irrigation.

Secondly, at the time when the water is most needed, in the dry season, not only is the water level too low for gravity flow, but the Creek also "runs salt." That is, water from the sea backs up the river, and for a distance of about 50 miles from its mouth, the "sweet" Creek water becomes mixed with the ocean's salt water and cannot be used for irrigation. This process is the result of the slow flow of the Creek during the dry season and also because Blairmont sugar estate, about 15 miles upriver from the village, works a huge pump which takes out vast amounts of fresh water from the Creek to irrigate the cane fields.

Even if the village had its own pump then, it could not be used in the dry season. The only solution would be to pump the water from further upriver and carry it in trenches to the Bush Lot area.

Irrigation then, does not exist in the Bush Lot area. The drainage usually functions as long as the Armadale channel is kept clear and the water behind the Crown dam can flow out through what should have been the irrigation trench.

32. The New Empolder Scheme was financed by USAID and attempted to boost employment at the same time that it improved drainage and irrigation. As a result, according to the conditions of the grant, shovel-men had to be used for the digging of trenches rather than draglines. Money ran out before the scheme was completed.

According to Map 5, this scheme should have functioned as follows. Trenches were dug from east to west - from the high level canal to the eastern sideline trench, and each trench was to be used alternately for drainage and irrigation. To do this, farmers' fields were changed to run from north to south with the ends of each field touching on a drainage and irrigation trench.

In addition to the facts that the scheme failed because of incompletion and would have been of limited use due to the fact that the rest of the irrigation system does not function, the attempt has had additional ramifications.

First, the dams beside the irrigation trenches are also used for travelling with machinery from the dam running between the Jib and the New Empolder to fields situated within the area. However, to get water

into a field, farmers have to cut the dam since the trenches have been placed in between two dams. If there is to be no cutting, then the scheme requires that a box koker be built for every field at both ends - an intolerable expense. Secondly, the dams were not made wide enough for large machines - mainly the self-propelled combine which has a width of 14 feet. For a farmer to reach a field situated inside the area - since he cannot use the dam - he must cut through those fields situated in front of his own and as a result, cuts a 14 foot pathway in the other farmers' fields as he moves along.

Thirdly, the digging of so many trenches, and the building of so many dams has resulted in the loss of many acres of what could otherwise have been productive farm land.

In short, the farmers have not benefitted from the scheme. In fact, many lost their original fields as a result of the new north-south layout of fields. For those who had invested money in the old field, or feel that their new land is not as good as the old, the changeover has generated much tension and political fodder.

33. The selling of padi and rice can be handled in several ways by the farmer. Rice must be sold to the Rice Marketing Board, a government corporation, which fixes the grades of rice and the prices to be paid for all grades. Padi however, can be disposed of in several ways. First it can be sold to a rice miller who mills the rice and sells it to the Board. This method is used only by small producers who need the miller as a source of credit and who are probably caught in a cycle of indebtedness. In Bush Lot, 27.8% of the farmers sell their crop in this way.

Secondly, a farmer can mill his own rice, pay a milling fee and sell to the Board. In this method, the profits are highest but so are the dangers. For it could rain while the padi is on the drying floor and result in low-grade rice. As well, the village mills are not so technologically proficient as to provide for the highest possible grade. As a result, only 1.3% of the farmers sell through this method.

The final alternative for marketing is to sell to the Mahaicony-Abary Rice Development Scheme (Mards) - a government agency which buys padi, mills it at two modern mills in Mahaicony and Anna Regina, Essequibo, and prepares it for either export or domestic use. In the village, 57.4% of the farmers utilize this method.

The remainder of the farmers, 13.6% do not have enough padi to sell after keeping back the amount they will need for domestic use for the year.

34. Of the cattle rearers, 51.3% keep their herds in the Abary. In addition to these, are the 18.5% who keep their cattle "on another person's land" - that is, they are younger people who are using their father's Abary land to develop their own small herds, or they are members of the Kebawer Land Society - a land co-operative which leases Abary land and permits members, who do not have land elsewhere, to use the land in common. But here again, the number of cattle permitted per member is limited by the Society.

The Abary area then, provides grazing land for 84.8% of the villagers.

The remainder of the rearers keep their cattle "anywhere" - that is, they have no land and allow their cattle to wander through the village lands. Such rearers have only a few head, but because their cattle are nearby, they obtain additional income from the sale of milk. Abary

rearers do not generally sell milk since the distances between the Abary and the village is too great, and although the government has a barge on the Abary to collect and buy milk for its pasturization plant in Georgetown, the prices paid are too low to induce the Abary herders to make an organized effort in dairy farming.

35. Cattle can be sold through several means. First, they can be sold to the village butcher who kills approximately two head per week to provide meat for the Muslim and Christian communities. His absorption capacity however, is limited, and the prices paid are lower than through the other means.

Secondly, the villager can sell to a cattle dealer who pays cash and delivers the cattle to the abattoir in Georgetown and makes his profit from the difference paid by him to the rearer as compared with the price paid by the abattoir.

The difference prompts a third method of sale - that of a rearer hiring a truck and taking the cattle to Georgetown and selling directly to the abattoir.

There is thus no organized cattle industry in the sense of there being a steady supply of meat to a market through a consistent method of wholesaling. Rather, the selling of cattle depends on the needs of a particular family at any given time and the surplus of cattle they are willing to sell. This amount will vary from year to year. On the average, the following statistics are an indication:

Cattle sold per year	% of rearers
0 Heads	9.0%
1-2 "	28.4
3-4 "	31.4
5-9 "	18.0
10-15 "	9.0
16 + "	4.5

Assuming approximately $200 to $300 received per head, the additional income which a family can earn is substantial. This is of course related to the size of the herd and hence the amount that can be sold without depletion. Logically then it can also be noted that the larger the herd, the more cattle sold per year.

36. In such cases, provisions growing is usually associated with huckstering in that the women of the household will either sell their goods from house to house or in a market that is held on the middle dam of the village every Saturday morning.

37. Such persons can fish with a minimum of technical equipment since they generally catch swamp shrimp or trench fish in season.

38. There are 13 hire car owners in the village, all of whom own one car except for a person who owns three. Two-thirds drive local routes - from Bush Lot to the ferry at Rosignol - and the rest ply the Bush Lot-Georgetown route. For the former route, older cars are utilized. But as soon as an owner obtains a new car, he joins the latter route. Over 80% of the owners drive the cars themselves while two hire drivers.

Obviously more difficult to engage in given initial capital outlay is the ownership and running of trucks and buses. There are 11 truck owners, and 1 bus owner in the village. The trucks are used to transport padi, sand and lumber often for the owner's own business ventures but also as hire service. The bus runs from Georgetown to the Rosignol ferry carrying passengers and their loads.

39. More precisely, 31% of the shops are worked solely by the owner with no additional labour; 45.2% hire at least one other person; 14.3% hire two; and 9.6% hire between four and seven additional labourers.

40. Of the 14 hucksters in the village, 2 sell provisions and greens; 5 sell coconut oil; 2 sell sweets; 2 sell clothing; 1 sells newspapers; and 2 sell chickens and eggs.

Interestingly, most obtain their products from outside the village. Four manufacture the goods themselves (i.e., the clothing, chickens, provisions, sweets); one buys the goods within the village; and nine obtain their goods from outside by fetching them by bus or having them delivered by truck.

41. Such is alleged to be the case for the employment of persons by the Ministries of Education and Works/Hydraulics. It is also supposedly the case for the firm of Wong and Khan, a Georgetown construction firm partially run by a Bush Lot person which allegedly hires local labour according to national party affiliation since the firm itself is reported to be intimately tied to government contracts and the PNC Muslim movement - a situation which will be discussed later. Finally, the village authority hires casual labour for local public works and many times, has been accused of hiring persons according to factional and political affiliation.

42. The tendency toward virilocality has been noted for other overseas East Indian communities. At the same time, the break-up of these potential extended families after a few years of the children's marriage also appears to be the general trend. (cf: Speckmann, 1965; Jayawardena, 1960; Niehoff, 1960; Klass, 1961; Mayer, 1961; and Benedict, 1961.)

43. The tendency towards exogamy also characterizes East Indian in Surinam, Trinidad, Fiji and Mauritius. (cf: ibid., 41 above.)

44. Again, other East Indian communities are characterized by having marriages arranged by parents at the same time that recent changes are allowing for an increasing participation by the children in their partner selection. (cf: ibid., 41 above.)

45. The distribution of the Christian population among the various churches is as follows:

Presbyterian	7.4% of the total village population
Roman Catholic	1.8%
Lutheran	1.6%
Christian Catholic	.9%
Full Gospel	.8%
Anglican	.5%
Nazarene	.4%
Pilgrim Holiness	.1%
Not Specified	1.3%
Total:	14.8%

The large proportion of Christians associated with the Presbyterian Church, as compared with the other churches, is related to the historical role which the Presbyterian Church has played among the East Indian population both in Guyana in general and Bush Lot in particular. Also known as the Canadian Mission, it was the first church to proseletize among the Indian population during and after the indenture period. The church founded schools for East Indians and was the first agency to bring both English education and the Christian god to the Indians. More specifically, the original supervisor of Bush Lot after it was founded as an East Indian Land Development Scheme was the Head of the Canadian Mission Church in Guyana. In addition, until the late 1950's, the church financed and ran the Bush Lot Primary School.

As such, its long association with the East Indian population would account for its large number of adherents. In fact, in Guyana it is known as the "East Indian Church." Given as well the ethnic polarization within the country, the association of the other Christian denominations with the African population would tend to account for their relatively low East Indian membership.

46. The Laws of British Guiana, The Local Government Ordinance, Chapter 150, Section 28 (1).

47. Ibid., Section 86, 87.

48. A more detailed description of the constitution of the council, its powers and those of other personnel is presented in Appendix V.

49. According to the legal terminology, "rates"are paid on freehold land within the village as a form of property tax; "rents" are paid on land rented from the Local Authority. As a result of the tenure patterns, then, rates are paid on house and cultivation lots; rents are paid on rice lands.

50. The Laws of British Guiana, Section 80 (1).

51. Ibid., Section 82 (2), (3), (4).

52. Ibid., Section 71.

Chapter 3: The Framework for Analysis.

(a) Introduction.

In Chapter 1, the two emphases of the thesis were delineated to be (a) how resource change affects the internal structure of factions and (b) how resource change affects factional politics.

This emphasis on resource change implies the need for an historical perspective. In viewing Bush Lot Village from its inception in 1902 it becomes apparent that there are certain periods in its history which can be distinguished from one another. These can be characterized as being different from previous and later ones due to differences in the kinds of internal dynamics which were occurring.

In delineating these periods, there are no distinct lines of separation such as major historical events which ended or began a period. There was rather a flow of events, changes and alterations which reached a fluorescense at a certain point in time and in such a way that an observer could state that a new period was in progress in that the resources or strategies had definitely altered and a new dynamic was underway.

The issue in short, is how best to organize the empirical material in the light of the problems to which the thesis is oriented. The method chosen is to delineate "periods" or "stages," not as an end product of analysis, but as a device for the organization of data such that emphasis can be ultimately placed on the internal dynamics of each period and on the evolution of one period to the next.

The assumption is thus made that with different resources characterizing

each period, there will be different rules and therefore different political games being played. Each period represents then, a major game in Bailey's terms and the aims are to look at each game and to ascertain how one game leads logically into the next. In this light, the periods are not distinctive in and of themselves. Rather, they are a device for organizing data so that the problems outlined for investigation may be looked at.

Given this purpose, the first step in the analysis is to deal with the structure of resources and the structure of their allocation within each period. In this first step, the periods are viewed as static entities with specific and stated givens. This static perspective however, given the aim of looking at the internal dynamics and the evolution of periods, is not the aim of the thesis. Rather, the use of resource structure and allocation is another heuristic device from which will emerge the actual dynamics and fluidity of change which characterizes the on-going history of the village both within and between periods. The flow of events and gradual alterations mentioned previously will become apparent within the data chapters where it will be seen that change in structure never involved an abrupt alteration, but consisted rather of a gradual emergence and ultimate fluorescence. The dynamic will also emerge from the emphasis on the internal processes of each period and in the emphasis on attempting to ascertain how one political period or political game leads into another.

In summation, the phases are not distinctive entities, but a device for organizing empirical data. Each phase is a game and the major concern is to see how one game leads into, and becomes, the next. Therefore, although the concept of periods is utilized, the emphasis is not on the statics implied in the concept of stages, but rather, on the evolution of periods and the dynamics within each. Although written in static terms, the data chapters and the associations drawn between resource structure and the political game will

ultimately show that the history of the village is not in fact composed of discrete, independent and synchronic stages.

(b) The Nature of Resource Structure and Allocation.

The concept of **resource structure** implies (cf. Bailey, 1969) that the environment of political structures imposesconstraints on political action and at the same time, providesresources for political competition.

Also implied is the fact that resources are usually differentially allocated among a given population. This has been labelled "stratification." Resource structure for present purposes thus implies not only the resources available for competition or the resources which constrain political activity, but also the manner in which these are allocated within the community. One of the main dimensions of resource structure is thus the stratification pattern exhibited by the village at any given time.

In theoretical terms it has been noted that village communities, despite ideologies of equality, are in fact characterized by various patterns of stratification. One such pattern occurs wherein the control of resources within the community is in the hands of one or a few families (Whitten, 1965). An extreme example of this emphasis on kinship are the "cacique" kin groups of Mexico (Friedrich, 1965; Goldkind, 1966).

Another method of dealing with stratification has been to utilize Weber's three dimensions wherein persons can be differentiated by class (economic criteria); status (prestige criteria); and party (political criteria) (cf. Goldkind, 1965; Goldberg, 1966). This method does not however, preclude the possibility of analyzing kin group access to resources in terms of these dimensions as well (Whitten, 1965).

Finally, stratification can be viewed from an economic perspective such that it refers to "status differences based on economic differences . . . by which adult members of a society enjoy differential rights of access to

resources" (Fried, 1967: 52).

No matter which perspective is taken, Bush Lot Village, as far back as can be traced, has been a stratified community. The various dimensions of stratification (kinship, economic, political, prestige) which have always implied differential access to resources and the extent to which these have been more or less generalized among the population at different times, are what provide the axes of variation within the general notion of stratification or differential access. The general nature of the patterning at any particular time is also intimately related to the games and factional structures which have existed within the village.

In summary then, the concept of structure in relation to resources implies three associated features: the nature of resources available for competition; the constraints imposed by these resources on political action; and the nature of stratification or differential allocation of these resources which in turn affect political competition. Each stage or period in village history then, will first be analyzed and described in terms of the resource structure of that period.

(c) The Major Historical Periods.

The village history has been divided into the following periods with each labelled according to the variation in resource structure and/or the internal structure of factions and the political game:

1. The Era of Familial Elitism;
2. The Period of Displacement;
3. The Period of Political Peace;
4. The Era of Class Elitism; and
5. The Period of Incorporation.

The question which arises is what is the nature of resource structure in

each of these periods?

1. The Era of Familial Elitism, 1930-1942.

As will appear in the more extensive descriptions of the period, this stage was characterized by having a crucial resource, credit facilities through the ownership of rice mills, controlled by two families within the village. Thus there existed a limited elite group with ascribed membership that necessarily implied control of the village by a small oligarchy. Consequently there occurred a major division between the elite and mass of villagers, all of whom were indebted to the rice millers with whom each individual had a transactional or patron-client relationship. This situation in turn, was made possible by the subsistence conditions of the economy which required credit sources for the masses to survive.

The basic structure then, of small scale cultivation and the need for credit facilities enabled two families to consolidate an elitist position such that all the dimensions of stratification mentioned above, coupled with the fact that access to surplus resources was limited to the very few, were the definitive structural characteristics of the period. The elite families were differentiated by economic class, political power, prestige criteria and by definition, kinship ascription.

2. The Period of Displacement, 1943-1947.

This period resulted as a culmination of several major changes which occurred in the resource structure and allocation of the village. It should be noted further that these changes had their initial appearance during the latter years of the previous stage.

The changes in structure involved first, an alteration in the economic base of the village. These alterations consisted of a diversification in cultivation from the basic monocrop pattern and also, new methods of marketing produce. These events undercut the credit monopoly enjoyed by the millers,

and over a period of time, gradually released the majority of villagers from their situation of indebtedness.

Secondly, in the political field, changes in suffrage requirements and the political status of the village meant that villagers were now a political force whose support had to be won at the polls.

What these factors further implied when looked at in terms of their interconnectedness, was the fact that the stratification pattern had become less polarized with the emergence of the unindebted villager who could make choices about his relationship with the millers. A type of middle class, lying between the elite and the indebted mass thus emerged although elitist affiliation criteria still remained intact. Despite this however, when the emergence of a middle class became associated with electoral rights, the way was open for a challenge to the economic, political and prestige control of the people by the elite. How this occurred becomes the basis for the discussion of the nature of the political competition during the period. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the structure of resources had changed; the manner in which surplus was allocated had also altered; and finally, specific political alterations combined in such a way that one can state that the resource structure of the community was different than it had been during the previous period.

3. The Period of Political Peace, 1948-1952.

The political competition which took place during the previous period led to major changes in the allocation of power within the community. The result of these changes permitted a period in Bush Lot history which was unprecedented in terms of the amount and extent of economic expansion which took place. The sugar industry, and hence wage labour opportunities increased and stabilized such that wage labour was available to all who wanted it; acreage available for agriculture expanded both within the village and in surrounding

areas; secondary crop production was also increased; a large scale cattle industry developed; and lastly, new means of production were introduced which partially enabled the extent of the expansion mentioned above. These included mechanization, the introduction of the cooperative movement; and a renewed emphasis on joint economic ventures by extended family groups.

Under such conditions, the major characteristic of which was an abundance of resources, the politics again reflected the structure of resources and particularly, the ongoing exploitation of this physical base by the majority of the village population.

4. The Era of Class Elitism, 1953-1966.

The previous period of expansion had major ramifications on both the structure and allocation of resources; first, an end was reached in the extent to which the above expansion could occur in so dynamic a manner; secondly, families had been differentially successful in the expansion. An entirely new stratification pattern thus emerged. The membership criteria of the small elite group had extended to include, aside from those with ascribed ties, those persons who had been especially successful in the expansion and who, on economic grounds, became the new elite of the village. Those who had been moderately successful became the middle class; while those whose success or failure depended on external factors such as continued expansion of the sugar industry and hence wage employment, were caught in a general economic recession which occurred in the village. As a result of this recession, land became a scarce commodity and conflicts of interest invariably came to occur over patterns of land use. What this implied was that as well as an extension of the vertical divisions within the village (that is, stratification divisions), there was also occurring as a result of the expansion, horizontal divisions due to occupational multiplicity; diversification in the bases of production; and divisions of the population into crosscutting interest groups.

As will be seen, the effects of the previous period of expansion and the resultant structure of resources during the following, were crucial in the political sphere.

5. The Period of Incorporation, 1967-1970.

The closure of access to resources in the previous period and the fragmentation of the population into vertical and horizontal segments also coincided in the final period with the introduction of national political competitions into local level arenas. New sources of patronage opened up; new avenues of mobility were available; and a new variable was introduced into the segmenting nature of the village. Although the economic base remained intact, the introduction of party competitions was a major new resource for the village. As such, it had major effects on local politics and on the potentialities for change in resource structure and allocation in the future.

(d) The Framework for Analysis.

It was stated at the end of section (b) that on the assumption that the history of the village could be divided into periods or stages for heuristic purposes, the first step in the analysis was to describe the resource structure and allocation of each period. The major historical periods were then delineated and the characteristics outlined in capsule form. The structure of analysis will follow logically from this first step.

Each period which forms its own chapter in Section II of the thesis will deal in detail with this resource structure. This will be followed by a description of the local politics or what can be termed the arenas of competition which characterized each period. The goals of competition are outlined; situations and strategies are described; and social networks utilized wherever possible to bring into relief the nature of the dynamics which were occurring and the structures of the period.

The final section of each chapter analyzes the structure of factions: that is, the rules which define eligibility for competition, the composition of the competing teams, and how the intrafactional structures of the period are related to the typology presented in Chapter 1. Secondly, the interfactional sphere will be analyzed in terms of the rules governing the competition and the control mechanisms embedded in the competition. At the base of both the description and analysis of the intrafactional and interfactional spheres, will be the view of the resource structure as providing resources for and constraints on the competition.

What is being done in short, in concluding sections, is the analysis of the dynamics of factional games and organization within periods given specific constellations of resources.

The final section of the dissertation, Section III, will deal first with a comparative analysis of factions and factionalism as a product of the analysis within each period. Secondly, the nature of resource structure will be related to the variations which have occurred. Finally, Section III will deal explicitly with the larger dynamic which was implicit in the data chapters, that is, the evolution of periods and the concomitant effect of and on the internal organization of factions and the nature of factional competition. The logic in this latter analysis is as follows: Given a particular resource structure and concomitant factional system, the political competition and the results of the resource structure together with external influences, will result in a new resource structure and a new factional political system. How period X becomes period Y given previous resources and competition as well as new resources or influences, is the aim of analysis in the concluding section.

SECTION II: The Historical Dimensions of Factional Competition.

Chapter 4: The Nature of the Bush Lot Environment Before 1930.

(a) The Formative Years.

(i) The Founding of the Village.

After the emancipation of the African slaves, the plantation interests demanded a labour supply for the sugar estates since the African population had deserted the plantations in favour of setting up free villages.[1] An Ordinance in 1843 responded to these demands by introducing state controlled immigration of indentured labourers. From that time, until 1917, East Indians were brought into Guyana to service the plantocracy.

The terms of indenture required each person to serve a five year period after which time he could re-indenture himself. After a period of indenture for five years and continuous residence in the country for ten, every immigrant was entitled to a return passage to India. In 1894, however, a committee was appointed by the Governor to consider the possibility of allocating grants of land to the Indians in lieu of back passages and to select land on which they could settle.[2]

The reasons for this policy related to the facts that the government had by then incurred a large liability in relation to the return passages and was eager to avoid payment; the fact remained that the plantations still required a labour force even if it were a free one and that the Indians could be induced to work on the estates;[3] and thirdly, the Indians were themselves interested in land and the government felt that their offer would be accepted by the large majority.[4]

Bush Lot as a village owes its existence directly to this government

policy. For in 1896 the government gave Plantation Helena to the Return Passages Committee which divided and allocated the land.[5] From the large number of applications received the government decided to continue the policy[6] and, by 1897, after Helena was completely taken up, Plantation Whim on the Corentyne Coast was surveyed for the same purpose.[7] Finally, in 1898, Plantation Bush Lot was turned over to the Return Passages Committee and the work of surveying and drainage begun.[8] Allotments were commenced in July, 1900.[9]

All the plantations converted to East Indian Settlements were located near sugar estates such that the planters would have a labour force settled nearby, and the settlers able to utilize the wage labour to augment their farming income.

The government of the village was vested directly in the hands of a Superintendent responsible to the Immigration Agent General and with powers to act as a local authority.[10] His duties were to visit the settlements, inspect the drainage, water supply, etc., and to force the immigrants "to co-operate" with each other "in matters requiring combination on their part for the welfare of the settlement."[11] In addition, taxation was imposed for the upkeep of the village since "it had been proved that the settlers will not co-operate and themselves do the public work of their settlement."[12]

By 1905, however, the Settlements had been brought into the mainstream of local administration by being declared Country Districts.[13] By 1907, they had councils exercising the power of the local authority.

(ii) <u>The Founding Population</u>.

All the original settlers who came to Bush Lot had come from various areas throughout Guyana. There was no "indigenous population" on the plantation.[14]

From immigration records, however, it is possible to deal with some of the social characteristics of the settlers. First, the number of persons who received allocation was 1275 including children under the age of ten who were given half an allotment. Of these persons, however, it is not possible to ascertain how many actually settled in the area. The census of 1911 indicates the presence of only 623 residents including those children who were born in the village after settlement took place. Ignoring this for the moment, however, one can approximate that the proportion of settlers as compared with allottees was 49.6%.

Part of the explanation for the large proportion of persons who did not take up land is that many of the allottees were labourers on Bath Estate who may have planted their Bush Lot land but did not take up residence. They either could not afford the move, or found the former arrangement more convenient.

A second aspect of the original population was its historical and cultural diversity. By tracing through indenture numbers allocated to the immigrants, it is possible to obtain background information on age, sex, caste, area of origin in India, plantation where the indenture period was served, and the ships on which immigrants arrived. These statistics are presented in Appendix VII although they are based on the total allottees for whom such information could be traced regardless of whether they ever settled in the area, since this latter information has been impossible to ascertain.

From these statistics, what is immediately apparent is the great diversity according to the above variables. The settlers came to Guyana on a large number of different ships thereby precluding the possibility for the growth of fictive kinship ties noted in other studies.[15] Caste groups also exhibit much diversity, although such groups were probably mutated in function and importance long before settlement in Bush Lot ever took place.[16] The districts

of origin in India also varied, as did the plantations on which the indenture period was served or from which the native born population came.

In short, assuming that the available sample is to some extent random according to those persons whose histories could be traced, and according to the actual persons who settled in the area, it can be hypothesized that the original Bush Lot population was characterized by an absence of pre-existing social ties such that the organization of persons in this initial period was relatively atomistic in nature and probably lacking interpersonal cohesion of any type.

(iii) Origins of the Economic Base.

The original settlers founded the economic base by planting rice in the cultivation lots to the rear of the houselot area. The technology originally consisted of a digging stick but within a few years was replaced by oxen for ploughing. Planting, however, was done by the women since the men were engaged in wage labour at Bath estate. They left home for two weeks at a time and returned to the village every third week. The concept then, of dual or multiple occupations for the family group was embedded in the social organization of the village from its inception.

In addition, the concept of rice as a cash crop, rather than an emphasis on subsistence agriculture, also characterized the village from the beginning. Yields during the early years were twenty to forty bags of padi per acre with the average family planting one to three acres. A surplus was thus available for sale either to rice merchants buying for large Georgetown companies on a commission basis or to rice millers who bought and milled the padi making profit on the sale of rice. After 1905, this latter alternative was available since a rice miller had set up business in the village. Villagers, however, preferred at this time to sell padi to the merchants since the competition

between them resulted in slight increases in the prices for which the padi was bought. At the same time, the rice miller dealt only in cash, not credit, with the result that there was no additional incentive to sell to the mill.

This, however, raises the point that there were several major problems facing villagers during this period. One of these was the lack of available capital for investment given the fact that the rice merchants had no capital to lend and did not advance credit since their commission was paid on the goods delivered. The original rice miller also did not engage in extending credit facilities. The only alternative available to villagers was the money-lender whose interest rates might be as high as eight cents per week for every dollar borrowed, or 416% per annum.[17]

Other problems were the facts that the growth of fruit trees and provisions were hampered by theft[18] and destruction by wandering cattle since no provision had been made for planned pasturage in the village. Although the front and backlands were used for grazing,[19] no fenced area separated the cattle from the cultivation areas.

Drainage and irrigation were also major problems. As the colonial government contemplated the high cost of water control, the Bush Lot settlers were flooded out every few rainy seasons, and every dry season, stood in long queues for pails of drinking water supplied by the nearby sugar estates. In 1904 a major scheme for irrigation by pumping was abandoned by Governor Sweetenham on the grounds that any works beyond irrigation by gravitation would be "unremunerative. . . . It is not until all the land which can be planted has been fully appropriated and utilized for rice, that it becomes expedient to encourage such an outlay and considerable works. Such outlay is only justified when there is a large unemployed population able and anxious to grow more rice."[20]

The governor's conclusion that irrigation be used to increase production

once the maximum unirrigated level had been reached, ignored two basic problems. First, it ignored the problem that settlers would only come and remain if rice production could be rationalized. Increased settlement and cultivation would have been a result of irrigation. It could never have been a pre-condition for it given the uncertainty of returns without irrigation. Secondly, the conclusion ignored the fact an irrigation scheme might have incuded farmers to become full-time cultivators since they would have had two certain crops a year. Without this certainty, the villagers retained their dual occupational pattern as a cushion against crop failure and low returns. In any case, however, the sugar estates needed labour, and the East Indians were supposed to provide it.

In addition, the amount of land allocated to each settler was insufficient for him to become a full-time cultivator. With the advent of oxen, a family could plant fifteen acres. The scheme allotted to him, however, a maximum of three to four acres if one includes the amount given to his wife and possibly children. This amount enabled him, during years of proper climate, to feed the family for a year and sell the surplus for cash. In a bad year of drought or flooding, however, an entire crop could be wiped out. But there was seldom enough surplus to support a family for two years, buy seed padi, pay for ploughing and plant the next crop. As a result, there was a further incentive toward the maintenance of multi-occupations; there was a need for credit facilities such that anyone who could or would advance credit or cash had a clientele that could potentially become involved in a cycle of indebtedness; and finally, the value of land was increased and the demand for it continuous. In a village such as Bush Lot, with vast empty tracts, land became a scarce commodity. This latter fact was related to the problem of the need for capital to open new land since empoldering, the building of levees, and the digging of trenches was required to put the land in order. The possibility of

such capital investment was beyond the means of the average settler, who, as a result, had to depend on the few acres which had been originally allocated to him.

Within the economic sphere then, a circuitous process was in operation. Crop uncertainty and failure limited individual capital accumulation which in turn prevented farmers from expanding their acreage and introducing irrigation since the government refused to do this. At the same time, the lack of adequate water control created crop insecurity, limited acreage, individual indebtedness and the need for dual occupations which in turn prevented settlers from putting all their labour and capital potential in cultivation which again limited returns.

(iv) The Initial Political Structure.

Until 1905, as has been mentioned previously, the village was governed by a Superintendent after which the village was granted the status of a country district which, after 1907, entitled it to a council consisting of "not less than three members appointed by the Local Government Board"[21] which could add to or diminish the number of members. In Bush Lot, seven authority members were appointed to the first council in 1907. A major point to be noted here is that since the Board was appointing members they could only appoint persons with whom they were familiar, that is, persons who were part of well-known families within the village. In addition, the literacy rate in English was exceptionally low. The colonial administration used that language. As a result, only those who were literate in English were able to exercise any of the prerogatives of power associated with the council.

(v) The Formation of Basic Alliances.

It has been mentioned that the majority of villagers appeared to have no interpersonal pre-existing ties that could provide a focal point for unity or

alliance within the village. Within the first few years of the settlement, however, certain patterns can be discerned.

First, it has been noted that a rice miller had moved into the village by 1905. This miller took as a consensual and second wife, a woman named Rajpati who was the sister of a man named Manraj Maraj who was appointed to the first Bush Lot Village Council in 1907. The Maraj family had been converted to Christianity and, as a result, had received an English education at the Canadian Mission School in Bath Estate from where the family had come in 1905. Also on the council at the same time was the Reverend Cropper, who had been the Superintendent of the East Indian Settlements and also the Head of the Canadian Mission Church in the country. A major alliance had been formed - an alliance that crosscut the economic, political and social spheres.

(b) The Consolidation of the Initial Resource Structure.

(i) Introduction.

In the two decades which followed the laying down of the basic environmental structure of the village, all changes which occurred had the net effect of consolidating the preliminary alliances noted above and resulted in the formation of a local elite group which was to control the factional political system until the early 1940's. The questions are then: what changes in the resource structure enabled the consolidation of the elite; and how could the elite place themselves in a position such that they could control the political system of the village?

It has been noted that rice cultivation had been established as the basis for the village economy but that this cultivation was subject to the vagaries of climate and rainfall, limited capital accumulation, and a static acreage. As well, land hunger coupled with the acceptance that rice cultivation as it was practiced by 1907 was not in itself a viable means of livelihood meant that

families either had to expand the bases of their production or find a complementary means of livelihood. At the same time, the technological levels had reached the limits of their potential and this fact, together with the potential for indebtedness to a credit source, all added to the cyclical pattern which was beginning to characterize the economic situation. Within the political field, the method of local government was such that it favoured a select few, i.e., the English literates, the Christians and the well-known families, with the result that a powerful political resource, the council, was placed within their grasp. Finally, a minor alliance had been reached which crosscut the other fields and as such, had immense potential.

The question is: With this basis, what occurred which resulted in the consolidation of the early resource structure and allocation, such that an elite could emerge?

(ii) The Economic Base.

a. Introduction.

Continuing vagaries in rice production, the expansion of rice acreage, technological innovations, the failure of a major irrigation scheme and new sources of credit were responsible for the consolidation of the early tendencies. Although several of these may seem to be contradictory, the manner in which they meshed within the village economy and the process of their interaction, is what became crucial, rather than each factor in and of itself.

b. Rice Production.

During the period of Bush Lot history under discussion, the cultivation of rice continued to be an unstable basis for any long or short term planning for the individual. The only constant was its fluctuating returns from year to year. Between 1907 and 1909, the acreage planted and the crop reaped was on upward swing throughout the country, with efforts being most successful in

areas with a good water supply and efficient means of water control.[22] The following year, drought lowered the return per acre; prices went down 25% below the market rate of previous years; and acreage in the country was reduced by 20%.[23] In 1910, there was another low-yielding crop in Berbice due to late planting and insecure water supply.[24] For the next two years, drought again affected the returns[25] and in 1913 as well, particularly in those areas dependent on rainfall.[26]

Between 1914 and 1918, however, there was a boom in rice[27] due to the increased export market offered by French and Dutch Guiana as well as the other West Indian islands, all of whom had been forced by the war to use more rice for subsistence and to inflate the price of or limit the supply of other imported foodstuffs.[28] In the last year of the war, however, there was again a crop failure in Berbice[29] followed by two good years, only to have, in 1921 the reaping of a potentially bumper crop halted by heavy rainfall which caused the flooding of fields.[30] By 1922, there was a depression in the rice industry caused by the previous year's losses, the low prices being paid for padi and the uncertainty of the market, particularly in relation to the prices and security which had existed during the war years, and due to the high rates being charged for rice land by small proprietors.[31]

In short, what becomes obvious are the fluctuations in returns from one year to the next due to climate; rainfall, which could result in drought or flooding; a poor water supply which precluded the possibility of irrigation when necessary; and poor farming practices such as late planting, the use of impure seed padi[32] and the impossibility of recouping losses in any given year since the poor water control enabled only one crop per year.

At the same time, there also appeared in the records what can be termed an inverse relationship between the success of the rice crop in any given year and the demand for wage labour on the sugar estates. For example, in 1911,

"villagers were still dependent on the estates for supplementary earnings"[33] and two years later, in 1913, "there was a cutback in labour on the estates. In East Berbice villagers came to the Immigration Agent General's office and complained that there was no work available on the estates and that the crop had failed because of lack of rainfall. Similar complaints were echoed in West Coast Berbice where the estates would not supply labour to non-residents [villagers] except during the crop season."[34] Finally, there also occurred situations whereby "by 1917, although wage rates were increasing, there was shortage of labour on the estates. These had lost one quarter of their labourers due to the succession of good rice crops, the high prices paid for rice, and the entry of East Indians into other occupations - all of which distracted potential workers from the estates."[35]

Within the economic sphere then, rice cultivation remained problematic in terms of the expected returns and wage labour became a necessary supplement which was viewed as part of a family's income in years when crop returns were low. Dual occupations were thus reinforced; rice cultivation received primary concern particularly in the light of the high returns which were found to be possible during World War I; and the economic strategies of families appeared to be the balancing off of their two options in such a way that maximum returns could be realized.

c. Technological Innovations.

Between the Abary Creek and Blairmont Estate there were 30,000 acres of Crown land which the colonial government, in 1908, felt could be irrigated and profitably farmed. Of this acreage, 9,000 were leased to the proprietors of Plantation Bath, and 5,000 were bought by an American company, known as the Abary Company, which was also given an option on an additional 8,200 acres.[36] By 1910, the company's cultivation of rice on a large scale was declared

successful.[37]

For the Bush Lot villagers, there were four major results emanating from the establishment and success of the Abary Company. First, the company empoldered their land grant which was situated to the southwest of the village. Prior to this, the villagers had been able to obtain a water supply for their rice crop from the large amounts of rain water which collected on the Crown lands during the rainy seasons and which was diverted into the Bush Lot fields when needed. With the empoldering, however, the village was left without this reserve. After 1909 then, the problem of drainage and irrigation became even more acute than it had been in the past.

Secondly, the Company established the feasibility of large scale rice production and the potential profits which could accrue to such an enterprise. The Bush Lot villagers, who were at the time locked into their small holdings, received actual proof that the bases of production could be profitably expanded.

Thirdly, according to one informant "the Abary Company revolutionized rice production in the area because of the technology which they introduced." As has been mentioned, the original method of cultivation in the village had been the digging stick with which a hole was made in the hard ground and a blade of rice inserted. The crop was reaped by hand and a bull mash used to separate the grain from the husk. This method was followed by the introduction of oxen pulling a wood plough. The grain was still hand planted one seedling at a time, however, and reaping was still done by hand and bull mash. With these methods, one man could plant a maximum of three beds or two and one half acres.

The Abary Company introduced four major innovations: (1) They brought in steel ploughs which provided greater speed and efficiency as compared with the wood plough since there was less breakage and hard ground was more easily turned

and made softer by the steel plough. (2) They introduced an intermediate step between ploughing and planting, that of harrowing the ground with a steel harrow which could be pulled by oxen. This intermediate step softened the ground even further and provided more turnover of earth. (3) This latter innovation in turn, allowed for the notion of broadcasting the seed padi by hand as opposed to the planting of seedlings. This method, called "shying," enabled the farmer to plant perhaps ten times as much acreage in that the seed was thrown onto the harrowed ground as opposed to the laborious and time consuming task of having to plant each seedling separately. This method was only possible when coupled with the introduction of harrowing in that the latter process softened the ground sufficiently to allow the broadcasted seed to sink deep enough into the ground to take root. (4) The Company built a rice mill on their land grant. As an economic alternative, the use of this mill became a reality when the company left the country at the beginning of World War I and sold the mill to Easter Jaikarran, a resident of Plantation Armadale and a local moneylender who set up the mill in Bush Lot and sold it to a villager.[38]

The expansion of the village economy to include the Abary Company thus had the effects of introducing the concept of the feasibility of large scale rice production and as well, of introducing the technology which made such production potentially possible for the average village cultivator. New dimensions had thereby been introduced into farming which were to provide the incentive and the desire to expand acreage. This incentive was to be realized when in fact, in 1919, the potential for expansion was made possible.

d. The Expansion of Acreage.

The Crown Land Regulations of 1919 were based on a report of a Land Committee in 1917. This Committee had concluded that "good cause had been shown for the reviving of the old policy of making grants" to small cultivators

as opposed to the former leasehold system.[39] The conditions by which persons could obtain a land grant, or lease if they preferred, were well within the means of the majority of Bush Lot villagers.[40]

At the same time, land became available to village residents which allowed the use of the conditions of the new Ordinance. These were lands which had been recently surveyed on the left bank of the Abary Creek.

With the survey and the Ordinance, there began in 1920, a large scale movement of villagers to the Abary for the purposes of rice cultivation. Some families, however, chose not to make the move. The strategy chosen by each family took into account several features associated with the general economic situation at the time.

First, the distance between the village proper and the nearest point on the left bank required a seven mile trek and the crossing of a river. The lack of motorized transport at the time, and the fact that the dams leading to the Abary became mud heaps in the rainy season, were conditions which mitigated against the move.

Secondly, the problems associated with the development of the land in that area were immense. The land had less drainage facilities than did the village proper and irrigation was non-existent. These problems were compounded by the low level of the land in general and the resultant flooding which took place every rainy season. Crops could potentially be destroyed and cattle drowned. To prevent this, large amounts of capital were needed to dig at least a minimum number of drainage trenches and to build "high places" for the cattle to retreat to when the flooding began. Finally, given the distance between the village and the Creek, an investment had to be made for housing the family since the journey could not be made daily.

In short, there were very obvious debilitating features to taking up the land in the Abary. At the same time, this was countered by other options

available in the economic structure. A family could maintain its previous pattern of combining small scale cultivation with estate labour. This option was made even more attractive by the fact that a proposed irrigation scheme to be discussed below, was in the offing which resulted in the opening up of the New and Jib Lands, thereby expanding the average acreage per family within walking distance from the village such that the pattern of cultivation coupled with wage labour would not be grossly affected.

Given these options, some Bush Lot families chose to move to the Abary thus establishing dual residence in that they lived in the Abary area during the rice seasons and returned to the village proper in between. Other families remained in the village and continued the pattern of dual occupations, i.e., small scale agriculture and estate labour.

e. The New Irrigation Scheme.

In 1910, Ordinance No. 10 was passed by the Court of Policy which enabled the proprietors of any land area to petition the Governor-in-Council to have the area declared a "polder" such that a drainage and irrigation scheme would be considered for the area.[41]

After much discussion with neighbouring villages for a combined scheme, the Bush Lot proprietors petitioned for a modified scheme for the Bush Lot area alone.[42] The plans called for the improving of the drainage by deepening the outlet channel and for the irrigation of the land which lay between the railway[43] and the backdam. The scheme was expected to irrigate 777 acres, that is, the land up to the end of the second depth.[44] A pumping station was to be installed at the Abary Creek with channels dug for the irrigation water.[45]

In March 1915, the Combined Court recommended to the Governor that a loan be made to the authority for $15,000 to carry out the works with repayment being made over a period of twenty-five years.[46]

Due to the war, however, the government could not make the loan with the result that work was delayed until a private member of the Court of Policy advanced the money. Work on the scheme thus began in 1916. At the time, it was expected that the Bush Lot proprietors would offer their labour at a low price. But good weather and good rice crops resulted in indifference and the government had to obtain labour at a wage higher than the estimated cost. Also, owing to the war, the price of the pump and engine had increased as had the cost of most of the materials for sluices, fences, bridges, etc. More money was advanced by government.

In 1917, the irrigation engineer decided to incorporate the Jib Land into the irrigation scheme and the money was again advanced for this purpose by the Combined Court.[47]

The scheme was considered to be completed on December 31st, 1918. It had cost $28,190, but because some of the works were improperly carried out and some done that were unnecessary, the Director of Public Works decided that the village would only be responsible for repaying $20,468. By resolution No. 40 of 1919, it was further decided that the payments be spread out over a fifty year period.

The Varey Scheme as it came to be called, however, never worked properly and payments were seldom made. The problems were twofold. First, the cost of pumping was found to be too high for the village to accommodate. Secondly, the pump had been erected in an unsuitable place. It had been located between two "creek hands" which means that whenever pumping was started it caused vibrations to the dam which was made of pegass soil. As a result, the pumped water seeped back through the pegass dam both because of the vibrations and because of the porous quality of the soil which made up both the dam and the sides of the creek hands.

As a result, the pumping station was abandoned. The village authority

could never pay to recondition the works and the village was removed from the declared drainage and irrigation areas and again, after a few years, reverted wholly to dependence on rainfall and gravitation.

The effects of the scheme were thus far less reaching than had been anticipated. Its major results were the opening of over one thousand acres for rice cultivation, although this area still depended on rainfall, and the deepening of the outlet channels thereby facilitating drainage in the village. The former effect, of course, was what kept many villagers exercising the option of dual occupations discussed in the previous section.

(iii) The Entrance of New Personnel.

The entrance of new actors into Bush Lot was another factor which allowed for elite consolidation.

The first of these persons was Jacob Panchar from Ogle on the East Coast of Demerara. Panchar was a Presbyterian and what seems to have occurred was that the Reverend Cropper arranged a marriage between the daughter of Manraj Maraj, Shirley, and Panchar. His business acumen was readily apparent in that he had been a successful rum shop owner at Ogle. These ties were further solidified when, in 1923, Panchar's brother was married to Etwaria Maraj, a first cousin to Shirley.

With Jacob Panchar's entrance, a major economic resource was introduced in that Panchar took over and was to successfully operate one of the two rice mills in the village. As has been noted previously, the Abary Company had sold the mill to Easter Jaikarran who had it removed to Section D of Bush Lot. The mill was bought by a villager named Premmiranjan in 1915, although Jaikarran still held the mortgage. Premmiranjan, however, was illiterate in English and spent much of his time outside the village in other employment. These factors prevented him from successfully running the mill. At the same

time, he became indebted to Jaikarran who then proceeded to foreclose on the mortgage. Jacob Panchar then bought the mill. It is open to speculation as to whether the foreclosure was based on purely economic grounds, for Jaikarran was related to the Maraj family (Cf. Appendix IX) which possibly used this relationship to set Panchar up in a lucrative business.

The second person to enter the village, A. B. Ramprashad, arrived in West Berbice in 1919 and settled in Hopetown. The following year, the Georgetown firm of Sandbach Parker appointed him as a buying agent for padi on the East and West coasts of Berbice with payment by commission. The system required the company to advance money to Ramprashad to buy padi from farmers. Ramprashad, who had ten sub-agents soliciting customers, paid the farmers from the advance and dispatched the padi to the company in Georgetown via ship, train, or truck and collected his commission.

At the same time, however, the company had other interests in Bush Lot. The miller of the first rice mill had borrowed money from the company to pay expenses and had not been able to repay before he died intestate. His wife, living in Mahaica, could not carry on the business because of the heavy debts, nor would the company extend any more loans. Sandbach Parker took over the mill and made Ramprashad the manager. A few years later he bought the mill from the company and continued to be a buying agent. Then the Bookers Company also offered him the position of agent. By the early twenties then, Ramprashad was a mill owner and a padi agent for two major Guyanese companies. His other economic interests included one hundred and twenty houselots which he had taken over as part of the assets of the mill, and an Abary ranch of six square miles which he leased from government on which he raised pigs and cattle.

The fact that Ramprashad remained a representative for the companies was a crux of another of his economic activities, moneylending. The cash advanced by the companies for buying padi provided him with the necessary money in that

a new arrangement with the companies had come into effect. Under this new arrangement, Ramprashad was no longer merely an agent. Instead, by 1925, the following system was in operation. Before the reaping season in October, the companies and Ramprashad agreed upon the price which would be paid for padi and the amount of padi which each company wished to buy. The necessary cash was placed in Ramprashad's account which he used to pay the labourers and farmers. Under this arrangement, Ramprashad received no commission but instead, all the profits which the companies made in reselling the rice were divided fifty-fifty. Any loss incurred if the rice were resold at prices lower than estimated, was borne wholly by the companies. With this system, Ramprashad received an income from two sources - from the resale of rice and from any amount of money left in his account which had not been used to pay farmers for padi. It was to his benefit on two accounts then, to keep the prices for which he bought the padi as low as possible. And the extra cash which he now had as a result of his dealings with the companies, enabled him to enter the lucrative moneylending profession.

Two other persons also entered the village during this consolidation period. Although their effect on the political processes of the village was not to be felt for some time, their initial alliances should be noted.

First, Peter Premsingh arrived in 1925. Then in 1926, Dagleish came to Bush Lot because of his marriage to Premniranjan's daughter. Premsingh, in the first few years in Bush Lot, formed a cricket club and Ramprashad became the manager. Dagleish, whose wife's family had been economically hard hit by the Jaikarran mill foreclosure so that the Maraj-Panchar family could have an economic base in the village, became close friends with Premsingh.

(iv) The Effect of New Personnel on the Economic Base.

The major effect of the new actors on the economy was in the area of credit facilities. The ability of these specific personnel to control this service in such a way that large monetary profits were made together with actual control over villagers, was what created a local elite group within the village.

The empoldering of the Abary Company's land grant exacerbated the water control situation for the Bush Lot cultivator. At the same time, the irrigation scheme failed although it had opened up new land for rice as had the Land Ordinances and the surveying of the Abary area. In a village committed to rice production, the new lands were taken up and cultivated with a technology which enabled large scale production. This kind of production required, however, capital with which to develop the land and credit facilities both for this purpose and to tide farmers over the years in which crops were lost. The latter was a very real possibility given the water control problem. The cyclical process mentioned previously remained intact therefore, despite changes in the economic structure.

When this cyclical process came into contact with the services provided by the new millers, the latter were in the position to control the crucial nexus of the cycle, i.e., the need for capital and credit.

A. B. Ramprashad thus entered the moneylending profession in his capacity as rice miller. The Panchar milling family, whose livelihood depended on undercutting the clientele of the Ramprashad mill, also began to extend credit facilities and make loans.

In their capacity as credit agents, however, both millers found themselves in competition with Easter Jaikarran and the Co-Operative Credit Banks which had been established by government in 1914 in an attempt to undercut the exorbitant interest rates of the moneylenders on the grounds that these rates

were interfering with the development of the rice industry.[48]

The Jaikarran hegemony was undercut by the millers through the lowering of the interest rate to 12% per annum. This was possible, for the millers were able to supply other services which also brought in an income, notably, the milling of rice, their own cultivation, etc.

The Credit Banks were more difficult to undercut, but this too was accomplished, for the Banks' liabilities were limited to the amount of share capital. They could thus only make loans to members and only when adequate security was put up by the borrower. The interest rate was set at 12%.[49]

Table VIII.1 in Appendix VIII lists the amount of share capital between the years a particular bank was formed in West Berbice and 1926. Figures are not available for the extent to which Bush Lot persons availed themselves of the credit opportunities at the Banks. The table shows, however, that the amount of share capital reaches a stabilization point after 1921, particularly in Hopetown which was the bank closest to Bush Lot. Although this would indicate that the membership was remaining constant, a fact also borne out by Table VIII.2, it is also an indication that the members themselves were not investing additional capital into the banks. In short, after an initial growth of share capital and membership in the early years between 1916 and 1920, the banks reached a plateau. This was due to the difficulties which the banks themselves were experiencing. By 1921, "the banks had restricted their business and were merely trying to collect outstanding loans."[50] A crop loss in 1921, due to rain, apparently hindered this collection and the banks had to apply to the government through the Banks Committee for a loan from public funds in order to assist farmers in harvesting, storing and milling.[51]

By 1922, the banks were in trouble. Business was stagnant because of poor crops and low prices which in turn resulted in the poor collection of outstanding loans.[52] These facts are reflected in the amount of money which

was loaned out during these latter years as presented in Table VIII.3. The amounts are, of course, minimal given the credit needs which at the very least had remained constant.

What appears to be happening then, is that the credit facilities of the banks were subject to the same vagaries that required people to turn to the banks for loans in the first place. One can question then, whether the banks provided a viable alternative to the rice millers from that point of view. For the banks could give loans in the "good years" when people were repaying debts. In the "bad years," the banks did not have enough excess capital to accommodate demands for credit.

In addition, the terms for borrowing from the banks required that the borrower be a member by investing share capital and as well, that he put up security for loans.

At the same time, the millers required no such initial investment. Their interest rate was competitive with that of the banks, and possibly more importantly, they provided additional services which the banks did not. For their loans were not tied to business and farming ventures alone. Rather, the millers helped people build homes, buy land, marry off their daughters. In short, they loaned capital for any purpose a client wished. What made this system so viable, however, was that it was intimately tied into the village economy and the seasonal economic cycle. A farmer would bring his padi into the mill and depending on how many bags of rice he needed for home consumption, the miller would give him a receipt for the padi and the farmer could pick up the rice as he needed it. The rest of the padi went into the farmer's account. From this account, padi was deducted for the expenses the farmer had incurred during the year, for example, the money borrowed or the grocery bills the miller had paid for him. If any padi was left after this, the farmer could get cash or credit to his account.

In summary then, the cyclical components of the economic structure, the changes which resulted in a crucial need for credit facilities, and the fact that persons were able to utilize the need for credit facilities as a resource given the constraints imposed by the economic situation, resulted in the formation of a group of a few families who may be quite easily labelled the elite. The structure of the environment at the time, enabled the consolidation of an elite group.

(v) The Political Field.

The second question posed at the beginning of Section (b) was how the elite, once consolidated, could gain control of the resources in the political field, notably, the council.

Part of the answer obviously lies in the fact that council members were appointed by the Local Government Board, a system which favoured local notables who had come to their attention. The Panchar, Maraj and Ramprashad families were thus obvious appointments. All were Christian; all were highly literate in English; all were economically successful businessmen; and all had economic networks which led out of the village into Georgetown by virtue of the milling activities.

Several other factors also worked in their favour. First, the movement of villagers to the Abary Creek removed a large part of the population from effective involvement in day to day village affairs. Those who didn't move were still involved in wage labour outside the village on the estates. If the millers were able to control the council, part of the reason was that the people were too busy with their own economic activities to really care.

Secondly, the large majority were indebted to the millers. Opposition was totally impossible, and in fact, support for such a situation became part of the debtor-creditor relationship.

Finally, it became apparent through a major incident in the village,

where the power lay. For the village had, until 1927, a Panchayat council used for settling of inter-personal disputes. In that year, a man called Jurany allegedly assaulted Gangadeen opposite the Canadian Mission School in the village. The matter went before the Panchayat but the council refused to act in the matter since assault was an indictable offence and was, therefore, not under its jurisdiction. The matter was then taken to the Magistrate's Court, and it is said that before the case came up, Ramprashad spoke with the Magistrate such that when Gangadeen walked up to the courthouse, he was told that "the case finish." In short, the Panchayat, a traditional social and political body, had refused to handle a case, while a rice miller had been able to "fix" it. The Paychayat received no more cases after this incident, and it became abundantly clear to the villagers who could perform the most successful services.

The access to the council then, which the millers had through their contacts with the colonial regime, went unopposed by the village population. The result was that the elite had the resources which control of the council implied.

(c) Conclusion.

This chapter has attempted to describe the environmental structure of Bush Lot Village as it was by 1928 in order to provide the basis for the description of the factional politics which were to take place given this environment as the source of resources and constraints for the competition.

The following chapter then, is a discussion of the processes which occur given an environment with the general characteristics just discussed.

Notes: Chapter 4.

1. It was only after Emancipation in 1833 and the end of the "apprentice-ship" period in 1838 that Guyana for the first time, had a peasantry and free population large enough to provide the impetus for the formation of villages. Among the Africans, these took two forms. "Proprietary villages" were encouraged by planters who gave the freed slaves plots of land adjacent to or on the plantation on the assumption that they would then provide the needed labour force. Secondly, "Communal villages" were formed by Africans who banded together and bought abandoned sugar and cotton estates. By 1841, the Village Movement was under way. The following year it received further encouragement in that planters cut the wages of the African labourers in the Proprietary villages such that more Africans voluntarily migrated from the plantations into more villages. Again in 1847, the economic crisis in Britain resulting in a devaluation of the currency, had the effect of lowering wages in Guyana and pushed more Africans off the estates and encouraged them to invest in land rather than banknotes. Again the village movement received an impetus. This chronology, however, had two major effects: It created a labour shortage on the estates, and the problem of how to administer the newly formed villages (Young, 1958: 1-23).

2. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1894-1895.

3. Young, 1958: 152.

4. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1894-1895.

5. According to the Polder Ordinance of 1880, the government was allowed to purchase any estate sold at execution sale (Young, 1958: 103). It was in this way that the estates were obtained by government for handing over to the Return Passages Committee.

6. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1895-1896.

7. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1897-1898.

8. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1898-1899.

9. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1899-1900.

10. These jurisdictional powers are described in the Public Health Ordinances of 1878.

11. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1899-1900.

12. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1899-1900.

13. The Regulations for the management of the Indian settlements were embodied in the East Indian Settlements Regulations Ordinance of 1901. With this Ordinance, two types of village administration came into existence - one for the East Indian Settlements, the second for the other villages in the colony. The latter type of administration had bested the control of the villages under a Central Board of Health with each village having a council of 6, 9, or 12 members with a maximum of two-thirds elected and one-third nominated, (Ordinance No. 11, 1892. From Young, A., p. 114). In addition, according to Ordinance No. 8 of 1878 (Young, A., p. 101), the country was divided into three types of districts - Town Sanitary Districts (Georgetown and New Amsterdam); Village Sanitary Districts (or incorporated villages); and Country Sanitary Districts (or the remainder of the colony).

    In 1905, with the government planning new ordinances for village administration, the dual system of village control was ended as all the East Indian Settlements were brought under the control of the Central Board of Health by being declared Country Sanitary Districts as of April, 1905. (Yount, A., p. 158.)

14. It is difficult to piece together the history of the village prior to 1899. It is apparent, however, that the name "Bush Lot" implies that the village area was once a waste area of an adjacent plantation - probably Armadale. In 1879, there is a record of the village being surveyed and divided into at least 24 houselots, four of which were bought by four former labourers from Plantation Bath. The sellers of these lots were individuals, rather than a plantation owner. And the names of two of the sellers, Blair and Semple, imply that the lots were owned by Africans as these two surnames are still found in the village of Hopetown. How these two persons, and a man named McConnan, originally acquired the lots in the first place, is unknown.

    Of the four East Indians who bought the lots, one returned to India in 1881; one died in 1887; and the other two disappear from the records.

    In 1886, there was a census taken of the area and the surrounding villages, (Letter from W. S. Turner, Chief Commissary, to Charles Bruce, Government Secretary, March 15, 1886). The number of houses located on the "abandoned plantation" were three and the population approximately fifteen. The sea dam was rated as being in fair condition; the backdam in bad condition. Cultivation consisted of plantains, corn and sweet potatoes grown on the houselots. No other cultivation or land use was in evidence. Who the people were who lived in Bush Lot, or where they had come from, is unknown. In the same year, however, the plantation was bought by government at execution sale because of the failure of the owners to maintain the public road running through it. For the purpose of Bush Lot history then, these settlers disappear when the estate was handed over to the Return Passages Committee in 1898.

    (I am indebted to Lesley Key for the above information.)

15. Speckmann notes that "immigrants who arrived in Surinam in the same vessel look upon themselves as 'ship brothers' and hence as kin. To the original immigrants this . . . relationship could constitute an impediment to marriage" (1965: 69).

16. The attenuation of caste and its associated cultural features is dealt with in Barton Schwartz, ed., Caste in Overseas Indian Communities, and the consensus about the Guyanese situation reached by Jayawardena, Raymond Smith, and Singer is what has been accepted here.

17. Report of the Superintendent of East Indian Settlements, 1903.

18. Report of the Superintendent of East Indian Settlements, 1904.

19. Report of the Superintendent of East Indian Settlements, 1903.

20. Meeting of the Combined Court, July 22, 1902. Extract from a speech by Sir James Sweetenham, Governor.

21. The Local Government Board "was born from the union of Village and Public Health Administration" according to Ordinance 13, 1907, (Young, A., p. 124.)

22. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1908-1909.

23. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1909-1910.

24. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1910-1911.

25. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1911-1912; and 1912-1913.

26. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1913-1914.

27. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1916 and 1918.

28. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1916.

29. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1917.

30. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1921.

31. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1922.

32. The government was supplying free seed padi in the attempt to improve the quality of rice. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1922.

33. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1911-1912.

34. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1913 and 1914.

35. Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1917 and 1918.

36. Minutes of the Combined Court, Special Session, November 5, 1908.

37. Address of the Governor to the members of the Combined Court, Annual Session, February 7, 1910.

38. The company also introduced a fifth innovation which was not taken up by the settlers immediately, but was to have its effects later. This was the innovation of mechanized rice production, for the company utilized steam engines to pull plough and harrows. Because of the cost, however, and the fact that the engines bogged down in muddy fields during the wet season, the innovation was not accepted by the villagers. The recognition of the viability of mechanized production, however, probably enhanced the speed with which tractors and combines were adopted thirty-five years later once the major problems of cost and utility on wet ground had been more or less overcome.

39. Ramsahoye, F. H. W., The Development of Land Law in British Guiana, p. 42.

40. "The objections made against the old leasehold system were first, the difficulty of obtaining loans on mortgage on the security of leasehold property; secondly, the insecurity of title and the possibility that a man's family after his death may suffer loss of the land; and thirdly, the difficulty of disposing of a leasehold interest in the land should the original lessor for any reason wish to dispose of his interest.

[The recommendations of the committee] were to the effect that a modified form of provisional grant should be introduced followed by a short certificate of absolute title which was to be given after five years of satisfactory occupation instead of ten years as previously" (Ramsahoye: 42).

Under the new ordinance, a grant was limited to ten acres with the right to purchase an additional ten in the rear of the purchase during the first five years, provided that within two years, one fifth of the original land was cultivated or beneficially occupied, and that after five years, half the area was beneficially occupied.

The term beneficial occupation meant the land was occupied by buildings, farm acreage, pens or corrals, and/or by stock in the proportion of three cows, horses, mules or donkeys to two acres; or three sheep or five hogs to one acre. As well, the grantee had to keep the boundary lines of his grant open and maintain identification boards at the two front corners. The cost to the individual was as follows:

Filing fee for grant:	$ 5.00
Survey fee:	7.50
Purchase price: @ $2.40 per acre:	24.00
Total	$36.00

Leases could also be taken out and were issued for a term not exceeding 99 years with a right of renewal. Small cultivators were limited to ten acres with the stipulation that after two years, one-fifth of the land had to be beneficially occupied, and after three years, one-quarter of the land had to be maintained for the duration of the lease. The same regulations regarding boundary markings were in force. The

cost to the individual for a lease was as follows:

Filing fee for lease:	$ 5.00
Survey fee:	7.50
Rent: $.20 per acre per annum:	20.00

In case of failure to beneficially occupy either the leased or granted land, or where the rent for the leased land was three months overdue, the landholder was to receive a warning to carry out his obligations within 6 months or to pay his rent within three. Failure to do this or to pay the purchase money resulted in the forfeiture of the land. Compliance with the regulations, however, entitled a grantee to an absolute grant free from conditions, and a lessee to continue occupancy under the same conditions.

(Source: Ramsahoye, pp. 142-143 and Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1918.)

41. If the petition had been signed by at least one-third of the proprietors, the land would be surveyed, a scheme for drainage and irrigation prepared, and an estimate of costs made. The proprietors could then either carry out the works on their own, or the Combined Court would grant a loan to be repaid in yearly installments. The works would then be carried out by the Public Works Department. In 1913, an Irrigation Engineer was appointed to deal with applications made under this ordinance.

(Source: Combined Court #21, First Special Session. Report on the Condition of the Colony of British Guiana during the Great European War and on the Chief Problems Awaiting Solution, p. 68. And: Address of the Governor to the members of the Combined Court, Annual Session, 1910, February 7, 1910, paragraph 4.)

42. The Irrigation Engineer who was appointed investigated the possibility of several large-scale schemes. Among these was one to drain six adjacent estates-- Hopetown, Belair, Armadale, Bush Lot, Golden Grove and Lovely Lass. The plans and cost estimates were submitted to the Combined Court in September, 1914.

(Source: Report on the Condition of the Colony . . . and on the Chief Problems Awaiting Solution, pp. 69-70. And, Combined Court Paper #780 of 1914.)

Subsequent to this, however, five villages with the exception of Bush Lot decided that they did not want such a scheme. The proprietors of Bush Lot, at a public meeting, decided to petition the government under Polder Ordinance #10 for a modified scheme to drain and irrigate only Bush Lot. Of the 1130 proprietors, 628 signed the petition in favour of the scheme. Three were against it; while the remaining 499 lots belonged to absentee proprietors.

(Source: Combined Court Paper #820. Further Correspondence Relating to Drainage and Irrigation of Estates from Lovely Lass to Hopetown relating more particularly to Bush Lot: Letter from the Local Government Board to the Government Secretary.)

Reverend Cropper and the Chairman of the Local Board both insisted that a modified scheme be carried out, with the latter commenting that the settlement would probably be abandoned if it were not.

(Source: Ibid.: Letter from J. B. Cropper to the Government Secretary. Letter from the Chairman, Local Government Board to the Government Secretary, August 2, 1914.)

43. The railway was completed between Mahaica and Rosignol in 1900.

44. Combined Court Paper #820, op. cit., Letter from the Irrigation Engineer to the Director of Public Works, October 6, 1914.

45. Ibid., Letter from the Director of Public Works to the Government Secretary.

46. Combined Court #811, Annual Session, Continuation of Sessional Paper #820: Modified Scheme for the Irrigation of Certain Lands in Bush Lot Country District.

47. This description of the building of the Varey Scheme has been abstracted from Combined Court #21, First Special Session. Report on the Conditions of the Colony . . . and on the Chief Problems Awaiting Solution, pp. 70-71.

48. In 1910, the government secretary moved a motion that the Combined Court was prepared to consider a scheme to establish agricultural loan banks under the control of the government for the purpose of aiding small farmers and non-agriculturalists to obtain small loans on good terms.

(Source: Combined Court Minutes, Sessional Paper #563, 1910.)

This move was prompted by the fact that by 1908, the rice industry had begun its massive expansion, and the problem of indebtedness was compounded by the fact that its "quick returns and the familiarity of the East Indians with the cultivation of the cereal was tempting infatuated growers to prosecute the industry on money borrowed - in some cases, on the pledge of a bag of padi at crop time for every sum of 72¢ loaned at the time of planting, or in other words, at the exhorbitant rate of 300% per annum."

(Source: Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1908-1909.)

49. Report of the Committee of the Combined Court, Special Session, 1911.

50. Report of the Banks Committee of the Local Government Board and the Co-operative Credit Banks Established in the Colony for the year 1921.

51. Ibid., 1921.

52. Ibid., 1922.

Chapter 5: The Era of Familial Elitism, 1930-1942.

(a) Introduction.

It was discussed in Chapter 4 how an elite group, which had its foundations in the initial period of the founding of the village, was able to consolidate its position. First, the entrance of Jacob Panchar and his marriage to Shirley Maraj provided the family of Manraj Maraj with an economic basis for elitism through Panchar's control of a rice mill as a result of the efforts of his relative, Easter Jaikarran. At the same time, this family was able to control the political machinery of the village through their appointments to the council. From this position they could defend their economic superiority. Appendix IX indicates the extent to which this group had control over the council by 1928. This control was further increased when Panchar himself was appointed in 1933.

Theoretically, such a situation should have given the family absolute control over the village. The entrance of A. B. Ramprashad however, already noted, prevented this. He too was appointed to the council and through alliances with members not related to the Maraj family, was able to establish a base that could compete with the Maraj hegemony.

This was possible largely because Ramprashad had strong links with the major padi buying companies such that the cash and credit in demand by the village population was readily available to him. Through their use, Ramprashad was able to undercut the support which the Maraj family had been building over the years by cutting into their economic base.

By the late 1920's, Bush Lot thus had an elite superimposed on it but

with the added complexity of its division into two groups or factions competing for the same prizes and resources.

Given then the structure of resources, resource allocation and the environment which characterized the village at the beginning of this phase, the issue is how the factional processes which occurred - the internal structure of factions and interfactional competition - related to this pre-existing and developing structure.

For this purpose, this chapter deals first with a description of the arenas within which the factional competition took place, followed by a series of case studies, analyzed in terms of situations and social networks, in order to arrive at specific principles of factions and factionalism.

(b) Arenas of Competition.

(i) The Goals and Rules of Competition.

There were several goals or prizes for which competition took place during this period with each being intimately related to the others. For purposes of analysis, one can begin with the view that was presented earlier of the village council. In this competition, the goal was control over the council by means of each elite group trying to control a majority of the seats. The reasons for the value placed on council control were related to both the prerogatives which council control implied and to its relationship to other more immediate prizes.

In the case of the prerogatives, there were two major aspects. First, control of the council gave both legitimacy and legal authority to any one faction which could control it. Since the council was a legally constituted body, the faction which controlled it exercised authority.

Now this authority enabled the council to allocate lands, collect tolls, rates and rents. Such powers, if differentially applied, could be powerful

tools for exerting pressure and influencing villagers for both political and economic ends in that both political support and padi were desired. The former maintained the faction's council position; the latter maintained intact the factional leaders' economic base. This economic implication was the second major aspect of council control.

The goal of council control thus allowed a faction to exercise both legitimate authority and influence. This exercise was related to the finite nature of the economic resources within the village such that the millers were continuously competing for padi and mill-clients, i.e., additional resources and support in order to maintain their position.

In this light, the council was an arena of competition both for control and as a resource for use in other arenas for other prizes.

Now aside from the economic goals, there were two further prizes for which competition took place.

First, elite status necessarily implied higher prestige among the elite families. This concern with differential prestige also finds expression in traditional East Indian values through the "mati" or "eye-pass" dispute which erupts when an individual feels another has ignored or insulted his prestige by assuming himself to be superior (Jayawardena, 1963).

The maintenance of prestige was thus a logical goal in the competition. Relative prestige also meant political credit - it would draw more respect and more followers in the competition for other goals, notably economic ones.

Secondly, the Local Government Ordinances had structured the communication channels such that all communications between the village and the District Commissioner went via the council (cf: Chapter 2). Although the council could not legally withhold communications, it occasionally did. More importantly, it could delay transmission with the added advantage of knowing who was dissatisfied and why. The faction in control could align its resources before a complaint or petition was received by government officials.

Hence the village council was legally the middleman between the people and the colonial government. Control of the council meant control of the position of "mediator," and conversely, to utilize resources from the colonial government implied that the council had to be controlled. The final prize then was control of the communication nexus through control of the village council.

The prizes and goals of competition among the elite thus involved several foci, but each was intimately related to the other such that absolute control over the workings of the village was the apical aim. Every gain was viewed as a step in this direction.

On the basis of these prizes as well as the structure of the village and resources during this period, the rules defining eligibility for competition were necessarily such that they eliminated all except elite familial members from the competition. Incentives were handed out by the elite in order to ensure a core of support, prizes however, belonged solely to the elite group. As a result, the composition of competing teams, how the competition took place, and the control mechanisms embedded in the process, were necessarily affected by the structure of the village and resource allocation. The following is a description of the competition within the village council arena and a look at the strategies employed by the competitors. This will serve to elucidate the nature of these rules as well as the nature of the internal organization of factions.

(ii) The Village Council Arena.

While the factionalized elite competed for the surplus of the village, the villager was forced to take sides in that his padi had to get milled and sold, and most often, he needed credit to continue his cultivation. The elite split thus forced him into the position of choosing one miller or another. If he became indebted, there was no further choice.[1] The majority of villagers

were thus pulled into the economic competition and concomitant political machinations as each miller attempted to protect his economic investment by controlling the council through several means: by numerical domination by getting as many supporters appointed as possible; or by subverting existing appointees.

One of the first major incidents in this sphere was that in the early thirties, the Maraj family suffered a breach in their united familial front through a quarrel with their relatives in the Jaikarran line. The support that the Maraj's once commanded over this group was lost to them, and at the same time, astutely picked up by Ramprashad.

The family quarrel occurred between Easter Jaikarran and his brother-in-law Jagdial over land allotments in Armadale. For when "Old Man" Jaikarran died, he divided the first depth of Armadale into seven equal portions - one for each of his children. Easter was not only dissatisfied with one seventh of the total, but he also wanted more first depth land in order to be able to make claims on a section of the second depth which was leased to his brother Ramdharry. Jagdial's wife meanwhile, had promised to sell her portion of the first depth to two of her brothers, Ramdharry and Sewah Jaikarran. Easter however, induced her to sell to him, and immediately began to pressure his brother Ramdharry, the lessee of the second depth, to give up the land according to the government ordinances. Ramdharry however, was joined in a labour-expense exchange with A. B. Ramprashad. The latter provided the capital for cultivating the second depth, and Ramdharry split the profits fifty-fifty. When Easter began to agitate for the second depth, he came into direct conflict with Ramprashad, forced his brother-in-law Jagdial to support Ramdharry and hence Ramprashad.[2]

Jagdial thus defected to the Ramprashad faction while the Maraj faction

continued in their support of Easter Jaikarran. For example, in 1933 just prior to Jacob Panchar's appointment to the council, he complained to the District Commissioner that the chairman and overseer refused to allow Jaikarran's padi from Armadale to pass through Bush Lot District dams although tolls of fifty cents per acre under cultivation were offered. Panchar accused Ramprashad of refusing to allow the padi to pass because of his own vested interest in the Armadale land given his association with Ramdharry, and because the padi would be brought to the Panchar mill.[3]

Meanwhile, the council seats and control of the council were in a state of continuous flux.[4] Jagdial's defection in 1931 had given Ramprashad the majority which he retained until 1935 through the appointment to the council of his brother John, who had moved to Bush Lot, and the appointment of Ramdharry. At the same time, the Maraj group had been worn away through the retirement of Panday and Wailloo even though Panchar had been appointed in 1933. By that time his only supporter was Jaigobin Singh.

In 1935 however, the situation was reversed through the actions of the Local Government Board. The entire Ramprashad group had not been reappointed, although Ramprashad now had P. T. Premsingh who, as mentioned previously, became allied to Ramprashad through their association on the Cricket Club. At the same time, Panchar, who had taken over leadership of the Maraj hegemony,[5] found the council packed with supporters of the Maraj faction. First, there was Darshanand whose nephew Parmeshwar had maintained neutrality during his sojourn on the council.[6] He merely joined what appeared to be the winning side because of his family's lack of attachment to either group. Secondly, there was Imdad Usman, whose father Yamin had been the overseer in the village during 1927 and who had received the active support of the Maraj family both in his position as overseer and client of the Panchar mill. Usman logically joined the Maraj-Panchar group.[7] Thirdly, there was Bhagwandin who was

married to Panchar's wife's sister. Finally, there was Seeram Ramhit, who, as a client of the Panchar mill,[8] had to support the Maraj-Panchar group.

The factional affiliations which thus occurred on the council between 1930 and 1935 can be summarized as follows:

Table 5.1: Factional Alignments on the Council,[9] 1930-1935

Year	Ramprashad faction	Maraj-Panchar faction	Neutral
1930	A. B. Ramprashad Naipaul	Panday Wailloo Jaigobin Singh Jagdial	Morrison*
1931	A. B. Ramprashad Naipaul Jagdial	Panday Jaigobin Singh	Morrison Parmeshwar
1932	A. B. Ramprashad John Ramprashad Ramdharry Jagdial	Jaigobin Singh	Morrison Parmeshwar
1933	A. B. Ramprashad John Ramprashad Ramdharry Jagdial	Jaigobin Singh Jacob Panchar	Parmeshwar
1934	(same as 1933)		
1935	T. P. Jaundoo Shivrattan	Jacob Panchar Darshanand Bhagwandin Seeram Ramhit Imdad Usman	

*Morrison was the district medical officer who left West Berbice in 1932 thus leaving a seat vacant. His official position explains his neutrality.

After 1935 however, there were major changes which eventually altered the nature of the competition for control of the council. These changes will be discussed in detail in a later section. For the moment, it is only necessary to note these changes and their immediate rather than long-term effects on council competition.

First, the suffrage laws were altered such that persons did not have to

be literate in English to vote. Secondly, the suffrage was extended to include voting for council members in village districts. At the same time the status of Bush Lot was altered in 1936 from a Country to a Village District.

What these changes implied was that the number of councillors was increased to nine, and that six of these, or two-thirds, were to be elected by the villagers. In addition, according to the new Ordinance, the position of council chairman was no longer an appointed one, but rather, the elected and appointed members of council were responsible for electing a person to that position.[10]

Since elections were not due to be held until November 1937, the Local Government Board appointed an additional two members in order for the council to conform to the new Ordinance.[11] In addition, the chairman, from that time on, was to be elected by the councillors.

By January 1937, the council was constructed as follows:

Table 5.2: The Council in 1937[12]

Ramprashad faction	Maraj-Panchar faction
A. B. Ramprashad	Jacob Panchar
John Ramprashad	Bhagwandin
Jurany	Jones
Dagleish	Johnson
Dindayalsingh	

This was how the council split for the first chairman election.[13] Panchar nominated Jones for the position, knowing well that he himself did not have a chance because of the numerical superiority of the Ramprashad group. The ploy however, did not lose votes for A. B. who was thus elected by one vote, and it saved face for Panchar in that he was not directly a loser.

Now the membership of these groups had altered since 1935. First, Dagleish was appointed and joined Ramprashad because of his friendship with Premsingh and the dislike for the Maraj family whose supporter, Easter

Jaikarran had foreclosed on his father-in-law's mill years previously. Dagleish also brought to the Ramprashad faction, Jurany, who was married to his wife's sister. John Ramprashad, A. B.'s brother was again reappointed, and finally, Dindayalsingh was another example of the Maraj-Panchar family's inability to control their extended family as first witnessed in the defection of Jagdial. In this case, Dindayalsingh's sister was married to Panday, a former councillor and brother to Manraj Maraj. He threw his support however, and his padi selling to Ramprashad.[14]

The Maraj-Panchar faction before the election, was thus reduced to a core of two: Panchar and his brother-in-law Bhagwandin. The support of the other two members was variable and not dependable since there were no ties on which to formulate a close alliance, with Jones being the District Medical Officer and Johnson an African from Belair. In fact, Panchar's nomination of Jones for chairman was an attempt to formulate such an alliance on the assumption that if elected, Jones would need Panchar's support for the council to function. This manoeuvre however, as has been seen, was offset by the absolute majority held by Ramprashad and the control which he was able to exercise over the votes.

In September 1937 however, there erupted a quarrel between Johnson and another of Ramprashad's brothers, Ernest.[15] A. B. Ramprashad refused to take sides in the matter since he and Johnson were fellow churchmembers. He thus withdrew from active participation on the council as well as the chairmanship.[16] Because of this, the Maraj-Panchar core was able to put Johnson forth as a candidate for the chair. With A. B. and another Ramprashad member absent, the Maraj-Panchar faction won the vote.[17] They thus gained a supporter through the same manoeuvre attempted previously with the nomination of Jones. Johnson however, ran into racial discrimination and was totally ineffective as chairman.[18] The Maraj-Panchar faction however, was content. For with A. B.'s

withdrawal and Jones' occasional support, they now had some leverage within the council.

In November of that same year however, elections were held. The factions aligned themselves as parties and competed against each other as groups even though the ballot was based on votes for individuals. Campaigning was done on a group basis, and every voter knew the affiliation of each candidate.[19] The slates run by each faction are presented in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Factional Parties: 1937 Election.[20]

Ramprashad faction	Maraj-Panchar faction
P. T. Premsingh	Jacob Panchar
John Ramprashad	Bhagwandin
Dagleish	Loknauth
Jurany	Darshanand
Dindayalsingh	Seeram Ramhit
Jaigobin Singh	

From this, several points should be noted. First, A. B. Ramprashad did not run for election, and in fact never did so. He considered it beneath his dignity and was an appointed member throughout his career. His connections in Georgetown always assured him of a seat.[21]

Secondly, the only new person in the Jaundoo camp was Jaigobin Singh - a defector from the Maraj-Panchar faction whose reasons were the same as had been those of his brother Ramdharry and his brother-in-law Jagdial - namely, the machinations of Easter Jaikarran and the support which the Maraj-Panchar faction gave to him.[22]

Finally, within the Maraj-Panchar party, the only new person was Loknauth who had married another of Panchar's wife's sisters.

Of the two slates, those elected were Premsingh, Dagleish and John Ramprashad in the Ramprashad faction; and Panchar, Bhagwandin, and Seeram Ramhit in the Maraj-Panchar faction.[23] This even split meant that the allegiances of the three appointed members would be the deciding factor as to

which faction would control the council for two years. Those appointed were A. B. Ramprashad; Johnson; and D. Morrison.[24] Johnson was by now a strong Maraj-Panchar supporter in the light of their previous transaction; Morrison, who had returned to the district, was now a friend and supporter of Ramprashad since both had served together on the Local Government Board in the interim period between Morrison's appointments.[25]

As a result of this division, the Ramprashad faction held the majority. A. B. however, decided to remove himself from his conspicuous position and designated Premsingh to carry on.[26] The latter was elected chairman for 1938 by the Ramprashad faction, and again for 1939.[27]

In that year, elections were again held, and were organized in the same manner as the first. That is, the factions competed as parties, and in this election, the same core was apparent. In addition, several new persons had emerged to take part. These joined the parties as they were already constituted; none formed a new party; and all new persons joined the pre-existing factions.[29] Table 5.4 presents the slates as they were constituted for the election.

Table 5.4: Factional Parties: 1939 Elections.[30]

Ramprashad faction	Maraj-Panchar faction
Premsingh	Jacob Panchar
Dagleish	Bhagwandin
Ernest Ramprashad	Seeram Ramhit
Rajaram Dabi	Loknauth
Hussein Amin	Darshanand
Chandkairan	Imdad Usman
	N. I. Dookhun
	Bandoo
	Alladin Azam

In the Ramprashad slate then, were three new candidates. First, Chandkairan was a long standing client at Ramprashad's mill; secondly, Amin was a good friend of Premsingh's, and he and his father had always utilized

the credit resources of the Ramprashad mill; finally, Rajaram Dabi was a friend of Premsingh's. He had close kinship relations with the Panchar-Maraj family in that his sister Etwaria was married to Jacob Panchar's brother, and his support as a result proved to be tenuous.[31]

The Panchar faction drew in for the election several persons who had once been aligned with it. First there was Usman who had been on the 1935 council as a Panchar supporter. Secondly, Dookhun had been the village overseer and had obtained the job with the aid of the Ramprashad group. They withdrew support from him however, and he defected to the Panchar faction for whom he was now running. Thirdly, Bandoo had married Jacob Panchar's niece, and finally, Alladin Azam was a client of the Panchar mill through the help of which, he was rapidly becoming a wealthy man.[32]

As a result of the election, Ernest Ramprashad, Dagleish, Premsingh, Rajaram Dabi and Amin were all elected from the Ramprashad faction. Only Jacob Panchar was elected from his own faction.[33] Due to this division, Premsingh was elected to another term as chairman since the appointed members,[34] A. B. Ramprashad, Dr. De Freitas of Fort Wellington who was neutral, and Parmeshwar who was a former neutral councillor, did not alter the division in any way in Panchar's favour. The council was totally controlled by the Ramprashad faction for the next two years.

In November 1940, De Freitas resigned from the council as he was being posted out of the district,[35] and a shopkeeper named Harbaran, a strong Panchar supporter, was appointed.[36] In the elections for the chairmanship for the year 1941, Panchar had the support of Harbaran and had managed to subvert the support of Parmeshwar and his relative Rajaram Dabi. He was thus nominated and ran against John Ramprashad. Since A. B. Ramprashad was ill at the time and could not attend the meeting, Panchar expected an even split in the voting which would then have required a general election to fill the post. This

stalemate did not occur however, as Harbaran did not attend the meeting. This gave the Ramprashad faction a majority of one vote.[37]

It was alleged afterwards by the Panchar faction that the reason Harbaran did not attend the meeting was that the clock in the village office was pushed ahead twenty minutes such that Harbaran, who had left the village for a few hours, would not return in time for the election. Both Panchar[38] and Harbaran[39] complained to the District Commissioner and demanded an inquiry as did several persons outside the council who supported Panchar.[40] Village overseer Gainlall maintained however, that he had checked the office clock against his watch and found it correct. As well, he stated that Harbaran only returned to the village office at 4:41 p.m. even though the election had been called for 3:00. According to Gainlall, Harbaran walked in, "simply said good afternoon, and walked out."[41] The District Commissioner, in his report to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, stated that "time is of so little importance and is taken so little notice of in such a community as Bush Lot, that unless special precaution is taken, the clock is likely to be inaccurate. I doubt if an inquiry will serve any useful purpose as my experience in Bush Lot is that it is extremely difficult to arrive at the truth when holding an inquiry there."[42] So the matter rested.

(iii) Situations and Strategies in other Arenas.

The previous section has dealt with the village council as a major arena of competition within the village during this period. Section (d) of the chapter will deal with specific analyses in terms of the problems outlined for investigation. At the same time however, there are other situations and arenas which existed in the village at the time which can contribute to such an analysis. These are described below. They can be roughly divided into three categorical types: first, those dealing with leaders' relations to their

followers; secondly, those dealing particularly with the interfactional sphere; and finally, an example of the nature of the competition which occurred over attempts to control official personnel of the village, thus illustrating as well the first two types of situations. Cases (a) to (e) inclusive are of the first two types; cases (f) to (k) inclusive are of the second types; and the final case is one of competition in relation to the overseer.

a. The Bhola Incident.

A. B. Ramprashad stated that "Bhola came to me with his pregnant wife and a bailiff who had just levied on their house and contents because Jacob Panchar's father-in-law, Maraj, had loaned them money and gotten judgement on them. They came to me for help. Bhola said he would pay me when the crop came in, so I paid the whole amount to the bailiff and their property was released. He became my client. At the end of the year, he couldn't pay off his entire debt so he continued with me as was the usual custom. He gave me a pro-note for all the borrowed money, but he became so delinquent in his payments that I had to put him in court. He told the magistrate that I had made him sign the pro-note - that I had held his hand and made him sign. It was true that I had held his hand to help him sign but that was because to write his name was all he knew. The pro-note had been witnessed by the Headmaster of the Hopetown Congregational School who was a friend of mine. We sent for him and he told the magistrate that the week before the court case, Bhola had come to his house with a bunch of plantains and asked him to appear for him in court in relation to the pro-note. But the Headmaster threw him out of the house."[43]

b. The Ramdharry and Jaikarran Incident.

A. B. Ramprashad stated that "Ramdharry, Easter Jaikarran's brother, had one half of the second depth of Armadale on government lease. Easter had the other half. Ramdharry asked me to join him in cultivating the western half

because he couldn't finance it himself. A short time later, Easter tried to dispossess him of the land. He bought out from his sister her portion of land in the western half of the first depth. That gave him a lead on the second depth and he applied to the Department of Lands and Mines for the lease, because Ramdharry's lease was 'at his majesty's pleasure' - that is, it could be terminated at any time. At this time, Ramdharry was ill and dying, and the two lawyers, Van Sertima for Ramdharry and J. A. Luckhoo for Easter, decided to let the matter rest, and as long as Ramdharry lived, he could carry on. But I saw the implication. I saw that if Ramdharry died, Easter would get the land since Ramdharry had been married 'under the bamboo' only; and his wife had no legal claim on his possessions. I told Van Sertima, who was my lawyer all the time, that he had made a foolish decision, and I told Ramdharry that Luckhoo had pulled a fast one on Van Sertima and that the only way out was for Ramdharry to marry his wife legally. He told me to go ahead. I applied for the license and having the right friends in the right places, I did it quickly and got a reverend to come to his house and marry him. Ramdharry died a week later. A day after his death, Easter went to Luckhoo about the land and applied for it to be transferred. But it couldn't be because the wife was now the legal heir."

Jaundoo continued to work with Ramdharry's son under the same arrangement he had with his father - sharing expenses and dividing the profit fifty-fifty.[44]

c. Panchar and Mohamed

John Mohamed complained to the District[45] Commissioner that his father had owned several houselots in the village when he died in 1933. Of these lots, 9C and 84K had been appraised as his property until 1939 when it was put up for sale by the official receiver as part of the estate of one Elizabeth Kent who had died intestate. Mohamed maintained that the lots had never been sold or transferred to her and the lots had been in the assessment book under his father's name until Kent's death. He asked for an investigation into the matter.

Meanwhile, Jacob Panchar wrote to the District Commissioner also complaining about the irregularity and stating that "a matter of this nature should not go by. Anyone can be made to suffer at the hands of unscrupulous men."[46] Panchar also accompanied the wife of Mohamed to the village office for the investigation.[47]

d. The Fire in the Factory.

It had been a traditional policy of the village council, to charge tolls for padi being brought from outside the district, for example, from the Abary Creek area or Armadale, in order to help upkeep the dams and trenches which persons transporting this padi used. These persons were of course Bush Lot residents who had holdings outside the village. These same persons did not pay tolls when their padi came from inside the area controlled by the Local Authority.

In 1934, there was a fire in Panchar's factory in which toll records were destroyed. This was crucial in that the usual procedure was for the miller to keep a record of the tolls people owed, and pay the Local Authority directly, while deducting the amount paid from a client's account. When the records burned, Panchar's clients did not have to have money deducted from their accounts and Panchar himself did not have to pay tolls as the records were destroyed. It is alleged that Panchar himself lit the fire.

e. Mohani, Nagassar and the Overseer.

In 1938, a woman called Mohani complained to the District Commissioner that she and her husband had been living at Lot 22, section C since their marriage 27 years before. Her husband had died 4 years previously and she was still residing on the houselot and planting the cultivation lot until the previous year. She had also been paying rates for the lot until 1936. The lot

itself had been given to her husband by his mother and was still being assessed in the mother's name although she had died 25 years before intestate.

In 1937, the overseer put the house and cultivation lot up for execution sale for the non-payment of rates in 1937. Mohani informed the overseer that she would attend the sale and buy the lot to obtain legal title. At the last moment, her husband's brother Nagassar, with whom she had been quarrelling, paid the rates and law costs to prevent her from buying the lot at execution sale.

A week before the complaint was made, Mohani prepared the lot for planting only to have Nagassar take over the lot and plough. She asked the District Commissioner to investigate the matter in order to avoid litigation which she could not afford, and to advise Nagassar to quit the cultivation lot.[49]

The District Commissioner referred the matter to the Village Council pointing out only that the mere payment of rates did not give any person the right of possession.[50]

On June 7, 1938 the council discussed the matter at a Statutory meeting. "After hearing both parties, councillor Ramprashad advised the council that both parties should arrive at a settlement and suggested that Mohani give to Nagassar the rates and law costs he had paid out that year in return for possession of the lot. The chairman concurred, but the other councillors refused to interfere in the matter as it was a family matter."[51]

f. The Boards Incident.

In 1934, the entire village was flooded due to exceptionally heavy rains. The government, in an attempt to aid the village, inaugurated a flood relief programme and gave boards to the village to strengthen a dam that was giving way. The boards disappeared, and it is variously stated by different persons that: "Ramprashad had lost all his sheep and cattle in the flood and he took

these government boards to rebuild his house at the Creek"; "Ramprashad took the boards for his mill"; and "the story that Ramprashad took the boards is not true. The District Commissioner would have noticed this. The boards may have been lodged in the mill, but Ramprashad didn't take them. That Panchar caused a lot of trouble."[52]

g. The Attempt to Change the Village Name.

In 1935, A. B. Ramprashad had the idea that the name of the village should be changed to one which was more suitable to its history as an East Indian Land Settlement. The name he decided upon was "Rampur." He received the support of the council, or that part of it which supported him, and applied to the District Commissioner to transmit the suggestion to the relevant authorities for approval. This request was made in August 1936,[53] and the District Commissioner delayed his reply until January 1937 when a new council would have been appointed. He then suggested to Ramprashad that he have the new council consider the idea.[54] Ramprashad refused, knowing full well that public opinion was going against the suggestion as well as some of his own councillors. How and why this was occurring will become apparent in the next chapter. On this basis however, Ramprashad refused to bring the matter up for discussion on the ostensible grounds that such a move would be ultra vires according to the Ordinances since six months had not passed since the original motion was approved.[55]

Unfortunately for Ramprashad's plans however, Section 44 of the Local Government Ordinances provided only for the change of name of a local authority and not for a village district. The change would thus not affect titles, transports, or plans. The only change would be that one could state that the "village council of Rampur was administering the village district of Bush Lot." And because of the confusion which would result from the redrawing of maps,

the reissuing of titles, etc., the Local Government Board, which was sent the request when the District Commissioner failed to get the subject rediscussed on council, refused the change.[56] Ramprashad then appealed to the Governor, through the Colonial Secretary, on the grounds that the idea of an Indian name as being good was publicly stated by the Governor in 1936. Ramprashad accused the Governor of "acquiescing" on the issue.[57]

The Colonial Secretary tersely replied to Ramprashad that the governor's support had naturally rested on the feasibility of the suggestion. Once this was found to be limited, the governor could not give his consent.[58] The matter ended there.

h. Premsingh, the Maraj Family and the Race Club Arena.

There were two major incidents which occurred between the Maraj family and Premsingh which were to have ramifications for many years after.

In 1937, Premsingh was living in the yard which housed the village office and which belonged to Manraj Maraj. The day after the second incident described below, two of Premsingh's pigs were shot. He pressed charges against Manraj's nephew, Bala (Manraj's wife and Bala's father were brother and sister) for damages. When he did this, Manraj Maraj ordered him to quit the house he was living in. Since Premsingh had no written permission from Maraj supporting his tenancy, he and his lawyer decided not to press charges since they felt that Maraj would deny that permission had ever been given for Premsingh to live on the houselot.

In the second incident, Johnson, while he had been chairman of the village in the latter part of 1937, rented the middle dam and common land north of the village to the Maraj family for the purpose of holding a race meeting on January 1, 1938, the day on which Premsingh took over as chairman of the village. People in the village objected to the fact that the rent charged was only $6.00

and to the fact that the holders of the meeting were given permission to erect barriers on the middle dam and charge people to enter the common lands to see the horse races. The morning of the races, the council held a meeting and decided to take down the barriers since the former council had not obtained permission from the Local Government Board to erect them and charge an entrance fee. Premsingh went to the dam, with police protection, and tore down the barriers. The following day, his pigs were shot, and within one month, 24 head of his cattle had died from having their tongues slit such that they could not eat.

The Maraj family took the village council to court for their interference in the race meeting on the grounds that they had had permission from the previous village council. The village council claimed however, that such permission was invalid without the approval of the Local Government Board. The village council won its case.

As for Premsingh, he never again raised cattle or pigs, and developed an antipathy towards the Maraj family which has survived until the present time.[59]

i. Panchar as a Minority Chairman.

In August 1940, P. T. Premsingh resigned as chairman of the village council because he had taken a job at Atkinson, East Bank Demerara to work for the United States Government on the airfield they were building in the vicinity.[60]

Elections were held for the position of chairman for the unexpired term of 1940. A. B. Ramprashad nominated Panchar. This was seconded by John Ramprashad. Since there were no other nominations, Panchar was acclaimed chairman.[61]

In his role as chairman, Panchar found his position almost untenable. In November, in recommending Harbaran for an appointed seat which had become

vacant, he asked the District Commissioner to push through the appointment as early as possible as this would assist him in carrying out his duties for none of the councillors were attending meetings, the government nominees included, and his administration was being hampered.[62]

In December, several proprietors approached Panchar as chairman to cut the eastern dam north of the public road in order to facilitate drainage. He told them that he could not give the order as the dam was weak and would give way. Instead, he ordered the overseer to clear the channel and get the water out that way. But the overseer went on holiday and didn't clear the channel. The same day, the dam was cut by four men.[63]

At a special meeting of the council held five days later, councillors John Ramprashad, Premsingh and Dagleish said that they gave the orders to cut the dam to the four men, one of whom was Jurany.[64] Panchar complained to the District Commissioner that as he, the chairman, was in the village at the time, the councillors broke the law by giving the order. As well, he gave an order two days after the cut was made to have it fixed. By December 31, that had not been done.[65]

j. Declaration of the Seats Vacant.

On September, 1941, on a motion moved by Amin and Seconded by Premsingh, the seats on the council of Jacob Panchar and Rajaram Dabi were declared vacant on the grounds that Rajaram Dabi, an elected member, had failed to attend meetings for more than three consecutive months, and that Jacob Panchar was in arrears of rates for more than three months after they became due. In voting on the motion, those "for" were John Ramprashad, Amin, Premsingh; "against" was Harbaran; Jacob Panchar abstained. There were no other councillors present.[66] The elections to fill the vacancies were deferred because a general election was due to be held, and because new councillors would fill the seats

in January 1942.[67]

Jacob Panchar complained to the District Commissioner that he should have been given notice by the overseer a week before his rates were due so that he could have put his affairs in order.[68]

k. Gainlall and Dookhun - Village Overseers.

P. Gainlall was appointed overseer of Bush Lot Village in 1933. By the end of 1935 however, it was claimed that people in the village were complaining about the overseer with the underlying reason being that he was not a villager but an outsider. The council, controlled by the Panchar faction, lowered his salary in response to this so that he would resign. He did so at the end of 1935.[69] Of the applications received for the overseer's job, two received the attention of the council - that of Dass and N. I. Dookhun. The Panchar faction supported the Dass application, the Ramprashad faction supported Dookhun, mainly because J. Luckhoo, of a renowned Georgetown family, had informed Premsingh that he would like to see Dookhun get the job as he was a relative. The Ramprashad faction, in a majority, complied with the request and Dookhun was appointed.[70]

In late 1937, after the resignation of Ramprashad and the election of Johnson to the Chairmanship, a strained relationship emerged between the chairman and the overseer. Dookhun complained that it was almost impossible to carry out the work of the district under Johnson. He complained that work of trench cleaning was given to Gangadeen at a cost of three cents per rod when there were other applicants who would do the work for two and a half. On these grounds he refused to make out the paysheet. As well, he stated that he and councillor Dagleish had inspected the works and found them unsatisfactory. When he refused to make out the paysheet, Johnson made it out himself. He also complained that the chairman shifted rangers and constables without his

knowledge, and that they were told to report directly to Johnson, Bhagwandin and/or Panchar. "They ran the show," and Dookun's authority as overseer was totally bypassed.[71]

On the other hand, Johnson complained that the overseer refused to take orders from him, and had done nothing to collect rates and rents although the time was right because reaping had just been completed. Johnson maintained that Dookhun had been opposed to him from the day of the election because he was "Negro born," and that he was purposefully trying to undermine his administration.[72] In discussing the matter of the paysheet, Johnson maintained that the overseer stated that Johnson had the work done at that price "because he wanted a drawback. And when I informed him of his villainness, he told me to follow him outside and he will make me swallow my teeth."[73]

As a result of this situation, the council, at a statutory meeting on November 3, made up a list of charges against the overseer. At the end of the meeting Johnson instructed the overseer to hand him the key to the village office. Dookhun refused on the grounds that he had not been dismissed or suspended. The chairman grabbed Dookhun's walking stick and said he could not go unless he handed over the key. Johnson and Ghagwandin held onto him and Dookhun pretended to throw the key out of the window. Johnson and the others ran outside with a lamp to look for it, and Johnson ordered Bhagwandin, who was a constable, to arrest him. This he did, but after a time, let him go. Johnson ordered the office barred and put a watchman on duty.[74] Dookhun complained that he could not answer the charges because the books and records were locked in the office.[75]

The charges against Dookhun included - failing to pay an individual for trench cleaning; issuing unofficial passes for tolls countersigned by Dagleish; failing to pay into district funds amounts collected for impounded strays; and failing to carry out the verbal and written instructions of the chairman.[76]

The next day, Dookhun handed in his resignation to the council to take effect from November 30th, stating that he had been humiliated by the actions of the chairman and was tired of not receiving his salary promptly.[77] The council however, refused to accept his resignation as several of the members wanted to have him dismissed.[78] The District Commissioner however, felt that the resignation should be accepted since Dookhun had withheld money on certain occasions and had not supported the chairman.[79]

At the end of November, Dyal Matadin was appointed acting overseer.[80] In February of 1938, with the Ramprashad faction once more in control, the chairman informed the District Commissioner that the council could find no trace of legal notice given the previous overseer terminating his appointment as overseer. For this reason, the council decided to give Dookhun legal notice before February 28 and thereby terminate his services on March 31st. The chairman explained that although the minutes of the meeting of November 1st indicated a suspension, this was on account of presumed irregularities and an audit of the books was called for. As the audit did not disclose any irregularities, the council now felt that the original suspension fell through.[81] Councillor A. B. Ramprashad then moved that the acting overseer, Dyal Matadin be dismissed and N. I. Dookhun be reinstated and paid for his services until the appointment of a new overseer.[82] This move drew official protests from Panchar, Bhagwandin, and Seeram Ramhit, who maintained that the Board had approved of the original dismissal of the overseer as from November 30th, in a letter dated February 5th, and as recommended by the council on December 2nd. They demanded that Dyal Matadin be reappointed to act until a new overseer was appointed.[83]

A special meeting of the council was held on February 20th and was attended by the District Commissioner and District Administration Officer. The District Commissioner stated that the matter had to be straightened out as the council was divided on the problem. He also stated that he could not support the

reinstatement since he could not ask for the Board's approval of an appointment of an overseer just dismissed.

The council then reached a compromise.[84] It was decided that there would be no overseer until the appointment of a new one, but that from the legal point of view, Dookhun's dismissal was effective from March 31st. Panchar however, stated that he still wished to decide whether his protest against the payment of Dookhun's salary until the end of March still stood. He decided in late February that it did, and the Board was left to decide on the payment of Dookhun's salary.[85]

On February 21st however, P. Gainlall was appointed overseer by the council.[86] Premsingh and Dagleish had persuaded him to take back his former job.[87] In this capacity, he too was in the centre of factional competition. For example, in 1940, Jacob Panchar, who was the agent of the owner of the house Gainlall rented, summoned him to court for non-payment of rents knowing that the Local Authority owed him salary for the same period. The day after Panchar obtained judgement, he sent Gainlall a letter informing him that he was raising his rent beginning the following month. Two months later, Panchar again summoned Gainlall for non-payment, and again Gainlall complained that he had not received his salary for six months. Again Panchar obtained judgement, and a week later sent Gainlall a notice to quit the house. Gainlall wrote the District Commissioner asking for several months salary in order to move from Panchar's house "and be done with him altogether."[88]

(c) Arenas of Cooperation and Alliance.

(i) The Goals and Contexts.

It has been noted that "there are instances of factions cooperating with one another, of factional 'coalition' or 'alliances'" (Nicholas, 1965: 44). This is what occurred in Bush Lot during the period under investigation. It

should be noted however, that such cooperation formed an integral part of the general competition which was taking place and given the allocation of resources during the period, this aspect of the competition is highly predictable.

This is because first, the two groups which were competing against each other were, in a larger context, part of the same group - the elite of the village as opposed to the mass. In this larger frame of reference, they can be viewed as competing with non-elites in attempting to maintain their position and the status quo.

Secondly, if one recalls the goals delineated for the competition, it will be recalled that competition centred around the prizes of controlling the village council; maintaining the economic base intact; prestige maintenance; and control of the communications between various levels of government. Now the apical aim which all these prizes implied, was absolute control over the workings of the village and the villagers. It is predictable then, that if a threat came to the rule defining prizes either from outside the village or from within, the elite would react as a unified group to defend the rules of their political game.

Finally, alliances in this situation are predictable given the fact that individuals within the core of each faction or within the elite itself might have individual interests in particular situations, thereby encouraging alliances to serve the self-interest of individuals within the core.

Two aims then, defense and goal attainment, could lead to a factional alliance or factional cooperation. By definition, these would be situationally specific and could occur in any sphere in which these aims became paramount. At the same time the potential for cooperation was predictable given the resource allocation of the period.

(ii) Situations of Cooperation.

a. The Barring of the Village Office.

On February 7th, 1938, when the council announced its decision, amid much conflict, to reinstate Dookhun as overseer, four villagers who were dissatisfied with the decision went to the village office and nailed a board across the door to prevent persons from entering and leaving. At a special meeting convened on February 20th to settle the issue, the council moved and unanimously passed a motion which stated that "whereas the attitude of certain villagers appears to be a spreading danger to 'village administration' and an incentive to cause a breach of the peace much to the annoyance of His Majesty's peaceful subjects, be it resolved that this council with an endeavour to put a period to such hostile acts, unhesitatingly agrees to retain council and prosecute in a court of law the offenders named above."[89]

b. The Pumping Incident.

In July 1940, the cultivation in the New and Jib Lands was threatened because of an insufficient supply of water. The council decided to petition government to assist the village by sending pumps from the Public Works Department to pump water from the water path trench coming in from the Abary into the fields.[90] The government complied with the request and paid for the pumps, the fuel and transportation. The government however, insisted that the village bear the cost of the wages of the labourers employed for the pumping.[91]

In November, the council unanimously passed a motion that as the council had no control whatever over the employment of the labourers or the supervision of any of the pumping works, and that since the works were under the direct control and supervision of the Department of Agriculture, the council did "not see its way to shoulder all or part of the expenses incurred which in the opinion of the council should be borne by government."[92] A week later, the

District Commissioner stated that he "considered it deplorable for the council to have passed such a resolution. . . . The pumps were requested by the proprietors and council, . . . government paid the cost of fuel and transportation of the pumps but considered that the wages of the labourers should be borne by the Local Authority. . . . It is to be deplored that the Local Authority is raising a quibble that the works were under the direct control of government and therefore should be paid by the government. . . . Doubtless this instance of apparent ingratitude will be borne in mind by government in future instances when proprietors or the council request assistance which will receive the consideration it deserves in the light of experience gained in this particular instance."[93]

In the beginning of December, the village council unanimously rescinded the previous motion and substituted another - " . . . this council wishes to convey to government its deep sense of appreciation for the efforts exercised to save the rice cultivation (but as) water was unprocurable (after initial pumping) which brought destruction to the whole area under rice cultivation, this council respectfully requests the District Commissioner to make representation to the government to assist as far as possible with the expense incurred as no revenue was derived - and this council pledges itself to abide with the decision of government and shall be ever grateful."[94]

c. The Checking of Padi.

The council unanimously decided in 1935, that since the crop yield varied greatly from field to field, to waive the payment of flat amounts for rents and to institute a system of charging rents based on the amount of padi reaped - 15 cents per bag where the yield was from one to nine bags per acre; 20 cents per bag for 10 to 14 bags per acre; and 3 dollars per acre where the yield was 15 bags or more.[95] This system however, was highly fallible. First, farmers

could fill bags fuller than usual to reduce their number and secondly, farmers who got more than 15 bags would pass other persons' padi as their own so that the other person would get a reduction and the difference could be split.

The only way to control the situation was to have a strict tabulation of the yields. The District Commissioner insisted, and the council agreed, that the ranger and the Crown dam watchman should do this, but should be accompanied at all times by two councillors.[96] The councillors however, never went with the ranger to help check.[97] But all council members were planting in the area, and all received rent reductions because of poor yields.

(d) Principles of Factional Competition.

(i) The Internal Structure of Factions.

The nature of the internal structure of factions can be viewed from the perspective of the rules governing the eligibility of persons for the competition; the rules governing the composition of the competing teams;[98] and the nature of the core and following which made up the factions in terms of the typology presented in Chapter 1.

The first point to be noted then, is that given the structure of resource allocation during the period and the prize of absolute control over the village, it is apparent that the rules governing the internal structures were dictated by the needs and demands of the elite family groups, or in other words, the millers. Given this situation and ability to make their rules, they maintained exclusiveness in access to the prize, and this in turn had ramifications on competitive eligibility and the nature of the competing teams.

The nature of eligibility can be observed from the perspective of the community-elite-team-leadership continuum, and which part of the population was selected for each of the categories.[99] All villagers were a part of the political community with their internal loyalties being decided by the mill to which

their padi was brought and the miller to whom they were indebted. From this mass, the millers chose those whom they would allow to be eligible for active participation in the factional competition which was occurring. This was done on the basis of the projected loyalty of the persons which in turn was based on the nature of the linkage between miller and villager. The most trusted tie was that of kinship, with loyalties diminishing depending on distance and pre-existing rivalries. The Panchar faction's mode of recruitment is a case in point. This faction concentrated on its extended kin ties within the village, but was not always successful in activating these. The extended Jaikarran line split off because of a family quarrel and opposing loyalties mainly due to economic ties with the other faction. At the same time that this support was lost however, the Panchar faction was able to pick up other ties which were the result of second generation links, such as the affinal relationships with the Bhagwandins and Loknauths. The attempt was constantly being made then, to activate kinship links as the basis of factional membership.

On the other hand, the Ramprashad faction had limited ties within the village except for first order kin. This faction then had to turn to other methods of recruitment to the political elite. For this purpose, they picked up friendship ties and long-term patron-client relationships. The former were more effective in that the personnel were either less or unindebted and therefore had a greater independence of action. But although these relationships were expensive to maintain; at the same time, their subversion was unlikely. Premsingh therefore, was given ostensible leadership of the Ramprashad faction although A. B.'s economic base was paying the bills and providing the resources for more peripheral recruitment. This position however, put Premsingh into the situation of having a direct encounter with the Panchar group such that his loyalty was thereafter ensured, at least insofar as subversion was concerned. Rebellion of course, was another matter. For the time being however, the

friendship link and the expensive payoffs served as the second method of recruitment in terms of relative effectiveness for the miller families.

The third major linkage which was utilized was that of long-term patron-client tie, in which multi-stranded transactional ties were activated. Such was what occurred in the incidents with Ramprashad and Mohani and Panchar and Mohamed. In the latter case, long-term transactions and the rules of the tie required Panchar to lend active support to Mohamed's claim. Precisely the opposite occurred with Mohani however. Her brother, Nagassar, against whom her claim was made, was a Ramprashad supporter. He was a nominator of Dindayalsingh in the 1937 election. It was a Ramprashad controlled council, and her request was pushed aside as not being relevant to council deliberations. At the same time, the resources of Mohani were not worth precipitating an encounter from the perspective of the Panchar faction. First, they would have lost had they supported her. Secondly, even a show of support was not worth the cost in that she was poor, widowed and planted only a few acres of rice which were entirely for consumption. There was no economic profit to be made and no political profit given her status as woman, widow, and member of an extremely small family group consisting only of herself and brother, the latter of whom already had his loyalties determined. Mohani's request therefore passed unattended by the council and both factions.

Another type of link for creating the political elite was the use of pre-existing schisms that could be exploited. Dagleish was a case in point as was Ramdharry and his close relatives, and finally, this was the final solidifying link with Premsingh. Depending then, on the intensity of the schism, such links could also be more or less secure.

The final tie which was utilized to create a political elite from which a team could be drawn was the use of the transactional relationship. The most tenuous method of all, this relationship was exhibited in Ramprashad's paying

off of Bhola's debt incurred by him with Panchar, the attempt to turn the relationship into a multi-stranded one, and the subsequent failure in this latter move. Panchar's alleged burning of toll receipts was a service performed for his clients which benefitted not only his long-term clients, but was also a ploy to gain and/or keep the support of the peripheral personnel. In the council arena, the nomination of Jones and Johnson for the position of chairman, was also an attempt by Panchar to put into action a transactional base for support. He succeeded in the latter case, and the transactional relationship, as a result of the actions of the Ramprashad faction in their attempts to destroy the administration of Johnson, resulted in a multi-stranded and friendship link between Panchar and Johnson.

In short, there were several methods the millers could utilize in order to draw from the community an elite which was eligible to compete for membership on the team or from which the millers themselves could draw their team. The links which could be utilized for the purpose existed directly between the miller and the community, and to some extent, membership in the political elite was achieved except in the cases of cyclical indebtedness. These various links, seven in number are as follows:

1. First order kinship relationships;
2. Friendship links;
3. Economic exchange/ties involving symmetrical relationships in terms of input;
4. Pre-existing schisms which could be exploited;
5. Second and third order kinship links;
6. Patron client relations with an assymetrical economic and social base; and
7. Transactional relationships.

For the most part, the majority of links involved several of these perspectives. For example, first order kinship also implied strong economic

involvement with the miller; friendship was often the result of schisms which in turn resulted in further solidification of the original tie; friendship links also implied symmetrical economic exchange, etc. The extent to which the links were reinforced by secondary or tertiary relationships, implied stronger and more loyal affiliation. The more multiplex the link, the stronger it was.

On this basis then, the miller's political elite was defined. From this elite, the team or the electoral slate which was to engage in factional competition was either chosen or accepted on a voluntary basis, the latter being important in that team membership involved greater payoffs than did more general factional or elite membership. And given the dichotomization of the village elite into competing groups coupled with their absolute economic control, the incentives toward persons volunteering for team membership were great. From that perspective, the miller was free to choose his team taking into account the strength of the link from among those who had the time, resources and incentives to volunteer.

The teams which thus emerged become apparent through the council competition and the political arena which this implied. At this point, in dealing with team membership as exhibited through council competition, we are also dealing at the same time with the second rule of the political game, that of the composition of the competing teams. In this case too, as with elite recruitment, there were the major characteristics of recruitment on diverse principles in keeping with Nicholas' (1965) basic definitional criteria.

In looking at team membership as exhibited either through active competition with one of the factional parties for a council seat or through the nomination of one of these persons, the recruitment criteria of personnel to team membership can be summarized for persons between the years 1907 and 1942. In such a way, a rough index of what has been labelled by Mitchell (1969) to be the "content" of relationships in a network, or one of the "interactional

criteria," can be obtained. Table 5.5 presents these criteria of recruitment or in other words, the interactional criteria of team membership.

Table 5.5: Recruitment Criteria of the Miller Teams+

	Criteria: (cf: p. 143)						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A) Ramprashad's links with:							
John Ramprashad	*						
Ernest Ramprashad	*						
! Rajaram Dabi		*					
Dagleish		*	*				
P. T. Premsingh		*	*				
Dindayalsingh		*	*				
# Ramdharry		*	*	*			
# Jagdial		*		*			
Hussein Amin		*				*	
# Jaigobin Singh				*			
Chandkairan						*	
Jurany						*	
! Dookhun							*
= Morrison		*					
Simpson		*					
Chandrakha						*	
Nagassar						*	
Rajkumari						*	
Permaul						*	
Azeez						*	
Bahadur						*	
B) Panchar's links with:							
Johnson		*					*
Jaikarran			*		*		
Panday			*		*		
Manraj Maraj			*		*		
Darshanand			*			*	
# Dookhun				*			*
Bhagwandin					*		
Loknauth					*		
Bandoo					*		
! Ramdharry					*		
! Jagdial					*		
! Jaigobin Singh					*		
# Rajaram Dabi					*		
Imdad Usman						*	
Seeram Ramhit						*	

Table 5.5 continued

	Criteria:						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Harbaran						*	
= Parmeshwar							*
Jai Panchar	*						
Gangadeen				*		*	
Dial Dabi						*	
Deen						*	
Yacoob						*	
Abdul Ebrahim						*	
Jawahir						*	

Note: + In the lengthy period under discussion, the content of a relationship may have altered over time. In such cases, all criteria which were relevant are noted.

! Indicates that the person, at some point, defected from the faction to the other.

Indicates that the person, at some point, defected to the faction from the other.

=. Indicates that the person moved from a neutral position to the particular faction.

In cases of defection, the person is included in both lists.

What is apparent from the patterning of the recruitment criteria is the fact that each faction has placed a different emphasis on the possible criteria which could be utilized. Each faction leader was carrying out the major part of recruitment according to different principles. Table 5.6 presents the totals for criteria used within each faction.

Table 5.6: Criteria Utilized by each Faction Leader.

Criteria:	Ramprashad	Panchar
1	2 link(s)	1 link(s)
2	9	1
3	4	4
4	3	2
5	0	9
6	9	10
7	1	3

The outstanding differences are in criteria two and five. Panchar was emphasizing extended kinship links; Ramprashad was emphasizing friendship links.

Furthermore, if the nature of the internal links between team members are analyzed, the same pattern holds. Within the Panchar faction, the only known linkages are those of extended kinship among the following eleven persons: Jaikarran; Panday; Maraj; Bhagwandin; Loknauth; Bandoo; Ramdharry; Jai Panchar; Jagdial; Jaigobin Singh; and Rajaram Dabi. On the other hand, within the Ramprashad faction, there were three independent kinship groupings, those of Ernest and John Ramprashad; the Ramdharry - Jagdial - Jaigobin Singh - Dindayalsingh - Rajaram Dabi group; and the Dagleish - Jurany relationship. In addition, there was the close friendship tie between Dagleish and Premsingh and Amin and Premsingh.

The Panchar faction had a far greater emphasis on extended kinship than did the Ramprashad faction. This holds for both the relationships between leader and followers and for the additional relationships which existed between the members themselves. Panchar used more extended kin links in terms of absolute number; in terms of the extent to which the lateral extensions were mobilized; and as a result, the Panchar faction had less independent groupings internally than did the Ramprashad faction.

Even after subversions took place with persons who had crosscutting ties moving from one faction to another, the same pattern holds. This however raises the question of the nature of the ties which were both severed and created in those cases of subversion. Which interactional criteria could be deemed a worthwhile exchange? Table 5.7 presents the nature of the links which were subverted and subsequent links characterizing the new affiliation.

Table 5.7: The Content of Links in Subversion Cases.

Person	Subverted Link		New Link
Ramdharry	2nd Order Kinship	+	Friendship/Schism/ Symmetrical Economic.
Jagdial	2nd Order Kinship	+	Friendship/Schism.
Jaigobin Singh	2nd Order Kinship		Schism
Rajaram Dabi	Friendship		2nd Order Kinship +
Dookhun	Transaction		Transaction/Schism.
Morrison	(none)		Friendship
Parmeshwar	(none)		Transaction

From this several patterns become apparent. First, single ties were generally lost to multiplex links. Secondly, all subversions were rational in that more was gained than was lost. Accepting this as a premise, what becomes apparent is that particular links or combinations of ties were more binding than others. For example, a friendship-economic tie could break a second order kin link, although friendship alone as the link did not hold. A schism in a kin link however could break the tie to the point of defection although such a situation depends on other factors, such as having internal links within the other faction. The point which emerges however given the fact that certain links or combinations could and were broken by others, is that the types of links, or the content of ties, can be scaled according to relative importance.

What this implies is another criteria of the interactional type, intensity, (Mitchell, 1969) which can be utilized in looking at the internal structure of factions and the nature of the teams which emerged for competition.

The scale which logically emerges is as follows:

Criteria 1 or first order kin relationship can be given a weight of 4. It is the most secure and is empirically seldom broken;

Criteria 2, 3 and 5, friendship, symmetrical economic exchange and second order kinship can be given a weight of 3 in the light of Table 5.8;

Criteria 4, a schism within factional ranks, is given a weight of 2 on the grounds that it may or may not be as important as criteria 2, 3 and 5 depending on circumstance;

Criteria 6 is given a weight of 2 as compared with criteria 1, the transaction, which is given a weight of 1, being less secure than the former which in turn has less strength than the criteria weighted 3 and probably the equivalent intensity of a schism.

Now when this weighting is applied to every link within each faction: the total intensity for the Ramprashad team is 72; the total intensity within the Panchar team is 73. The mean intensity within the Ramprashad group for each person in terms of their relationship to Ramprashad is 3.4. The mean within the Panchar faction, or the average intensity of each person's link to Panchar is 3.0. In addition, the mean of every link, regardless of person is 2.6 within the Ramprashad team and 2.4 within the Panchar team.

Given then a measure of intensity, the internal composition of the two teams is almost identical although they vary considerably in terms of the content of the links between leader and followers.

This same situation emerges in viewing persons who have multiplex ties to the leader. Table 5.8 presents the distribution of these combinations between the two factional teams.

Table 5.8: Distribution of Multiplex Links in the Teams.

Combination Type	Number of Persons	
	Ramprashad	Panchar
- friendship + symetrical economic	3	0
- friendship + symmetrical economic + schism	1	0
- friendship + schism	1	0
- friendship + patron-client	1	0
- friendship + transaction	0	1
- symmetrical economic + 2nd order kinship	0	3
- symmetrical economic + patron-client	0	1
- schism + patron-client	0	1
- schism + transaction	0	1

Again the internal nature of the two teams varies directly in terms of the content of the relationships which make up the team in terms of leader-follower relationships, i.e., the multiplex ties within the factions differ in content. However, in looking at the ratio of multiplex to single-interest ties on the assumption that multiplexity gives greater strength to the link between leader and follower, the per cent of persons with multiplex links as compared with the total personnel of the team is 35% within the Ramprashad team and 34.2% within the Panchar team. Similarly, the per cent of multiplex ties as compared with total links is 21.4% in the Ramprashad faction and 23.3% within the Panchar faction.

The content of the multiplex links vary, but their proportion within each team is almost identical. In addition, if the links are weighted according to the intensity scale, the total intensity of Ramprashad's multiplex links is 36; Panchar's is 34. The mean intensity per person who is engaged in multiplex tie is 6.0 within the Ramprashad team; 4.9 within the Panchar team. The intensity

of the multiplex links then within the Ramprashad faction is slightly greater than within the Panchar team.

A last issue which can be looked at is the nature of the asymmetrical as opposed to symmetrical ties within the factional teams. The assumption underlying this perspective is the fact that a faction leader has as a major task that of keeping his individual links in repair. Given the economic control which the millers exercised over the large mass however, it is apparent that controlling the symmetrical links was far costlier than controlling the asymmetrical ones which by definition took care of themselves because of the pattern of cyclical indebtedness and the subsequent lack of options by the debtor. The question is thus, was one faction utilizing more resources in the maintenance of the team because of a higher proportion of symmetrical relationships which had to be kept in continuous repair? Table 5.9 collapses the content criteria into whether the links involved were symmetrical or asymmetrical.

Table 5.9: Symmetry and Asymmetry Within the Teams.

Criteria	Symmetrical	Asymmetrical
	1, 2, 3, 5	6, 7
Ramprashad	15 links/60%	10 links/40%
Panchar	17 links/58.6%	12 links/41.4%

What emerges then, is that both teams had the same proportion of high cost as opposed to limited cost links. The utilization of resources for internal team maintenance was the same for both factions.

To summarize thus far: In order to view the internal structure of factions, the rules governing the eligibility of persons for competition were looked at from the perspective of the community-elite-team-leadership continuum. Leadership was the prerogative of the millers who in turn had exclusive access to the prizes of the competition as a result of the economic control exerted by them

as outlined in Chapter Four. From this perspective as well, the political community was in fact the village population, tied to the millers by the need for credit, services, and indebtedness.

The use of the services provided by the mills and the choice of mill, immediately divided this community into two competing political elite groups. The kinds of relationships which linked the community and its individuals into elite membership were seven in number: first order kinship; friendship ties; schismatic relations with the other faction; patron-client ties over long periods; second and third order kinship; transactional relationships with the miller; and symmetrical economic exchanges.

From this elite the millers chose and the elite volunteered for team membership. The teams which emerged were visible in the village council arena as electoral slates. An analysis of the resulting teams further bore out Nicholas' (1965) emphasis on the diversity of the recruitment principles and also lead into an examination of the second major rule relating to the internal structure of factions, the rules governing the composition of the competing teams. In analyzing the content of team relationships or recruitment principles, several major points emerged. First, it was found that each faction emphasized different principles for its recruitment of teams from the elite. One emphasized extended kinship links; the other emphasized friendship ties. In addition, the links between team members exhibited the same pattern.

Second, the patterns of linkages were examined in the light of subversions. It was found that single-stranded links were less durable than multi-stranded ones and that particular combinations of relationships, or particular types of content, could be scaled according to relative strength. On this basis, all the types of relationships, that is the recruitment criteria and the content, were weighted in importance and a measure of intensity thus obtained. When the links of both factions were weighted in this way, it was found that the internal

composition of the teams were identical. Both teams exhibited the same degree of intensity despite the different principles according to which the members were recruited.

Thirdly, in looking at the content of the multiplex links which existed between leaders and followers, it was found that differences in content were again apparent, but at the same time, both factions had the same proportion of multiplex to single-stranded links within the team. In addition, the intensity of the multiplex links varied only slightly between the two teams.

Finally, both teams had the same proportion of symmetrical as compared with asymmetrical relationships between leaders and followers. The maintenance costs for both faction leaders was thus the same.

In short, in dealing with the internal structure of factions, we have dealt with Bailey's concept of rules governing eligibility for competition and the composition of competing teams. In dealing with these rules we have also utilized first, Mitchell's interactional measures of content and intensity and secondly, Bailey's characterization of two of a leader's major tasks - recruitment and team maintenance (1969: 60).

The findings indicate that the two factions utilized different principles of recruitment and therefore the factional teams varied in terms of the content of the internal relationships. At the same time, intensity measures indicate that both factions were alike. The teams, in short, differed in content, but in fact were evenly matched according to other measurements.

In dealing with the internal structure of factions during this period however, it is possible to further specify their nature. This can be done through two means. First, the issue of the "core" which characterized the factions as related to the typology presented in Chapter 1 can be analyzed. Secondly, an analysis can be done of the composition of the competing teams at different times during the period, using measures of the kind described by Mitchell (1969)

as being relevant to ego-centred networks.

In dealing with this latter issue, social networks are available which refer to particular situations of team composition at specific times. Data on such networks or action-sets are to be found in the lists of the persons who were nominated and did the nominating of candidates for the 1937 and 1939 village council elections. These are presented in Table 5.11 and 5.12.

On the basis of these, one can first consider how far the teams were a "closed" network in which members nominated each other as opposed to how far the teams were part of a wider radiating network. This can be measured by viewing the proportion of seconders and nominators who were themselves candidates. This proportion increases from one election to the next within both factions and so indicates an increase in "closedness." This is presented in Table 5.10.

Table 5.10: Seconders and Candidates in Council Elections.


Year	Ramprashad Team	Panchar Team
1937	54.5%	55.5%
1939	60.0%	75.0%

In addition, both factions showed similar increases between the 1937 and 1939 elections.

Secondly, for the 1937 election, the two networks were linked to each other through the nomination of Loknauth by Premsingh. No such linkage exists in 1939.

Thirdly, one can consider whether all members of a team are linked into a single network or whether they are divided into disconnected nets. For the 1937 election, the Ramprashad team comprised two mutually exclusive networks while the Panchar action-set is tied into one unit. The opposite situation occurs however in the 1939 election.


Table 5.11: Networks of Nominators and Seconders of Candidates, 1937 Council Elections.




*Candidates names are underlined.

Table 5.12: Networks of Nominators and Seconders of Candidates, 1939 Council Elections.

JAUNDOO FACTION:



BANKAY FACTION:



*Candidates names are underlined.

As will be seen in a later discussion of the implications of these and other measures, these preliminary observations are associated with particular implications. First, the increase in "closedness" exhibited by both factions from one election to the next is tied into the fact that there was developing gradually, a criticism of the factional game by the political community. Secondly, as this criticism increased, not only did the factions close ranks within themselves, but also in terms of interaction between the factions. As a result, no cross-nominating occurred in 1939.

Finally, the disconnectedness of networks will be seen to relate to the electoral success of a particular faction relative to the other. Where connectedness in the total net appears, there also appears a greater strength at the polls.

The more general point which can be raised at this time however, is whether the action-sets which were thus utilized by the two competing factions for the purposes of electing their members vary to a greater extent than did their actual team structure in terms of previous measures. This, as well as a more specific comparison of action-sets, can be analyzed through the application of several suggested "morphological" measures (Mitchell, 1969). Table 5.13 presents the density measures;[101] Table 5.14 presents the reachability measures;[102] and Table 5.15 presents the measure of range within the action-set.[103]

Table 5.13: Density of the Teams, 1937 and 1939.

		1937	1939
(a)	For candidates only:		
	Ramprashad team	40.0%	33.3%
	Panchar team	50.0%	38.8%
(b)	For the total network:		
	Ramprashad team	20.0%	26.6%
	Panchar team	25.0%	23.9%

Several observations emerge first from the density measures. First, the Panchar team exhibited more dense relationships in all cases with the exception of the 1939 total network. Here the difference between the two factions however, is far less than in the previous three measurements. For the most part then, the Panchar team was more dense than the Ramprashad team.

Secondly, the density of the candidates net decreases from 1937 to 1939 in both factions. At the same time however, the total Ramprashad network increases in density from one election to the next while the Panchar density decreases. In short, the density of the Panchar team decreases over time; the density of the Ramprashad team exhibits both tendencies, a decrease among candidates, an increase within the total network. This latter tendency was sufficient in addition, to make the Ramprashad team more dense than the Panchar team for the first time.

Lastly, the ratio of the candidates density measure as compared with the total network,[104] exhibits both changes over time and differences between the two factions. The Panchar faction has a consistently higher ratio of difference between candidates and total team than does the Ramprashad faction. In addition, the ratio of difference decreases within both factions from one election to the next.

The density measure thus enables three major deductions. First, the action-sets activated or the specific teams fielded for particular competitions differ from one faction to the other in terms of the denseness of structure exhibited. Secondly, this structure within both teams changes over time. Lastly, the difference in density measures for the total network as compared with the candidates net has obvious implications for the concepts of "core" and "support" as exhibited during this period. The issues are thus why the action sets of the two factions differ and why both factions change over time such that the candidates density decreases while the total network remains

constant or increases. The last issue of core and support will be discussed later.

In attempting to deal with the former two issues however, the other two measures, reachability (cf.: note 102) and range (cf.: note 103) also become relevant.

Table 5.14: Reachability of the Teams, 1937 and 1939.

		1937	1939
(a)	For the candidates only:		
	Ramprashad team	.9	1.3
	Panchar team	1.6	1.5
(b)	For the total network:		
	Ramprashad team	1.6	1.5
	Panchar team	2.1	1.6

Again the Panchar team exhibits more dense relationships than does the Ramprashad team, thereby implying greater efficiency and cohesiveness. This difference however, is more acute than in the density measures in that Panchar's 1939 total net has a higher measure of reachability as compared with the density of that net.

Secondly, reachability over time increases within the Ramprashad faction for one net; remains almost constant for the other; but declines from one election to the next within the Panchar faction for both nets. This trend is also similar to that exhibited by the density measure, except that although the Panchar faction's structure decreases according both measures, in the density measure the Ramprashad team declined in the candidates net, while in the reachability measure on the other hand, the decrease is in the total net.

Lastly, the ratio of candidates reachability as compared with the reachability for the total network again exhibits changes over time and differences

between the two factions. In this case however, it is the Ramprashad faction which has a consistently higher difference between the candidates as compared with the total network. In addition, the ratio of reachability for both factions decreases over time.

The range exhibited by the networks for both the candidates and the total net in terms of first order and second order links for the two elections is presented in Table 5.15.

Table 5.15: Measure of Range of the Teams, 1937 and 1939.

	1937	1939
(a) For the candidates only:		
Ramprashad team:		
1. First order links:	2.9	2.8
2. Second order links:	3.6	6.1
Panchar team:		
1. First order links:	2.8	3.5
2. Second order links	5.8	5.0
(b) For the total Network:		
Ramprashad team:		
1. First order links:	2.0	2.4
2. Second order links:	3.0	5.3
Panchar team:		
1. First order links:	2.0	3.0
2. Second order links:	4.3	4.5

In this case of range, there is a new trend as compared with the other two measures. That is, the dense nature of the Panchar faction as compared with Ramprashad faction is far less according to the measure of range than was the case with the density measure and the reachability measure. Here, the first order links for both factions in both networks exhibit almost identical structure for 1937. In 1939 however, the Panchar team's range was greater than the

Ramprashad's team in terms of first order links. In the case of second order links also, the Panchar team has a more dense structure than the Ramprashad team for 1937. The opposite situation however, occurs in 1939. At the same time, this is accompanied by a general increase in range of both factions and both nets between 1937 and 1939 with the exception of the second order links within the candidates' net of the Panchar group and the first order links within the Ramprashad candiddates net. In short, the general trend within the candidate's net is toward an increase over time in Panchar's first order links and in Ramprashad's second order links. Otherwise, the trend is towards an increase in range in the total networks for both factions, thereby implying increased mobilization of support for the ego (Mitchell 1969: 19).

Lastly, the ratio of difference in range between the candidates as compared with the total network is greater among both factions. This ratio is almost identical for both factions in terms of first order links. However, in the case of second order links, the ratio of difference within the Panchar group for both years is far greater than within the Ramprashad faction. Over time however, the ratio of difference remains constant for both factions.

The deductions set out as a result of the density measures, namely the fact that action-sets of both factions differed and the fact that both teams changed over time, also hold for the other two measures. The issue raised was why this occurred. To examine this however, a summary of the findings and implications of the three morphological features is presented in Table 5.16.

In addition, the action-sets can be measured according to the intensity[105] of content of the links within it. This is presented in Table 5.17.

Table 5.16: Summary of Observations on the Structural Features of the Factions.

Observations on:	Density	Reachability	Range
1. Panchar faction as compared with Ramprashad:	-Panchar more dense except for 1939 total network	-Panchar greater for all networks.	-1937: first order same for both; : second order greater in Panchar faction; -1939: first order greater for Panchar; : second order greater for Ramprashad.
2. Changes over time from 1937 election to 1939 election:	-decrease in both factions in candidates net; -decrease in Panchar for total net; - increase in Ramprashad for total net.	-increase in Ramprashad for candidates nets; -decrease for Panchar in both nets; -decrease for Ramprashad in total net.	-decrease in Panchar's second order links in candidates net; -decrease in Ramprashad's first order links in candidates net; -otherwise, general increase for both.
3. Ratio of difference between candidates as compared with total net:	-Panchar has higher ratio of difference; -ratio decreases for both between 1937 and 1939.	-Ramprashad has higher ratio of difference; -ratio decreases for both over time.	-same for first order links; -Panchar has greater ratio for second order links; -over time, the ratio remains constant.

Table 5.17: Intensity of Action Set Links, 1937 and 1939.

	1937	1939
(a) For candidates only:		
Ramprashad action set:	4.3	4.3
Panchar action set:	2.6	2.9
(b) For total action set:		
Ramprashad action set:	3.3	4.1
Panchar action set:	3.1	2.6

From Table 5.17, it becomes apparent that the Ramprashad faction consistently fielded action-sets based on greater intensity of links than did the Panchar faction. This occurred despite the equal intensity of both factional teams as indicated previously and which implied as well that the teams were evenly matched despite differences in the content of links between leaders and followers.

The reasons for the differences in the nature of the action sets or the particular teams fielded in the particular election situation are probably due to the original recruitment principles utilized by the leaders for their teams in general. The greater density of the Panchar action-set may be due to the fact that strong pre-existing kinship links enabled more mixing of nominators and seconders than did the nature of the links within the Ramprashad team which tended on the other hand toward internal sub-groups and cleavages. This fact is further borne out by the division of the candidates and nominators into two distinct groups for the 1937 election as well as Premsingh's nomination of an opposition member, Loknauth. Throughout 1937, the Panchar action-set exhibited greater strength in terms of the structural features, density, reachability, and range. On the other hand however, the intensity of the action-sets indicate that the Ramprashad set in 1937 could counter the structural strength with their interactional strength. In short, the teams were evenly matched for the 1937

election, but this was achieved in different ways by each and was a product of the nature of the recruitment criteria which each of the leaders emphasized. Panchar emphasized his kinship relations; Ramprashad his friendship links with individuals. These differential emphases provided resources for Panchar's structural strength but at the same time, limited the interactional strength because of the finite nature of these links. Simultaneously, the more diversified relationships which characterized the Ramprashad team constrained the structural potential, but enabled the utilization of more intense links because of their less limited nature. Ramprashad could make a friend; Panchar could not make a kinsman. The deployment of the action set reflected both the resources and constraints which surrounded the faction leaders as a result of their work in team recruitment.

Finally, the results of the competition of these two evenly matched teams is borne out by the results of the election in 1937 in which the two factions each elected three members.

For 1939 however, the Ramprashad team made a clean sweep of the electoral slate almost totally demolishing the Panchar team. According to informants, this was due to a massive and well organized ampaign which the Ramprashad people waged. As can be seen from Table 5.16 however, it was also due to the increased structural strength which the Ramprashad action-set had achieved which, when coupled with the greater intensity of links, created an imbalance in the competing teams and resulted in the subsequent success of the Ramprashad faction. For example, in 1939, Panchar's density was no longer greater in the total network; Panchar's density decreased within the total net while Ramprashad's increased; Panchar's reachability index no longer exhibited the same degree of tightness as compared with Ramprashad's for either network as a result of an increase in Ramprashad's index as well as a decrease in his own; the second order range of the Ramprashad team increased to a greater range than the Panchar

team such that the implication was that a larger group was tied more tightly together within the Ramprashad team; and finally, the Panchar action-set divided into two discrete groups while the Ramprashad set united into a single network.

In short, the action-sets activated by the leaders for specific competitions were constrained by the recruitment principles and the specific nature of the links between leaders and followers which were part of the resources available for competition. At the same time, the success of each faction in competition was related to the structure of their action-set. When both were evenly matched, although this occurred through different methods, a "draw" resulted. When this balance was upset by the increased internal strength of one faction, coupled with its greater linkage intensity, the results of the competition as exhibited by the council elections reflected the more general imbalance of the teams.

The final issue left to consider in analyzing the internal structure of factions, is the nature of the core and support which characterized them. It has already been noted that the political community was defined through a basic economic alliance between farmer and miller; that the political elite was defined on the strength of this original tie by virtue of the possible additional links which could be added to the basic transactional tie; and that the political teams were the product of both voluntary membership and the assent of leadership.

In addition, specific action-sets were analyzed for particular situations and were viewed as having been derived from the networks between leaders and those followers who composed the team. This however raises an important issue of why action-sets derived from the team rather than being the basic criteria for factional membership. In other words, in light of Chapter 1, the definition of a faction was taken to be that it is an ego-centred action-set based firstly on transactional relationships. In the rice miller period, these action-sets

did exist. As noted, the basic criterion for factional membership was the transaction between miller-leader and the farmer who was thus part of the political community. These relationships however, became increasingly more exclusive through the use of six additional types of links previously discussed. Their differential use resulted in elites and teams being formed according to relationships that were never solely transactional. As a result, the action-sets mobilized by the millers for specific competitions derived from the most exclusive category of support, the team. Because of this, the action-sets for competition were based on intense rather than transactional ties. Although this leads back to the issue of the nature of the cores and supports during the period, the existence of two kinds of action-sets at different levels of organization must be explained. This will be done on the next section on interfactional competition, for the two action-sets were related to the fact that there were two types of competition occurring simultaneously and this in turn was related to the hierarchy of goals which characterized the period. For the moment however, the issue of core and support characteristics is more relevant to a discussion of the internal structure of factions. Therefore given the fact that the leaders activated action-sets from the resources available as a result of the existence of teams, the issue is the character of these action-sets in terms of the issue of core and support. Are there personnel who constitute part of a faction through several situations? If so, does this quasi-group solidify more closely into a clique?

Now the empirical presence of personnel over periods of years contributes to the notion that a core existed as part of the structure of factions during this period over and above the basic "following." In addition, the fact that the original action-set or transaction evolved in many cases to a more exclusive relationship indicates that at some point "core" can be distinguished

from "support." The three issues are then: (a) at what point can this distinction be made; (b) to what degree did this "core" solidify; and (c) what is the relation of (a) and (b) to the typology of factional solidarity presented in Chapter 1.

Qualitatively, it is possible to see that certain villagers were more intimately involved in the factional competitions than others. For example, Premsingh and Dagleish were quite obviously a crucial structural core of the Ramprashad faction as were Bhagwandin, Locknauth, and Seeram Ramhit of the Panchar faction. It is probably also possible to state that all persons who appear in Table 5.6 were the factional core for the simple reasons that their names emerge from the mass of transactional relationships in which all villagers were involved. At such a point, one would be stating that the teams of the period were coterminous with the core, and that the structural characteristics of the teams were in fact the characteristics of the core. Insofar however, as within these teams action-sets were mobilized which did not include all these available team personnel, and insofar as even the action-sets were differentiated for electoral purposes into two sub-sets, those who were allowed actively to compete for a seat as opposed to those who were utilized merely to nominate the candidates, it seems more useful to view the core as part of the team and at the same time, a more exclusive sub-unit within it. From the perspective of the core-support issue, the political community, elite and team were sub-categories of support during the period while the core can be empirically distinguished in qualitative terms from this support.

The issue however of the point at which core is distinguishable from support is also relevant to quantitative analysis, although no such measures in fact exist. It is possible to count duplicate memberships in the two electoral action-sets. In such a case, the core would be Dagleish and Premsingh

within the Ramprashad faction; Locknauth, Bhagwandin, Seeram Ramhit and Darshanand within the Panchar faction. At the same time however, it is difficult to exclude Ramprashad's first order kin from the core which would be the result of such a measure. It is probably therefore more useful to deal with action-sets and the sub-groups within them while recognizing the fact that first, persons who were no longer politically active would be excluded, for example, Jagdial and Manraj Maraj, and second, that persons who were permitted by the leader to run for election with the factional party may not have been part of the core, but rather been allowed to run as a payoff for their supporting the faction. Within these limitations however, the core can be distinguished from support and the characteristics of the solidarity of the core can be dealt with.

In this second issue, two measures are available for comparing the structure of core between the two factions. First, Bailey states that the "structure of a group can be expressed as a variable derived from the core/support ratio" (1969: 283). From this perspective, Table 5.10 becomes again relevant in which percentages of nominators who were themselves candidates is presented. In both cases, the proportion increases from one election to the next thus indicating that the factional cores were becomnng more inbred and solidified over time. As well, the Panchar core is consistently more inbred in that the entire action-set consists of a higher proportion of candidates doing the nominating than did Ramprashad's set. This concept of ratio has also been discussed in relation to the structural characteristics of the action-sets and is summarized in Table V.16. Panchar's density and range ratio is higher than Ramprashad's with the latter having a higher ratio in reference only to the reachibility measure. The implication is that the Panchar faction had a more distinguishable core than did the Ramprashad faction and the line between core and support within the team was

more definitely drawn within the Panchar faction. Finally, for density and reachability, the ratio either remains constant or decreases over time. Only Panchar's reachability measure increases. The implication here is that over time, the core of the two factions was becoming more solidified with team support either becoming part of the core or being dropped from active participation. This is in keeping as well with the results of the percentages of nominators who were also candidates, a percentage which increased over the two elections.

This increasing solidarity being exhibited by the factions is related to external features of dissatisfaction that was beginning to be verbalized within the village. The effects of this discontent are in fact the characteristics of the next historical period and are discussed in the next chapter. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the factional cores were increasing in exclusiveness by 1939 and that the Panchar faction exhibited stronger core solidity than did the Ramprashad faction.

This fact is also brought out by the second measure available for distinguishing cores based on Barnes' (1968) density measure and the taking of the arbitrary 80% density index as the criterion for distinguishing clusters within networks.[106] When this is applied to the action-sets for the elections, clustering is not found in either of the two action-sets for 1937. For 1939 however, Premsingh, Ernest Ramprashad, Ramdharry and Dabi cluster at an index of 83.3%. Similarly, within the Panchar faction, Panchar, Dookhun, Usman, Bhagwandin and Bandoo cluster at an index of 90%. In short, the cores are more distinguishable in 1939 and Panchar's core has a higher density.

The final issue is now the implications of these results for the typology of factional solidarity presented in Chapter 1. The first type of internal structure based on the transactional relationship was found to exist between the miller and the villager. The formation of this link was also viewed as

creating the political community. The second type of factional structure based on alliances of leaders, is not relevant for this period. Thirdly, the nature of core and support was found to be related not merely to the increased intensity or content of transactional relationships, but to more complex categories of differentiation. First, several types of support were distinguished based on the elite and team membership which were in turn based on more intense relationships that a transaction would imply. As result, there are several types of support, not just the transactional relationship, and from the most exclusive category of support, the core could be distinguished. Finally, this core, for the period under investigation, appeared to solidify into the clique.

In short, the concept of support cannot be reduced solely to the transactional relationship. Rather, the latter is merely one type of the former. From this perspective, the typology must be amended.

(ii) Interfactional Competition.

The second major problem for investigation has been delineated to be the nature of the competition which characterized particular resource structures and allocations. For the present period, the nature of the competition has been implicitly dealt with throughout the presentation of situations and the discussion of the internal organization of factions. The aim in this section is therefore to summarize the nature of the factional competition in terms of the rules governing how the competition should take place and the control mechanisms which were utilized to prevent the breakdown of the political game.[107]

Already noted in terms of being relevant to the present section is that a hierarchy of goals existed during this period such that prizes could be ranked in importance. The prizes of the competition consisted of control of

the village council; the maintenance of economic control; the maintenance of a differential prestige ranking; and the control of the communications nexus between two societal levels. Competition for these resulted in arenas of competition which occurred simultaneously and for the purpose of achieving the major goal, that of absolute control over the village. Two types of competition were thus occurring - the competitions over minor goals with each winning encounter seen as a step or gain within the larger arena or competition. There were thus competitions within a larger competitive arena based on the fact of hierarchically organized prizes.

As has been seen, the result of the dual character of competitions was crucial in affecting the internal structure of factions. There were therefore action-sets derived in turn from larger action-sets. The basic set was founded on a transaction between miller and villager, the formation of which defined factional membership and was part of the economic competition, or competition for economic control, being waged by the millers. From these resources of transactional links, more exclusive categories of personnel were built up such that action-sets based on intense relationships could be fielded for competitions in other arenas, such as the council arena. The hierarchical organization of goals was thus related to the factional competition in that the hierarchy resulted in two types of competitions, also hierarchically organized, and thereby intimately affected the internal structure of factions.

Furthermore, as a result of the hierarchy of goals, games and factional structures, the nature of the competition was also affected. The rules governing competition emphasized encounters and confrontations[108] between the two competing factions which took place in recurrent periodic cycles. Since the ultimate goal or prize was apical control of the village but since this

was based on the winning of other minor goals which together entailed apical control, and since a win in one arena could be balanced by a loss in another given the high cost of competing in all arenas simultaneously, the probability of one faction gaining absolute control was not great. As a result, competition was an oscillation from one arena to another; from a win to a loss; and thereby resulted in a stalemate in terms of the apical prize. To an extent, the hierarchy of prizes and the high costs of the ultimate win can be seen as well as a built-in control mechanism. Over and above this however, the hierarchy defined the nature of competition by turning it into recurrent cycles of confrontations and encounters without a decisive win by either of the two factions. A win in one arena only meant that forces and resources had to be deployed for competition in another. By the time several arenas were controlled, the costs of maintenance and the need to deploy for other arenas made cumulative wins impossible. The hierarchy of prizes then, both defined the nature of competition as being indecisive encounters and served as a control mechanism by creating high costs for an absolute win thereby preventing any one faction from ever achieving the apical prize. As such, the competition could theoretically continue in this indecisive manner indefinitely.

This cycle of confrontations and encounters can be seen in the situational events previously presented. The council elections and the chairman elections were actually legalized encounters in which both sides were forced to publicly state their strength vis-a-vis the other by mobilizing all possible links for electoral purposes. In addition to these encounters, others are apparent from the situations. For example, the refusal of the Ramprashad controlled council to allow Jaikarran to pass Armadale padi was a statement of strength by the Ramprashad group about which the Panchar faction could do nothing. That in fact was the point of the regulation which also

slightly debilitated economically the Panchar case. Nothing permanent however was to be gained. It was merely one encounter in the ongoing competition. The same holds true for the clock incident involving councillor Harbaran. It is unknown whether Harbaran was paid off or whether the Ramprashad team actually tampered with the clock. In either case, it was a winning encounter.

The Ramprashad interference in the Ramdharry-Jaikarran quarrel over land allotments can also be seen as an encounter while the fire in Panchar's factory was a confrontation or a statement of strength about which Ramprashad could do nothing. The Mohani incident on the other hand, is an example of a confrontation followed by a withdrawal. Ramprashad and his chairman suggested conciliation in the matter, while Panchar refused to consider this. Since the resources which Mohani could provide in return for support were minimal, Ramprashad withdrew. Supporting her in short, was not worth precipitating an encounter.

A different chronology is apparent in the election of Panchar as a minority chairman. It began also as a confrontation, or as a challenge to Panchar to force him to try his hand at the position given the uncontrollable nature of the council. The attempt was to force him to fail. Panchar picked up the challenge, took the position, and the Ramprashad faction responded by initiating an encounter to ensure his failure.

The declaration of the seats vacant can also be viewed as an encounter as can the race club incident. The Ramprashad faction won both, but neither incident destroyed the Panchar faction. In addition, the oscillating encounters over controlling the overseers of the village also is an indication of the indecisiveness of a given win.

Finally, competition characterizing several arenas simultaneously is apparent in the Board incident; the Bhola incident; and the attempt to change the village name. The first, in which what really occurred remains unknown,

can be seen as either an attempt at progaganda by the Panchar faction to precipitate an encounter or it was merely Ramprashad being extremely successful in the economic arena. The Bhola alliance was also part of the economic competition while the attempt to change the village name was part of the competition for prestige. Had Ramprashad succeeded, his political credit, given a village named after him, would have been overly enhanced.

His failure in this realm however, such that it is possible to state that success would have created a great imbalance between the competing teams, was largely due to the interference of the District Commissioner. Here one comes to the discussion of the control mechanisms which existed aside from the hierarchy of goals already mentioned which prevented a decisive win. Several of these additional mechanisms are apparent. The first was the legal right of the District Commissioner to interfere in the workings of the village. Related to this was the propensity of the protagonists to appeal to him for aid when an encounter appeared to be lost. In fact, from the situations presented, it is possible to distinguish an encounter from a confrontation on the basis as to whether one faction, the losing one, called on the District Commissioner to interfere.

In some situations, the call for mediation worked such as in the case of the overseers. The Pnnchar faction succeeded through mediation in having Dookhun dismissed. Unknown to them however, was the fact that another Ramprashad overseer, Gainlall, had already been persuaded to take on the job. Panchar thereby won the first round of the encounter, but ultimately lost despite the interference of the mediator. In other situations, the call for mediation could not be accommodated. For example, in the Harbaran incident the District Commissioner saw it pointless to interfere and saw as well that such interference was not crucial. The point however, is that when the encounters were threatening to become serious breaches, outside mediation

was available as in the overseer and race club incident. A control mechanism was thus available in the form of a mediator.

Another control mechanism found its expression in the alliances which periodically occurred between the two factions. These were precipitated by a mutual threat or benefit. The implication is that the two competing factions saw a common goal of maintaining their position vis-a-vis the rest of the village and vis-a-vis the outsider. As long as this common interest held, a balance could be kept.

Thirdly, control was also maintained by the fact that both sides agreed on the rules of the game. Both defined the prizes in the same way; both agreed on what constituted legitimate tactics; both utilized resources in the same way; and both had an ideology of familial elitism. There were thus no rival political structures, but rather, two teams fighting for the same prizes and resources. The competition never became a fight, but remained a competition for agreed upon prizes.

Finally, control was effected by the nature of the internal structure of the competing teams. Both were evenly matched as exhibited in the measures of their internal structural features. Given the fact that the apical prize was costly, too costly for either team, and given the fact that they were evenly matched, a balance was kept such that the competition was never decisive in that one faction wiped out another. When an imbalance did occur, such as for the 1939 election, all that happened was that one faction won the competition in that particular arena. They did not win the apical prize. The imbalance which this would require could never occur given the more general equality of the teams.

To summarize the nature of interfactional competition: It has been noted that the hierarchy of goals which existed during this period resulted in two

types of competition occurring simultaneously - competition for minor goals which in turn were part of the competition for the apical prize. This in turn affected the internal structure of factions in that action-sets could be mobilized at different levels in the basic transactional relationship between leader and follower. Finally, the nature of the competition was also affected in that first, the overall competition could never be won since the competition within each arena required too high costs for a faction to ever gain control of all the competitive arenas and hence the apical prize. Secondly the nature of the competition thus became a recurrent cyclical pattern of ongoing encounters and confrontations with no decisive win by any faction. The hierarchy of prizes, competitions and factional structures thus served as a control mechanism and at the same time, defined the nature of the competition into one which had a recurrent pattern.

Notes: Chapter 5.

1. Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969 and with Dagleish, January, 1970.
2. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, November, 1969.
3. Minutes of the Council Meeting of Bush Lot Country District, October 30, 1933.
4. Minutes of the Council Meetings of Bush Lot Country District, 1930-1935.
5. Interview with Dagleish, January, 1970.
6. Ibid.
7. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969.
8. Ibid.
9. Abstracted from Minutes of the Council Meetings of Bush Lot Country District, 1930-1935.
10. Ordinance #16 of 1935.
11. Letter from the Acting Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 16, 1937.
12. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village Council, 1937.
13. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village Council, Elections for 1937, December, 1936.
14. Interview with Dagleish, March, 1970.
15. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, November, 1969.
16. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970.
17. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September, 1937.
18. Letter from District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to Secretary, Local Government Board, November 5, 1937.
19. Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969.

20. Ibid., and Letter from District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Local Government Board, November 16, 1937.

21. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970.
During his career, Ramprashad served on many national committees, for example, the Local Government Board; the Local Board of Guardians; and in later years, he was the President of the West Berbice Union of Local Authorities; President of the Rice Producers' Association; Vice-President of the Rice Marketing Board; a Member of the Transport and Harbours Board; a Director of the Rice Development Company; and a Director of the British Guiana Credit Corporation.

22. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, February, 1970.

23. Report of the Returning Officer for Bush Lot Village Elections, November 26, 1937.

24. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Secretary of the Local Government Board, November 29, 1937.

25. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970.

26. Ibid.

27. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village Council, December, 1937 and December, 1938.

28. Interview with Dagleish, January, 1970.

29. Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969.

30. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, November 20, 1939.

31. Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969.

32. Ibid.

33. Report of T. Thompson, Returning Officer for Bush Lot Village Elections, November 28, 1939.

34. Letter from the Acting District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village District, December 13, 1939.

35. Letter from the District Commissioner to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, November 7, 1940.

36. Letter from the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 13, 1940.

37. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 16, 1940.

38. Minute from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, undated.

39. Letter from Harbaran to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 16, 1940.

40. Petition from Abdul Ebrahim and eleven others to the Chairman of the Local Government Board, December 17, 1940.

41. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 16, 1940.

42. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, December 21, 1940.

43. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970.

44. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, November, 1969.

45. Letter from John Mohamed to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, June 7, 1939.

46. Letter from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, May 16, 1939.

47. Interview with Dagleish, January, 1970.

48. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, November, 1969.

49. Letter from Mohani, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, May 4, 1938.

50. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village District, May 25, 1938.

51. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, June 10, 1938.

52. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, November, 1969.

53. Letter from N. I. Dookhun, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, August 21, 1936.

54. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to A. B. Ramprashad, Bush Lot Village, January 9, 1937.

55. Letter from A. B. Ramprashad to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, January 16, 1937.

56. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village District, February 10, 1937 and March 8, 1937.

57. Letter from A. B. Ramprashad to the Colonial Secretary, Georgetown, March 15, 1937.

58. Letter from the Colonial Secretary, Georgetown, to A. B. Ramprashad, March 31, 1937.

59. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, November, 1969.

60. Ibid.

61. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, August 7, 1940.

62. Letter from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 4, 1940.

63. Letter from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 26, 1940.

64. Minutes of the Meeting of Bush Lot Village Council, December 30, 1940.

65. Letter from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 31, 1940.

66. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, September 1, 1941.

67. Letter from the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, Georgetown, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 27, 1941.

68. Letter from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, September 4, 1941.

69. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, October, 1969.

70. Ibid.

71. Letter from N. I. Dookhun to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, October 31, 1937.

72. Letter from F. Johnson, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, October 28, 1937.

73. Letter from F. Johnson to the District Commissioner, November 11, 1937.

74. Letter from N. I. Dookhun to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 3, 1937.

75. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village District, November 23, 1937.

76. Letter from the District Commissioner to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village District, November 23, 1937.

77. Letter from N. I. Dookhun to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 1, 1937.

78. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Secretary, Local Government Board, Georgetown, December 17, 1937.

79. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Secretary, Local Government Board, November 5, 1937.

80. Ibid.

81. Letter from P. T. Premsingh, Chairman, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, February 8, 1938.

82. Letter from J. Panchar, T. Bhagwandin and Seeram Ramhit to the Local Government Board, February 9, 1938.

83. Ibid., and Letter from J. Panchar and T. Bhagwandin to the Local Government Board, February 16, 1938.

84. This was rationalized by the Ramprashad group as not having known the full facts of the case because the November and December Minutes were incorrectly written. (Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Secretary, Local Government Board, February 24, 1938.)
In fact, P. Gainlall was ready to accept reappointment and he was a strong Ramprashad supporter.

85. Ibid.

86. Minutes of the Meeting of the Bush Lot Village Council, February 21, 1938.

87. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, October, 1969.

88. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, December 17, 1940.

89. Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Bush Lot Village Council, February 11, 1938.

90. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, July 2, 1940.

91. Letter from the Agricultural Superintendent, New Amsterdam, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, August 21, 1940.

92. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 21, 1940.

93. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, November 26, 1940.

94. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 3, 1940.

95. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 20, 1935.

96. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, December 11, 1935.

Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 23, 1935.

97. Ibid.

98. After Bailey, 1969.

99. Ibid.

100. Letters from the District Commissioner to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, November 18, 1937 and November 20, 1939 concerning the Returning Officer's report.

101. "Density" is defined as "the extent to which links which could possibly exist among persons do in fact exist" (Mitchell, 1969: 18). The formula utilized is: $\frac{200a}{n(n-1)}$ (Barnes, 1968).

102. "Reachability . . . implies that every specified person can be contacted within a stated number of steps from any given starting point" (Mitchell, 1969: 15).
"The sociological significance . . . lies in the way in which the links in a person's network may be channels for the transmission of information including judgements and opinions especially when these serve to reinforce norms and bring pressure to bear in some specified person. This is particularly important where links . . . lead back to ego" (Mitchell, 1969: 17).
As derived from Mitchell's description, the method of computation is as follows:
From a matrix of steps between all nodes:

$$\frac{\text{Nodes} \times [(1 \text{ step} \times n) + (2 \text{ steps} \times n) + (3 \text{ steps} \times n) \ldots]}{\text{Total Aggregate Steps}}$$

103. "The first order range or number of persons in direct contact with the person on whom the network is anchored is likely to be a significant feature of a personal network . . . if the emphasis is on mobilizing support for Ego." "Range here refers to direct contacts. The range could equally refer to the second, or any order contact if necessary" (Mitchell, 1969: 19).
As utilized here, range is computed for first and second order links.

104. What is implied by "ratio of difference" is the percentage difference between the "candidates net" and the "total net" obtained by subtracting the percentage for total net from the percentage of the candidates net.

105. The ascription of intensity is based on the same scaling technique utilized previously.

106. Barnes in fact distinguishes between "cluster" and "clique." This distinction is not utilized here.

107. After Bailey, 1969.

108. The definition of "encounter" and "confrontation" are taken from Bailey's (1969) description.

Chapter 6: The Period of Displacement, 1943-1947.

(a) Changes in the Structure of Resources.

By 1943, changes in the resource structure and resource allocation within the village, which had begun earlier, coalesced into a whole. This finally resulted in concomitant changes in the factional process.

What were the nature of these resource changes?

(i) Changes in Suffrage Requirements.

Ordinance No. 16 of 1935, as has been noted, removed the requirement that a village councillor had to be literate in English. It also provided for the election rather than the appointment of chairmen in village districts and made provisions for the use of the secret ballot in elections. It meant that every individual had an added resource to exchange with the politically active elite.

(ii) The Change in Village Status.

The effects of changes in the suffrage laws would have been minimal had they not been followed in the next year with the change of Bush Lot from a Country to Village District.

In 1935, a public meeting was held at the school at which proprietors and residents complained that the cost of administering the village was too high considering the amount of public works being done. They complained that the chairman Ramprashad never went back and, therefore, never knew what was happening in the cultivation areas. They stated that they wanted new councillors and objected as well to the proposed change of the village name to Rampur.

Dagleish and Premsingh were major organizers[1] of this move, for they saw the potential of increasing their own positions of power through a council

which had an electorate in the light of the villagers' dissatisfaction with the Ramprashad regime. In attempting to save themselves from the public outcry, Dagleish and Premsingh took the position that they had not been involved in the economic machinations of the rice millers since Premsingh was a tailor and Dagleish was a driver at Bath Estate. Their strategy was to disassociate themselves from the rice miller competition in the light of complaints, and to establish their own power base separate from the economic one which the millers had used.

Through their petitioning the District Commissioner and Local Government Board, and by virtue of their positions on the council, the status of the village was altered in 1936.

Now the results of these two changes were not immediately effective in altering the political and factional processes which had been occurring. This was due to several factors.

First, the majority of villagers were still economically bound to the millers who still maintained their competitive relationship. Everyone knew who brought their padi where, and it was thus to the voter's advantage, in view of the powers of the council, to make sure his faction remained in power.

Secondly, Premsingh and Dagleish were too intimately involved in the old alignments and competitions to actually provide a new leadership which opposed the old system. They were bound to the old system, and in any case, the political base which they had anticipated had not emerged because of the continued economic dependency. When the two incidents in early 1938 between Premsingh and the Maraj family polarized the village along the old factional lines, Dagleish and Premsingh were eliminated from the new leadership.

The immediate effects of the initial changes were therefore limited. They did allow, however, the villagers somewhat more say in village affairs, and did raise a sense of political consciousness. The number of petitions after

1936 which complained about various problems[2] can be viewed as an index of this despite the fact that the signatories followed factional alignments. In short, people began to see themselves as a political as well as an economic base, but this perception was not translated into an attack on the factional process until several years later. What had to occur in the meanwhile, was that the economic control of the millers had to be curtailed and a new leadership had to emerge which was not explicitly tied to the old competition and which was capable, at the same time, of exploiting the new political base and dissatisfaction within the village. By 1943, these conditions were satisfied as a result of several additional changes which had occurred.

(iii) The Rice Marketing Board.

One of the major changes was the formation in 1939, by the colonial government, of the Rice Marketing Board in an attempt to rationalize the rice industry.

"In the early history of the rice industry, the marketing of rice within the colony was handled by millers, private individuals and commercial concerns. As production increased, surplus exceeded local requirements and an export trade was born. Exports continued to increase from year to year, and a large amount of export agents appeared on the scene. Competition among them was keen and they were continually underselling each other in the West Indian market. As a result, the producer received a very low price for his rice, and his hardships were increased by the uncertainty of the value of his produce from year to year. At the outbreak of the war in 1939, conditions were almost chaotic and the industry bore all the marks of lack of organization, instability and uneconomic prices. There were about forty exporting concerns and approximately one hundred and seventy spies and small millers competing destructively in the buying and selling of rice. . . . Cognizant of these difficulties, government intervened to provide some form of protection to rice

producers, and the Rice Marketing Board came into being."[3]

The Board would buy rice from the producer at a stated price, and paid cash. For the Bush Lot cultivator, an alternate way of selling produce had been found which could compete with the rice millers' hegemony, provided that the cultivator could survive any given crop year without depending on the credit facilities extended by the millers. This possibility was made probable by two further developments which occurred.

(iv) The Extension of Provision Farming.

In the late thirties, and particularly by 1942, an increasing proportion of villagers were turning their cultivation lots, to the rear of the village, into farms for the growing of greens and provision crops while maintaining their rice crops solely on the lands rented from the Local Authority behind the Crown Dam.[4] The impetus for this change in land use pattern was twofold.

First, the land in front of the Crown Dam had been planted for forty years in rice, and the yield had been continuously decreasing to the point whereby the average yield per acre was six bags of padi.[5] Secondly, the government had established a "Grow More Food Campaign" to eliminate the need for imports during the war. Agents had been actively encouraging farmers to change to provisions growing while pointing out the low returns obtained from rice and the fact that the cultivation lot area was slightly higher than most of the land in the district, and hence suitable for provisions if the drainage were improved.[6]

The changeover put five hundred and ten acres of land under provisions, or just slightly less than the amount of land under rice in the New and Jib Lands.[7] The implication was that a family could then provide most of its consumption needs with a probable surplus of varying crops to exchange or sell. This change from monocrop production also gave the farmers more flexibility in that they were less prone to total crop failure.

The effects of the change in land use were two. First, it provided cultivators with more of their subsistence needs and gave them more flexibility such that their dependence on the credit facilities of the millers through cyclical indebtedness could be somewhat curtailed.[8] Secondly, the expansion of provision farming required improved drainage facilities. This was to put a severe strain on the financial resources of the village such that the persons responsible for the depressed state - the elite - as well as the inability to make improvements, came under increasing attack from the villagers.[9]

(v) The Increase in Literacy.

Another major change which reached fluorescence was the growth of a second generation of villager who was at least minimally literate in English as a result of the educational facilities in the village. For it has been alleged that the rice millers used various schemes to take advantage of persons illiterate in English and who were, therefore, unable to check the records which the millers kept of transactions. A common practice appears to have been for a villager, having come to the mill for one bag of rice for home use, to be asked to put his mark on a receipt that recorded he had taken three bags.[10]

Between 1931 and 1946, the literacy rate in Guyana among East Indians had increased from 25.1% to 56% (Nath, 1970: 247), and the survey of educational levels reached (cf. Chapter 2) indicates a similar upward swing. Informants state that as their children began to go to school, they would bring them to the mill in order to check the transactions which the millers recorded. This action, and the increased literacy in the village, thus eliminated to a great extent one area of potential exploitation by the millers.

(vi) The State of the Village Economy.

By 1941, the finances of the village, and its viability as a local

authority, had reached an extremely low point. The problems, as has been seen, had been building for some time, and finally culminated when the council could not afford to improve the drainage system of the village in order to accommodate demands of persons who wished to grow provisions.[11]

In the late thirties, it was extremely commonplace for officials and labourers hired by the local authority to have to wait up to eight months for receipt of their salaries and wages. For example, after Dookhun was dismissed in 1938, A. B. Ramprashad asked the District Commissioner to hold for him four months of Dookhun's salary as it was owed to Ramprashad who had loaned him money "to help him out of his domestic and financial difficulties as there was no money to pay him from district funds."[12] The District Commissioner also received a complaint from Maikoo, the koker watchman, who stated that both Panchar and the Loan Bank were pressing him for some of the money loaned to him, and he asked for at least two months of back salary to be able to settle with them.[13] Again, the ranger Decroop was dismissed by the local authority for neglecting his duties. At that time, the village owed him seven months salary. After his dismissal, he obtained a lawyer to collect.[14] The same situation had occurred in 1937 after the dismissal of ranger Dass whose lawyer asked the District Commissioner to guarantee that back wages of twelve months would be paid to his client.[15] The District Commissioner, however, declined to do this "as the district has no money at present."[16]

Finally, the ordinary labourers were not receiving wages for work done,[17] and in 1937, the council asked the District Commissioner for an overdraught of $600 pending the collection of rates in order to pay off its outstanding paysheets.[18]

It had thus reached the point whereby the villagers were refusing to work for the local authority and public works were not getting done. In turn, the local authority was caught in a vicious circle. Since they could not pay wages,

the labourers could not pay their rates and rents. And since the village could not collect these, they had no resources with which to pay the labourers.

The District Commissioner refused to advance the above loan on the grounds that the money would be used to pay for works already done, and that there would be no guarantee that future work would be paid for out of current rates. Furthermore, he argued that the local authority had been giving out work knowing full well that there were no funds available to pay for them. Finally, there were no funds from which an overdraught could be made. The only solution was to stop all works and collect outstanding rates.[19]

In the previous year, however, the authority had received a loan from the Local Government Board of $728 to carry out works.[20] By 1938, however, the District Commissioner was trying to prevent a situation of continued indebtedness and force the council into collecting rates, rents and arrears, and thus be able to carry on village administration independent of outside financial sources.[21]

By 1939, however, nothing had improved. By August of that year, only 35% of the rates and 36% of the arrears had been collected. In addition, over $600 was owed on unpaid paysheets; $400 was owed on loans which should have been repaid before 1939; and $200 was owed on loans for the current year. Finally, there were additional outstanding accounts amounting to over $100.[22]

In 1940, the village again applied to the District Commissioner to secure a loan for $827 for the authority so that the drainage sluice could be re-erected. This had become necessary because several years before, accretion had begun on the West Berbice coast with the result that silt had built up one-quarter to one-half mile beyond the original sea sluice. To prevent this longer channel from silting up, the authority had placed an additional sea sluice at the end of the extension to the original channel. Meanwhile, they had allowed the original sea sluice to fall into disrepair in addition to which,

the outer sluice had been badly undermined twice during the year.[23]

The District Commissioner, however, refused to allow an order for the repair materials because of the authority's outstanding accounts, paysheets, and loan commitments which totalled over $1,100. On these grounds as well, he refused to recommend the loan, for the council had received $4,000 from the Flood Relief Fund in 1934 and all the money had been utilized.[24]

The Local Government Board overruled the District Commissioner's recommendation and granted a loan to the local authority which was to be repaid in four annual installments with an interest rate of 4% per annum.[25] In building the sluice from these funds, however, the authority consulted the Public Works Department which did not favour the type of sluice being built, but suggested one which involved double the expenditure and money loaned. This time, the recommendation of the District Commissioner was followed. His recommendation was also aided by the fact that by July of that year, only 15% of the rates, 35% of the arrears rates, 2% of the rents, and 17% of the arrears rents had been collected.[26] The Local Government Board concurred that the village could not afford the large financial commitment which the loan entailed.

By 1942, however, villagers were demanding additional rice acreage in the area behind the Crown dam since they were converting the lands in front to provisions. For this purpose, they needed better drainage. In addition, for the local authority to rent out an additional two hundred and sixty acres over and above the four hundred and sixty already rented out for rice; fencing, stop-offs and kokers would have to be constructed throughout the additional area, and works in general would have to be done to improve the condition of the land to be rented. In view of this, the Local Authority applied for a loan of $2,000 to recondition the rice and provisions areas. The application was refused,[27] as had been an application for $500 for the same purpose the previous year.[28]

The finances of the village then, had reached the point whereby the demands of the villagers for services could not be accommodated and whereby the economic base was being constricted and expansion stifled.

(vii) Conclusions.

By the early forties then, several changes which had been occurring during the previous years all pointed in the direction of basic structural changes within the village. There was a new basis for power resulting from changes in the suffrage laws which became crucial when combined with the economic alteration of the position of the villager in relation to the controlling miller elite. The villager now had economic options which enabled him to disengage himself from the cycle of indebtedness imposed by the millers and which enabled him to exercise the political options offered by the suffrage laws.

This meant that the old elite families could no longer control all the resources, economic and political, on which they based and maintained their position.

Agitation for reform first began with the changes in the suffrage requirements and village status. This, however, was limited in scope in that the structure of the economic situation left few villagers in an economic position to challenge the millers. Once options were made available in this sphere, however, there emerged latitude for change in the political sphere. What was needed and what emerged was a leadership which could challenge the political position of the elite through the utilization of a major new political resource, the unindebted villager who had the vote and who represented a new addition within the overall stratification pattern of elite vs. mass groupings.

Such a move, however, required a higher level of dissatisfaction with the existing situation than already existed. But as the villagers demanded expansion of acreage and services, and as the controlling groups were unable

to provide these, the motivation for supporting a new leadership, and a new resource for this leadership, came into being.

The politics of this period then, can be labelled the "politics of displacement," as a new group ostensibly engaged in a "fight" to remove the old factions from their positions of power and influence.

Who was this leadership and what was the nature of the "fight" in which they engaged?

(b) The Politics of Displacement.

(i) The New Leadership.

There were basically six personalities who emerged during this period and who claimed to have joined together as a party in order to challenge the positions of the millers.[29] These persons, however, were for the most part intimately related to the closest supporters of both the Ramprashad and Panchar factions by being either the second generation of the original elite families or by being second generation of the core which the families had utilized for factional competition.

First, there was William Jaikarran, the son of Ramdharry with whom A. B. Ramprashad had originally engaged in the Armadale farming venture and whose family had been a strong supporter of Ramprashad and had received services in return. Secondly, there was Gerald Panchar, the son of Jacob Panchar and Shirley Maraj-Panchar. Thirdly, there was Abdul Ebrahim whose sister had married the son of Alladin Azam, a strong Panchar supporter, and whose father's brother had married the sister of Imdad Usman, also a core member of the Panchar faction. Fourthly, there was Petamber Singh who was a nephew of Dindayalsingh who in turn was a core member of the Ramprashad group despite his kinship relationship to the Panchar family. Finally, the last two persons, Mark Bhagwan and Lalman were close friends of Gerald Panchar[30] and the only ones whose family connections had not been within the elite or their core.

What emerges from this description of the linkages which the new leadership had, is the fact that they had been and were intimately related to the stratification pattern which had characterized the village and to the factional process which this implied. The only factor which separated this leadership from the old elite, was the factor of generation.[31] It was this factor which gave these persons an opportunity to employ a popular front in opposition to the miller elite. People "wanted a change and so they voted for the younger men."[32] In fact, they were still voting for the old elite under a different guise. But it was this ability to disguise the actual relationships which accounted for their eventual success. In reality, however, this new leadership merely was carrying the old factional competition under the guise of change. On a normative level then, the villagers perceived the politics as a "fight." In fact, the new leadership was absorbed into the pre-existing alignments, and in this absorption, they were in fact individuals, not a party as their public platform had seemed to imply.

(ii) Arenas of Competition.

a. The Goals and Rules of Competition.

In the light of the normative as opposed to actual alignments occurring, the goals and rules involved were thus operating on two levels. On the first, there was the public image presented to the new power base, the electorate. On the second level, however, was the fact that this seeming coalition of new leaders were individuals acting for their own political advancement.

The goals then, as far as the village population was concerned was the displacement of the competition between the elite groups with which they had become increasingly dissatisfied. The goals of the new leadership, however, was to move, as individuals, into positions of power in the village. In doing this, they appealed to the new resource within the village, the unindebted electorate. The rules of competition, were also as a result differently

interpreted.

The villagers perceived the political situation as an attempt to change the rules. The leadership in fact, saw the rules as something to be exploited for their own advancement. The pre-existing factional competition was what they sought to join. Under the guise of the fight, they received the increasing support of the electorate who thought they were opposing the old system.

b. The Village Council.

Given the nature of the new resource as being based on the potential political power of an electorate, it was logical for the attempt to infiltrate to begin with the village council.[33] At the same time, to the villager, this was also the logical place to begin. For the old economic resource of absolute control was no longer possible for any person, group or party. Villagers realized that the alternative was to vote the new leadership onto the council.

The focal point of political activity then, was the council. What occurred in the council arena can be divided into three stages. First, with the election of the new leaders to the council, there was the stage when it appeared that these new leaders would be irrevocably labelled in terms of their real purpose and actual factional alignments.

This was partially because they were elected to the council as individuals, not as a group as their public stance would have implied. Partially it was a result of the fact that as individuals interested in their own positions, they could not but manoeuvre within the council once elected.

For example, Abdul Ebrahim was elected in 1941 with a reputation as a strong critic of the Ramprashad faction in particular. The majority of the petitions sent to the District Commissioner after 1938 had his signature on them. It is possible then, that his appeal to the electorate was based on his being a Panchar supporter. Gerald Panchar found himself in a similar position

as a son of one of the faction leaders. William Jaikerran's father's relations with Ramprashad probably defined him as a Ramprashad supporter, while Mark Bhagwan's and Lalman's friendship with Gerald Panchar defined them as Panchar supporters.

By 1944, the council thus consisted of these new leaders and several old faction activists - Dagleish, Premsingh, A. B. Ramprashad, Ernest Ramprashad and Parmeshwar.[34] The labelling process of the new councillors was a very real possibility.

In addition, their involvement in interfactional competition aggravated this possibility. For example, in 1942, Abdul Ebrahim switched his allegiance from the Panchar group because Jacob Panchar had promised him the deputy chairmanship and had not kept the bargain.[35]

Similarly, William Jaikarran switched to the Panchar faction when they promised to make him the council chairman.[36]

What was occurring was that prior links and manoeuvring were in danger of altering the public front which had been put up to the electorate. The new leadership, as individuals, were utilizing the factional quarrels for their own advancement and yet were faced with the problem of maintaining their normative position vis-a-vis the electorate.

Then, in early 1944, Jacob Panchar died leaving the Panchar faction leaderless. Gerald Panchar became the obvious leader.[37] What this accomplished was to give the appearance that the new leaders were opposing the system by aligning themselves against the Ramprashad faction. In fact, the old Panchar faction had a new leader and the old alignments continued.

In the second stage of this process, it becomes apparent that although the old alignments remained intact, the rules of competition had altered drastically. In fact, what occurred was that there were no agreed upon rules as each side utilized resources in a different way such that eligibility for the competition,

the composition of competing teams and how the competition should take place were differentially defined by each group.

In addition, the basic control mechanisms which had characterized the rice miller competition, equivalence in access to resources and team size, were upset by the fact that each of the factions was playing the game differently. The Ramprashad group concentrated on their old methods of economic domination, while the new Panchar faction emphasized electoral strength.[38] And as more villagers emerged from indebtedness, and size of the Panchar team and elite increased; the size of the Ramprashad faction decreased. The control mechanisms had been eliminated.

What had been then, an electoral ploy of displacement of the old factional system, became, in actual fact, a fight. And within a few weeks after Panchar's death, the new Panchar faction began a systematic destruction of the Ramprashad group which could do nothing, despite attempts, to stop this process.

The first step taken in this second stage by the Panchar faction was to delimit the power of Ramprashad by removing his brother from the position of overseer to which he had been hired two years previously due to the strength of his brother's group on the council. In doing this, complaints were made by Chairman Bhagwan to the District Commissioner in relation to the overseer's refusal to carry out building inspections so that the council could certify building applications. Complaints were also made by Bhagwan that John Ramprashad refused to come to his house each morning for orders, despite the fact that he passed the house on his way to the village office. Bhagwan stated that "he makes me come to the conclusion that the overseer means to take his eyes and pass myself and the council as a whole."[39]

In turn, John Ramprashad agreed to do the building inspections provided that he was relieved from some of his other duties. He refused, however, to go to Bhagwan's house for orders on the grounds that he was on bad terms with him. Therefore, Bhagwan should come to the office where business was usually conducted.[40]

The council interpreted this attitude as belligerent and terminated his

services immediately foregoing the usual procedure of asking an official to first resign. They then presented the District Commissioner with the situation as a fait accompli.[41]

At the same time, the new Panchar faction continued in their public support of the village as a whole rather than emphasizing individual clients. They claimed, in that year, that a water shortage in certain areas had resulted in low padi yields and succeeded in having the Local Government Board reduce the rents of all growers by 50%.[42]

Meanwhile, Ramprashad attempted to retain his position through several measures. The first measure was a mere replaying of the old means of obtaining the support of villagers through the performance of services for individuals particularly in their claims against other persons, the council, or any authority, in an attempt to secure their political and economic support.

The second measure was the disruption of the administrative continuity of the council through boycotts, the interruption of meetings and the carrying out of council functions. The final strategy was the search for a new control mechanism to prevent the snowballing success of the new Panchar faction. This search was an attempt to bring into the political arena a presumably neutral person, the District Commissioner, in the hope that he would mediate the "fight."

In late 1944, after reaping, when villagers were accustomed to pay their rents, councillors Dagleish, Premsingh and J. Ramprashad advised people not to pay a rent increase of one dollar per acre on the grounds that the council's motion to raise rents had not been recorded in the minutes. In the village office, J. Ramprashad prevented people from paying their rents to the overseer.[43]

At about the same time, one renter named Mangar, appealed to Ramprashad to obtain a rent reduction for him because of his poor crop.[44] Ramprashad brought the matter up before the council, but the chairman refused to allow the motion. At that point, A. B. and John Ramprashad, as well as Premsingh and

Dagleish left the meeting.[45]

At the following meeting, A. B. Ramprashad complained that his motion had been rejected and in addition, a notice of questions which he had presented to the council at the previous meeting had not been included in the minutes. The chairman then told Ramprashad that he would not be getting answers to these questions. Again Ramprashad left the meeting.[46]

Ramprashad then complained about these two incidents to the District Commissioner and asked for an investigation.[47] The District Commissioner in turn, asked for the chairman's comments on the matter. Bhagwan stated that an investigation had been made of Ramprashad's mill in order to ascertain the amount of padi which Mangar had reaped. He maintained that the council had found that Mangar had reaped ninety bags as opposed to the forty-five bags which he had originally claimed.[48] In the case of the refusal to answer the questions, Ramprashad insisted that the Local Government Board be asked for a ruling.[49] The District Commissioner, however, refused this and supported the position of the chairman on the grounds that the answers to the questions posed by Ramprashad would have required the overseer to work for approximately two uninterrupted weeks in order to gather the information which Ramprashad requested.[50] These questions, nine in number, included such items as: the number of rice fields which were rented and cultivated in each of the east and west halves of the New and Jib Lands separately in 1944; the number of acres in each field with the names and acreage of each renter in both the east and west halves of the New and Jib Lands respectively, etc.[51]

Another major incident of this period occurred in 1946 when a complaint was made to A. B. Ramprashad by Amin Mohamed and his family. They had rented forty-one acres of Jib Land in 1945 from the Local Authority. The family stated that they had invested large sums in fencing, levying, etc., but that in early 1946, the village council had given the same piece of land to the Bhagwandin family

despite the fact that the Amins had followed the instructions of the bell-cryer and reapplied for the land within the week specified by the council. However, on the first day of this week in which villagers could reapply or terminate their tenancies, the council reallocated the land to the Bhagwandins.

The issues involved were first, whether the council, in allocating the land in 1945, had specified tenureship for one year only. And the council minutes were unclear in this respect. Secondly, the council maintained that the bell-cryer's instructions referred only to land within the fenced area of the Jib section and the Amins' land lay outside this area.

On receiving the complaint, Ramprashad took the matter directly to the District Commissioner[52] which incurred the anger of the Chairman Jaikarran on the grounds that all correspondence had to pass through the hands of the chairman.[53] At that point, however, the Bhagwandin family withdrew their application in favour of the Amins.[54]

Now theoretically, if this incident were interpreted in terms of the old factional alignments of either Panchar vs. Ramprashad or in terms of the new Panchar faction vs. Ramprashad, the outcome should have been for the Bhagwandin family to have obtained the land given their affiliation with the Panchar and new Panchar group and the Amins' affiliation with Ramprashad. The question thus emerges as to why the former withdrew their application instead of pressing it as would have been the case ordinarily.

The answer to this lies in three pressures which turned the dispute towards conciliation and compromise as opposed to an emphasis on competition for the land.

First, the District Commissioner put pressure on the council to allow the Amins to retain the land for at least one more year because of the confusion in relation to the time specified for reapplication; because of the capital which they had invested in the land; and because the minutes did not specify

that the original rental had been for one year only.[55]

Secondly, in 1945, the Colonial Government had passed the Rice Farmers' Security of Tenure Ordinance which was to protect tenants from arbitrary removal from land by the landlord. The presence of this new Ordinance and the fact that the Amins could have involved the council in litigation before the Assessment Court set up by the Ordinance to deal with complaints, possibly forced the council into a more congenial mood for conciliation.[56]

At this point, however, conciliation was not necessarily inevitable. For the council had disobeyed the District Commissioner on previous occasions and as well, had gone to court for other issues. The third factor then appears to be the crucial one. And this was the new distribution of power which was emerging in the village which was associated with the new Panchar faction's consolidation of their superior position vis-à-vis the Ramprashad group. For in the two years after 1944, the Panchar faction had garnered the support of an extremely large proportion of the villagers and it had reached the point where their supporters outnumbered the Ramprashad supporters in a ratio of more than two to one.[57] Using this as the base for what they chose to be the focal point of their power, the council, the Panchar group appeared to be firmly entrenched. They could, therefore, afford to compromise on particular issues without fear of losing support and with the added possibility that the large and increasingly wealthy Amin family, would also throw their support behind the Panchar group after more than twenty years of supporting the Ramprashad faction.

With this incident, the second stage drew to an end. Conciliation in disputes was shown to be possible, and dispute settlement could be done outside a framework of factional competition. The third stage in the politics of displacement was thus a gradual withdrawal from competition by core members of the Ramprashad faction. Premsingh, for example, once again went to Atkinson

and was removed from the scene.[58] Ernest Ramprashad lost his seat on the council and John Ramprashad had lost his position as overseer.[59] A. B. Ramprashad, who had always been aware of his superior position in relation to the "coolies" because of his impeccable manners and integrity,[60] saw no reason to continue the disputes once his support had been almost completely undercut within the council and on the popular front. He continued to attend council meetings ever so often, but for the most part, retired to his Abary ranch, sent his family to live in Georgetown, and lost interest in the politics of the village.[61]

Finally, Dagleish had always been friendly with Gerald Panchar, and in the light of his attempt in 1935 to build a popularly based front, he was simply absorbed into the new state of affairs.[62]

What began as a normative fight in fact ended in a real fight between the two factions. Because of the unavailability of control mechanisms mainly due to the differential acceptance of rules and the lack of a mediator, the new Panchar faction eliminated the Ramprashad faction from political competition within the village.

(c) Social Alignments during the Period.

It is possible to trace the changing alignments of villagers during this period from a situation of extreme fragmentation to a consensus by the majority. This can be done utilizing two indices - the numerical changes in the supporters of each faction and the alignment changes of petition signers during the period.

In the case of the first index, the possibilities facing the individual villager after the death of Jacob Panchar, in the light of the changing nature of factional alignments, were six in number. They could (1) change allegiance from the old Panchar to the new Panchar faction; (2) change allegiance from the Ramprashad to the new Panchar faction; (3) change allegiance from neutrality

to the new Panchar faction; (4) change allegiance from the old Panchar faction to Ramprashad; (5) remain supporters of Ramprashad; or (6) they could retain their neutrality.

The numerical breakdown of persons choosing each option is presented below.[63]

(1)	From old to new Panchar faction:	67
(2)	From Ramprashad to new Panchar faction:	67
(3)	From neutrality to new Panchar faction:	6
(4)	From old Panchar to Ramprashad:	7
(5)	Remain with Ramprashad:	64
(6)	Retain Neutrality:	1

From these figures, several trends become apparent. First the majority of Panchar supporters turned to the new Panchar faction. Only a few who were still in need of credit facilities supplied by millers changed from Panchar to Ramprashad. This is not unexpected in view of the extreme enmities created during the period of miller factionalism and therefore, it would have been unlikely for Panchar supporters to turn to Ramprashad. From that perspective, the Panchar faction's direction of support was largely pre-defined for them.

Secondly, it is interesting to note the large number who switched from Ramprashad to Panchar thereby cutting Ramprashad's support by half, and creating the situation which ultimately forced the Ramprashad faction to withdraw from political arenas in which popular support had become extremely important.

In the case of the second index, the petitions which were presented during this period, the first point to be noted is that these all came from Ramprashad supporters and were part of the more general strategy of the faction to maintain itself in the light of the increasing power of the new Panchar faction; their inability to win support on a mass scale in any other way; and their attempts

to obtain support from the District Commissioner.

Petition 1 was drawn up by the Ramprashad core of councillors protesting the council's appointment of Dyal Matadin as Overseer on the grounds that the councillors had not been given three days clear notice of the meeting which made the decision and on the grounds that the council in 1937 had found him to be incompetent. Among the signers was William Jaikarran who at the time was still involved in the Ramprashad faction.

Petition 2 was drawn up and signed by twelve Ramprashad supporters protesting against the council's use of a loan from the Social Welfare and Development Scheme given to improve the drainage in the residential area. The petitioners maintained that the funds were being used to carry out more general drainage works not necessarily associated with the residential area. The council, on receiving the petition, maintained that the works were related to the residential area, the petitioners countered by stating that they were not. At the time of the petition in 1944, all twelve signatories were those of Ramprashad supporters. Two years later, seven of these had joined the new Panchar faction.

Petition 3 was signed by ten Ramprashad supporters protesting the appointment of Dyal Matadin and supporting Petition 1 above which had been sent by the Ramprashad councillors. Two years later, three of the ten signatories had switched their allegiance from Ramprashad.

Petition 4 was signed by eighty-three persons protesting against the dismissal of John Ramprashad as Overseer and asking the Local Government Board to force the council to retain his services. Of the signers, fourteen had been old Panchar supporters and the rest Ramprashad supporters. Of the fourteen, two later turned to Ramprashad while the rest supported the new Panchar faction. Of the Ramprashad supporters who had signed, twenty-eight later joined the new Panchar faction - a low proportion as compared with the total defections which later took place.

This would indicate that by the time Petition 4 had been put forward, early 1945, the majority of supporters who were to defect from Ramprashad had already done so and that by this time, the Ramprashad support had been largely eroded on the peripheries.

Secondly, the fact that the petitions are all from Ramprashad supporters indicates the fact that the new Panchar faction was largely in control of the political competition after 1944 and that the Ramprashad faction was trying to disengage them from their position. In this light, the petitions can be seen as part of the strategy of the Ramprashad faction to mobilize supporters in the public domain in a situation where they were overpowered in numerical terms and to obtain the intercession of the District Commissioner as a mediator to prevent the dissolution of the faction.

Between 1943 and 1947 then, approximately two-thirds of the village had opted to join the new Panchar faction, with the concomitant effect of the remaining third seeing their faction being whittled away as a major force particularly on the council.

Therefore, in the election for the position of chairman in 1945 for the year 1946, no representatives of the Ramprashad faction attended. In any case, only two members of the faction, Dagleish and Ramprashad, were left on the council. All the rest were members of the new Panchar faction. The result was that William Jaikarran was elected unopposed.[64] The following year, the same thing occurred. The Ramprashad faction did not attend, and Gerald Panchar was elected chairman unopposed.[65]

The new Panchar faction was thus in complete control, and this point was conceded by the remnants of the Ramprashad faction.

(d) Principles of Factional Competition.

(i) Introduction.

It has been noted that the present period was characterized first, by a

change in the nature of the resource structure of the village. Basically, this involved the fact that an ever increasing proportion of villagers were able to release themselves from the economic domination of the millers and their concomitant political influence both of which were embedded in the patron-client ties which united the political community to the faction leaders. This was made possible by the emergence of new economic alternatives within the village; a new political consciousness as a result of an extended franchise and literacy; and a dissatisfaction with the priorities of the millers in dealing with new demands made by villagers in their attempts to expand the bases of their production through improvements in the cultivation areas.

At the same time that demands were being made which would allow for the expansion in the cultivation of rice and provisions, the financial resources of the local authority reached an extremely low point. This was further exacerbated by the intervention of the District Commissioner who cut off outside resources which might have been utilized to satisfy demands for improvements.

At the same time that these four issues were beginning to cause increasing dissatisfaction with the political situation within the village, the Ramprashad faction experienced a minor revolt within its ranks through the attempts of Premsingh and Dagleish to establish their own power base within the village separate from the political game of the millers. Their failure, previously discussed, added fuel to the dissatisfaction which was beginning to emerge.

Finally, there emerged individuals who claimed to be putting forward a united front against the rice miller game and were thus able to gather together the political support of the majority of villagers. This new support emerged gradually over time, as villagers themselves gradually emerged from the binding relationships which they had had with millers. This in turn was a product of the new resources which had become available.

This new leadership, however, was intimately related to the old elite

groups and in fact, their motivation for engaging in the political competitions was for personal power. As a result of this, the goals which emerged in the subsequent competition were differentially defined by different segments of the population. The villagers viewed the new personnel as leaders in a struggle against the old order; the new personnel, however, still retained traditional goals, but were vying for individual political power within the new normative ideology which the villagers had accepted.

In the light of this new resource structure within the village, the example of rebellion presented by Premsingh and Dagleish, and the differential definition of the goals of the competition, the question emerges as to the nature of the factional structures during the period and the nature of the political competitions.

(ii) The Structure of Factions.

As in the previous chapter, the internal structure of factions can be viewed from the perspective of the rules governing eligibility for competition; the composition of the competing teams; and the internal characteristics of the factions per se.

During the period under discussion, in the light of the differential interpretation of goals and prizes, what becomes apparent in the terms of the rules governing the eligibility for competition was the fact political team membership was still a prerogative of the traditional elite within the village. The affiliations of the new leadership bears out this fact. At the same time, the political community was still defined, as in the previous period, as the village mass. What had changed, however, was the nature in which this community could be utilized as a resource for political competition. Economic ties were no longer viable in the light of new economic opportunity and the decreasing need for credit facilities which had previously led logically into a patron-client

tie between the political leader and the villager. Instead, the villager was now a resource by virtue of his enfranchisement. His political capital was the primary resource, not his economic capital which was subsequently translated into political resources.

This change was reflected in the rules governing the eligibility for competition which remained only somewhat similar in nature to those of the previous period. First the village was still the political community, although the nature of this community had altered. Secondly, the political elite membership rules were again similar except that they were expanded to include those who had other than kinship or economic relationships with the traditional village elite. For as has been seen, the Panchar faction incorporated "friends," a category not utilized by them until this time. Further, insofar as the electorate was unindebted, or at least a large portion of it, the composition of the political elite was also based on more voluntary criteria. The control of the leadership was thus lessened in the choice of the political elite as compared with the control which the millers had been able to exercise over this category of personnel. At the same time, control over team membership was consequently lessened as well. In other words, the elimination of the patron-client tie between the leadership and the political community, eliminated the situation whereby the leadership had absolute control over who could compete in the more exclusive categories. The new leadership in short, had to allow for more flexibility when volunteers appeared on the scene. Their control over the eligibility categories was thus more delimited.

At the same time, however, insofar as the new leadership was in fact tied intimately to the traditional elite, this lessened control was more one of degree rather than quality. It has been noted that the only new personnel on the teams in terms of not having traditional elite affiliation were Bhagwan and Lalman. Their acceptance by the Panchar team was based on a friendship

tie with the son of the faction leader. Here again it should be noted that the Panchar group had not previously utilized this type of tie.

Flexibility then, not change, was important in determining elite and team membership. Traditional categories of eligibility were merely expanded to incorporate new volunteers. But this in turn was done in what was an acceptable traditional idiom. Thus, with the public guise of overturning the rice miller game, the new leadership was forced into accepting what appeared to be new, but were really expanded categories of personnel for elite and team membership.

On the normative level then, the political community was satisfied with the team put forward which was to displace the rice miller control. At the same time, the manner in which this new definition was put forward, also allowed the individuals who ostensibly composed a united leadership to manoeuvre for their own power positions, and this dual definition of prizes and eligibility provided the structure within which the factional competition could occur in the manner which has already been described in the previous section and which will be discussed further in the next section.

In light of this, the issue is the composition or internal structure of the competing teams which resulted from the eligibility rules.

In light of apparent rather than real changes in recruitment patterns, it is not surprising to find that the content of links between leaders and team members did not differ to any great extent from the previous period. The only major change was the absence of the patron-client tie on the team level. It has already been noted that this tie was in any case one of the least preferred by leaders in team recruitment. Its absence during the present period is thus both a product of leadership preference as well as the more general decreasing importance of the link within the village itself. What replaces it, however, is the fact that a team member may have had a familial history which involved such a link. This is the case with two of the new recruits, William Jaikarran

and Abdul Ebrahim. At this point, it is interesting to note that the only two subversions which took place during this period involved this familial patron-client tie - another index of its decreasing importance within the village.

At the same time that the patron-client tie decreased in importance, there also developed an absence of the symmetrical economic tie characterizing any of the leader-follower relationships. Again, this can be viewed as an index of the changing nature of what was regarded as viable political resources within the village at the time. Economic linkages were being superseded by political ties.

With these two changes, the linkages between leaders and team members incorporated the following types of content:

1. First Order Kinship;
2. Friendship;
3. Patron-client - Familial;
4. Schisms;
5. Second Order Kin Relationships; and
6. Transaction.

The relationships between faction leader and team members are presented in Table 6.1.

What is of course obvious from Table 6.1 is the fact that the recruitment content of the two teams was absolutely identical. Even in the two cases of subversion, equivalent linkages were exchanged. Further, if an intensity index were to be derived, it also follows that the two teams, by virtue of the same content, would also be composed of precisely the same intensity of links.

Where the difference occurs between the two teams, however, was in the nature of their links to the wider population or the political community. It was these linkages which were to prove crucial in the interfactional sphere.

Table 6.1: Recruitment Criteria of the Factional Teams.+

	Criteria: 1	2	3	4	5	6
A) Ramprashad's links with						
Ernest Ramprashad	*					
Premsingh		*				
Dagleish		*				
Parmeshwar		*				
!William Jaikarran			*			
!#Abdul Ebrahim				*		*
B) Panchar's links with						
Gerald Panchar	*					
Lalman		*				
Bhagwandin		*				
Petamber Singh		*				
#!Abdul Ebrahim			*			
#William Jaikarran				*		*

Note: ! Indicates that the person at some point, defected from the faction to the other.

Indicates that at some point, the person defected to the faction from the other.

+ A detailed comparison of recruitment criteria during the different historical periods will be carried out in Chapter 10.

For by definition, the two teams were evenly matched. This should have resulted in oscillating confrontations and encounters with no decisive victor. As has been seen, however, this did not occur. Rather, the Ramprashad faction was eliminated from the political competition. The issues raised then are: why the evenly balanced teams were an insufficient control mechanism; if it was the nature of the competition which affected the outcome regardless of the evenly matched teams; and finally, the factors which propelled the competition to a decisive end. The answers to these questions are embedded in the nature of the interfactional competition.

(iii) Principles of Interfactional Competition.

The nature of interfactional competition can be viewed from the perspective of the rules governing how the competition should take place and the rules concerning the control mechanisms which prevent escalation.

It has already been noted that the Panchar faction altered the rules by which they recruited team members in order to accommodate the public platform of displacement. What is further apparent, however, is that the rule governing eligibility for competition was not the only rule altered by the new Panchar group. In fact, the rule governing how competition should take place implies the use of particular resources in a manner that is acceptable to both competitors in order to eliminate or at least reduce, the element of surprise. According to Bailey, the chances of escalation increase when new resources are used and when the ratio of pragmatic to normative rules increases (cf: 1969: Chapter 9).

For present purposes, it can be assumed that during the period of competition between the rice millers, there were certain explicit patterns which both parties accepted as being the means by which competition should take place. Although factionalism by definition is a "pragmatic" organization of the political

field (cf: Chapter 1), for present purposes it can be accepted that the miller competition embodied what was viewed by all as a normative method for engaging in interfactional competition. Basically, these normative rules involved the formation of patron-client relationships in which economic credit was exchanged for political support. Competition thus centred on obtaining mill clients whose economic support could be translated into political power through the support of a given faction on the village council. The changes in the suffrage requirements and the legal position of Bush Lot from a Country to a Village District provided a base upon which political support could be obtained without recourse to the economic ties involved in the patron-client relationship. When this base merged with alternate economic opportunities such that the patron-client relationship as being the basis for political resources was undermined, what was in fact occurring was that a new resource was being introduced into the village. In addition, the nature of this resource, the unindebted electorate standing outside patron-client ties, implied that competition for political power would involve utilizing this resource in an entirely different manner. As a result, the normative rules governing the rice miller competition were in themselves in competition with the new rule which stated that the politicized electorate was the resource through which power was obtained in the local arena.

In short, when Solomon Panchar died and his position was taken over by his son, the public front or ideology of displacement was translated into the "new councillors" versus the Ramprashad faction. In other words, the public front which characterized the new councillors' means of obtaining council election gained reinforcement when they appeared to amalgamate as a faction against the Ramprashad group. What was previously labelled as the first period of competition, i.e., the period whereby it appeared that the new councillors might be labelled according to their actual motives, was prevented by the death of Jacob and succession of Gerald to the leadership of the Panchar faction. The new

councillors could continue their quest for personal power, but at the same time, they were able to organize themselves as the anti-Ramprashad faction, as being against the rice miller game, and as a group attempting to carry out their electoral promise of ousting the factional system.

Once this transformation took place and the new councillors united into a faction front, what began was a competition in which the two factions were utilizing resources in a different manner. The Ramprashad faction continued in its support of individual villagers thereby basing its support on interpersonal and patron-client ties; the new Panchar faction on the other hand, was appealing to the population not as individuals with whom personal transactions were to form the basis of support, but as a general electoral body whose support had to be won through the electoral system. In both cases, the villagers were the resources whose support was translatable into political power. The manner in which the two factions proceeded from this assumption, however, differed radically. The rules governing strategies were thus differentially interpreted by the two factions. Ramprashad played the "rice miller game"; Gerald Panchar played a "new game."

There were thus new resources introduced in terms of the changed electoral requirements, the altered legal position of the village, and the changed economic position of the villager vis-à-vis the rice miller. In addition an ostensibly "new faction" introduced new means of competing for support and for the basic political resource of the village, the villager. The two major characteristics of political competition which can cause escalation and the "fight," new resources and new strategies, were thus present in the period under discussion.

The next issue thus becomes why the Ramprashad faction did not adjust to the new pragmatic rules being introduced and why control mechanisms were not available to prevent the fight which ensued.

In the case of the first issue, it can be argued that the level of

dissatisfaction within the village was so high, that the possibility of the Ramprashad faction altering their strategy to one which appealed to the electorate as a whole was probably impossible. The failure of Dagleish and Premsingh, ten years previously, to build a political base outside the factional competitions has been seen to have failed partially as a result of the fact that economic indebtedness still characterized the village, but also as a product of the personalities involved. They were too tied to the Ramprashad team to have credibility as popular leaders. Their failure in 1935 in eliminating the Ramprashad faction can be viewed as an index of the difficulties the Ramprashad faction in general would have had in altering their strategy.

This alteration was also made more difficult by the attitude of the traditional factional mediator in village politics, the District Commissioner. His actions in preventing loans to the local authority which might have stemmed the dissatisfaction, instead propelled the competition to a fight. For as a result of the financial condition of the village and the inability of the Ramprashad group to provide public services demanded by the population, there was a concomitant increase in dissatisfaction. Further, the Ramprashad faction's appeals for mediation in situations such as the steps taken to remove John Ramprashad from the position of overseer, went unheeded by the District Commissioner.

Finally, the Amin-Bhagwandin land dispute can also be viewed as an indication of another new rule introduced by the new Panchar faction which again upset possible control mechanisms. In this situation, the Ramprashad group to whom the Amin family had been traditionally aligned, took up the cause in the manner which had traditionally characterized factional competitions. They threw their support behind the Amins, appealed to the District Commissioner, and attempted to win continued support through the more general support of such schisms within the village. The new Panchar faction, however, buttressed by

their strong electoral base, introduced the notion of conciliation into the council arena, and by doing so, literally eliminated the viability of traditional factional strategies from local politics. Another control mechanism, collusion by having the stronger team withdraw from competition, was eliminated.

To summarize: New resources and new strategies were introduced into the village and were both exploited and created by new personnel. Despite the evenly matched nature of the teams in the ensuing factional competition, the new resources and strategies enabled escalation in competition such that a "fight" emerged and control mechanisms failed. This in turn resulted in the elimination of one of the traditional factions from competition. In turn, this change in the nature of the factional competition, was to ramify into what has been characterized as the next period of factional and local level politics.

Notes: Chapter 6.

1. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970 and Dagleish, February, 1970.

2. From the files of the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington.

3. The Rice Review, October-December, 1959: 30.

4. Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969.

5. Memo from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Local Government, November 24, 1942.

6. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, 1942 and Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969.

7. Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Bush Lot Village, to the Chairman, Food Production Committee, Berbice, August 24, 1942.

8. Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969 and Dagleish, March, 1970.

9. Letter from the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government to the Bush Lot Village Council, August 24, 1941, concerning the application for a $500 loan.

   Memo from the District Commissioner to the Commissioner for Local Government, November 24, 1942.

   Petition to the Chairman of the Local Government Board from twelve proprietors, March 9, 1944.

10. Interview with Anjuman, August 1969; Petamber Singh, November 1969; and Amin Mohamed, September 1969.

11. Op. cit.

12. Letter from A. B. Ramprashad to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, January 5, 1938.

13. Letter from Maikou to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, August 4, 1939.

14. Letter from Deoroop to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, March 18, 1938.

    Letter from J. Eleazer, New Amsterdam, to the Bush Lot Local Authority, March 28, 1938 and April 20, 1938; to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, May 18, 1938.

15. Letter from V. D. Wilfred, New Amsterdam, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, October 26, 1937.

16. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to V. D. Wilfred, New Amsterdam, November 30, 1937.

17. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village District, April 1, 1937.

    Letter from N. I. Dookhun, Overseer, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, April 17, 1945.

18. Ibid.

19. Letter from the District Commissioner to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, April 1, 1937.

20. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Local Government Board, March 16, 1936.

    Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, May 6, 1936.

21. Op. cit.

    Letter from the Acting District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village District, August 15, 1939.

22. Letter from the Acting District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village District, August 15, 1939.

23. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, April 8, 1940.

24. Ibid.

25. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Bush Lot Village District, May 9, 1940.

26. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, August 10, 1940.

27. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, March 3, 1942.

    Motion passed by the Bush Lot Village Council and forwarded by Gainlall, Overseer, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, February 23, 1942.

28. Memo from the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, August 27, 1941.

29. Interview with Dagleish, March, 1970 and Petamber Singh, November, 1969.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

Petamber Singh constantly emphasized the notion of these men being the "younger generation."

32. Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969.

33. Ibid.

34. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village Council, 1944.

35. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village Council and Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969.

36. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District and Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969.

37. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village Council.
Gerald Panchar was elected Chairman the year after the death of his father.

38. This becomes apparent from the situations described below and from the description of the competition given by A. B. Ramprashad, September, 1969 and Petamber Singh, October, 1969.

39. Letter from Mark Bhagwan, Chairman, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, February 10, 1944.

40. Minute from the District Administration Officer, Fort Wellington, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, February 24, 1944.

41. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, February 24, 1944.

Memo from the Commissioner of Local Government to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, March 28, 1944.

Memo from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Local Government, April 4, 1944.

42. Memo from the District Administration Officer, Fort Wellington, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 20, 1944.

43. Letter from Mark Bhagwan, Chairman, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, October 23, 1944.

Memo from the District Administration Officer, Fort Wellington, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 3, 1944.

44. Letter from Mangar to the Chairman and Members of the Bush Lot Village Council, November 20, 1944.

45. Letter from A. B. Ramprashad to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 11, 1944.

46. Letter from A. B. Ramprashad to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, March 5, 1945.

47. Letter from A. B. Ramprashad to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, April 5, 1945.

48. Letter from Mark Bhagwan, Chairman, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 13, 1944.

49. Op. cit.

50. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to A. B. Ramprashad, April 10, 1945.

51. Letter from A. B. Ramprashad to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village Council, January 6, 1945, re Notice of Questions.

52. Letter from A. B. Ramprashad to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, February 13, 1946.

Minute from the District Administration Officer, Fort Wellington, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, undated.

53. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to William Jaikarran, February 18, 1946.

Letter from William Jaikarran to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, February 22, 1946.

54. Letter from William Jaikarran to the District Administration Officer, Fort Wellington, March 3, 1946.

Letter from the District Administration Officer, Fort Wellington, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, March 12, 1946.

55. Minute from the District Administration Officer, Fort Wellington, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, undated.

56. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Local Authority, February 18, 1946.

57. Lists of villagers were given to three informants who were asked to state the factional affiliation of the persons for the period during the 1930's and for the mid-forties. In over ninety per cent of the cases, all three lists yielded the same information. From comparing these lists, the change of factional alliances, or ratios, was obtained.

58. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, November, 1969.

59. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village Council.

60. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970.

61. Ibid.

62. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969.

63. See footnote 57 above.

64. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village Council.

65. Ibid.

Chapter 7: The Politics of Peace, 1948-1952.

(a) Introduction.

The last period ended with the destruction of one of the two rice miller factions which had competed in local politics since the early thirties. This meant that the remaining faction had complete control of the village political field. Furthermore, with a great amount of popular support reinforcing their position, the potential existed for eliminating all factional competition.

A series of major changes took place in the structure and allocation of resources within the village at approximately the same time, and enabled the potential to be realized.

First, the period after the demise of the Ramprashad faction was one of enormous economic expansion resulting in an increase of available resources which remained, for a time, sufficiently diffuse to allow the majority of villagers to obtain what they considered to be their fair share. In such a situation, wherein competition for scarce resources was eliminated, the elite could maintain their position without being challenged by either a factionalized segment of themselves, or by popular discontent.

Secondly, there emerged major political movements on the national level which had the effect of siphoning off political activism from the village to the national political arena. This situation caused several persons who were potential political leaders within the village to direct their politics outward from the village into the national arena.

The cumulative result of these factors was a political peace, a period of prosperity and satisfaction within the village as to "the way things were

going."

This chapter deals first with the economic changes which took place in the village which supported a factional peace by providing unlimited resources with a minimum of competition. Secondly, there follows a discussion of the changes which took place in the national political arena and the effects which these had on local politics. Finally, the nature of the factional peace is described and the role of the village council, long an arena of competition, is examined in the light of the changes in the structure of the economy and polity of the period.

(b) Changes in the Resource Structure.

(i) Economic Change and Expansion.

During this period all sectors of the village economy were expanding. Rice, sugar and provisions growing each received some impetus which resulted in their extension. In addition, a new industry of large-scale cattle rearing was made viable. The result was that family groups could engage in the expansion regardless of which economic enterprise they had chosen for their household base.

The period between 1948 and 1952 was also one in which the resources being exploited were characterized as being available to the extent that families did not have to compete with others. There appeared to be enough to go around for everyone. As a result, families mobilized themselves for the exploitation of the resources, and by doing so, provided a further stimulus for expansion by encouraging other families to do the same. Resources were available and villagers took advantage of the concomitant opportunities.

At the same time that the expansion became a possibility, stimulus was also received from major changes in the means of production. The beginnings of mechanization and the founding of the first co-operative in the village

both fed into the general expansiveness of the economic situation during this period.

What then, were these major economic changes which occurred?

a. The Expansion of the Sugar Industry.

It should be recalled, that between the years 1908 and 1926, two economic strategies were made available to villagers. The first involved the expansion of a family's rice growing capabilities into the Abary Creek area. The second involved a family engaging in the original employment pattern of supplementing rice production within the village area with wage and/or estate labour. It was also stated that both options could seldom be chosen by the same family unit given the distance to the Abary, the conditions there and other problems previously discussed. By 1920, a family had been forced to choose the direction in which it wanted to expand.

This choice now came to be crucial in that it was affecting a family's economic opportunities almost thirty years later, since leases taken out on the first depths of Abary land entitled the lessee of that depth, according to the Crown Land Ordinances, to have first option on subsequent depths. A family who had chosen wage labour would later find it difficult to change their strategy to Abary cultivation. Changes in the sugar industry then, which was the major source of their employment opportunities, were thus crucial.

During the 1940's and until 1960, a notable record of growth reflected "the decision by management in the later 1940's to take the risky course of rapid expansion in the hope of obtaining a larger share of the [sugar] market especially in the quotas to be assigned under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which was then under discussion". (Reubens, 1962: 18). This expansion created new opportunities for employment, and employment trends in sugar reached a peak in 1949 and continued with a "work force that was virtually stable during

1949-1954" (Reubens, 1962: 19).

So for the period under discussion, it becomes apparent that the opportunities available for persons who had invested their labour potential in the wage labour market increased substantially and remained stable during the period.

From data on the employment histories of a sample of villagers who were in the labour market at the time, six out of twelve were working on estates during the entire or part of the period under discussion. One had never engaged in estate labour; four had worked on estates but had left this work in the early forties before the expansion in cane production took place; and only one entered the industry after the period of expansion had ended in 1954 when the "application of scientific discoveries and the investment of capital in field and factory [resulted] in a contraction of over 20% in the average weekly number employed" (Ibid.: 19).

In anticipation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, the sugar industry thus engaged in a period of expansion which resulted in an extended labour market and a stable employment situation. This directly benefited the village in that a substantial portion of villagers who had chosen to combine wage labour with rice cultivation found employment conditions which first expanded, and then remained stable during the period under study.

b. The Expansion of Abary Agriculture.

For those families who had chosen to expand their labour and capital resources into the Abary area in the 1920's, this period also provided them with an opportunity to expand their production. In this expansion, there was available to them, land, labour and capital.

The land was available for the taking as a direct result of their having beneficially occupied the first depth. Upon application to the Department of

Lands and Mines for subsequent depths, their application was automatically granted.

The decision to apply for more land however, was based on their decision as to whether there was available labour to work the land and capital to develop it. The labour problem for most of these families was largely solved by the developmental cycle which resulted, at this time, in the availability of adult children to provide the necessary labour. The family of Shahidan and Amin for example, consisted of five sons between the ages of twenty-one and forty-one. All were married, and the eldest had children just reaching adolescence. The youngest had been married for only two years and had one small child. These sons were anxious for expansion in order to benefit themselves in the long run. For the more land that was taken up, the more there would be to divide as the inheritance, and therefore, the more each nuclear unit would obtain. As a result, the entire unit co-operated in a massive expansion effort into the second and third depths of the Abary Creek area.

This same kind of attitude could be found among several of the Bush Lot families, and the period was characterized as a result, by extended family co-operation and land expansion.

The capital for the expansion which was needed for such things as empoldering, building levees, digging trenches, etc.,was available due to an accumulation which had been taking place during the period between the end of the indebtedness cycle to the miller and before the expansion. At a minimum the twelveper cent interest that was paid to the millers, became available as savings. At the same time, there had been little capital expenditure during that interim period, and capital for the expansion had been accumulating for at least five years.

c. The Expansion of Bush Lot Agriculture.

In late 1947, the village council decided to apply for an additional 1,350 acres of land to be put under rice cultivation by local authority tenants in the area known as the New Expansion, lying immediately behind the New Lands area. The application was granted and the local authority also received a loan of $13,913.12 for the purpose of putting the land into usable condition.[1]

The major problem which then faced the council was how to allocate this land. Two principles were adopted. First, families would rent land as individuals, but could be allocated this land, if they wished, in one "block." This would allow for greater agricultural efficiency in that family groups could pool their resources and work together on contiguous plots of land. This reduced travelling time between plots and enabled more intensive cultivation. This act of the council also contributed to extended family co-operation.

The second principle which the council laid down concerned the amount of land to be allocated to an individual or family group. They laid down a hierarchy of statuses of potential applicants accompanied by a decision as to how much land each status was to receive. The persons at the bottom of the hierarchy would receive land as long as the amount available held out.

The hierarchy was as follows:

a. Renters in 1947 who had rented eight or more acres were to be given eight acres;

b. Renters in 1947 who had less than eight acres were to be given a maximum of three; and

c. For those who had not rented in 1947, a maximum of four acres were to be given to:

1.-resident proprietors;
2.-resident renters;
3.-non-resident proprietors.[2]

From this, it becomes apparent that persons who had rented in 1947

received land in the New Expansion in proportion to the amount they had previously rented. Despite this inequality however, everyone shared in the new land and for the moment, were content.

The work of empoldering the land was completed in 1949, and the first crop reaped in November of that year. The yields were excellent, far superior than those of the farmed-out areas in the New and Jib Lands.[3]

d. The Impetus to Provisions Growing.

The Grow More Food Campaign, which had begun as part of the war effort, was continued into the postwar period with added enthusiasm. During the war the extension in the amount of land utilized for provisions and the reduction in the amounts of imported foodstuffs, had provided a ready local market for the goods produced. After the war, with the Campaign continuing, several members of the Bush Lot village council were appointed to regional committees of the Campaign. In addition, the government was giving out cassava roots to encourage the farming sector. All these factors had the effect of encouraging villagers to turn their cultivation areas into provisions farms.[4] Also with the expansion of rice acreage behind the Crown Dam, the need for the use of the cultivation plots for the growing of rice was further minimized.

e. The Growth of the Cattle Industry.

East Indians in Guyana had been traditionlly associated with cattle rearing during their indenture period on the estates and in the villages afterwards. On the estates, the labourers had often been allowed to keep a few head on the plantations' scrub lands. After indenture, at the turn of the century, the East Indians had gained control of the milk and cattle industry.[5] This was largely due to the numbers of cattle being kept by them on estates and to the fact that in many villages, cattle became the primary industry as

opposed to rice.[6]

In Bush Lot, where rice had become the basis of the village economy, cattle were kept on the village scrub land between the public road and seashore and on the lands which later became the New Expansion area. The numbers of these cattle however, were small, and they served mainly for the production of milk for family consumption. With the expansion of land in the Abary area however, the numbers and functions of cattle altered radically. For when moving into the second and third depths, cultivators found that they could not necessarily farm all the available land. This was predictable given the size of the blocks in these subsequent depths as compared with those in the first. The latter were approximately ten acres, while the former varied between fifteen and twenty acres. In addition, the first depth was taken up alone while the second and third depths were taken up simultaneously.

In short, there had been no excess land after the first depth was taken up to allow for cattle grazing. When the later depths were taken up however, there was excess land, and Abary cultivators invested in cattle.[7]

Now given the large amounts of land relative to what had been available on the right bank of the Abary, the potential for the maintenance of large herds increased, and with it, the function of cattle also changed. As previously mentioned, cattle had been mainly utilized for milk. With the advent of larger herds they became what can be termed insurance policies, i.e., they were reared for the purpose of having on hand an easily convertible cash product. If capital were needed for any purpose such as a wedding, levying land, etc., an animal could be quickly sold and the money raised. At the same time, the fact that cattle were now kept at such a large distance from the village also meant that they could no longer be used for milking. The result was that many families kept several cows in the village area with the

remainder of the herd in the Abary area. Families who had no Abary land could not invest in large herds and continued to keep their few cattle in the village.

f. Changes in the Means of Production.

Aside from the extension of the economic base of the village, there were also changes as to how this base could be most profitably exploited. Changes in the means of production stimulated many of the above changes and provided additional impetus for the economic expansion which was occurring.

1. The Beginnings of Mechanization.

The use of machinery for the cultivation of rice was not unknown to the Bush Lot villagers. As early as 1914 the Abary Company had introduced a steam driven tractor for use on their land grant adjacent to the village. This machine however, was too costly for the farmer of the period and was also impractical on muddy ground.[8] Villagers however, were aware of the potential of machinery, and when an alternative to the steam engine was introduced, they were quick to adopt the new technology.

This alternative was being experimented with by the government in the Mahaicony area. In 1944, two hundred acres were planted with a spring crop and it "was cultivated, reaped and threshed entirely by mechanical means. The experiment was undertaken solely for the purpose of testing the capacity of machines under all conditions."[9] This Mahaicony-Abary Scheme[10] which was established by the Board as an experimental agency, hired its machinery out to farmers.[11] This proved so popular that additional machines were ordered from the United States. The war interfered with their manufacture, but by 1949, one hundred and nine tractors and sixty-three combines had been imported[12] with the Board instituting a scheme to provide for this importation in order

to sell to farmers on easy payment terms.[13] Throughout 1949, the mechanization of the industry developed rapidly.[14]

In Bush Lot, the first tractor made its appearance in 1949 in association with the first village co-operative which is discussed below. From that point, the villagers readily adopted the technology of mechanization. This in turn allowed for the extensive exploitation of the large tracts of land which were taken up in both the Bush Lot and Abary areas.

2. The Bush Lot Rice Growers' Co-operative.

The grouping together of several persons along lines other than extended kinship had never proven necessary in the Bush Lot economic context until agriculture required a large capital outlay for machinery which was most efficiently worked over extremely large tracts of land. The first of such groupings in Bush Lot began as informal association of persons and culminated in a licensed co-operative under the Co-operative Ordinances.

"At night, about five of us used to sit and discuss the new machinery. Then Dyal Dabi read in the papers that the Rice Marketing Board was giving loans for machinery with easy terms of payment. We wrote to the Board and asked for a catalogue of their tractors. They sent it. We discussed the types and decided we preferred a Case tractor with wheels rather than the Caterpillar because it was cheaper. We went to MARDS and saw how the Case tractor worked in mud and on dry land, and we decided to buy it. We went to the Rice Marketing Board and the man there was very cordial. We discussed payment and decided to put $2,000 down. So we got five more people and we each paid $200. We didn't know anything about a co-operative yet; we just joined together. We got the tractor in December 1948 and also got a plough and harrow. We also booked ourselves for a tractor-drawn combine.

When we got the tractor, we went through the village and everyone had a grand spree.

In 1948, when the New Empolder was taken up, our group managed to get a hundred and thirty-one acres. The council did not give it to the society, but to us as individuals. But we got it in one block. After ploughing we decided that we needed some rules. So we went to a solicitor to get binding rules and paid him $25. During the time the agreement was being drawn up, a Mr. Cheeseman came into the country. The solicitor wrote to us about this man who had come to form co-operatives and sent him to see us. He came with leaflets and lectured about co-operatives. We deleted some rules and accepted others. We got registered and became the first producers' co-operative. Cheeseman visited us constantly.

During that first year, we reaped a good crop, twenty-eight hundred bags of padi, and in August, we got the combine. We paid off all our indebtedness and members' wages. It all went very well for a few years. We all worked together and ate together at the camp we had built on our land, We dried our own padi on a drying floor in the camp while it was being reaped, and we shipped it out by boat.

By 1952 the hundred and thirty-one acres couldn't sustain us. So we tried to get more land and we rented a hundred and seventy-five acres from Puri in Armadale. To put this land in order, we took in two more members who had tractors but only small scattered land holdings. We joined with them only for the Armadale land. We spent $1,000 on the Armadale land, but the drainage was bad; it had a lot of creek hands; and the combine kept bogging down as a result. We hever got a good return in Armadale.

Until that time as well, the co-operative worked well. Then there was trouble. Members starting sending substitutes to work instead of coming themselves. They had no sons to send, so they sent any man they picked up. Since we harvested until late at night and transported at night, these labourers didn't want to work so hard. And the members had shops or other

businesses and didn't want to work in the field. And the labourers couldn't take over.

Also in 1952 we got poor crops because of flooding. We got only nine hundred bags of padi. All this was the beginning of the end."[15]

g. Summary and Conclusions.

From the above description of the changes occurring in the economic structure of the village, it becomes apparent that these changes involved a massive expansion of the economic opportunities available to the individual villager regardless of the direction in which he chose to invest his labour and resources. Returns in all areas, rice, estate labour, provisions and cattle were, during this period, expectably high and secure. Most importantly, the new resources and opportunities were sufficiently diverse and diffuse to allow villagers to expand without engaging in any overt competition with their neighbours. The system was open, and there was a seeming equality about the opportunities available. As a result, there was a concomitant decrease in competition. For this short period resources were not scarce as far as the villagers were concerned.

At the same time, changes in the means of production towards co-operation crosscutting extended kin groupings coupled with a renewed emphasis on the extended kin group in order to maximize family holdings were apparent. This provided an impetus towards mechanization which in turn enabled the expansion of agriculture by allowing for the cultivation of large tracts of land.

There was, in essence, a mesh between all sectors of the economic structure and the means used in exploiting these sectors. All sectors were expanding at the same time and the new means of production, mechanization and extended labour groups, reinforced the general trend of expansiveness and large-scale opportunity. Hence, there was little competition between any of the segments of the village.

Within the elite group and between the elite and mass, each family was able to engage in their economic enterprises without infringing on the attempts and aspirations of others.

(ii) National Level Politics.

a. Introduction.

As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, the probability for the elimination of political competition within the village became significant due to the changes occurring in the structure and allocation of resources in both the economic and political spheres. In the latter, the major development occurred on the national level. This was the emergence of Dr. Cheddi Jagan as a charismatic leader among the East Indian population of Guyana. The effects of this development were felt in Bush Lot as the demands of national politics siphoned off political activists and activism from the local political arena to the national arena. Dr. Jagan's emergence was via the formation of a nationalist political party and the trade union movement.

b. The Founding of the People's Progressive Party.

> At various times during British Guiana's history, associations of leading citizens had been formed for the purpose of pressing some particular point of view or furthering some interest. These groupings were sometimes referred to as political parties. . . . [But] since the constitution did not provide for any group of elected persons taking office, there was little incentive for such parties to develop strong internal organization. Nor was such a development encouraged by the narrow franchise and the prevalent practice of buying votes. None of these early political alliances survived for very long and all were ridden with internal factional dissension. Formed for the attainment of short term goals, they were likewise shortlived (Smith, R., 1962: 165).

In 1946, Dr. Jagan formed the Political Affairs Committee for the main purpose of political education. The Committee organized evening classes and a monthly newssheet. Jagan ran for election to the Legislative Council in 1947 and won. In 1949, an independent commissioner was appointed to examine

the franchise and constitution and make recommendations for reform. In January 1950, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) was formed out of the Political Affairs Committee and the British Guyana Labour Party which had been founded in 1946, contested the election in 1947, but broke into competing factions immediately after.

During the period subsequent to its founding, the government and news media immediately labelled the new party as "communist." The party however, held together despite latent antagonisms over ideology and began to prepare for the 1953 elections (Smith, R., 1962: 166-170).

Between its founding and the political campaign for the election, the party and particularly the Jagans, engaged in attempts to appeal to the "grass roots" segment of the population. In this attempt, the party entered Bush Lot Village.

c. Trade Unionism - the MPCA and the GIWU.

"The trade union movement in Guyana, as in most underdeveloped countries, has been a major platform from which political careers are launched" (Depres, 1967: 153), and has been closely linked to political change.

"One of the major unions in Guyana has been the Man-Power Citizens Association (MPCA) which was formed in 1937 with the immediate objective of aiding sugar workers. The union was recognized by the Sugar Producers' Association in 1939 and reported a membership of 20,970 workers" (Ibid.: 156). During the war years however, the union "was able to accomplish little by way of improving working conditions and wages. . . and it also developed a cordial relationship with the Sugar Producers' Association. By 1946, the compromising attitude of the MPCA was such that Cheddi Jagan, who had become its treasurer, resigned his position and criticized the organization as having become fully identified with sugar interests. With Dr. Lachmansingh, a doctor and druggist,

Jagan organized the Guiana Industrial Worker's Union. . . . The GIWU embarked upon a programme designed to wean sugar workers away from the MPCA and to replace it as a bargaining agent. . . . A jurisdictional conflict arose, . . . [but] the Sugar Producers' Association refused to negotiate with the GIWU. . . . By 1948, the GIWU claimed a membership of 4,130 as compared to the MPCA's claims of 5,141. . . . [In addition] the GIWU fomented a series of strikes on East Coast Demerara Estates, . . . but failed to win recognition. . . . Nevertheless, the union retained the loyalty. . . of most of the sugar workers and it continued to operate under Jagan's influence" (Ibid.: 156).[16]

d. National Politics and Bush Lot Village.

In 1950, the PPP held their first formal meeting in the village. This meeting had been preceded with much publicity from the media as to the political leanings of the party. In addition, villagers had come into contact with the party as a result of their employment on the sugar estates. Villagers were very aware of the party's existence and the strength it was gathering among the people. At that meeting, villagers came for "a look see" and to decide for themselves what it was all about.[17]

Within a year however, the party had consolidated a small group of extremely committed villagers who proceeded to carry out a programme of propaganda and politicization within the village in the attempt to gain supporters who would actively join their group.[18]

Three tiers of political affiliation thus came into existence. There was first, the small group of activists who were led by Dabi Maraj, the son of Manraj, a close relative to the Panchars, and importantly, a first cousin to J. P. Lachmansingh, Dr. Jagan's major organizer. Dabi's core of support came from several other villagers who had never before been part of the elite

group within the village. For example, both Drepaul Bharat and Samuel Dookhun[19] were relatively poor men, but for the first time, the village limelight, in keeping with the ideology of the PPP, was accessible to those without family connections or wealth.

On the second level were the strong supporters of Dabi and his core group. These consisted of Dabi's extended family, the Bhagwandins, Loknauths, and Panchars, as well as the few members of the small families associated with the rest of the core group.

The final tier consisted of the mass of villagers who were strongly sympathetic to the PPP but were uncertain as to the efficiency of such a party within the village itself. They therefore withheld their active support but were strong sympathizers.

The results of the introduction of the PPP onto the local level were threefold.

First, the major families who had always been politically active in the village had their attentions directed to a new cause - that of gaining support for the party in order to contribute to its success on the national level. Their attention was focused outward from the village into the national arena. Secondly, a new leader of the Maraj-Bhagwandin-Panchar group had emerged. As a family member, he reconsolidated this long existing alliance among the extended kin group. But his attention was also directed outward, and in 1952 he began campaigning for a seat in the Legislature in the 1953 elections.

Finally, a new avenue of mobility had emerged within the village. This was evident in the case of Dookhun and Bharat who, under no other circumstances, would have been able to place themselves in a position of such influence within the village.

The major families of the village then, and their new leaders, had their attentions directed outside the village, and merely utilized the villagers as

a resource in a struggle that was occurring elsewhere. For as long as this political activism was directed outside, more specifically to the 1953 elections, the entire situation remained a "Georgetown story" with which they sympathized and voted for the PPP, but did not actively support.[21]

The election then, plus the priorities of the PPP and its Bush Lot activists provided further impetus to the political peace within the village by turning new leaders and political competition toward a larger political arena.

(c) Arenas of Conciliation and Arbitration.

(i) The Goals and Rules of the Arenas.

The question which arises in the light of the resource structure is what was the nature of the factional peace which characterized the village and what were the rules in relation to the prizes of arenas which emphasized conciliation.

The first point to be noted is that arenas, which in the previous period had been characterized by factionalism, now became arenas in which competition no longer took place between groups with a stated factional affiliation. The emphasis rather was on individualism, both in the economic expansion and consequently in the political sphere. For the economic base, as has been seen, was characterized by individuals and family groups attempting to exploit new resources with new means. The resultant opportunities were too diverse and for the moment, too diffuse for competition to take place in the economic realm. Given this individualist base in the economic expansion and the numerous directions in which the expansion could take place, there were too many interest groups; too many people with different aims for themselves in the expansion; and no control over the economic base by a small group. As a result, political groupings, insofar as in the past they had represented a

means for families to maintain their economic base, were no longer relevant to the economic situation. Interests were too diverse; alliances in one context could not be consistently maintained through others, and, as a result, factional groupings which depended on allegiances through numerous situations were no longer relevant to economic and hence political maximization.

This new individualism was the major rule within the village during this period. When coupled with new opportunities and crosscutting interests, prizes for competition could no longer be defined on a group basis. Without this kind of definition, factionalism could not emerge. In addition, a potential factional leader could not recruit, since the basic transactional nature of these relationships were not at the moment needed. No one had anything to exchange over a period of time, and the concomitant cost of maintaining factional groups given the atomized nature of the village at the time and the crosscutting interest groups which could only have resulted in continual subversions, further debilitated potential leaders from attempting to organize political competition on this basis. Further, potential leaders were themselves engaged in their own expansion and they did not need the political support of others to be successful. They could do better when unencumbered, making alliances as the situations demanded, without the cost of maintaining links over periods of time.

Finally, the extension of the elite group which had displaced the Ramprashad faction and hence, the rice miller political game, were also individuals engaged in the economic expansion; were also divided by cross-cutting interests depending on the nature of expansion of each individual; and were also governed by the new rule of individualism. At the same time, their economic position vis-a-vis the rest of the village, was never placed under systematic attack. Villagers were busy elsewhere. Thus divided, but at the same time not being challenged by any co-ordinated group or effort,

the elite did not have to unite as a group for either the expansion of its individual members or for its protection as a group. A final area in which factional groupings would have needed was thus eliminated from the village.

On this basis, and with the diffuse nature of prizes during the period, the issue which emerges is how the "peace" which resulted was expressed in former competitive arenas and how the atomism and individualism of the period was reflected in these arenas.

(ii) The Village Council Arena.

a. Introduction.

The principles which governed the manner in which the council functioned were far different from those of the period in which the village had been divided into two polarized factions. The emphasis within the council was now placed on conciliation and arbitration between conflicting sections of the population, between individuals in dispute, and between the council and/or other groups or individuals.

Secondly, vested interests impinged on council decisions in the light of the individualistic nature of the economic and political spheres. The stances that were thus taken in council deliberations, the issues raised for discussion, and the manner of voting, reflected both this individualism and the fact that alignments shifted depending on the problem that was being discussed and the vested interests which were embedded in them. The actions of councillors now depended on the situation and context, not on group affiliation.

Thirdly, as a result of this atomization, the rule of the majority remained impartial and tended toward conciliation unless the majority of councillors were being simultaneously threatened by the same incident. Only in these rare cases did the councillors react as a group. Even here however, the councillors

never split into competing subgroups.

Lastly, the potential of several councillors grouping together in a pact of mutual support of each other's vested interests could not be entertained. The issues were too diverse, the economic expansion had created too many alternatives, and councillors might find each other totally opposed one day, totally in agreement the next.

Unlike the factional situation of the thirties then, the economic base was not under the control of the councillors and there could be no reason for polarizing issues on the assumption that political power directly increased economic gain and vice versa. As a result, the new emphases within the council reflected the new economic situation and these were apparent in the voting patterns which characterized the council of the period and in the situations which the council either handled as a body or in which individual councillors become involved.

b. Voting Patterns within the Council Arena.

The absence of factionalism within the council can be seen from three indices: (a) the voting patterns for the positions of chairman and deputy chairman which took place in December of every year; (b) the patterning of votes on issues that were brought forward as motions over the six year period under discussion; and (c) the elections of councillors.

In the case of the first, Gerald Panchar and Petamber Singh were unanimously elected for the positions without opposition in 1946.[22] This also occurred in 1947, 1948 and 1949 when both positions were filled by unanimous consent and without opposition candidates.[23] Such situations were made possible since the councillors had decided beforehand who would be placed in the positions and a concensus was reached.[24] In the 1947 election for example, A. B. Ramprashad was selected on the grounds that he was the person

most capable of obtaining a $10,000 grant which the council needed to put the New Empolder area into farmable condition. After the grant was obtained, he was replaced as chairman without opposition.[25]

In 1950, it is said that Ramprashad either did not know who the candidates were or that he attempted to inject old methods into the new proceedings. In any case, he nominated Dagleish, an unsanctioned candidate, for the chairmanship. Dagleish however, refused the nomination.[26]

In the same election, two councillors who were dissatisfied over a particular issue, attempted to inject another candidate as well. They were the only two councillors however, who voted for their nominee.[27]

A similar situation occurred the following year. The second nomination in this case however, was not made by the same persons who had done so the previous year. Again they were motivated by dissatisfaction with a particular incident and again, the upstarts bowed to the majority. In this same election, three nominations were put forward for the position of deputy, again by the dissatisfied parties. One of these was not seconded while in the case of the second unsanctioned nomination, the candidate himself voted for the pre-arranged nominee.[28]

In the 1952 election for the positions in 1953, the chairman was again unanimously elected while two other nominees refused to accept. A division was needed however, for the position of deputy in that again, two persons were nominated who should not have been. But again, the persons nominating were different than those of the previous two years. Again however, the pre-arranged candidate won easily.[29]

In the case of the voting patterns within the council on issues that were brought forward as motions and hence required a vote by the councillors, the council was able to arrive at unprecedented unanimity. Of seventy-two

motions placed before the council during the period under discussion,[30] thirty-eight or 52.7% were decided upon unanimously. Of the remainder, the pattern of voting as presented in Table 7.1 reveals no consistent divisions within the council between or among the various personnel. Motions 23 to 26 inclusive, in which it appears that Premsingh, Mahatma Deoroop and Petamber Singh consistently voted together, all took place at the same meeting immediately after the chairman elections for 1952 in which these three had been the ones to nominate and support unsanctioned candidates as a result of dissatisfaction with a particular issue. During this latter vote however, Petamber Singh had been the one to vote against himself for the position since he "did not want to cause divisions."[31] Furthermore, the pattern of these three going against the majority and voting together on issues, disappears in later motions.

Finally, unanimity during the period was expressed in the manner in which councillors were themselves elected. For example, in 1949 a proprietors' meeting was held in which nominations for the council were taken openly and no one else "stood up except those nominated." An election was thereby avoided for that year and all nominees, and hence councillors, were elected by acclamation.[32]

Similarly in 1952, a by-election was held to fill the seat of Gerald Panchar who had died two months before. Jori Jawahir was nominated and elected by acclamation.[33] In addition, Panchar's chairmanship was unanimously filled by Dagleish[34] whose deputy chairmanship was unanimously filled by Hussein Amin.[35]

c. Situations and Strategies in Council Conciliation.

The villager, Mongal, wanted to rent the southeast corner of reserve land at the eastern dam. A councillor however, had applied for this land and it

Table 7.1: Voting Patterns of the Bush Lot Village Council, 1947-1952.

Key: + Voted for the motion
- Voted against the motion
o Abstention
==== The person was not a council member at the time

Motions brought to a vote:

Councillors	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
John Mohamed	+	-	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
Damil	-			+	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
Jurany	-	-		-	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
Panchar	+	-			o	+				+	-			+	-		+	-	+	+		+	+	+	+	+		+	+	-	+	+	=	=	=
Dagleish	+	+	+	+		-	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+		o	+	+	+							-	+	+	+	+	-	-
Hussein Amin	+	+	+			-	+	+	+	-	+	-	-		+	-	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+			+	+	+		-	-
Premsingh		+	-	-			-								-	+		-			+	o	-		-	-				+	-	+	-	
Ramprashad	-	-	+	+	+	-					+				-	+			o	+			+	+	+	+								
Petamber Singh		-	o		-		+	-	-	-	+	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
Seeram Ramhit	=	=	=	=	=	=	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
Mahatma Deoroop	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	+	+		+	o	+		+		-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	o	+	+	-	-	+	o
Jowahir	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	-	+	+	o	-	-	+		+	+	-	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
Narain	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	+	+		-	-	o		o		-	+					+	+	+	+	+		-	
Sindhu	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	+	+	+	+	o			+	+		+	
Jori Jawahir	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	o

had been granted. To avoid complications, the council disapproved Mongal's application and at the same time cancelled the councillor's permission.[36] Similarly, a villager Beharry accused councillor Petamber Singh of cultivating a portion of his rice land in the east New Lands. Words were exchanged but the council succeeded "in making an amicable settlement by having Singh perform the labour expended by Beharry." Beharry then apologized and withdrew his comments against Singh.[37] At a later date Petamber Singh attempted to gain extra land from the village by having the overseer, who was a personal friend, allocate land to his aunt who was a non-proprietor living in East Coast Demerara. The council cancelled the allocation.[38]

These incidents show councillors with an interest in increasing their land holdings being prevented from doing so by the council. In addition, in cases where the councillor interfered with another person's rights, the council attempted to reconcile conflict and play the role of arbitrator. With flagrant violations of regulations by councillors, the council rectified the situation as best they could.

The New Empolder, to which farmers were transferred from the Jib and New Lands in the council's land expansion and attempt to let the latter lands lie fallow so they could recover their fertility, was divided into two sections, the Creek block section and the road section. The latter lay immediately behind the New Lands and extended to the No. 6 Crown Dam. Beyond this Crown dam to the Abary Creek lay the Creek block section. In allocating these lands, the council attempted to give families and voluntary groups their land in blocks but at the same time, maintain an orderly method of distribution to avoid villagers complaining and getting into disputes over who received the better land. To do this, an allocation list was drawn up and persons were giver land in turn, from west to east, wherever this land might happen to fall.

The members of the Bush Lot Rice Growers Co-operative were given their land in a block. This land however, did not satisfy the members who felt that there were too many creek hands.[39] The members then went to Ramprashad to plead their case stating that the land had not been allocated as decided by council but should have been shared from east to west rather than from west to east. They would have then obtained lands without the creek hands. At a council meeting in 1949, Ramprashad asked that the lands be redistributed. Councillors Ramhit and Petamber Singh were vehemently against this, while Panchar expressed satisfaction with the road section although he felt that the creek block section should be redistributed. The solution the council reached was to make allowances for the creek hands in favour of the Co-operative, but to continue allocating from west to east as had been decided.[40]

In this case, Ramprashad had supported the co-operative members in order to gain more long range support, particularly since the members were generally persons who had a history of opposition to him. In this attempt, he obtained the help of Dagleish, the chairman, who called the meeting so that the matter could be discussed. At the meeting however, his case ran into the interests of Petamber Singh, both of whom had land in the road section and didn't want to be removed from it through a reallocation. In this situation, Panchar took a middle path. He accepted[41] the interests of both groups by agreeing that the road block section allocations should stand, but also supported the co-operative members by suggesting that the creek block area be reallocated. The way was then clear for the council to retain the original allocations but to give the Co-operative an allowance for the creek hands.

In later months,however, the Co-operative was becoming extremely powerful as the allocated lands of its members were being pooled. The Panday family had land at the Left Bank Abary as did the family of Gaffur Gobin. The

latter applied to the council for his Bush Lot land to be transferred to Panday while Panday in turn would give Gobin land on the Left Bank Abary. The council refused to entertain the application as Gobin had enough Bush Lot land while the Abary lands were not under the council's control. The council preferred to give the land to other tenants rather than expanding the holdings of one person.[42]

In a similar vein, a year later, two Narain brothers asked to have their lands in the New Empolder transferred to the Co-operative. The council refused, unanimously, since the Co-operative had enough land.[43]

When threatened by an outside body the council reacted as a unit. This was made possible in the above case since none of the councillors were Co-operative members. In addition, there was the attempt to maintain a balance between potentially competing groups outside the council field. Thus the lands of large family groups were not allowed to be consolidated within the village if it was detrimental to another section of the population. Rather than give Panday access to a large block, the council preferred to subdivide the land among several smaller tenants. In keeping with this decision, the council began to disallow transfers of land from one person to another even within the village. The reasoning was that an individual could have a proprietor rent land and then transfer it to himself. This could be especially effective among friends and relatives. To prevent the consolidation which could occur as a result, the council began to insist that lands be surrendered to it first with the council then having the control of reallocation to applicants in order of date.[44]

At the same time, the council explicitly developed an ideology of the "common good." When proprietors approached councillor Petamber Singh as to the possibility of a gate being built in a new fence at the Crown Dam, Persaud

presented the application to the council "on behalf of the people" who needed an easy means of ingress and egress. The council agreed to the application unanimously.[45]

This type of action put the council in a position of being able to mediate disputes which did not concern it directly.

For example, when Cecil Seeram complained to the council that Imdad Usman had ploughed under a portion of his rice in the New Empolder, the latter claimed that when he went to plough he saw a paal and assumed his land stretched that far. He therefore ploughed up to the paal. The council then convinced Usman to replant the land for Seeram and at the same time, decided to remeasure the land and move the paal to its proper place.[46]

In a similar vein, when Bharat was charged by the council for cutting a fence, the council unanimously decided to attempt to obtain a settlement out of court.[47]

In the matter of hiring and dismissing village officials, such as overseers, rangers and assistant overseers, the council during this period was able to arrive at unprecedented unanimity. Eighteen decisions had to be made, and of these, thirteen were unanimous ones.[48] The council then, in view of the lack of internal schisms, could deal with hirings and dismissals from an "objective" point of view rather than giving first priority to the incumbent's political leanings. In the cases where divisions had to be taken, this was largely due to personal and individual conflicts and threats to vested interests between the official and a few of the councillors. The example of the ranger Teekah is a case in point. Councillor Ramhit developed a strong distaste for this ranger who refused to take orders from anyone except the chairman and who reported to the council that Ramhit, who had cattle land on the Left Bank Abary opposite the New Empolder area, was driving his cattle daily to graze

in the latter area. A similar situation arose between Teekah and councillor Jowahir. The result was that the two councillors continually brought up motions for Teekah's dismissal as well as writing letters of complaint to the council.[49] The more Ramhit complained about Teekah however, the more Teekah took special care to report Ramhit's infractions of village by-laws. He thus wrote the council on one occasion that Ramhit's tractor had gotten stuck in the mud and the councillor had taken wallaba posts from a local authority fence to brace the tractor to get it out of the mud. Ramhit thus voted against Teekah being confirmed in the position of ranger and accused him of using local authority workers to fill a house spot for himself in the New Empolder area.[50]

This type of situation however was a personality conflict and a dispute between individuals. It never resulted in the council becoming divided on the issue.

In a similar situation, the application by councillor Petamber Singh for the position of village overseer, vested interests of individuals played the key role in decision making rather than factional alignments. Singh was in competition with Banoo Charran for the job. Dagleish nominated Singh[51] because he felt that the councillor had done an efficient job while in the position of acting overseer several months previously.[52] Ramprashad however, supported Charran because the latter used to work in his office at the rice mill while Ramprashad himself lived in Charran's father's house in Hopetown. Narain's father had worked for Ramprashad and the latter had helped the family. He too voted for Charran as did Jowahir, who was related to Charran by marriage. Panchar also voted for Charran as he did not like Singh.[53] The result was that Charran won the election on the basis of personal ties which he had with the members. The councillors in turn voted on the basis

of personal preferences.

This characteristic of voting patterns based on personal preference and vested interests is evident in other situations.

On two occasions the issue came up of renting out the Jib Lands to tenants,[54] the land itself lying fallow at the time as renters had been switched to the New Empolder area. In the vote that followed,[55] Ramhit voted for the suggestion because he wanted more land since he had just invested in machinery.[56] Hussein Amin on the other hand, suggested that the Jib from the No. 6 Crown Dam to the Abary be rented out for cultivation thereby enabling cattle to be kept on the other half which was near enough to the village for large-scale milking.[57] Amin was a large cattle owner. Dagleish, a driver at Bath estate with no real investment in rice, maintained that the land should be left idle to increase its fertility.[58]

At about the same time, two Armadale cultivators applied to the council to rent the entire New Lands area in order to plant rice. In return, they offered to allot the local authority the fifth depth of their Armadale land on which the Bush Lot proprietors could keep their cattle. The reason behind this application was that the drainage was superior in Bush Lot and therefore more amenable to rice, while poor drainage did not affect cattle to the same extent.

Amin strongly objected to this idea on the grounds that the land should be left idle.[59] In fact, he kept his cattle in the New Lands. In addition, the Armadale area was savannah, wide open with no high places for cattle when the land flooded. Mahatma Deoroop supported the application as one of the applicants was his brother. Narain also agreed since he wanted the increased revenue for the council. Ramhit agreed in the hope that he would get more land to plant.[50]

The cattle owners of Bush Lot however, made strong objections to the idea with the result that the two applicants withdrew their application, a move which the council unanimously accepted.[61]

In a similar vein, the council, had to decide on the tolls to be charged to farmers for passing their padi out of Armadale and Abary lands through local authority trenches and dams. The tolls for the Abary people was set at fifty cents per acre while the Armadale people were charged seventy-five per acre. The reasoning of the council was that the Abary farmers were also Bush Lot proprietors and therefore should have a reduced rate. The Armadale planters were for the most part non-proprietors. Both councillors Premsingh and Mahatma Deoroop objected strongly to the seventy-five cent rate for Armadale padi and were the only two to vote against the motion.[62] For Deoroop and his brothers were large landowners in Armadale; and Premsingh's brother was a large planter.[63]

A final characteristic of the council during this period was the fact that it would defend the interests of the councillors if these interests became involved in a situation that could not be arbitrated to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.

In 1948, both David Panchar, a brother of Gerald and Samuel Dookhun applied to buy houselot 26D. This lot was inside the mill compound and was in fact being illegally occupied by the Panchars in that they had never formally rented it from the local authority, nor had they ever paid rates on the lot. Dookhun had learned of this situation through his father, who had been village overseer, and applied for the lot because of the enmity between his father and the Panchar family who had quarrelled over land.

The councillors suggested various possibilities for the settlement of the dispute since the lot had the mill's concrete drying floor on it. One suggestion was that Dookhun and Panchar exchange lots. Both parties however,

refused to compromise. The council then sold Panchar the lot.[64]

In 1952, the chairman Panchar was sued for illegal impounding together with Noor Azam who had been authorized by the local authority to impound cattle which were illegally traversing dams, grazing in rice fields, etc. The council unanimously decided to obtain and pay a lawyer to defend Panchar.[65]

To summarize: The village council arena in the period under study was characterized by what can be termed "factional peace." This was exhibited through the manner in which the chairmen and deputy chairman were elected, and by the voting patterns within the council on specific issues. In both cases emphasis was on concensus and unanimity. Decisions on which disagreement occurred exhibited no continuing patterns of division among personnel on the council.

These patterns were in turn tied to the adaptation which the council had made to the changed economic and national political conditions impinging on the village. The result was a council arena which was far different from that which characterized previous periods. The emphasis was now on conciliation and arbitration between conflicting segments of the population and between individuals. In addition, the vested interests of councillors as individuals, interests which were dependent on changing contexts rather than group affiliation, became the major reason for conflict. The result was that the council never split into subgroups, for the long range exchange of mutual support between any specific group was impossible given the economic and political changes which had created too many alternatives and issues for individual interests to coincide for any length of time. Once the economic base of the village was no longer under the control of the councillors, but was an open and expanding system, political polarization became impossible since alternatives were too diverse, and for the moment, there was enough potential for the majority of villagers to be content.

The consequences of this situation were numerous. The personal ambitions of councillors could be checked by the impersonal perspectives of others; the acquisition of political support by individuals through patronage networks was generally minimized by the lack of support which patrons obtained from other council members and by the high cost of maintenance; vested interests of councillors, individual enterprises, became the prime motivation behind issues raised and voting patterns; compromise on issues became the paramount method of dispute settlement because of the atomized nature of the council; a "conception of the common good" became emphasized; the council was able to function as a mediator in disputes which did not directly concern it; the attitude toward officials hired by the council became "objective" rather than political; and finally conflicting interests between council members and officials were the motivations behind conflict rather than political considerations and affiliations.

At the same time the council would react as a group when threatened by an outside body and defend its own members first in situations where compromise was impossible.

In short, the council remained an elite body, but one which was not under any systematic attack from outside. This was a result of the economic opportunities which had become generalized through the village and the fact that potentially competing elites were engaged in a larger arena. As such, the nature of the village council could assume the form which it did.

(iii) Other Arenas Within the Village.

There were several other arenas which were also characterized by "peace" and conciliation. Partially, this was because the council became a resource which was utilized by the villagers to maintain the "peace." They appealed to it for arbitration in potentially disruptive situations and arenas. At the

same time, villagers were not being mobilized into political struggles within the village and they, as well as the councillors, were mainly concerned with their own enterprises. Finally, economic resources were diffuse enough at the moment to enable most people to expand their economic base without impinging on their neighbour's attempts. Four characteristics, the presence of a political arbitrator; the lack of competition for political support; the concern of each family with its own enterprises; and the unlimited nature of the resources, resulted in a predisposition for conciliation in potential dispute situations. As well, disputes between individuals remained at that level and were not translated into a political idiom or issue.

The example of the race club situation, and the holding of race meetings is a case in point. In 1936, this arena was characterized by disputes which were carried over from the village council arena with the result that the race meeting of that year became a political encounter between two polarized factions which controlled both the council and the political support of the villagers. In 1948 however, two applications were made by two different persons to hold race meetings at approximately the same time, The council, in considering the two applications, suggested that the two applicants combine their meetings and submit a joint application. Both agreed to do so,[66] and the race meeting was held without incident or objection from any section of the village population.[67]

During the period the villagers themselves formed an additional arena to explicitly serve as an impetus toward co-operation. For this, several families formed a "Ratepayers Association" in which the headmaster of the primary school was president. Almost every family in the village joined and they met with the council to make suggestions on the development of the New Empolder area.[68]

Finally, the potential conflict between the cattle owners and rice farmers was a long range dispute which came into sharp focus during this period, but

was held in abeyance because of the political and economic structure of the village at the time. The potential for dispute had always been present in the village in that no pasture had been allotted for the agistment of animals. This situation however, did not reach crisis proportions in that the scrub land behind the cultivated areas and near the seashore north of the public road served as pasturage for both cattle and oxen. The major points of contention in this situation were that cattle would often wander into the provision and rice cultivation areas and damage crops. The council however, had generally attempted to build and maintain fences to minimize the danger of conflicts.

The expansion into the Abary however, had created a cattle industry which implied a very high increase in the numbers of cattle which could be kept. At the same time however, as has been seen, many of these Abary cattle owners brought their herds into the Bush Lot area to graze. This was done so that they could conserve the pasturage of their own lands - pasturage which was not of the highest quality and required the inordinate proportion of one animal to two acres of land. They thus used the Bush Lot scrub land as much as they possibly could.[69]

At the same time however, the village council had taken up over 1,800 acres of land in the New Empolder and put it under rice cultivation. A large portion of de facto pasturage was therefore being otherwise utilized. The fact that the Jib and New Lands were being allowed to lie fallow did give the cattle owners some pasturage, but this area was smaller than the New Empolder area and the propensity of cattle to wander into cultivation was increased by virtue of the layout of these areas.

In short, pasturage had decreased; the size of the herds had increased, and the dangers of wandering cattle to cultivation had also increased.

It has already been seen that on several issues pertaining to the allocations and distributions of land for cattle as opposed to rice and vice versa, the councillors were themselves divided on the issue according to the extent of investment each had put into one of the two industries. It is not surprising then, that the villagers found themselves in a similar situation. On issues that involved cattle or rice, villagers took sides according to their interests. But it was the council that controlled the allocation of lands and was responsible for the upkeep of fences which could control the damage which the cattle did to the cultivation. The fact that this council was itself divided in the issue, meant that the same "objectivity" and compromise which had characterized the village council would also be found in this particular economic arena. Thus the council was continually put into the position of having to compromise between the two opposing groups of which they themselves were members. For the period under study they were successful.

In 1948, the council began to seriously construct wire fences to keep cattle out of the cultivation area and to repair already existing fences.[70] The council also authorized persons as stray catchers and supported them financially when cattle owners sued them for illegal impounding.[71] They built a watch house at the crown dam to enable the cultivation to be more systematically guarded.[72] At the same time however, the council preserved the delicate balance which existed in the differential allocation of land to cattle and rice. Several councillors wanted to extend the rice area into the Jib and New Lands both to increase the council's revenue and to possibly obtain more land. These councillors were offset however, by councillors who were cattle owners and councillors who had no real interests in either rice or cattle. Several motions, as has been seen, to extend the rice lands were defeated in this manner. At the same time, the council lowered the agistment rates on

cattle or waived them completely. The council also built high spots in the New Lands for the cattle owners to keep their animals during the rainy season.[73] Finally, the council mediated disputes between both groups when damages by one against the other were claimed. At meetings, complainants were brought forth and the council discussed damages and claims until a settlement was reached.[74]

In these ways, the council kept the "malice and vengeance between farmers and cattle owners"[75] at bay. The distribution of land until 1952 was in balance with the demands of both groups, and the actions of the council towards conciliation kept the issue on an interpersonal level between villagers rather than turning the situation into a political encounter.

To summarize: The major arenas within the village, the race club arena, and the interaction between rice and cattle, were characterized by a similar factional peace which characterized the village council arena. In both these arenas the council was used as a resource which was tapped for the purpose of conciliation in order to keep disruptive potential outside the realm of "politics." In the case of the rice vs. cattle issue, the peace was an uneasy truce that could be upset through any minor alteration of the delicate balance. The council however, in the period under study, maintained this balance due to the crosscutting interests of its own members.

(iv) The Arena of Inter-Village Relations.

It was also during this period that the village, as represented by its council, became involved in the culmination of a long-standing dispute with Golden Grove Village immediately to the west of Bush Lot.

This dispute, begun in 1946 over the control of the western dam which divided the villages, became acute primarily because of an increase in territorial and ethnic chauvinism.

A paal had marked the dividing line between the two villages and had been placed on the extreme western side of the dam. The dam had eroded however, and someone had moved the paal onto the centre of the dam. Not knowing this however, Ramprashad and Thompson, the chairman of Golden Grove, accepted the paal as the dividing line and therefore assumed that the dam belonged equally to both villages. This matter of ownership was important in that the question had arisen as to who was to maintain the dam and the sideline trench. With the assumption that the paal was the marker and situated in the centre of the dam, the decision was made that the dam belonged to both villages and both would be equally responsible for its upkeep.[76]

At the same time, the council was reacting to certain policies being perpetuated in Hopetown. The Hopetown council had passed a resolution stating that no East Indians were to be sold lots in the village even if they lived there and were renters. In response, the Bush Lot village council served notices on all non-residents and non-proprietors who rented land in the village to quit. At the same time, the policy was stated that as Bush Lot was an East Indian settlement, no persons of African descent would be permitted to buy land.[77]

By 1947, the combination of racism, derived from the Hopetown incident but extrapolated to Golden Grove, and the possibility of losing control over the western dam had become a major point of dispute with Golden Grove. The Bush Lot council demanded a surveyor to mark the village boundaries.[78]

The problem festered for over a year, with the Bush Lot council claiming that the dam was part of the original land grant made to East Indian settlers, and that it had been kept up by Bush Lot since 1905. Golden Grove claimed however, that it was a common dam. The Bush Lot council then proceeded, in September 1949, to build a fence along the dam, to set up barriers, and

prosecute any person trespassing or destroying these.[79]

At this point, the District Commissioner stepped in and called a joint meeting of both Local authorities.[80] When the Golden Grove representatives did not come, the Bush Lot council decided to obtain legal advice to protect their dam against the Golden Grove encroachment.[81] Meanwhile, the District Commissioner set another time for the meeting.[82] By March 1950, an agreement was reached in which the responsibility for the dam was to be a joint one. The Bush Lot council still insisted on a survey.[83] Two months later, the council again complained to the District Commissioner that Golden Grove was encroaching on the dam.[84] A year later, an addendum was made to the original agreement in which more specific points were made explicit, such as: All cattle on the dam were to be impounded; no works were to be done to the dam without the approval of both local authorities; and all proprietors have access to the dam without tolls in dry weather.[85] Later in the year however, Golden Grove refused to help Bush Lot repair the dam.

During the period 1948-1952 then, the council and the village of Bush Lot were engaged in a dispute with an outside party. In this dispute, the council retained unanimity as well as the support of the villagers. An added impetus towards internal cohesion was present during this period.

(d) Principles of Factional Peace: Conclusions.

After the demise of one of the rice miller factions, there occurred in Bush Lot major changes in the structure and allocation of resources. These changes interrelated to create a situation of "factional peace" within the village. Generally, there was satisfaction as to the "way things were going" and given the nature and allocation of resources, factionalism as a means of organizing political competition was not an adaptive strategy in the village at the time. As a result, local level politics were geared to the maintenance of peace, both consciously and unconsciously on the part of the major actors.

Notes: Chapter 7.

1. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 15, 1947.
2. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January 5, 1948.
3. Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969 and Dagleish, February 1970.
4. Ibid.
5. According to the Reportsof the Immigration Agent General cited in Chapter 4.
6. Lesley Key, personal communication.
7. Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969; Amin Mohamed and Alla Mohamed, January 1970.
8. Interview with Amin Mohamed, February 1970.
9. Report of the British Guiana Rice Marketing Board, 1943-1944. Third Legislative Council, Tenth Session, 1944, page 5.
10. This scheme is known as MARDS.
11. This did not affect Bush Lot cultivators who were geographically too distant to benefit from such lending.
12. Report of the British Guiana Rice Marketing Board, 1949-1950. Fourth Legislative Council, Fourth Session, 1951, page 9.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid. page 4.
15. Interview with Seeram Bhagwandin, member of the Bush Lot Rice Growers' Co-Operative, December 1971.
16. Also, Leo Depres, personal communication.
17. Interview with Dagleish, October 1969; Petamber Singh, October 1969; and P. T. Premsingh, November, 1970.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Minute of the Bush Lot Village District, December 20, 1946.

23. Ibid., December 1947; 1948; and 1949.

24. Interview with Dagleish, October 1969 and Petamber Singh, October 1969.

25. Ibid.

26. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 1950.

    Interview with Dagleish, October 1969 and Petamber Singh, October 1969.

27. Ibid.

28. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 1951.

    Interview with Dagleish, October 1969 and Petamber Singh, October 1969.

29. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 1952.

    Interviews with Dagleish, October 1969 and Petamber Singh, October 1969.

30. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, 1948 - 1952.

31. Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969.

32. Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969 and Dagleish, October 1969.

33. Letter from A. Chesney, Returning Officer, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, October 28, 1952.

34. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Local Government, October 1, 1952.

35. Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Local Government, October 10, 1952.

36. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 1, 1947.

37. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, July, 1948.

38. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, March 7, 1949.

39. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 7, 1949.

40. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 12, 1949.

41. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969.

42. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, April 11, 1949.

    Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969 and Dagleish, October 1969.

43. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, April 3, 1950.

    Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969, and Dagleish, October 1969.

44. Ibid.

45. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 25, 1949.

    Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969.

46. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, June 9, 1952.

47. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 26, 1951.

48. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, 1947 - 1952.

49. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, May 1, 1950.

50. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, March 7, 1949 and July 3, 1950.

51. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, June 17, 1950.

52. Interview with Dagleish, October 1969.

53. Ibid.

    Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969.

54. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, April 19, 1950 and November 13, 1950.

55. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, November 13, 1950.

56. Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969.

57. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, April 17, 1950.

58. Ibid.

    Interview with Dagleish, October 1969.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, April 19, 1950.

62. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, October 2, 1950.

63. Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969.

64. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, April 5, 1948.

65. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, July 9, 1952.

66. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, October 4, 1948.

67. Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969, and Dagleish, October 1969.

68. Ibid.

Interview with P. T. Premsingh, January 1970.

69. Interview with Amin Mohamed, September 1969.

70. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, March 1, 1948 and March 9, 1948.

71. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, August 20, 1948.

72. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, April 11, 1949.

73. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, March 3, 1952.

74. For example, the complaint made by Petamber Singh, Mattai, Jairam Mangar, and Wahab Hassan to the Assistant District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, January 29, 1951, re the possibility of illegal impoundings.

75. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, November 6, 1948.

76. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March 1970.

77. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January 5, 1948.

78. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, November 6, 1948.

79. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 25, 1949.

80. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, November 14, 1949.

81. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 5, 1949.

82. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 6, 1950.

83. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, March 21, 1950.

84. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, May 1, 1950.

85. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 15, 1951.

Chapter 8: The Politics of Class Elitism, 1953-1966.

(a) Introduction.

In 1953, the effects of the economic expansion of the previous years could be observed in the village. In addition, changes in the economic base and the national political arena had major effects on the nature of the political peace which had accompanied the expansion. These changes are discussed in the following section. Discussion then proceeds to a description of the local level politics which followed quickly upon the events and changes in 1953 and to an analysis of the nature of factions which grew out of a factional peace.

(b) Effects, Events and Changes After the Expansion.

The 1953 national election for the Legislative Council was characterized by massive campaigning throughout the country. Competing in the election were not only the People's Progressive Party, but also the National Democratic Party which "aggregated the forces of conservatism in Guyanese society . . . and whose members shared but one thing in common - all were militant anti-communists who were convinced that the Marxists within the PPP had to be rooted out of Guyanese life" (Depres, 1967: 201-202). The leader of the party was Lionel Luckhoo, president of MPCA, who "launched a campaign to prohibit the importation of subversive literature into the country - meaning by this the various left-wing and communist propaganda tracts sold or distributed by the PPP. The passing of the [Undesirable Publications] Bill gave the [PPP] party a great fillip and made people much more interested in the now banned literature

than they had ever been before." Luckhoo bought "a four page supplement in the Sunday newspapers published a week before the election enlarging on the dangers of communism, the horrors of slave camps. . . . Since it was widely believed that this supplement must have been paid for by the sugar producers, the general reaction was - 'if they are so much against the PPP, it must be good for us'" (Smith, R., 1962: 170).

"There was enormous public interest and enthusiasm . . . [and] despite all that has been said about the gullibility of the electorate, anyone who was in touch with the ordinary people in April, 1953 knows that they had accepted the PPP as an instrument of a new deal for the country, and they voted for it as a party that would work for a better future for them and their children" (Ibid.: 171).

In the election, the PPP won 51% of the votes and captured eighteen of the twenty-four seats (Ibid.: 171). The NDP obtained only 13% of the vote and two seats (Depres, 1967: 202).

After their election, the PPP attempted to pass a Labour Relations Bill to enable the GIWU to supplant the MPCA and give the Minister of Labour almost complete control over the labour movement. A strike on the sugar estates was called to demonstrate the need for the bill and the industry came to a standstill. Two weeks later, the GIWU called an end to the strike and the following day the Labour Relations Bill was introduced in the Assembly. The day after, the British government suspended the constitution and removed the PPP from office on the grounds that the government was controlled by a communist clique. The major leaders of the party were imprisoned or placed under house arrest (Ibid.: 208). Among them were Dr. J. P. Lachmansingh and Dabi Maraj.

According to Reverend Premsingh, Dabi had been sent by the PPP to Bath Estate to organize the workers as part of the general sugar strike. Premsingh

claims that he was standing by the Bandu Koker observing the events. He then went to Georgetown and informed the British officials of what had transpired. In the general roundup of "communists" occurring several weeks later, Dabi was one of those arrested on the basis, partially, of Premsingh's evidence.

Premsingh was then asked by the Maraj family to testify for Dabi as a character reference. He refused to do this on the grounds that people would accuse him "of taking two sides and hanging his mouth where the soup was." For Premsingh had also publicly made it known that he had joined the NDP. Everyone in the village knew of this and his role in the Bath strike.[1]

The British government had meanwhile suspended not only the elections but the workings of the Assembly. After three months' imprisonment, with the PPP momentarily eliminated from national politics, Dabi Maraj returned to Bush Lot in time for the village council elections for the years 1954-1955. He collected around him the PPP activists and his extended family, and contested the election as a PPP party group running against the old and non-aligned councillors.[2]

Dabi slipped easily into this leadership role since at the end of 1952, Gerald Panchar had died.[3] Several months later, A. B. Ramprashad sold his mill since he was afraid that the PPP would take away his holdings as they were already encouraging farmers to renege on their debts.[4]

The leadership vacuum resulting from the death of a crucial conciliator and the retirement of an old political force within the village, enabled Dabi to enter the local political arena and gather support from the PPP people, several powerful families and the former debtors of the Ramprashad mill.

Coterminous with these events, the Bush Lot Village Council, which for several years had been a major conciliatory body within the village, upset the delicate balance which had existed between cattle owners and rice farmers and which had been meticulously maintained until 1953.

On January 9, 1953, the council, reacting to pressure from farmers in the absence of cattle owners at a meeting, passed a resolution that a portion (one hundred and ninety-five acres) of the Jib Land on which cattle were then being agisted be converted to rice cultivation.[5] The villagers were immediately mobilized through a petition against the resolution signed by one hundred and thirty-six proprietors[6] and followed six days later by a counter petition supporting the resolution signed by one hundred villagers.[7] Those against the motion claimed that the area of the Jib to be converted was where oxen were being kept for planting and ploughing, and since the land was just opposite the area in the New Empolder where the rice fields were laid out, the agistment area was extremely convenient.[8]

Those who favoured the resolution maintained that many people did not have rice land and others had insufficient amounts with land unobtainable from any other source. They also maintained that the upkeep of the land for cattle cost more than did the incoming revenue from agistment fees and claimed that the cattle were also damaging rice lands while the owners cut the wire fence to let their cattle through.[9]

The issue reached the District Commissioner through these petitions. His concern was with the immense cost required to convert the land and claimed that better supervision by the rangers would prevent the fence cutting and cattle from straying.[10] He also insisted that a proprietors' meeting be called in order for the council to ascertain the opinions of the villagers rather than making such a decision without such awareness.[11]

The proprietors' meeting was held on February 14th, and the consensus of opinion expressed at the meeting was that the conversion should not take place. In the light of this, the District Commissioner instructed the council to reconsider the matter with the strong suggestion that the original resolution be rescinded.[12] It was.

This event however, had major implications. First, it was a statement that the economic expansion had come to a virtual end for the majority of villagers. Applications for land were being refused by the council throughout 1953 on the grounds that there was no more available land in the New Empolder area.[13] It was this fact, the pressure for land, that forced the council's decision to open the Jib Land for rice cultivation.

The subsequent dispute however, indicated secondly, that there was now a tension between machine owners and farmers who cultivated by the traditional use of oxen. Tractor owners demanded more land in order to operate their machinery at an acceptable level of efficiency. In addition, they were capable of cultivating additional acreage, and demanded this from the council. On the other hand, the small farmer with his traditional technology became allied with the cattle owners. Both needed pasturage, one for oxen, the other for cattle.

This split in the ranks of farmers indicates as well a major result of the expansion which had been occurring in the previous six years. Machine ownership requires a large capital outlay. As a result of the expansion, some farmers were able to make this investment, others were not. The expansion, in short, had resulted in an obvious economic differentiation between individuals and families. Then, in the matter of expanding acreage, all the new interests became polarized. Three groups - cattle owners, small traditional farmers, and large mechanized cultivators - each began demanding their due. This was further complicated by the fact that the small farmers were themselves split into two further groups - those who had sufficient land and whose concern was maintaining an agistment area for their oxen, as opposed to those who were landless or had insufficient land and were demanding acreage from the local authority.

As a result of the expansion, and according to the furor raised over the suggestion to turn the Jib into a cultivated area, there was now apparent

within the village major divisions based on occupational interests which had become more diversified as a result of the expansion. Further, this implied another type of split within the village. The ownership of machinery, the extent of a family's land holdings, and the nature of their expansion was now an index that families had been differentially successful in exploiting available resources during the expansion period. The village was split not only vertically as a result of occupational interest groups but also horizontally, in terms of economic success.

This latter aspect becomes apparent when reviewing the effects of economic decision making on relative success in much the same manner as the decision for Abary expansion in the 1920's had major effects on the type of expansion which a family could engage in during the late forties.

Those who had the capability of Abary expansion still retained, by 1953, access to almost unlimited resources in the form of available land. In addition, they had the added option of combining large-scale cattle rearing with the more traditional occupation of rice cultivation. The sale of ten or twelve cows would buy another tractor. This in turn would enable further exploitation of land for rice cultivation.

On the other hand, those families who had chosen to limit their rice cultivation to the Bush Lot area, found themselves caught in the land shortage. As well, their means of cultivation, oxen, were under pressure of obliteration by tractor owners and those among themselves who wanted pasture land converted to rice. If they extended their land, they lost their means of production. At the same time, there was not enough land for growing families and children.

In addition to these pressures, those who depended on estate labour to augment their earnings were being caught in new policies which the estates were beginning to introduce. This was an increased emphasis on mechanization which replaced manual labour; new farming techniques such as the ratooning

cycle of cane plants being increased from a four-year cycle with the subsequent drop in the need for labour; and new social policies which were attempting to deal with labour unrest on the estates. Thus for example, the estates were beginning to cut down on the amount of casual labour which they hired and depend instead on a permanent but smaller work force. The implications of this policy were that the estate could then afford to pay a few workers more and offer them job security rather than have a labour force consisting of a large number of underpaid, dissatisfied and casual workers (Reubens, 1963).

The result of these policies meant a cutback in seasonal labour which affected villagers who wanted work only part of the year between rice crops. The small Bush Lot farmer then, who since 1902 had depended on a small rice crop coupled with estate labour for part of the year, found a source of cash income being cut off.

The land squeeze, together with the cutback in estate labour required the small farmer and estate labourer to find additional sources of income. This was usually accomplished by the opening up of small shops within the village. Table 8.1 presents the numbers of persons who applied for building permissions to open these shops between 1941 and 1960. The numbers proliferate after 1952 and indicate that a new source of income had been found which began to be utilized after the first crop was reaped in the New Empolder in 1949 and which reached a high point in the years immediately following the period of expansion which ended in 1952.

Table 8.1: Applications to Build Shops - 1941-1960.


Years:	Number of Applications:
1939-1940 (2 years)	1
1941-1944 (4 years)	4
1945-1948 (4 years)	5
1949-1952 (4 years)	13
1953-1956 (4 years)	22
1957-1960 (4 years)	13

Insofar however, as each enterprise was carried out with different degrees of success, as discussed in Chapter 2, the opening of shops contributed additionally to the differentiation which had been occurring on the basis of both occupation and income.


In short then, the results of the economic expansion of the previous period had different implications for different families depending on the economic alternative which they had chosen as the basis for their expansion. The result for the resource allocation within the village was a new distribution of wealth as well as a more complex economic sphere. The former result implied as well an elite group which was not only larger in size, but one in which recruitment no longer depended on traditional associations. Village elitism was now the prerogative of the family groups which had been most successful in the economic expansion. Further, there had emerged a new method for gaining elite membership as a result of the successful advent of the PPP within the village. Membership in the core group, regardless of wealth, had associated with it the status of "important person." This was evident in the cases of Samuel Dookhun and Drepaul Bharat, both of whom had little material wealth and little opportunity for increasing it as a result of the economic alternatives they had chosen. Both were small farmers who had concentrated their cultivation in the Bush Lot area and depended on wage labour, now growing scarce, for an income supplement. Yet, they were regarded as important in the village because of their early association with the PPP which was now viewed as the people's party in opposition to the colonial government. Table 8.2 presents the two patterns of stratification, the pre-1953 pattern and the post-1953 pattern. It should be noted that the latter pattern was definitely associated with the economic differentiation which had been occurring and the division of the economic sphere into occupational interest groups which were becoming apparent by 1953 and which emerged in sharp relief as a result

Table 8.2: Village Stratification; Pre-1953 and Post-1953.

1. Pre-1953:



2. Post-1953:



of the Jib Land dispute.

Now aside from this dispute indicating the new allocation and structure of resources within the village, it also had important implications for the village council. For the council's handling of the dispute indicated that this body, whose previous structure had allowed for conciliation by virtue of the crosscutting interests its members, had first, become aligned with the wealthier segment of the population and had secondly, become unable to adapt to the new situation of contracting resources. Finally, the village had become too complex to have represented on it all the competing segments of the village population. In the Jib Land dispute, the structure of the council made it impossible for the conciliatory pattern to continue and it was an outside mediator, the District Commissioner, who had to initiate an action strategy in order to force a decision on the issue. Further, this decision was contrary to the original motion, thereby pointing out in sharp relief the inability of the council to deal with crisis situations and to please all the various pressure groups all the time. For example, on the council at the time, only two of the economic segments were represented. Hussein Amin, who missed the meeting, later objected to the motion on the grounds that the cattle industry would suffer. Except for Dagleish, who was a disinterested party from a personal economic perspective, the remainder of the councillors were large farmers with investments in machinery and the desire for more farmland. The two groups of traditional farmers had no representation and the decision of the council reflected only the interests of the majority of its members. In the light of the complexity of the village at the time and the emerging scarcity of land, the resulting decision could not be later paid off with another concession to the other groups. For first, they were not represented; and second, the decision to convert the land in the light of scarcity, implied that an equal trade off at a later time was impossible. The decision in short, was hurting the economic base of many villagers. It was too high a price that could not

be later repaid.

At the same time, the local PPP group was making major inroads into the popular support of the council as a prelude for the local elections in 1953 and as a result of events in the national political arena. As disputes within the village developed into major crises and as the council was no longer able to adapt to the new resource structure and allocation, the PPP group provided an alternative for political loyalties. The factional peace of the previous period had ended.

(c) Arenas of Competition.

(i) Introduction: The Goals of Competition.

The Jib Land dispute which signalled the end of the factional peace, also served as the initial point for a new kind of factional competition within the village. A national political party was attempting to organize and control the local government and loyalties of the people in opposition to the entrenched local political elites who insisted that national politics were a "Georgetown story" and whose position of political elitism would be eliminated should the former group be successful. In addition, members of the latter group were in many cases members of political parties which opposed the PPP in the national arena. Their attempts to eliminate the PPP from the local arena was not however, wholly a result of competing national loyalties. For the secondary national parties were not engaged in any concerted effort at grass-roots organization. Rather, as competitors in the local arena, the non-PPP faction quite explicitly defined themselves as anti-PPP and anti-communist rather than being for any other particular party.[14] In such a case, the goal of the competition was whether a national party could enter the local arena and control the formal and informal workings of local government. For the PPP, this was regarded as a logical necessity of their national platform and organization.

For the other faction, the goal was to prevent this infiltration both because of ideological disagreements, but more importantly, because the success of the PPP on the local level would eliminate many of the former political elite from political competition and political control.

This latter threat to the anti-PPP group was extremely crucial. For the possibility that the elite group could amalgamate was not wholly prevented by ideological differences. Rather, this was obviously made impossible by the historical dimensions of factionalism which had been characterizing the village from its inception. These traditional splits, involving the same personnel through several decades, could not be reconciled. A major cause of the new factional competition then, was the history of enmity which characterized the village as well as competing ideologies and threats to political and power positions which individuals held during previous years.

The goals of the competition then, although having their base in competing ideologies and vested interests, also found their roots in the factional alignments of the past. The goal was now political control of the village electorate. Each faction which emerged for this competition however, had different motives in competing for this prize. One faction viewed itself as an extension of a nationalist movement; the other viewed itself as a defender of local autonomy. Again underlying this explicit statement however, was the fact that both factions had personal vested interests to maintain as a result of the economic and political position of the team members and as a result of enmities which had their roots in the political competition which had taken place thirty years before.

With these goals and motives then, and with the prize of political control, what was the nature of the factional competition during this period?

(ii) The Village Council Arena.

From 1953, competition occurred over which faction was to control the council, and with this encounter done, competition then proceeded to occur within the council itself.

Of interest however, is that until 1959, each faction alternately gained decisive control of the council. In 1953, the PPP faction successfully exploited the inability of the old council to conciliate disputes and reach decisions. That year they won six of the nine seats. The 1955 elections resulted in a reverse situation in which the anti-PPP group captured seven of the seats only to be entirely eliminated from the council after the 1957 elections. Only in the 1959 election did the two groups split the seats such that competition within the council was evident in the form of major confrontations and encounters.[15]

This fact of the alternating success of the two groups over a six year period had the effect of diminishing extreme competition within the council with the result that major encounters occurred only during elections, or in other words, during the attempts to gain control of the council. As a result of this, the council arena must be divided into two periods on the basis of the major types of competition which were occurring.

a. The Competition of Alternating Succession, 1953-1959.

During the year 1953, there occurred several incidents which were similar in nature and outcome to the Jib Land dispute. Basically, they involved the inability of the council as it was constituted to find solutions to problems emerging as a rssult of the termination of the economic expansion and the continuous need for mediators to force decisions.

For example, in that year there arose a major dispute among council members. The chairman Dagleish had ordered that the New Empolder area be

remeasured because of conflicts between farmers as to the boundaries of their lands. After the measurement was done, the council realized that the cost of the work was over $200. Dagleish maintained that this was because the measurement had been done using paals to mark the fields rather than being a mere measurement without markings. Several other councillors maintained however, that the high cost was because Dagleish had given out the work to a villager in contract form rather than hiring men himself and having the overseer or rangers supervise the work. The result of this method of carrying out the work was that the council was being robbed by the contractor. These councillors also maintained that Dagleish had had no right to carry out the work in this manner since the contract method had not been authorized by the council. Dagleish answered this criticism by stating that even if the council had wished to supervise the work itself, the rangers were too busy to do so and the councillors he had asked were unwilling to expend the time. The suggestion then arose that perhaps "a certain councillor" was making money on the deal. Discussion of this sort continued through two council meetings[16] until finally, the District Commissioner was invited "to act as an arbitrator in the matter."[17] At this meeting, Narain began by stating that the "inquiry" should begin. Dagleish insisted that it was an "arbitration," not an inquiry. Ramprashad stated that the correct procedures for carrying out an arbitration had not been made and so the council finally agreed to call the meeting a "departmental inquiry." At this point, Narain insisted that Petamber Singh should leave the room for he was to be questioned about the matter. Singh refused on the grounds that he too was a councillor. The council then decided to get around this problem by questioning Singh first. The meeting then continued with the arguments being given as they had been in previous meetings. After a time, the District Commissioner stated: "Alright, Dagleish has exceeded the amount in the measurement and the council has to pay $211. This is the issue and what

is the council going to do?" At this point, the Commissioner of Local Government, who was also attending the meeting, said the contract Dagleish had made was illegal and that left two alternatives: the council could pay the amount and censure the chairman or attempt to get the amount lowered through a compromise with the contractor. This latter suggestion was immediately accepted and the compromise effected.[18]

In this situation, it was the District Commissioner and the Commissioner of Local Government who disrupted the pattern of allegations and criticisms in which the council members were engaged, and it was they who stated the issue in practical terms with concrete suggestions for a solution. For not only had the councillors been unable to effect a solution, but they had not been able to raise the issue beyond the level of mutual accusations and recriminations to the point of realizing that a practical problem existed which required solution. It was left to the mediators to introduce this dimension into the discussion thereby forcing a solution.

In viewing this incident together with that of the Jib Land dispute, two major points become apparent. First, the council was no longer capable of functioning without outside mediation to force decision making. At the same time, the need for decisive action had become extremely crucial within the village in the light of contracting resources. Secondly, there was related to the first point the fact that council members had such immense cross-cutting interests, that decision making became impossible and deliberations were reduced to individual disputes.

In the light of this inability to function in a decisive manner and the inroads which the PPP was making into the village, the Maraj faction won six of nine seats in the 1953 elections.[19] The campaign itself emphasized a two party division and involved public meetings and house to house canvassing.[20] Overtly competing "parties" were again introduced into the council arena.

For the 1955 election, the same type of campaign was utilized.[21] However, no great changes had been wrought by the PPP control, and as will be seen, the council continued in the same manner as previously although decision making ability increased as a result of the fact that two factions were in competition for popular support. This increased efficiency however, characterized both factions and when the elections in 1955 came, the Premsingh-led anti-PPP group gained the majority of seats.[22] The reason was due to the fact that although the villagers could not discern much difference between the two groups, the two years of the PPP control had been characterized by major disputes in other arenas and much conflict over other issues.[23] This unrest was attributed to the PPP, and the Premsingh group was elected.

During their sojourn between 1955 and 1957, conflicts in the village did not abate. In addition, the PPP faction suddenly became heir to an immense amount of potential patronage, for the Jagan government, again in control in the national arena, had taken over the land grant at Onverwagt from the former lessees and were converting it to a land development scheme for local residents. This was in keeping with the more general PPP policy of expanding rice production but it had the effect of subverting massive support to the PPP group. For the committee appointed by government to distribute the plots of ten and twenty acres to worthy applicants consisted of Dabi Maraj, Drepaul Bharat, and several PPP activists from Bath Settlement. In the 1957 election, it is alleged that votes were publicly exchanged for a chance to obtain land in Onverwagt.[24] Dabi's PPP group swept the election.

During these years of alternating factional successions, factional competition, as has been noted, centred mainly around competition for council control. The usual characteristics of competition within the council, such as attempts to control administrative personnel, did not receive the same degree of attention as they would have had the council been more evenly

divided among the competing groups. Such competitions however, did emerge, although in attenuated form.

For example, in early 1955, when the Premsingh faction had three members on the council, the issue arose as to what to do with outstanding arrears rents owed by farmers in the New Empolder area for 1953. The two groups on the council, very aware that such an issue was a politically important one in that it could be used to gain support, unanimously refused to take action against the defaulters and were willing to allow the issue to lapse.[25] The District Commissioner, however, ordered proceedings to be taken against defaulters on the threat that he would ask the Local Government Board to hold an inquiry.[26] The council countered this by unanimously passing a motion to reduce the rents in the New Empolder by 50% to any farmer who had reaped less than eight bags of padi per acre.[27] The Local Government Board however, refused to allow this motion to stand and the District Commissioner forced the council to pass a resolution to terminate the tenancy of any renter who was in arrears for 1953.[28]

In this incident is exhibited several typical features of factional competition. First, given a competitive political arena, neither faction was willing to act in a way that might be publicly unpopular and used against it in an election. The motions to ignore and reduce the rents were therefore unanimous. In fact, the issue was picked up mainly because it was a useful political weapon for gaining popular support. In addition, the District Commissioner's role was no longer one of mediator, but rather, he emerged in direct conflict with the objectives of the two political groups. Finally, the parties exhibited strong decision making ability in keeping with their desires to appeal to popular support by utilizing both the issue and the opposition of the District Commissioner.

In 1956, after the Premsingh faction had gained majority control of the council, the issue came up as to whether to confirm Jawahir in his position as

village ranger after his probationary period had ended.[29] During the discussion, councillor Premsingh's brother complained that Jawahir had allowed Mahatma Deoroop, a PPP member, to commit an offence without reporting it to the council. Another villager also complained that the ranger had allowed two persons to pass their boats through a trench without authorization and in addition, Jawahir was stated to have opened the sluice for them to pass. The council decided to investigate the matter[30] and at the next meeting, when the motion for his confirmation came up, the PPP group voted for, the remainder of the council voted against.[31]

In this situation, the council split along factional lines and worked on the assumption that the support of the village officials was a crucial part of their appointment. For that reason, the PPP group voted for his appointment, while the Premsingh group refused to consider him.

At the end of 1956, the council wanted support in their demands to government to refund to the village the cost of clearing the silted Armadale channel,[32] and to build a check koker across the facade canal. The council, with Premsingh as the majority factional leader at the time, decided to ask Lionel Luckhoo, a member of the Legislative Council and an active member of the National Labour Front Party which had superseded the NDP, to lead the delegation which the council wanted to send to the government. Dabi strongly objected to this on the grounds that the council should meet the government as council members without seeking the help of a member of the Legislature.[33] As it turned out however, Luckhoo was out of the country at the time, so the entire idea of a delegation was dropped.[34]

Eight months later however, Bush Lot was experiencing a water shortage in the rice area. The same council decided that they should ask Luckhoo to lead a deputation to the Minister of Agriculture to discuss the situation. Dabi maintained however, that the council should ask the District Commissioner to

make an appointment with the Minister and that the council should see him themselves.[35]

In these two cases, there are several factors at work. First, the Premsingh faction was aiming for popular support by attempting to show that their group had patronage lines into the Legislature that were effective and efficient. Second, they were attempting to manoeuvre popular support away from the PPP and hence towards themselves by indicating to the villagers the efficacy of dealing with the Luckhoo group rather than with the PPP. At the same time, such a move was calculated to reflect back on themselves by indicating that they were a group who could get things done. Thirdly, Dabi's objections were made to directly counter the aims of the Premsingh group; if he could not bring the PPP into the patronage picture by virtue of his minority position, then he could at least prevent another political party from gaining political credit or any positive benefits that might occur. His suggestion in the second case, that the council make the appointment with the Minister through the District Commissioner, was in fact the usual and accepted procedure for deputations to follow. But the Premsingh faction was trying for direct contact with the national arena in the hope of obtaining both prestige and practical results from the support of Luckhoo. Party politics then, had not only entered the village arena, but the actors in this arena were most willing to take advantage of the benefits that could accrue from such a situation.

Two final incidents also indicate the presence of factionalism on the village council although in attenuated form. First, there were several incidents whereby the two groups clashed over issues such that the minority group then left the meetings in protest. In May, 1955, Premsingh and the chairman Hansa Sayed quarrelled over how the minutes of the previous meeting should be worded. When Premsingh then asked, several minutes later, how much work the rangers had done within a certain period, the chairman told him to

put his question in writing.[36] Premsingh left the meeting. Several months later, Maraj and Petamber Singh engaged in a shouting match.[37]

In 1956, after the council control had changed factional hands, councillors Dabi Maraj and Drepaul Bharat left the meeting after the council had decided to pay reparations to Daljeet who lost two head of cattle while they had been impounded. After a brief argument as to the amount that should be paid, Maraj requested that the decision not be recorded in the minutes.[38] His motives were that if the decision were unrecorded, the council could eventually get out of paying the reparations.[39] Chairman Premsingh however, insisted that the decision be put in the minutes and the PPP group withdrew from the meeting.[40]

In the same year, October, the council made a decision to form an agreement with Armadale residents to collect tolls for their using the Bush Lot sideline dam. Dabi Maraj then raised the point that the council had previously decided to close the dam and prevent the Armadale farmers from passing. Premsingh stated however, that the council could rescind a previous motion if it wished, and besides, it was time to end the continuous enmity between the two villages on this issue. Maraj then insisted that the matter be discussed further. Premsingh disagreed; an argument ensued, and Dabi left the meeting.[41]

As a final example, during the discussion of the draft estimate for 1957, chairman Premsingh told Maraj to be brief in his discussion as time was short. Insulted, Maraj left the meeting.[42]

These brief issues indicate that there was tension on the council and it was between two constant groups. The voting patterns during the period 1954-1960 indicate similar divisions but are of limited utility given the extreme minority position of each of the factional groups during alternate years. The divisions however, are apparent from the types of disputes that took place and the fact that these were between constant individuals.

A final characteristic of the factionalism of this period was the fact that the villager was drawn into the conflict between the competing groups. Although the villager was not an obvious economic resource as he had been during the 1930's, the fact of elections made his support crucial for the councillors. The situation with Daljeet was a case in point as is that of Dwarka Etwaroo. In 1956, the Premsingh faction, with the majority, decided to prosecute Etwaroo for disrupting a meeting.[43] This disruption was brought on by the fact that Etwaroo was drunk. He had bought land from Ramprashad which had been mortgaged to Bookers Company as had most of Ramprashad's property. But he wanted the council to transfer the land to his name in the assessment book in any case. On the other hand, the council maintained that they could not do this unless the land were first put up for execution sale which would enable Etwaroo to obtain transport for the land, at which point, he could apply to the council to assess the land in his favour. The council maintained that according to the Ordinances, a receipt of purchase was not sufficient for the council to assess land in a person's name. That person had to have transport and the council suggested to Etwaroo the easiest means of obtaining this.

Etwaroo objected however, drank too much, and interrupted the council meeting.[44] At the motion to prosecute him for this offence, the PPP group objected to such strong measures.[45] This was because Etwaroo was the brother-in-law to one of the wealthier men in the village, Poonai Etwaroo, who was a strong PPP supporter and a close confidant of Dabi Maraj.

In summary then, the competition within the village council was a product of the divisions of the political elite into two groups and the efforts to control the council. Insofar however, as one group always maintained a majority on the council between the years 1954 and 1959, the competition within the council was of a more limited degree than during other periods of factionalism in the village. The basic characteristics of factionalism however, as

they have been generally exhibited in the Bush Lot context, were present in such forms as the attempts to control village officials, the attempts to make decisions in a forceful manner, the raising and support of issues that would appeal to the people as a base for popular support, and disagreements during council deliberations which ended not in compromise but in the withdrawal of one group from the council for the time.

At the same time, other focal points of potential competition were eliminated as a result of alternate factional successions. For example, the elections for the positions of chairman and deputy no longer received the concern and intensity of competitive strategy as should have been the case. In 1953, as a partial continuation of the factional peace, a compromise was reached and Premsingh was elected chairman while the deputy chairmanship was given to Hansa Sayed, a member of the opposing group.[46] In the next election, in 1954 for the year 1955, Sayed was elected chairman unopposed and Taharally was elected deputy unopposed.[47] The compromising had ended and the elections were reflecting the distribution of seats between two opposing factions.

After the election for councillors in 1955 for the years 1956 to 1957, the other faction took over control of the council and Premsingh was elected chairman unopposed for both years. The positions of deputy were also filled unopposed from the ranks of Premsingh's faction. For the year 1956, when both Petamber Singh and Dagleish were nominated, the former withdrew in favour of the latter.[48] The following year, Dabi attempted to inject some division into the faction by nominating Ebrahim Sultan for deputy when the Premsingh faction had decided that it was now Singh's turn to take over the position. Sultan however, declined Dabi's nomination.[49]

For the years 1958 and 1959, Dabi was elected chairman unopposed,[50] and in the former year, Taharally was elected deputy unopposed.[51] In 1959 however, two of Dabi's supporters contested the election for deputy - Taharally and

Nalini. The latter was elected however, on the grounds that Taharally had had his turn the previous year and the position should be handed to another. No repercussions followed this decision.[52]

b. The Competition of Direct Encounter, 1959-1966.

The situation of alternating successions ended abruptly in 1959 as a direct result of actions taken by the PPP controlled council to finally resolve the situation of the continuing conflict of interests between cattle owners, traditional farmers who wanted land, farmers who needed their oxen, and the large machine owners. This issue had had extensive ramifications in 1953, but had still remained unresolved. Cattle were still destroying farmers' crops and utilizing potential farmland. On the other hand, many villagers were still dependent on oxen for cultivation and on cattle as a source of milk for both domestic use and sale. But the land shortage for rice and the demand for more land were becoming more obvious each year,[53] and the PPP group made a decision in keeping with the national PPP commitment to the expansion of rice cultivation. Therefore, the council in 1958, redistributed the lands in all areas, the Jib, New Empolder, and New Lands.[54] In doing so, several crucial points were involved. First, all available land was put under rice. Second, renters had to be displaced from their old allocations and given new lands. Third, the council allowed only proprietors to receive land and each was limited to two acres, although several proprietors could ask for their land in one block.[55] Each of these points had major implications.

First, since all land was now under rice, small cattle ownership in the absence of Abary land was largely eliminated from the economic sphere. Villagers could keep a few head at the most, but under the risk of their cattle being impounded. In addition, the use of oxen as a means of preparing fields for planting and for reaping was no longer possible since there was no longer

any agistment area. The village became wholly committed to mechanized production and the small farmers, who could not invest in machinery, were now forced to pay equipment owners to plough, harrow and reap their crops. The self-subsistence of many family groups was thus wiped out. Some farmers however, who had some capital saved, then invested in machinery in order to avoid having to pay for ploughing and reaping. The result was that many tractors were bought which could not be utilized at any level of efficiency given the limited and scattered land holdings of the small farmer. The village, as a result of the elimination of oxen, became not only committed to mechanization, but also became over-mechanized.[56]

Vertical stratification among farmers was now altered in view of the above changes. There were now large, productive machine owners, small farmers who had overinvested in machinery, and small farmers who were dependent on the machinery of others. Insofar as some of the second group were able to obtain Onverwagt land or successfully rent out their equipment thereby adding to its efficient use, there thus emerged a fourth category of farmer - what can be termed the medium-sized farmer. The complexity of the stratification pattern thus increased and became the focus for more extensive lobbying patterns in village politics.

The second point involved in the reallocation of lands meant that many farmers lost land in which they had invested capital for drainage, irrigation, the building of levees, etc. The new land which they were allocated may have been without such amenities, may have had creek hands, may have been low-lying, and may have been generally less productive than the former lands. A new potential for resentment and conflict was introduced.[57]

Thirdly, by allocating lands only to proprietors, the council created several problems. First, many villagers merely rented their house and cultivation lots from the council and were thus left without land. Second, many

persons had been cultivating lands which they had received from parents who were now deceased. These lands had been still allocated in the parents' names although the surviving children paid the rents. A family then might have had several extra acres by virtue of this informal inheritance pattern. The council however, took back these lands and the new distribution of allocating two acres per proprietor did not give allowance for the fact that many families had had extra acreage. Many families lost several acres in this way.[58] Finally, the number of proprietors within a family group, either extended or nuclear, could vary, and generally depended on the wealth of the family and the extent to which the head of the household had invested in lots to hand on to his children. The wealthy families were thus able to demand two acres for every houselot they owned. Since this could be given in a block, many of the large families thus obtained rather large sections which were amenable to efficient cultivation by machinery.[59] The method of allocation then, benefited the wealthier families, took land away from some renters completely, and took land away from many families who had inherited it. The potential for dissatisfaction as a result of these policies was great.

In fact, several villagers attempted to take the local authority to the Land Assessment Court on the grounds that the council had taken away their lands without just cause according to the Security of Tenure Ordinance. This action however, never reached the Court, and several villagers attribute it to the fact that the cost would have been too high to fight the entire Jagan government which was planning to prevent any decision against its own party.[60]

In the light of these developments, the elections in 1959 involved an electorate which was extremely divided in its opinions of the PPP actions on council. As well, new groups had formed as a result of the changes which the PPP had made and some villagers had benefited while many had not. In the council elections then, the Premsingh faction was successful in obtaining a majority, but the PPP group held on to three seats.[61] This large Premsingh

majority however, did not last more than a few months as a complex pattern of subversion became commonplace. Competitive factional politics thus emerged in sharp relief after 1959.

Table 8.3 presents the factional composition of the council after the elections in December, 1959. For that election, the number of councillors was increased by the Local Government Board to twelve elected representatives and Premsingh's faction captured nine of the seats. Within two months however, Dabi had co-opted two members while Hussein Amin's support remained variable. The division on the council was now seven to five with one problematic allegiance among the seven.

Table 8.3: Factional Composition of the Council - 1959 and 1960.

	December, 1959.	February, 1960.
Premsingh	+	+
Dagleish	+	+
Petamber Singh	+	+
Chunilall Nagassar	+	+
Pritam Baijlall	+	+
G. R. Taharally	+	+
Hussein Amin	+ (-)	+ (-)
Ebrahim Sultan	+	-
Loknauth	+	-
Dabi Maraj	-	-
Drepaul Bharat	-	-
Mahatma Deoroop	-	-

In the case of Michael Loknauth, Dabi had revived the kinship aspect of their relationship and on these grounds, induced him to switch sides. Dabi then took Ebrahim Sultan as a close confidant, promising him success within the PPP, and Sultan joined the party.[62] Dabi had previously attempted to win Sultan's support by nominating him for deputy chairman in 1957. He failed at that time.

In the elections for chairman and deputy chairman in December of 1959 for the year 1960, Premsingh easily won the former position, while his faction

gave Amin the position of deputy in an attempt to hold onto his support.[63] In this, they were moderately successful. But by February, in any division which occurred, if Amin voted with Dabi, a tie would ensue which the chairman could break. If one member of Premsingh's faction was absent from the meeting however, the decision would go to Dabi's group. In short, by February, the council was split evenly between the two groups and competition escalated accordingly.

This was in turn aggravated by the fact that council membership after 1959 was to become extremely inbred. The Suspension of Elections Bill, passed in 1961, was to result in the suspension of local elections until 1970. Those members elected in 1959 therefore, merely carried on throughout the years leaving large scope within the council for long-term politicking between members. Any vacancies were filled by Local Government Board appointments. Insofar however, as no one knew when the next election would be, plans were made each year but the Bill was not rescinded, the councillors still had to maintain popular support among the villagers just in case an election were called. But the constant membership increased tension between individuals and was in large part responsible for the high incidence of subversion among the same individuals over time.

By 1960, Sultan and Loknauth had moved into the Maraj-PPP faction, but the Premsingh group retained control over the positions of chairman and deputy chairman until 1963.[64] After 1962, however, the composition of the council changed as did several allegiances.

First, in July of that year, Loknauth left the district and his seat was declared vacant.[65] At approximately the same time, Dabi Maraj hired his dragline out to the village council in order to dig the middle walk trench because of unusually heavy rainfall which was threatening to flood the village.[66] This was a breach of the Local Government Ordinances and Premsingh reported the

matter to the Local Government which had no choice but to declare Dabi's seat vacant.[67] It is important to note here that despite Dabi's leadership of one factional group in opposition to Premsingh, all members of the council, except Premsingh, held him in high esteem. His followers were of course upset at the incident, but so were the followers of Premsingh, who felt that the council was losing an extremely exalted and important person. As well, it was felt that public opinion, given Dabi's personal popularity, would reflect badly on Premsingh's group which would be held responsible for the unseating.[68] For a third seat had become vacant the year before, that of Petamber Singh, who had been appointed overseer of the village amid great outcry from the supporters of Dabi within the village. This incident, crucial in Bush Lot history, will be discussed later. Suffice to say that the Premsingh faction felt that villagers would interpret the unseating of Dabi as an attempt by the Premsingh faction to get back at Dabi's group for raising such a furor at the appointment of Singh.

The effects of the vacant seats, in terms of the persons appointed, indirectly resulted in the overturning of the Premsingh majority on the council. The three persons appointed were Jairam Mangal, who was a strong Premsingh supporter; Zubeda Mohamed, who was a niece to Hussein Amin; and Isaac Jaikarran,[69] a member of the Armadale family and closely related to Deoroop (cf.: Appendix IX). This meant that Premsingh's total was unchanged while Maraj had a net loss of one. However, Rohoman's commitment was mainly to her uncle Amin, who at that point was still uncommitted to either side,[70] and his immediate reaction to the unseating of Dabi was to support the latter's faction on council.[71] Thus, the council's two uncommitted members were turning to Dabi's faction - the leadership of which was being taken over by Sultan as the obvious heir apparent.[72] As a result, in the 1963 elections for chairman and deputy, the Premsingh group did not vote or nominate any of their members.[73] The Maraj-

Sultan faction however, had failed to give Amin a position on the council. Rather, they made Sultan chairman and Bharat deputy, with the result that Amin turned his support and that of his niece back to the Premsingh group.[74] This was done with reservations however, as Amin still had desires of succeeding to one of the council positions. Therefore, the following year the Premsingh group offered him the position of deputy in return for his support. He accepted this offer and nominated Premsingh for chairman.[75] But the support of Brijlall and Taharally for the Premsingh faction was now becoming rather tenuous. Although Brijlall supported Amin for deputy, he threw his support for the chairmanship behind Sultan. Taharally also supported Sultan rather than Premsingh in the election in the hope that Sultan's group would support him[76] in a bid for the deputy chairmanship.[77] The result was that Sultan defeated Premsingh for the chairmanship while his faction split in their vote for deputy between Taharally and Bharat. The result was that Amin, supported by the entire Premsingh group, won the position of deputy again.[78]

This type of exchange which emerged on the council after 1960 continues until the present time and is largely a product of the absence of elections and the concomitant importance placed on the positions of chairman and deputy as a result. By 1966, the end of the period under discussion, the factional composition of the council was as follows: Sultan's group consisted of Bharat, Jaikarran, Deoroop, Taharally and Brijlall, the latter two of whom had permanently switched, and Amin, who had finally joined the PPP and Sultan's faction after the latter had made him chairman in 1966.[79] His niece, Zubeda, had left for England and was replaced on the council by Hassan Rasool, a cousin to Sultan and a strong PPP supporter.[80]

Premsingh's faction then, was reduced to a core consisting of Chunilall Nagassar, Mangal and Dagleish.

Within this pattern of shifting alliances between the two factional groups, was also a situation of extreme competition. Meetings were continuously being interrupted by the protests and desertion by the factional members who happened to be in the minority at any given meeting. For example, in May, 1960, Deoroop protested to the District Commissioner about the chairman's decision to adjourn a statutory meeting on the grounds that the motion to do so was not put to the vote.[81] In fact, at that meeting, the acting chairman Loknauth had to leave early and Dagleish was elected to replace him. A motion to adjourn the meeting was put two hours later as it was nearing dinner. Councillors were asked for their opinions and the two factions became engaged in an argument at which point Dagleish told the meeting to adjourn to end the argument.[82] The protest eventually reached the Local Government Board[83] which suggested that Dagleish should have adjourned the meeting for only several minutes to "allow tempers to cool," and then after, continue with the discussion on the adjournment motion.[84]

In January of 1961, Dabi Maraj, Bharat and Deoroop protested to the District Commissioner that they arrived at the village office to attend a meeting but were slightly late. The overseer refused to allow them to sign the attendance register as the meeting had already fallen through for want of a quorum. This group that arrived however, maintained that they had never been informed that the meeting had been postponed, and since they had a quorum, they wanted to begin the meeting.[85] Bharat added a second protest, and signed his name as a member of the Local Government Board to which he had been recently appointed, stating that "the overseers were instructed not to go on with the meeting as the purpose is to overthrow Mr. Dabi Maraj who was absent for quite a long time. The chairman and his majority boycotted the meeting. He and his majority have been evading all statutory meetings and just calling emergency meetings misconstruing the place of the meeting all the time. He has been

calling special meetings without giving us notice."[86]

The assumption made by Bharat here is that the Premsingh faction was attempting to unseat Dabi by placing him in a position where he could not help but miss three consecutive months of meetings such that the council could then declare his seat to be vacant.

In the previous case, Deoroop was objecting to what he felt was the dictatorial attitude of the chairman who was attempting to cut off faction from expressing their opinions.

Both incidents indicate the extent to which tensions existed between the two groups and which flared into open conflict given the slightest provocation or the implication that one group was attempting to "put something over on the other."

In the light of this, minor issues became blown up into full scale factional disputes. The issue of Phulmatie Lall is a case in point. She had been employed by the council for twelve years as of 1960, to clean the village office one time per month. The council decided however, that she had alternate means of employment since she helped new mothers with their babies and received payment for this work. The council - that is, Premsingh's faction - therefore decided that another woman, who had no other means of earning a wage, be employed to do the work and that the "contract" be handed out to a different woman annually.[87]

The Maraj faction - Dabi, Deoroop, Bharat, Loknauth and Sultan - objected strongly to this decision stating that no cause was found for dismissing her and therefore the council could not terminate her services.[88]

At the back of this issue of course, was the fact that although minor, this job was a form of patronage, and Phulmatie Lall was the mother of three sons who were strongly opposed to Petamber Singh and the Premsingh faction as a result of the "boards incident" in 1947.[89] Petitions within the village

were drawn up by supporters of either side so the Premsingh group passed another motion stating that the office had never been cleaned satisfactorily and therefore, it was decided to have the servants of the local authority, such as the rangers, do the cleaning in the same manner as was done in the police department.[90] The Local Government Board, after ruling invalid the original motion,[91] had to concur with the second although the Board ordered the council to pay Phulmatie for the entire year although she had cleaned the office only in January of that year.[92] As a final note however, "no councillor was prepared to certify the paysheet;" and the District Commissioner had to pay Lall directly.[93]

These however, were mainly minor incidents in the ongoing factional conflicts which had emerged after 1959. They indicate that the nature of factionalism had remained constant with only changes in emphasis of the various characteristics which had been traditionally associated with factionalism in the village.

More critical was an ongoing dispute which emerged in sharp relief in 1961 and permeated the politics of the entire village until 1970. This was the case of the appointment of Petamber Singh as village overseer.

It will be recalled that Singh had been associated with the new Panchar faction in the 1940's and with Premsingh in later years. The history of these oppositions as growing out of each other has been implicit throughout the thesis. It is evident then, that Singh's later history of opposition to the Panchar and Maraj families, as well as his intimate involvement in local politics, would necessarily make his appointment as overseer a politically crucial one for both factions given their perception of these village officials as resources in political competition.

In 1961, October, both the overseer and assistant overseer of the village resigned from their positions. The latter had obtained clerical work elsewhere,[94]

whereas the resignation of the former was in itself a product of the political climate of the time, and the result of the PPP control of the council during the 1950's. The retiring overseer, Lala Etwaroo, was politically active in the United Force Party[95] which had been founded in 1960 with the intentions of "opposing communism, socialism and the racialism of the PPP and PNC . . . [and with a] leadership consisting of businessmen with a long history of colonial ties" (Depres, 1967: 7). Given this commitment, Etwaroo was in fact alienating all the political factions in the village. In handing in his resignation, he complained that "council members are not co-operating - especially those of the PPP group - and the confusion is causing double work for local authority staff [by resulting in] lengthy council meetings . . . [while] the attitude of the PPP group is not to carry out the work of the local authority but to find fault with other members of the council. . . . Works are being carried out unknowing to the overseer. . . . The chairman should not give orders to the rangers but to the overseer."[96]

It is apparent then, that Lala Etwaroo was finding himself in an untenable political position. The council, not wishing him to have the prerogative of resigning, unanimously dismissed him from office.[97] Premsingh's faction then called for applications for the post of overseer by advertising officially in the newspapers. This advertisement called for applications from qualified personnel between the ages of twenty-five and forty-five years. Petamber Singh, aged forty-four years and ten months, applied for the position.[98]

At the next meeting of the council, after the position had been advertised, the Maraj faction, in the absence of several members of the Premsingh group, passed a motion stating that the previous advertisement was to be cancelled and a new one placed in the newspapers in order to change the age range requested from twenty-five to thirty-five years on the grounds that the upper age limit of the old range was too old and because the first advertisement had

not stipulated that typing and educational qualifications would be required.[99] In fact, the Maraj faction was attempting to exclude Singh from the running.

Premsingh then wrote of the council's decision to the District Commissioner emphasizing that the new advertisement would delay for too long the appointment of an overseer and hence the rate collection. He asked therefore, that the Local Government Board either appoint an overseer or allow the chairman to do so. In case this occurred, he strongly suggested "one Petamber Singh" as being eminently qualified.[100]

The District Commissioner advised the council against readvertising the post and suggested that if age were such an important criteria, then the council could take this into consideration when making the appointment.[101] On receipt of this letter, the Maraj faction made an appointment with the Minister of Home Affairs and objected to the age range advertised. The Minister could not attend, but the Commissioner of Local Government promised an investigation into the matter and agreed that the age range should be lowered and the position readvertised.[102]

The following day however, the Commissioner had investigated the situation and maintained that the original motion of the council had not been rescinded according to the Local Government Ordinances and therefore, had to stand.[103]

Two days later Premsingh wrote the District Commissioner stating that the council would meet that evening to elect an overseer and that he "presumes that it may be a very hostile meeting." He therefore asked "the District Commissioner to [have] the non-commissioner officer in charge send two peace officers to preserve the order if necessary."[104]

At the meeting Premsingh stated quite clearly that he had been told by the Local Government Board to proceed with the selection. Dabi stated that Singh could not be nominated because he was a member of the council. Premsingh countered by stating that Singh would resign from the council if elected.

Given the control which Premsingh had of the council, Singh was elected.[105] A month later a petition was submitted against the appointment, which attempted to point out that the election was unconstitutional; that Singh was a member of the council at the time; and that Singh was too busy with his duties as secretary of the Bush Lot Thrift and Credit Society to make an efficient overseer. The petition was signed by the predictable families and individuals, the Bhagwandins, Panchars, Lalls, Deoroops, etc.[106]

In forwarding the petition to the District Commissioner as he was supposed to, the chairman Hussein Amin pointed out that most of the signatory persons were indebted to the local authority and given Singh's record of prosecuting defaulters in the Co-operative, these villagers were afraid. In addition, many of the persons were former members of the Rice Growers' Co-operative whose arrears rents had to be paid out of their own pockets despite Dabi Maraj's attempts to get these rents waived. These members were resentful against the Premsingh group. More specifically, he pointed out how the Deoroop and Maraj families had much to gain economically if the appointment were blocked.[107]

The Local Government Board however, upheld the appointment.[108] The Maraj faction could do no more while they remained in a minority position on the council.

By 1964, their position had altered in the light of new appointments to the council, the reaction against the unseating of Dabi, and the variable loyalty of Amin, Taharally and Brijlall. Sultan had become chairman and Singh began to complain about the manner in which the council was functioning. He felt that his work as overseer was being interfered with as the chairman complained about the people he hired to carry out village works. He "observed that when a certain section of the people are working with the local authority - whether they work satisfactorily or not - the chairman has nothing to say but will express his satisfaction. But as soon as other sections are

seen working, he gets red hot and will even make row with the people." Singh was complaining about the chairman's constant attempts to utilize the local authorities' works as political patronage and maintained that "there were certain plans to keep [him] outdoors as much as possible so as to delay and hinder his office work." He also stated that he was going to send the District Commissioner a detailed statement of "what is going on in the village and the action of the council as a whole, for it to be sent to the Local Government Board."[109]

Such conflicts kept occurring and in 1965, the Maraj faction attempted to delete Singh's annual increment from the village estimate. Singh felt it was because he had taken "drastic action against defaulting renters and proprietors" in the period before the discussion of the draft estimate, including Deoroop and several relatives of the chairman Sultan. As well, this group allegedly interfered with the arrangements Singh had made for the bailiff from New Amsterdam to come to Bush Lot and levy on defaulters' property.[110]

At the same time however, the Premsingh faction strongly supported the actions of the overseer. In 1965, Singh took an extra seven days' leave after his vacation although the Local Government Board had ruled that he was unentitled to it. As a result, the District Commissioner withheld some of his salary for the month; Singh objected, and sent a lawyer's letter.[111] He sent around a motion to all councillors whereby they were to decide whether or not he should be paid for those seven days. This round robin system[112] ensured that all councillors would be polled rather than taking the chance that some sympathetic members might miss the meeting at which the issue was raised. The consensus reached was that the overseer be paid and the seven days deducted from his casual leave.[113] This was contrary to the ruling of the Board[114] and the opinions of the District Commissioner who maintained that the members of

the local authority "were intending to cover up for him."[115] The council however, insisted on making payment to avoid a court case and "because certain elements on the council were behind the overseer's action in the matter despite the Board's ruling."[116]

In short, Singh had the strong support of the Premsingh faction and the increasing enmity of the Sultan faction.

The entire issue reached a climax in 1966 as a result of a series of interrelated events. The Sultan faction controlled the council and suspended the overseer for certain alleged irregularities in carrying out his duties.[117] One of these included allegedly having put up a houselot for execution sale belonging to the wife of the late Jacob Panchar without informing her of the intended sale and having a friend of his, Mandlall, the operator of the village dragline, buy the lot with money which Singh had given to him in order to have the lot later transferred to himself.[118] On the grounds that Singh had an indirect interest in the transaction, the council suspended him from duty.

The Local Government Board however, refused to sanction the suspension on the grounds that an investigation had not taken place and according to the Ordinances, the council could not suspend any official personnel without the approval of the Board.[119] The Sultan faction however, was adamant and proceeded to appoint the assistant overseer as acting overseer with a concomitant salary increase.[120] The council then passed a resolution to recommend to the Local Government Board that the overseer be dismissed on the grounds of specific charges which they proceeded to draw up. Among them were the issues of the Panchar houselot; the fact that Singh had failed to issue receipts for some monies collected from proprietors to withdraw their lots from execution sale; the fact that he did not deposit this money into the local authority accounts until the evening before the issue was to be brought up at a council

meeting; that Singh failed to account for the change he had received from the purchase of dragline parts in that he had not returned the money to the village funds; that Singh allowed the dragline to do work for a woman at Lovely Lass and received several fowl in payment which were not turned over to the council; and finally, that the overseer did not record that this work was done or that payment was received.[121]

The council also decided at the same time to report the irregularities in relation to the money transactions to the police department.[122] Meanwhile, Singh was attempting to abide by the decision of the Local Government Board that the council could not suspend him and that he was therefore on active duty. He tried to get into the village office, but Sultan refused to allow him to enter and informed him that he would not be paid for the month in accordance with the council's decision, regardless of the pressure from the Board.[123] The District Commissioner summarized the situation by stating that "the position at the moment is that the overseer is prevented by threats from entering the village office despite my directions to him in advising him of the Board's decision with a note to the chairman to see that he is reinstated forthwith. . . . I am informed that the council will not have him back at any cost . . . and the council is prepared for a showdown on this issue if the overseer resumes his normal duty. . . . The council has [also] refused to certify the overseer's paysheet."[124]

Dispute then arose over Singh's salary with the assistant overseer refusing to make out the necessary paysheet "for fear of victimization from some members of the council,"[125] and the council receiving legal advice to the effect that it did not have to pay the overseer until the charges were cleared - a contradiction of the Board's ruling.[126]

At the same time, Singh answered in writing the charges which had been laid against him as was the usual procedure in the preliminaries for an investigation. He claimed to be innocent of the charges[127] but the council

maintained that his explanations "were weak and unfounded and decided to recommend to the Board that he be dismissed forthwith."[128] As well, the council passed a resolution to take the necessary steps to retransport Panchar's property back to the family.[129]

By this time petitions began circulating in the village. The one supporting Singh maintained that Singh's actions against defaulting rent payers who were relatives and friends of council members had resulted in "this clique making frivolous charges"[130] against him. Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Local Government had come to the conclusion that there was "not sufficient evidence of dishonesty or negligence to warrant Singh's dismissal."[131]

Simultaneous to this conflict over the suspension, two side issues arose directly connected with the conflict between Singh and the Sultan faction. First, on February 14, 1966, Sultan, at a proprietors' meeting, publicly accused Singh of engaging in the irregularities of which the council had accused him. Sultan claimed that in making these accusations he was acting in his capacity of chairman of the village and was merely informing the villagers of the facts. Singh disagreed with this interpretation and went to see a lawyer. He astutely chose the man who had been the Attorney General of Guyana in the Jagan regime and proceeded to file slander charges against Sultan.[132] The upcoming court case was thus running parallel in time with the suspension issue.

Secondly, midway through both disputes, the council brought a further charge against the overseer, claiming that his son Gunraj was illegally cultivating a strip of land next to his own allotment without paying rents. Gunraj wrote to the District Commissioner stating that his father was not involved in this issue and that in any case, it was in the best interests of the local authority that he cultivate the abandoned piece of land since it harboured rats and birds which destroyed the surrounding crops. He also stated that he was prepared to pay rent if the council so decided, pointing

out that persons such as Deoroop and several Sultan supporters were all illegally cultivating up to six acres of local authority land without paying rents.[133]

Meanwhile, the Sultan faction was collecting affidavits and official statements for use as evidence in the upcoming investigation of Singh's activities, the date for which had been set by the Board. The statements were from Nalini and Bacchus, who maintained that Mandlall had told them that Singh had given him the money to buy the Panchar lot. The Premsingh faction countered by obtaining statements from villagers[134] as to how the witnesses had reasons to dislike the overseer for levying against them in the Thrift and Credit Society and for arrears rates and rent; how they had petitioned against his appointment in 1961; and how their evidence was therefore unreliable and prejudiced.

The Local Government Board then attempted to meet with the council in order to reach a compromise,[135] but the factions on council were interested only in presenting their respective cases. The petitions in the village grew longer and more intense for both sides.[136] Finally, an enquiry was held and the Board, "after considering the charges made against the overseer together with his reply and the comments of the council, . . . have come to the conclusion that with the exception of the charge concerning the delay of five weeks by the overseer in paying over to the office revenue, there is insufficient evidence to sustain the other charges and it is therefore decided that the overseer be censured by the council for negligence in not accounting for the amount in question" but that "he should resume duty forthwith."[137]

The Sultan faction countered the above decision by passing a resolution stating that insofar as the Board found the overseer guilty of the charge of withholding funds, he was to be served notice of the termination of his services.[138] The Board restated that the charge which was upheld was insufficient

for the overseer's dismissal and Singh returned to his post.[139] But the issue had not ended. The wife of Jacob Panchar had decided to take action against the local authority in the case of her houselot,[140] and the Premsingh faction maintained that the Sultan group had encouraged her to do so in order to further embarrass the overseer.[141] Secondly, the court case of Singh vs. Sultan in the slander issue was still pending and resulted in a long dispute as to whether the council should help the defendant Sultan pay for legal fees since he was allegedly acting in his capacity as chairman. In 1966, with the Sultan faction in control, it was decided to allocate to Sultan five hundred dollars for this purpose despite the strong objections of the Premsingh faction which immediately reversed the decision at the first opportunity and allocated the money to Singh.[142]

Finally, the son of Sukhu Lall, a strong supporter of the Maraj-Sultan faction over the years, sued Singh's son, claiming that the extra one acre which Gunraj had been planting illegally was in fact allocated to him and therefore, Gunraj had reaped Lall's crop. This too reached the courts after lengthy legal procedures.[143]

(iii) New Arenas of Competition.

a. Introduction.

The politics of alternating succession were to a very large extent the product of competition that was occurring in other arenas within the village. More specifically, these other competitions contributed to the fall of the conciliatory council after 1953, and to the loss of the 1955 election by the PPP faction. In the former case, the council's inability for decisiveness was exacerbated by these other competitions, and in 1955, as the competitions continued unabated despite PPP actions, the electorate turned their support to the Premsingh faction once again.

What was the nature of these other arenas?

The most important point to be noted is that new arenas came to the fore as a direct result of the changes which had been caused in the village during the economic expansion. Further, these new arenas emerged along lines of fission which had always been present in the village, but which had remained latent until exacerbated by the emerging scarcity of resources and their new allocation among a class based elite. The most obvious of these conflicts came to the fore in the religious arena; the horse racing arena; and the co-operative arena.

b. The Religious Arena.

The first problem arose in this arena during August, 1953, when Imdad Usman, secretary of the Muslim mosque, asked the council's permission to sacrifice a cow in the mosque compound. The council reacted to this request merely by suggesting that someone on the council ask Usman how this could be done without offending the Hindus, whose temple was just across the dam from the mosque.[144] Before the council had time to do this, the issue erupted into a major dispute. At the next council meeting, councillor Narain strongly objected to the intended sacrifice as the members and executive of the Sanatan temple, including the pandit, had appealed for his help.

Councillor Dagleish stated that no permission had yet been given and Hussein Amin, a Muslim, offered to try to persuade the Muslim community to carry out the sacrifice at another place.[145]

In this issue, the Aryans and Sanatans worked together to lodge their objections and the Muslim community had agreed to compromise. But the next time the potential for a dispute arose, the Muslims were quick to pick it up.


In September, 1955, the Aryans asked the council's permission to erect a school and temple on a portion of unused common land next to the mosque.

Imdad Usman made extremely strong objections to the location of the building,[146] objections whose history went back to the 1930's.

At that time, the Aryan building was opposite the Muslim mosque and the Aryans were carrying out repairs on the building. In doing this, they disturbed the prayer meetings of the Muslims who proceeded to complain to the District Commissioner. The latter ordered the Aryans to move their building back eight feet so as not to cause a disturbance. This was done, and there was no further outbreak of conflict until 1953 with the intended sacrifice.[147]

By 1955, the Muslims were quick to pick up this old issue of the location of the Aryan church when the latter applied to the council to re-erect their buildings. In this case too, the District Commissioner was called in to effect a compromise, but none was reached. Councillor Premsingh suggested that the Aryans be permitted to build so long as they began their complex of buildings at the extreme west end of their land allotment so as to maintain a maximum distance from the mosque once the buildings were completed. To complement this compromise, he suggested that the Muslims in turn agree to discontinue the slaughter of animals in the mosque compound. The president of the Aryans agreed to this suggestion, but the Muslims, including Hussein Amin, disagreed unless the new Aryan buildings were built west of the old Aryan church, rather than beginning at the east of the church and moving west from that point (cf.: Diagram 8.4).[148]

Diagram 8.4: Locations of Aryan and Muslim Churches.



In short, the Muslims wanted to be sure that there were no Aryan buildings extending further than their old church in keeping with the compromise made in the 1930's. Premsingh's suggestion allowed for the possibility that their complex would extend beyond this "boundary."

With the Muslims' refusal to compromise, the meeting was adjourned and the District Commissioner and council went to investigate the site. After they returned, the meeting was reconvened, but again no compromise was reached.[149]

In January, 1956, the council decided to call a special meeting with both the Aryans and Muslims in another attempt to reach a compromise.[150] In February, the Aryans informed the District Commissioner that they could not attend the meeting as the time set was inconvenient.[151]

Eventually, the Aryans never built their building complex, and on this basis, the specific issue died down. It was however, superseded and complemented by other events in the religious arena which further exacerbated the tension.

In 1958, the Muslims applied to the council to erect new buildings on their common land allotment[152] and this time the Sanatans objected. Pritam Baijlall, secretary of the Sanatan church, insisted that their buildings be placed on the extreme east end of the land and that no slaughter take place in the compound. The village council however, took the line that they could not make such assurances to the Sanatans nor could they ask the Muslims to abide by such a decision.[153]

Basically, there were two issues in these disputes between the religious groups and the locations of their respective buildings. The underlying issue was the fact that the land area in the section of the village designated as common land was limited, and given the mutual exclusiveness of the religious rites, the land shortage became a crucial problem.

The Canadian Mission Church had been given two houselots in the village on which to erect their church and school. This was done since they had been

occupying these lots for decades, and in leasing the land to them, the council was merely engaging in a fait accompli. This decision was taken in 1954.[154] By this time however, there was a shortage of houselots in the village which could be given over to the churches. In addition, the Muslim practice of sacrifice, for example, would offend any Hindu neighbours who lived nearby. As well, the Sanatan church was too large for one lot. In short, the churches had to be accommodated on the common land which was of finite size.

By 1955, the council defined the maximum dimensions which the churches could hold as part of their allotment[155] and when it was found several months later that the Aryans had fenced in more than the maximum allowed, the fences had to be relocated.[156] Finally, in 1955, the Sanatans applied for a grant similar to that which the Muslims and Aryans held. The council had to agree to the allotment since the other groups had been given land.[157] The implication was however, that the common land area was totally occupied. At that point, the way was open for the religious groups to conflict in their interests.

In short then, an old dispute over the location of buildings was in fact a statement of religious differences which was revived during this period as a result of the land shortage which was emerging in all parts of the village. Underlying this as well was the fact that the religious groups, in building new churches and expanding their physical facilites in general, were responding to new demands that were a product of the recent stratification pattern which had emerged. The large wealthy families were insisting that the church facilities keep pace with their new prestige. In addition, there was money available for the churches themselves to compete for prestige.

Given then a new and more general distribution of elite status, the churches had to respond. The result was a proliferation of building and a concomitant decrease in available land, which in turn forced the churches to cooperate and compromise with each other's religious practices more than ever before. The fact that they were unwilling to compromise, having had no

previous need to do so and hence no experience, meant that competition in the religious arena would inevitably emerge as a result of contracting resources and new stratification patterns.

c. The Co-operative Arenas.

The founding of the Bush Lot Rice Growers' Co-operative and its subsequent success in rice cultivation has been discussed in a previous chapter. There it was also mentioned that by 1953, the society appeared to be in some difficulty because the land holdings were not large enough to satisfy the demands of members; because the attempts at expansion into Armadale had failed as a result of poor drainage and irrigation; and because members were refusing to invest so much time and effort into working for the society. Instead, they sent labourers, a factor resulting in lower labour input, since the workers were unwilling to expend the same amount of time and energy as had the members. Now the reasons for this last attitude were that many of the members had opened shops as an income supplement and could not leave these untended. In addition to this new source of income, members had seen the potential and profits accruing to large scale cultivation and preferred to invest in their own equipment and expand their land holdings beyond the average allotment they had within the co-operative.[158]

The disintegrative tendencies then, were largely economic in nature. The co-operative had given its members large profits; a model of successful large-scale cultivation was available in the form of family groups which had been successful on their own; and many members, having access to tracts of Abary land which had lain idle through their efforts for the co-operative and their lack of individual machinery, now decided that individual effort would be more profitable in the light of the emerging scarcity of land in Bush Lot. In short, the members now felt that there was no longer any purpose in confining their

economic activities to the co-operative. Too many other alternatives had become available as a result of the economic expansion.

In January, 1955, the co-operative applied to the council to have the one hundred and thirty-one acres divided into individual allotments. This was done.[159]

In the same year, another co-operative society, the Bush Lot Thrift and Credit Society was founded.[160] It too provides an illustration of the individualist orientations and changing resource structure and allocation which were the disintegrative factors in the Rice Growers' Co-operative. In addition however, it brings into sharp relief the extent to which class elitism had become generalized within the village and the extent to which the new stratification pattern which emerged after 1953 was utilized by new elite members for their own purposes in the light of the increasing scarcity of resources which characterized the village.

On February 24, 1955, the society was formed and a committee of management consisting of a chairman, secretary and three committee members was elected by the general membership. The same committee personnel retained their positions until April 30, 1968, when the chief co-operative officer of the Co-operative Department in Georgetown removed them from office and appointed a single manager in their stead.[161]

What had happened in the interim which necessitated a step that removed control of the society out of the hands of villagers and resulted in a functional equivalent of liquidation?

The answer lies in the form which the society took, the villagers' expectations of its functions, and the intimate involvement of the village's political and economic elite in its affairs.

A thrift and credit society requires members, upon entering, to buy a certain number of shares in the society which, unlike a credit union, did not

necessarily have to be increased over time. At the same time, the credit facilities were emphasized, but no pressure was put upon members to save their money through the society. The villagers looked upon the society as a credit-extending body and never as a mechanism through which they could invest or save their money at a substantial rate of interest. The society lent money for seed padi, ploughing or reaping. For most persons it was the only credit facility available and they used it as such. Few people increased their initial share capital however.

The money for loans then, did not come from capital which the society had earned through the interest made by investing the savings of its members. Rather, through an arrangement between the Guyana government and Barclay's Bank, the latter gave overdraughts to the credit societies which were guaranteed by government. Depending on the amount of the overdraught, the committee members would then allocate loans to the society members. When the members paid back the loans to the society, the society would in turn pay back the bank.

The result of this arrangement was that a society had no resources on which to fall back if members defaulted in their payments, if the bank overdraught was not given, or if the overdraught was not large enough.

The granting of loans to society members then, depended on four factors. First, money had to be available from the bank. Secondly, a member had to apply for a loan which was done a month or so before the loans were to be made. Thirdly, the amount of the loan supposedly depended on a person's "maximum credit limit" rating. On entering the society, an individual listed all his assets. This, plus his reputation, enabled committee members to assign him a maximum limit which the society would lend him.

In fact, this credit rating was not adhered to in many cases. Persons were granted loans over and above their limit. As well, a rating could be

changed. Each year in fact, a member was supposed to submit a new listing of his assets so that his credit rating could be adjusted. This was never done. Although most people in the village would know who sold property or bought a tractor, such transactions could slip by the committee unnoticed.

Credit limits were thus largely based on what a man declared his assets to be on entering the society. At the same time, since new listings were never called for but because the committee could alter ratings, the way was open for these changes to be carried out arbitrarily and without recourse to an individual's assets.

A fourth factor affecting loans was that a society could not grant a loan to an individual whose previous loan had not been paid back, nor could a society receive an overdraught from Barclay's until its previous overdraught had been paid.

Barclay's followed this policy strictly. The Bush Lot society however, was willing to take into account extenuating circumstances such as a poor rice crop, and enabled persons who had defaulted on loans to receive another in the hope that a new crop would enable the individual to pay back both loans. What constituted extenuating circumstances however, was left for the committee to decide. Again, the opportunity was available for circumventing the rules.

In short then, the form which the society took with its emphasis on lending rather than saving and the loose interpretation of the rules governing credit limits, duplicate loans and lending, made the society extremely vulnerable to the manipulations of individuals.[162] This manipulation was not long in emerging, for it was also aided by the nature of the membership of the society. All economic statuses were represented, as was an even distribution of religious and age groups. The executive committee however, was drafted wholly from the new elite section of the population, and the fact that they retained their positions throughout the life of the society, enabled the manipulations to emerge.[163]

Between the years 1955 and 1963, sixteen overdraughts were obtained from Barclay's and the money loaned to society members. Some of these were for planting, to cover such costs as land preparation, seed padi and fertilizer, and others were to enable members to pay for the services of a combine for reaping. Until 1961, each loan given out was for the most part paid back to the society by its members, and the society in turn had been able to fulfil its obligations to Barclay's. In the spring of 1963, however, Barclay's advanced an overdraught of $30,000, which has not yet been repaid. It was therefore the last overdraught which the society received. In addition, most members only began paying back these loans in 1967.[164] What had occurred to precipitate this situation?

The answer is tied to two issues: the events which were occurring in the national political arena and political events within the village itself.

In the first case, major changes were occurring in terms of politics and racial unrest. In 1962, riots broke out between East Indian and African segments of the population, which seriously interfered with the planting and reaping of the rice crop for that year. Seed padi and tractor fuel were almost impossible to obtain with the result that few people anywhere in the country reaped a crop. In 1963, after order had been restored, the government, once again headed by Jagan, decided to increase and encourage rice production due to a high export demand, mainly from Cuba and due to the fact that the PPP was an "East Indian party." Since the Bush Lot society had such a good loan repayment record, Barclay's was induced to advance the $30,000 overdraught.[165]

At this point, the politics within the village became crucial. For a pattern of lending had been emerging, gradually reaching its height in 1963, in which there was a high association of kinship and political affiliation with the executive of the persons who were granted the largest loans and hence the major portions of the $30,000. Basically, the committee members and their

families borrowed one third of the total, and they, together with their political allies, accounted for $23,000 of the total sum. The management committee had then divided the remainder of the loan among the small farmers.[166]

This pattern had in fact been emerging from the beginning of the society's existence. Until 1967 however, there had been no criticism. Villagers knew of the situation, but no complaints were made.[167] In 1967, this situation changed and was caused by three events.

First, between 1963 and 1966, there was a commonly believed rumour that Jagan would waive the repayment of these loans. The attitude was that if the farmers "saw Cheddi, he would fix this thing for us." The result was that no one paid back their loans but waited to see what would happen.

This attitude was of course related to the role which the PPP had been playing vis-à-vis the rice farmer, that of paying high prices for produce, permitting farmers to use duty free gasoline for their machinery, and generally encouraging a dependency on the PPP in order to get things done. The attitude of the villagers to the large amount that was owed then, after the rumour began, was therefore one of waiting to see if "Cheddi could do this too for them."

In 1966, however, the government changed hands and the PNC took control. With a government which they felt was more amenable to pressure, Barclay's Bank now began to demand the $350,000 which they had outstanding to co-operatives throughout the country. They pressured the government which in turn pressured the co-operative department, which then had to place pressure on the societies.[168]

When the pressure to repay began to be felt at the village level, resentment arose among the smaller borrowers. This took the form of blaming the large borrowers who had "taken all the money" such that "a poor man couldn't pay because he couldn't get loans to plant his crop." In this manner, criticism of the pattern of lending began to emerge.[169]

Secondly, until 1967, no source had been available as the focal point for complaint. In 1961, for example, a meeting of the general membership was held with the minister and the chief co-operative officer. "The executive" of the society "didn't show up. This was planned. Members came and aired their views. Other meetings were held as well, but nothing happened."[170] There was no one available to the smaller farmer who could substantiate claims of possible maladministration and who was in a position to assess the accuracy of rumours and unorganized grumblings. For the District Co-operative Officer was a close friend of the secretary of the society, Petamber Singh, and preferred "not to see what was happening." In 1967 this officer was transferred and a new one assigned. On a routine inspection of the books, he discovered the skewed lending pattern and began talking with villagers who now began to loudly voice their complaints.[171]

Thirdly, criticism now began to be made by the politically active and wealthy in the village. This was a result of the competition which was taking place in the village council. The now highly factionalized council was in a situation whereby the difference between the majority and the minority was one vote. At the same time, volatile issues which served to polarize these two groups had emerged. The problems which the Thrift and Credit Society was encountering were then used as a means of criticism of one faction by the other since the executive of the society had four of its five members in the Premsingh faction on the village council.[172]

Due to these pressures from several points simultaneously, the management committee tried to take action. They made an appointment with, and met, the Prime Minister in June, 1967, in an attempt to get the loans waived. They were told they had to pay.[173]

The next step was an attempt to get society members who had assets to join them in putting up security for the money to be paid back as soon as the

next crop was reaped. This step was a response to a threat made by the chief co-operative officer.[174] In a letter to the society dated January 17, 1968, he states:

> It appears that your committee is unable to give that degree of leadership to the society which will result in the honouring of obligations on all sides.
>
> It is probable that some members of the committee are themselves indebted to the society. These members should be asked to resign immediately.
>
> Barclay's Bank have called upon the government to pay the amount owing by your society, and I am considering whether I should assume management of your society and appoint a manager of my choice, or cancel the registration of your society and appoint a liquidator.
>
> I shall be glad to obtain the reactions and wishes of your society on the above before the end of this month.

The fear of liquidation, the fear that management would be transferred to an unfriendly source, and the fear that they would be forced to pay off large debts in one installment, prompted the management committee to attempt to retain their positions so as to be able to exert some control over the extreme pressure which was being brought against them.

But the same fears also kept their allies from joining them in putting up security for the loan to be paid back over time. Few wanted to become involved either for friends or a society which benefited mainly the poorer farmers when functioning properly.[175]

On May 15, 1968, the committee succeeded in sending a petition to the Co-operative Department with a listing of four of the five committee members' names, houselots, and values, and those of twenty other society members as a guarantee for the repayment of the $23,000 which this group owed.[176]

On April 30, however, the management committee had been dissolved and a manager appointed by the Co-operative Department with instructions to force payment by any means.[177]

The committee still continued to lobby for more time to pay off their loans. In another meeting with the Prime Minister, they promised to pay back half of what

they themselves owed by October 15, 1968. This was not done.[178]

This type of promise had been made several times due to the pressure of the Co-operative Department. All committee members had assets, cattle for example, with which to pay off their loans. The Department however, under the assumption that these assets would never be sold for the purpose of repaying rice debts, simply and finally disbanded the committee.[179]

The new appointed manager is Hassan Rasool, councillor and member of the Sultan faction. He was appointed by the Chief Co-operative Officer who knew him personally when he had been a district officer. As well, Rasool had once applied to join the society, but had been refused admission by the executive committee.[180]

As manager, he makes a commission of ten per cent on all he collects. His method of collection is by setting up arbitration procedures against defaulting members, who are then ordered by the court to pay something by a certain date. If no payment is made, bailiffs are brought in who levy on property. By this point, most people will have paid something. In fact, as early as 1967, some members, realizing the situation which would emerge, began making payments on their loans. By 1969, all defaulters had had writs taken out against them, and approximately thirty per cent of the debts, fines and interest had been collected.[181]

One of the major results has been that the smaller farmer has been left without credit facilities since 1963, thereby exacerbating the continuing separation of the elite from the mass. In addition, the disintegrative forces of individualism and elitism have prevented other co-operatives from being formed within the village as has a lack of trust between the elite and mass, as well as between the two factions of the elite.[182]

d. The Race Club Arena

The major form of public recreation within the village is the horse races, held twice annually by any villagers who are inclined to organize them. Generally, such organizers have been prosperous villagers who owned horses and wished to race them because of an interest in the sport.

In the 1930's, such a race meeting became the focal point of a factional dispute between the Ramprashad and Panchar factions when Premsingh prevented the Maraj-Panchar faction from holding such a meeting. The resulting conflict, in which Premsingh lost his livestock and houselot had formed a basic division in the village, which has been traced through previous chapters until the present period.

During this time however, the racing arena had not in itself been open to any conflict, but had been proceeding in a regular manner with individuals holding meetings as they saw fit. After 1953 however, this arena again erupted into a competitive one in which was represented the general tendencies that have been exhibited in all other arenas of competition discussed in this chapter. Basically, two competing groups emerged with both claiming the right to hold race meetings, thereby denying the other group this prerogative.

The underlying issue was one of prestige competition. The organizing of these meetings had always been the prerogative of the elite group in the village and hence, had associated with it high prestige. In coming to the meetings, villagers were in fact informally recognizing the position of the elite in the village. Therefore, when the organizers split into two opposing groups, it was a sign that the elite of the village had become factionalized.

In 1955, Jori Jawahir and Deygoo Mahesh had both applied to hold meetings at approximately the same time.[183] The council deferred both applications and suggested that the two men, with their associates, meet to co-operate in holding one meeting simultaneously.[184] But each of the groups had taken a name and

each considered the other an upstart. The Bush Lot Sports and Race Club was headed by Mahesh, who had with him mainly the Mohamed family. Opposing them was the Bush Lot Race Club led by several brothers of the Deoroop family.[185] The latter group were strong PPP supporters, while the former were aligned with the Premsingh faction that was opposed to party politics in the village. In addition, the families of both groups were members of the elite by virtue of the new stratification pattern. All had invested in machinery and were cultivators of large Abary tracts in addition to being large cattle owners. All had invested money in race horses and were extremely interested in the sport. By 1969, fourteen years later, there were still these two race clubs in the village which conflicted every time race meetings were traditionally held, in August and in December.

Thus for example, in October, 1956, both Deoroop and Sultan, the latter a member of the Mahesh club, applied to hold meetings with each claiming that he deserved the application because he had already spent money on the project. Sultan was granted permission[186] since the council, being controlled by the Premsingh faction, was most sympathetic to him and because he said that he would allow the Deoroop club to hold the next meeting.[187] When the time came for the next meeting however, both groups again made application. The Premsingh faction all voted for the Sultan application, while the Maraj faction supported the Deoroop one. In addition, Dabi strongly protested against Hussein Amin voting on the issue because he was a Mohamed brother.[188]

Deoroop however, refused to abide by the decision which went against him and proceeded to make arrangements to hold his meeting. The Premsingh faction then decided to take out an injunction against the Deoroops with both Dabi and Drepaul Bharat strongly objecting. In addition, the Premsingh faction passed a motion that the issue be discussed at a proprietors' meeting.[189]

The competition in this arena then, was a sign that the elite had become

polarized and factionalized. Each of the two race groups were members of the elite, each was associated with a particular stance in relation to party politics, and each was supported by a particular faction within the village council. Such a situation, as has been mentioned, continued for years after, although there had been no competition in the race club arena since the 1930's. Even at that time however, the conflict had been part of another issue - that of the competition between two polarized economic and political groups in a situation of limited resources. In the same way, the competition in the race club arena after 1954 was also a reflection of the divisions which had arisen in the village although these divisions were of course based on different criteria than those of the 1930's. But the situation of prestige competition, an important aspect of village life, the fact of limited resources and a factionalized, although more generalized elite, still combined to produce conflict and competition in a manner similar to that of the Rice Miller period.

In short, competition in the race club arena emerged whenever there was a major split in the elite group caused by the fact that the race meetings were basically prestige competitons and made possible in this case by the more general factors which have been discussed throughout this chapter; that is, the complex interaction between party politics, new stratification patterns, local factionalism and scarce resources.

(d) Principles of Factional Competition.

(i) The Internal Structure of Factions.

The nature of the internal structure can be viewed, as were the factions during the period of Familial Elitism, from the perspectives of the rules governing the eligibility of persons for the competition; the rules governing the composition of the competing teams; and the nature of the core and following which characterized the factions of the period in the light of the typology utilized in Chapter 1.

In dealing with this issue however, three aspects of village organization must be borne in mind. First, as noted in Chapter 7, the introduction of the PPP onto the local level had created three tiers of political affiliation consisting of activists, strong supporters and sympathizers. At the same time, the end of the expansion had resulted in a village which was segmented into numerous crosscutting interest groups. This was a product of the new distribution of wealth, and hence, a new kind of elite group and a more complex economic sphere with different economic priorities characterizing subsections of the population. Scarcity of resources, differential access to resources, and a new allocation of resources were now major distinguishing characteristics of the village population, coupled with crosscutting economic interest groups.

Finally, the major inroads which the PPP had made as a result of the 1953 election and its aftermath, together with its ideology of grassroots mobilization, had resulted in a fourth category of political affiliation, that of anti-PPP sentiment, which was in turn tied to the economic vested interests of many of the villagers.

In the light of this diversity, the prize of the factional competition became relevant. This was control of the village electorate. The motivations however, underlying this aim were very different for the two faction leaders, as discussed in a previous section.

The point however, which is to be drawn from the nature of village organization and the structure of prizes, is that the rules governing the internal structure of factions were largely dictated by the structural features of the village, rather than by the factional leaders themselves, as was the case during the Rice Miller Period. Access to the prize was still the prerogative of the elite, but this elite was far more diversified than ever before. With the notion of vested interests underlying the major prize and a long history of interpersonal enmity, the eligibility for competition took on distinctive traits.

As viewed from the perspective of the community-elite-team-leadership continuum, the political community was once again defined by residence in the village. All villagers were part of the political community, but loyalties were now decided on the basis of the economic priorities which an individual had. On this basis, the individual chose his faction. At the same time however, this same individual was eligible for political elite membership by virtue of an act of volunteering. From the volunteers, i.e., from the elite, the leaders chose their teams. Unlike the factionalism of Familial Elitism, wherein the political community was bound in an economic relationship to the faction leader prior to his involvement in political affairs, the factionalism of the present period had no such pre-existing base. Recruitment to team membership had to take place from a voluntary elite rather than from a pre-defined political community. Leaders' recruitment choices were thus more circumscribed as a result of these externalities, and this in turn affected the content of ties which were utilized for recruitment.

The village was thus again the political community while the elite consisted of volunteers who perceived political activity as a means of protecting vested economic interests. It was at the level of elitism that faction leaders were first able to exercise choice in the composition of their teams. The issue thus becomes the nature of the links which were utilized for team recruitment, or in other words, the rules set out by the leaders governing the composition of the teams which were to actively compete in the interfactional sphere.

On the basis then of the various interest groups present in both the economic and political spheres, villagers decided on the efficacy of political involvement for their own personal position. For example, Bharat and Dookhun, whose cases have already been discussed, were part of the political elite as a result of their activities in the PPP. In fact, they had utilized this activity for more general prestige ranking. Other villagers, depending

on their occupational interests and their economic position in the horizontal stratification scheme, affiliated with the factional grouping which appeared to represent their interests most closely, and may or may not have volunteered for elite membership. However, the fact of crosscutting interest groups within the village will be seen to have affected the permanence of these choices. For the moment however, what should be emphasized is the nature of decision making in relation to the composition of the competing teams and the effect this had on the links which were utilized for team recruitment.

In recruiting teams, the links which were used by the faction leaders were the following:

1. Friendship links;
2. Factional history: Self;
3. Factional history: Familial;
4. Second Order Kin Relationship;
5. Religious affiliation;
6. Political Party Core;
7. Transaction; and
8. Schism.

For the period under investigation, the recruitment criteria utilized by each faction leader with each supporter is presented in Table 8.5. It should be noted that once again, the criteria for labelling persons as team members is based on their active competition for a seat on the village council, or their support for this competition. In addition, the table becomes an index of the "content" (Mitchell, 1969) of leader-follower relationships.

Table 8.5: Recruitment Criteria of the Factional+ Teams.

A) Premsingh's links with:	Criteria 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Dagleish	*	*						
Petamber Singh	*	*						
Chunilall Nagassar	*		*					
Sindho	*							
Jairam Mangar	*							
!#Hussein Amin		*					*	*
Bahadur		*						
!Ebrahim Sultan			*					
!Zubeda Mohamed			*					
!Loknauth							*	*
!Pritam Brijlall							*	
!Taharally							*	
B) Maraj's links with:								
Gaffur Gobin		*		*		*		
Hassan Rasool			*			*		
#Ebrahim Sultan			*			*	*	
Hansa Sayed			*		*	*		
Nalini			*			*		
M. Johns			*			*		
Mahatma Deoroop			*			*		
Isaac Jaikarran			*			*		
#Loknauth				*		*		
!#Hussein Amin					*		*	*
Ramesh						*		
Drepaul Bharat						*		
Gopaul						*		
George Bhagwan						*		
Matura						*		
#Zubeda Mohamed							*	
#Pritam Brijlall							*	
#C. R. Taharally							*	

Note: + In the period under discussion, the content of a relationship may have altered over time. In such cases, all criteria which were relevant are noted.

! Indicates that the person, at some point, defected from the faction to the other.

Indicates that the person, at some point, defected to the faction from the other.

In cases of subversion, the person is included in both lists.

Two major points derive from the table. The first is that the two factions were each characterized by differing content emphases. The second point to be noted is that all links of both factions differed considerably from the links utilized during the period of Familial Elitism.

In the case of the first issue, the criteria utilized by each of the faction leaders is presented in Table 8.6.

Table 8.6: Criteria Utilized for Recruitment.

Content Type	% of Total links		% of Total Persons	
	Premsingh	Maraj	Premsingh	Maraj
1	27.8	0.0	41.7	0.0
2	22.2	3.1	33.3	5.6
3	16.7	21.9	25.0	38.9
4	0.0	6.3	0.0	11.1
5	0.0	6.3	0.0	11.1
6	0.0	43.7	0.0	77.8
7	22.2	15.6	33.3	27.8
8	11.1	3.1	16.7	5.6

In the light of this table, it is possible to rank the content criteria in terms of the degree of difference between the two factions' recruitment policies. This ranking is presented in Table 8.7. Also included is the faction leader with the higher percentage of the particular link.

Table 8.7: Ranking of Recruitment Criteria Differences.

Greatest Difference On the basis of:			
	Total Links	Total Persons	
Faction leader with higher %:			Faction leader with higher %:
M	Political Party	Political Party	M
P	Friendship	Friendship	P
P	Factional history: Self	Factional history: Familial	M

Table 8.7 continued:

Greatest Difference	On the basis of:		
	Total Links	Total Persons	
Faction leader with higher %:			Faction leader with higher %:
P	Schism	Schism	P
		Religion	M
		Second Order kinship	M
P	Transaction	Factional history: Self	P
M	Second Order kinship	Transaction	P
M	Religion		
M	Factional history: Familial		

From this, it is apparent that consistent ranking differences occur only in the political party links and the friendship links. Both rank one and two respectively in terms of computations according to total links and total persons. In addition, it should also be noted that these two links are the ones which exhibit the greatest per cent difference between the two factions. Finally, of interest here is the fact that each of the faction leaders utilizes one of these major links. Premsingh emphasizes friendship ties; Maraj emphasizes political party ties.

At the same time that political party links and friendship links rank one to four in terms of degree of difference between the two faction leaders for both total links and persons, it should be noted that Self-factional history and Familial-factional history rank fifth and sixth in an overall ranking scheme and that Premsingh emphasized the former, Maraj the latter.

The next greatest difference is found in the constellation of Second Order kinship/Religion/Schismatic links (11.1% difference) characterizing the total person percentile of Maraj. This is followed by Premsingh's emphasis on Schism (8.0% difference for total links). At this point however, the amount of differences are minimal: 7.7% difference for Self-factional history; 6.6% for transactional links; 6.3% for the Second Order kinship and Religious affiliation; 5.2% for Familial-factional history, with the latter three referring to the percentage of total links and the first referring to the percentage of total persons.

Now it should be obvious that the differences in percentages and hence ranking between the total person as opposed to the total link computations is a product of the multiplex ties which characterize many of the relationships. Ignoring this for the moment, the question is the implications of this discussion for the nature of recruitment which characterized each of the faction leader's strategy.

The most obvious and consistent difference is the differential emphasis placed on political party as opposed to friendship links. In the case of the former, it is questionable as to whether the link existed before factional membership or was generated as a result of such membership. In the light of the fact that four Maraj members did not share party membership but were recruited on a transactional basis, it can be argued that party membership was not a pre-existing tie but was generated after. At the same time, it will be recalled that four tiers of affiliation existed within the village in terms of individual relationships to the PPP. All of the four persons who were not party members fell into the category of party sympathizers. Hussein Amin, Mohamed, Brijlall and Taharally were definitely not part of the anti-PPP tier. In addition, since these non-members were all subverted links, it can be argued that Maraj's relationship was based on the exigencies of interfactional competition

rather than on the more long-term need of creating core membership. If this were the general pattern, one would again be left with the assumption that party membership was generated after factional recruitment.

Simultaneously however, persons could not be recruited to the Maraj faction unless they were at least part of one of the pro-PPP tiers. Persons who saw their economic base as best protected by the Premsingh anti-PPP stance would never have joined Maraj. Minimally then, Maraj recruited only PPP sympathizers. More probably, he recruited persons from all three PPP tiers. In this vein, party membership as a basis for recruitment was variable.

But the point could also be made that party membership itself involved certain prerogatives generally in the form of access to actual or future patronage sources. From this perspective, joining with Maraj implied not only joining the party, but was in itself an opportunity for economic gain.

In short, as a member of the PPP, Maraj was able to publicly present a great amount of political credit. Joining him meant joining the PPP. The two steps probably occurred simultaneously as persons were drawn in from the various pro-PPP tiers. The use of the political party as a link for recruitment was thus as much an incentive for factional membership as it was pre-existing tie that could be actively solicited by the leader.

From this perspective, the political party link was the closest in structure and content to the patron-client tie of the Rice Miller period. This will be discussed in Chapter 10. For the moment it is necessary to note the extreme emphasis which was placed on this tie within the Maraj faction both as a basis for recruitment and as a means of maintaining the team intact.

Meanwhile, Premsingh continued in the main with his former emphasis on friendship and personal loyalty, and probably augmented this by exploiting any anti-PPP feeling which existed. In this vein, it is important to note that the next most important link which Premsingh utilized was the link which

exploited an individual's personal factional history and hence, interpersonal enmities with the Maraj faction. At the same time however, in the light of Table 8.6, it is apparent that Premsingh's next most important link was the transaction followed by the exploitation of familial-factional histories and schisms.

What is apparent then, is that Premsingh was emphasizing personal loyalty as the basis for recruitment. Where this ended he built on the basis of transactional relationships and then finally, he turned to the use of schisms and familial-factional experiences. In short, in viewing recruitment in terms of concentric circles of content, Premsingh had a core of personal followers; outside this group were an impersonal set of ties based on the transaction, which in turn, at the peripheries, became a series of relationships based on dissatisfaction as a result of historical or present circumstances.

Maraj's core was his political party cohorts. His next emphasis, in viewing Table 8.6, was the recruitment of persons with a familial-factional history, the majority of whom were his fourth and fifth order kin who had been actively aligned during the 1930's. He then turned to the transactional tie which now superseded second order kinship in terms of numbers. The religious ties were actually secondary links in that Sultan, a strong supporter and later successor, brought with him members of the Muslim community of which he was priest. His emphasis finally turned to schismatic tendencies and personal dissatisfaction.

In looking at Maraj's relationships as concentric circles, there appears to be a greater series of types. His centre was based on party linkages, followed by extended kinship. Insofar as his kin had been the basis for PPP activism in the village, these two links are in fact similar in content. Outside this centre lay those relationships based on transaction, followed in turn by his second order kin and Sultan's religious followers. His outer relationships

like Premsingh's, were based on schismatic products but with a greater emphasis on present schisms, i.e., self-factional history and schisms, rather than historical schisms (familial-factional histories) which were more important to Premsingh at this level but closer to Maraj's centre in that the familial-factional histories incorporated mainly persons who were his extended kin.

In combining these observations on the internal structure of the factions with those made in relation to the differences in content between the two in reference to Table 8.6, the following generalizations can be made.

First, the two factions have different structures in terms of the content of links utilized by the leaders for recruitment. The basic difference is the differential emphasis on party affiliation as compared with friendship links. This basic difference is brought out in terms of each being the most numerous link within their respective factions, in addition to each being the link which exhibits the greatest degree of differential emphasis within the factions. These points also hold whether one looks at content from the perspective of individuals tied to the leader or from the perspective of the total links within the faction itself.

Another major difference relates to the use of the historical dimensions of factionalism by the leaders. From this perspective, Maraj emphasized schisms of long duration, familial-factional histories, since these were tied intimately to the Maraj-Panchar family's history of alignments within the village. Simultaneously however, Premsingh tended to emphasize the dissatisfaction experienced by individuals partially as a product of his own lack of extended familial ties, but also as a result of anti-PPP feeling which the Maraj faction generated by taking strong stands in such issues as the redistribution of rice lands. In addition, Premsingh's emphasis on friendship ties for core formation can be seen to shade into this type of tie as well. Basically, he picked up personal support from those individuals who had been supporters over a long period.

The only other ties which exhibited great differences between the two factions were the use of second order kinship links and religious ties. The former is basically a carry-over by Maraj from previous factional recruitment policies, while the latter, as has been seen, was related to the secondary leadership which emerged in the Maraj faction after the subversion of Sultan.

The use of the schismatic basis for recruitment was similar for both factions as was the utilization of the transaction.

In summary, each faction leader placed a different emphasis on different recruitment criteria. Both leaders carried out recruitment according to different principles with the result that the internal structure of the competing teams, from the perspective of the content of leader-follower relationships, differed greatly.

Additionally, if one looks at the internal linkages which existed between and among the members of the respective factions, the same point holds true. For the Maraj team, the major internal linkages were party affiliation; religious ties between Sayed, Amin, Rasool, Mohamed, and Sultan; and extended kinship among Maraj, Loknauth, Gaffur Gobin, Johns, Mahatma Deoroop and Jaikarran (cf.: Appendix IX), all of whom shared as well long familial histories of bipartisan factional relationships.

With the Premsingh faction as well, the relationships which the leader had with his followers was very largely duplicated among the membership. Basically, long term friendship ties and factional affiliation characterized the internal structure.

Another issue to be dealt with in order to shed light on the internal structure is the nature of the subversions which took place and the nature of the ties which were both severed and created in these cases. Again the issue is which interactional criteria were deemed a worthwhile exchange in the period under discussion. Table 8.8 presents the nature of the links which were subverted and subsequent links characterizing the new factional affiliation.

Table 8.8: The Content of Links in Subversion Cases.

Person	Subverted Link	New Link
Hussein Amin	-Self-factional history -Transaction -Schism	-Religion -Transaction -Schism
Ebrahim Sultan	-Familial-factional history	-Familial-factional history -Transaction -Political party
Pritam Brijlall	-Transaction	-Transaction
C. R. Taharally	-Transaction	-Transaction
Loknauth	-Transaction -Schism	-Second Order kinship -Political party
Zubeda Mohamed	-Familial-factional history	-Transaction -Religion

Accepting the premise that subversions are logical in terms of the balancing off of gains and losses, it follows that certain combinations of links were more durable than others. In other words, the content of ties can be scaled according to their relative importance.

In Chapter 5, a scale was suggested as a means of measuring "intensity" of the links making up the team. Applying this scale to the present data, the measure which results is as follows:

Friendship and Second Order Kin Relationships are assigned a value of 3;

A relationship based on a Schism is given a value of 2; and

A Transactional link is given a weight of 1.

With this basis it is then possible to derive weights for linkage contents which were not present during the period of Familial Elitism. These emerge as follows:

The link of Familial-factional history can be, for present purposes, regarded as the equivalent of a schismatic link in the past tense and given a weight of 2;

> The link of Self-factional history, insofar as it logically implies more involvement than Familial history, is increased by one and given a weight of 3. This is also logical in that this link will tend to fade into a friendship tie or be constituted on the basis of a combination of transaction and schism;
>
> The Religious affiliation link involves a linkage derived from a secondary arena in which competition and schisms were occurring. It is therefore given a weight of 2.
>
> Finally, Political party membership can be viewed as a combination of ideology and transaction. Its weight is therefore viewed as being a total of the weights assigned to religion and transaction, i.e., 3.

From this perspective, the subverted links and the new links created in terms of relative weight are presented in Table 8.9.

Table 8.9: The Weight of Links in Subversion Cases.

Person	Weight of Subverted Links	Weight of New Links
Amin	6	5
Sultan	2	6
Brijlall	1	1
Taharally	1	1
Loknauth	3	6
Mohamed	2	3

In comparing this table with the weighting of the subversion and new links during the period of Familial Elitism, it can be noted that the latter period had the following situation: 3 subverted by 8; 3 subverted by 5; 3 subverted by 3; 1 subverted by 3; 0 subverted by 3; 0 subverted by 1; and one extenuating circumstance. Of these six subversions, the total increase in the new links' weighting was 13. In the present period, again with six cases of subversion, the total increase in the new links' weighting is 7. In addition, in the light of the weighting scale, Amin's link should not have been subverted.

The issue then is whether the weighting scale derived from a previous historical period is applicable to the present material. In the light of the internal logic of the weighting system as being a measure of the intensity of links, the system is valid, for "the intensity of a link refers to the degree

to which individuals are prepared to honour obligations or feel free to exercise the rights implied in their link to some other person. The intensity of a person's relationship with a close kinsman is likely to be greater than that with a neighbour, for example" (Mitchell, 1969: 27). From this perspective, the scale does differentiate on a logical basis the links which should be more intense than others. For example, given the definition of transaction utilized here, it has a definite relationship to the content and intensity of a friendship tie. If the weights do in fact measure intensity then, it follows that since the subversion cases do not exhibit a great amount of increased weight in the new linkages and since one person should not have been subverted, perhaps the issue becomes a methodological one in which the question is whether intensity itself is a relevant criteria for discussing factional structures in the present period.

This becomes relevant in looking at the number of transactional links, both in the general structure of the factions and in the cases of subversion. During the Rice Miller period, 6.8% of faction leaders' links with team members were based on transaction; in the present period, 18.0%. Further, in subversion cases, the former period had three transactional links, the present period had nine. In addition, five of the six persons were subverted at least partially by a transactional exchange.

Given this increased emphasis on the transactional relationship during the present period, the issue may well be raised as to whether one is dealing with the "durability" of links rather than with intensity in the subversion cases. Mitchell applies the notion of durability solely to personal networks which are viewed as having "a dynamic character" over time (Ibid.: 27). Can not the notion of durability however, also be applied to particular links for use as a concept in comparing the structure of different networks as opposed to its use in referring solely to changes in ego-centred nets over time?

If so, the argument can be made that the subversion cases are examples of the dynamic of durability rather than intensity. This argument can be made since the majority of new links involve the transactional tie with two cases of transaction being subverted by transaction. In such cases, the intensity or "degree to which individuals are prepared to honour obligations" (Ibid.: 27) is minimal, or weighted as 1, while at the same time, an emphasis on the increased importance of the transaction in the present historical period through the use of another concept, durability, would explain why subversions so readily took place; why transactions are so observable; and why transactions are differentially distributed in the two historical periods.

In the case of the last issue, it will be recalled that the economic expansion involved a new emphasis on individualism and individual goal attainment. During the Rice Miller period, persons were bound by pre-existing economic ties to the faction leader. Choices were circumscribed by economic factors. In the present period however, it was noted that it was the faction leaders whose manoeuvrability was circumscribed as a result of the lack of pre-existing base from which to recruit supporters such that recruitment to team membership was from a voluntary elite rather than from the political community. With this basis of individualism and voluntary membership in the political elite, it is hardly surprising that the transactional tie emerges in sharp relief and becomes at the same time, the most subvertible link.

From this perspective, the scale continues to represent intensity as defined by Mitchell but does not account for the new emphasis and importance being placed by individuals on the least intense relationship, the transaction. At this level, the issue is no longer intensity, since by definition the transaction lacks "emotional content." Rather, the issue is durability, or the extent to which linkages can or cannot be subverted. In the transactional instances, this durability must be empirically determined, not assumed as the intensity measure implies by its nature.

The number of subversions then, and the fact that they would not be predictable on an intensity scale, are thus understood to be a product of the proliferation of the one link which has minimal intensity, the transaction, which in turn is subject to manipulation and therefore dependent on particular exchanges rather than on emotional content.

In short, by looking at the content of subversion cases in order to elucidate the internal structure of factions during the period under investigation, several conclusions were reached.

Given the intensity scale with its internal consistency in weighting, it was found that certain subversions during the period should either have not occurred or were not predictable from the scaling technique. The underlying reason for this seeming inconsistency was related to the high frequency of transactional relationships which by definition are links of low intensity and dependent on particular exchanges rather than on the intrinsic value of the linkage per se. In this light, it was suggested that in dealing with low intensity links, the concept of durability be utilized to investigate in this case, subversion situations rather than assuming intensity. This suggestion is also in keeping with the resource structure which characterized the period and which placed constraints on the recruitment of personnel to teams such that transactional links would necessarily become more numerous and crucial than in previous periods. Particularly this would hold in subversion cases or in cases where persons were likely to be subverted.

In terms of the internal structure of factions, which is the point of the present discussion, the investigation of subversions has accomplished several things. First, the extent to which external constraints can become relevant for the recruitment of team members has been pointed out. In addition, the relevance of the nature of the economic base and the extent to which pre-existing economic relationships affect recruitment were made explicit.

Secondly, the investigation of subversion cases has pointed out the shortcomings of utilizing only an intensity measure to predict alignments in political action. Rather, where the economic constraints allow for greater individual decision making in political alignments and delimit the manoeuvrability of factional leadership, the concept of durability must be introduced to allow for the empirical investigation of particular linkages since relationships of low intensity, such as the transaction, will emerge in such contexts thereby limiting the predictability of intensity measures.

In short, the examination of subversion cases has pointed out the shortcomings of utilizing only an intensity measure in given historical and economic circumstances; the importance of the transactional relationship in factional recruitment again given particular resource allocation; and finally, there has been the introduction of the notion of durability to be utilized where the intensity of linkages is low such that exchanges must be empirically determined rather than assumed. Basically, this means that transactional relationships may or may not have an intensity which must be independently measured.

At the same time however, for purposes of comparing the internal structure of factions, the intensity measure can still be utilized on the assumption that one is measuring only intensity and not the predictability of alignments. In other words, if it is borne in mind that other criteria are relevant as well, the intensity measure can still be one device for comparing the internal structure of factions.

For this purpose, the intensity scale when applied to the linkages within the Premsingh and Maraj factions, results in the following comparisons. The mean intensity within the Premsingh team when computed according to person, is 3.5; for the Maraj team the average intensity per person is 4.2. The mean intensity for each link within the Premsingh team is 2.3; within the Maraj team it is 2.4. The internal relationships then, within the Maraj

faction are more intense than within the Premsingh team although this difference decreases radically when the intensity of links rather than persons is viewed.

In looking at persons who have multiplex relationships with the faction leaders, there is again evident the extreme differences in the content of the links or the criteria used in recruitment. Table 8.10 presents the content of the multiplex links.

Table 8.10: Content of Multiplex Links in the Teams.

Content Type	Number of Persons	
	Premsingh	Maraj
Friendship + Self-factional history	2	0
Friendship + Familial-factional history	1	0
Transaction + Schism	1	0
Transaction + Self-factional history + Schism	1	0
Political party + Second Order kinship	0	1
Political party + Second Order kinship + Self-factional history	0	1
Political party + Familial-factional history	0	5
Political party + Familial-factional history + Religion	0	1
Political party + Familial-factional history + Transaction	0	1
Religion + Transaction + Schism	0	1

What emerges is that the internal structure of the two teams varies according to the content of the leader-follower relationships where multiplex links are utilized. Of interest however, is the fact that the proportion of

single-interest ties as compared with multiplex links is very similar within the two factions. Given the assumption that multiplexity can give greater strength to a linkage, the per cent of persons with multiplex ties as compared with the total personnel on the team is 41.6% in the Premsingh team and 55.6% in the Maraj team. However, in looking at the percentage of multiplex ties as compared with total ties, the Premsingh team's proportion is 27.7%, the Maraj team's proportion is 31.3%.

In addition, if the multiplex links are weighted according to the intensity scale, the average intensity of Premsingh's multiplex ties is 5.2 and of Maraj's ties, 5.8.

In general then, the Maraj team exhibits a slightly greater degree of intensity than does the Premsingh team. The nature of the interfactional competitions however, will bear out the equality implied in this measurement.

The final issue left to consider is the nature of the core and support which characterized the internal structure of the factions during this period. In the absence of "action-sets" which can be analyzed from this perspective, the discussion of this issue must rest on qualitative analysis as must the attempt to apply the typology presented in Chapter 1.

Within the Premsingh team, the existence of a group more selective than the team derives logically from the large number of subversions which took place. Members who were not subverted form a distinctive set of persons within the larger team. In addition, this core had a "direct structure" and an absence of secondary lieutenants. By definition then, the Premsingh team had within it a "quasi-group." Whether this "group" solidified into a clique is unanswerable in the absence of quantitative material.

Despite these limitations however, there is still an interesting comparison to be made with the Maraj faction. It has already been noted how the subversion of Sultan and his subsequent leadership resulted in the activation of links

based on his position as priest of the Muslim community. Sultan in short, while Maraj was leader, was actually able to manipulate this tie in relation to Amin and Sayed as well as in relation to the larger politico-religious community. Sultan was in fact a secondary leader within the Maraj faction. As time passed and his position within the faction solidified, the amount of Muslim support he was able to muster within a predominantly Hindu and Christian faction given the competition in the religious arena, enables one to label him an ally as well as a lieutenant.

The first difference then between the Premsingh and Maraj faction in terms of the nature of the core and support was the "indirect structure" which developed within the latter team.

The concept of indirect structure however, as defined in Chapter 1, implies that the links with secondary leaders are also transactional. To an extent, this was the content of Sultan's linkages with his followers who were active in the Maraj faction. But the links also implied a shared religious affiliation and political party membership although the latter was partially constituted as a transactional relationship and supplemented in several cases by a schism. The issue is thus whether the "indirect structure" type should not in fact allow for more intense and durable content than the transaction would imply. If so, the typology must be amended.

Beyond this indirect structure which characterized the Maraj faction, any other suggestions as to the nature of core must also rest on the issue of who among the team was either not subverted and possibly not subvertible. In such a case, it can be suggested that those with Familial-factional histories which had an extended kinship connotation would qualify for such a label. Secondly, there would also be those persons, such as Bharat and Ramesh, who were committed party members, who utilized party membership for upward mobility, and who in fact were the tier of activists. Such persons, unless willing to

forego their elite status within the village, were not subvertible.

The Maraj faction thus had two basic core groups in addition to an indirect leadership. Both cores had a commitment to the faction, one as a result of historical circumstance, the other as a result of having too much to lose without their factional and political activism. In addition, what is crucial is that these two additional cores were mutually exclusive with no apparent overlapping of personnel between them. Whether they formed a clique remains problematic; however, the fact that they did not overlap suggests an additional "type" of factional structure - that based on more than one core with each distinguishable from the general membership and from each other.

In viewing the internal structure of the Maraj faction then, it becomes apparent that several types of solidarity are possible within a given faction. In this case, an indirect structure is combined with two mutually distinguishable core groups. Again the typology must be amended to allow for this possibility.

Now insofar as the two factions exhibited great difference in terms of content of relationships and internal structuring coupled with similar intensity indices, the next issue is the relationship of these structural features to the realm of interfactional competition.

(ii) The Nature of Interfactional Competition.

It has been implicit in the previous sections that the political competitions of the period were in fact composed of three separate political games. First, there were the competitions which took place in the first year of the present period. Secondly, there was the competition which has been labelled the "politics of alternating succession." Thirdly, there was what has been called the "politics of direct encounter." What are the characteristics of these three games in relation to each other; how did one become the next; why did this change occur; and what is the relationship of the resource

structure and factional structures to the types of competition? These are the issues which are relevant to the present discussion of the nature of the competition and the control mechanisms. In addition, it should be recalled that competition had erupted in other village arenas as well. These were related to the factional competitions and as such, form part of the more general political games which were in progress.

The first year has been discussed in some detail in previous sections. The village council, briefly, was characterized by an emphasis on conciliation as a result of individual interests and crosscutting ties which made factional alignments too costly and hence improbable. In that year however, it became apparent that there was a new wealth distribution in the village and a complex economic sphere. Basically, the interest groups in the village were now too numerous and too differentiated to enable factional peace, or the emphasis by the council on conciliation, to continue. The political game, whereby an elite mediated political conflict, not out of altruism, but in defense of their own position, came under attack as a result of the changing resource structure of the village. The result was that this particular game was no longer tenable because of the effects, economic and social, of the massive expansion.

To an extent, one can view the crises which emerged on the council, notably the Jib Land incident and the measurement incident, as a failure of the control mechanisms which kept the old game intact because of their irrelevance when the implications of the expansion moved to the forefront. The nature of these control mechanisms, the crosscutting ties of council members to ensure the representation of all interests in decision making, and the "collusion" among the elite in relation to the mass of villagers, failed directly as a result of increased complexity.

As well, the crises were precipitated by the presence of other rules which became inconsistent in the light of the new structure of the village and

the allocation of resources. The rules governing prizes, how to compete, the acceptance of agreeable payoffs for all parties, and the nature of the competing teams were no longer functional in the light of recent changes. For example, in the emergent situation of scarce resources, the Jib Land incident was a direct statement that there was no longer enough land to go around in an equitable manner. Insofar as land was a prize of the period to which every individual was entitled, its sudden scarcity upset the definition of this rule. Further, by the nature of its finite quality, coupled with its extreme importance in the village economy, trade-offs were not possible since land by this time had no equivalent. Finally, the emphasis on individualist competition could only become disputes since conciliation and trade-offs were no longer possible. In short, the prizes of the expansion and individual competition had altered; the possibility for exchange had, as a result, become limited; the rules governing the peace were thrown into question; and finally, the control mechanisms broke down.

These were the characteristics of the first year of the present period and the relationship of the resource structure in precipitating the change from conciliatory stability within the council arena to the advent of a series of crisis situations which the District Commissioner, the traditional mediator between factional groups, had to mediate between the elite and the mass and between the individuals forming the elite itself.

This "lack of organization" within the council arena might have foreshadowed a "fight" in Bailey's terms in that a conflict was emerging concerning the rules of the game (Bailey, 1969: 163). However, the introduction of a new resource into the council arena, the PPP as an ideology, as a group of activists, and as a focal point for organizing both discontent and local political activity resulted in the introduction of a new political game. The local PPP group took control of the village council, forced the old elite to reconsolidate vis-à-vis the new upstarts, and hence resulted in the political

field being reorganized along factional lines. Nicholas states that factions are "one mode of organizing political relations under conditions of rapid social change" (1965: 22). In the present situation, we have an example of this. Relevant as well is the fact that factions had a long history in the village such that their renewed presence in the political realm involved expectations and behaviour that were not new to the majority of villagers. As a result, the old elite was quickly able to realign itself and its competitive priorities. This move was of course made easier because of the stated intention of the PPP faction to eliminate the old elite from effective competition. Given the experience and new ideology, the old elite responded by reorganizing itself into a faction to enable competition with the PPP activists.

At the same time, both factions accepted common rules. Each defined the prize as control of the village electorate; each defined eligibility for competition as an individual's right partially because faction leaders' choices were constrained in recruitment by the complexity of the economic base in the village; each accepted the rule that competition should take place for control of the village council through appeals to the electorate on the basis of ideology and/or patronage; and each accepted the major control mechanisms which are discussed below.

In short, the disorganization of the previous political game was followed by a consensual return to a factional game. This in turn implied the reorganization of the political field in such a way that a new game came into being. What were the characteristics of this new factional game?

The period that was entered into has been labelled "the politics of alternating succession," referring to the fact that each faction leader and his followers gained alternate and decisive control of the village council. Competition within the council had the major attributes found during other factional periods, although these were necessarily delimited by the makeup of the

council. However, the reparations paid to Daljeet and the Dwarka Etwaroo incident represent attempts by the council to win popular support through patronage relationships with the electorate and persons who were to some extent related to council members. Secondly, there were the attempts to subvert large amounts of popular support as exhibited in the waiving of rents for rice lands. Thirdly, there were attempts to build up political credit by utilizing outside resources, such as national arena personnel, in order to get things done. Fourthly, there still emerged competition for the loyalty of administrative personnel, as in the situation involving the confirmation of Jawahir. Finally, tactics of disruption were utilized when none other were available in order again, to build political credit, to appeal to popular support, and to utilize the council as a resource by attacking the administrative capabilities of the other faction.

In short, the rules of competitive behaviour, even when there were alternate successions, were still followed by and manipulated by the two factions as had been done in previous periods. An added dimension during this period however, was that resources were produced by competition in other arenas within the village. The religious competitions over sacrifice and the location of buildings enabled the politicization of the Muslim community which was aided by the active participation of Sultan in local politics. Depending on which faction he chose, he would bring a large portion of Muslim support with him as a result of tension and competition in the religious field. As a political competitor, Sultan could exploit these tensions thereby utilizing the Muslim community, now united as a result of competition, as a resource for his own political manoeuvring. Simultaneously, the faction leader that could subvert and maintain Sultan's support as a secondary leader, thus had access as well to twenty per cent of the voting electorate. The basis for transactional exchanges as a result of religious competition and the

resource nature of this competition did not, as has been seen, go undetected by faction leaders.

The second arena which was characterized by competition was the race club arena. Long a source of prestige competition, the arena was utilized by the leaders to enhance their prestige by supporting one or the other group in their competition thereby gaining political credit as a result of winning encounters which could in turn be translated into a resource for the council arena.

Finally, the co-operative arenas were utilized for political credit, for economic gain, and for patronage in order to support the factional competition. To some extent, the prestige gained by the fact that three of Premsingh's major supporters were on the executive could be used as political credit. This aspect also made Amin an object for subversion attempts as well as his preeminence in the Muslim community. As long as the Thrift and Credit Society functioned properly, the prestige associated with it and the executive committee's control over loans could be translated into a political resource. When however, the resentment of the general population against the manipulations of the executive came to the fore, the use of this arena as a resource quickly ended. However, the economic viability which it had given the executive by virtue of their uneven distribution of funds enhanced their elite status within the village and gave further economic stability to the Premsingh faction. Finally, when functioning properly, the Credit Society had been the main source of credit for the average villager. Insofar as the Premsingh faction largely controlled the executive and hence the allocation of funds, a major source of patronage was available to counter the patronage potential of the PPP faction.

The Rice Growers' Co-operative in turn, was a resource used by the Maraj faction. The majority of its members were aligned with Maraj as a product of

extended kin relationships, factional histories and an active commitment to the PPP. The success of the co-operative underwrote the economic elite status of the Maraj faction and even after disintegration, the success which members had had continued to be an economic resource which in turn affected political credit as a result of their enhanced prestige through economic preeminence.

So the competition of alternating succession implied an acceptance of the rules of the game and as such, the characteristics of factional politics during this period were similar to those of other eras. At the same time however, there were two important distinctive features about the factionalism of the present period. The first, as discussed, was the utilization of other competitive arenas as resources in council competition. The second was dictated by the very nature of alternating succession itself. For the first time, the factional competitions were characterized by a situation of repetitive encounters in a cyclical pattern. Each council election was an encounter and each election was decisively won by one of the factions. At the same time, this winning did not involve the demise of the other faction. The reasons here were the control mechanisms at work.

First, there was the fact that within the cycle of encounters there were confrontations not all of which were lost by the loser of the larger encounter. This enabled the loser to continuously make public statements about strength and issue challenges to the winner. The waiving of rents, the disruption of meetings, and the boycotting of meetings were mechanisms which enabled the loser of the encounter/election to still retain a public front.

At the same time, these mechanisms were supported by another type of "collusion" in which the loser could withdraw from competition without losing his identity as a separate entity. Insofar as both factions were each placed in the position of losing a major encounter, it is logical to perceive this kind of collusion as built into the game, accepted by all participants, and

hence, functioning as a control mechanism.

Thirdly, alternating succession enabled differential goal attainment as discussed by Schwartz (1969) in which each faction represented different interests or interest groups and as such, their base of support remained at least somewhat intact despite the loss of an encounter/election. In turn, this precipitated alternating succession since neither in-faction could solve local problems to the satisfaction of all village groups.

Fourthly, both factions appeared to have an almost equal access to outside resources and sources of patronage. The Maraj faction had the PPP; the Premsingh faction, as has been seen, quite explicitly attempted to circumvent this obvious fact by taking every opportunity to tap the other parties in the national arena to secure at least political credit. If the other parties did not provide patronage to the same extent as did the PPP, the Premsingh faction made up the difference through control of the Thrift and Credit Society, a control which was extremely immediate to the village population.

Fifthly, although it would appear that the situation was one of extreme encapsulation and the effects which this could have on the local level (cf.: Bailey, Chapter 8), what is crucial in distinguishing such encapsulation from the attempts of the PPP to infiltrate the local level was the fact that the infiltration became translated into the old idiom of how local level politics should be carried out, i.e., through factional competition. In addition, the majority of villagers were sympathetic to the PPP and voted for that party in national elections. On the local level however, as has been seen, the issue quite explicitly was phrased in terms of whether a national party was a "Georgetown story." Despite the popular phrasing of the issue within the village, in fact, villagers were operating in terms of a local idiom which was familiar to them. The issue at this time was never in fact one raised by encapsulation. Rather, it was one of the elite attempting to protect itself from another elite

who themselves had an historical place in village factions despite the espousement of nationalist ideology. In short, both factions were playing the same political game. Insofar as neither was challenging the rules, the game could be played. This in turn constitutes a control mechanism.

Finally, the structure of factions during the period also provided another means of control. Both were almost of equal intensity; both represented different means of recruitment; and as noted above, both represented different segments of the population. The structure of factions thus implied equality and balance. With this, another aid to controlling the game was achieved.

Such were the characteristics of the Period of Alternating Succession in terms of the rules governing the nature of the competition and the control mechanisms embedded in the game. In addition, the relationship of the particular game has been tied to the resource structure of the village and the factional structures of the period. The issues remaining to be discussed are how this period evolved into the next and why.

The major impetus which precipitated the Period of Direct Encounter was the reallocation of rice lands within the village such that resentment was created among several sections of the population while at the same time the other segments strongly supported the move. The result was that the 1959 election was an encounter in which for the first time since 1953, the seats on the council were evenly distributed between the two factional groupings, and where the imbalance occurred, subversions immediately corrected this. The Period of Direct Encounter then, as the name implies, was one in which competitive factional politics emerged in sharp relief in the village council arena.

One of the major characteristics of this factional period as compared with others was the amount of effort and resources that went into subversion attempts. Loknauth, Sultan, Brijlall, Taharally, Amin and Mohamed all defected

mainly on the basis of transactional exchanges. At the same time, given the equal distribution of council seats, the efforts of the leaders and the costs directed to this end were crucial.

This characteristic however, was reinforced by the Suspension of Elections Bill which limited leaders' recruitment ability for council membership. In fact, the constraints imposed on recruitment by the Bill were such that it can be argued that much of the effort at subversion was a direct result of the unchanging composition of the council. Recruits had to come from personnel already appointed or elected to the council.

At the same time however, the assumption that the Bill would be revoked at any time and a local election called, was sufficient reason for the factions to still remain in touch with the electorate. Such was the reasoning behind the support of Phulmatie Lall to the point where an encounter was precipitated, a mediator called in, and the competition forced to a decisive win by one faction. The alignment of the Lall family had to be maintained by the Maraj faction and therefore an encounter ensued.

Simultaneously however, the intensity with which competition was carried out seems to have been unprecedented in village history. The unseating of Maraj and the controversy surrounding the appointment of Petamber Singh as overseer were major encounters within a more general pattern of confrontations in the form of the disruption of meetings and the general game of one-upmanship which appears to be typical of all the factional periods viewed thus far.

So within the general cyclical nature of the factional competition, there appears to be occurring an intensity in encounters which were threatening to create a "runaway system." The case in point surrounds the personage of Petamber Singh and how his factional alignments precipitated an encounter over his appointment as overseer which in turn caused further encounters, each one escalating in intensity and generating new arenas.

The Period of Direct Encounter was thus one in which the typical cyclical pattern had embedded in it a cumulative nature which could have run out of control.

This is a different situation from what Bailey terms a "fight" between rival political structures simply because the rules of the game were continuously being reinforced despite the spiralling effect. For example, Sultan was thought by many to have broken the rules in discussing Singh at the proprietors' meeting. Singh thought so and sued him for slander. The courts upheld the claim thereby reinforcing the factional situation within the village. Similarly, the continuous reallocation of five hundred dollars was a statement by the council, regardless of which faction was allocating and to whom, that the rules had not been broken and that the situation was still part of the old game.

However, despite the fact that the protagonists were acting to reinforce the rules, a more useful interpretation is that in fact, if the rules were not broken, they were at least bent to the point whereby accommodation was becoming impossible. In looking at the chronology of events, the first challenge to the rules came with the Premsingh faction's appointment of Singh as overseer. Given the political nature of the office and Singh's political commitments, it is easy to see why the Maraj group would feel threatened and attempt to respond in kind. When Singh's appointment is also viewed next to the fact that the Premsingh faction had a hand in removing Maraj from the council, the latter faction's behaviour in precipitating an encounter with Singh was understandable. They had to remove him from office. Their political credit was in question; the resources which they presumably commanded from the national arena were being put in doubt if their PPP leader could be removed; and they had to come up with a coup to equal those accomplished by the Premsingh faction. When these attempts failed, Sultan's "slander," whether intended

or not, was picked up by Singh who created another encounter from what might have been merely a confrontation. This in turn forced the Maraj-Sultan faction to counter with other lawsuits as well as a statement of support for their leader.

In this cumulative progression of events, the traditional mediation by outside sources, notably the District Commissioner and Local Government Board, failed to resolve once and for all the ongoing crisis situation and failed to halt the cumulative process. They were successful in minor issues, but not the major one. Feeding into this situation was the Suspensions of Elections Bill, which had the effect of disenfranchising a population which might have ended the competition by creating an imbalance on the council or voting for an entirely new group of personnel. This Bill was a constraint on council recruitment, but also a resource enabling cumulative competition to continue.

What kept the process from escalating entirely out of control were three factors. First, the teams were evenly matched; the personnel of the teams were becoming more committed as the escalation continued; and the villagers were becoming increasingly polarized. In short, one faction could not have destroyed another.

Secondly, the possibility that the political game was evolving into another type as a result of the escalation is a point worth considering. However, personnel were committed to the traditional factional competition. Neither faction had alternate goals or rules which they were attempting to introduce as described by Bailey (1969) in the case of caste climbing which he labels "cumulative change." On both grounds it is hardly likely that this type of change was going to occur. More likely, a situation of "schismatic factionalism" (Siegel and Beals, 1960a) would have been the outcome.

This however was prevented by a third element, time. The slander case took time to come to court as did the other lawsuits. As villagers and

protagonists waited for the outcome and the new encounter, the introduction of a new political resource altered the seeming inevitable trend toward schismatic factionalism. With the introduction of this resource, the last period of this factional history comes under discussion.

Notes: Chapter 8.

1. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, September, 1969.
2. Ibid.

   Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969.
3. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 22, 1952.
4. Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970.
5. Letter from Dagleish, Chairman, to the District Commissioner, January 13, 1953.
6. Petition to the Chairman and Members, Local Government Board, January 20, 1953.
7. Petition to the Chairman and Members, Local Government Board, January 26, 1953.
8. Ibid.
9. Petition, January 13, 1953.
10. Letter from the Acting District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the District Commissioner, January 27, 1953.
11. Letter from the District Commissioner to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, February 2, 1953.
12. Letter from the District Commissioner to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, February 17, 1953.
13. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, 1953.
14. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.
15. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1959.
16. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, May 8, 1953 and June 15, 1953.
17. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, July 6, 1953.
18. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, August 8, 1953.
19. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January, 1954.

20. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January, 1950.

23. To be described in the next section.

24. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969; Dagleish, October 1969; Amin Mohamed, January, 1970; and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

25. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 8, 1954.

26. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 6, 1954.

27. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 22, 1954.

28. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 7, 1955.

29. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, March 23, 1956.

30. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, June 4, 1956.

31. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, June 14, 1956.

32. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, October 9, 1956.

33. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, October 15, 1956.

34. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 7, 1956.

35. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, July 15, 1957.

36. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, May 2, 1955.

37. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 6, 1956.

38. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, May 7, 1956.

39. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

40. Op. cit.

41. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, October 1, 1956.

42. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January 31, 1957.

43. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, August 13, 1956.

44. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, July 10, 1956.

Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

45. Op. cit.

46. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

47. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 13, 1954.

48. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 17, 1955.

49. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 7, 1956.

50. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 16, 1957 and December 18, 1958.

51. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 16, 1957.

52. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 18, 1958.

... Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

53. For example, throughout 1957, there was much discussion as to the possibility of tenants planting and obtaining a spring crop and obtaining government aid for the pumping of water or for the buying of a pump after a water shortage hit the growing crop in the summer of 1957.

At the same time, discussion on the council centered around whether or not to plant the New and Jib Lands as well as the New Empolder. The issue was then raised, continually, as to what would happen to oxen and cattle if this were done.

Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, July 15, 1957; August 6, 1957; August 7, 1957; August 10, 1957; August 17, 1957; August 21, 1957; August 24, 1957; and August 27, 1957.

All these meetings were called to discuss the water shortage and the pump. By September 21, 1957, the issue of the spring crop was raised and the problem of which area to plant and what to do with the cattle.

Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 21, 1957; October 2, 1957; October 25, 1957.

A proprietors' meeting was called where it was decided to plant the New and Jib Lands. Cattle owners complained and the Premsingh faction attempted to have some of the Jib Land area left for agistment.

Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, October 30, 1957.

In January, the council decided to leave a portion of the Creek block section for cattle although the agistment fee was raised from fourteen to twenty-five cents per head per month.

Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January 8, 1958.

54. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 8, 1958.

55. Ibid.

Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 14, 1958.

Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and Dagleish, October, 1969.

56. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969; Dagleish, October, 1969; Amin Mohamed, January, 1970; and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

Interview with Joseph Bhagwandin, January, 1970.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January, 1960.

62. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

63. Ibid.

64. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, 1961 and 1962.

65. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, July 2, 1962.

66. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, June 4, 1962.

Interview with Joseph Bhagwandin, November, 1969.

67. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, November 19, 1962.

68. Ibid.

Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and Dagleish, October, 1969.

69. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and Zubeda Mohamed, September, 1969.

Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January 7, 1963.

70. Interview with Zubeda Mohamed, September, 1969.

71. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, 1963.

Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

72. Ibid.

73. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 28, 1963.

74. Interview with Petamber Singh, October 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

75. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 18, 1964.

Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

80. Ibid.

Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, 1966.

Interview with Hassan Rasool, August, 1969.

81. Letter from Mahatma Deoroop to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, March 9, 1960.

Letter from P. T. Premsingh, Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, May 30, 1960.

82. Letter from Hussein Amin, Deputy Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, June 3, 1960.

Letter from Dagleish to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, June 22, 1960.

83. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, July 2, 1960.

84. Letter from the Commissioner of Local Government to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, August 15, 1960.

Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, October 23, 1960.

85. Letter from Drepaul Bharat to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, January 20, 1961.

86. Letter from D. Bharat, Member of the Local Government Board, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, January 31, 1961.

87. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 1, 1960.

    Letter from P. T. Premsingh, Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, February 10, 1960.

88. Letter from D. Bharat and M. Deoroop to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, February 3, 1960 and February 10, 1960.

89. In 1948, a wood plank was stolen from the village office compound. Villagers reported the matter to Councillor, Petamber Singh, and claimed that they saw the plank in the yard of another villager, Sukhu Lall. Singh apparently reported this to the chairman, Gerald Panchar, who, instead of taking back the plank, informed Lall who proceeded to hide the plank which he had built into the foundation of his house. Again Singh approached the chairman and told him that the police should have been brought in. The matter was raised at the next council meeting - a move which irritated Panchar as the council censured him for his actions in the matter. The result was the emergence of "bad feelings" between Singh and Panchar and was one of the reasons Panchar voted against Singh for the position of overseer in 1950. In addition, when Dabi Maraj returned to Bush Lot to contest the council elections against the old, non-aligned councillors of which Singh had become part, the Lall family became staunch PPP and Maraj supporters.

    Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

90. Letter from P. T. Premsingh to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, October, 1960.

91. Letter from the Commissioner of Local Government to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, July 26, 1960.

92. Letter from the Secretary, Local Government Board, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, November 12, 1960.

93. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Secretary, Local Government Board, December 21, 1960.

94. Letter from the Assistant Overseer, to the Bush Lot Village Council, October 10, 1961.

95. Interview with Lala Etwaroo, August, 1969 and Petamber Singh, October, 1969.

96. Letter from Lala Etwaroo to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, November 1, 1961 and February 2, 1962.

97. Letter from P. T. Premsingh, Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, November 22, 1961.

    Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, November 22, 1961.

98. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, November 11, 1961.

99. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, November 28, 1961.

100. Letter from P. T. Premsingh, Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, November 29, 1961.

101. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, November 30, 1961.

102. Notes of a meeting between a deputation from Bush Lot Village and the Commissioner of Local Government, held at the Ministry of Home Affairs, December 8, 1961. Present were the Commissioner of Local Government; Secretary, Local Government Board; Dabi Maraj; Mahatma Deoroop; and ten Bush Lot proprietors.

103. Letter from the Commissioner of Local Government to Dabi Maraj, December 9, 1961.

104. Letter from P. T. Premsingh to the District Commissioner, December 11, 1961.

105. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 11, 1961.

    Letter from Hussein Amin, Deputy Chairman, to the District Commissioner, December 12, 1961.

106. Petition from one hundred and forty-eight proprietors to the Chairman, Local Government Board, January 8, 1962.

107. Letter from H. Amin, Deputy Chairman, to the Chairman, Local Government Board, February 12, 1962.

108. Letter from the Secretary, Local Government Board, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, May 18, 1962.

109. Letter from Petamber Singh to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, May 15, 1964.

110. Letter from Petamber Singh to the Chairman and Members of the Local Government Board, June 1, 1965.

111. Letter from Petamber Singh to the District Commissioner, July 2, 1965.

    Letter from Fung-a-Fat, Barrister, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Local Authority, October 9, 1965.

112. Letter from Ebrahim Sultan to the District Commissioner, September 24, 1965.

113. Letter from E. Sultan, October 13, 1965.

114. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, November 18, 1965.

115. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, October 18, 1965.

116. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, November 18, 1965.

117. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 14, 1966.

Letter from G. R. Taharally, Deputy Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, February 14, 1966.

118. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, February 15, 1966.

119. Letter from the Commissioner of Local Government to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, February 25, 1966.

Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Chairman, Bush Lot Village, March 7, 1966.

120. Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Bush Lot Village District, February 16, 1966.

Letter from G. R. Taharally, Deputy Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, March 10, 1966.

121. Letter from G. R. Taharally, Deputy Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, March 16, 1966.

122. Letter from G. R. Taharally, Deputy Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, March 23, 1966.

123. Letter from Petamber Singh to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, undated.

124. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, March 28, 1966.

125. Letter from Petamber Singh to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, April 6, 1966.

126. Letter from the Acting District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, undated.

127. Letter from Petamber Singh, to H. Amin, Chairman, April 7, 1966.

128. Letter from G. R. Taharally, Deputy Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, April 14, 1966.

129. Letter from G. R. Taharally, Deputy Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, April 15, 1966.

130. Petition from twenty-four proprietors to the Chairman and Members of the Local Government Board, April 17, 1966.

131. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, April 18, 1966.

132. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969; P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970; and Dr. Fenton Ramsahoye, October, 1969.

133. Letter from Gunraj Singh to the Chairman and Members of the Bush Lot Local Authority, May 7, 1966.

134. For example: Letter from Doodnauth, June 13, 1966 and Dinally, June 15, 1966.

135. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Bush Lot Local Authority, June 25, 1966.

136. Petition, July 1, 1966 and July 4, 1966, each signed by more than one hundred proprietors.

137. Letter from the Secretary, Local Government Board, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, July 7, 1966.

138. Letter from H. Amin, Chairman, to the District Commissioner, August 31, 1966.

139. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, September 5, 1966.

140. Letter from H. Amin, Chairman, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, April 29, 1966.

141. Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

142. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 26, 1968.

143. Interview with Dr. Fenton Ramsahoye, September, 1969; Petamber Singh, October, 1969; and P. T. Premsingh, March, 1970.

144. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, August 10, 1953.

145. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, August 17, 1953.

146. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 12, 1955.

147. Interview with Joseph Bhagwandin, September, 1969.

148. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 12, 1955.

149. Ibid.

150. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January 9, 1956.

151. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 6, 1956.

152. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, January 6, 1958.

153. Interview with Joseph Bhagwandin, September, 1969.

154. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 6, 1954.

155. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, July 4, 1955.

156. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 5, 1955.

157. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, September 5, 1955.

158. Interview with Seeram Bhagwandin, January, 1971.

159. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, March 7, 1955.

160. Interview with Albert Kishoor, Co-Operative Officer, West Coast Berbice, August, 1969.

161. Interview with Hassan Rasool, September, 1969.

162. Op. cit.

163. Op. cit.

164. Records of the Bush Lot Thrift and Credit Society.

165. Interview with Albert Kishoor, August, 1969.

166. Ibid.

Records of the Bush Lot Thrift and Credit Society.

167. Op. cit.

168. Ibid.

169. Ibid.

170. Interview with H. Rasool, September, 1969.

171. Op. cit.

172. Ibid.

Op. cit.

173. Interview with Albert Kishoor, August, 1969 and Hassan Rasool, September, 1969.

174. Interview with Albert Kishoor, August, 1969.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid.

177. Interview with Hassan Rasool, September, 1969.

178. Op. cit.

179. Ibid.

180. Ibid.

Interview with Albert Kishoor, August, 1969.

181. Interview with H. Rasool, September, 1969.

182. Op. cit.

183. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 30, 1954.

184. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 7, 1955.

185. Interview with Chetram Chand, November, 1969; Amin Mohamed, December, 1969; and Gopie Deoroop, December, 1969.

186. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, October 1, 1956.

187. Ibid.

188. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 17, 1956.

189. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, December 20, 1956.

Chapter 9: The Politics of Incorporation, 1967-1970.

(a) Introduction.

The previous period had ended with what appeared to be an inevitable movement toward the permanent division of the village into two polarized and opposing groups. The village elite was split between the factions; the population was being mobilized in support of one or the other; and the polarization was permeating both major arenas and latent fissions of village organization.

The years following were basically characterized by the continuation of the major competitions. However, the introduction of a new type of nationalist politics into the village altered this course of development with the result that the old politics became redefined in terms of a new idiom which in turn added a new dimension to the old competitions. This process has been labelled the "politics of incorporation" and to discuss its introduction onto the local level, its ramifications and its implications as a new resource and constraint for local politics, a brief history of events which had been occurring on the national level is presented followed by a discussion and analysis of the implications for local level politics and factional competition.

(b) The Nature of National Level Politics.

(i) National Party Politics, 1955-1970.

Events had been occurring on the national level which did not immediately affect the village until 1967. These began after the Constitution was suspended in 1953 and a British Commission, investigating the roots of the 'troubles', came to the conclusion that any election held in the country would only return the PPP to power. They therefore suggested that an interim government be

appointed to remain in control until 1957 after a new constitution could be readied and elections held.

During this period of the interim government, a split occurred in the ranks of the PPP such that two factions emerged, one under Cheddi Jagan, the other under L. F. S. Burnham. At the same time, a third political party was formed, the United Democratic Party (UDP), which was basically a reorganization of the former National Democratic Party designed to take advantage of the split in the PPP.

Until 1957, however, the two groups of the PPP were not associated with any particular ethnic group. But in that year, Burnham's faction lost its major Indian supporters through death and resignation and Jagan's group lost its major African followers. Burnham then renamed his group the People's National Congress (PNC) and in 1959, absorbed the African membership of the UDP. There had thus emerged two mass parties each appealing to one of the major ethnic groups in the country (Depres, 1967: 5-7).

This association of ethnic groups with political parties finally emerged in sharp relief after 1960 when two major developments came to characterize the national political arena. First there was the rise of "apanjaht" politics, meaning "vote for your own kind" which became the watchword of the PPP. Secondly, in keeping with apanjaht politics was the conscious effort of the PPP to gain the unanimous support of the East Indian ethnic group despite internal variations. Jagan thus enforced policies, after his election in 1957, which appealed to business interests, Indian professionals, sugar workers and farmers. For example, the "1960-1964 development programme almost completely ignored the pressing economic needs of the Afro-Guianese" (Ibid.: 228-250).

In reacting to this situation, the PNC, in order to survive as a party, had to secure the major portion of the African vote for the election which was to be held in 1961. As a result, they had to mobilize the African section. With this

move, the association of parties with ethnic groups was almost complete (Ibid.: 260).

The final association took place through the election campaigns waged by both parties. By August, "practically every scheduled political meeting presented the risk of a racial riot. . . . By the time of the elections, relationships between East Indians and Africans had reached a boiling point." Jagan's party, which won the election, was soon "confronted with one serious political crisis after another." In 1962, race riots broke out and allowed the leaders of the PNC and United Force Party (which had been formed in 1960) to push for a system of proportional representation in elections. This was particularly crucial since the PPP had never garnered over fifty per cent of the votes and were always a minority government. As such, if the other two parties could form a coalition, the PPP would no longer retain control of the executive powers of government. The British government readily agreed to the suggestion of the PNC and UF, and the 1964 elections were held under a system of proportional representation with the result that the PNC-UF coalition took power. Then in 1966, Guyana became independent under the leadership of Burnham and D'Aguiar of the UF (Ibid.: 263-266).[1]

From that point, the PNC began an effort to woo East Indians into their fold in order to ensure additional support at the polls. It was in this attempt that the PNC entered Bush Lot local politics.

(ii) National and Local Politics.

a. Introduction.

It was quite predictable given the previous history of national parties in the Bush Lot arena that when the initial split occurred in the PPP there would be some division within the village as to which families would support either faction. For example, P. T. Premsingh remained with Burnham, as did his family and their political allies.[2] Then Dabi Maraj died and the two fragments of

the PPP began to polarize along racial lines. Finally, with the outbreak of race riots in 1962, it is quite apparent that the sympathies of the Bush Lot villagers would turn back to the PPP group led by Jagan as opposed to supporting the PNC which was by then associated with the African ethnic group.[3]

There were, however, several families which had never associated themselves with the PPP but rather, had supported first the NDP and the UDP. With the polarization occurring on the national level and the absorption of the UDP into the PNC, these families for the most part turned their loyalties to the PPP as being the Indian party. Several families turned to the United Force but they were an extremely small group. One Bush Lot man, however, did make the change-over from the UDP to the PNC when the two merged in 1959. This was P. T. Premsingh, councillor, village chairman and faction leader.[4]

By 1962 then, Bush Lot village was a PPP stronghold with the party having won the support of former Burnham supporters and NDP-UDP sympathizers. This support was further reinforced by two other factors. The race riots of 1962 and 1964 reached Berbice. A village near Bush Lot was obliterated and minority groups in villages moved to where they would be in a majority with their "own kind." In Bush Lot, several African families left in 1962 and the remainder in 1964.[5]

Support for the PPP was further reinforced in the village by the effects which Jagan's policies had had on Bush Lot during the carrying out of the 1960-1964 development programme, the precedent of which in the Bush Lot area was the opening of the vast tracts in Onverwagt for rental to villagers. At the same time, the price paid for rice was kept at an extremely high level and gasoline for machinery was allocated to farmers duty-free.

On the basis then of the economic policies of the PPP and the concomitant polarization of racial groups in the society at large, Bush Lot became a PPP base.[6]

In terms of these changes on the national level, and the reaction in Bush Lot to them, the period between 1955 and 1970 can be divided into two stages, the period before 1967 which has been discussed in detail in the last chapter and the period after 1967 when the polarization on the national level began to have new effects on village politics.

b. National and Local Politics, Pre-1967.

As has been mentioned, the factionalism in the village during the period discussed in the last chapter centred around local issues and competition between a strong PPP core group and the older elite councillors who wished to keep national parties out of the local arena.

The majority of these old councillors had joined the NDP and UDP mainly as a reaction against the extent to which the PPP had infiltrated the village. When, however, the UDP united with the PNC and all parties became associated with racial groups, the majority of these turned by default to the PPP. The result was that the issues in the village were not really focused around competing political parties as they were deployed on the national level, but rather, around the extent to which the village should incorporate the PPP party in such matters as dispute settlement and council debates. It was on this basis that the factions within the village were aligned before 1967.

There was, however, one exception. This was Reverend Premsingh who had joined the PNC after the merger with the UDP in 1959. He stated his affiliation publicly but in this he stood alone. His faction members continued to support him in opposition to the PPP group and his affiliation as a result, remained a personal matter.

The PPP group in the village strongly resented this affiliation, however, and several attacks were directed against him on this basis. An extreme example was in 1964 when Premsingh was running for a seat in the Rice Producers'

Association as a representative for Number Five District which incorporated Bush Lot. The PPP was also running candidates, namely Sultan, Sayed, and Amin, all former or present council members. Premsingh ran as an independent unassociated with any particular party. The evening before the election, a bomb was thrown at his house. No serious damage was done. Premsingh lost the election, however, and the PPP slate of candidates took the RPA positions.[7]

This incident was the culmination of Premsingh's association with the PNC. He had run for a seat in the Legislative Council in 1961 as a PNC candidate against Sayed, the PPP man, and lost.[8]

By 1967 then, with the exception of Premsingh and a few families associated with the United Force, Bush Lot was a PPP village. In elections which pertained to matters outside the village, such as RPA and national elections, villagers voted solidly PPP. In local politics, however, the issues which divided the village remained local in nature. Premsingh's affiliation was not considered relevant in council politics. He was merely regarded as the opposition to the Maraj-Sultan faction and this local level perspective was reinforced by the fact that his council supporters were PPP people in national issues but against party politics in local issues. There was in short, a power struggle within the local arena and only one of the factions was defined in terms of a national party. Their support came from the strongly committed PPP core in the village, while Premsingh's support came from persons who were against "such stupidness in the village." These same people, however, voted PPP in national elections.

By 1967 then, national party politics had filtered into the village in the manner which was discussed in the last chapter. The subsequent split in the PPP which occurred during the period of the interim government did not contribute in any way to the local polarization which had its roots in other causes. Premsingh's affiliation was not considered relevant in the local arena and the machinations on the national level by the various parties did not affect

the village until after 1967.

c. National and Local Politics, Post 1967.

Two factors served as a basis for a new political game and arena in the village as a result of national party politics after 1967. First, there was emerging the conscious effort of the PNC to attract Indians into the party for the purposes of increasing the number of votes available and for attempting to create fissions in the Indian community to prevent further racial disturbances.

Secondly, the village was polarized over the Singh-Sultan issue which in turn had given rise to the dispute between the Lall and Singh family and the Panchar lawsuit against the local authority. It is obvious then that the already existing polarization could be exploited and that the results would be further competition along the old lines. This is precisely what occurred.

The Singh-Sultan slander suit came to court in 1967. Singh had as his lawyer a former cabinet minister in the PPP, and it is alleged that Sultan went to see Dr. Jagan in order to obtain his support in the case. Apparently Dr. Jagan refused the request, Sultan lost the case, and he was ordered to pay $2,500 in damages to Singh.[9] Sultan supposedly blamed the PPP for both the economic and prestige setback which he had received as a result of the slander suit and was open to suggestions as to where he should then place his allegiance.

Several months later, Mohamed Kassim, an Indian member of the Legislature for the PNC, was made a minister in the Burnham government and proceeded to form a Muslim section of the PNC as a subsidiary unit to the national party dedicated to winning the support of Muslim Indians. This group then began their attempts to build local parties in as many villages as was possible to infiltrate. Sultan was approached by the Muslim wing and became the PNC activist in Bush Lot.[10]

In this move, he took with him his supporters on the council. This was, of

course, possible due to the extreme conflict in the village which prevented the unification under the PPP banner of former and traditional enemies. The long history of factionalism wherein family groups had been in competition for decades made a new coalition against Sultan impossible. Those families who had traditionally supported the Maraj-Panchar-Maraj-Sultan faction over the years, remained with him.

But two new dimensions had emerged. It should be remembered that the Indian wing of the PNC was designated as Muslim. Since Sultan was the priest for the Bush Lot Muslim community, it was logical that many of the Muslim families would follow him. This too, however, was a logical extension of the tension which had been building between the various religious groups after 1953 as discussed in the last chapter.

Within the village then, the PNC exploited the splits which had occurred in the political arena and the competition between the religious groups over the land issue and animal sacrifice. As well, the history of factionalism in the village, with its precedent of rather stable family alliances, provided added support to Sultan's subversion by enabling him to bring with him that part of the elite group which had long been associated with the faction he had inherited.

But there was an additional impetus for the Muslims to turn to the PNC - an impetus which would later be picked up by other Indian subsections - that of the elaborate extension of patronage lines made possible largely by the fact that Guyana had become independent from British rule. The potential for patronage by the PNC was thus far greater than had ever existed for the PPP.

This patronage also fit well into the situation of scarce resources which had been characterizing the village since the early fifties. Land leases given by the Commission of Lands and Mines, civil service and government jobs, all allegedly became means of encouraging Indian support for the PNC. In addition,

public works projects benefiting entire villages were used as a means of subverting support. In Bush Lot, this took the form of the metalling of the middle dam for one mile in length thereby providing an all-weather thoroughfare. The money was provided by USAID, but the PNC plan for distribution coincided with the extent to which a village had given support to the party. Thus, for example, a nearby village was purposefully denied funds since their council was controlled by a PPP majority. The local activists maintained that "this was done to show the people where the money is."[11]

In short, the PNC infiltration took advantage of the political, economic, and religious cleavages in the village.

(c) Arenas of Competition.

(i) The Village Council Arena.

During this period, as in all others discussed, the village council was a focal point for factional competition. In general, the politics in this arena after 1967 followed much the same pattern as they had in previous years. Competition was characterized by polarization on specific issues such as competition for the loyalty of local authority officials and attempts to control the council with its associated legal power. As well, many of the specific issues which were at the base of the competition during this period were those which had emerged during the previous one. However, what differentiated council politics during this period was the extent to which national party affiliation and interference became an integral part of council deliberations. For the first time, the council became a microcosm of the competitions that were occurring on the national level. The attempts of the Premsingh faction to keep national party politics out of the village had definitely failed.

In addition, the suspension of local elections in 1961 resulted in an in-breeding of council membership such that one of the major activities of the competing factions was subversion attempts which reached a complexity previously

unknown.

In 1966, Amin had been chairman of the village and had aligned himself with the Sultan faction which had in turn given him the position in order to control the council through his and his niece's support. For the position in 1967, Amin had hoped to retain the chairmanship and gave evidence at the Lall-Singh court case in favour of the Lall family who were strong Sultan supporters. The Sultan faction, however, in the light of the pressure emerging from the slander suit, decided that Sultan could better control Singh and hence should be chairman. The Premsingh faction, in a minority position, subverted Deoroop, however, by promising to support him for the chairmanship. The result was that the election ended in a draw since not only was Deoroop subverted, but also Amin, who was both disillusioned with the Sultan faction and given the deputy chairmanship by the Premsingh group. According to the Ordinances, however, if a tie occurs, lots are drawn. Deoroop won the draw.[12]

The following year, the national PPP wanted the support of Deoroop in order to give the PPP a clear majority on council. They instructed the Sultan faction, at a meeting, to give Deoroop the chairmanship. The Sultan faction refused because of Deoroop's previous defection and because they wanted Sultan as chairman. This was now a possibility since the Sultan faction had won back Amin's support by pressuring him as a Muslim who had to support his priest. In the election, Sultan won by two votes.[13]

By the time elections came for the positions for the year 1969, the Muslim wing of the PNC had subverted Sultan, his factional supporters and Amin. In doing this however, they lost the support of Bharat who remained a staunch PPP supporter and could thus be expected to vote with the Premsingh faction in the election. A tie would thus result with the chairmanship depending on the drawing of lots.

The PNC recognized this situation and the Minister of Local Government

called Premsingh in for a discussion. At that meeting, Sultan and another Bush Lot supporter, Alladin Azam, were present. The Minister informed Premsingh that since he was a PNC member, the party wanted him to vote for Sultan as chairman. Premsingh refused on the grounds that he "was the oldest PNC member in the village and that [he] should be chairman." The Minister refused to allow this.

It seemed then that a tie would result. The evening before the election, however, Bharat was arrested by the Fort Wellington police and held in custody until noon the following day. Since the election had been held in the morning, Sultan won by one vote.[14]

For the year 1970, the patronage of the PNC was allegedly used in an attempt to secure the requisite number of votes for Sultan's re-election. The metalling of the middle dam was begun and Deoroop was hired as a supervisor at ten dollars per day. In addition, his tractor was hired for transporting material. Finally, after he was given an inspector's job for the Rice Marketing Board, Deoroop joined the PNC. The election seemed won. But defections then occurred from the Sultan camp. The Premsingh faction offered Taharally the position of deputy chairman for his vote for Premsingh as chairman. Already angry that he was receiving only five dollars per day on the road project as compared with the amounts Sultan, Brijlall and Deoroop were receiving, Taharally threw his support to the Premsingh faction.[15]

Meanwhile, conflicts in other arenas resulted in the defection of Amin. First, a land dispute arose between Amin and the Loknauth family who were strong Sultan supporters as a result of their political and kinship relationship with the Maraj family. Amin apparently ploughed and shyed Loknauth's land. Loknauth then ploughed over Amin's shying. The council, controlled by the Sultan faction, supported Loknauth's claim for damages since they wanted to retain his political support and felt that in any case, Amin had erred.[16]

Secondly, a quarrel erupted in the Muslim church which caused a division between Amin and Sultan. Amin was president of the mosque, Sultan was priest. Sultan wanted works done on the mosque building and Amin claimed there were insufficient funds to do the job. Sultan then attempted to get church members to do the work by self-help and Amin became angry since, as president, he felt that Sultan had gone over his head.[17]

Thirdly, some of Amin's cattle were impounded by the local authority's stray catchers. Amin felt that Sultan had done this purposefully and that in any case, he felt that his cattle should not have been impounded since he was a Sultan supporter.[18]

The result of these disputes culminated in Amin voting for Premsingh for the 1970 chairmanship. His vote, plus Taharally's, gave the position to Premsingh despite threats of sanctions from the PNC.

This description of subversions and changing factional alliances brings into sharp relief several points which are highly relevant for the workings of the council.

First, the positions of chairman and deputy had become during this period, a major focal point for dispute and competition. To a large extent, this had been true for most council politics during all the periods of Bush Lot history which have been discussed. The payoffs however, of controlling these positions had radically altered after 1967. This was due to the competition between political parties in the national arena which had as its extension the "view to extend party organization to the local level. How else could government control the villages? If people were not attached to parties, the government would not be represented. Nothing would get done. Therefore, to be effective the PNC has to control the local councils."[19] With this perspective, the first step in controlling the local government apparatus was to control the executive of the councils. As a result, the positions of chairman and deputy would be

given full PNC support if they were sympathetic to the party. Full support in this instance referred to two basic points. First, the PNC quite explicitly allotted the role of "middleman" to these persons, and secondly, gave them access to patronage sources such as government jobs to enable them to extend their influence among the local population.

In the Bush Lot context then, Sultan's need to control the executive was a product of his goals as a faction leader and a political necessity if he were to survive as a major PNC figure on the local level. Premsingh in turn, had similar motives. Controlling the executive positions meant increased influence for his faction. But it could also mean that the PNC would accept him as their major representative in the village. For in fact, despite Premsingh's protestations as to his party membership, two factors alienated him from actual leadership of the local PNC. The first were suspicions as to his loyalty given the rumours of his past history and the fact that his faction members were not PNC activists. The second was phrased by an informant who stated that "Premsingh is not recognized by the party as being PNC. They see him as Bush Lot." In fact, Premsingh's preference for British rule in post-independence society was hardly able to endear him to the PNC which viewed itself as the legitimate nationalist movement.

The point, however, is that the positions of the council executive became increasingly important after the infiltration of the PNC into the village. It was important for both the local leaders in their dealings with each other and with the government. And it was important for the government in their attempts to control the local level. The position of middleman which inevitably resulted was a role sought by the political activists. In keeping then with the dual nature of the importance placed on the positions from two societal levels, it is not unexpected that competition for these positions would increase as the PNC's infiltration of the village increased.

At the same time that a new importance was being placed on the executive positions, a concomitant importance was necessarily placed on council control. To have a PNC executive, one had to have a PNC council. Once again the effects of national level policy increased the extent of competition which had been traditionally associated with council control and the use of the council as a political resource.

This in turn put an increased emphasis on subversions which reflected the inbred nature of the council and hence the need for subversion to enable factional control. It also emphasized the new importance placed on the executive positions as mediating positions between the national and local levels. As a result, other areas of council competition continued in the traditional manner but with the new idiom taking precedence.

Although the introduction of the party idiom at the local level had begun with the identification of the Maraj faction with the PPP after 1953, it has been noted that factionalism retained its local definition. In essence, the Maraj faction was, by virtue of its opposition to a purely local group and its lack of opposition from a similar group with a national level base, merely regarded by villagers as taking part in village competitions. It was with the introduction of the PNC that party politics, in terms of competition between two organized national units, entered Bush Lot. When Sultan joined the Muslim PNC wing and introduced the PNC as a viable alternative in a PPP village, party politics and the competition implied therein, began in the village.

At this point then the enmity between Sultan and Singh began to be viewed by the villagers as a clash between two outside groups which had infiltrated the village. Even more so was this the case in the issue of Lall's son against Singh's son over the control of one acre of land. The village had been aligned between two local factions and suddenly, the villagers found themselves aligned between two political parties.

This alignment could be found on the council not only in terms of the emphasis on subversion. Rather, the majority of issues that came before the council were now defined in the new idiom of party competition. This was made more complex by Premsingh's claims that he was a PNC member. The rumour generally believed in the village, however, was that he had voted PPP in 1964 and was merely trying to jump on the PNC bandwagon of patronage. It was quite apparent to villagers that Sultan was recognized as the PNC representative by the party. Equally apparent was the fact that Premsingh was ignored by the PNC. Besides, his supporters on the council were generally believed to be PPP supporters which in turn reinforced the image of Premsingh as a PPP man himself.

In short, the council was divided between the PNC faction and the PPP faction. And this division was apparent in the focal points of competition which arose within the council.

In June 1967, Hassan Rasool complained to the District Commissioner that the overseer "behaved in a disorderly manner and threatened to murder me or anyone who should say anything against himself or his son. . . . At the termination of the meeting, the overseer ordered councillors and proprietors out of the office saying 'get ah you rass out of this office for this is me office'. . . . I would be glad if the Local Government Board could hold an inquiry into this matter."[20]

The District Commissioner, however, felt that an investigation would be unwise since Sultan had been returned as chairman mainly to get at the overseer and he did not want to begin the new year with such a matter.[21] When the incident was brought up at a meeting in February 1968, it was found that the incident had never been recorded in the minutes. In the absence of documentary evidence, the issue was dropped.[22]

In the same month, Rasool reported to the District Commissioner that the council's attempts to waive rents owing from 1958 were in fact rents that were

collectible particularly from such councillors as Dagleish, Mangar, Deolall and such administrative personnel as Singh, his sister, rangers Jagai Jamal and Modramootoo as well as others such as the sons of councillor Amin.[23]

Several months later, chairman Sultan informed the District Commissioner that a motion was passed at a council meeting to hold an inquiry to have the seats of Nagassar and Deoroop declared vacant in that their tractors were alleged to have been working for the local authority. Insofar as councillors were not permitted to have a direct or indirect interest in district financial matters, the request was made to have the councillors removed from office.

At the same time, councillors Taharally and Rasool introduced a motion to the council that all village personnel should have a medical examination to ensure their fitness.[25] The Commissioner of Local Government commented to the District Commissioner that "it is apparent that the Local Authority is not satisfied with the work of the overseer and I advised the chairman that if this is so, to try to get the medical board to say that the overseer is unfit for service is not the proper procedure."[26]

Late in 1968, the council decided to present both Premsingh and Dagleish with gold medals to commemorate their sixty years of combined service as councillors. Both Rasool and Jaikarran lodged a complaint with the District Commissioner on the grounds that the idea was a waste of taxpayers' money and that the expenditure had not been cleared on the previous year's village estimate.[27] After the protest had reached the Local Government Board, legal advice confirmed the fact that the Ordinances did not permit such an expenditure.[28] The matter was dropped and the medals returned to the goldsmith.

(ii) Other Arenas of Competition.

At the same time that the village council arena exhibited typical factional competition, other arenas within the village were subject to the kinds of competition that were also characteristic of previous periods.

The first of these other major arenas was again the race club arena. The two formal race clubs began to request permission to hold race meetings at precisely the same time[29] with each thereby attempting to gain legitimacy by having their application accepted by council. It is interesting to note that after Sultan's defection to the PNC he had withdrawn from active support of the race club in which he had been involved in previous years such that the race club arena became separated from council politics. Basically, the competition between the clubs involved the Mohamed family against the Deoroop family. Insofar as the Mohameds were Muslims and sympathetic to their priest as well as their brother Hussein Amin, and insofar as the Deoroop family, particularly Mahatma, were readily subvertible supporters, Sultan's withdrawal from the arena was expedient behaviour. It resulted, however, in the separation of the race clubs from overt factional competition such that the arena was reduced to a prestige competition between two elite families whose political support in other arenas remained problematic and subvertible. The race clubs were no longer utilized as a political resource by either faction and competition continued independent of other village alignments.

The religious arena, again a traditional albeit recent source of competition which fed into larger factional competitions, was characterized after 1967 by a similar situation. The former division between Hindu and Muslim became a fait accompli within the village after Sultan's joining the Muslim wing. Since he took some wealthy Hindu and Christian families with him, however, the split was not schismatic although some bitterness remained against the Muslims who were viewed as being tied to Sultan's coattails both because "the Muslims always stick together" and because of the PNC affiliation.

This schism, however, was superceded by others in the religious sphere. For as a result of politico-religious movements on the national level, the Sanatan Hindu community had split along political and religious lines.

In the 1930's, the Maha Sabha organization had been introduced into Bush Lot as a cultural organization for Sanatan Hindus and was tied to a central organization located in Georgetown. In the early fifties, an organization named the Gandhi Youth Organization was introduced into the country and a chapter formed in Bush Lot in 1963. They too began cultural programmes, classes in Hindi for children and started a membership drive in 1966 within the village. At this time, the major activists left the Maha Sabha organization which was alleged to have been a strong PPP supporter. It was also stated by informants that in the following year, the national Maha Sabha group factionalized over whether to support the PNC or remain wholly a cultural organization. While this split was occurring, the Maha Sabha was apparently visiting the village and accusing the Gandhi Youth group of attempting to take over the traditional Maha Sabha functions. Disagreement also occurred over the nature of ritual to be utilized in the temple with the result that the Maha Sabha supporters proceeded to hold their services in members' homes since the Pandit was a supporter of Gandhi Youth. Finally, an informant stated that in 1969, the Maha Sabha leadership in Georgetown committed itself to PNC support thereby losing its Bush Lot chapter, while the Gandhi Youth "tries to remain divorced from politics."

A similar but slightly different chronology is available from supporters of the local Maha Sabha group. They maintain that conflict did occur in 1967 between the two groups over who would have supremacy as representatives of the Sanatan community and that the Gandhi Youth did take over the temple. This, however, was due to the fact that they were strong supporters of the PNC and that their Georgetown leader was thrown out of the Maha Sabha because of this political affiliation and was therefore trying to destroy his old organization with his only success to date being the Bush Lot chapter. At the same time, however, it was maintained that the Maha Sabha does not mix in politics but remains a cultural organization.

The polarization of the two groups is exemplified in a land dispute which emerged in 1968. The Maha Sabha applied for a section of common land on which to build a school. The village council agreed to this[30] only to have the Commissioner of Lands and Mines inform them that the land was Crown land and therefore, application and permission would have to be obtained from the Lands and Mines Commission. Before this could be done, the Gandhi Youth Organization applied for the same piece of land to the Lands and Mines Department thereby creating massive confusion for all parties such that a special council meeting was called to discuss the matter with both organizations present. As councillors realized full well, there was probably no point to such a meeting since non-Sanatans realized the impossibility of getting two such opposed groups together. At the same time, the issue remains as to which group should obtain the land. Theoretically, it was originally allocated to the Maha Sabha by the council which was told that it had no right to do so. According to the Ordinances, the Gandhi Youth had made the first correct application. This, however, tied into a dispute between the village and the Lands and Mines Department over who controlled the dams and common land in the village with the government claiming they were part of Crown lands and the village claiming them to be part of the original land grant made in lieu of back passages to India. In the light of these legal complications, the issue was never resolved.[31]

The point, however, is that the Sanatan community is deeply fissioned as a product of competition over religious jurisdiction in a national arena. The fission is exacerbated by the presence of competing national political parties which are apparently utilizing the split as a resource.[32] This strategy is in turn filtering down to the local level such that the fission is utilized for political credit depending on particular circumstance. For example, Sultan maintained studious neutrality throughout the land dispute although rumour stated that he actually supported the Gandhi Youth in that they were PNC allies. If

this were true, no overt action of his would have indicated this.

At the same time that fissions in the Sanatan community had particular political implications, the Muslim community was also having its problems. Again these became indirectly related to competition in the political arena. According to Hussein Amin, Sultan had given strict instructions to the stray catchers to impound his cattle in particular and this was related to a quarrel within the church in which Sultan accused the executive committee of which Amin was president, of not carrying out church works. The committee maintained that there was no money available and a disagreement ensued about how it should be collected. At that point, the cattle were impounded, and land rented by several of Amin's sons was allegedly allocated to the sons of Loknauth on the grounds that the Amin family was in fact ploughing the wrong land. Apparently the "bad feeling" lasted until the council election in which Amin voted for Premsingh although the PNC had warned him to co-operate with Sultan.

Meanwhile, Amin, who had been active in one of the race clubs, maintained that a meeting was called by two of his brothers without his instructions. He attributed this to the fact that his brothers and their allies probably wanted his position as president. He then withdrew from the club.

According to other informants, the actual reason why Amin defected to Premsingh was because of the impounding of his cattle. However, Amin, in his capacity as President of the mosque, had been constantly quarrelling with Sultan over leadership. Sultan at one point apparently threatened to resign and for several days did not attend services. Other members, however, convinced Sultan that resignation was impossible because he could not "spite the majority" and because it was the feast of Ramadan. Sultan returned and Amin was apparently quiet until the issue came up of raising money for mosque repairs. One Friday after services, Sultan suggested that money be collected and Amin accused him of eye-pass and attempting to do his work. Amin, however, proceeded to collect

the money and the repairs were done.

Meanwhile, the race club competition was going on. Informants state that elections within the club were supposed to have been held annually. Amin, however, refused to call an election meeting for three years. Finally at a regular meeting, one of his brothers insisted that elections be held immediately. The membership agreed and one of Amin's brothers was elected president. Amin was nominated for the vice-presidency but refused that nomination and all others. He also withdrew from the club. It is said that "he only want to have the honour of the presidency and want somebody else to do all the work."[33]

As well, it is alleged that a similar situation was occurring within the mosque committee. Amin was refusing to call elections and members "can't move against he or there will be row. Only Sultan can do it, but he ill and no one else got the guts. Last August Sultan say to hold an election. Amin said the time not finish. Sultan write he a letter and then Amin sent he lawyer letter. So everyone frightened to go to court. They would look bad in court. Amin going be president forever."[34]

What appears to be occurring in general terms is that arenas of competition have opened in what were previously solidifed and united fronts within the village in opposition to similar units. There was an arena consisting of competing race clubs, but at the same time, within one of the clubs, a separate competition was occurring. Secondly, there was the long term competition between the Hindu and Muslim communities, but within this arena, both groups were engaged in internal competition.

At the same time that this fissioning of arenas was occurring, the factional political arena and issue of national party politics were being provided with resources for competition and at the same time served as constraints on the competition. A more extensive discussion of this will take place in Section (d). For the moment, it is necessary to note that not only were arenas fissioning,

but also new and larger arenas of competition were opening up. Competition within the village now came to include larger goegraphical and political entities.

For example, all the local authorities in West Berbice are united into a West Berbice Union of Local Authorities in which chairmen and councillors meet to discuss common problems several times a year and in which an election is held annually. In 1969, this election was held in Bush Lot. The Minister of Local Government attended and Amin, Sultan and Deoroop rushed out to meet his car on his arrival. Speeches were made and several issues raised for discussion. Deoroop and Premsingh had a heated debate on the importance of villages in local government and Sultan stood up to say that "there is too much talk. Too few people are talking for too long including Premsingh." Eventually, nominations for elections were held. Premsingh was unanimously elected president of the Union; Gopaul of Woodley Park was unanimously elected treasurer after being nominated by Premsingh and seconded by Mangar; and Petamber Singh was re-elected assistant secretary six votes to one after being nominated by Premsingh. Ten persons were nominated as committee members with six to be elected. Among the nominees were Mahatma Deoroop who declined Nagassar's nomination; Amin who accepted Deoroop's nomination; two non-Bush Lot persons nominated by Premsingh, one of whom declined; and Sultan nominated by Premsingh. In the election which followed, Amin was elected as were the two persons whom Premsingh had nominated. Sultan received the lowest number of votes of all the candidates.

From this, it is apparent that Premsingh and his allies had immense influence in the West Berbice arena. Equally apparent is the fact that Sultan had little recognition beyond the immediate village. Premsingh nominated him in order to prove this point and to embarrass him.

Possibly as a result of this lack of influence, Sultan then attempted to utilize his PNC backing as a base for extending his influence in West Berbice. According to informants, he took steps to organize PNC Muslims outside the

village. This brought him into conflict with Ameerally, the activist at Woodley Park; the chairman of the Muslim arm of the PNC; and with the general PNC membership.

For in the 1968 national election, Sultan and Ameerally canvassed house to house in both villages collecting proxy votes for the PNC. In Bush Lot, it is said that approximately three hundred were collected. In the light of this success, and the desire for wider influence, Sultan apparently attempted to organize a wider following and also bypass the Muslim wing and enter into the upper echelons of the general PNC organization. In doing this, he came into conflict with Ameerally on territorial claims; with the party in terms of their own strategy of having activists located in villages to organize and maintain local participation; and the national party emphasis on fragmenting the Indian community by emphasizing one segment of it.

In 1969, at a Woodley Park celebration for the PNC, Sultan was not invited. Rather, Amin was made chairman of the proceedings. Simultaneously, Sultan allegedly approached Kassim for particular favours such as a position on a government corporation. Kassim refused him. Sultan went to see Anjat Kamar, president of a construction company employing numbers of Bush Lot labourers and vice-president of the Muslim wing in order to get an appointment with Burnham. At that meeting, Burnham sent Sultan back to Kassim. Sultan in short was forced back into the Muslim wing and into Bush Lot.[35]

In short, in the wider arena of West Berbice politics, Premsingh's strategy was more successful. The point, however, is that political competition had opened a new and larger arena.

The extent to which the political arena had expanded is also apparent from material available when the Prime Minister visited Bush Lot in September 1969 in order to officially open the one-mile road. Of the persons invited to the dinner following the ceremony, the roster is interesting from the perspective

of who was invited and who was left out. First, of the Bush Lot people, all the councillors were of necessity invited. In addition, there were three religious leaders, the Aryan priest, Pandit Deoroop of the Sanatans, and Reverend O. B. Singh of the Presbyterian Church; Sookool Deygoo, secretary of the Gandhi Youth organization in Bush Lot; eight villagers who were supporters of the Sultan faction such as Shiv Maraj (Dabi's brother), Sukhu Lall, Matthew Johns, Gaffur Gobin, etc., two of the wealthiest villagers whose allegiances remained problematic; and the headmasters of the two schools. Non-Bush Lot personnel included representatives from nine villages on the west coast, the majority of whom were explicitly PNC supporters or activists. The persons from Fort Wellington included the District Commissioner and his staff as well as persons whose government departments were partially responsible for the road in addition to several whose only relation to the road was their PNC affiliation. No other extraneous Fort Wellington personnel were invited.

(d) Principles of Factional Competition.

(i) Introduction.

Before dealing with the internal structure of factions during this period and the nature of interfactional competition, there are two issues which are relevant and which have been implied throughout the past discussion but never dealt with in detail. These issues are the notion of party politics as a resource and constraint on factional competition and the goals of the competition during the present period.

In the following sections, each of these will be discussed in turn and then related to the more detailed discussion of factional structures and competitions.

(ii) Party Politics as a Resource and Constraint.

It has been noted that the last historical period exhibited a trend toward the division of the village into schismatic factions. It was also noted that

this was in fact prevented by the introduction of a new resource into local politics which served not only as a resource, but also as a constraint on the spiralling process. The introduction of national level politics in which both policy and implementation attempts were geared toward the integration of the local arena; the use of patronage resources and the creation of activists or middlemen on the local level to serve as intermediaries between the national and local arena; and the input of resources to enable the national arena to subvert support on the local level, all served as constraints on the trend toward schismatic factionalism.

It has been said by several informants that the only access to jobs is through the PNC and that the only access to the PNC is through the two Bush Lot activists, Sultan and Amin. In the light of the economic scarcity in all spheres, the wage labour market, land, etc., the PNC has placed itself in a peculiar position vis-à-vis the villager. In order to get almost anything done, the individual must promise support for the party. When Sultan joined the PNC in 1968, he was thus given access to resources which the other faction could not hope to have. In utilizing these patronage resources, he thus added a new dimension to the factional game. Two factions were no longer locked in by the finite resources, but rather, one was able to subvert support on a massive scale within the local arena. This upset the seeming balance and deadlock of the old game. At the same time, however, because the PNC created middlemen or brokers who controlled the communication nexus between the local and national arenas such that the former was never in direct contact with the latter except when the PNC deemed it necessary and expedient, the factional process on the local level could continue in much the same manner but without the trend toward schism. The communication barrier in short, protected factional politics on the local level. However, the introduction of national arena resources changed these politics from being based on limited resources and hence potentially schismatic, to

politics in which new resources and new strategies could be employed and hence, politics where there was more manoeuvrability. The introduction of national arena competitions on the local level was thus both a constraint and a resource on the local factional process.

(iii) The Goals of the Competition.

Given a situation whereby the national arena was attempting to incorporate the local level and given the characteristics which were associated with this situation during the period under investigation, the goals or prizes of the competition took on unique traits.

Basically, incorporation attempts exhibited such variables as the national arena's policy aim of integration and direct control; the national arena's implementation attempts based on controlling the formal workings of the local government organs; and finally, the national arena's creation of middlemen who were given complete control of the communication and resource nexus between the two arenas, local and national. These characteristics determined the prizes and goals of the period and as well, made these prizes different from what they had ever been.

What in fact occurred as a result was that two types of goals emerged which became intimately related to each other.

First, there were those goals which were basically oriented to the politics of the national arena. Under this category were subsumed the following; Persons and faction leaders were attempting both to gain and retain control of the middleman role which the national arena had created via its policy decisions. The motives underlying this goal were twofold. They implied access to high political credibility and access to resources which the national arena was deploying for use in the local arena as part of the aim for control. In turn, control of the middleman role meant that both the resources and credit could be used in local level competition.

At the same time, however, control of the middleman role successfully would

also create the political credit needed for mobility in the national arena and for recognition in the larger political sphere. The payoffs here were basically obscure, but did involve access to economic resources for personal use, such as large land grants or well-paying government jobs.

In short, the goal oriented to the national arena, control of the middleman position, meant access to resources and political credibility for use in both local competition and national mobility.

Secondly, there were the goals oriented solely to the local arena, which by definition were also related to the national arena's incorporation policies. Here again we find the aim being control of the village electorate. But this prize had implications which were different than in previous periods. What this control now implied was the building of credibility to reinforce the retaining of the middleman role, or in other words, to create the legitimacy needed in order to compete and succeed in the national arena according to the definition of success put forth by this arena.

What was occurring then, was that the national arena and the local arena were intimately involved in a feedback situation in terms of the goals of competition. Success in one arena created credit, credibility and access to resources for use in the other. The successful local politician would be the successful national arena personage. In turn, the successful national arena incumbent would have the resources and credibility for success in the local competition.

Within this definition, however, it should be apparent that the prize of success in two arenas simultaneously was the prerogative of the faction leaders. The other personnel allied to them, particularly their cores, could expect payoffs in the form again, of land grants, government jobs, etc. From this perspective, followers were recruited by expectations as to which leader could produce the highest returns. In this vein, it will again be seen that the

transactional relationship is the most frequent basis for leaders' links with followers. This will be discussed in the next section.

For the moment, it is important to note the manner in which prizes were constructed; the relationship between the national and local arenas in the definition of prizes; and the exclusivisity once again being given as to who was eligible for the major prize, control of the middleman role; the potential for upward mobility; and associated with these, the potential for absolute control over the local arena.

With this basis, the issue becomes the nature of the internal structure of factions and the relationship of the goal definition to the structures of the period.

(iv) The Internal Structure of Factions.

The political elite, like in all periods after that of Familial Elitism, was a category in which membership was voluntary. An individual could choose to become involved or to stay away from the local political arena.

It was at the next categorical level that the leadership once again could make decisions as to the nature of the competitors. In other words, from the voluntary elite the leader chose his team. But here again there was a constraint on the leader, particularly in relation to the team which he was able to choose for council competition. The Suspension of Elections Bill, still in force since 1961, circumscribed totally any leadership decisions in council membership, and hence in team recruitment for what was one of the major political arenas in the village.

Deriving logically from this fact, is the conclusion that the council as it was constituted during the period was no longer representative of the factional alignments, recruitment patterns, and nature of core and support as it was in previous periods. In short, the use of village council material must be supplemented with other data on the nature of the internal structure of factions.

First, however, the council material can be used for initial analysis. From this perspective, the links utilized by faction leaders in their relations with council followers consisted of the following ties:

1. Friendship ties
2. Factional History: Self
3. Second Order Kinship
4. Religious ties
5. Political Party affiliation
6. Transaction
7. Schism.

Table 9.1 presents the relationships each leader had with his followers, or the recruitment criteria of council relationships.

Table 9.1: Recruitment Criteria of Council Teams.

	Criteria						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Premsingh's links with:							
Dagleish	*	*					
Chunilall Nagassar	*	*					
Jairam Mangar	*	*					
#!Hussein Amin		*				*	*
!Mahatma Deoroop		*				*	*
#Drepaul Bharat		*				*	*
#C. R. Taharally		*				*	*
Sultan's links with:							
Pritam Brijlall		*			*	*	
Isaac Jaikarran		*			*	*	
!G. R. Taharally		*			*	*	
!Drepaul Bharat		*			*	*	
#Mahatma Deoroop		*			*	*	*
!#Hussein Amin		*		*	*	*	*
Hassan Rasool		*	*	*	*		

Note: In the period under discussion, the content of a relationship may have altered over time. In such cases, all criteria which were relevant are noted.

! Indicates that the person, at some point, defected from the faction to the other.

Indicates that the person, at some point, defected to the faction from the other.

In cases of subversion, the person is included in both lists.

Several points derive from this table. First, the inbred nature of council membership becomes obviously apparent from the fact that every member is aligned partially because of Self Factional histories. Secondly, there is again Sultan's emphasis on political party membership which, with the exception of Bharat, was carried over into his subversion to the PNC. Thirdly, the number of transactional links exhibits an increase as compared with any other period of Bush Lot history. This too is true of the schismatic link which is also a product of the lack of elections and hence new councillors. Finally, the religious tie is not as prominent as should be the case simply because there was only one Muslim on council and this was not a result of his election. In short, the village population had not decided on the proportion of Muslims. Rasool had been appointed to replace Mohamed and hence, the religious ties which Sultan might have been able to activate particularly in his capacity as activist for the Muslim PNC wing, are not necessarily represented in the council membership.

With these observations, the next issue is how the recruitment criteria differed between the two factions.

Table 9.2 presents the criteria of leaders' relationships with followers in terms of the percentage each link characterized both the total links and total persons within the council factions.

Table 9.2: Criteria of Council Relationships.

Content Type	% of total links Premsingh	Sultan	% of total persons Premsingh	Sultan
1	16.7	0.0	42.8	0.0
2	38.9	28.0	100.0	100.0
3	0.0	4.0	0.0	14.3
4	0.0	8.0	0.0	28.6
5	0.0	28.0	0.0	100.0
6	22.2	24.0	57.1	85.7
7	22.2	8.0	57.1	28.6

From this, several points can be made. First, the linkages of friendship and political party membership, as in the last historical period, are the major axes of variation between the two factions. Secondly, unlike the previous period, there is no distinction between Self and Familial factional history since the latter link has become irrelevant as a product of the constant council membership. Instead, both factions predictably emphasize an individual's factional history although the schismatic nature of factional competition in terms of creating conflict between individuals is more exploited by Premsingh than by Sultan. As will be seen, however, this link proves to be tenuous and is broken in all subversion cases. Finally, there is similarity between the two factions in terms of their use of the transactional tie. In this case, 22.2% of Premsingh's total links and 24.0% of Sultan's total links are based on this tie. Again this is evidence of the effect which the lack of elections was having on council factions.

In short, beyond the central cores of friendship and political party used differentially by each faction leader, there is definitely a similarity in the recruitment criteria or, in the present period, in the links which leaders forged with council members. In fact, as time goes on, it can be predicted that the transactional and schismatic linkages will increase numerically.

In applying the weighting or intensity scale as it was derived from the previous period, there is the following: The friendship tie is weighted as 3;

Self factional history is 3; Second order kinship is 3; Political party is 3; Religious tie is 2; Schism is 2; and Transaction is 1. When applied, differences do emerge in the intensity of the two factions. The average intensity per person within the Premsingh faction is 6.0; within the Sultan faction, it is 8.4. As will be seen in Chapter 10, these intensity levels are higher than they have ever been. Again this is due to the fact that given the same personnel over a long period of time, the propensity for duplicate and multiplex links to be forged is high. The point again, however, is that intensity is a limited measure and may not be useful as a tool for predicting alignments in situations where the turnover of personnel is minimal. For given these intensity measures, one would predict that no subversions should take place.

However, when intensity is averaged out per linkage, the measure drops considerably. In this case, the average intensity for each link within the Premsingh faction is 2.3 and within the Sultan faction it is 2.4. In short, these latter measures are more of an index of the true intensity within the teams since they take into account the propensity for multiplex links to develop over time. At the same time, it should be noted that these latter intensity measures are in keeping with the intensity found during other historical periods. As such, the fact that subversions did in fact take place with regularity is hardly surprising.

Table 9.3 presents a summary of the subversions which took place during the period and the old links which were exchanged for new ones.

Table 9.3: The Content of Links in Subversion Cases.

Person	Subverted Links	New Links
Hussein Amin	-Self factional history -Transaction -Schism	-Self factional history -Transaction -Schism -Religion -Political Party
Mahatma Deoroop	-Self factional history -Transaction -Schism	-Self factional history -Transaction -Schism -Political Party
Drepaul Bharat	-Self factional history -Transaction -Political Party	-Self factional history -Transaction -Schism
C. R. Taharally	-Self factional history -Transaction -Political Party	-Self factional history -Transaction -Schism

The first point to be noted is that of the four persons subverted, two of these actually realigned themselves more than once. The content of their linkages, however, has been noted solely in terms of total quality rather than quantity.

Secondly, it is interesting to note that each faction leader subverted two persons and that the content of links subverted by Sultan in both cases was the Self Factional history/Transaction/Schism constellation. In turn the two persons who went over to the Premsingh faction formed precisely the same constellations with Premsingh.

Thirdly, of the persons who realigned themselves with Sultan, their content of links in the new faction involved also the same constellation but with the mere addition of one or two extra links. In the case of Deoroop, this extra

link was the political party tie. In the case of Amin, the religious as well as the political party tie was added. Insofar, however, as a major portion of the political party tie has been seen to consist of a transactional exchange, Deoroop's and Amin's subversions were basically founded on the transaction. In addition, the propensity of these persons to realign themselves several times, as the qualitative material has shown, would also seem to indicate this fact. Finally, in the case of Amin, even with the additional religious tie added to his new linkages, the situational material would appear to indicate that this was basically a rationalization for his subversions rather than a cause.

Finally, of the linkages Sultan lost to Premsingh as a result of subversions, both were again identical. Bharat's and Taharally's old linkages consisted of the Self factional history/Transaction/Political Party constellation and as pointed out, their new links with Premsingh were identical to those Premsingh lost via Amin and Deoroop.

There would appear to be major points to be derived from this discussion. The first is that the subversion cases were basically individual goal oriented moves based on a calculation of gain. The transactional element in short, appears to have been paramount.

Secondly, the similarity of content of the two factions is borne out by the nature of linkages exchanged. In all cases, equivalent exchanges appear to have been made.

What is occurring then in the subversion cases is that the inbred nature of the council is once again coming into play. The lack of elections served as a constraint on the nature of the content of links within the factions, but also to be noted is that it served as a resource for those individuals on the council wishing to maximize their position without fear of recrimination from the electorate.

In weighting the linkages exchanged, the same situation would appear to

occur. Both Bharat's and Taharally's linkages were exchanged for linkages of lesser intensity although the addition of linkages in the Amin and Deoroop cases results in weighting which indicates logical exchange. As has been seen, however, these new linkages were more apparent than real, and the general argument would appear to hold.

A final point to be noted and related to the conclusion as to the role which the transactional element appears to have been playing during the period, is the fact that all alignments, whether new or old, had the transaction as one of the links. In comparison with previous periods wherein the transaction was differentially in evidence, it would appear that the transaction takes pre-eminence during the present period. As such, the intensity scale as a predictive tool would appear, as in the previous period, to be of limited value.

To summarize: What is apparent in the council factional alignments during the period under discussion is the fact that both factions exhibited similarity in content and that the transactional element takes precedence in council constitution. This is related to the absence of elections during the period which also has the effect of limiting the usefulness of the council data for a discussion of the structure of factions.

In the light of the latter point, it is quite obvious that additional data and analysis are required in order to understand the nature of factional structures and social alignments during the present period. What is also apparent is that more extensive social alignments will constitute the actual support which factions had, and as such, these refer mainly to the notion of elite-mass structure. Given this fact, the use of additional data on social alignments in the village in general, although supplementing the inadequacies of the council material, will have the effect, as will be seen, of obscuring the issue of core and support structure during this period. This, however, would also have been obscured by the stability of council membership. Therefore, an investigation can be made

of the more general social alignments as being actual factional support while at the same time there is a recognition of the limitations on the use of such data for other purposes.

Given these general points, a random sample of village households was taken and associated with factional alignment, income category and religious affiliation. The results are presented in Tables 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6. The category of Sultan-Premsingh connotes persons who were stated by informants as turning either way depending on which faction appeared to be gaining the upper hand at any given time.

Table 9.4: Religious Affiliation by Factional Alignment.

Factional Alignment	Religious Affiliation: Sanatan	Aryan	Muslim	Christian
Sultan	30.4%	7.5	41.9	28.2
Premsingh	27.7	32.5	18.6	35.9
Sultan-Premsingh	29.4	32.5	27.9	17.9
Neutral	12.5	27.5	11.6	17.9

Table 9.5: Factional Alignment by Religious Affiliation.

Religious Affiliation	Factional Alignment: Sultan	Premsingh	Sultan-Premsingh	Neutral
Sanatan	50.7%	46.9	50.7	36.8
Aryan	4.5	19.8	20.0	28.9
Muslim	26.9	12.1	18.5	13.4
Christian	16.4	21.2	10.8	18.4

Table 9.6: Income Distribution and Factional Alignments.

Income Group	Factional Alignment: Sultan	Premsingh	Sultan-Premsingh	Neutral
$ 0 - 1500	28.3%	42.4	41.5	42.3
$1501 - 3000	35.8	37.8	44.6	42.1
$3001 - 6000	25.2	13.7	10.8	7.8
$6001 +	10.4	6.1	3.1	5.2

From these, it would appear that factional alignment was definitely associated with income and religion. Although these results are not surprising, they do indicate several important trends in village organization.

First, the PNC was definitely being successful in subverting the Muslim portion of the Indian population. The policy aims of incorporation were working.

Secondly, it is interesting to note that despite Petamber Singh's pre-eminence in the Sanatan community, the Premsingh faction, with which Singh was so intimately aligned, does not in fact exhibit the massive support that would be predictable. Somewhat the same situation holds true for Premsingh's role in the Christian community which was more supportive of the Premsingh faction than were the Sanatans.

This latter fact can be related to two mitigating factors. First, Singh was a supporter of the Maha Sabha group during the fission which occurred between it and the Gandhi Youth organization. This split probably contributed to Sultan's strong support among the Sanatans. This is further borne out by the large Aryan support that Premsingh commanded as compared with Sultan. This group, uninvolved in the Sanatan split, turned logically, as Hindus, to the Premsingh-Singh faction.

In this vein, the Christian support which Premsingh could have expected as a Christian minister was quite obviously undercut by the factional history of the village. In other words, the large majority of Christians were part of the extended Maraj-Panchar-Loknauth-Bhagwandin family who had their alignments pre-determined. This family was the traditional Christian group within the

village and as such, Premsingh's ability to gain support on religious grounds was thus delimited.

In short, then, in terms of religious affiliation and factional alignment, the village appears to fall logically along axes of variation, particularly when religious affiliation is coupled with the fact of competition in other arenas and the historical dimensions of factionalism in the village.

In terms of Table 9.5, it becomes quite apparent that in political-factional commitment, the village is split along economic class lines. The Sultan faction supporters are definitely in a higher income group than are those of the Premsingh faction.

This is in keeping with the PNC patronage and the realization by the wealthier village families that support in this direction is where the higher returns lie. In turn, such families are of more interest to the PNC and the party appears to be putting more effort into their subversion than with the lower income cases. The PNC incorporation policy in short, exploited the economic differentiation within the village and by virtue of its payoffs, should contribute further to this differentiation.

Finally, what has occurred is that the village population, by being drawn into the massive PNC subversion attempts, has in its way contributed to the demise of the core and following of factions being solely concentrated on council recruitment. The cores of each faction leader are rather, to be found among the population at large. For example, Sultan's major support comes from several unsubvertible families whose participation has been noted throughout this chapter. Premsingh in turn has a council core consisting of Nagassar and Mangar, but outside there is the Singh family and several other lower income families who retain their strong Premsingh affiliation and who can be counted on for support in cases where issues arise.

In this light, it is impossible to quantitatively measure the nature of

these cores. In fact, it is possible to state that in the light of the election suspension, their existence has been irrelevant for council competition as organized by the factional game and therefore, impossible to isolate systematically.

To summarize: The introduction of party politics into Bush Lot provided new resources for the factional competition, and in doing so, they constrained the trend, visible in the previous chapter, toward schismatic factionalism. This latter aspect was a product of the manner in which the new resources were introduced. Basically they were siphoned through the middleman roles which the national arena created to control the local level process of subversion to the party. This policy had the effect of first, allowing new resources to enter the local arena. Secondly, it protected these arenas, organized until that time by factional politics, by controlling the manner in which both the party and the resources entered the village. In short, incorporation kept intact the factional game.

However, certain major changes did result. First, the goals of the competition altered to incorporate the new political reality. Faction leaders still vied for control of the village electorate but there were new motives underlying. These were related to the fact that successful control gave legitimacy to the faction leader's middleman role. In turn, the middleman role gave political credit for use in local arenas. In short, prizes were now defined with reference to two major arenas, the local and the national.

In turn, these facts altered the nature of the internal structure of factions as did the Suspension of Elections Bill, passed in 1961, which created an inbred village council over which faction leaders had little recruitment control but rather, had to base strategy on subversion attempts. In this light, the structure of factions as they were constituted on the village council was found to be of limited utility.

Despite this, an analysis was made of council membership and factional structures. It was found that differences between the two factions still centred on different links with a central core. One faction still emphasized friendship ties, the other, political party. Beyond this, however, there was a basic similarity in linkages used, mainly an emphasis by both on Self factional history, Schism and Transaction. This was in keeping with the absence of elections and new members thereby resulting as well in regular subversion situations. These in turn emphasized the transactional content of links and again, both factions were found to be similar in content.

Reference was then made to the nature of factional recruitment among the general village population. Here it was found that the population was recruited according to religious and income variables, but that intervening factors were the factional histories of family groups in the village and the competitions in other arenas which created new categories of supporters whose allegiances could only be determined in the light of these additional schisms.

Given these findings, the obscurity of factional "cores" as defined in Chapter 1 made it impossible to attempt to apply the typology to the present material except in a qualitative and general manner. The absence of action-sets precludes such micro-analysis.

(v) The Nature of Interfaction Competition.

It has been noted that party politics served as a constraint on the factional competition by the introduction of new or outside resources. At this point the potential for a "fight" theoretically increased (Bailey, 1969). This, however, was prevented by the nature of the middleman role which protected the local arena and its factional game from too much input and hence unpredictable strategizing. The new resources in short, became part of the local idiom of factionalism and the factional game was protected by the manner in which both the resources

and the policy of incorporation were implemented. In this light, the issues which emerge are the rules governing how the competition should take place and the control mechanisms which emerged to prevent breakdown within this framework.

In keeping with the notion of the introduction of party politics as having ended the closed nature of the factional game in the previous period, the first point to be noted is the fact of the opening up of wider arenas of competition. The viewpoints and goals of factional leaders extended outside the village and the factional game came to include wider entities, "outside" entities, and higher level entities. This was the case with the West Berbice Union of Local Authorities meeting and the attempts of both Premsingh and Sultan to gain wider support as a product of the goal to maintain the middleman role created by the PNC.

At the same time, the PNC policy of incorporation forced fissions in older and stable arenas. The competition between Sultan and Amin, partially a product of the fact that the PNC recognized both as legitimate middlemen, forced this competition over who was more legitimate into both the race club and religious arenas. These two competitions can easily beseen as an attempt to retain control over these secondary arenas in order to make themselves more indispensable to the policy aims of the PNC. In terms of the strategizing in the mosque, the encounter was a direct one. In the race club arena, the strategies of the two PNC middlemen differed such that no encounter or confrontation was possible. Sultan withdrew from the race club, not seeing it as an essential arena and considering it more important to glean the support of all the elite in the light of the competition between the two clubs and the fact that the other club was headed by potentially subvertible and powerful support. Amin on the other hand, chose to attempt to retain control of one of the clubs and precipitated an encounter within it from the ranks of his own kin. Since Sultan had already withdrawn, however, this competition within the club did not materially affect Amin's

standing with the party since the issue became reduced to a family affair.

The point, however, is that the fissioning of these two arenas can be seen as a result of the incorporation attempts which in turn, by opening new arenas either by expansion or fissioning, provided new resources for competition and thereby provided a constraint on the schismatic tendencies.

The same point holds true for the Sanatan split. The political competition in the national arena in which the two associations were obviously involved, was also a product of the issue of Indian commitment to the PNC. This national level competition then, by filtering into the village, again created the fissioning process which had the same effects as the race club and mosque fission.

In short, resources had to be deployed for the new competitions and the majority of these resources were those provided by the incorporation situation. Had new arenas not opened up, the first effect would have been a high disproportion of resources available to the Sultan faction for traditional arenas which might have enabled them to demolish the Premsingh faction. Secondly, the fissioning of other arenas created new divisions within the village not all of which were sympathetic to the traditional categories of support which the faction leaders had utilized. For example, Sultan could now call on Sanatan support which should have gone to Premsingh; the split in the Muslim mosque also created more neutrals and oscillators than would otherwise have been the case and hence, cut into Sultan's support; finally for example, the PNC exploitation of the stratification divisions in the village gave numerical support to the Premsingh faction although the income level of this group was lower than Sultan's.

By creating wider arenas and being a catalyst for the fissioning of arenas, the incorporation situation enabled new strategies, new resources, and new categories of support to emerge. In doing this, one of the major effects was that the schismatic tendencies of the old arenas were truncated.

At the same time, however, it has been noted in the situational description

that council competition continued to retain the characteristics which had been typical for decades. In this case, the suspension of elections was partially responsible. However, what in fact occurred was that the implementation of the incorporation policy isolated this traditional arena from the potential effects of the new categories of support, new strategies and new resources available such that, in the light of constant membership, the typical pattern of cyclical confrontations could be kept intact. The increased incidence of subversion was coupled with the fact that the new resources which the PNC could provide to councillors were insufficient to allow for the total subversion of the council since these were countered by the fissioning of arenas which in turn put certain councillors into new categories and made their support for Premsingh unshakable. For example, both Mangar and Nagassar as well as Singh were Maha Sabha supporters. The support the PNC gave to the Gandhi Youth organization only reinforced the Premsingh council membership. In addition, the situation with Taharally elucidates how party patronage could backfire. Those who felt that they weren't being aptly rewarded, merely turned to the other faction. Through these mechanisms then, the factional competition on the council was protected.

Now what in fact these constitute are the control mechanisms of the factional game. Insofar as the incorporation situation ended the schismatic trend, the old game was maintained intact. Insofar as the new resources which were introduced were differentially allocated thereby creating new categories of personnel, the Premsingh faction would always have a base of support intact. Insofar as new arenas were created, either by fission or expansion, all new resources had to be widely and therefore diffusely spread. Concerted action in traditional arenas which could have resulted in the fight was prevented by this need to deploy resources more widely than previously. Further, insofar as the new strategizing which became possible was countered by new support bases in addition to being predictable, the factional game could also continue.

In this vein, an interesting point to note is the decline of the formal hierarchy of government being utilized as the most efficacious means of getting things done. This tendency was apparent in the previous period, but only came to the fore in the present one. To get things done, one went to Sultan or Amin, not the District Commissioner, and the former would in turn climb the party hierarchy. But insofar as the formal hierarchy still provided broad parameters for action, as in council competition situations whereby personnel complained and referred to the District Commissioner and Local Government Board, these levels or entities and the Ordinances protecting their existence as well as their prerogatives, thus served as control mechanisms on the party becoming all pervasive and in the Bush Lot case, thereby prevented the provision of the Sultan faction with unlimited and exclusive access to outside resources.

Finally, the game was ultimately protected by the policy of the PNC. They emphasized activists on the local level who in turn were involved with local politics. They insisted that these activist-middlemen be successful in their local roles. And one of the major roles which these middlemen had was that of faction leader or factional core membership. Their success in short, was gauged on the extent to which they were successful in their factional game. Until the party found the resources to circumvent this game, which was done eventually and discussed in the Postscript, their policy emphasized the factional role of their middlemen, and in fact, the resources which they allocated to their middlemen were for use in the factional game. Insofar then as the government or PNC strategically recognized the factional game as a means of subverting support for the party on the local level, and insofar as they provided resources for this game, the most potent control mechanism was in operation.

However, since the other control mechanisms also discussed were in operation as well, it must be noted that the factional game was not merely being controlled by the PNC as puppeteers. There were still aspects, as discussed above, over

which they had no control and these in turn prevented the game from becoming a mere playing out of national level directives.

The point, however, is that when all the mechanisms are discussed in total, the factional game on the local level could continue as a game of oscillating encounters indefinitely. The trend toward schism was ended at the same time that a traditional factional game was reinforced. The incorporation attempt, with its associated characteristics, accomplished both.

Notes: Chapter 9.

1. This description has been abstracted from L. Depres, 1967, Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana. For a more detailed description, the reader is referred to this source.

2. Interview with Petamber Singh, November 1969 and P. T. Premsingh, March 1970.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, March 1970.

8. Ibid.

9. Judgement presented by Francis Veira, Judge, June 28, 1967, in the case of Singh vs. Sultan.

10. Interview with Ameerally, November 1969.

11. Ibid.

12. Interview with Dagleish, October 1969; Petamber Singh, November 1969; and P. T. Premsingh, March 1970.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

    Interview with G. R. Taharally, December 1969.

16. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, May 1969.

17. Interview with Amin Mohamed, January 1970.

18. Interview with P. T. Premsingh, March 1970.

19. Interview with Ameerally, November 1969.

20. Letter from Hassan Rasool to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, June 26, 1967.

21. Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, December 29, 1967.

22. Minutes of the Bush Lot Village District, February 26, 1968.

23. Letter from Hassan Rasool to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, February 19, 1968.

    Letter from the Commissioner of Local Government to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, May 23, 1968.

24. Letter from Ebrahim Sultan to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, August 26, 1968.

    Motion of the Bush Lot Village Council, August 17, 1968.

25. Motion of the Bush Lot Village Council, August 26, 1968.

26. Letter from the Commissioner of Local Government to the District Commissioner, November 4, 1968.

27. Letter from Hassan Rasool and Isaac Jaikarran to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, November 4, 1968.

28. Letter from the Commissioner of Local Government to the District Commissioner, January 25, 1969.

29. Interview with Amin Mohamed, December 1969 and Gopie Deoroop, December 1969.

30. Letter from Mahatma Deoroop, Chairman, Bush Lot Village, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, December 19, 1967.

31. Interview with Petamber Singh, November 1969; Joseph Bhagwandin, February 1970; and P. T. Premsingh, March 1970.

32. Ibid.

33. Interview with Amin Mohamed, January 1971.

34. Ibid.

35. Interview with Ameerally, November 1969.

SECTION III: Conclusions: A Comparative Analysis of Resource Change, Factions and Factionalism

Chapter 10: A Comparative Analysis: Conclusions.

(a) Introduction.

(i) The Problems and Their Implications.

In Chapter 1 of the dissertation the problems to be investigated and the underlying theoretical framework were outlined.

Briefly, it was initially noted that "the external influences are inadequately described" (Siegel and Beals, 1966) in relation to the phenomenon of factionalism. In addition, the nature of the apparent empirical durability and temporal perpetuation of factions have also received little attention. With this basis, Nicholas' definition of factional structures was accepted together with his notion of factionalism as a "mode of organizing political relations" (1965: 22).

The problem still remained in the literature however, as to the degree of solidarity a faction must achieve or not achieve before it becomes an expression of public opinion or party politics respectively. It was thus decided that the final three attributes suggested by Nicholas, non-corporateness and recruitment by leaders on the basis of diverse principles, should be further specified thereby elucidating the internal structure of factions and shedding light on the issue of solidarity.

In this vein, a typology of possible internal variations in factional structures was set up on the basis of the literature and postulated as a hypothesis for investigation.

Given this basis, the first major problem delineated for investigation was to specify variations which can occur in the internal structure of factions, and associated with this, the need to specify what Siegel and Beals referred to

as the "external influences" associated with this variation. The problem thus needed either historical or comparative research. This would describe variation and show how it is associated with particular "influences," defined as "the environment which provides resources and constraints" (Bailey, 1969).

The second major problem for investigation was derived as a logical converse of the above. Given the assumption that the internal structures of factions can vary in association with resource change, it was suggested that the nature of interfactional competition will also vary in association with both factors.

Therefore, the major problems delineated for investigation and the implications of studying these problems in terms of generating additional emphases are as follows:

1. The nature of the internal variation of factions in the light of the typology and the issue of solidarity;

2. The nature of external or environmental influences which allow for and/or constrain variations in structures;

3. The nature of variation which occurs in interfactional competition or factional games;

4. The nature of external or environmental influences which allow for and/or constrain variations in factional games;

5. The relationship between different factional structures and different factional games; and

6. How factional structures and factional games change their structure in terms of environmental effects and effects on each other, or how structures and games evolve into others.

(ii) The Method of Analysis.

To permit comparative study of factions and factionalism, an historical division was used. Village history was divided into "stages," each characterized by a particular political process. It was hypothesized that each stage represented a distinct factional game and that these games could each be viewed in isolation and then compared with each other.

With these two approaches, it thus becomes possible to compare the factional structures and games of each period as the basic comparative method while at the same time, attempting to see the dynamics between periods. In other words, to see how both games and structures evolved over time.

This concluding chapter deals in turn with each of the seven problems listed and thus attempts to tie together the analyses of the individual chapters through the use of a comparative framework and through an attempt to show the dynamic between periods which in turn is related to changes in resource structure.

(iii) The Nature of the Environment.

Resource structure has been defined as the differential access to resources of different groupings within the village. For purposes of linking resource structure with both factions and factionalism, the following dimensions have been typed.

First, the nature of elitism within the village has been labelled according to whether it was familial based or class based with the assumption that the former constitutes a more or less "closed" system of stratification, the latter an "open" system.

Secondly, the economic structure of the village has been typed according to two factors - whether the general patterning of economic processes was cyclical as opposed to expanding and whether there were limitations as opposed to diversity of choices possible in economic activities. The former are viewed as constituting a "closed" system, the latter an "open" one.

The final dimension refers to the nature of choices in the political sphere. The issue here is whether choice as to political affiliation was delimited by other constraints as opposed to being "open."

Table 10.1 presents these dimensions on an "open-closed" basis and shows, for each dimension, the stages of Bush Lot history which are relevant. As will be seen, the varying patterns resulting are related to both variations in

factional structures and factional games.

Table 10.1: Dimensions of Village Resource Structure.

	Closed	Open
Nature of Elite:	Familial Elitism Displacement Peace	
		Class Elitism Incorporation
Economic Process:		
(1) Choice:	Familial Elitism	
		Displacement Peace
	Class Elitism Incorporation	
(2) Pattern:	Familial Elitism	
		Displacement Peace
	Class Elitism Incorporation	
Political Resources:	Familial Elitism	
		Displacement Peace Class Elitism
	Incorporation	

(b) Intrafactional Variation.

The first dimension in terms of which the different types of factions can be compared, is that of the relationship between leaders and followers, or, more precisely, between political community, political elite and political team. This comparison is shown in Table 10.2.

Table 10.2: Variations in Competitive Eligibility.

Period:	Eligibility for the:		
	Political Community	Political Elite	Political Team
Familial Elitism:	Local Government Ordinances; The Village population.	Those with pre-existing economic ties with the leaders.	Volunteers from the elite and leaders' choices.
Displacement:	The Village population.	Pre-existing ties with old and new leaders.	Volunteers from the elite and leaders' choices.
Class Elitism:	The Village population	Volunteers and political party membership	Volunteers from the elite and leaders' choices.
Incorporation:	The Village population.	Volunteers and political party membership	Volunteers; Circum-scription of leadership choices.

The major point to be noted is that eligibility for some categories varies from one period to the next. In turn, the variation or lack of it in specific cases can be seen as a product of the resources and constraints on recruitment due to the resource structure.

The political community, throughout Bush Lot history has been the village population. This is associated with the fact that in all periods, the goals of competition have been to control human resources either for political or economic ends. And given the legal and geographic definition of the village and village council, the major arena of competition, this definition of political community is to be expected.

In the category of the political elite, however, differences are most obvious. According to the dimensions on Table 10.1, the period of Familial

Elitism was a totally closed system economically and politically with a small familial based elite. Logically then, recruitment to the political elite was based on multiplex economic relationships with this elite which pre-existed political competition. In turn, when the nature of the economic and political resources of the village altered, although the familial elite remained constant, recruitment to the political community involved an associated expansion of eligible personnel in terms of the ties needed with the village elite although the existence of pre-existing ties remained intact. Such was the period of Displacement.

The period of Peace has the same resource structure according to Table 10.1 and theoretically, had the factional game been in operation, the same criteria for eligibility would have been in operation. As has been seen, however, the nature of the economic processes, a logical extension of the end of closure and subsequent expansion during the previous period, precluded factional alignments. And it was a product of this period of expansion that altered the resource structure of the village, thereby creating the period of Class Elitism.

In this latter period, there is the first incidence of voluntary membership in the political elite which in turn, for the first time, constrained leadership choices for this category. At the same time, Table 10.1 indicates a village elite which was class based and political resources in which choice was possible. As such, volunteers and political party members were eligible for political elitism, although the village economic processes had reverted again to a system of closure.

The last period, Incorporation, had the same criteria for political elite eligibility. However, the constitution of political teams involved almost a total circumscription of leadership choices. Again, what has occurred is that the economic and elite structure has remained constant, but the nature of political resources had altered as a result of the suspension of elections and

this is reflected in political team composition.

Table 10.3 presents a summary of the eligibility criteria and resource structure.

Table 10.3: Eligibility and Resource Structure.

Resource Structure	Eligibility	Period
Closed Elite Closed economy Closed polity	Pre-existing economic ties	Familial Elitism
Closed Elite Open Economy Open Polity	Elaboration of pre-existing ties	Displacement
Open Elite Closed Economy Open Polity	Volunteers and political affiliation	Class Elitism
Open Elite Closed Economy Closed Polity	Volunteer; limited leadership choices	Incorporation

From this, several generalizations can be made. Where the system is based on a closed resource structure, familial based factions will totally define the nature of eligibility. When the system opens but the elite persists, pre-existing ties will also persist but will have to be more widely defined. When elitism becomes more diffuse, volunteers for more exclusive categories must be accommodated and the extent of leadership choices will be constrained according to the nature of the economic processes and political resources.

Now in addition to factional variation being viewed from the criteria governing eligibility for recruitment, there are also available indices of structural features, discussed in each chapter, which allow for the further comparison of factional types as a product of recruitment policies. As will be shown in the following pages, it is suggested that the following criteria are of relevance: The content of recruitment links; the frequency distributions

of differing contents; the intensity of the content characterizing different factional structures; the durability of content; the relative presence or absence of multiplex links or the degree of multiplexity which characterize leader-follower ties within a faction; and the extent to which symmetrical and asymmetrical linkages are differentially utilized. All these can be considered axes along which factional structures can be compared and the degree of solidarity analyzed.

Tables 10.4 through 10.11 summarize these structural features as exhibited during the major historical periods.

Table 10.4: Recruitment Criteria Utilized.

Content	Period:			
	Familial Elitism	Displace-ment	Class Elitism	Incorpora-tion
Patron-client - familial:		*		
First Order Kin:	*	*		
Patron-client - Self:	*			
Symmetrical Economic exchange:	*			
Second Order Kin:	*		*	*
Friendship:	*	*	*	*
Schisms:	*	*	*	*
Transaction:	*	*	*	*
Factional history - Self:			*	*
Religious Affiliation:			*	*
Political Party			*	*
Factional history - Familial:			*	

The first point to be noted is that, as Nicholas (1965) has suggested, recruitment ties are very diverse. Secondly, however, it should be noted that not only do actual ties vary between factions, as discussed for each period, but also, the ties utilized change over time. Again this can be associated with changing resources and constraints, but also, variations in recruitment criteria indicate differences between historical stages.

Table 10.5 further illustrates these points by presenting the frequencies of ties for each period and faction.

From these, the effects of the resource structure can be seen. First, Patron-client (self) ties are solely a product of a totally closed resource structure which allowed for the proliferation of these ties and hence their utilization for factional recruitment. The familial patron-client tie is a temporal survival of the original patron-client relationship and indicates the progressive elimination of this tie once economic and political choices become available. Similarly, the first order kinship tie could only be utilized when the elite was familial based. When an open class system developed, cognizance had to be taken of political volunteers who were not kin and of other ties which had to be utilized in their stead. A similar situation holds for the symmetrical economic exchange tie in that the progressive opening of the economic sphere to both individual economic endeavour and a class based elite made obsolete the relevance of this tie for factional recruitment.

Similarly, the second order kinship tie, although remaining throughout village history, tends to decrease in importance over time again as a product of the availability of economic and political choices, increasing individualism, a class based elite and volunteers for factional competition.

Friendship ties as well tend to decrease in importance over time and are an index of this more general trend toward less intense and more "secular" relationships. Thus as kinship, friendship, and economic ties decrease in

Table 10.5: Recruitment Criteria Utilized: Frequency.

A) Total Persons %:

Content:	Period: Familial Elitism		Displacement		Class Elitism		Incorporation	
	Ramprashad	Panchar	Ramprashad	Panchar	Premsingh	Maraj	Premsingh	Sultan
Patron-Client -familial			16.6%	16.6%				
First Order Kin	9.5%	4.2%	16.6	16.6				
Patron-Client -Self	42.8	41.7						
Symmetrical Economic Exchange	19.0	16.7						
Second Order Kinship	0.0	37.5			0.0%	11.1%	0.0%	14.3%
Friendship	42.8	4.2	50.0	50.0	41.7	0.0	42.8	0.0
Schisms	14.3	8.3	16.6	16.6	16.7	5.6	57.1	28.6
Transaction	4.8	12.5	16.6	16.6	33.3	27.8	57.1	85.7
Self-factional history					33.3	5.6	100.0	100.0
Religious Affiliation					0.0	6.3	0.0	28.6
Political Party					0.0	77.8	0.0	100.0
Familial-factional history					25.0	38.9		

Table 10.5 continued:

B) % of total links:

Content:	Period							
	Familial Elitism		Displacement		Class Elitism		Incorporation	
	Ramprashad	Panchar	Ramprashad	Panchar	Premsingh	Maraj	Premsingh	Sultan
Patron-Client -familial			14.3%	14.3%				
First Order Kin	7.1%	3.3%	14.3	14.3				
Patron-Client -Self	32.1	33.3						
Symmetrical Economic Exchange	14.3	13.3						
Second Order Kinship	0.0	30.0			0.0%	6.3%	0.0%	4.0%
Friendship	32.1	3.3	42.9	42.9	27.8	0.0	16.7	0.0
Schisms	10.7	6.6	14.3	14.3	11.1	3.1	22.2	8.0
Transaction	3.6	10.0	14.3	14.3	22.2	15.6	22.2	24.0
Self-factional history					22.2	3.1	38.9	28.0
Religious Affiliation					0.0	6.3	0.0	8.0
Political Party					0.0	43.7	0.0	28.0
Familial-factional history					16.7	21.9		

frequency over time, there is a corresponding increase in transactional ties, schismatic ties, factional histories, and national political affiliations. In turn, the resource structure has tended toward class elitism, open political choice, and open economic choices which, although later closing, provided the impetus for class differentiation and the continuing potential for elite expansion.

In short, the general trend of recruitment ties has parallelled the opening of the resource structure to both economic and political choice as well as the changing class structure of the village.

A third major axis for comparison of the internal structure of factional teams, is based on the assumption that the linkages between leaders and followers will vary in their intensity. Table 10.6 presents these variations as they have occurred throughout the different periods of Bush Lot history.

Table 10.6: Recruitment Criteria Utilized: Intensity.

Period	Faction	Intensity of leaders' links:	
		Per linkage	Per person
Familial Elitism	Ramprashad	2.6	3.4
	Panchar	2.4	3.0
Displacement	Ramprashad	2.4	2.8
	Panchar	2.4	2.8
Class Elitism	Premsingh	2.3	3.5
	Maraj	2.4	4.2
Incorporation	Premsingh	2.3	6.0
	Sultan	2.4	8.4

What has occurred is that factions have varied in intensity of linkages between leader and follower from 2.8 to 8.4. In all cases, however, neither "public opinion" nor "parties" (Boissevain, 1964) were being dealt with. The high intensity of links per person during the latter two periods were a product

of the suspension of council elections thereby resulting in seemingly stable factional groupings. The existence of subversions, however, and the similarity of the measure of linkage intensity with other periods, definitely indicates that despite the absence of elections, "parties" had not formed.

The conclusion then, is that linkages and leader-follower ties can and do vary in intensity. Theoretically, the lower limit is 1.0 in that factions may be totally based on transactional relationships which have been weighted as 1. It is suggested that for future studies, intensities of 1.0 be accepted as the lower limits nearest "public opinion" while the upper limits be placed at approximately 4.0 intensity per linkage and at 8.5 intensity per person in order to serve as indices along which intensity within factions may vary without solidification into "parties."

At this point, however, it is important to note the methodological problems associated with the intensity measure as discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. It would appear that intensity allows for comparative analysis. However, as an index to predict alignments, the intensity measure does not hold in situations in which low intensity linkages become the most crucial type, such as a high importance placed on transaction, and in situations in which external factors create "false" intensity by constraining recruitment to the point whereby leadership makes few decisions about new personnel and must constantly subvert and re-recruit old followers by the continuous addition of new ties to the original links. This was the case in the last period, Incorporation, and accounts for the high intensity per person found during that period.

It was suggested that perhaps an index of durability be obtained which could predict alignments without assuming intensity and which could, at the same time, take into account extraneous features which affect intensity. The point, however, is that in utilizing an intensity measure, it should be kept conceptually distinct from that implied by durability. The former allows for

comparative analysis, the latter implies prediction.

A fourth major axis along which the factional structures and teams can be compared is based on the frequency and intensity of multiplex links within factions. A summary of the findings is presented in Table 10.7.

Table 10.7: Recruitment Criteria Utilized: Multiplex Links.

Period	Faction	Multiplexity of leaders' links: Per linkage	Per Person	Intensity of leaders' multiplex links: Total	Mean per Person
Familial Elitism	Ramprashad	21.4%	35.0%	36	6.0
	Panchar	23.3	34.2	34	4.9
Displacement	Ramprashad	14.3	16.6	3	3.0
	Panchar	14.3	16.6	3	3.0
Class Elitism	Premsingh	27.7	41.6	26	5.2
	Maraj	31.3	55.6	53	5.9
Incorporation	Premsingh	38.9	100.0	42	6.0
	Sultan	28.0	100.0	59	8.4

It should be noted that the existence of multiplex linkages is not solely related to the recruitment aspect of leader-follower relationships. In fact, multiplexity will develop over time as the leader-follower relationship persists and new criteria are added as a product of changes in resources and the strategy of leaders keeping intact their teams by adding new content to old linkages.

This fact is borne out by the increasing frequency of multiplex links within the factions over time coupled with an increasing intensity of these links. Further, however, the adding of new criteria to linkages is also a product of resource change. Table 10.8 collates the structural criteria of Table 10.1 with the ranking of extent of multiplexity as found in Table 10.7.

Table 10.8: Resource Structure and Multiplexity.

Resource Structure	Multiplexity Rank (high = 4; Low = 1)	Period
Closed Elite Closed Economy Closed polity	2	Familial Elitism
Closed Elite Open Economy Open Polity	1	Displacement
Open Elite Closed Economy Open Polity	3	Class Elitism
Open Elite Closed Economy Closed Polity	4	Incorporation

What is apparent is that first, a class based elite results in greater multiplexity of ties. Secondly, an open economy appears to result in less multiplexity. Finally, the nature of the polity appears random in that the high multiplexity in the last period was a product of the suspension of elections while the other periods do not exhibit consistent variation.

In the light of the former two points, however, the implication is that a closed economy coupled with a class based elite tends to result in an increased amount of multiplex linkages. In the light of the issue of team maintenance resulting in multiplexity, these findings are not surprising. For in a totally closed system, multiplexity is not a necessary strategy since persons are already tied to faction leaders. A similar situation occurs with any closed elite group despite economic and political choices. Every person's competitive position is pre-defined by his relation to the elite. However, with a class elite, multiplexity in the absence of pre-existing ties is a strategy which can be used to ensure support over time, particularly in situations with limited economic choice and hence the possibility of continuous

subversion of followers maximizing their economic opportunities.

Multiplexity then, is a logical result of persisting factional ties as a response to the historical dimensions of factionalism; a response to the resource structure which in certain cases makes multiplex teams more adaptable; and finally, in the Bush Lot context, it is a response to polarization in the interfactional sphere which began in the 1950's and the external constraint on new recruitment as a result of the suspension of elections, both of which led to the adding of new ties to old linkages.

In general, however, the notion of multiplex linkages within factions can be said to be one method in which the internal organization of factions can and do vary. And a more general method of dealing with this characteristic is to look at the frequency of leader-follower relations within given factions, or in other words to look at the average number of ties characterizing each leader-follower relationship. Table 10.9 presents this material.

Table 10.9: Frequency of Leader-Follower Linkages.

Period	Faction:	Average number of links each leader had with followers:	
		Total	Average
Familial Elitism	Ramprashad	28	1.3
	Panchar	31	1.3
Displacement	Ramprashad	7	1.2
	Panchar	7	1.2
Class Elitism	Premsingh	18	1.5
	Maraj	32	1.8
Incorporation	Premsingh	18	2.6
	Sultan	25	3.6

A final criteria related to recruitment policies which affect the internal structure of factions is the nature of symmetrical and asymmetrical ties which can be found within factional teams. Table 10.10 presents this distribution.

Table 10.10: Recruitment Criteria: Symmetry and Asymmetry

Period	Faction	% Symmetrical	% Asymmetrical
Familial Elitism	Ramprashad	60.0%	40.0%
	Panchar	58.6	41.4
Displacement	Ramprashad	85.7	14.3
	Panchar	85.7	14.3
Class Elitism	Premsingh	100.0	0.0
	Maraj	100.0	0.0

Again it can be found that resource structure affects the internal organization of factions. Obviously there is a decreasing emphasis on asymmetrical linkages over time. In the light of the elimination of the patron-client tie during and after the period of Displacement and in the light of the opening of the economic and political systems within the village to wider participation and the extension of the elite itself into a broad based class, it is apparent that the use of asymmetrical ties was progressively constrained by the elimination of pre-existing relationships which could be utilized for recruitment as well as the absence of asymmetrical ties which no longer existed to any degree after the opening of economic and political choices.

Now it has been implied, particularly in the discussion of multiplexity and the strategies associated with its use in factional recruitment, that aside from a leader's task of recruitment, there is also, as Bailey (1969) notes, the major task of team maintenance. The analyses of the intensity of ties, multiplexity of ties, and symmetry of ties is related to this issue on the grounds that the extent to which these characterize the internal organization of factions will affect the costs of team maintenance. For example, as noted in Chapter 5, symmetrical linkages are more costly to maintain. Their presence

therefore must somehow be related to their greater adaptability in a particular political arena or to constraints which prevent the utilization of less costly links. This was the implication of the discussion above. And from this perspective, all the characteristics previously discussed are relevant to the issue of team maintenance in addition to their being axes of variation along which factions may be said to vary. And these variations must be explained from both perspectives - maintenance as well as recruitment.

In addition, the issue of team maintenance is intimately tied to the subversions which take place, a subversion implies a failure in the maintenance strategy of the leader unless the loss of a follower was planned. Where this cannot be shown, however, it must be assumed that the former situation has occurred. The investigation of subversions can thus illustrate differences in the internal organization of factions from the perspective of the leader's task of maintenance. Table 10.11 presents the number and intensity of subverted and new linkages for each historical period.

Table 10.11: Team Maintenance: Subversion Case Linkages.

Period:	Intensity of:				
	Subverted Links		New Links		
	Total	Average per Case	Total	Average per Case	Net Gain
Familial Elitism	10	1.6	23	3.8	2.2
Displacement	2	1.0	6	3.0	2.0
Class Elitism	15	2.5	22	3.6	1.1
Incorporation	26	6.5	32	8.0	1.5

What is apparent is that the number of subverted linkages has tended to increase with the exception of the period of Displacement at the same time that there is a decrease in the net gain number of new linkages and a decrease in the net gain of intensity. It thus appears that in closed systems with minimal economic and political choice and with a familial based elite, subversions occur

less frequently and that when they do occur, the gains made by the subverted person are greater than in periods where more choice is available and elitism more extensive.

To conclude thus far: The internal organization of factions has been shown to vary according to the following criteria: Definitions of competitive eligibility; recruitment ties; frequencies of recruitment criteria and intensity; durability of recruitment ties; the relative presence or absence of multiplex links; the relative presence or absence of symmetrical as opposed to asymmetrical links; and the number and gain of subverted links. All these can be considered axes along which factions can be compared and analyzed. In addition however, variations are tied to the nature of the resource structure of the village at any particular time. Variations in the constitution of the elite, economic choice, political choice, and the general patterning of the economic process have all been seen to cause variations along these axes as a product of providing resources for and constraints on both factional recruitment and factional team maintenance.

The next issue which logically emerges is the comparison of the axes of variation in the various historical periods with their relation to the typology presented in Chapter 1. Before this can be done however, it is first necessary to alter the typology. The reasons for this step are based on two distortions embodied in the typology as a result of its assumption that transactional relationships are the basis for factional recruitment with increased solidarity emerging in a lineal manner from these basic relationships as a product of increased intensity. Variables associated with factional solidarity were thus ignored. First, there is the fact that a multidimensional rather than a lineal view of development is required. This means that the issue of core and support, and hence that of solidarity, is related to the levels of recruitment which a faction may utilize, be it support or core, but that this distinction does not

rest solely on the transactional relationship becoming more secure and hence constituting the core. Rather, support and core membership may be recruited simultaneously, and an individual may form the core without having been involved in a pure transactional and support relationship with the leader. This latter development may occur but it is not a necessary development which accounts for core formation in all cases.

In short, the first problem with the typology has been the assumption of a developmental cycle of core formation based on the transactional relationship. A more inclusive typology however, must take into account variations in recruitment which do not assume this cycle, but allows for other progressions as well.

As such, the original first two categories of the typology remain intact and Type 1, the transactional relationship between leader and follower, would seem to stand in all cases of factional structures derived from the present data, particularly the rice miller method of economic recruitment and the PPP method of utilizing political party linkages on a transactional base. Beyond this initial level however, it has been found that all factions discussed have a more complex structure than this characterization assumes. Further, this complexity never arose solely as a result of a progressive building on the transactional base. This point was expecially made in Chapter 5, where it was noted that "several types of support were distinguished based on elite and team membership which were in turn based on more intense relationships than a transaction would imply. As a result, there are several types of support, not just the transactional relationship. . . . The concept of support cannot be reduced solely to the transactional relationship. Rather, the latter is merely one type of the former."

And this raises the second variable mentioned which the original typology ignores, that of the fact that not only does the category of support not necessarily derive solely from the transactional relationship, but also the

fact that cores must be further distinguished in terms of content. All the cores noted for the Bush Lot context exhibited more diverse recruitment criteria than the transaction. These should be noted. In the amended typology, presented below, this is done.

A. Divided public opinion

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1. Transactional relationships between a leader and all followers

   or

   Action-set

2. Group of leaders each with own followers on a transactional basis

   or

   Indirect Structure

   or

   Action-Sets with Several Egos in Alliance

3. Core and Support distinguishable:
   (a) Quasi-group

   or

   Direct Structure
   (b) Indirect Structure:
   i) Secondary leadership
   ii) Two ego's in alliance
   (c) Two mutually exclusive cores/quasi-groups
   (d) Clique - i) Direct Structure; ii) Indirect Structure
   (e) Combinations of the Above

In this new typology, any Type 3 implies a following based on transactional or other relationships, but, solidarity beyond the following may or may not incorporate the transaction while at the same time it most definitely incorporates other recruitment criteria.

With these assumptions as to the relevance of recruitment criteria, the variation possible in core development, and the complexity possible even within a situation where core is distinguishable, the typology has been amended and

discussion can now proceed to the association of factional types, axes of variation, historical periods and structural measures. Table 10.12 presents the association of factional types with the relevant historical period.

Table 10.12: Factional Types in Bush Lot.

Type	Period	Faction
1. Transactional ties:	-	-
2. Indirect Transactional Structure:	-	-
3. (a) Quasi-group or Direct Structure:	Class Elitism	Premsingh
	Incorporation	Premsingh
		Sultan
(b) Indirect Structure:		
i) Secondary Leadership:	Class Elitism (Period 2)	Maraj
ii) Leadership Alliance:	Class Elitism (Period 3)	Maraj
(c) Exclusive Quasi-groups:	Class Elitism (Period 3)	Maraj
(d) Clique:	Familial Elitism	Ramprashad
i) Direct Structure:		
(e) Combinations:	Class Elitism	Maraj

And as a final step, Table 10.13 associates the types presented above with the structural measures of factions constituting each type.

From this, several points can be noted. The first is the degree to which each different factional structure depends on transactional linkages. The direct clique structure has the lowest proportion of such linkages; the combination type has an intermediate proportion; and the quasi-group direct structure, the highest proportion.

Logically of course, the combination type falls in between the quasi-group and clique type in that it integrates several variations of quasi-group structure without solidifying into clique organization. At the same time, it can be

Table 10.13: Association of Structural Measures and Factional Types

Period:	Faction:	Structural Type:	Content: Transaction	Intensity: Link	Intensity: Person	Multiplexity: Link	Multiplexity: Person	Multiplexity: Mean	Symmetry:	Average linkage
Class Elitism	Premsingh	Quasi-group-direct structure	33.3	2.3	3.5	27.7	41.6	5.2	100.0	1.5
Incorp-oration	Premsingh	"	57.1	2.3	6.0	38.9	100.0	6.0	100.0	2.6
	Sultan	"	85.7	2.4	8.4	28.0	100.0	8.4	100.0	3.6
Class Elitism	Maraj	Combination Type	27.8	2.4	4.2	31.3	55.6	5.9	100.0	1.8
Familial Elitism	Ramprashad	Clique - Direct Structure	4.8	2.6	3.4	21.4	35.0	6.0	60.0	1.3
	Panchar	"	12.5	2.4	3.0	23.3	34.2	4.9	58.6	1.3

hypothesized that clique structured factions have less need of low intensity relationships such as the transaction since the central core is so tightly aligned. In turn, quasi-group structures embody more transactional links to make up in quantity what is lost in the absence of intense and dense linkages.

This latter point is further brought into relief when looking at the intensity measures for linkages and persons in the different structures. Clique structured factions show the most intense linkages overall, but the least intense linkages per individual. In contrast, quasi-group structures build overall intensity by adding together several low intensity links. This creates strength in leader-person relationships rather than in leader-link constellations.

This fact is further illustrated by the measures for multiplex linkages. The clique structured factions have the lowest proportion of multiplex ties of all types represented for both followers and linkages.

One can thus state that clique structured factions build their solidarity on the basis of high intensity linkages rather than by combining several low intensity linkages in one leader-follower relationship. In turn, quasi-group structured factions reach this level of solidarity on the basis of the progressive building up of low intensity but multiplex ties.

From this perspective then, the clique structures do not necessarily emerge as a result of a linear and progressive development from quasi-group structures. Rather, each type builds its solidarity in a different manner from a different base. Although progressive development is not logically impossible, the present study indicates that the two types are often structurally distinct and involve two methods of building solidarity. How general this finding is, is a problem for further investigation.

These findings are also borne out by the other measures presented in Table 10.13. The clique structure incorporates within it asymmetrical linkages; the other types do not. It has been shown here and in Chapter 5 that the cost

of maintaining asymmetrical ties is low. This suggests that the reason why only clique structures utilize asymmetrical ties is because their use allows for the availability of additional resources needed to keep intact the remainder of the team which is based on high cost linkages and a minimum number of low cost transactions. It is further suggested that where constraints are placed on the possibility of using asymmetrical ties to recruit followers, it is questionable whether clique structures can be successful.

(c) Interfactional Variation.

(i) Games, Arenas, and Controls.

For each historical period the rules governing how competition should take place and the control mechanisms preventing breakdown were analyzed. First, there was an analysis of the goals governing the political competition in each period. Secondly, and related to the goals, was an investigation of the organization of competitive arenas; for example, whether there was more than one, whether these arenas were in a process of alteration during the competition, etc.

A summary of the findings for all periods is presented in Table 10.14. From the table three basic types of factional games emerge. There is the game based on cumulative encounters; that based on cyclical encounters and confrontations; and that based on the fight.

In turn, the type of factional game seems to vary with the type of arena organization on the one hand, and both these two variables vary with the control mechanisms limiting factional disputes on the other.

The cyclical game appears to occur when firstly, there is more than one competitive arena, and secondly, when these are organized in either a hierarchical or simultaneous manner in terms of the competition being waged. At the same time, the fight emerges when there is only one arena in which competition is being carried out and when the organization of this arena is differentially interpreted by the protagonists. Finally, cumulative encounters occur when again there is more than one arena, but when these arenas of encounters become

Table 10.14: Interfactional Variation: A Summary

Historical Periods:	Axes of Variation: Organization of Competitive Arenas	The Nature of Competition	Control Mechanisms
Familial Elitism:	Hierarchy of arenas with minor arenas totalling the larger.	Oscillation between arenas and oscillation/ cycling of confrontations and encounters.	High costs of apical arena win; District Commissioner as mediator; factional alliances (collusion) Agreement on rules; Evenly matched teams.
Displacement:	Two conceptual definitions (private vs. public) of arena organization; one structural arena.	Fight/Conflict	Failure: Altering of rules governing eligibility, use of human resources and concept of conciliation; failure of traditional mediator; differential strategies.
Peace:	Elimination of competitive arenas.	Conciliation, arbitration. Competition based on individual conflict.	Outside economic and political resources; proliferation of alternatives, cross-cutting interests; individualization of vested interests; elite collusion.
Class Elitism:	(1) Breakdown, disorganization of conciliatory arenas.	Re-organization of factional arena.	Failure: Old rules dysfunctional.
	(2) Proliferation and overlap of arenas with each providing resources for others. Proliferation was occurring simultaneously.	Oscillation between arenas with repetitive and cyclical confrontations and encounters.	Acceptance of rules; wins/losses evenly distributed; equal access to resources; collusion; differential goal attainment; teams equally matched.
	(3) Continued proliferation of arenas but with occurrence and resource provision being lineal/successive.	Cumulative Encounters.	Failure: Lineality of encounters; failure of mediator. Partial control: Evenly matched teams; polarization of support; common rule acceptance.
Incorporation:	Proliferation of wider/ outside/higher level arenas as a result of arena fission and accretion.	Oscillating/cyclical confrontations and encounters.	Middleman protection; new arenas of competition; widened deployment of resources; new categories of support; new resources and new strategies; predictability; formal government hierarchy; national level policy.

significant successively rather than simultaneously.

In turn, the control mechanisms are also linked to the type of game. It should be noted here, that in speaking of control mechanisms in this context, the concern is solely with those mechanisms embedded in the factional game. Table 10.11 in fact delineates all the mechanisms which were isolated as being relevant. However, in this section, those mechanisms which come from outside the actual game are being viewed as part of the environment and will be discussed in section (d).

Cyclical games involve the following control mechanisms: The need to widely deploy resources in several arenas and hence the unlikelihood of an absolute win; collusion among the political and village elite; equal access to resources; and agreement on the rules of the game.

By definition, cumulative encounters imply less effective control mechanisms and a fight implies total failure. In cumulative encounters there was often an acceptance of common rules, but in the case of the fight, rules were in fact altered and different strategies came into use. This however, is not a distinctive characteristic of the two types of game since during the Incorporation period, when a game of cyclical encounters was being played, there were new rules and strategies which did not endanger the political game. Obviously then, it is not the existence of common rules and strategies that is the distinctive control mechanism but whether or not rules and strategies are predictable by the protagonists as they were during the Incorporation period. Bailey (1969) also notes this point.

Further, the period of Displacement was characterized not only by new rules and strategies, but also by different perceptions of arena organization by the two factions. In short, it was when strategies became unpredictable that the game changed into a fight.

The final point to be noted is that the mechanisms of resource deployment

and of collusion were controls in the cyclical game in addition to the control through acceptance of common rules and strategies in situations of predictability. In the cases of the cumulative game and the fight, neither of the former two mechanisms were in operation. Displacement was waged in one arena with the result that each faction could deploy maximum resources for the competition and thereby endanger the game. Further, the cumulative encounter game had an arena structure in which competition went successively from one to the other both temporally and structurally. In short, at any given time, there was one arena which was in operation.

In addition, both these periods involved a political polarization which precluded the possibility of any type of elite collusion - either alliances or a rule enabling one team to withdraw without a major loss of political credit. Both the fight and the cumulative encounter game thus allowed for maximum deployment of resources because of arena organization and the unlikelihood of collusion.

The cumulative encounter game did not however, evolve into a fight because of more extensive rule acceptance, evenly matched teams and the introduction of outside resources. It is difficult to state whether this game would have become a fight had not the latter input occurred. What can be said however, is that the two games are distinct in the types of arena organization and in control mechanisms used.

What has thus emerged from the above discussion is that first, common rules and strategies are insufficient for control. Rather, these must be combined with predictability to be effective. Secondly, there has emerged the fact that factional games can be analyzed not only in terms of the patterning of competition and the control mechanisms as Bailey suggests, but also in terms of the arena organization through which the competition takes place. In all cases, different structures of arenas have been associated with different patterning and have, in

addition, provided control mechanisms by affecting the deployment of resources and the perception of the game itself.

(ii) Factional Games and the Resource Structure.

Reference is again made to Table 10.1 in which the various dimensions of the village resource structure were associated with particular historical periods. In the present context, the attempt is made to associate the types of factional games and arena organization with the deployment and allocation of resources during specific periods. Table 10.15 summarizes the relevant characteristics.

The first issue which arises is the environment in which the oscillating encounter game appears to occur. Two points appear relevant. First, when the entire system is cyclical, economically and politically, and there is a familial elite, oscillating encounters appear to occur as a probable product of the fact that the factional game is highly controlled, both by the elite and their need for collusion against the village mass. In turn, this mass has few choices available to them and cannot upset the game by independent decision making.

Secondly, in looking at the periods of Incorporation and Class Elitism, period 2, there is a common sharing of a class elite and a closed economy. The former however, has a closed polity, the latter, an open one. From this, it can be stated that with a class elite that is protected by limitations on economic choice and processes for the mass, a similar situation has occurred as compared with that of the period of Familial Elitism. Again, economic choice is differentially distributed with the population mass caught in a situation of scarce resources. The elite can thus manipulate for gain while at the time protect themselves from agitation from below. The combination of elitism and collusion will thus produce a situation of cyclical encounters and this in turn is product of an elite, whether class or familial, and a closed economy.

However, the period of Class Elitism, period 3, has the same resource

Table 10.15: Resource Structure and Factional Games.

Period	Resource Structure	Game Pattern	Arena Organization
Familial Elitism	Closed Elite Closed Economy Closed Polity	Oscillating encounters	Hierarchical
Class Elitism (period 2)	Open Elite Closed Economy Open Polity	Oscillating encounters	Simultaneous proliferation
Incorporation	Open Elite Closed Economy Closed Polity	Oscillating encounters	Simultaneous proliferation
Class Elitism (period 3)	Open Elite Closed Economy Closed Polity	Cumulative encounters	Lineal proliferation
Displacement	Closed Elite Open Economy Open Polity	Fight	Two conceptual interpretations; one structural arena

structure as the Incorporation period above but was characterized by cumulative encounters. The difference is due largely, as discussed in Chapter 9, to the nature of the arena organization which in turn was largely a product of extraneous features and external inputs into the village during the period of Incorporation which halted the cumulative game at the end of the period of Class Elitism. It can thus be deduced that when there is a class elite and all other options are closed, cumulative encounters will result except when mitigated by outside resources which have to be empirically verified.

Given this, and the first conclusion reached above, it can be stated that situations with any elite type coupled with a closed economy will lead to oscillating encounters provided that the entire system is either cyclical, i.e., totally closed, or provided that political choice is available. If the latter characteristic reverses while the others remain constant, cumulative encounters will result as a product of total polarization because of the absolute lack of choices. This latter game can in turn revert to one of oscillating encounters if interference comes from extraneous features which allow for resource input such that, although the village economy remains closed, the new resources can halt the cumulative game. This input was noted for the period of Incorporation in Chapter 9.

The major features thus involved in the relation of resource structure and factional games are whether the entire system is closed on the one hand and whether a class elite and a closed economy allow either for political choice or the incorporation of external inputs. In such cases, cyclical games will occur. And what appears crucial here is the process of elite collusion against the mass in a system involving either a familial elite or political choice making. When a class system closes entirely, oscillating encounters may become cumulative.

In turn, the period of Displacement saw the obverse. Here a familial based class system opened up both politically and economically. Not surprisingly,

an attack on the elite followed and a factional fight ensued. In short, where the elite is closed but choice has become available, the elite will be attacked from below.

The crucial variables thus appear to be the particular mesh of economy, polity and elite type coupled with the significance of external inputs.

(d) Resource Change, the Environment and Factional Variation.

(i) Introduction.

The previous sections have dealt with variations occurring in the internal organization of factions and in factional political games in the light of the resource structures of particular periods. A major premise throughout however, has been the notion that resource change and environmental alterations are associated with the variations and changes in both structures and games. The present section is an attempt to deal more explicitly with this premise.

From this perspective, the associations can be analyzed as being of three major types. First, factional structures can be analyzed as being related to factional games and vice versa. The nature of this interdependence is the first problem for discussion below.

Secondly, changes in structures and games can be analyzed as being the result of changes in the resource structure of the village - that is, the differential access to resources of different groupings within the village. This has been looked at in previous sections.

Finally, the changes in factional structures and games can be analyzed in terms of their relationship to inputs from outside the village and from higher levels of socio-political organization. Basically, it can be said that Bush Lot is an encapsulated political structure (Bailey, 1969) and that changes in Bush Lot have resulted from changes in wider national political organization. Encapsulation within a national polity can thus be viewed as having produced effects internal to the local arena.

Finally, these types of association can be analyzed as all intimately

related to each other.

(ii) The Interrelation of Factional Structures and Games.

Table 10.16 compares the typologies utilized for both structures and games.

Table 10.16: Factional Games and Structures: A Comparison.

Game Type	Faction Type
Oscillating Encounters and Confrontations	1. Direct Clique Structure for both factions during period of Familial Elitism.
	2. Direct Quasi-group Structure for both factions during period of Incorporation.
	3. Direct Quasi-group Structure for Premsingh during period of Class Elitism.
	Secondary leadership and two Quasi-groups for Maraj.
Cumulative Encounters	1. Direct Quasi-group Structure for Premsingh.
	Leadership Alliance and two Quasi-groups for Sultan.

The first generalization would appear to be that where the factional teams are evenly matched in structure, the factional games tend to be those of oscillating confrontations and encounters. This was the case during three periods - those of Familial Elitism, Incorporation and the second stage of Class Elitism (cf.: Table 10.14).

There are however, two exceptions to this generalization. Firstly, in one period, that of Displacement, two identical teams engaged in a fight. Secondly, in another, that of the third stage of Class Elitism, teams which were structurally equal produced a game of cumulative encounters.

It is possible to analyze the former case as an exception to the general trend. In it, misconceptions by the protagonists as to the arena organization and the altering of rules and strategies outweighed the effect which evenly matched teams had on the organization of the game. The case of cumulative encounters on the other hand, needs a more complex explanation. It closely resembles the first exception in that a fight could well have resulted because of the misconceptions prevalent. That the fight did not eventuate was shown to be because partial control mechanisms were present, one of which was that there were comparable team structures.

It is thus possible to rephrase the first generalization about the relationship between factional structures and games. Without control structures factionalism tends to become a fight. Evenly matched team structures constitute a control mechanism and tend to make the major games into oscillating confrontations and encounters. Depending on the degree of differential interpretation and lineal proliferation in arena organization, there will be a divergence from the game pattern predictable from a knowledge of team structures alone. Great differential interpretation will produce a fight; less differential interpretation will produce cumulative encounters. Lineal proliferation of arenas will produce cumulative encounters; simultaneous proliferation will produce an oscillating game. The organization of the competitive arenas thus modifies the direct relationship of structures and games.

This conclusion that the simple relationship of structures and games is in fact complicated by the factor of arena organization is further borne out by reference to the periods of Peace and the first stage of Class Elitism. In the former case, competitive arenas were eliminated at the same time that competition on a factional basis became dysfunctional. Structured factional teams could not be recruited because of crosscutting and individualized interests, because of the high costs that would have been required, and because of the

impossibility of any extended alliances. The openness of the economic structure enabled elite collusion and individual maximization with a minimum of competition. At the same time the political game became one of conciliation. In short, the three factors of structures, games and organization of arenas all varied at the same time. Factional teams were absent, competitive arenas were eliminated, and the game was one of conciliatory politics. Then, during the subsequent period of the first stage of Familial Elitism, a factional game, competitive arenas and factional teams emerged together. It is of course impossible to state on the basis of these cases whether the teams or arenas or games came first.

During the period of Familial Elitism as in the period of Peace just discussed, the interrelation was the same. In Chapter 5 it was noted that there existed several competitive arenas organized in a hierarchical manner. Coupled with this was the presence of "two kinds of action-sets at different levels of organization related to the fact that there were two types of competition occurring simultaneously and this in turn was related to the hierarchy of goals which characterized the period." "The result of the dual character of competitions was crucial in affecting the internal structure of factions. There were therefore action-sets derived in turn from larger action-sets. The basic set was founded on a transaction between miller and villager, the formation of which defined factional membership and was part of the economic competition . . . being waged by the millers. From these resources of transactional links, more exclusive categories of personnel were built up such that action-sets based on intense relationships could be fielded for competitions in other arenas, such as the council arena. The hierarchical organization of goals was thus related to the factional competition in that the hierarchy resulted in two types of competition, also hierarchically organized, and thereby intimately affected the internal structure of factions."

In short, a hierarchy of goals, a hierarchy of arenas for factional competition, and an internal structure of factions into hierarchically organized action-sets appear as yet another case where all three factors co-vary and no primacy or independence of any one factor can be demonstrated.

Now all the previous analysis has been to associate evenly matched or similar teams to the types of games and arenas. However, it is possible to discern further relationships between structures and games by looking at each historical period and analyzing other relationships between the two variables.

During the period of Familial Elitism, the competition surrounding council control in both 1937 and 1939 illustrates several interesting points. In the former year, both factions obtained the same number of seats; in the latter year, the Ramprashad faction swept the election. As noted in Chapter 5, "throughout 1937, the Panchar action-set exhibited greater strength in terms of structural features: density, reachability and range. On the other hand, the intensity of the action-sets indicate that the Ramprashad set in 1937 could counter the structural strength with their interactional strength." In short, the teams were differently structured in terms of recruitment but were equally effective in competition.

In addition, it was noted that "Panchar emphasized his kinship relations; Ramprashad his friendship links with individuals. These differential emphases provided resources for Panchar's structural strength but at the same time, limited the interactional strength because of the finite nature of these links. Simultaneously, the more diversified relationships which characterized the Ramprashad team constrained the structural potential but enabled the utilization of more intense links because of their less limited nature." Thus, "the deployment of action-sets reflected both the resources and constraints which surrounded factional leaders as a result of their work in team recruitment." In short, the manner in which factions could compete was delimited by the recruitment principles

originally utilized.

Finally, it was noted that "the success of each faction in competition was related to the structure of their action-set. When both were evenly matched, although this occurred through different methods, a 'draw' resulted. When this balance was upset by the increased internal strength of one faction [Ramprashad], coupled with its greater linkage intensity, the results of the competition . . . reflected the more general imbalance of the teams." Success or failure in factional competition can thus be gauged by the structures of the competing factions.

From the period of Familial Elitism then, three points can be made concerning the interrelation between factional structures and games. First, it is suggested that differently structured teams may be equally effective in factional competition provided that their structures are complementary such that they are equally matched. In other words, evenly matched teams may result from different recruitment patterns but can be equally effective in competition. Secondly, the deployment of teams for competition is a product of the original recruitment strategies. Thirdly, success in competition can be predicted by looking at the internal structure of factions.

During the period of Displacement, it was noted that "the Panchar faction altered the rules by which they recruited team members in order to accommodate the public platform of displacement." The alteration of rules has been noted to be one of the factors contributing to the fight. Since recruitment patterns and rules form the basis of factional structures, their alteration may very well define political competition as a game or fight.

The period of Peace has already been discussed and the relation between structures and games noted. This period however, was followed by the reorganization of the political field into a factional game. What this implies is that when recruitment for political competition becomes feasible as in the first year of the period due to resource change, the factional game becomes the means

of political competition. As such, both factions and games are related to each other in terms of a common relationship to the resource structure.

The second stage of Class Elitism saw this general point in sharper relief. The proliferation of arenas provided resources for recruitment as in the cases of the subversion of Sultan because of religious antagonisms and the competition in the co-operative and the race clubs. These arenas created new categories of personnel whose allegiances became problematic as arenas fissioned and new categories were created. In turn, the recruitment of personnel in several cases caused the proliferation. In short, the arena organization of the factional game is related to the recruitment resources available to faction leaders.

The final period of Class Elitism was characterized by legal constraints on recruitment to council teams. As a result, much of the factional game was concerned with subversion attempts and structures exhibited an emphasis on transactional linkages. External constraints thus affect both factional structures and games.

The final manner in which factions and factionalism can be viewed as interrelated is again in terms of the typologies presented in Table 10.16. It appears that the cyclical game tends to be associated with direct structures. Where this has not occurred, the Combination type is found as characterizing one of the factions. However, this same situation occurs with the cumulative game example except that the nature of the Combination type is different. In the cumulative game, the Combination type is constituted as a result of a leadership alliance as opposed to a secondary leadership as in the cyclical game. It can thus be suggested that indirect secondary leadership types are complementary to the direct structure type in terms of effects on game patterning. At the same time, a leadership alliance type opposing a direct structure creates disjunction and contributes to the cumulative game. Such a distinction and suggestion however, needs further investigation.

To summarize: From the discussion, the following generalizations can be made as to the relationship between factional structures and games.

First, factional structures may serve as a control mechanism, i.e., a constraint which prevents a spiralling game and a resource allowing for the continuation of a cyclical game. However, this control function can be mitigated by the factional game itself or more specifically, by the manner in which competitive arenas are organized. Where these are differentially defined or lineal, the function of factions as control mechanisms is delimited. In terms of control mechanisms, structures and games constrain each other.

Secondly, several points have emerged from the investigation of the various historical periods. These include the following: When factional recruitment becomes dysfunctional, there will be an associated absence of factional structures, arenas, and games and when the factional game is based on a hierarchy of goals and arenas, the factional teams will also have a hierarchical recruitment and competitive deployment pattern. As well, these characteristics are associated with the more general point of the intimate relation between arenas, games and structures. In addition, the following points were noted: That evenly matched teams, even if differently structured, are equally effective in competition; that the manner in which teams are deployed for competition is constrained by the recruitment principles originally utilized by leaders; that wins and losses are predictable from factional structures; that the alteration of recruitment principles affects the factional game; that arena organization affects recruitment potential; and that external constraints affect both the factional structures and games. Finally, it was suggested that particular game patterning may be related to particular factional types. Where teams are of the same or a complementary type, oscillating encounters should result. Where complementarity of type does not exist, it is suggested that cumulative games result.

(iii) Resource Change, Structures and Encapsulation in Factional Variation.

a. Introduction.

The present section deals with the second and third analyses of village political activity - its relation to the internal organization of the village, or the resource structure, and its relation to higher levels of socio-political organization and the encapsulation process.

b. Resource Structures and Changes.

Table 10.17 summarizes the way in which resource structures and external inputs have varied in the different historical periods since 1902.

Table 10.17: Resource Changes: A Summary

Note: In the following table, broken lines indicate a direct linkage between the external source and the change in the village structure.

Period or major political game	External sources of inputs:	Resource Structure:
	Commutation of Return Passages; Bush Lot as a Land Development Scheme.	Vagaries in rice Production;
	Refusal of irrigation plan.	Drainage-Irrigation problem; Limited available capital;
	Abary Company.	New technology;
	Government survey . . .	Expanding acreage in the Abary; and in Bush Lot; Need for credit facilities; Potential for mass indebtedness;
	Moneylenders	Moneylender indebtedness;
	Cooperative Banks . . .	Failure; Cyclical economic process in operation for the village masses;

Table 10.17 continued:

Period:	External Sources:	Resource Structure:
		Small ascribed elite (marital/kin ties) controlling credit facilities (rice mills), the crucial nexus in the economic cycle;
	Local Government Board appointments.....	Elite control of the Village Council;
		Credit facilities of millers tied into the socio-economic cycle;
		Cyclical indebtedness of mass;
	Miller intervention.....	Failure of the Panchayat;
		Polarization of the elite because of competition - economic and political.
Familial Elitism.		
	Alterations of the Franchise.....	Increased political consciousness- petitions;
	Change of Village Status.....	Elite rebellion (failure);
	Rice Marketing Board.....	New marketing method;
	Presbyterian Church.....	Literacy increase; Depressed village economy;
	Grow More Food Campaign.....	Increase in Provisions Growing;
		Demand for services not possible;
		Increased subsistence production; end of monocropping;
		Economic choice expanded;
		Unindebted electorate emerging;
		Extension of ascribed elite: Apparent new leadership.
Displacement.		
Peace.	Sugar industry expansion..	Wage labour increase;
	Government surveys.....	Abary agriculture expansion;

Table 10.17 continued:

Period:	External Sources:	Resource Structure:
		Bush Lot agriculture expansion;
	Grow More Food Campaign	Provisions growing Increase;
	Increased Abary land . .	Growth of cattle industry;
	MARDS	Mechanization;
	Cooperative Movement . .	Village cooperatives;
		Extended family co-operation;
		Economic expansion;
		Extension of economic opportunities to all persons in several directions. Absence of economic scarcity and competition;
		Crosscutting interests; individualization of interests;
		Political support not needed for economic success; Exchange and transactions not needed;
		Both mass and elite subject to the same forces; No systematic attack against the elite;
	Founding of PPP	Siphoning off of political activists; New mobility means;
	Golden Grove Boundary . .	Inter-village dispute;
		Bush Lot land shortage.
	Contraction of the sugar industry	Decreased wage employment;
	Unlimited Abary land . .	Expansion of rice and cattle continuing for some; For small farmers however, cyclical problem - additional acreage leads to loss of production means;

Table 10.17 continued:

Period:	External Sources:	Resource Structure:
Class Elitism.		Vertical differentiation (occupational categories): 1. Cattle owners; 2. Mechanized farmers; 3. Small farmer - a. Oxen/agistment; b. Rice land needed; Issue: Land Use. Agistment vs. Rice land: 1, 3a vs. 2, 3b. Horizontal differentiation-categories: 1. Successful expanders (Abary cultivators and cattle); 2. Moderately successful; 3. Unsuccessful (Bush Lot farmers and wage labourers); Shopkeepers - differential success; New wealth distribution; More complex economic sphere; Expanded elite group: Recruitment on 1. achievement and 2. PPP membership;
	Suspension of the Legislature; PPP infiltrates local level; Return of local leader....	Traditional leader with PPP aims; Tiers of PPP "support" become relevant: 1. Anti; 2. Pro: activists; supporters; and sympathizers; Village council aligned with wealthy segment; non-adaptation to complexity and scarcity; no representation of "lower class"; Land trade-offs impossible;

Table 10.17 continued:

Period:	External Sources:	Resource Structure:
Incorporation	Bush Lot personnel in national PPP arena.	Bush Lot as a PPP base;
	PPP-PNC split; PNC contols national arena; Muslim wing founded; PNC policy of East Indian subversion. Middleman policy.	Religious splits and cleavages; historical splits; economic splits; and political polarization on the local level.
		Fissioning and expansion of competitive arenas.

From this summary, what is apparent is that not all resource structure changes have been associated with external inputs. Some have presumably resulted from endogenous processes within the village itself. In fact, some changes within the village have led to new inputs from the outside. In addition, some of the changes have occurred in succession with a single change in one period being followed by another in the next period in a lineal fashion; other changes have occurred simultaneously with the total effect of the set of changes being greater than the sum of the single changes and feeding into a more general process. Finally, several changes in resource structure have resulted not only because of internal structural changes but particularly as a product of the factional processes.

The most obvious inputs from the outside include government ordinances (the commutation of return passages, franchise alterations, changes in the village status, Golden Grove boundary); government policies (irrigation attitudes, land surveys, Grow More Food Campaign, the co-operative movement, rice prices, the 1953 Constitutional crisis); government bodies (Co-operative Credit Banks, Local Government Board, Rice Marketing Board, MARDS); independent outside organizations (Abary Company, Presbyterian Church); independent economic units (the sugar industry); and national political units (PPP, PNC,

Gandhi Youth, Maha Sabha, PNC Muslim Wing). All these have contributed to political change.

Secondly, examples of changes endogenous to the village that resulted in a response from the national arenas and hence, new inputs into the village, include such things as demands for irrigation opening new rice areas; elite rebellion resulting in the change of the village status; village economic depressions resulting in the failure of the cooperative banks; joint labour exchanges resulting in the input of the cooperative movement; agitation leading to the Golden Grove boundary dispute and government mediation; and aiding the infiltration of national parties by support of traditional leadership. In short, the village did not merely respond to outside inputs, but in many cases precipitated these itself.

Thirdly, there are those alterations caused by village processes and not involving external inputs such as the changes in stratification within the village produced by differing access to resources, differential incomes and prestige consequent on economic choices made by families at various periods in the history of the village.

Finally, there are those changes induced by the factional processes themselves. The most obvious examples occurred in the period of Displacement, but all others are relevant. For example, the rice miller competition during the period of Familial Elitism utilized resources in such a way that basic village services and population demands could not be met, thereby giving way to the successful displacement attempts. Or the absence of factional arenas during the period of Peace, resulting from and allowing for the massive economic expansion which took place. This in turn divided the village into economic and social segments which could only be organized, politically, by a new factional game, Class Elitism. This latter game in turn, was one of cumulative encounters which enabled the acceptance of PNC subversion attempts, and hence a new game, Incorporation.

Now when these four categories of change are associated with the various historical periods and games, it is found that each period is a product of all the types of changes with the exception of the period of Familial Elitism wherein factional processes, since not pre-existing this first game, had no effect on the game itself. These patterns are summarized as follows:

Period:	Source of Changes:			
	External	Endogenous and external	Endogenous	Factional Processes
Familial Elitism	*	*	*	
Displacement	*	*	*	*
Peace	*	*	*	*
Class Elitism	*	*	*	*
Incorporation	*	*	*	*

What this implies is that factionalism is not just a product of rapid social change (Nicholas, 1965 and others); nor solely a response to the interaction of external stresses and internal strains (Siegel and Beals, 1960a and b); nor a passing, ephemeral phenomenon (Bailey, 1969), but rather, a political process which has its own internal dynamic which functions in conjunction with internal change and external inputs in a feedback manner. The resource structure of the village and the resource input of outside entities adds new dimensions to what is already an ongoing process, and the nature of this process, when coupled with resource change will determine, together, any new direction which is observable.

(e) Summary and Conclusions.

The general findings of the present work in relation to factions, factionalism, and resource structure can be simply summarized.

First, within the general definition of non-corporate factions put forth by Nicholas (1965), there are systematic variations in internal structure and in degrees of solidarity achieved. Factional structures vary in terms of competitive eligibility definitions and these in turn vary according to the resource structure. Where the system is based on a closed resource structure, familial based factions will totally define the nature of eligibility. When the system opens but the elite persists, pre-existing ties will also persist but will have to be more widely defined. When elitism becomes more diffuse, volunteers for the more exclusive categories must be accommodated and the extent of leadership choices will be constrained according to the nature of the economic processes and political resources.

Factional structures were also seen to vary in terms of the content of linkages; the frequency with which available contents are utilized due to both resources and constraints resulting from the opening of the resource structure to both economic and political choice as well as the changing class structure over time; the intensity of leader-follower linkages; the durability of links which allows for prediction of alignments in situations which emphasize low intensity links and constrained recruitment; the frequency and intensity of multiplex linkages as against single-stranded links, or, the average number of links characterizing leader-follower relationships in that multiplexity is a logical response to the historical dimensions of factionalism, a response to the polarization in the interfactional sphere and a response to external constraints on new recruitment as a result of the suspension of elections. Where the resource structure is characterized by a closed economy coupled with a class based elite, multiplex teams are most adaptable. Finally, factions vary according to the extent to which asymmetrical or symmetrical linkages are utilized due to resource change which eliminates pre-existing and asymmetrical ties from the economic and political spheres when economic and political choices become available.

What this implies is that not only do factions vary in terms of recruitment "on the basis of diverse principles," but also, factions vary in their internal structure as a product of the need for team maintenance by the leader. Intensity, multiplexity, durability and asymmetry are all leadership decisions which refer not only to recruitment strategies but also to maintenance strategies.

In this light, the nature of subversions over time become relevant. In closed systems with minimal economic and political choice and with a familial based elite, subversions occur less frequently, and when they do, the gains made by the subverted person are greater than in periods where more choice is available and elitism more extensive.

Now when combining the dimensions of factional variation and internal solidarity, a new typology of factional types results. Basically, this typology distinguishes between factions based solely on transactional relationships and those based on more diverse principles of recruitment. In addition, the typology does not assume a continuum of increasing complexity and progressive proliferation of factional types. Instead, types with distinguishable cores may or may not incorporate transactional relationships and if so, may do so at differing levels of structural organization. The typology attempts to account for this diversity by allowing for variations in content of linkages and variations in the nature of core which can result.

The third major finding was the fact that factional types and structural measures were associated and that whether a faction has a clique or a quasi-group structure is not necessarily indicative of how far a quasi-group has solidified into a clique. Rather, each type was found to build its internal solidarity in a different manner from a different base. Two alternate means of achieving solidarity are possible: Through the use of a limited number of high intensity links and secondly, through the use of an unlimited number of

low intensity links. These differing recruitment and maintenance strategies produce, respectively, clique structured factions on the one hand, and quasi-group structured factions on the other. In addition, clique structures are impossible to maintain where low cost asymmetrical links cannot be recruited for peripheral support. What this implies as well is that structural measures derived from an analysis of networks (Mitchell, 1969) are highly applicable for characterizing factional structures.

Fourthly, in dealing with the nature of variation in factional games, it was first found that common rules and strategies are insufficent for controlling escalation. Rather, these must be combined with predictability to be effective. Secondly, it was found that factional games can be typed according to their general pattern but that analysis must be done not only in terms of this patterning and the control mechanisms embedded in the game, but also in terms of the arena organization through which the competition takes place. Cyclical encounters are associated with multiple arenas or simultaneously proliferating arenas; the cumulative game is associated with arenas proliferating in a lineal progression, and fights are associated with competition in only one competitive arena. In all cases, different structures of arenas have been associated with different patterning and have in addition, provided control mechanisms by affecting the deployment of resources and the perception of the game itself. In short, the type of factional game varies with the type of arena organization on the one hand,,and both these two variables vary with the control mechanisms limiting factional disputes on the other.

In dealing with the environment of factional games, it was found that the major features involved in the relation of resource structure and factional games are whether the entire system is closed on the one hand and whether a class elite and a closed economy allow for either political choice or the incorporation of external inputs. In such cases, cyclical games will occur.

And what is crucial here is the process of elite collusion against the mass involving either a familial elite or political choice making potential. When a class system closes entirely, oscillating encounters may become cumulative. In turn, when a closed class system opens to allow for political and economic choice, the game escalates into a fight. The crucial variables thus appear to be the particular mesh of economy, polity and elitism coupled with the significance of external inputs.

Now in addition to the environment of political games consisting of the resource structure, it was also found that factional structures themselves affect the factional game andtthat each provides resources for and constraints on the other.

First, factional structures have been found to serve as control mechanisms on the escalation of the game and as resources allowing for the continuation of cyclical games. It was also found however, that the control function could be mitigated by the manner in which the competitive arenas are organized. Where these are differentially defined or lineal, the function of factional structures, or evenly matched teams, as control mechanisms is delimited. Given this intervening variable of arena organization, games and structures constrain each other.

In addition, from the analysis of particular historical periods, additional relationships were postulated. These include the following: When factional recruitment becomes dysfunctional, there will be an associated absence of factional structures, arenas and games and when the factional game is based on a hierarchy of goals and arenas, the factional teams will also have a hierarchical recruitment and competitive deployment pattern. AAs well, these characteristics are associated with the more general point of the intimate relation between arenas, games and structures. In addition, the following points were noted: That evenly matched teams, even if differently structured,

are equally effective in competition; that the manner in which teams are deployed for competition is constrained by the recruitment principles originally utilized by leaders; that wins and losses are predictable from factional structures; that the alteration of recruitment principles affects the factional game; that arena organization affects recruitment potential; and that external constraints affect both the factional structures and games. Finally, it was suggested that particular game patterning may be related to particular factional types. Where teams are of the same or a complementary type, oscillating encounters should result. Where complementarity of type does not exist, it is suggested that cumulative games result.

The final issue was the effect of external inputs on games and structures. It was found that each period or game is a product of several processes simultaneously occurring.

First, there are external inputs into the village. Secondly, there are endogenous processes which result in external inputs. Thirdly, there are the endogenous processes not caused by external change. And fourthly, there are changes in resource structure, games and factional structures as a product of the factional process itself. In addition, it was found that the feedback relation between these sources of change indicate that factionalism should be viewed as a normal and logical organization of political competition and that the issues of its association with social change, stresses and strains, and ephemeralism be made issues for empirical investigation rather than assumptions.

Postcript

Since the researcher left the field in the spring of 1970, several major changes have occurred which have probably permanently altered the nature of village politics.

A Report on Local Government, prepared in 1955 by A. H. Marshall had, as one of its major recommendations, the suggestion that "the whole of the Coastlands, including unorganised areas sugar estates should be parcelled out into not more than eighteen authorities" (1955: 76). The implication of this was that existing local authorities should be combined together on the basis of geographical proximity into one local authority. Act Number 24 of 1969, the Municipal and District Councils Act, provided the legal basis for the partial institution of the Marshall plan recommendation.

On September 21, 1970, the Naarstigheid-Union District Council met for the first time in the Hopetown-Belair village office. The villages composing this district council were Golden Grove, Lovely Lass, Bush Lot, Armadale, Belair and Hopetown. In effect, the Bush Lot village council was abolished and the local government of the village passed into the hands of this unified body.

Of the Bush Lot personnel appointed to the new council, there was P. T. Premsingh, Ebrahim Sultan and Hassan Rasool. These, however, were considered interim appointments until an election could be held.

What is of interest here, and as noted in Chapter 2, is the fact that Bush Lot is surrounded by villages which are mainly African in ethnic composition. As such, they are predictably strong PNC bases of support. In short,

in any election, whether national or local, the PNC has gained control of this particular local authority. As was noted in Chapter 9, the party has potentially passed over the factional political system as it was constituted in Bush Lot prior to 1970 and which provided the bases whereby the PNC was gaining local support.

In addition to this, two further changes must be noted. In early 1972, both Ebrahim Sultan and Mahatma Deoroop died. Two major protagonists are thus absent from the political sphere.

The implications of these changes are, of course, uncertain. What can be stated, however, is that the council arena specifically and the nature of village factions, insofar as they were intimately tied to the council and the personnages of Sultan and Deoroop, are of a different nature than when research was being carried out.

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Tables on the Physical Features of Bush Lot Village.

Table I.1: House and Cultivation Lots in Each Village Section.

Section	Number of House Lots	Number of Cultivation Lots
A	148	-
B	148	-
C	326	-
D	243	-
E	-	59
F	-	46
G	154	4
H	-	338
I	-	340
J	-	170
K	-	170
Total:	1019	1127

Table I.2: Density of Houses in Each Village Section.

Section	# of House Lots	# of occupied houses	% of density
A	148	74	50.0 %
B	148	97	66.2
C	326	189	57.9
D	243	111	45.6
E*	-	8	-
F	154	13	8.4

*Section E is made up of cultivation lots, but several persons have built their dwellings on them. All these dwellings, however, are located near the junction of Section E and Section D.

Appendix II: Tables of Population Characteristics in Bush Lot Village.

Table II.1: Ethnic Distribution in Bush Lot according to the 1960 Census.

Ethnic Group	Population
East Indian	2609
Mixed	44
African	19
Other	13

Table II.2: Population of Bush Lot Village by Age and Sex.

Age Group	Male	Female	Total
1-10 years	35.5%	37.3%	36.3%
11-15 years	15.8%	15.8%	15.8%
16-20 years	12.1%	12.8%	12.4%
21-25 years	7.1%	6.8%	6.9%
26-30 years	5.2%	5.4%	5.3%
31-35 years	4.6%	4.5%	4.5%
36-40 years	4.7%	5.0%	4.9%
41-45 years	3.8%	3.9%	3.8%
46-50 years	4.1%	3.4%	3.8%
51-60 years	5.0%	3.1%	4.1%
61 + years	2.3%	2.1%	2.2%


Table II.3: Distribution of Educational Levels.

Educational Level Reached	% of Total Population
No education	28.1%
Standard 1 (one year of school)	4.3%
Standard 2	6.0%
Standard 3	9.9%
Standard 4/Form 1	16.1%
Standard 5/Form 2	13.5%
Standard 6/Form 3	14.0%
Form 4	2.9%
Form 5	4.9%
Form 6	.3%

Table II.4: Educational Distribution of the Population by Age Group.

Educational Level	Age Group										
	1-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-60	61+
No Education	62.2%	1.3%	1.1%	2.4%	3.2%	4.5%	9.3%	18.8%	23.2%	30.6%	50.0%
Standard 1 (1 year)	9.6	0.2	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.5	2.1	6.2	5.4	1.6	0.0
Standard 2	9.9	1.5	1.6	1.0	1.3	2.3	5.7	8.9	11.6	12.1	7.8
Standard 3	11.4	9.6	2.6	3.8	7.1	9.8	15.0	9.8	18.8	18.5	14.1
Standard 4/ Form 1	6.6	35.1	13.7	15.4	14.1	15.8	27.1	22.3	22.3	18.5	12.5
Standard 5/ Form 2	0.0	27.4	21.6	27.4	20.5	22.6	20.0	17.0	7.1	12.9	7.8
Standard 6/ Form 3	0.1	16.3	19.8	34.1	45.5	42.1	20.7	16.1	11.6	5.6	6.2
Form 4	0.2	7.8	10.6	3.4	0.6	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Form 5	0.0	1.0	28.0	11.5	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
Form 6 (9 years)	0.0	0.2	1.1	0.0	0.6	0.8	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table II.5: Distribution of "No Education" According to Age.




Tables 11.6 and 11.7: Distribution of Standard 5 and 6 Education According to Age.

EDUCATION LEVELS

Standard 5 and above

(Age groups 1-15 have been omitted as the majority of these students are not old enough to have reached these levels.)



Standard 6 and above




Table II.8: Educational Level According to Age and Sex.

Age	Male				Female			
	No Educ.	Std. 1-3	Std. 4-6	Form 5+	No Educ.	Std. 1-3	Std. 4-6	Form 5+
11-15	1.2%	11.8%	80.4%	6.5%	1.3%	10.8%	67.2%	10.7%
16-20	0.0	6.3	48.1	45.5	2.1	2.2	62.1	33.7
21-25	2.8	2.8	69.5	25.0	2.0	9.0	85.0	4.0
26-30	3.7	7.4	76.5	22.3	2.7	9.4	84.0	4.0
31-35	2.9	11.5	82.6	2.8	6.2	15.6	78.1	0.0
36-40	8.5	14.0	77.5	0.0	10.1	31.8	57.9	0.0
41-45	10.9	27.3	60.0	1.8	26.3	22.8	50.9	0.0
46-50	11.3	41.9	46.8	0.0	38.0	28.0	34.0	0.0
51-60	16.7	35.9	47.5	0.0	54.3	26.1	19.6	0.0
61+	23.5	35.3	38.2	2.9	80.0	6.6	13.3	0.0

NB: For those students who have gone beyond Standard 6/Form 3, the proportion of males to females is much higher in the 21-25 age bracket, and slightly higher in 16-20 age group. Within the youngest group, the females have surpassed the males.

A somewhat similar situation exists for persons who completed Standards 4 to 6, although the gap between male and female is not as great. In this case, it is in the 31-35 age group that males continue to surpass females in terms of the proportion completing this level.

For those who completed Standards 1 to 3, the male proportion becomes systematically greater in the 41-45 age bracket, while the high percentage of females in the 21 to 40 age group indicates that many more women were leaving school at a lower level than males.

Finally, the "no education" category indicates that the percentage of women here increases rapidly over the percentage of men within and after the 31-35 age bracket.

In short, in the past, women were systematically receiving less education than men.

Appendix III: Tables on the Characteristics of the Village Economy.

Table III.1: Occupational Distribution of the Bush Lot Population.

Occupational Categories	Number of Persons Engaged	% of employed population	% of occupations
1. White Collar:			
(a) Teacher	48	8.2%	5.2%
(b) Priest	6	1.0	.7
(c) Clerk/ Official	12	2.0	1.3
2. Self-Employed:			
(i) Primary Production			
(a) Rice	343	58.4	36.9
(b) Cattle	80	13.6	8.6
(c) Horses	16	2.7	1.7
(d) Provisions	6	1.0	.7
(e) Fishing	36	6.1	3.9
(ii) Tertiary Services			
(a) Equipment Rental	9	1.5	.9
(b) Shop	42	7.2	4.5
(c) Truck/Bus Owner	12	2.0	1.3
(d) Taxi	13	2.2	1.4
(e) Cattle Dealer	3	.9	.3
(f) Craftsman	34	5.8	3.7
(g) Huckster	14	2.4	1.5
3. Employed:			
(a) Unskilled Labour	232	39.5	24.9
(b) Driver	7	1.2	.8
4. Pension/Welfare	16	2.7	1.7
Total:	929	-	100.0%

Table III.2: Allocation of Rice Acreage Among the Village Population.

Acreage Cultivated	% of Farming Population
1 - 2 Acres	6.7%
3 - 4 "	7.9
5 - 6 "	7.4
7 - 8 "	5.0
9 - 10 "	28.4
11 - 15 "	6.4
16 - 20 "	19.5
21 - 30 "	6.6
31 - 50 "	6.9
51 +	5.2

This distribution can also be presented as follows:

1 - 10 Acres	55.4%
11 - 20 "	25.9
21 - 30 "	6.6
31 - 50 "	6.9
51 + "	5.2

Table III.3: Distribution of Cattle among Bush Lot Rearers.

Number of Head	% of Rearers
1 - 5	20.2%
6 - 10	15.3
11 - 15	12.7
16 - 20	12.7
21 - 30	11.5
31 - 50	9.0
51 - 100	7.7
101 - 200	8.9
200 +	2.6

Table III.4: Distribution of Shop Types in the Village.

Type	% of Total
Cake Shop and Parlour	28.6%
Grocery	35.7
Rum Shop	2.4
Rice Mill	7.1
Welding/Mechanic	14.3
Dry Goods	7.1
Butcher Shop	2.4
Other	2.4

Table III.5: Types of Crafts in the Village.

Type	Number	% of Total
Barber	1	2.9%
Chicken rearer/ Egg producer	3	8.8
Building Contractor	4	11.8
Guttersmith	1	2.9
Goldsmith	2	5.9
Carpenter	7	20.6
Wedding/Birth Attendants	2	5.9
Dentist	1	2.9
Tailor/Dressmaker	11	32.4
Lumber dealer	2	5.9

Table III.6: Types and Lengths of Wage Labour Employment.

Permanent Jobs:

Length of time employed	% of Labourers
1 - 3 years	35.5%
4 - 7 years	10.0
8 +	12.6

Part-time Jobs:

When work available	29.0
Crop time	12.6

Table III.7: Job Types of Wage Labourers.

Job Type (Ranked by average income from low to high - assuming permanent employment.)	% Employed
Apprentice	.4%
Watchman/Domestic	6.5
Unskilled Labour	30.0
Painter/Tailor	3.0
Truck/Lorry Driver	20.9
Carpenter	19.1
Cane Cutter	14.3
Surveyor/Foreman/Salesman	5.7

Table III.8: Employers of Wage Labour.

Employer	% of labour employed
Bush Lot employer	40.9%
Bookers Sugar Estates	17.2
Bush Lot Village Authority	11.2
Non-Bush Lot Person	11.2
Ministry of Education/Govt.	7.3
Ministry of Works & Hydraulics	5.6
Wong and Khan	4.7
Rice Marketing Board/ Kebawer Ranch*	.9
Other	.9

*Kebawer Ranch is part of Bookers Estates.

Table III.9: Length of Employment of Teachers.

Time Employed	% of Total
1 year	36.6%
2 years	17.1
3 years +	46.4

Appendix IV: Tables on Kinship and Marital Characteristics of Bush Lot Village.

Table IV.1: Distribution of Household Types.

Type	Number	%
1. Male headed Nuclear	329	70.9%
2. Female headed (no male) Nuclear	20	4.3
3. Male headed (no female) Nuclear	5	1.1
4. Male headed patrilocal extended (virilocal)	40	8.6
5. Male headed patrilocal extended (uxorilocal)	3	.6
6. Female headed matrilocal extended (virilocal)	7	1.5
7. Female headed matrilocal extended (uxorilocal)	6	1.3
8. Male headed (no female) patrilocal extended (virilocal)	3	.6
9. Male headed patrilocal extended (virilocal and uxorilocal)	2	.4
10. Male headed nuclear with attached parent	18	3.9
11. Male headed nuclear with attached others	13	2.8
12. Male headed nuclear with attached parents and others	1	.2
13. Female headed (no male) with attached others	1	.2
14. Male headed patrilocal (uxorilocal) with attached others	1	.2
15. Male headed (no female) nuclear with attached others	2	.4
16. Male alone	4	.9
17. Female alone	6	1.3
18. All siblings	3	.6

NB.: The number of households total 464 thus making an average of 6.8 persons per household.
The total nuclear units form 76.3% of the total, including those households missing one spouse but classified as nuclear in that no other persons are attached.
Despite variations, the extended families form 13.0% of the total, and compound families form 7.7% of the total.

Table IV.2: Household Types According to Annual Income.

Household Type	Income Category* Low 1	2	3	4	5	High 6	7
Nuclear	80.7%	70.1%	69.3%	59.3%	48.9%	48.5%	43.6%
Extended	7.3	17.3	17.8	20.9	22.2	30.3	25.6
Other	7.3	.8	2.0	0.0	2.2	0.0	2.6

*For the intervals in dollars of the income categories, refer to Table 5 in Chapter 2.

Table IV.3: Type of Marriage According to Year of Marriage.

Year of Marriage	Type of Marriage: Arranged	Partially Arranged	Elopement
1911 - 1915	2 (66.3%)	1 (33.3%)	-
1916 - 1920	10 (100.0)	-	-
1921 - 1925	11 (68.7)	4 (25.0)	1 (6.2%)
1926 - 1930	17 (77.3)	2 (9.1)	3 (13.5)
1931 - 1935	37 (86.0)	4 (9.3)	2 (4.6)
1936 - 1940	57 (75.0)	7 (9.0)	12 (16.0)
1941 - 1945	72 (75.0)	15 (15.6)	9 (9.4)
1946 - 1950	52 (49.0)	26 (24.5)	28 (26.5)
1951 - 1955	62 (50.0)	29 (23.4)	33 (26.6)
1956 - 1960	74 (52.4)	37 (26.2)	30 (21.2)
1961 - 1965	48 (33.5)	46 (32.1)	49 (34.4)
1966 - 1970	54 (42.2)	42 (32.8)	32 (25.0)

Appendix V: Summary of Local Government Ordinances.

The following is a general paraphrasing of those portions of the Local Government Ordinance, Chapter 150, which are particularly relevant in the Bush Lot political context.

The Village Council is "entrusted with the management of the administrative and financial business of the village and with its government generally."

Each village council consists of 6 to 9 members, two-thirds elected and one-third appointed by the Local Government Board. The appointed members must reside in the village or within a five mile radius of it, and must vacate their seat if they fail to attend meetings for three consecutive months; if they resign; if they are judged insolvent; if they are sentenced by the courts to imprisonment for more than twelve months or to death; if they cease to reside in the village or within the five mile radius; or if they engage in any contract with the council in which they are monetarily interested.

Any person can stand for election if they have been resident within a five mile radius of the village for a twelve month period prior to the election; if they can read and write English; if they are registered voters in the village; and if they are under no legal incapacity. An elected councillor must vacate his seat for the same reasons which force an appointed member to do so, except that in this case the council must declare the seat vacant and inform the Local Government Board which makes the declaration. Also, if the council fails to declare the seat vacant, the Board can do it itself.

The franchise for the election of the councillors is extended to anyone who has attained the age of 21; is under no legal incapacity; is a citizen; and is a proprietor of land or a building within the village which has a value of not less than $50. Each voter is allowed one vote for every seat to be filled.

From among the councillors who have been appointed or elected, there is elected a chairman and deputy chairman. The chairman (or in his absence, the deputy) exercises all the executive powers of the council between any two regular monthly meetings. His actions however, must be reported to the council at the next meeting and the council can declare them null and void. The chairman also presides at all council meetings in which every question is decided by a majority vote. In the case of a tie the chairman has the casting vote.

Chairman and council members are not personally liable for anything done within their jurisdiction.

When twelve registered voters of a village district represent to the Local Government Board that the "continuance in office of the village council is prejudicial to the welfare of the inhabitants of the village," the Board can direct an inquiry to be made and then declare the village council to be dissolved, appoint new persons to carry out the functions of the council, and order a new election.

A village council can also represent to the Board that the continuance in office of a particular councillor is prejudicial, and the same procedure is followed.

The Local Government Board sets the quorum for the council which in turn is allowed to set up committees for the transaction of business. The local authority however, can disapprove of the committee actions and declare them null and void.

A local authority, subject to the approval of the Board, can appoint persons to be overseer, assistant overseer, clerk, or other official in order to carry out the powers and functions of the authority. The duties of these persons are fixed by by-laws which the council passes or by a definition of his duties by the council.

No employee can engage in a contract with the local authority in which they are financially interested.

The overseer or assistant overseer is the collector of rates and rents in the village district and functions as the clerk of the council.

No employee of the council can be dismissed without prior approval of the Local Government Board.

All property belonging to the village district is vested in the local authority as are the rates, rents and revenue from these properties. The council thus manages and controls the property and monies of the district.

In addition all Crown land, and undivided portions of land such as pastures, dams, sluices, roads and bridges, are under the control of the local authority which can let all resources to any person at a rent fixed by the authority and approved by the Local Government Board.

The authority may take action against defaulting rent payers by seizing the renter's moveable property, repossessing the rented land and all things (e.g., crops, provisions) on the land.

The council can fix fees for animals kept on village common lands and charge tolls for the use of dams, bridges, trenches, etc.

The local authority or the Local Government Board is responsible for ordering an appraisal to be done on freehold land in order to fix rates according to property value. The assessment and amount of rates are embodied in an annual estimate of expenditure prepared by the council and submitted to the Local Government Board for approval. The estimate is then considered binding on the persons concerned (village proprietors, the council, etc.) and the rate is then levied by the authority. The only lands not subject to the annual rate are Crown land and buildings, the land and buildings of churches and schools, and burial grounds.

With the approval of the Board however, the local authority can exempt, on the grounds of the poverty of the proprietor, any lot or building from the payment of rates.

Failure to pay rates enables the local authority to levy on all the moveable property of the proprietor for recovery, or to proceed by parate execution against the lot and/or building if it can be shown that there was not sufficient moveable property to pay the debt.

The officer of the local authority instituting these proceedings cannot be sued for mistakes made, and the death, resignation, etc., of the officer does not halt the proceedings.

The officer however, cannot purchase directly or indirectly any property sold at execution sale (except to protect the interests of his family) although the local authority is permitted to purchase property thus sold for the benefit of the village.

The purchaser of a lot at execution sale receives transport for the lot - i.e., legal proof of ownership.

The major responsibilities of the local authority are to maintain dams, trenches, kokers, and be generally responsible for the drainage of the district. In addition, the local authority is responsible for controlling and providing a pure water supply for the domestic use of residents, and preventing any formation of stagnant pools of water such as might occur in a poorly drained trench.

The council is responsible for preventing the flooding of the district and the wastage of water. In this capacity they are permitted to require any proprietor to repair and maintain any dams, trenches, or sluices which might obstruct the carrying out of these responsibilities.

The local authority is permitted to pass by-laws concerning the manner and place in which any trade or manufacture can be carried out within the district. They thus prescribe the conditions under which machinery may be erected; they can inspect any trading or manufacturing premises; they may provide a market place within the district and charge rents and tolls for the use of stalls; and they may prohibit the selling of meat and fish in the district except in the marketplace.

The council can provide slaughter houses and pass by-laws with respect to their management; erect and maintain bath and wash [illegible]; charge fees for graves in the burial ground; and impound animals straying or grazing in any public place by authorizing persons to do so.

A local authority is permitted to purchase, lease, or mortgage any lands situated within or out of the district and is permitted to sell any lands which it bought - subject to the approval of the Local Government Board.

The local authority is also permitted to rent out any lands it possesses and an authority can borrow any sum of money using the rates as security, or can mortgage these rates for the repayment of loans.

The authority is permitted to make agreements with neighbouring plantations or landowners for the purpose of improving the drainage of the district, and enter into contracts for the obtaining of materials and supplies to carry out public works. Any contract over $100 however, must be approved by the Board.

The Local Government Board, on behalf of the village district, may boorow money from the government using the rates and property of the district as security, and may make free grants to an authority with funds derived from the government for purposes of carrying out works in the district which the latter could not otherwise afford.

The books and accounts of the local authority are under the care of the overseer and audits are periodically carried out by the Audit Department of the government.

All money received by the overseer on behalf of the local authority must be transmitted to the District Commissioner who banks it for them. Each week the overseer is responsible for making out a pay-sheet in which the expenses of the week are listed (workmen's salaries, material bought, etc.). This sheet must be countersigned by two members of the council, at which point it is transmitted to the District Commissioner for payment. The latter can refuse to certify a paysheet if it appears that there is an irregularity, and the matter is reported to the Board.

In cases where there is a need to perform emergency works not specified in the annual estimate, the local authority is permitted to begin these works, but must submit a supplementary estimate to the Board for its approval.

Offences against the local authority such as occupying land without permission, damaging the authority's property, obstructing dams or trenches, assaulting a member of the council, cutting a dam, opening or closing a koker without the authority's permission, removing earth from any public place without permission, and offences against the authority's by-laws in general, are punishable by the council through the payment of fines. In turn, the local authority is responsible for any damages it causes to persons or property, and compensation must be paid.

Legal action can be instituted against a local authority and the chairman represents the authority in court. No officers or members are liable whenever acting in the capacity of authority members. If legal action is taken against them, the local authority pays their expenses.

The Local Government Board is a "corporate body with perpetual succession and a common seal, and with the power to sue and be sued and to hold lands."

The Board is composed of the Commissioner of Local Government, the Director of Medical Services, the President of the Village Chairman's Conference, two persons who are members of Village or Country Authorities, one person nominated by the Sugar Producers' Association, and four other persons.

Appendix VI: Bush Lot Village District Approved Estimate and Rate 1970.

EXPENDITURE:

I. SALARIES:			
1. Overseer $2160. x $120. - $3168 @ $230 per month		$2,760.00	
2. Asst. Overseer $1584. x $72 - $2016 @ $144. "		1,728.00	
3. Temporary Clerical Asst. 3 months @ 94. "		282.00	
4. Ranger No. 1 $720. x $48 - $1296 @ $108. "		1,296.00	
5. Ranger No. 2 $720. x $48 - $1296 @ 96. "		1,152.00	
6. Ranger No. 3 $720. x $48 - $1296 @ 92. "		1,104.00	
7. Dragline Operator 3000 hours at 90¢ per hour		2,700.00	
8. Dragline Greaser 1000 hours at 40¢ per hour		400.00	
9. Dragline Watchman 30 weeks at $21. per week		630.00	12,052.00
II. DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION:			
1. Cleaning trenches, levees, drains, etc.		2,200.00	
2. Cleaning fresh water trenches		900.00	
3. Building and repairing sluices and kokers		2,500.00	
4. Forcing Armadale Channel		250.00	
5. Building stop-offs, digging trenches, levees		1,600.00	
6. Digging 16,000 cu. yds L.A. trenches @ 25¢ each		4,000.00	11,450.00
III. ROADS:			
1. Maintenance of Roads, streets, etc.		2,300.00	
2. Maintenance and erection of gates, bridges, barriers, etc.		300.00	
3. Maintenance of One Mile Road		1,500.00	4,100.00
IV. PURE WATER SUPPLY:			
1. Maintenance of Overhead Tank - Arrears 1966		3,808.93	
2. Maintenance of Overhead Tank - Arrears 1967		3,865.86	
3. Maintenance of Overhead Tank - Arrears 1968		3,870.00	
4. Maintenance of Overhead Tank - Arrears 1969		3,800.00	
Arrears Instalment 1967 - 1970: (Loan of $9,268.00)			
5. First Instalment	1967	1,853.60	
6. Interest	1967	389.26	
7. Second Instalment	1968	1,853.60	
8. Interest	1968	389.26	
9. Third Instalment	1969	1,853.60	
10. Interest	1969	389.26	
11. Fourth Instalment	1970	1,853.60	
12. Interest	1970	389.26	
13. Overdue Interest	1967	129.75	
14. Overdue Interest	1967-1968	259.50	
15. Overdue Interest	1967-1969	389.25	
16. Adjustment on arrears owing by L.A. 1965		20.50	
		$25,115.23	
By Payment of 50%			12,557.61
CARRIED FORWARD			$40,159.61

Appendix VI continued

BROUGHT FORWARD		$40,159.61
V. WIRE FENCE:		
1. Maintenance of Wire Fences		500.00
VI. RENTS - CROWN LANDS:		
1. Agricultural Lease No. A 5032	157.70	
2. Agricultural Lease no. 719/66	111.50	269.20
VII. ELECTION EXPENSES:		400.00
VIII. VILLAGE OFFICE AND WATCH HOUSE:		
1. Stationery, Books, Registers & Stamps	400.00	
2. Painting of Facing and Windows of Office and erection of Vault	700.00	
3. Maintenance of Office and Watch Houses	500.00	
4. Insurance of Office, Furniture & Fittings	62.50	1,622.50
IX. MISCELLANEOUS:		
1. Travelling and Subsistence Allowances	400.00	
2. Subscription to Official Gazette	9.00	
3. Contribution to L.A. Guarantee Fund	5.00	
4. Contribution to G.A.L.A.	32.50	
5. Contribution to West Berbice Union of Local Authorities	49.00	
6. Contribution to Guyana Tuberculosis Society	15.00	
7. Contribution to Guyana Red Cross Society	15.00	
8. Contribution to Infant Welfare & Maternity League	20.00	
9. Contribution to National Insurance Scheme	1,500.00	
10. Contribution to Guyana Republic Celebrations	350.00	
11. Contribution to U.G. Appeal Fund	100.00	
12. Tea and light refreshments for members attending meetings	72.00	2,567.50
X. LAW COSTS:		
1. Execution Sales and Civil Action	3,000.00	
2. Retaining Counsel in Law Suits	300.00	
3. Retaining Counsel to obtain Transport for Dams, Streets, etc.	400.00	3,700.00
XI. SANITARY WORKS:		400.00
XII. MAINTENANCE OF DRAGLINE:		
1. Purchase of Fuel, Grease, Oil & Spares	3,300.00	
2. Minor Repairs	300.00	3,600.00
XIII. LOAN ACCOUNTS:		
1. Balance 1964 - 1968 Loan Accounts	22,634.97	
2. Interest 1970	1,584.45	
	24,219.42	
By Payment of 50%		12,109.71
XIV. OUTSTANDING ACCOUNTS:		5,611.77
XV. OUTSTANDING PAYSHEETS:		5,832.91
XVI. CONTINGENCIES:		2,512.70
		$79,325.90

Appendix VI continued

Bush Lot Village District: Ways and Means 1970

I. RATES:			
1. Appraised Value of Lots		$184,045.00	
2. Less L.A. Property	$3,985.00		
3. Less Property exempted from rates	720.00	4,705.00	
		$179,340.00	
7% of $162,585.00 (Secs. A - D; H - K)		11,380.95	
10% of 12,600.00 (Secs. E & F)		1,260.00	
16% of 3,675.00 (Sec. G houselots)		588.00	
10% of 480.00 (Sec. G House and Cul. Lots)		48.00	
		$13,276.95	
Estimated Collection 80%			10,621.56
II. ARREARS RATES:			
1. Amount Collectible		11,663.92	
Estimated Collection 90%			10,497.53
III. RENTS:			
1. 10 Houselots at $8.00 each		80.00	
2. 18 Cultivation Lots at $10. each		180.00	
3. 653 acres New and Jib Lands at $8.00 each		5,224.00	
4. 1110 acres New Empolder at $8.00 each		8,880.00	
		14,364.00	
Estimated Collection 70%			10,054.80
IV. ARREARS RENTS:			
1. Amount Collectible		34,734.50	
2. Less amount for lands not rented out in 1969 - 150 acres at $8.00	$1,200.00		
3. Less amount to be written off	3,200.78	4,400.78	
		30,333.72	
Estimated Collection 95%			28,817.03
V. RENTAL OF STREETS:			
1. Rental of Portion of First Street in Sec. A			6.00
VI. ARREARS WATER FEES:			789.11
VII. TOLLS:			1,500.00
VIII. CONTRIBUTION FROM T. & H.D.:			9.14
IX. MISCELLANEOUS:			100.00
X. LAW COSTS:			3,000.00
XI. SALE OF LOTS:			3,904.24
XII. DRAGLINE HIRE SERVICE:			10,000.00
XIII. CASH ON HAND:			26.49
			$79,325.90

Appendix VI continued

Bush Lot Village District: Dragline Estimate 1970.

I. SALARIES AND WAGES:		
1. Operator - 3000 hours at 90¢ per hour	$2,700.00	
2. Greaser - 1000 hours at 40¢ per hour	400.00	
3. Watchman - 30 weeks at $21. per week	630.00	3,730.00
II. FUEL, ETC.:		
1. Petrol, Fuel, Oil, Spares, Grease etc.	3,300.00	
2. Minor Repairs	300.00	3,600.00
III. INSURANCE:		250.00
IV. LOAN REPAYMENTS:		
Loan of $28,000.00 from the Guyana Credit Corporation for the purpose of purchasing one 10RB Dragline from Messrs Sprostons Limited to carry out internal development works in the village.		
Loan granted on the 13th of December, 1963, repayable over 5 years.		
1. Balance 1964 1968 Loan Account	22,634.97	
2. Interest - 1970	1,584.45	
	$24,219.42	
By Payment of 50%		12,109.71
V. RESERVE FUND FOR DEPRECIATION:		5,000.00
VI. CONTINGENCIES:		1,310.29
		$26,000.00

Ways and Means:

HEAD I.	
1. Digging 16,000 cubic yards of trenches for Local Authority at 25¢ per cubic yard	4,000.00
2. Reconditioning 6000 rods of trenches at $2.00 per rod	12,000.00
HEAD II.	
1. Hire of Dragline	10,000.00
	$26,000.00

Appendix VII: Social Characteristics of the Original Bush Lot Settlers.*

(a) Characteristics of the Immigrants.

1. Age on Arrival.

1-5	years	49 persons
6-10	"	26 "
11-15	"	25 "
16-20	"	105 "
21-25	"	148 "
26-30	"	67 "
31-35	"	24 "
36+	"	2 "

2. Sexual Distribution.

Male	284
Female	164

3. Religion.

Hindu	363
Muslim	82
Christian	1

4. Year of Arrival in Guyana.

1871	18
1872	12
1873	23
1874	26
1875	11
1876	11
1877	11
1878	38
1879	18
1880	13
1881	11
1882	15
1883	2
1884	32
1885	50
1886	11
1887	27
1888	17
1889	13
1890	6
1891	4
1892-94	0
1895	1
1896	1

5. Ship of Arrival.

The 452 immigrants arrived on 106 different ships.

42	ships had persons alone
33	ships had 2-3 persons
7	ships had 4-5 persons
8	ships had 6-7 persons
1	ship had 8-9 persons
3	ships had 10-11 persons
6	ships had 12-13 persons
3	ships had 16-17 persons
2	ships had 27 persons
1	ship had 32 persons

Total: 106 ships.

Appendix VII continued

6. Major caste groups of the settlers.*

Brahmin	4
Kshatriya	24
Kayastha	1
Baniya	7
Cultivator	62
Grazier	30
Artisan	38
Trader	5
Fisherman	28
Menial/ Labouring	107
Madrasi	20
Miscella- neous north castes	36

*Settlers were divided into 56 further "sub-castes."

7. District of Birth of the Settlers.*

United Provinces	144
Bihar	81
Orissa	1
Bengal	4
Central Provinces	3
Rajputana	1
Punjab	1
South India/Madras	24
Other	72

* In terms of smaller geographic units, settlers came from 54 provinces of the above districts.

8. Plantations Indentured Period served at.

The 452 persons in the sample were scattered among 71 plantations for their indenture period.

14 plantations had persons alone who later received allotments.
22 plantations had 2 - 3 persons
9 plantations had 4 - 5 persons
14 plantations had 6 - 7 persons
2 plantations had 8 - 9 persons
3 plantations had 10-11 persons
3 plantations had 14-15 persons
2 plantations had 17 persons
1 plantation had 29 persons
1 plantations (Bath Estate) had 91 persons

Total: 71 plantations

Appendix VII continued

(b) Characteristics of Native-Born Allottees.

9. Year of Birth

1859	1	1867	8	1874	18
1860	1	1868	9	1875	11
1861-62	0	1869	7	1876	16
1863	2	1870	9	1877	15
1864	3	1871	6	1878	22
1865	7	1872	6	1879	18
1866	3	1873	11	1880	18
1881	19	1888	21	1895	5
1882	20	1889	21	1896	1
1883	26	1890	11	1897	23
1884	14	1891	19	1898	14
1885	20	1892	9	1899	13
1886	28	1893	4	1900	10
1887	25	1894	8		

10. Plantation of Birth.	Number of persons.
Bath Estate (West Coast Berbice)**	122
Enmore (East Coast Demerara)	114
Georgetown	37
Albion (Corentyne)	16
Melville (Wakenaam Island)	14
Peter's Hall (East Bank Demerara)	13
Belair (West Coast Berbice)	12
Port Mourant (Corentyne)	9
LBI (East Coast Demerara)	9
Ogle (East Coast Demerara)	8
Goedverwagting (East Coast Demerara)	7
Lovely Lass (West Coast Berbice)	7
Cove and John (East Coast Demerara)	6
Blairmont (West Bank Berbice)	5
Hope and Experiment (West Coast Berbice)	5
Greenfield (East Coast Demerara)	5
Helena (East Coast Demerara)	5
Windsor Forest (West Coast Demerara)	5
Triumph (East Coast Demerara)	5
Smythfield (West Canje)	4
Chateau Margot (East Coast Demerara)	4
Spring Hall (East Coast Demerara)	4
Industry (East Coast Demerara)	3
Supply (East Bank or Coast Demerara)	3
Uivlugt (West Coast Demerara)	3
Mon Repos (East Coast Demerara)	3
Eccles (East Bank Demerara)	3

Appendix VII continued

10. Plantation of Birth continued	Number of persons
La Bonne Mere (East Coast Demerara)	3
Turkeyen (East Coast Demerara)	3
Hope and Enterprise (East Coast Demerara)	3
Poudroyen (West Bank Demerara)	3
Ross (West Coast Berbice)	3
Clonbrook (East Coast Demerara)	2
Nouvelle Flanders (West Bank Demerara)	2
Better Hope/Vryheid's Lust (East Coast Demerara)	2
Herstelling (East Bank Demerara)	2
Number 22 Village (Corentyne)	2
La Grange (West Bank Demerara)	2
La Resouvenir (East Coast Demerara)	2
Cane Grove (East Coast Demerara)	2
Mon Pareil (East Coast Demerara)	2
Agricola (East Bank Demerara)	2
Goldstone Hall (Corentyne)	2
Versailles (West Bank Demerara)	1
Providence (East Bank Demerara)	1
Lusignan (East Coast Demerara)	1
Farm Demerara (East Bank Demerara)	1
Prospect (East Bank Demerara)	1
Number 72 Village (Corentyne)	1
Golden Grove (West Coast Berbice)	1
Paradise (West Coast Berbice)	1
Number 23 Village (West Coast Berbice)	1
Enterprise (East Coast Demerara)	1
Good Success (Wakenaam Island)	1
D'William (West Coast Demerara)	1
Jonestown (East Bank Demerara)	1
Rose Hall (Corentyne)	1
Nabaclis (East Coast Demerara)	1
Meadow Bank (East Bank Demerara)	1
Adelphi (East Canje)	1
Great Diamond (East Bank Demerara)	1
DeVillem & Zeebourg (West Coast Demerara)	1
Ruimveldt (East Bank Demerara)	1
Vreed-en-Hoop (West Bank Demerara)	1
Schoon Ord (West Bank Demerara)	1
Hague (West Coast Demerara)	1
Montrose (East Coast Demerara)	1
Nismes (West Bank Demerara)	1

*I am deeply indebted to Lesley Key for access to her raw data which enabled the presentation of the descriptive features of the Bush Lot allottees.

**The reader is referred to Map 2.2 (Chapter 2) to locate the "banks" and "coasts" of Guyana.

Appendix VIII: Characteristics of the Co-Operative Banks in West Berbice.

Table VIII.1: Share Capital in West Berbice Branches until 1926.

Amount of Capital	West Berbice Branches			
	Eldorado	Lichfield	Hopetown	Expectation
At Date of Registration	$420	$138	$100	$113
December, 1916	438	-	-	-
December, 1917	787	632	753	463
December, 1918	1355	889	1262	677
December, 1919	2135	1382	1548	742
December, 1920	4441	3262	2569	1000
December, 1921	4441	3262	2996	1011
December, 1922	4441	3262	2996	1016
December, 1923	4441	3262	2996	1050
December, 1924	4441	3283	3000	1118
December, 1926	4467	3322	3033	1186

Source: Report of the Banks Committee of the Local Government Board and the Co-Operative Credit Banks Established in the Colony for the Year 1921; 1922; 1924; 1926.

Table VIII.2: Number of Shareholders in the Banks by Year.*


	Number of Shareholders			
Bank	1921	1922	1924	1926
Eldorado	483	483	512	534
Lichfield	356	356	357	366
Hopetown	470	470	469	472
Expectation	317	317	185	194


Table VIII.3: Capital Loaned by the Banks, 1921-1930.*

	Year of Loans				
Bank	1921	1922	1924	1926	1930
Eldorado	-	-	$ 76	$2512	$ 345
Lichfield	-	-	412	2899	1450
Hopetown	$2781	-	262	1447	808
Expectation	136	$84	633	441	486

*Source: Report of the Banks Committee of the Local Government Board and the Co-operative Credit Banks Established in the Colony for the Year 1921; 1922; 1924; 1926; 1930.

Appendix IX: The Maraj Family Geneology: Relevant Personnel.





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