INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA

UMI®
800-521-0600

Wellington's Supply System during the Peninsular War, 1809-1814.

Tina M. McLauchlan
History Department
McGill University, Montreal
August 1997

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

ABSTRACT

Much of the success of the Allied Peninsular Army was due to the effectiveness of Wellington's supply system. The ability of Wellington to keep his army supplied presented him with an enormous advantage over the French. This paper examines the role logistics played in deciding the outcome of the war in the Peninsula as well as detailing the needs of the troops. The primary focus of this paper is the procurement, transport, and payment of supplies for the use of the Allied Army during the Peninsular War. Wellington's ability to consistently defeat French forces despite a substantial numerical disadvantage presents the thesis that the efficiency of Wellington's logistical system impacted the strategic situation to a significant degree. While superior logistics alone cannot win a war, their absence can lead to defeat, as the French learned to their detriment.

RESUME

Une grande partie du succès de l'armée alliée de la Peninsule fut due à l'efficacité du système d'approvisionnement de Wellington. La capacité de Wellington de ravitailler son armée lui conféra un avantage important sur les Français. Dans cette thèse est etudié le rôle joué par la logistique en ce qui concerne l'issu de la guerre dans la Peninsule ainsi que les besoins des soldats. Le thème principal de cette thèse est l'acquisition, le transport et le paiement des provisions de toutes natures pour l'usage de l'armée alliée pendant la guerre de la Peninsule. Le fait que Wellington pût vaincre régulièrement les forces Françaises en dépit d'un désavantage numérique considérable soutient la thèse que l'efficacité du système logistique de Wellington affecta d'une manière significative la situation stratégique. Même si la seule supériorité logistique ne saurait gagner une guerre, son absence peut entrainer la défaite, comme trouvèrent les Français à leur détriment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

The Peninsular War, fought predominantly in Portugal and Spain, was considered a sideshow to the main conflict in Europe. As a secondary theatre of war, however, the Peninsula was important in forcing the French to commit ever-increasing front-line troops in an effort to pacify this rebellious region. The troops sent to the Peninsula would become sorely missed once Napoleon launched his invasion of Russia in 1812. The inability of the French to capitalize on their vast numerical superiority led to a protracted war of attrition where increasing numbers fell to the British, the guerrillas, or to starvation.

Much has been written about the Napoleonic period in general, and the Peninsular War in particular. While Wellington's strategy and tactics, as well as those of his adversaries, have been meticulously disected, the more fundamental topic of logistics has been largely ignored. An army would cease to exist if it had no supplies. The gathering of those supplies dictates, to a great extent, the type of strategic options open to the commanding general. This paper is a study of the effect the method of supply has on the type of strategy available.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance and support of the many people who were involved in the completion of this paper, especially my advisor, Professor Hereward Senior of McGill University. His tremendous patience as we struggled to find a new thesis topic was invaluable. Though this thesis took a long time to come together, his advice and suggestions of sources made the task much more manageable. I would also like to acknowledge the great assistance rendered by the staffs of McLennan Library, McGill University, Montreal; the British Library, London; the Manuscript Room of the British Library, London; the Public Record Office, Kew; and the Insitute of Historical Research, University of London. I would like to thank my friends, Karl Hele, Fleur Woodward, and Meirion Todd for their generous assistance in proofreading my thesis. I would especially like to thank Mary McDaid, the Graduate History Coordinator at McGill University, for all of her assistance and encouragement. I would also like to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to the late Professor Robert Vogel of McGill University, without whose guidance and inspiration I would never have found the sheer enjoyment that can be found in history. He will always be missed. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my mother, Shirley McLauchlan, for always believing that I could do this.

CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION

Wellington's supply system greatly affected his success against the French during the Peninsular War. It was his ability to keep his troops supplied that enabled him to implement the strategy and tactics he desired. Supply is central to any military campaign yet its importance is rarely mentioned in the studies of those campaigns. The method of supply not only affects the efficiency of the army but often the strategy and tactics employed. If an army is to be effective, it must have the means available to feed and supply its troops. Without an efficient supply system, an army is unable to perform to the best of its ability.

While not as exciting to examine as battles, strategy, and tactics, supply is just as important, if not more so. One tends to forget to ask about what goes on behind the scenes of war-the less glamorous but still essential element of supply. While battles are the most obvious sign of success in the field, it is often what goes on off the fields of battle that plays the decisive role. Success undeniably comes with victory on the field but those victories are made possible by the work done off the field by the supporting organizations. The mark of a truly great commander is his ability to integrate the two areas of expertise.

Wellington was one commander who excelled at the art of supply. Many great commanders left the supply of their army in the hands of others. Wellington preferred to have control. No general considered in the first rank of battlefield commanders had planned logistics as carefully as Wellington had. He inherited a system of supply and only changed the outward forms slightly. The end result, however, was different from anything seen before. His staff was moulded by his dominant personality and their ties to their civilian organizations back in Britain were relaxed. There were also less rigid boundaries between individual responsibilities. Money was sent to Wellington instead of individual departments. He assumed total responsibility. This was an enormous personal risk. He was legally responsible and, if Parliament disagreed with his decisions, he could have lost his

personal fortune.[1] The fact that Wellington was willing to risk his personal fortune shows the depth of his belief in his ultimate success.

In this examination of Wellington's supply system, several important areas will be considered. The administrative structure may not be the first thing one thinks of when contemplating logistics but without an understanding of the hierarchy involved, it becomes virtually impossible to decipher the individual roles played by the characters concerned. To further this understanding, both the overall structure and that of the commissariat will be examined. The next item for consideration is the size of the army involved. It is necessary to get some idea of the numbers before the scale of operations can be understood. Likewise, a survey of the conflict is also essential since, without a knowledge of troop movements, there would seem to be no need for transport. Also, the scale of operations gives an idea of the distances involved in transporting the supplies. Next in importance are the supplies themselves. Without them, there would be no army. The basic requirements will be considered here. After supplies comes transport. Transport involves both getting the supplies to the Peninsula as well as getting them to the troops once on land. The most important element, however, is the payment of all of the above. Without money, there can be no troops, food, or transport. As always, the resources never seem to match the necessary expenses. Finally, a consideration of the French system is necessary. After all, what better system is there to measure against the success, or failure, of Wellington's system? The French system is generally held up to be the ideal in this period. It will be interesting to see how Wellington compares.

Importance of Supply

In many ways, supply is the most important part of a campaign and the general who uses his supply system most efficiently has a greater chance of victory. While it is very true that it is not logistics which defeats an army once battle is engaged, superior logistics will get an army to a battle in superior condition. Battles are often won or lost long before the

personal fortune.[1] The fact that Wellington was willing to risk his personal fortune shows the depth of his belief in his ultimate success.

In this examination of Wellington's supply system, several important areas will be considered. The administrative structure may not be the first thing one thinks of when contemplating logistics but without an understanding of the hierarchy involved, it becomes virtually impossible to decipher the individual roles played by the characters concerned. To further this understanding, both the overall structure and that of the commissariat will be examined. The next item for consideration is the size of the army involved. It is necessary to get some idea of the numbers before the scale of operations can be understood. Likewise, a survey of the conflict is also essential since, without a knowledge of troop movements, there would seem to be no need for transport. Also, the scale of operations gives an idea of the distances involved in transporting the supplies. Next in importance are the supplies themselves. Without them, there would be no army. The basic requirements will be considered here. After supplies comes transport. Transport involves both getting the supplies to the Peninsula as well as getting them to the troops once on land. The most important element, however, is the payment of all of the above. Without money, there can be no troops, food, or transport. As always, the resources never seem to match the necessary expenses. Finally, a consideration of the French system is necessary. After all, what better system is there to measure against the success, or failure, of Wellington's system? The French system is generally held up to be the ideal in this period. It will be interesting to see how Wellington compares.

Importance of Supply

In many ways, supply is the most important part of a campaign and the general who uses his supply system most efficiently has a greater chance of victory. While it is very true that it is not logistics which defeats an army once battle is engaged, superior logistics will get an army to a battle in superior condition. Battles are often won or lost long before the

first shots are fired. If an army has no food or ammunition, can they fight? Maybe. For a small amount of time. Can logistics affect the course of a campaign? Definitely. As with all things, the degree of importance played by logistics depends on the principals involved and how effectively they use their logistics. One thing is true, though, however effectively you utilise your resources; logistics are a point of vulnerability. A deficiency in one area could lead to a breakdown in all. The truly superior general understands this and works to prevent it from becoming a factor.

Armies relied on stores in depots, on regular convoys of transport, and on the goodwill of the inhabitants. Deprived of one of these for more than a few weeks, all power of movement is lost. Deprived of all of these for more than two days and they cease to be a military force.[2] Lack of proper forage for a few days could make cavalry unserviceable. The same is true for artillery.[3] It is worth remembering these facts as we consider Wellington's logistical problems.

Strategic Dilemma

Wellington realized, from his experience in India, that a military force which pays in hard currency will have many friends, even while operating in hostile territory. Indeed, Wellington refused to resort to requisition when his armies entered France while the French continued to requisition. The result was that the French civilians would rather do business with Wellington's army. Soult complained of French farmers smuggling beef to sell to the Allies.[4]

If an army is forced to rely on a system of requisitions, a prolonged occupation and a return to an exhausted area is impossible. The concentration of too large a force could not be maintained for long. The system of depots allowed Wellington to concentrate his forces for prolonged periods of time. With requisitions there is a risk of inflaming the countryside against you. Wellington's goal was to make the British army as independent as possible of

local resources. The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had started because France was unable to support her armies on French soil. The armies could only subsist by invading neighbouring countries. The wars would stop when the French were forced into France where their armies could not be supported.[5]

Should logistics dictate strategy? Or should strategy dictate logistics? That is the essential problem faced by both Wellington and the French. How they each decided to deal with the problem affected how they fared in the war. The French allowed their logistics to dictate their strategy and they were forced to deal with the consequences that entailed. Wellington took the other route and had his own consequences to face. After examining the evidence, we should be able to reach some conclusion about the efficiency of the relevant approaches.

CHAPTER II : ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

To appreciate the importance of supply during the Peninsular War, an understanding of the administrative structure is essential. An army cannot function without an administrative structure and its success is determined, in part, by the efficiency of that structure. In this chapter, the overall structure as well as that of the Commissariat will be examined.

To understand the limitations inherent in the system bequeathed to Wellington, an examination of the English attitude toward armies is necessary. The English had a deep-seated prejudice against the army. The wealthy disliked the army because it increased the amount they had to pay in taxes. The poor mistrusted it because the troops were used to quell riots and prevent smuggling in the absence of a police force.[1] Furthermore, the pay was low and the soldiers were billeted amongst the public. This mingling did not help the relations with the public since the soldiers were frequently drunken and rowdy. A constitutional jealousy dating from the Civil War also contributed to the prejudice against the army. The army was feared and Parliament worked at ensuring that the army had no power during peacetime.[2]

Overall

The army's command and allegiance were held by the Crown. This right was conceded after the Restoration. The command and allegiance of the army in the hands of the Crown was preferred to an army commanded by Parliament. Pay and supply, however, were controlled by Parliament. Moreover, discipline in the army was dependent on passage of an annual Mutiny Act which provided for court martials in peacetime. The Secretary of State was responsible for the size of the army and was answerable to Parliament. The troops could only be moved or billeted with the sanction of the minister responsible, usually the Secretary-at-War. Apart from the inner workings of the army, the administration was deliberately denied to military officers and was kept in civilian control.[3] Thus, what we see here is a structure whose necessary functions of command and maintenance were divided between two bodies of power who did not

necessarily always work well together. Parliament's ability to control the pay and supply of the army greatly limited the control of the Crown when, at any time, funds could be withdrawn by Parliament.

The Treasury played a dominant role in the maintenance of the army by releasing the necessary money through the "Ordinaries" in peace and the "Extraordinaries" in war. The Ordinaries were mostly part pay and allowances that were given to the Paymaster-General, a political office jointly held by two people. The Extraordinaries remained in the hands of a treasury official, the Commissary-in-Chief, whose subordinates were in the field with the army and made the necessary payments.[4]

The executive head of the military administration was the Secretary-at-War. His department, the War Office, was in control of movements, establishments, and pay rates. The Secretary-at-War was answerable to Parliament for the cost of the army. He was also responsible for settling disputes that arose from the clash of military and civilian interests.[5] He had control over the smaller subordinate departments and, even in war, it was usually impossible for military departments to get action from subdepartments unless approved by the Secretary-at-War.[6]

The Secretary-at-War carried on a continuous rivalry with the Board of Ordnance. The Master-General of the Ordnance was the principle military advisor and held a seat in Parliament. He was responsible for the manufacture and supply of cannon for the Royal Navy and the army, the supply of arms, ammunition and other military stores to the infantry and cavalry, and the survey and provision of maps for the United Kingdom.[7] The Board, itself, was a civil organization that was maintained by a separate vote from Parliament and had the power to make disbursements in unforseen emergencies not previously sanctioned by Parliament. They were paid, maintained, and organized as a separate force consisting of the artillery, the Royal Engineers, and the Royal Military Artificers, which were officered by engineers. Ordnance was not included with the army and they kept their numbers and costs separate from the infantry and cavalry. They clothed their men by large-scale contract, educated their own officers, and had their own commissaries, stores, physicians, and surgeons.[8]

The Horse Guards formed the office of the King in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the army. There were two assistants to the King, the Adjutant-General (A.G.) and the Quartermaster-General (Q.M.G.). These two assistants took over the functions of staff officers used in previous generations. The A.G.'s main duty was to ensure that the Commander's orders were carried out, even those issued through the Q.M.G.. He was responsible for issuing all orders and making up the returns and duty rosters. He was also responsible for the maintenance of discipline and the punishment of offenders. He was generally responsible for the drill of regiments and for seeing that infantry and cavalry were armed and that the army was properly clothed. In practice, the greater part of the army's administration was conducted by the Secretary-at-War, an M.P., corresponding with the regimental colonel's secretary.[9]

The Quartermaster-General was responsible for routes and camp equipage as well as matters relating to the cantonment and encampment of troops. He was also responsible for all matters that related to quarters, camps, marches, plans, and dispositions for defence. The general conveyance and embarking of troops was another of his responsibilities.[10] All requisitions for regimental transport and necessary field equipment had to be forwarded through him.[11]

Besides the large departments of state and the military offices at the Horse Guards, there were smaller civilian offices to look after other branches of administration. One such branch was the medical branch. There were three offices connected with the medical services: the Apothecary-General, the Purveyor-General, and the Medical Board. The Medical Board consisted of the Physician-General, the Surgeon-General, and the Inspector of Hospitals. The Apothecary-General was responsible for the supply of drugs, surgical instruments, and materials. The Purveyor-General supplied hospital clothing and bedding, wines, hospital tents, etc.. The Medical Board was responsible for nominations and promotions within the various departments.[12]

The Paymaster-General and his assistants were responsible for the transmission of money to the various regimental paymasters of the units. He was usually from three

to six months in arrears because of the immense difficulty of obtaining local hard currency. Issuing English money to the troops was useless since they had no way of spending it locally.[13]

The Storekeeper-General's department is one that deserves mention. He was responsible for the safekeeping and issue of all stores for the army, not including munitions and regimental clothing. No representatives were sent abroad, however, so the stores were forwarded to foreign stations and put under the control of the Commissariat.[14]

During wartime, another emphasis was laid upon each department. The directing influence during war was exercised by the Secretary of State. He spoke for the Cabinet and was the ultimate arbiter regarding the employment of the Army and Ordnance Corps and the manner in which they should be equipped, supplied, and maintained. A second Under-Secretary, a military officer, was added to the political Under-Secretary in 1809 to improve the connection with the military departments.[15]

The military office gained an importance not seen previously because of circumstances peculiar to the war. The presence of a Commander-in-Chief was the first circumstance. The Duke of York was appointed Commander-in-Chief in 1795. He was a capable administrator and had more influence than any previous Commander-in-Chief since the King commanded the army in person. He had a strong staff at the Horse Guards and was able to lay the foundation of a uniform system throughout the new army.[16] Of his many reforms, three are preeminent. The training of infantry and cavalry was standardised, military patronage of all ranks was taken over through the Military Secretary, and the useless and incompetent officers brought in during Yonge's tenure were dismissed.[17]

The Duke of York's powers as Commander-in-Chief were limited. He had direct authority over only the infantry and the cavalry of the line. Any authority over the Foot Guards that he possessed was coincidental to the fact that he was a colonel of a Guard regiment. He was unable to give orders to the Household Cavalry except through the

King and the colonels of the Horse and Life Guards. He had no control over artillery, engineers, and the supply services. Transport, either by sea or by land, was under the control of other departments. He also had no funds for the collection of intelligence.[18]

A third office, the Military Secretary, was created at the Horse Guards. The Military Secretary acted for the Commander-in-Chief in all areas of business that were not in the jurisdiction of the A.G. and the Q.M.G.. These areas included the vast patronage in appointing and promoting officers.[19]

The Horse Guards were brought into unwonted prominence because the war in 1803 began with the threat of invasion instead of a continental campaign. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the raising and organization of new levies, the preparation of the militia, volunteers and yeomanry, and the stationing of these troops. The Secretary of State was therefore able to look to the Horse Guards for military advice. He was also able to look to Ordnance for advice regarding fortifications. The brunt of Britain's defence fell on the Duke of York and his staff.[20]

The Adjutant-General's office was greatly enlarged when, in 1807, the responsibility for raising troops became his after the abolishment of the position of Inspector-General of the Recruiting Service.[21] His responsibilities extended to the internal condition of the troops while their movement came under the purview of the Quartermaster-General.[22] The Q.M.G.'s office was also greatly enlarged and the realisation arose that the Q.M.G. had to have training before assuming the position.[23] Previously, the Q.M.G. and his staff were responsible for hiring transport and labour for road-making while on active service. The Q.M.G. was dissociated from financial concerns which left him in a more independent position regarding the undertaking of his military duties. A body of engineers was formed to assist on active service. They were called the Royal Staff Corps and were controlled by the Q.M.G. and were responsible for temporary field-works.[24]

The Q.M.G. also enlarged the competence of his own office at the Horse Guards. By 1809, the Q.M.G.'s department consisted of the Q.M.G., the Deputy Q.M.G., five

Assistants, three Deputy-Assistants, a draughtsman, and seven clerks. This provided the government with a body of expert military opinion which could be consulted on questions beyond the purely departmental ones the Master-General could answer.[25]

In practice, the operational functions were divided between the A.G. and the Q.M.G.'s departments but control over them was kept firmly in Wellington's hands. The largest proportion fell to the Q.M.G. although traditionally the A.G. was considered the more important position. The fact that the Q.M.G. was responsible for all troop movements could be a possible explanation but it is more likely based upon the fact that Wellington saw George Murray, the Q.M.G., as a more reliable staff officer than the A.G., Charles Stuart.[26]

In time of war, the administration of the military was as follows: the Secretary of State directed, the Treasury financed, and a military staff devised the operations. The Secretary-at-War became merely a regulator of the army's affairs for the sake of the economy. The civil boards were no more than suppliers. The Secreatary of State was responsible for the employment and maintenance of the expeditionary forces abroad and for the selection of competent officers to command. The Commander delegated the power to hold courts martial and to issue warrants to settle expenses incurred. These powers made the Commander virtually a representative of the Secretary of State abroad. All representatives of the other departments looked to the Commander for their orders.[27]

In the field, there were also limitations placed on the Commander's control over his troops. The Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, although acting as Wellington's adviser, commanded the artillery on behalf of the Master-General of the Ordnance, not Wellington. Artillery, ordnance, and transport were not under Wellington's jurisdiction. Neither were the Royal Engineers who also reported to the Master-General of the Ordnance. Wellington's principal staff officers, the A.G. and the Q.M.G., were appointed as delegates to the army commanded by Wellington as opposed to Wellington himself. They were free to correspond directly with their superiors in London. The Commissary-General, although required to meet Wellington's supply requirements, was accountable to the Treasury.[28] The representatives from the civil departments had their

own standing orders regarding the acceptance of contracts, the discharge of accounts, etc. that the Commissary-General was strictly held to in the field. Where the Commander and their own instructions conflicted, the Commissary referred to his superior in London. Despite these limitations, the Commander had control over all the supporting departments.[29]

The Commander's headquarters comprised the following officers: the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, the Military Secretary, the Commissary-General, the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, the Commanding Royal Engineer, and the Inspector-General of Hospitals. The A.G. and the Q.M.G. were the channels through which orders were issued to the army. The Military Secretary was responsible for the financial business and officer appointments. The Commissary-General, a representative of the Treasury, was responsible for providing transport, food, forage, keeping stores and, with the Deputy-Paymaster-General, acting as army banker. The Officer Commanding Royal Artillery was responsible for providing all arms and ammunition and for acting as the Commissary's artillery adviser and, with the civil subordinate (the Inspector of the Train) represented the general interests of the Ordnance Department. The Commanding Royal Engineer was the storekeeper for the engineering tools and pontoons as well as being the expert consultant in siegecraft and defences. The Inspector-General of Hospitals, representing the Medical Board, Purveyor's Department, and the Apothecary-General, was responsible for all the medical arrangements. The Commander relied on these seven men for the movement, maintenance, and efficiency of his army.[30]

Commissariat

One of the most important components of the administration, and the one we are most concerned with, is the Commissariat. The commissaries were the representatives of the Treasury in the field. They were responsible for buying, storing, forwarding, and issuing. The commissary was a civilian subject to military discipline. He was responsible for settling all outstanding claims even after the army had embarked for home. Commissariat officers tended to come from the worst elements of the commercial world

(much like the army). Many joined for personal profit. There were, however, some respectable members, such as the sons of merchants or bank managers.[31] The commissariat was often seen as a place to make a living by those who could find no other means of subsistence.[32]

The responsibilities of the Commissariat can be divided into three sections. The first is the accumulation of sea-borne stores at the main bases. The second is the distribution, through an immense system of convoys, to the troops at the front. The third is the supplementation of the base-stores by the procurement of supplies in the area of operation. These supplies, however, were considered secondary since the main reliance was on the food ships which docked at Lisbon.[33]

The Commissary-in-Chief was the representative of the Treasury in London and was responsible for forwarding instructions from the Treasury to the Commissary-General in the field. The office, itself, was created in 1809. The Commissary-in-Chief was responsible for providing for the troops at home (except Ireland) bread and forage. The purchase of meat was originally in the hands of commanding officers but was transferred to the Commissary-in-Chief. He was also responsible for the various stores required by the barracks department and the departments of the Q.M.G., Inspector-General of Hospitals, and the Surgeon-General, as well as all supplies sent abroad by the Treasury from England for all armies and stations overseas. He was responsible for collecting accurate statistics of resources and means of communication both in Britain and in foreign countries where troops were stationed. He had general control over commissaries everywhere except the East Indies and Ireland.[34]

The chief of the Commissariat Department was responsible to the Commander for procuring supplies, hiring or purchasing transport, and negotiating the purchase of specie. He was also responsible for accounting to the Treasury for every transaction and was inundated with the daily correspondence of his department. The Commissary-General was the sole accountant and he became responsible for all his sub-accountants, whose appointment and removal was done without any prior consultation with him. He was also not given a previous knowledge of their characters or an assurance of their

ability or integrity.[35] In other words, he was essentially responsible for the actions of men he played no part in choosing. Their integrity, or lack thereof, was left in other hands while he was the one left to deal with the consequences of their actions. Wellington shared the Commissary-General's burden to an extent. Wellington was ultimately responsible for the maintenance of the army and his sanction was essential before any major step was undertaken.[36]

The Commissary-General was responsible for consulting with the Commander-in-Chief about the location of magazines, the quantity of supplies provided, as well as their removal and delivery. He was instructed to draw and negotiate Treasury Bills and was even responsible for those drawn on the Paymaster-General. He was responsible for the direction and control of all expenses, thus the fullest confidence of the Commander-in-Chief, as well as daily intercourse, was required.[37] Most important among his duties were the conveyance of all stores, heavy guns and siege materials, ammunition, field equipment, provisions and forage, transport of the sick, as well as clothing and other necessaries. Apart from the Commander, the Commissary-General was the only officer who was permitted to correspond directly with authorities of the country the army was occupying, in addition to the government back home.[38]

Fiscally, the Commissary-General was concerned with the control of the Extraordinaries. His subordinate, the Deputy-Paymaster-General (representing the joint Paymasters-General in London), dispersed the Ordinaries. In practice, since all Treasury money was kept together at Headquarters, no payments could be made without the authorization or warrant of the Commander, except in the case of routine payments. Since all money in the Chest passed through the account of the Commissary-General, he controlled both the Ordinaries and the Extraordinaries. The Deputy-Paymaster-General might have the Military Chest in his safekeeping but he drew a cheque upon the Commissary-General if he was required to withdraw money. Furthermore, if the Commissary-General and the Paymaster-General were separated, the Paymaster-General was obliged to give a periodical account of the contents of the Chest. Since the Extraordinaries included any type of expenditure not chargeable to the regiments in peacetime, expenses of the Medical and Purveyor's Departments (supplying and

transporting hospitals and stores) fell under his jurisdiction. The Commissary-General did not have any control over ordnance, however, since Ordnance accounted separately for its own money and had its own Paymaster.[39]

The Commissary-General had several officers working under him to ensure the smooth running of operations. Immediately under him were the Deputy Commissary-Generals. They were his representatives and the performed the duties of the Commissary-General in his absence. There were usually two Deputy Commissary-Generals. One was usually in charge of the mode of supplying the army and watching its component parts while the other was responsible for supervising the accounts and presenting them regularly.[40]

Assistant Commissary-Generals came next in rank after Deputy Commissary-General. They were responsible for the execution of commissariat duties. They distributed bread, forage, fuel, and other necessaries to the troops. They also ensured that articles of good quality and of the proper quantity were sent. They were responsible for the supervision of magazines and contractors with the intention of preventing fraud.[41]

In the overall commissariat structure, Deputy Assistant Commissary-Generals, or clerks with experience, were attached to brigades or regiments. Assistant Commissary-Generals were attached to divisions and acted as cash accountants. They had the superintendence over, and the responsibility for, supplying the brigades and regiments comprising their division. Deputy Commissary-Generals were attached to corps and had the same control over all of the troops under the General Officer's command to whom they were attached. He also acted on behalf of the Commissary-General and reported on the state of affairs in all divisions and brigades.[42]

The Commissariat was essential in the maintenance of the army. The dominant person was the Commissary-General. The feasibility of all operations was dependent on his ability to provide stores where and when they were needed. The Commissariat Department was divided into two branches: the Store Department and the Accounts Department. The Store Department procured, accumulated, and issued transport and

stores. The Accounts Department checked the accounts of the Store Commissaries upon the completion of each tour of duty. Both departments were subordinate to the Commissary-General and received equal rates of pay, however, not many commissaries of accounts accompanied the army.[43]

To be successful, armies were dependent upon the accumulation of stores gathered from an area much larger than the area of immediate occupancy. They relied not only on depots but on regular convoys of transport and on the goodwill of the inhabitants. An army would lose all power of movement if deprived of one of these requirements for more than a few weeks. An army would cease to be a military force if deprived of all of them for more than two days. The reliance on magazines limits the speed and scope of military operations. The armies of the French Republic stationed on the frontier were too immense to subsist through the use of traditional depots. Their only recourse was to requisition the necessary supplies to feed the troops. In 1792, France started to requisition supplies. Soon, requisitions and forced contributions were not sufficient to supply the troops and the armies were constrained to subsist by invading neighbouring states, not only for political or military reasons but by sheer economic necessity.[44]

"Forage" was a requisition by a military party carried out with the least inconvenience to the population. In the Peninsula, where the Wellington's army was primarily maintained through a system of magazines, British foraging parties were frequent. Requisitions were not uncommon and even embargoes were resorted to. The French army in Spain, although relying on a system of requisitions, kept depots for all types of stores throughout the country. Requisitions had been avoided because it antagonized the local population and even the French army could not afford to dismiss a hostile population. In Spain and Portugal, there was no comparable rise in agricultural production such as other Western European countries were experiencing, thus the requisition system underwent a few modifications.[45]

In peacetime, neither Portugal nor Spain had the ability to live at a level above subsistence at their agricultural production level. Furthermore, Portugal was forced to

import much of the food for Lisbon and Oporto. The dislocation of agriculture because of the war and conscription as well as the presence of two "large and voracious foreign armies" resulted in a shortage of food that could be had locally.[46]

The depot system was more expensive because it involved payment, by cash, within a reasonably short period of time from the date of transaction. Requisition did not have that obligation and was often no better than confiscation. The British used the depot sytem primarily. Britain was a rich country and her army usually acted in friendly territory. The British soldier was expected to receive his rations punctually and discipline rapidly deteriorated if they were not forthcoming. The depot system compensated for this characteristic. The system was also more amenable to the local population.[47]

The basis of Wellington's victories in Spain was the success of his supply and transport. Although the French had some supplies sent from magazines, they relied, for the most part, on what they could strip from the countryside. The Spanish countryside was not conducive to this method of supply. Wellington realized this fact.[48] It was impossible for the Peninsula to supply rations for the French army when you take into consideration the effect of an intrusion of around a quarter million French troops on top of the dislocation caused to agriculture by the war. The only way the French could have been fed was if the inhabitants had starved. Requisitioning increased the number of guerrillas more than any other factor. Requisitioning became less effective as the war continued. The smaller the crop yield, the smaller the French rations. The smaller the rations, the more siezed by force thus driving more men to join the guerrillas. Wellington could not have afforded to use requsitions because his most valuable asset was the goodwill of the Spanish and Portuguese people. He had to be supplied by magazines paid for with cash or credit.[49] From the beginning, he insisted that the stores brought up from the main bases were to be the primary means of supply for the troops. Requisitions would be subsidiary and would be paid for immediately, at least in some form.[50]

Strategically, Wellington's ability to concentrate his troops played a major role in his success. The success of the Commissariat in ensuring that Wellington could keep his troops concentrated for significant periods of time was the envy of the French. The French were only able to concentrate their forces until such time as they depleted the resources in the surrounding areas. The key to Wellington's success was his ability to keep his army intact while his enemy was forced to disperse theirs. His overall strategy was dependent upon this advantage.[51]

CHAPTER III : NUMBER OF TROOPS

Before the question of supply can be addressed, it is necessary to consider the troops themselves. The size of the forces involved as well as their composition and distribution are important. The Anglo-Portuguese forces will be examined as well as the Spanish. The arrangements existing between the British and Portuguese governments will be considered as well as any arrangements with the Spanish. A brief discussion of the progress of the war will also be included along with troop numbers.

Anglo-Portuguese

Without the help of the Portuguese army, Wellington would not have had the troops necessary to win the Peninsular War. In April 1809, before he sailed for Portugal, Wellington stipulated that he would need 60,000 men to defend Portugal against the largest army Napoleon would be able to send to the Peninsula. These troops would also be needed to aid in the liberation of Spain. It was not possible for Britain to field an army of that size and, despite all efforts, there were only six or seven weeks in which Wellington was able to field more than 40,000 effective British troops. The remaining 20,000 men could only have come from the Portuguese. Without the Portuguese troops, the allied army, after deducting essential garrisons, would have had a force barely large enough to defend Lisbon.[1]

Britain and Portugal had many ties in the past. They traded on a large scale with the Portuguese exporting raw wool and wine and receiving woollen goods and salt-fish in return. The British, for their part, were allowed to use the all-weather harbour at Lisbon. The port at Gibraltar was useful but it was not as well situated to protect convoys to the Caribbean and America as was Lisbon. The British had a vital interest in the security of Lisbon.[2]

In 1808, after Wellesley's defeat of the French at Vimeiro on 21 August, the Portuguese Regency asked for a British commander-in-chief. It was hoped that Wellesley would get the position but it was given to William Carr Beresford, a junior Major General. Beresford was given a local promotion to Lieutenant General in the British army and he

became a Marshal in the Portuguese. He reached Lisbon in March 1809, a month before Wellesley returned to command both armies.[3]

In April 1809, Wellesley received his command over the British forces in Portugal. At the same time, he was given orders that the Portuguese army was to be rendered capable of assisting the British troops. He was given the authority to make the requisitions deemed necessary by either himself or Beresford in order to make the Portuguese troops fit for service. The defence of Portugal was to be his first priority but, since the security of Portugal depended in large part on the security of the Peninsula as a whole, he was left to make any possible arrangements with the Spanish against their mutual enemy.[4]

Before Wellesley would be able to use the Portuguese troops, major reforms had to be instituted. The man responsible for these reforms was Beresford. Beresford's main problem was the state of the officer corps. He recognized that good leadership was essential if the troops were to perform to the best of their ability. The men were quite promising but the officers were "miserably bad". One of the problems was the age of the officers. Beresford had younger men replace the "most ancient" but it would take time to train them effectively. Beresford hoped that a subsequent rise in salary would be accompanying the promotions as an incentive but these measures were not adopted.[5]

To aid in the reform of the Portuguese army, Beresford was allowed to incorporate British officers into his ranks. The presence of British officers would serve as a check on some of the excesses of the Portuguese troops as well as inspiring confidence in the troops when facing the enemy. The Portuguese soldiers had more confidence in the British officers than in their own. Since speed was of the essence with respect to the reforms, the presence of British officers was essential.[6]

The British officers available to Beresford came under two categories. The first group, four majors and twenty captains, were given a higher rank in the British army and were given yet another rise in rank in the Portuguese army. The second group, up to two hundred officers at a time, served in the Portuguese army at a higher rank while maintaining their British regimental rank. Both groups were entitled to draw pay for both their British and

Portuguese ranks.[7] British officers served in every unit. Higher positions were left for Portuguese officers but British officers were to serve either immediately over or immediately under the officer. If a Portuguese general commanded a brigade, the colonels of his two regiments would both be British. These measures were very successful.[8] The difference between the two groups of British officers threatened to be a problem, though. Many of the officers in the second group expected a rise in their British rank as the first group of officers had received. Beresford feared that if this balance was not redressed, he would lose many of those officers. Beresford wanted all officers coming into the Portuguese army to be put on the same footing as well as was possible.[9]

Another aid in the reform of the Portuguese army was the influx of money from Britain. In December 1809, the British government agreed to pay the expenses of 20,000 men in the Portuguese army. The money would be paid to the Portuguese government which would, in turn, pay the troops. Wellesley considered this idea "impracticable" since you could not separate 20,000 men from the entire Portuguese army to be paid, equipped, etc. by Britain. The pay and provision for 20,000 men were set at £500,000 per annum or approximately £20,000 per month for each 10,000 men. The pay and allowances for British officers in Portuguese service was set at £100,000 per annum. They would be paid at different rates from the Portuguese officers which would be set according to the principles set by the Commander-in-Chief in Britain. The British were also to supply the ordnance, military stores, arms, ammunition, equipment, and clothing required by the Portuguese army.[10]

The Regency objected to the British intention of paying 20,000 troops outright. Instead, they preferred to receive a subsidy of £600,000 per annum. Even in 1809, that amount was insufficient and had to be increased by £100,000. When it was decided that 30,000 men would be needed in 1810, the subsidy increased to £960,000, of which £130,000 was allocated to the increase of pay for the Portuguese officers. This amount was inadequate and, for the remainder of the war, Britain provided an annual subsidy of £2 million. Most of this amount was provided as supplies. The Regency wanted the entire subsidy in coin and they resented the fact that the cash component was in Treasury Bills which were discounted by 20-25 per cent in Lisbon. They showed their disapproval of the situation by delaying the pay of

their troops. Consequently, the Portuguese pay was in arrears of six months to a year. Wellington urged that the entire subsidy be paid in the form of supplies. In his estimation, the Regency could raise the money necessary by reforming their taxation system and by regulating the money market in Lisbon.[11] The matter of subsidy will be considered when expenses are examined.

Spanish

The other important element in this equation was the Spanish army. The Spanish were necessary for both their numbers and their presence, especially when it became time to advance past the Spanish-Portuguese border. The Spanish army was in a poor state after the revolution in 1808. In the autumn campaign of that year on the Ebro, the supply situation was desperate. Even before the beginning of the campaign, the Spanish supplies were seriously low. Food was short, clothing was in rags, and there were hardly any tents, blankets, and greatcoats despite the wintry weather. The British blamed this situation on the inactivity of the government even though the Junta Central had ordered the provincial juntas to open a public subscription for clothing for the army. Citizens who made voluntary clothing donations were rewarded. The juntas were also authorised to order uniforms from civilian contractors. The Junta of Valencia was authorised to raise a loan of 2,000,000 reales from the propertied classes and issued orders for the increase in the production of saddles and muskets. The practical effect, however, was almost non-existent. This ineffectiveness was the result of the disruption caused by the French offensive of November-December 1808 or the neglect and incompetence of the provincial juntas. The Junta Central needed an effective authority. Because of widespread opposition, the only way to accomplish this would be a dramatic military victory. Considering the state of the Spanish army after the revolution, this victory was unlikely.[12]

Whenever the Spanish troops were defeated, which was usually whenever they took the field, their army had to be remade from virtually nothing. The casualties were frequently enormous and the levies lacked the necessary cohesion and discipline to retreat from the battlefield in good order. Defeat meant the disintegration of the army involved, with the

consequent loss of much equipment. Desertions were also common with the remnants of the army scattered across the countryside.[13]

The end of the war between the British and the Spanish reopened the communications with the Spanish empire. This enabled large consignments of bullion to arrive in Spain. Even with the bullion shipments, without support from Britain and America, the Junta would have been completely bankrupt. The revolution of 1808 compounded the logistical problems. The cost of Spanish mobilization was greatly increased while the effective use of resources was simultaneously disrupted. Much of the food and equipment reaching the troops was rotten or useless (from poor workmanship). The armies were expected to live off the countryside but much of the interior was too poor to support an army. When food was available, the civilians usually charged exhorbitant prices. The army also lacked an adequate transportation system. The drivers hired to transport goods were often unpaid and were therefore inclined to disappear with the goods at the earliest opportunity.[14]

In January 1811, Wellington stated that the Cortes had done nothing to raise, discipline, pay, or support an army. They were unable to act as a military body and he feared that the Spanish troops in Portugal would cause a war between the Spanish troops and the Portuguese inhabitants. Wellington saw the problem as being caused by the Spanish refusal to allow active interference by Britain in their affairs. He would have liked to have supported the Spanish army but he needed the power to tell the Spanish government that, unless the troops cooperated strictly with him, assistance would be withdrawn. The assistance could have been arranged in loans. He saw no chance of the Spanish being paid without British assistance.[15]

The British wanted the reform of the Spanish army. They thought that they would be able to impose order. An attempt was made to secure the command of the Spanish army. A proposal was also put forward by Henry Wellesley that Wellington be given control over the Spanish provinces bordering Portugal and the troops contained therein. It was also suggested, as had happened with the Portuguese army, that Spanish troops be put under the command of British officers. Wellesley's suggestion was rejected. It was unlikely that the Spanish would be willing to serve under British officers.[16] Wellington, himself, believed that there would be no good in his being given command or for British officers to be used in the Spanish army

unless the Spanish were provided for properly. This would include regular pay, food, and whatever else was needed.[17]

Survey of War

One of the biggest problems faced by all of the armies concerned was the difference between the army on paper and the army in reality. The effective strength of the army was always lower than the strength of the army on paper. It is this problem which must now be addressed.

Before the arrival of the British on the Peninsula, the regular Spanish forces were organised into the 35,000 man Army of Galicia, 6500 Army of Valladolid, 34,000 Army of Andalusia, 10,000 Army of Granada, 17,000 Army of Valencia, 21,000 Army of Catalonia, and a 9000 man force at Saragossa. Britain landed an expeditionary force of 14,000 men at Mondego Bay on 1 August 1808. They were joined by 2000 Portuguese as they advanced from Lisbon.[18] Wellesley defeated the French at Roliça on 17 August 1808. On 21 August, the British defeated Junot at Vimeiro but, instead of pursuing the French, Wellesley's superiors signed the Convention of Cintra on 30 August. Napoleon reorganised the French army in September. The Spanish also attempted to reinforce their army but they were hampered by the lack of a central command, provincial jealousies, and the inability of several generals to cooperate with each other. In October, Sir John Moore began leading the British troops to link with the Spanish on the Ebro. On 6 November, Napoleon took personal command of the French army and, after a succession of defeats, the Spanish army was broken. Moore decided to return to Portugal once the news of the Spanish defeats reached him. On 19 December, Napoleon set off after Moore. Moore's army reached Corunna on 11 January 1809. On 16 January Soult attacked Moore. Moore was killed but his army was able to escape.[19]

French strength in Spain totaled 288,551 as of 1 February 1809. At this time, Wellesley fielded a force of 26,000 British and Hanoverian troops with 16,000 Portuguese under Beresford's command.[20] The effective strength of the British troops in Portugal as well as those embarked and under orders for Foreign service in April 1809 was 23,455.[21]

Wellesley was exonerated over his role in the Convention of Cintra and he returned to take command of the combined Anglo-Portuguese army. On 12 May, Wellesley attacked Oporto and forced Soult to retreat. After joining with the Spanish General Cuesta on 17 July, Wellesley began a march along the Tagus to Madrid. At the battle of Talavera, 27-28 July, the French were repulsed but Wellesley was forced to withdraw to Portugal. Wellesley was created Viscount Wellington of Talavera for his success. In October, Wellington ordered the construction of defensive fortifications 25 miles north of Lisbon. These were the Lines of Torres Vedras.[22]

In the weekly state of the army of 1 November 1809, the number of effective troops differed quite substantially from the total number of troops. For the rank and file, of 32,036 total men, only 21,851 were counted as effective. Of the number of men ineffective, 9016 were listed as sick. The other 1169 were on command or missing.[23] Included in the sick were the casualties from Talavera, about 1500, and the convalescents at Lisbon and Elvas, approximately 1700. This would still leave about 6000 sick in an army of 30,000 men. Wellington stated that the sick list amounted to at least ten men of every hundred in all times and places. In other words, 3000 men out of a total of 30,000. Wellington had twice the normal number of soldiers on the sick list so he requested an additional 3000 men to make an efficient operating army of 30,000 men.[24]

Another 100,000 French troops crossed the Pyrenees during the winter of 1809-1810. This brought the total number of French troops in Spain to 324,996 as of 15 January 1810.[25] Massena was appointed commander of the French Army of Portugal on 17 April. He took command a month later. In July Massena captured Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida forcing Wellington to withdraw before him.[26] When the British withdrew behind the Lines of Torres Vedras on 10 October, they had a total force of 42,000 British (35,000 effective), 27,000 Portuguese regulars (24,000 effective), 12,000 Portuguese militia, 20-30,000 ordenança (of little value except for guerrilla warfare), and 8000 Spanish. This gave Wellington a total of about 60,000 regular troops and about 20,000 more who could fight behind the earthworks. The first line of defence only required 20,000 men which left the rest of the field army free to reinforce threatened points or to make counterattacks. The field army was kept mostly in two masses on the centre and the right so that the whole could be assembled in a few hours.[27]

In April 1811, Wellington began the sieges of Almeida and Badajoz. Massena, after an attempt to relieve Almeida, was defeated at Fuentes de Oñoro on 3-5 May. On 16 May, Soult was also driven back at Albuera after an attempt to relieve Badajoz.[28] By 1 July 1811, the strength of the Allied Army in the field had greatly increased. The grand total of the effective rank and file was 51,049. This total included the rank and file of both the British and the Portuguese armies. The Spanish brought another 42,000 effective troops which brought the total to 93,000.[29]

Wellington began the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo on 8 January 1812. On 19 January Ciudad Rodrigo was stormed and captured. The siege of Badajoz was started on 17 March and was captured on 5 April. Wellington advanced into Spain. He defeated Soult at Salamanca on 22 July and on 12 August the British entered Madrid. The convergence of the French army, however, forced him to withdraw towards Portugal. On 22 September, Wellington was appointed supreme commander of the Spanish armies to the dismay of many Spanish generals. Wellington re-entered Ciudad Rodrigo on 19 November to bring the year's campaigning to an end.[30]

By 31 January 1813, Wellington hoped to take the field with 70,000 British and Portuguese troops. He thought that he would be able to field 40,000 British and possibly 25,000 Portuguese.[31] During that year, the marching strength, all ranks, reached 81,276.[32] At the beginning of the 1813 campaign season, Wellington commanded about 172,000 allied troops in the Peninsula. At this time, the French still fielded over 200,000 effective troops.[33] Wellington defeated Joseph at Vitoria on 21 June then turned his attention to the fortresses of Pamplona and San Sebastien. Soult launched a counter-attack on 20 July but lost at the battle of the Pyrenees between 26 July and 1 August. On 31 August, Soult's attempt to relieve San Sebastien was beaten back by the Spanish. San Sebastien was taken by the British and Soult was forced to withdraw to a defensive position along the River Bidassoa. Wellington crossed the Bidassoa between 7-9 October. Pamplona was captured on 25 October.[34]

Wellington pushed Soult back into France on 10 November and followed him. On 9-13 December Wellington crossed the Nive and forced Soult to retreat further. In February 1814, Wellington left part of his army to invest Bayonne while he set off in pursuit of Soult.

Wellington defeated Soult at Orthez which enabled the British to occupy Bordeaux. Wellington heard of Napoleon's abdication on 12 April and hostilities ended.[35] By the time Wellington's forces crossed into France, he had 36,000 British, 23,000 Portuguese, and 4000 Spanish troops, a total of about 63,000 under his command. By the end of the campaign, 26,798 British and 17,604 Portuguese were involved.[36]

The Spanish Army, when comparing the numbers from 1808 and 1814, shows an interesting development. In 1808, the establishment strength was 182,855 while the actual strength was 130,578 (men only).[37] It is interesting that, even after all the years of war, the numbers remained virtually the same. In March 1814, the total strength of the Spanish army was 184,158 with a disposable strength of 130,821 men.[38] The numbers for the British and the Portuguese forces increased but the Spanish, despite their many defeats during the war, were able to maintain their numbers. With respect to supply, the numbers of troops dictates the quantity of supplies needed to support the army as well as the time it takes to supply those troops. It is necessary to consider the number of troops when examining the question of supply.

CHAPTER IV : SUPPLIES

Supplies are the lifeline of an army. Without supplies, an army is unable to march or fight. Indeed, their very existence is called into question. The provision of these supplies and their transport to the troops forms the crux of the dilemma. The increase in the Allied forces during the war put a strain on an already taxed system. How successful was the supply system in the Peninsula? Did it meet the needs of the troops? How did the supplies reach the forces in the field? How were they paid for? These are all questions that need to be addressed when considering the role played by the Commissariat during the Peninsular War.

To determine the level of success reached by the Commissariat, several areas must be addressed. The first area of interest concerns the origin of the supplies. Within this subject, an account of the type of supplies is needed as well as imported and local sources of supply. The second area concerns the question of transport. Within this topic, transport by water and by land will be examined; both ocean- and river-going supply lines as well as land transport by locally-hired carts and mules. The role played by the Royal Waggon Corps and Train will also be considered. The final area concerns the method of payment. The expenses of Wellington's army as well as his resources will be examined.

General Requirements of the Troops

When considering the supplies sent to the troops, it is important to determine the type of supplies needed. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, only the most important supplies will be examined. These supplies consist of bread, meat, and alcohol for the men; and forage for the animals. These are the supplies that were most vital to the survival of both the men and their mounts or transportation.

Wellington's Commissariat was responsible for procuring and transporting supplies for the troops. These supplies came from a variety of sources. Both overseas and local sources will be examined for each of the sources concerned. The proportion of overseas vs.

local supplies depends on the item concerned. For some, overseas sources were more efficient while for others, local sources were.

In a General Order of 31 July 1808, Wellington set the rations of the men and the horses. For the men, the rations for one man per day were one pound of bread or biscuit and one pound of meat, either salt or fresh. If the soldiers received fresh meat, they were not entitled to wine or spirits. If they had salt meat, they were to receive a pint of wine or one quarter of a pint of spirits. The women following the troops, six for every hundred man company, would receive half a ration every day. Children would receive a quarter ration. No spirits or wine were issued to the women or children. For the horses, they were to receive a ration of ten pounds of hay and ten pounds of oats if they should be delivered. If there were none in store, they would receive fourteen pounds of Indian corn or barley and ten pounds of straw.[1]

Sources of Supply

Wellington supplied his army through a series of depots. At first glance, depots appeared to be no more than an intermediate stopping point for supplies moving between the coast and the troops. Beyond this function, they served as repositories for supplies, rationing points for detachments, and centres for the system of cart transport. Depots were responsible for requisitioning, supervising, working, and paying vehicles needed for transport. They also served as commercial centres where the purchase of supplies and the negotiation of contracts occurred.[2] The depots formed the linchpin of Wellington's commissariat system. All supplies going to the front from the rear came through the depots. Their role in obtaining local supplies also cannot be underestimated. When considering Wellington's supplies, it is important to realize that not all of his supplies could be provided from overseas. The prevalence of overseas and local supplies for each of the main items : bread, meat, alcohol, and forage will be examined.

Bread

The most important item for the survival of the men was bread. Bread was supplied to the men in a variety of forms. Because it was easily damaged and perishable, bread was never stored in depots or sent far from where it was baked. Bread, itself, was a commodity which was baked locally. Bread rations were usually provided in the form of flour. Biscuits were capable of lasting a long time if they were baked hard enough. Biscuit was also lighter than bread to transport since the ration for biscuit was only one pound as opposed to the pound and a half for bread. From the commissary's viewpoint, biscuit was preferable to bread. For taste, however, bread was much more popular.[3]

There were three periods in which the supply of bread will be considered. The first period lasted from April 1809 to the end of 1810. The second period went from the end of 1810 until the ban on grain shipments from the United Kingdom lifted in June 1813. The final period lasted from June 1813 to the end of the war.[4]

In the first period, large-scale importing arrangements were absent. Slightly more than one million pounds of flour were sent to the Peninsula from England during 1810. Most of this quantity arrived in one shipment in August. At the end of 1810, the Treasury added a further 4.8 million pounds of wheat despatched to the Peninsula. Although no figures exist for the amount of biscuit sent to the Peninsula during this period, in 1809 only twenty percent of the 1810 total supplies came from the United Kingdom. This total included salt meat and rum as well as biscuit.[5]

A consignment of grain which included one million pounds of wheat was bought by Murray from a Mr. Phillips in January 1810. This transaction was probably the most substantial import of the period. On 9 June 1810, about 100,000 pounds of wheat were sent from the Azores. Flour was also sent from Cadiz to the Tagus by the Commissariat and by a contractor at the end of the year. It was also possible that a shipment from the Barbary Coast was sent but their is no record of its arrival. During this time, probably only a third to a half of all consumption came from imports.[6]

Local purchases and requisitions played a substantial role at this time. Redgrave mentions two letters which seem to confirm this idea. The first is from a Mr. Myler concerning the arrangements to supply four cavalry squadrons at Vila Vicosa. It was arranged that they would draw 1020 rations of bread daily from the villages in the vicinity. Another letter, from A.C.G. Gauntlett to General Sherbrooke states that the 8000 rations expected from the Junta of Badajoz had not been delivered.[7]

During the second period, an effort was made to increase the supply by imports under the auspices of Wellington and Charles Stuart. The two main areas of exertion were the Mediterranean and the United States.[8] Because of a blight during June, the wheat and barley crops were far below average. It was suggested that the chief dependence be on America, the Barbary powers, and the Mediterranean. As a result of the poor harvest in Britain, the government decided not to allow grain to be exported from the British Isles.[9] To make up the shortfall from the poor British harvest, alternate sources of supply were found. An arrangement was made with Messrs Oswell & Co. to ship grain from the Black Sea. Grain from the Mediterranean was also attempted. During peacetime, Portugal supplemented its insufficient wheat supply by importing from the North African coast.[10] Neither Spain nor Portugal was capable of living at more than a subsistence level on their own agricultural produce. Portugal routinely imported much for Lisbon and Oporto. The presence of two large armies and the dislocation of agriculture meant that there was little food to go around.[11] Wheat was also shipped from Oran although the shipments were not as large nor as reliable as those from the United States. In 1812, Sampaio, a contractor hired by the British, bought eleven shiploads of flour and grain at Gibraltar and Cadiz. In February 1813, he purchased eighteen million pounds of wheat in Egypt. Throughout 1811 and 1812, there were official initiatives to obtain grain from the Americas. By the end of 1810, Sampaio had been given £400,000 in bills to be used in America to purchase supplies. He was able to acquire forty-six cargoes of flour, rice, Indian corn, and biscuit which reached the Peninsula in early 1811. In the following year, another large purchase was made in America through Sampaio (payment by the British minister at Washington, Augustus Foster with bills sent from Lisbon). Seventy-one ships carried flour and grain. The American trade embargo delayed

the sailing but it arrived safely later in the year. In addition to these purchases, two separate transactions for flour and grain from South America were also made at this time (by the British ambassador to the exiled Portuguese court, Lord Strangford - at Stuart's instigation, same as the others). When the totals from the Americas are combined, they account for almost half of the 1811 and 1812 commissariat's issues.[12]

American flour imports to the Peninsula increased substantially after 1810. In 1810, the Americans sent 88,696 barrels of flour while in 1811, the total was 529,105 barrels. The figures for 1812 and 1813 were comparable at 557,218 and 542,399 barrels respectively. The smallest total was in 1814 when only 4141 barrels of flour were exported.[13] However, by 1814, the war was winding down with Napoleon's abdication. Between 1811 and 1813, the flour sold was more than the British and their allies could have consumed. The only limitation imposed on them was the lack of money or credit to pay for the provisions. This issue will be considered later.[14] During this period, the imported supplies went mostly toward increasing the stores at the reserve depots and paying the Portuguese subsidy in kind. The army, itself, was mainly supplied locally. By 1812, imported supplies were becoming more substantial. Through the end of 1812 and midway through 1813, bread was mostly supplied from the rear, although local supplies still existed.[15]

During this second period, the proportion of supplies procured locally was over two-thirds of the total expenditure on supplies. This would probably amount to approximately half of the bread supply in addition to much of the meat and probably all of the alcohol.[16] Local contracts also helped to increase supply. At Salamanca, there were several contracts in operation at the same time. The largest of these contracts was with Sr Antonio da Pessoa. The arrangement included the supply of 100,000 lbs. of biscuit at 5000 lbs. a day. The contract was renewed for a further 100,000 lbs. on 25 September 1812.[17]

The third period of Peninsular imports of bread began on 8 June 1813 with the abandonment of the British non-exporting policy which came on the heels of Napoleon's defeat in Russia and the loosening of his control over the fertile hinterlands of the Baltic. After this, the commissariat became dependent on England for its bread supply. An

alternative to sending flour or wheat was biscuit. Often flour was of little use due to poor baking facilities. During the later stages of the war, large-scale importing was reflected by the fact that bread was mostly supplied from the rear, especially once the army was settled around the Pyrenees.[18] As for local supplies, the situation was very similar to what had existed during the second period. There were some local contracts but it seems that the amounts supplied were relatively small.[19]

Meat

Another important item for the survival of the men was meat. Unlike the British, the Portuguese were not a meat-eating race and the country was unequal to the task of providing the immense quantity of meat needed by the British.[20] Unlike the bread supply, it was not efficient to ship meat from overseas. The high cost and immense difficulty involved in transporting live cattle on long voyages by sea made it impossible to supply the army in this manner. It was only towards the end of the war when the sea lines of communication were shortened that this type of supply was attempted. In October 1813, Herries reached an agreement where one hundred cattle per week would be shipped to Passages and San Sebastien from Ireland.[21] No record remains of how many survived the trip. There is also no record of the exact numbers involved. In 1814, the addition of English cattle appears to augment the Irish contribution, however, it does not appear that the numbers were very significant. Even considering the projected shipment, this method could not have supplied much more than a small percentage of the numbers needed to feed the men. It has been estimated that the consumption of meat during the closing stages of the war was approximately three hundred cattle per day and one thousand per week.[22]

Although the British were unable to make a large contribution to the supply of fresh meat, they were able to provide a substantial amount of salt meat. Indeed, on 31 May 1809, Wellington wrote to Castlereagh requesting that no more be sent unless requisitioned.[23] There are, however, no records of salt meat or fish shipments between the end of 1810 and early 1813 except for a consignment in December 1810 of two hundred tons of salt fish. Live meat was more economical, however, since salt meat had to be transported over land and the

transport system was already strained from bread supplies.[24] In 1812 and 1813, only one and a quarter percent of all meat was salt meat. Only during the times when the army was within close range of Lisbon (behind the Lines of Torres Vedras and on the Rio Maior) were salt provisions used often or when there was difficulty obtaining fresh meat in early 1814. Detachments marching from the rear, garrison troops, hospitals, muleteers, and commissariat employees were the exception. They usually received a ration of salt fish in place of part of their pay from 1812 onwards. Salt fish was also used in partial payment of the Portuguese subsidy.[25]

An attempt was made, in July 1812, to obtain a supply of cattle from the Azores. Purcell went to enquire into the possibility of obtaining cattle and grain. Unfortuantely, the quantity of the cattle did not meet expectations. It was also unfortunate that the cattle would have had to have been paid for in cash instead of bills.[26]

One overseas source that appears to have been important was the Barbary states. The British were able to reach agreements with the rulers of Oran and Algiers to export four thousand oxen (duty $15/head) as well as ten thousand sheep and two thousand oxen duty free. These promising arrangements were made too late, however, since the war was drawing to a close when they would have been implemented.[27]

The other source available for live meat was entrepreneurs. Although meat was actually acquired at some distance from the operations, it is considered a local source of supply since the purchase was made locally as opposed to the possible point of origin of the cattle. Because the supply of live meat was so limited from overseas, the army was forced to increasingly rely on private speculators. There were only two areas in Portugal which produced cattle in quantities sufficient for use as food. These were the Alentejo and Algarve in the south and, in the north, the areas of Entre Douro e Minho and Tras os Montes. The northern area was of greater importance because the supply was greater and they were closer to the area of operations.[28] Because of the competition for cattle among the various commissaries in the field, a fixed maximum rate was introduced in 1810 to prevent the

escalation of prices. Unfortunately, the price was based on the average weight of the cattle but, since the cattle were still alive, it was difficult to calculate their weight accurately.[29]

Alcohol

Although alcohol was not necessary for the survival of the troops, it was considered an important part of the rations. When examining the question of alcohol, one must look at the difference in types of alcohol supplied. The two main types concerned here are wine and spirits. Wine was readily available locally while spirits were supplied from overseas.[30] Although it was preferred to supply alcohol from the rear, it was only in 1811 that a regular quantity was sent from the United Kingdom.[31]

In the summer of 1811, a regular supply of rum from the United Kingdom was arranged by Messrs Idle & Co.. A quantity of two hundred eighty-four thousand gallons of rum per quarter would be sent which would be sufficient for 75,000 men over a period of three months. When the army was close to its depots, spirits were efficient. However, once the army advanced into Spain, the strain on the transport was too great to make the supply of spirits possible.[32]

When the army was unable to acquire spirits, they were forced to rely on the resources in the neighbourhood in which they were stationed. Wine was usually purchased not far from its place of consumption. Local wine was usually drunk while spirits were kept in reserve for sudden marches or emergencies. This pattern continued until late 1811 when the regular rum supply mentioned earlier was introduced.[33]

Forage

Another essential item for survival, not of the men but of the horses and mules, was forage. Without forage, the horses and mules responsible for carrying the men and supplies would have been unable to survive. Since their mobility as well as their own basic needs

were dependent on the health of their mounts, they were vitally concerned with their well-being.

Forage consisted of two parts. The first part usually consisted of some variety of grain, oats or barley, or Indian corn. This part was usually referred to as forage corn. The second part was intended to consist of hay or straw (long forage) and was simply referred to as forage. This second part usually suffered from shortages which forced a reliance on alternate sources.[34]

Forage was intended to have been procured locally whenever possible. The rule of thumb said that a cavalry regiment needed one mule for every two horses. These numbers meant that the units were not intended to carry a full ration more than a short distance from the nearest depot. Forage from overseas was scanty and transport problems interfered with the availability of the forage that did arrive.[35]

Finding forage was difficult in both Spain and Portugal and various substitutes had to be found. Green crops could be eaten in the summer. River grass, field grass, fern, and chopped furze were also used. The scarcity of forage forced the artillery and the cavalry units to be dispersed as widely as possible to keep the horses fed adequately as long as they were not prevented by the requirements of active service.[36]

Schaumann gives a good account of the collection of forage. Because the promised supplies from Spain were not forthcoming, they were forced to ride into the fields every night. Each dragoon put two sheafs of barley on their horse's back. The Spaniards received requisition notes for the forage taken.[37] He also tells of a time when the dragoons went to collect the corn and "hundreds of old women" would arrive with concealed bottles of brandy and wine with which they would bargain for the return of the corn. The horses were fed straw and grass instead.[38]

Although forage was scarcely imported, forage corn fared better. The forage corn was intended to be supplied from the rear as was the case with the bread. However, until 1811,

the United Kingdom was unable to supply a great amount.[39] Other overseas sources were also few during this period. Attempts were made to obtain corn from various areas of the Mediterranean through a Mr. Phillips in 1809. For one reason or another, this agreement fell through.[40]

Other sources for forage corn were examined. It was discovered that little was available from Morocco. The Azores were a little more successful where nearly one and a quarter million pounds were sent to Portugal. During 1809 and 1810, about one third of the necessary forage corn was supplied from overseas.[41] In November 1810, three thousand tons of transports of corn were sent under convoy to Lisbon from Algiers.[42] Kennedy sent a report on the alarming state of the army magazines on 30 November 1810. Two days later, he requested a supply of three and a half million pounds of oats with the same quantity to arrive monthly thereafter. Fortunately, Kennedy's request arrived during a period of low grain prices in Britain. There was a concerted effort to supply at least a high proportion of the forage corn demanded during 1811.[43] During 1811, it appears that the total United Kingdom supply was slightly less than half the consumption during the year. Some of the deficit was made up from the arrival of Indian corn from America that had been part of the deal mentioned earlier between Charles Stuart and Sampaio.[44]

The poor harvest in Britain and the subsequent high grain prices obliged the government, by 21 November 1811, to prohibit the further export of corn to the Peninsula. The Treasury refused to provide further shipments and urged Bisset to look to the Mediterranean and America. At Wellington's suggestion, Bissett arranged with Sampaio to obtain corn from Ireland. Between February 1812 and July 1813, corn was intermittently exported from Ireland. The arrangement ceased upon the order of Herries.[45]

North America was again capable of supplying various commodities, including Indian corn, during this time. In addition to the American supplies, thirty-one cargoes of various substances, including corn, from Brazil were purchased. At Cadiz, five thousand quarters of forage corn were purchased in early 1812. Enquiries were also made at Gibraltar about the possibility of obtaining forage corn from the Barbary states.[46] Purchases from the Azores recommenced in early 1812. The only difficulty in obtaining further shipments after

December 1812 was the result of Britain's inability to find a market for Treasury Bills.[47] Wellington, himself, suggested the purchase of corn from Egypt between October 1812 and February 1813 for goods, if possible, or for a cheap rate if not possible.[48]

Although exact numbers from the overseas supply during this period are not known, it can be estimated that at least a half to two-thirds or more were supplied in this manner. Between 1811 and June 1813, the commissariat was able to arrange enough overseas corn for a substantial reserve. Although the commissariat was able to amass such a large supply, a substantial amount was used to pay the Portuguese subsidy and stock the depots.[49]

CHAPTER V : TRANSPORT

The most important component of Wellington's supply system was his transportation capabilities. Although the acquisition and payment of supplies were vital to the survival of the men, they meant nothing if the supplies could not reach the troops. The transport of supplies to the Peninsula will be considered as will their movement to the front from the coast. Transport will be examined in two categories: water and land. Transport by water will include convoys of supplies, troopships, and transportation along river routes. Transport by land will include locally-hired carts and mules as well as the Royal Waggon Corps and Train.

Transportation by Water

The success of the British in the Peninsular War depended on their naval predominance in all seas. Wellington's position would have been little better than the French if he had been unable to draw on overseas sources.[50] This sea-power gave Britain a tremendous advantage that was recognized by the French.[51]

In 1809, there were 980 ships, nearly a quarter of a million tons, that were used for the transport of troops and stores. This total was more than ten percent of the total British merchant tonnage. In 1794, the Transport Board was formed to organise the hire of merchant ships for naval and military purposes. There were four main functions of the Transport Board. The first was troopships. In 1810, there were 77,400 tons for troops plus 17,617 tons of cavalry ships that were equipped for the transport of horses. The second function was army victuallers which comprised 3690 tons. The third function was navy victuallers at 16,534 tons. The fourth was navy storeships which comprised 32,754 tons which were mainly used for the supply of overseas dockyards.[52] The Transport Board consisted of five naval captains and a secretary.[53] Resident agents at some of the major ports (Deal, Isle of Wight, Portsmouth, Leith, Plymouth, Liverpool, Dublin, Gravesend, Dublin and Cork) were also included on the Transport Board. The most important post was at Deptford where many of the transports were first hired. The agents were usually naval lieutenants but at the more important posts

they were captains. They were responsible for hiring ships and making sure that they were suitable. There were also agents "afloat" (again naval captains and lieutenants) who took command of transport fleets. They directed their movements and made sure they obeyed naval orders. The masters of the various merchant ships were directed to follow their orders. Hired transports averaged 250 tons while troopships were larger at around 350 tons. The rate of hire for the ships varied. Ships were usually chartered for periods of three or six months with the possibility of an extension.[54] Armed transports were chartered from merchant shipowners without the officers and crews. They were commanded by naval lieutenants and were capable of sailing independently of convoys or acting as escorts for groups of transports. These armed transports must be distinguished from hired armed vessels which had naval crews but did not carry troops and served as patrol escorts.[55]

Before Wellington left Lisbon in May 1809, he intended to increase the amount of transports in Portugal. He was unsure if these measures were carried out since the Transport Agent was unreliable. Wellington did not have sole control over transports sent to the Peninsula.[56] By June 1814, Wellington's army was supplied by a fleet of 265 transports. Most transports were between two hundred and four hundred tons. Food and fodder were only carried by just over half.[57]

Convoys

The provision of convoys was the navy's most important contribution to Wellington's efforts in the Peninsula. During 1809, there were about thirty-four convoys sent to the Peninsula, usually Lisbon or Gibraltar. The convoys varied in size ranging from the largest at ninety-seven vessels to the smallest at two vessels. Most of these convoys sailed between June and November. In contrast to this, a more average year was 1811 in which convoys sailed every month and totalled ninety-eight during the year. On six occasions, there were over a hundred vessels. The smallest convoy included only two vessels. These numbers remained consistent throughout 1812-1814. Although the majority of the convoys originated in Britain, many convoys were delivered directly to the Peninsula without being routed through Britain first.[58]

The waters of the Peninsula came under three separate naval commands. The Channel Fleet was responsible for the area of Northern Spain from the French border to Cape Finisterre. This area was crucial to the defense of the British Isles. In 1810, the bulk of its strength consisted of nine ships of the line, sixteen frigates, and seven sloops and brigs. Their main duty was blockading the western naval arsenals of the French. The Lisbon station was responsible for the area from Cape Finisterre to the southern border of Spain and Portugal. In June 1812, this area was expanded to include Cadiz and Gibraltar. The size of this force was dependent on the military circumstances in Portugal at the time. The rest of the Peninsula, the eastern coast of Spain, was made part of the responsibilities of the commander of the Mediterranean Fleet. This was a powerful fleet and numbered thirty ships of the line, twenty-two frigates, and twenty-seven sloops and brigs in 1810. The primary duty of the Mediterranean Fleet was the blockade of Toulon but they were capable of being employed off Spain, especially near the important naval base at Cadiz.[59]

In 1810, there were 234 ships operating to and from the coast of Portugal and eighty-six from the coast of Spain. There were also one hundred twenty operating to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, fifteen for the Baltic and Heligoland, and nineteen for other areas. There were fifty-four ships in home waters either preparing for service, unloading, or carrying out miscellaneous services.[60]

By the summer of 1811, the provision of supplies to Lisbon had been so lavish that Wellington was forced to request that no further stocks be sent to him since there was a lack of storage space. Difficulties only arose between 1812 and 1813 once the army began to fight in northern Spain and the navy was obliged to supply Wellington via the ports in that region. The port on the bottom of the Bay of Biscay was one of the most dangerous in Europe because of its poor local harbours and the combination of wind and weather conditions.[61] As the army advanced to the Pyrenees, they depended increasingly on coastal supplies. In the summer of 1813, supplies began to be shipped to Santander and were forwarded to Bilbao or Passages as circumstances required.[62]

In June 1813, of the 191 ships (54,992 tons) in other Peninsular ports besides Lisbon, there were 119 ships (37,009 tons) in service of the army on the east coast of the Peninsula besides all the Royal Navy ships attached to the army. There were four ships (445 tons) on the same service at Carthagena and on passage from Gibraltar. There were four (1345 tons) on the coast of Catalonia. Of the remainder, there were twelve ships (3308 tons) at Cadiz, fifteen (3379 tons) at Coruna or on passage from England with Ordnance stores, etc.. In total, there were nearly one hundred fifty ships of one hundred ninety-one over which Wellington had no control. Of the remaining forty-one, eight were employed in conveying Spanish troops to the Catalonian coast and the others were moving stores for the Spanish and Portuguese army from one area of coast to another. Of the sixty-four ships at Lisbon and on passage, three were loading flour for Gibraltar and one for Alicante under orders from England. Fifteen ships were refitting, five were ordered to England, and eleven were on passage from England. The result was that only twenty-nine ships could be said to have been in the army's exclusive service.[63]

Besides their duty of maintaining Allied supplies, the Royal Navy played a substantial role in preventing the French from using their navy for overseas supplies. The French repeatedly attempted to alleviate their logistical difficulties through naval means. The British achieved great success in their efforts to contain the French but they were never able to completely prevent the French from using sea communications to some extent.[64]

As the Allied army advanced toward the Pyrenees, they became more dependent on coastal supplies. During the summer of 1813, supplies from the United Kingdom as well as the other Peninsular ports were shipped to Santander and then forwarded to Bilbao and Passages as Wellington's troops required. The capacity of the harbours were a problem, however. Provisions accumulated at Santander and Passages as a result of various circumstances. The shortage of transport, the frequent poor weather during December and January, and the refusal of the vessels hired by the Victualling Board to wait for either unloading or orders to proceed to another port, combined to strain the capacity of the harbours. By the end of the war, Passages had acquired such an excess of supplies that much

was being thrown into the sea in an effort to make room for new arrivals. While the war continued, these plentiful supplies were unable to reach the troops at the front because of deficiencies in land transportation.[65]

The greatest danger faced by the convoys was the War of 1812, between the years 1812 and 1814. During the war, American privateers attacked British shipping and caused considerable damage. Fortunately for the British, the war with the United States coincided with Napoleon's downfall.[66] In August 1812, Wellington reported that there were American privateers at the mouth of the Channel and on the coasts of Spain and Portugal. He was writing in an effort to have measures adopted for the security of packets, in particular, and for the general security of the lines of communication with Coruna, Cadiz, and Gibraltar. For the first measure, he recommended that a warship continuously cruised off Cape Finisterre and packets on the way home should be ordered to make Ushant from whence they would be seen safely to Falmouth. Those ships outward bound would be ordered to make Cape Finisterre. His second recommendation was that the Admiral of Lisbon station enough frigates and craft to enable him to secure his communications between Cape Finisterre and the rock of Lisbon and between the Tagus, Cadiz, and Gibraltar.[67]

In April 1813, Wellington again reported privateers on the coast. They were taken and destroyed by some ships off Oporto. Wellington worried that the coast could not be secured from Coruna to at least Cadiz. The British had money, clothing, provisions, equipment, and military stores on all parts of the coast throughout the year. He worried that the loss of one vessel would create a delay and inconvenience which would have far-reaching consequences.[68] Wellington demanded increased Royal Navy activity. The capture of a shipment of shoes intended for the British army by French privateers caused considerable difficulty. The Admiralty responded by sending ships in convoy protected by men-of-war.[69] British ships carrying supplies were unable to sail without a convoy present. They were liable to be turned back by British cruisers. In Autumn 1813, the army in northern Spain was seriously short of meat. An arrangement with Messrs Callaghan & Sons was reached to send livestock on its own boats to Spain at regular intervals. Herries was able to get a special

license for the ship of Irish bullocks to leave without a convoy.[70] There was also an incident when a special
convoy had to be appointed to transport an emergency supply of oats requested by Kennedy.[71]

Troopships

Another important naval contribution to Wellington's efforts in the Peninsula was the provision of troopships. The best existing ships for the provision of transports were the East Indiamen. They were comparatively spacious with ample deck space and moderate armament. In the absence of a sufficient number of East Indiamen, the next best thing was the conversion of a number of warships, if they were not needed elsewhere. The Admiralty offered the nine hundred ton, two-deck 44-gun frigates that had been introduced in 1744. These ships were heartily disliked and had been replaced by a more efficient class of frigate in 1797. Once their lower deck was removed, the 44-gun frigates made good transports. They were large enough to enable regiments to be kept together and for the troops to be embarked in reasonable comfort. They were unpopular, however, with the naval crews who objected to spending their service time carrying "lobsters" around the world.[72] It was difficult to find a sufficient number of vessels. It was better when the Royal Navy or East India Company transports were used. Hired merchantmen were often unsanitary and had incompetent crews.[73]

Troopships had the lower decks divided into cabins. The men slept in hammocks which were stowed away during the day, the same as the seamen. Since troops were not always well-behaved, the officer in command assigned one of his sergeants to take charge of the cabins. The troopships were manned at a rate of five men and a boy for every one hundred tons and carried troops at a rate of one man for every two tons.[74]

The most important troop movement overseen by the Royal Navy was the evacuation of Moore's army from Corunna. When Moore was forced to retreat to Corunna, his army, about 26,000 troops, were rescued and brought back to Britain by the Royal Navy. The security that a repeat performance by the Royal Navy at Lisbon was possible gave Wellington

the confidence to proceed with his retreat to the Lines of Torres Vedras and their subsequent defence in 1810-1811. If this campaign had failed, Wellington knew that he would have a huge fleet of transports, by March 1811 there were 256 vessels of more than 75,000 tons, available to evacuate his army. Without this maritime escape plan, the attendent risks of the retreat through Portugal in 1810, would not have been accepted.[75]

River Transport

The other form of water transport most concerned with Wellington's army was the transportation along the rivers in the Peninsula. The river transport played an important role in the movement of supplies from the coast to the troops at the front. Almost all of the supplies which originated at the rear depots were brought forward by river, at least initially, because water was easier for moving large quantities over distances. This usually involved shipping the supplies to the port at the mouth of the river they would be travelling on. Suitable transports were usually retained for this purpose. From the ports, the supplies would proceed in smaller craft upriver as far as the navigability of the river would permit. The boats involved were most likely owned by local people and were requisitioned in the same way that carts were.[76]

The first stage for the provisions on their way to southern Portugal was the Tagus.[77] The Tagus was navigable to Abrantes. This was helpful when the army was in Estremadura. Stores sent by barges and country boats were easier than by road.[78] Although some supplies proceded to the northern sector from Abrantes, this was probably rare since the distance of the direct route from Abrantes to Guarda was twenty-six leagues which was almost twice as far as the depots up-river on the Duoro and Mondego. A shorter route was suggested towards the end of 1809 that would bring supplies by sea from Lisbon around Cape Espichel and into the river Sado as far as Alcacer do Sal. Although this looked no closer to the army at Badajoz than Abrantes was, it was actually five leagues closer by road. Since Alcacer do Sal was higher than Abrantes, it proved impossible to ship supplies in large quantities. The lower river also had hazards. When the water was too high, no supplies could be shipped past the

mouth of the Zezere. In general, however, Abrantes can be taken as the point where the transition from water- to land-based transport for the southern sector occurred.[79]

Troops in Beira were able to use either the Mondego or the Douro to transport their supplies. The Mondego was generally navigable as far as Foz Dao or, during the dry season, to Raiva. High water, however, might interdict this supply route and prevent the transport of boats going higher than Coimbra. The Douro could be sailed as high up as San Joao da Pesqueira although, in the winter, it was also subject to intermittent periods of inclement weather that would prohibit passage.[80] In 1811, the only large consignments along this route were the heavy guns and the ammunition for Dickson's siege train. In 1812, the Douro was made navigable as far as Castro de Alva, forty miles upstream from Peso da Regoa. This brought the supplies not too far from Almeida. The engineers accomplished this feat by blasting and dredging the bed of the Douro. The Douro was subsequently of more use, especially in forwarding stores before the opening of the 1813 campaign.[81] Although the Douro formed a closer approach to the Spanish border than the Mondego, it was not the busier of the two. One of the reasons for this was the desirability for the supplies to be spread between the two waterways. This was both to overcome transportation shortages at the end of the trip and because any retreat to Lisbon would bring the army away from the Douro thus it would not have been safe to make it the major supply line. When Wellington, in preparation for his 1810 retreat, redistributed his army, the depots along the Mondego were made more important.[82]

Transportation by Land

Once the supplies arrived in the Peninsula or at the various depots, their transport over land became paramount. Indeed, the question of land transport was to be one of Wellington's biggest headaches. Without adequate transport, the supplies that had been labouriously collected at the coast would have no way of reaching the troops at the front. Without supplies, the army's abilities were sorely tried. The Peninsular Commissariat relied on two types of transport for supplies. The first consisted of carts while the second was mule

transport. Another minor form of transport was the Royal Waggon Corps and Train. Their role will also be considered.

There were three echelons of public transport by land available to the army. The first was transportation issued to each regiment on disembarkation. This was done on a scale drawn up by the Q.M.G. This usually consisted of mules who were required to carry camp kettles, the pay chest, etc.. They were paid and maintained by a twice-yearly allowance to the officers responsible for their upkeep. This was called "Bat Money". The number of mules was fixed by a General Order and were used exclusively for the purposes prescribed. There were thirteen for an infantry battalion and fourteen for a cavalry regiment. The second echelon consisted of division mules who were attached to each Anglo-Portuguese infantry brigade, cavalry regiment, and field brigade of artillery which moved between the unit and its supplying depot. They were under the exclusive supervision of the divisional, brigade, or regimental commissary. The number of mules attached varied with the distance the troops were from the depot. The third echelon consisted of the immense train of bullock carts that were responsible for replenishing and charging the depots. They were capable of travelling three leagues per day and travelled in stages. Supplies going further than one stage had to be off-loaded then reloaded before continuing.[83]

For commissariat purposes, the unit of infantry was the division, consisting of two brigades of foot and one battery of artillery. The unit of cavalry was the regiment and the horse-artillery was the troop. The reserve of artillery, excluding batteries attached to divisions was another unit with the headquarters of the army as another. The problem of forage put a regiment of cavalry, at 400 men, on the same footing as an infantry division at 6000 men. Feeding field-officers' horses and baggage mules in the infantry was difficult and required one mule for every six men. In the cavalry, the allowance was one mule for every two men and horses, therefore a regiment of 400 dragoons with almost 500 horses and baggage mules required nearly 300 commissariat mules alone. For all the units of the British army together, at a strength of approximately fifty-three thousand of all ranks, were needed between 9000 and 10,000 commissariat mules beyond those used for regimental transport.[84]

Originally, it was the intention of the Commissary-General to obtain land transport through contractual agreements with owners of carts and mules. In the case of mules, the voluntary principle was fairly successful but, when it came to carts, it became necessary to resort to embargo and other types of compulsion. The inhabitants of Portugal were disinclined to supply their carts and draught animals for the service of Wellington's army from as early as 1809. Desertion by men pressed into service, often their oxen with them, was commonplace.[85]

Carts

Bullock carts formed the majority of the transport of supplies between the off-loading points along the rivers and the forward depots. Bullock carts consisted of rough planks that were nailed to a massive shaft or pole. Two blocks of semi-rounded wood were fixed at right angles to the shaft under the planks. There was a hole in the centre through which the axle was fitted. Mule cars were another type of cart. They were wider and more cumbersome than ox waggons. They were encountered frequently in the south. There were also "quadrilhos" that were pulled by wild cattle, although they tended to march more slowly than domesticated cattle. The ox waggons, however, greatly outnumbered the others used in the supply of the army. Many of these carts were in poor repair and broke down frequently.[86] Wellington, in a General Order of 20 August 1809, attributed these breakdowns to overloading and ordered that they should not be loaded with more than six hundred pounds of weight.[87] The major cause of cart breakages, however, was not the result of overloading. In great part, it was the result of deliberate neglect by the owners so that they would not be taken for service. There were two other factors which contributed to the state of the carts. The first was the fact that the carts, as well as the animals pulling them, were worked excessively hard and were subsequently rendered inoperable. The second factor was the poor state of the Portuguese roads, especially in hilly areas. The main roads were bad but the secondary routes were atrocious.[88]

Carts obtained by the army often had to be kept longer than their expected tenure since there was such a shortage in carts available. Not all of the carts, however, needed to be

requisitioned or compelled to serve. A variety of agreements for the hire of carts were concluded. Even at their most expensive, though, carts remained much cheaper than mules as a means of transport, even taking into consideration the fact that they were not to be loaded past six hundred pounds. Mule transport cost approximately a third more than cart transport based on the most expensive agreements. Because the carts were so much more economical, the unwillingness of the inhabitants to let the army use their carts did not deter commissariat officials from attempting to gather a large body of cart transport. It did make it impossible for them to rely on the intended voluntary agreements. Instead, they were obliged to cooperate with the civil power using regulations passed by the Portuguese Regency. The regulations were designed to not only regulate the requisitioning of carts but to compel the vehicles to serve. There was also punishment to deter the desertion or theft of the cargo carried.[89] It was necessary to watch hired carts every minute of the day and night. The greatest need for carts was during October and November. A complication arose, however, in that this was the period in which the cattle usually began their winter rest. Under these circumstances, the owners were reluctant to have them worked. The result of this difference of opinion was that the commissariat was forced to break faith with the owners and retain as many carts as necessary through the use of force.[90]

One of the reasons for the difficulties faced by the commissariat throughout 1812 was the employment of a greatly increased number of carts. In November 1809, at Badajoz, there had been 168 carts and 894 mules. By August 1812, at Ciudad Rodrigo, there were no fewer than 1990 carts. The increase in the scale of operations was great. An increase in the effectiveness of the supply of provisions also occurred. The British ration strength had nearly doubled in the interim and the carts from Ciudad Rodrigo operated over a distance about half as great again as the carts from Badajoz had had to cover.[91]

Not all of the carts in the Peninsula were employed in carrying provisions. The tremendous discrepancy in turn around times by the carts and the differences between the speeds expected by the commissary officials and those actually achieved can only be interpreted to be the result of sluggishness on the part of the carters themselves. The recalcitrance of the carters caused much harm to the transport system. The progress of the

campaign of 1812 gradually drained the Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida depots of provision so that the army's return to Portugal found further privations and the wounded were reduced to begging for biscuit from passers-by.[92]

An attempt was made to supplement the cart system with the establishment of a regular formation of commissary-owned carts. The idea for this formation was originated in the autumn of 1811 when Wellington and Kennedy decided to construct two "Grand Divisions" of 400 carts each which would be staffed with regular commissariat employees.[93] Wellington set Bissett to design a suitable cart. During the winter of 1811, they were built at Oporto and Almeida. The wheels had iron axle-trees and brass boxes, mostly captured from the French. They were drawn by purchased bullocks and were driven by native drivers hired for the purpose. The full number of carts, eight hundred, were to be constructed in England and elsewhere. They would be organised into two grand divisions of four hundred, each grand division consisting of eight divisions of fifty each. Each lesser division would consist of two brigades, each comprising twenty-five carts and fifty-four bullocks, two bullocks per cart with four to spare. Each division would be commanded by a clerk or another subordinate commissary officer. The appearance of the carts completed the organisation of the transport in the Peninsula.[94] In 1812, the carts provided a useful service at the siege of Badajoz and in the north later that year. When the army went into winter quarters, the carts were installed on the route between Raiva and Celorico.[95]

Mules

Besides the carts used in the Peninsula for the transport of supplies, the use of mules played quite a significant role. Wellington resolved to rely on pack-animals for transport because of the poor roads. Each regiment was only allowed one cart for those who fell sick on the march. Officers were ordered to discard carts acquired for personal baggage and were told to use pack-animals instead.[96] Apart from those mules used for regimental transport, the greatest number of mules in use were hired. All of the mules, whether hired or owned by the commissariat, were grouped in brigades of no consistent size. They remained, however, administratively distinct even in circumstances where their numbers were very low. The

average strength, in theory, was fifty mules with one muleteer for every three mules. In practice, however, it often varied from over a hundred mules down to a low of only twenty mules.[97] Wellington calculated that one mule could carry a 200 lb. load 12 miles per day therefore the troops could be sustained up to a distance of 50 miles away. Beyond that distance, problems arose.[98] From November 1810 onwards, the mules were branded in the neck, or else a less conspicuous place, to distinguish to which division or brigade the mule was attached.[99] The muleteers within each brigade fell under the immediate supervision of a "capataz". The capataz was also a muleteer and had the responsibility of the pay books, routes, and work records that were required by departmental orders. The organization was standard whether or not the brigade was hired or was owned by the commissariat.[100]

Mules were in scarce supply during 1809 but, by 1810, they had replaced carts in number. It took some time to gather sufficient numbers. Some were even acquired from the Barbary coast in the summer of 1809 although most had been either hired or purchased locally. Mule owners were more cooperative than cart owners so requisition was not necessary. The number of mules attached to units increased as the years wore on. The increase in strength led to an increase in mobility which meant that units could operate at a distance further from their depots without relying on local supplies. There were never enough mules, however, to keep the troops completely supplied very far in advance. When the army was in the field, the most the mule brigades could furnish was a partial supply.[101] For an army of 53,000 men, the number of mules, not including regimental transport, was close to 9000.[102]

The rate of attrition among the mules greatly affected their efficiency. The most serious losses came during the winter months or else over long distances and difficult terrain. The losses were not insignificant. By the end of 1813, some divisions had a third fewer mules than they had had in the middle of 1812. During the winter, corn was issued to the mules, usually four pounds per day, in an attempt to maintain the existing numbers. This further reduced their efficiency as they were forced to carry their own fodder in addition to the supplies for their division.[103]

The payment for muleteers was actually quite generous. For each mule employed, they received a dollar per day with a reduction of 240 reis (there were 800 reis in a dollar) when the mules received commissariat-issued fodder. There was one muleteer for every three mules and an allowance of 80 reis per day was granted for each muleteer. The muleteers received rations on the same basis as the troops.[104] When the hire was not payed for lack of money, the mules were then supplied with forage.[105]

The problem, however, was that the muleteers' pay was almost always in arrears. For example, in December 1813, Wellington wrote that the muleteers' pay was 26 months in arrears. He had to give them Treasury Bills in partial fulfilment of their demands or he risked losing their services.[106] Even as early as July 1811, their pay was six months in arrears.[107] Keeping the pay of the muleteers was a deliberate policy. No commissary was allowed to make payments without the approval of the Commissary-General. The shortage of specie, however, caused an escalation in the arrears that was not intended. By the middle of 1812, the pay of the muleteers was at least a year in arrears.[108] One advantage in the build-up of arrears in pay was the deterrence of desertions among the proprietors who had been in service a long time. If they left, they would have lost all claim to the money owed them. There was also a disadvantage, however, that theft and abuses increased.[109]

One problem was the fact that the Spanish muleteers refused to knowingly work for the Portuguese on any terms whatsoever. When the Portuguese battalions were mixed with the British, they had no way of knowing but if they were to serve an independent Portuguese detatchment, they would rather bring their mules to the French. There was also the danger that the muleteers would use the prejudice against the Portuguese to desert the British altogether.[110]

There was some problem of stores being deficient upon reaching the army when coming from depots. This was partly the result of desertion by bullock drivers and partly the result of robberies by bullock and mule drivers. There was a problem, however, with having an army escort with every convoy. It was probable that the escort would cause more problems than previously existed. The Spanish muleteers would not accept the violence of a

drunken English soldier. Wellington thought that the muleteers would desert with the mules if escorted. Also, the drunkenness and irregularity of the troops caused delays and the loss by theft (by the troops) would be even greater than the losses caused by the dishonesty of the muleteers. Another problem was the troops taking bribes by cart drivers to enable them to leave the convoy with their carts and bullocks. The result was that the soldiers would have to press carts to make up the deficiency in transport. This was an act of violence. The soldiers were also frequently bribed by the inhabitants to leave their carriages alone. It was better to accept some losses than to accept what would happen with the troops escorting them. A compromise was reached where detatchments of ordenanza accompanied the convoys. There was no major loss of stores. Wellington also recommended that drivers be responsible for any losses or deficiencies in their loads.[111]

Royal Waggon Corps and Train

Another element of the transport in the Peninsula deserves a brief mention here. Although their numbers were never large enough to make a significant impact on the transport system, their contribution does deserve to be considered. In 1794, the Corps of Royal Waggoners was formed. The government purchased the horses and carts which made up the Corps. The personnel chosen were those who had been declared unfit for field service. The replacement of this organisation was the Royal Waggon Train which was formed in August 1799.[112]

The Waggon Train was directly under the supervision of the commissariat. It was originally raised with the intention of challenging the Treasury's monopoly of the supply of transport. However, by the time the Peninsular War began, they were used exclusively as an ambulance service. The Q.M.G. directed that the waggons were to be used exclusively for the use of the sick and that special care should be taken that they were not converted to any other use and that no baggage should be carried on them. The distribution of the waggons were as follows. Each battalion of infantry received one waggon. Each regiment of British cavalry received one waggon with the headquarters of the army receiving one as well. If the waggons were to be used for any other purpose, a written order was necessary from a general

officer with a copy being forwarded immediately to the Q.M.G. The detatchments of the Waggon Train that were attached to divisions were under the superintendence of the A.Q.M.G.'s of the divisions. They were to report to the A.Q.M.G. and receive their orders from them. Although they were responsible for the wounded with the battalions they were assigned to, they were under the immediate direction of the medical officers of the regiments.[113] The Waggon Train was of such use for ambulance services because they were possessed of a number of spring waggons.[114] The personnel mostly came from the cavalry and NCOs were commissioned as officers. Initially, they had five troops but two troops of the Irish Commissariat Corps of Waggoners were incorporated. By 1814, there were fourteen troops with approximately 1903 other ranks. Compared to the size of the army, the numbers were not impressive. They were also not generally held in high regard.[115]

CHAPTER VI : PAYMENT

The question of payment is perhaps the most important issue when considering supply. No matter how much is available, unless you can pay for it, it might as well not be there. That is, if you intend to pay for it in the first place. If you intend to use requisitions, the question of money is not as urgent. The British chose to pay for everything so money is very important. Paying for everything, especially in cash, has many advantages. Chief among them is the increased cooperation of the populace. The British benefitted greatly from this. The inability to pay for supplies necessitates forced requisitions and creates local hostility. Army discipline is also affected which is distracting to the commander's strategic planning. The inability to pay transport expenses also alienates the populace and prompts the desertion of the hired transport. Witholding the Portuguese subsidy would amount to a breach of faith with an ally Wellington needed in order to implement his strategy. Portugal had also undertaken commitments beyond her financial means based on the promise of British aid. The withdrawl of that aid would have severe consequences. The Commissary-General needed to obtain the wherewithal to at least maintain the appearance of creditworthiness even if unable to cover all of their expenses.[116]

Expenses

In addition to the costs incurred buying supplies and hiring transport, a further expense was subsidies to allies, specifically Spain and Portugal. There were no subsidy treaties negotiated with Spain or Portugal but Britain promised to send as much as she could spare in arms and money. Portugal was expected to maintain its own army as well as send 20,000 troops to serve in British ranks.[117] The decision was made to support 20,000 Portuguese troops. They would be provided with pay, equipment, and supplies. Money and supplies would also be given to the Portuguese Regency Council to raise and maintain a national army that would be commanded by Beresford.[118] In June 1809, the House of Commons appropriated £3.3 million for subsidies to Spain and Portugal during the forthcoming year. In April 1809, a special department of the British Military Commissary was established in Lisbon to pay the subsidy money to the Council. They were supplied with

money from the Commissary-General from the war chest and the payments were made at the direction of the British minister at Lisbon.[119]

On 2 April 1809, a £600,000 loan was guaranteed by the British. Wellington was named generalissimo of the Portuguese troops and was granted the right to attend council meetings when the matters under discussion were military or financial. On 24 June, Britain resumed the subsidy payments and they continued regularly throughout the year eventually totalling £270,538.[120]

The situation with Spain differed from that with Portugal. British aid to Spain was dependent on the opening of South American ports to British commerce. This was aimed at enabling the British to obtain specie to replace that which had been exhausted in the fight to free the Peninsula. The Spanish refused to make any concessions.[121] This was just one issue which threatened to come between the two allies.

Almost all of the subsidy payments were made from the military chest which was under Wellington's control. It was for this reason that remittances for military expenses and subsidies were treated as one. There were occasional specie shipments for Portugal but those occurrences were rare. Portugal's monthly subsidy was usually dependent on how much Wellington felt he could spare. The payments to Spain were made by the British Consul at Cadiz to the Junta's treasurer. They were rendered in either specie or Treasury Bills.[122]

In 1810, the decision was made to continue British support to Portugal and Spain as long as there remained a reasonable prospect of victory. The intention was to employ 30,000 effective British troops in Portugal (i.e. Portuguese troops in British service) as well as furnishing an annual sum of £980,000 to Portugal.[123] In return, the British expected to receive every assistance from the Portuguese government that Wellington and the army required. The government required regular monthly accounts of expenditures relating to Portugal's military charges. They also insisted on accurate returns of the condition and state of the corps receiving British pay. An account of the state and condition of the troops under Portuguese support was also required.[124]

By July 1810, Henry Wellesley had advanced £400,000 to the Spanish regency.[125] His advances to Spain made it difficult for his brother to obtain hard currency in Spain.[126] The British Aid Office was able to make regular subsidy payments to the council because Wellington was giving the office half of the money he had received into the military chest.[127] During 1810, more than £1 million were paid and they were still unable to meet the expenses of the Portuguese troops. It was expected that money would be turned over to the Portuguese Commissary-General but often they had insufficient funds to pay and feed the troops. When that happened, Wellington was forced to cover the shortfall from his own commissary. By the end of 1810, the total payments, in money and provisions, amounted to over £1.8 million, twice as much as Wellington had estimated.[128]

On 6 March 1811, Wellington was informed by Liverpool that £2 million would be set aside for Portugal in 1811. The budget for that year provided for a further £3.2 million vote of credit to supplement the government's Spanish aid program for the coming year.[129] Wellington felt that the Portuguese were mismanaging the subsidy. Often the Portuguese troops had not been paid or fed. Wellington took this as proof of mismanagement. What he failed to make allowances for was the fact that the Portuguese commissariat had to compete with the British commissariat for food while possessing a much poorer credit rating. The Portuguese revenue was unable to sustain this type of war.[130] To save the Portuguese troops from starving, Wellington would feed them from his own commissariat but the value had to be credited to the subsidy.[131]

The reform of the Portuguese commissary and the tax system were ordered by the Rio government. Stuart proposed that a separate military chest for the Portuguese government be created. Wellington also endorsed this view. The council refused but were forced to capitulate a week later after Stuart suspended the subsidy in August 1811. The council was also forced to accept that a substantial amount of the subsidy was to be paid in commodities other than those military. The British, however, never sent more than just over ten percent of the total in goods. The highest was in 1813.[132] The British subsidy was essentially a direct military aid program which was administered by Wellington's commissary. The council was no longer responsible for auxiliaries but they were still responsible for Beresford's

Portuguese troop. The Portuguese effort must not be underrated, however. Portugal, irrespective of the subsidy, nearly bankrupted herself in the attempt to provide Wellington with troops.[133]

By 1813, Wellington had taken over the management of the Portuguese subsidies. It was his belief that the money should be used exclusively on the troops in the field. Before the war ended, almost all of the money for the subsidy went through the Commissary-General's department for pay, provisions, and equipment for the Allied troops. An agreement between Wellington and his brother had been reached whereby Wellington would control most of the subsidy for 1813.[134] The British could not have won the war in the Peninsula without the help of the Spanish and Portuguese troops. By the time the war was over, they were almost entirely being clothed, fed, paid, and armed by the British.[135]

Resources

There were two methods to obtain the necessary money to support Wellington's army. The first involved money obtained by the Treasury either from the Bank of England or from places abroad and shipped to the Peninsula as cash or specie. The second method consisted of money raised on the spot by the Commissariat from money which passed through the major trading centres of the Peninsula.[136]

The issue which most concerned Wellington and his staff, as well as the Treasury back in London, was the accumulation and shipment of specie to be used by the army in the Peninsula. When an army decides to pay its way through a war, it needs to ensure that it has the means to do so. It was this problem which was to plague Wellington throughout his tenure in the Peninsula.

At the beginning of 1808, during the Spanish uprising, the British had flooded the Peninsula with over £2.5 million in silver.[137] Of the £2,778,796 spent in 1808, only £185,520 was not in specie.[138] After spending such a large amount of specie, they found it very difficult to find more. It was impossible to recoup the lost coin because of commercial

difficulties in 1809. There was no market for colonial goods because of the Continental Blockade.[139]

As the cost of the war continued to rise, the government was forced to look elsewhere for sources of specie. Other methods of payment also had to be found. Cash was necessary to pay the soldiers. In addition to army wages, almost all of the supply and transport bills had to be paid in coin. The shortage in specie forced the Treasury to limit cash shipments to the Peninsula. In 1809, approximately three-quarters or war costs were paid using Bills of Exchange.[140] Treasury Bills, or Bills of Exchange upon the Treasury, were one of the methods used to obtain cash. These Bills were payable in London usually 30 days after receiving it. During the period concerned, they normally bore an interest rate of 5%.[141]

The policy of paying commissariat drafts with bills on the Treasury caused problems and damaged British credit in the Peninsula. Herries, in a letter to Kennedy in October 1812, confirms that finances were exhausted and that credit was low. The existence of a "floating debt", drawn on bills at Lisbon upon the Treasury in England, was disadvantageous to credit as well as the speedy negotiation of Treasury Bills for the purchase of specie. He suspected that the Treasury would approve of the avoidance of making those types of payments in the future.[142]

Initially, the method of obtaining supplies from the countryside was irregular. The consequence was that it was impossible to settle commissary accounts without recourse to the Commander-in-Chief. Wellington was forced to look into every irregular voucher left. He had to inquire into circumstances before authorising payment. Sometimes too much time had passed to justify authorising payment. The demand could not be proven satisfactorily. Wellington ordered commissariat officers to settle accounts for supplies received from the countryside before leaving the town in which they had been furnished. He issued a proclamation that all of those who supplied goods to the army should demand payment within one month of furnishing supplies. He promised to pay in either cash or bills for the amount on the Commissary-General. It was never his intention to settle all bills within one month but instead wanted to give immediate proof of a debt for supplies without requiring them to go to

headquarters or to go through a long investigation. A bill was preferred because people would know of it and it also furnished information on whom they were to look to for payment. Bills were never made for a specific period of payment. One general rule was followed in the payment of bills. Those who bought bills, or the right to demand payment, at a depreciated rate were the last to be paid. Because of the difficulty in procuring specie, it was impossible to pay cash for all supplies. Wellington had assumed the authority, whether entitled to it or not, to determine which creditors would be the last to be paid. He wanted to penalize those who tried to make a profit from their country's difficulties and those who were destroying British credit by buying securities at depreciated rates.[143]

The quantity of bullion in Britain was inadequate to supply all the needs of Wellington's army. Although the government could conceivably reach a deal to purchase bullion in London to send abroad, it would be in direct competition with other markets. A rivalry would be established and would bring Portuguese and Spanish dollars to London from whence it would have to be shipped to the Peninsula where agents were already in place to negotiate for specie.[144]

In August 1811, the specie situation was in dire straits with no immediate hope of improvement. One reason was that the flow of specie into the Peninsula was halted because of problems between Spain and her colonies. Another problem was the prohibition by the American President, Madison, of trade with England. American ships were required to take specie as payment for corn as opposed to taking the value of the shipment in English manufactured goods.[145] There was a proposal, in November 1810, that the Americans bringing wheat and flour be given Bills on London. It was felt that this would be more advantageous because they were often unable to purchase a return cargo and taking dollars back with them would be a considerable loss in the exchange between Lisbon and the States. The Bills on the Treasury would become payable 30 days later with interest from that date. The rate of interest would be 5% per annum. It was thought that it might take a considerable amount of time to reach London since they would probably travel to the States first and from there wherever the ship takes them. At the time, the bills were being sent immediately for payment. They might prefer to bring the bills to the States with the new arrangment.[146]

In early 1812, a market at Gibraltar was established as a source for the supply of specie for Portugal, once the needs of the garrison had been met. The Admiralty were requested to provide regular vessels for the transport of specie to Lisbon.[147] One of the sources of specie was from markets outside the Peninsula. In October 1812, a commissariat officer, Bissett, was appointed at Gibraltar. His purpose was to raise specie for the Peninsula and the Mediterranean. It was intended for him to connect the financial arrangements of the two areas.[148]

Mercantile agents were also hired to buy specie for the use of the army in the Peninsula. They were employed in an attempt to prevent private bargains which would cause fluctuations in price. There were also hopes that this would prevent speculators from obstructing the purchase of specie.[149] One such agent was the mercantile agency of Messrs. Staniforth and Blunt. They had agents at Gibraltar whose duty was to collect specie. Herries told Kennedy to make sure that Bissett was aware of this fact before he left for Gibraltar.[150]

In October 1812, Herries wrote to Kennedy about joining the Peninsular and Mediterranean commissariat departments to prevent competition in raising money. The mercantile agencies were not supposed to interfere. If it was not possible, they were to make their operations subordinate to Kennedy's. Bissett would act under Kennedy and would communicate with Burgmann about the degree of assistance the Mediterranean could give. Intermediate mercantile agents would only be resorted to when absolutely necessary. The commission to Messrs. Staniforth & Co. was the result of ineffectual attempts by the Treasury to take the money negotiations away from the control of speculators who endeavoured to obstruct the commissariat officers involved. Herries did not like to employ outside people when he already had people in place. It was preferable for Kennedy to be able to raise specie without employing brokers in the Peninsula. He expected the situation in the Mediterranean would be successful. He expected no repetition of private bargains which had been so ruinous to the commissariat department and were so inconvenient to Kennedy.[151]

In April 1812, Herries wrote to Bissett about Bissett's acceptance in February of 400,000 dollars from Reid and Brown. The Treasury did not approve of private bargains. Their objections were based on the difference between the prices when the agreements were concluded and those of the public markets at that time. The government, in response, introduced measures to obtain specie in the Mediterranean.[152] Bissett defended his private bargain with Reid and Brown because of the great distance the troops were from the depots. He did not defend it on any grounds except necessity. He pointed out that Kennedy had accepted a similar arrangement.[153]

The Treasury's objections to private contracts for specie were based, not upon the price of negotiation being too high, but upon the great difference between the price and the rate at which larger sums were being raised on the open market at the same time. It would cause a greater inconvenience and would cause the decrease in the ability to continue negotiating bills at Lisbon abd Cadiz which had, up to that point, done extremely well in supplying the needs of Wellington's army. Another necessary consequence of the willingness to pay higher prices for dollars through private contract was the withdrawl of dollars from the public market to be offered at a higher price privately. The money-holders would not continue to sell at the lower price when they knew they could get a higher price at Gibraltar. The result would be that the public market, a major source, would be gradually destroyed. Eventually, they would be forced to depend solely on precarious supplies from private speculators.[154]

In January 1812, the Treasury contracted with Matthew Boulton's firm for a number of copper blanks to be produced for shipment to Lisbon to be stamped and used as coinage. The value of the copper sent was £2800,[155] A consignment of gold coins and parts of guineas was delivered, in October 1812, from the Bank of England. The delivery amounted to £100,000 and was considered a "very peculiar transaction". The Secretary of State wrote to Wellington to inform him that the disposal of the money was to be left up to his judgement.[156] Another consignment of gold coins was sent, unopened, straight to Wellington for his personal dispersal. Two boxes of gold bars and fourteen boxes of gold coin were sent. Pipon was directed to keep back the gold bars to be converted to coin at Lisbon then

forwarded to the army.[157] In the last half of 1812, a total of £775,213 in gold was sent to the Peninsula.[158] The gold included French, Portuguese, and Spanish coin in addition to bars of gold.[159]

The 1812 worldwide specie shortage was caused by a number of factors, all unconnected. The supply was severely disrupted by the revolt of the Spanish American colonies. The war with the United States in addition to Napoleon's invasion of Russia increased the demand for specie. The result was that the market price for gold rose sharply.[160] Bathurst decided to take a different approach to the problem. He knew that purchases on the open market would only drive the price higher so he decided to supply Wellington with a less obvious alternative. He demanded that the Bank of England release some of their foreign gold coin reserves. There was some resistance but, by the end of August, £76,424 had been released. Less than two weeks later another £100,000 had been released. With Liverpool and Vansittart's support, Bathurst was able to get another £100,000. By the middle of October, the Bank of England had agreed, albeit reluctantly, to provide £100,000 per month for a period of four months. The sums involved exceeded the Bank of England's foreign coin reserves by a fair amount but Bathurst was able to find a legal loophole that allowed for the export of guineas for the pay of British troops abroad. This loophole justified his demands but his subsequent instructions to Wellington for not just pay but all necessary expenses deliberately risked his impeachment. Fortunately for Bathurst's head, the other ministers approved. By the middle of November, the first guineas had reached Lisbon.[161]

In April 1809, an agreement was reached where assignments for three million dollars were to be collected from the Treasury at Vera Cruz. The rate was fixed at £3 11½d which was felt to have been too low. It was agreed that £593,750 would be provided in exchange, £400,000 of which would be in Treasury Bills.[162] In January 1811, there was more correspondence reporting on getting specie from Vera Cruz. A considerable amount of specie, in dollars, was supplied. They were disappointed by the high exchange rate at Cadiz and the limits which the agent at Vera Cruz was confined to in the negotiation of Bills to purchase the dollars. The limits were fixed with reference to the exchange rate at Cadiz on the date of the original instructions. The Treasury invested their representative with a larger

discretion on the subject. It was hoped that a sufficient quantity could be obtained although it would take at least three or four months before any specie obtained could be shipped to the Peninsula. Because of the delay, it was suggested that other sources of specie be found during that period. The Treasury, in the meantime, would attempt to gather alternate sources but they were not confident of success.[163] In May 1812, a shipment of 320,000 dollars, aboard the "Myrtle" arrived with more being expected.[164]

Other sources of specie were found from time to time. In September 1810, Commissary-in-Chief Gordon informed Commissary-General Kennedy that £110,000 of silver, in dollars, and 18,600 ounces of Spanish gold coin were being sent to Lisbon aboard the "Sylla". The specie had been obtained from China and most of the dollars had been defaced by Chinese characters. Gordon suspected there may be some problems passing it so Kennedy was told to deal with it, if it arose, as he saw fit.[165] In June 1812, a shipment from the East Indies also arrived in England.[166] In 1813, a considerable quantity of gold coin from India became available. It was converted in England to the last issue of guineas ever struck. Most of them were sent to Wellington.[167]

During 1813, more than £2.5 million passed through the military chest but increased demands led the Cabinet to ask the Rothschild's Bank for assistance. By the end of 1813, Nathan Rothschild and Wellington were working in cooperation to obtain gold from the continent. Gold pieces, mainly French, were bought in Holland and Germany and were shipped to Spain from the port of Helvoetsluys in the Low Countries. Eventually Rothschild was able to buy gold in France itself to be shipped overland to the army.[168]

Wellington suffered a severe, if temporary, shortage of specie during December 1813 and January 1814 but after that time, the money began to flow in regularly. A leading banker in Bayonne even supplied specie in exchange for Treasury Bills at a time when Bayonne was still occupied by the French. Nathan Rothschild was even reportedly buying specie in Paris, itself.[169] Within one year of Rothschild's involvement, he was able to send £11 million, in continental subsidies and remittances, to the Peninsula. He had a brother in Paris, James,

who was rumoured to smuggle bullion personally through the French lines to Wellington in female clothing.[170]

The Commissary-General had agents at Lisbon, Cadiz, Gibraltar, and other areas to exchange Treasury Bills for specie. Unfortunately, there were few who would buy Treasury Bills and those that did insisted on huge discounts because the balance of payments was so unfavourable between Britain and the Peninsula. The Commissary-General asked for increased English shipments as specie became more difficult to procure. It was difficult for the Treasury to meet the demands of the Peninsula and, as a result, the military chest shrank and the army went into debt. Another problem was that they could not afford the Portuguese subsidies.[171] The Treasury was sending more specie to the Peninsula than before but the proportion of war expenses paid through it fell drastically. Commissariat agents were forced to accept extremely heavy discounts in the conversion of bills into specie. The rocketing military expenses combined with the increased aid to Spain and Portugal prevented the government's attempt to maintain a healthy balance between Treasury Bills and specie when paying debts in the Peninsula. Army debts kept increasing and the pay of troops was several months in arrears.[172]

The scarcity of specie was increasingly a problem through 1812. In 1811, the cost of war had jumped to almost £11 million of which three-quarters were from bills drawn upon England. The paper discount was almost 25% and the exchange rate was so low that instead of buying five Spanish dollars, it would only buy 3,5. The specie shortage became critical when Wellington entered Madrid.[173]

In June 1812, there was talk of establishing a Bank of Lisbon. It would rest on British credit instead of Portuguese credit to establish the bank. There were doubts, however, that the Portuguese would be able to raise money in this manner. Putting more paper, at a value of six million, into the market would be a problem. The commissariat was already having great difficulty in meeting, with any degree of regularity, the immense amount of outstanding claims against them. This situation gave rise to a discount and was the argument used against the increase of paper circulation in the form of Exchequer Bills. This was the proposition that

had been discussed and rejected two years previously for the same reason. The pressures at that time had not even been close to the pressures at the time under concern.[174] Wellington felt it was not probable that the increased paper circulation which would follow in the wake of the creation of the Bank, would improve the Portuguese government's situation. It would instead, by putting more paper on the market, increase the depreciation and place the British military chest under more distressed circumstances than they had previously faced.[175]

The practice of paying bills all in paper instead of half paper/half money had increased the amount of paper in the market. The paper competed with the government bills and diminished, proportionately, the amount it was possible to weekly raise for negotiation.[176] Drummond gave an argument in favour of half money/half paper. He thought the Commissary-General should prefer, where able to be done on equal terms, the half and half method because paying all with money would throw paper into disuse and consequently the discount on it would increase, thus a larger amount of specie would become necessary to redeem it. Withdrawing circulation of paper money might be sensible but it would injure the British acquisition of Bills of Exchange. It could not be discredited until more accredited paper was in circulation to replace it otherwise it would increase instead of decrease the necessity of sending specie.[177]

As long as the army was operating in Portugal, precious metals sent to pay the troops and purchase supplies flowed back into the Lisbon market from whence they were able to return to the military chest. Since the theatre of war had moved to Spain, this advantage was gone. Supplies had to be paid in hard currency which no longer returned to the markets that had principally supplied the commissary to this point. In Spain, they had not found that the demand for bills on England had increased since the liberation of the capital.[178]

Lack of money often had a great affect on strategy. Upon reaching Lisbon in April 1809, Wellington found that only £120,000 of a promised £400,000 was waiting. By May, the situation was worse. Wellington refused to move until he had the necessary money. It was not until 25 June that the rest of the money arrived.[179] Wellington was forced to borrow from the merchants at Oporto before the rest of the money arrived.[180]

CHAPTER VII : CONCLUSION

Wellington's success in the Peninsular War is without question. He was able to consistently meet and defeat the French in Spain and Portugal, despite having inferior numbers. How was this success possible? To a large extent, his success was the result of his superior logistical arrangements. While it is undeniable that good generalship played a large part in his success, we must not underestimate the contributions made by the supporting organizations. Without an efficient supply system, Wellington would not have been able to march his troops anywhere, much less expect them to fight. Credit for the role played by Wellington's commissariat is long overdue.

Wellington entered the Peninsular War with a commissariat personnel that was vastly inexperienced and ineffectual. He left it with a system capable of meeting his strategic needs. The Peninsular War was the first time that the British commissariat had to handle the entire supply and transport by itself. They could not rely on contracting out since there were no contractors in the Peninsula. Animals could be hired but this still left the regiments much to do. Being without relevant training, the commissariat personnel had to "learn under the tuition of Wellington and the discipline of hard experience".[181] That the British commissariat was able to learn from their experiences was unquestionable and their contribution to Wellington's success was substantial.

Evaluation

When examining the logistical system of Wellington's army, there are two elements which cause much concern. The first is the transport system, specifically the transportation by land, and the second is the payment problems, specifically the dearth of specie. Although experiencing some difficulty in the collection of supplies, most notably forage, overall the commissariat was able to supply the troops with what was required. Even when they had problems, the cause was not so much lack of supplies but more lack of money. The prevailing theme seems to be a lack of the means to finance the war. Even the situation with

the muleteers could have been ameliorated with the application of hard currency. The financial crisis even had its effect on the strategic situation. In 1809, a supply crisis threatened to halt operations. The problem at that time was money, or the lack thereof. On 5 May, Wellington protested to the Secretary to the Treasury, William Huskisson, that he had only received a quarter of the £400,000 due to meet the operational costs. The situation was desperate and, by 30 May, he demanded £300,000 immediately. He reiterrated his plea to Castlereagh the next day. He was furious that delays were playing havoc with his plans. He could not advance until he had paid the army debts in the area.[182] This was not the only instance when lack of money caused Wellington to change his strategy.

The problems faced by Wellington in the area of finances was undoubtably one he would have had to face regardless of who was supplying his money. Once he, and the government, decided that everything was to be paid for in money, it was almost inevitable that difficulties would arise. It was only a matter of time. Even a wealthy country like England would have to come to the end of her gold reserves eventually. Wellington was fortunate, however, that he had all of England's credit to back him up. Without that credit, his task would have been much harder. The success of both the commissariat and the Treasury in raising the necessary specie played a large role in the success of Wellington's strategy. Although it did not always run smoothly, their efforts did pay off in the long run. Ultimately, that is all that really matters.

Comparison

The success of Wellington's logistical arrangements is even more striking when you compare it to the French experience in the Peninsula during the same time. The key to the British success was their commissariat system but, no matter how efficient they were, they would have been unable to stop the concentrated French army. If the French had been able to concentrate all of their forces in the Peninsula together and march against the British, the British would have been driven out of the Peninsula in one campaign. Napoleon was not strong enough, even with an army of 300,000 men, to both hold the Peninsula and drive the

British out of it. Moore had forced the French to scatter their forces over a much greater area than the French could keep in subjection thus weakening their hold in all areas.[183]

Most of the French problems could be traced to their use of requisitioning to obtain supplies. Requisitioning gave the French greater mobility but they were unable to remain concentrated for too long a period of time. No district, no matter how fertile, was capable of supporting a 50,000 man army for longer than one or two weeks. The French had no transport to bring in rations therefore, the French forces had no choice but to disperse into smaller groups to find food. They were also unable to return to areas they had recently occupied. Strategies looked simple on the map back in Paris but became impossible to implement on the ground. In February 1812, when Marmont was ordered to march against Ciudad Rodrigo from Salamanca, a distance of just over fifty miles, he stated that Napoleon did not understand that even a small movement caused an enormous loss of means and cost as much as a major battle would. The French army would have been unable to stay at Ciudad Rodrigo longer than three days because of lack of food. Nothing could have been achieved because the enemy would have known the French could not have remained long. It would have cost them about 500 horses and would have immobilized them for six weeks.[184] Wellington was well aware of the fact that after stripping one district bare, the French could not go near it again until the next harvest was ripe. Because of his organised transport and supply, Wellington was able to go wherever he wanted.[185]

The French armies were overstretched in Spain. They were unable to pacify the country and the guerrilla war forced them to detatch troops to guard supply convoys, garrison communication lines, and escort messengers. The situation got worse as the war progressed and it played havoc with the supply system. Even without the guerrillas, it would have been hard to subsist since Spain grew barely enough food for its own inhabitants. Wellington understood this fact.[186] In a war of attrition, the better fed and equipped army would fight better and survive longest. The French continued to live off the land, even though they had half-heartedly begun to establish magazines in 1812. This tactic failed in the Peninsula as well as in Russia where there were sparse resources and it also generated resentment and drove the populace to resist. Wellington was convinced that superior logistics were responsible for the survival of the British army. The system which emerged was the joint

creation of Wellington and Sir Robert Kennedy, Commissary-General intermittently between 1808 and 1814. Wellington sought a network of magazines across Portugal that would serve as a supply base and a point from which mule trains could regularly deliver food and fodder to the various fronts. In 1809, there were twelve magazines operating. By the end of 1812, there were thirty-seven.[187]

Massena was forced to retreat from Torres Vedras because of lack of food for his troops. His retreat proved that logistics was the key to success. The French were unable to find sufficient foodstuffs in the area of the march and, by the time he halted his withdrawl at Salamanca, he had lost 30,000 men since his departure the previous year. He lost 6000 men in the retreat from Santarem alone.[188] Logistics wore the French down more than casualties. The French were unable to find adaquate provisions and the Spanish resistance curtailed the French freedom of movement in anything other than large units which aggravated the difficulties in finding sufficient food. In his 1812 campaign, Wellington was able to increase the security of his own logistics. His army was based on the sea and rivers and depots were established that could be replenished by ships and by boats and were within easy reach of the troops.[189]

Wellington's insistence that nothing be taken without payment worked to his advantage. Without the support of the muleteers and the populace, he would have been unable to campaign.[190] Nowhere was this more striking than France once the British crossed the Pyrenees. Once in France, by paying cash, the British were able to obtain transport and supplies without a problem while Soult was unable to obtain anything. The behaviour of the British troops was exemplary and they were welcomed by the French peasants more warmly than the French were.[191]

Wellington's army never had an adequate transport train but they still had better logistics than the French. They were able to capitalize on the advantages that the Royal Navy and sea-based logistics gave them. The Spanish guerrillas played a vital role in interfering with French supplies and Wellington was able to capitalise on the logistical resources available to him. Wellington was "most nearly professional" in the administration and

maintenance of the British army and, despite limited resources, he was able to make the logistics work for him even though it was a "fatal weakness" for the French. He won the war of attrition through the "superior exploitation of available logistical resources" as opposed to military strategy.[192]

While the French system had worked very well in wealthier, more abundant areas, the Peninsula was not conducive to that type of warfare. Because the French were unable, or unwilling, to adapt their traditional methods, they were incapable of meeting the challenge from both Wellington and the Spanish resistance. The French let their logistics dictate their strategy and were forced to pay the price for that lapse. Wellington, by making his logistics fit his strategy, was able to capitalize on his enemy's mistakes. Although he had his own problems to face, in particular the dearth of specie, he was able to make his logistics work with him instead of against him. It is a tribute to his organisational abilities that he was able to consistently defeat an army of such superior numbers. It is an achievement which deserves more recognition than it has received to date.

Endnotes:

Chapter 1: Introduction

[1] Jack Weller, "Wellington's Peninsular War Logistics" in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. 42 (1964), p. 197.

[2] S.G.P. Ward, *Wellington's Headquarters*, (Oxford: 1957), p. 66.

[3] Sir Randolph Isham Routh, *Observations on Commissariat Field Service and Home Defences*, (London: 1852), p. 9.

[4] Weller, pp. 198-200.

[5] Ward, pp. 99-100.

Chapter 2: Administrative Structure

[1] Michael Glover, *Wellington's Army*. (New York: 1977), p. 14.

[2] Ward, pp. 2-3.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. British administration evolved from the eighteenth century to forestall any one person from gaining control of the army as Cromwell had. Transport and supplies were managed by the Treasury; gunners, engineers, and equipment by the Board of Ordnance; the Commander-in-Chief was responsible for promotions and shared responsibility for certain supplies and hospitals with the Secretary of State for War and was answerable to Parliament on all army matters. Wellington was fortunate that Castlereagh and Liverpool, the successive Secretaries of State, were close friends and were sympathetic.(Lawrence James, *The Iron Duke*, (London: 1992), p. 182)

[4] Ward, pp. 5-6.

[5] Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army 1509-1970*. (New York: 1970), pp. 238-239.

[6] Ward, p. 6.

[7] Glover, p. 16.

[8] Ward, pp. 6-8.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12.

[10] Glover, p. 137.

[11] Routh, p. 7.

[12] Ward, pp. 13-14.

[13] C.W.C. Oman, *Wellington's Army 1809-1814*. (London: 1913), p. 161.

[14] Ward, p. 15.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

[17] M. Glover, p. 16. When there was no Commander-in-Chief, the patronage of the army rested with the Secretary at War. There was no Commander-in-Chief from the end of the war with America and the Bourbons in 1783 until the beginning of the new war with France in 1793. Patronage fell to the civilian minister, Sir George Yonge, Bart., "a peculiarly unpleasant character". He promoted without regard to service or experience. Promotions were sometimes given to boys or even girls. (R. Glover, *Peninsular Preparation.* (Cambridge: 1963), pp. 147-148.

[18] M. Glover, p. 16.

[19] Ward, p. 17.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[22] Oman, p. 156.

[23] Ward, p. 19. The realization was the result of the disastrous campaign in Flanders and Holland. A new type of warfare was emerging, more "hurried".

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 27-29.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-31.

[26] M. Glover, p. 137. Charles Stuart is also spelled Charles Stewart by various authors. For the sake of consistency, I will use "Stuart".

[27] Ward, pp. 31-32.

[28] Barnett, p. 260.

[29] Ward, pp. 32-33.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 70-72. Commissariat officers were often responsible for accounts long after the war was over. An example occurred when, in 1794, the Q.M.G. to Lord Moira's column in Flanders (10,000 men) ordered supplies for 25,000 men from a town they were not passing through in an effort to deceive the enemy about troop movements. It was a success militarily but the Treasury tried to recover the money for the extra 15,000 rations from Lord Moira's widow for a long period afterward. (p. 71)

[32] Edward Herries, C.B., *Memoir of the Public Life of the Right Hon. John Charles Herries*, (London: 1880), p. 24.

[33] Oman, p. 310.

[34] Herries, pp. 23-24.

[35] Ward, p. 73. Herries, however, states that promotions only proceeded on the recommendation of a senior officer of the department with Wellington's approval. Patronage rested with the First Lord of the Treasury. First appointments were subject to test examinations and promotions were only given to those recommended by the Commissary-in-Chief. (Herries, pp. 24-25)

[36] Ward, pp. 73-74.

[37] Havilland Le Mesurier Esq., "A System for the British Commissariat" (1796) in Richard Glover, *Peninsular Preparation*, (Cambridge: 1963), pp. 268-269.

[38] Routh, p. 8.

[39] Ward, pp. 74-75.

[40] Le Mesurier, p. 270.

[41] Ibid., p. 270.

[42] Routh, p. 10. Commissariat officers worked closely with the commanding officers to whom they were attached thus it was essential that they have frequent access to that officer to combine their arrangements and act in concert. They should also never be too far in the rear. (pp. 11-12)

[43] Ward, pp. 75-76.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 66-68.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 69. "Embargo" is "confiscation under the law".(p. 81) "Forage" was a requisition by a military party in a manner that was designed to procure the largest amount of provisions while causing the least inconvenience to the population.(p. 69) And "requisition" was little better than confiscation. It involved no obligation to pay, unlike forage which involved payment at a date not too distant from the date of the transaction.(p. 70)

[46] M. Glover, p. 106.

[47] Ward, pp. 69-70. In May 1809, Wellington issued a General Order stating that only the Commissary-General or his assistants could make a requisition on the country except in an emergency, where no commissary official was accompanying. All requisitions contrary to this order would be paid by the commissary but the amount would be charged to the individual account of the officer responsible. (Lieut. Colonel Gurwood (ed.), *The General Orders of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington in Portugal, Spain, and France From 1809 to 1814*, (London: 1837), G.O. 4 May 1809, p. 75)

[48] Barnett, p. 261.

[49] Michael Glover, *The Peninsular War 1807-1814*, (London: 1974), p. 29.

[50] Oman, p. 307.

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

Chapter 3: Number of Troops

[1] Michael Glover, "'A Particular Service' Beresford's Peninsular War" in *History Today*. 1986, 36(June): p. 38. The Portuguese did play a substantial role in the defeat on Napoleon's armies. In a return dated January 1811, an abstract of the Portuguese forces was included. The regular troops numbered 45,717 which included the rank and file of the cavalry: 5636; the infantry: 36,095; and the artillery: 3986. There was also a militia numbering 44,356. (Liverpool Papers: Add. Mss. 38,361 February 1811, "Abstract of Portuguese Forces", f.117.

[2] Glover (1986), p. 34.

[3] Ibid., p. 35. Wellesley had been recalled after the controversial Convention of Cintra. Upon his return, he found himself subject to a military enquiry along with Dalrymple and Burrard. He was cleared and, upon the death of Sir John Moore, he was appointed Commander of the Peninsular forces. For an account of the public reaction to Cintra, see Christopher Hibbert's *Wellington: A Personal History* (Great Britain: 1997), pp. 75-78. For the government's reaction, see Rory Muir's *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815* (New Haven and London: 1996), pp. 54-59.

[4] Castlereagh to Wellesley, 2 April 1809 in Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke*

of Wellington, K.G., edited by his son, the Duke of Wellington, (London: 1858-1872), vol. VI, p.210. Henceforth to be known as *Supplementary Despatches.*

[5] Beresford to Wellesley, 12 September 1809, in *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. VI, p. 362.

[6] Beresford to Wellesley, 3 September 1809, in *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. VI, p. 345.

[7] M. Glover (1977), p. 123.

[8] Oman, pp. 232-233. Two Portuguese regiments were attached to every British division. At Busaco, the Portuguese troops fought so well that the French believed they were English disguised in Portuguese uniforms. (A. Schaumann, *On the Road with Wellington*, edited and translated by Anthony M. Ludovic, (London: 1924), p. 249)

[9] Beresford to Wellesley, 12 June 1809, in *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. VI, pp. 283-284.

[10] Wellington to Earl of Liverpool, 19 December 1809, in Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington, *The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K.G.*, edited by Colonel Gurwood, (London: 1934-1939), vol. V, pp. 364-367. Henceforth to be known as *Dispatches.*

[11] Glover (1986), p. 37.

[12] Charles J. Esdaile, *The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War*, (Manchester: 1988), pp. 117-118.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

[15] Wellington to Marquis Wellesley, 26 January 1811, in *Dispatches*, vol. VII, pp. 186-189.

[16] Charles J. Esdaile, *The Duke of Wellington and the Command of the Spanish Army, 1812-14.* (New York: 1990), pp. 19-20.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[18] Michael Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618-1991.* vol. 1, (Jefferson: 1992), p. 238.

[19] Clive Emsley, *The Longman Companion to Napoleonic Europe.* (London: 1993), pp. 12-13.

[20] Clodfelter, p. 240.

[21] "Effective Strength of the Force Serving in Portugal and of the Troops embarked and under orders for Foreign Service", April 1809, in *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. VI, pp. 211-212.

[22] Emsley, pp. 13-14. There is a very good description of the features and development of the Lines in Schaumann, pp. 267-268.

[23] "Weekly State of the Forces in Spain and Portugal Under the Command of Lieutenant-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B.", 1 November 1809, in *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. VI, pp. 418-420.

[24] Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, 19 November 1809, in *Supplementary Dispatches*, vol. VI, p. 424.

[25] Clodfelter, p. 241.

[26] Emsley, p. 14.

[27] J.W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, vol. VII, (London: 1917), pp. 542-543. Before withdrawing behind the Lines, Wellington had the Portuguese peasants burn crops in an effort to deny Massena enough subsistence so he would not be able to remain immobile. This did not work completely but it did work well enough to keep Massena's provisions scanty. The cause of his eventual retreat was hunger among the troops.(Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 1991), p. 438)

[28] Emsley, p. 15.

[29] "Abstract of the Strength of the Allied Army in the Field", 1 July 1811, in *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. VII, pp. 173-174.

[30] Emsley, p. 15.

[31] Wellington to Lieut. General Sir Graham, K.B., 31 January 1813, in *Dispatches*, vol. X, p. 67.

[32] Glover (1977), p. 102.

[33] Clodfelter, p. 244.

[34] Emsley, pp. 15-16.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 16. The Armistice, however, was not agreed until 17 April because Soult questioned the authenticity of the messengers.(M. Glover (1977), p. 335) Also, in February, Lieut-General Sir John Hope was sent to invest Bayonne which was completed on 27 February. He settled down to a "make-believe siege" (p. 320). The governor of Bayonne, Thouvenot, decided to make a sortie on 14 April. He had heard, by 12 April, of Napoleon's abdication but had received no official notification. He attacked with 6000 men. There were

838 British and 905 French casualties. Hope was captured and Bayonne finally surrendered on 27 April. (p. 335)

[36] Clodfelter, pp. 245-246.

[37] Esdaile (1988), Appendix 2, p. 204.

[38] *Ibid.*, Appendix 4, p. 211.

Chapter 4: Supplies

[1] General Order, 31 July, 1808, in *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. VI, p. 92. Before the British reorganization of the Portuguese army, Portuguese rations were as follows: A ¼lb. fish and 1½lbs. bread on Sundays and Fridays; ½lb. beef and 1½lbs. bread and a quart of wine every other day. The fish and meat were usually rotten, the wine was sour, and the bread was baked with sand.(Philip J. Haythornthwaite, *Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars*, (London: 1996),p. 110) In a General Order of 6 May 1810, Portuguese rations were set at 1½lbs. bread or 1lb. biscuit and ½lb. meat per day. The Portuguese cavalry had the same rations as the British cavalry. (Gurwood, General Order, 6 May 1809, pp. 75-76)

[2] Toby Michael Ormsby Redgrave, *Wellington's Logistical Arrangements in the Peninsular War 1809-14*. (Ph.D. Thesis, London: date unknown), p. 189.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 52. 100lbs. of flour produces 90lbs. of biscuit while the same quantity produces 140lbs. of bread. A third of the space is saved when biscuit is produced.(Routh, p. 14)

[4] Redgrave, p. 53.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[9] Wellington to Bissett, 17 December 1811, in *Dispatches*, vol. VIII, p. 446. Includes extract of letter from Liverpool dated 21 November 1811.

[10] Redgrave, p. 58.

[11] M. Glover (1977), p. 106.

[12] Redgrave, pp. 59-60. Wellington himself recommended that they send £400,000 to America, £200,000 for rice from the northern province of Brazil. (*Dispatches*, vol. VIII, p. 464.) Supplies from the United States were probably so extensive because of the numerous

licenses granted to bring supplies from the States.(W.O. 58/133, Herries to Kennedy, 3 November 1812)

[13] Redgrave, p. 61n.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 61. American ships were given licenses to import corn to Lisbon. Wellington would have liked to have had Portuguese ships have licenses to do the same from the United States, then he would have been certain to receive the supplies. Americans, once receiving licenses, might decide to bring their supplies to France instead. (*Dispatches*, vol. IX, pp. 394-395.)

[15] Redgrave, pp. 62-63.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 66-68. Herries informed Kennedy in July 1813 that he should receive regular shipments of grain and flour from England. They would begin to arrive in September. Because of army movements, they were being shipped to Santander instead.(W.O. 58/133, Herries to Kennedy, 7 July 1813)

[19] Redgrave, p. 69. There was a good crop in Castile so many of the Spanish merchants and contractors brought bread and corn to the army to make up for shortages.(p. 69)

[20] Ward (1957), p. 80.

[21] Messrs. Daniel Callaghan & Sons of Cork.

[22] Redgrave, p. 71.

[23] Wellington to Castlereagh, 31 May 1809, in *Supplementary Depatches*, vol. VI, p. 273.

[24] Redgrave, pp. 72-73. On 1 March 1810, the provision return stated that there was about one and a half million pounds of salt meat being stored in Portugal. Seventy-three percent was held on the coast at Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra. Twenty-four percent was held at depots along the navigable reaches of the Tagus, at Abrantes and Santarem. (p. 73) In January 1813, Herries wrote to Kennedy to inform him that 2 million pounds of salt meat had been shipped to the Peninsula as he had requested.(W.O. 58/133, Herries to Kennedy, 5 January 1813)

[25] Redgrave, pp. 73-74.

[26] W.O. 57/41, Purcell to Bissett, 23 July 1812.

[27] Redgrave, pp. 74-75. Arranged by envoy extraordinary to the Barbary states, William A'Court.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77. The speculators would drive the cattle up to the front where supplies were lower. Commissaries at the front would bid against each other thus driving the prices up.(p. 76)

[30] Distilled alcohol was more economical since it gave three rations per pint as opposed to one for wine. Also, per ration, spirits were cheaper than wine. (Redgrave, p. 85)

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 85. Once it did arrive, it was subject to the regular problems of transport.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 86. In 1812, only at most half of the alcohol consumed by the troops was imported with even less than that in early 1813. Although the troops were well-located to receive supplies from the coast, Kennedy only asked for shipments at one third the old rate. This suggests that much of the 1812 shipments were still in the depots at the end of the year.(p. 87)

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 92. Very little forage was provided from England. Summer 1809: three million pounds of hay; February 1810: two million; early 1811: two million; winter 1813-14: four and a half million pounds. At the ten pound ration, these quantities would have only fed an average of 609 horses per day between April 1809 and the end of the war.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[37] Schaumann, pp. 164-165.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 218. Schaumann disclosed his discovery to General Payne who issued a General Order stating that officers had to be present for the feeding of the horses and could not leave until the horses had finished.

[39] Redgrave, p. 95. In the summer of 1809, two consignments of oats, 8400 and 10,000 quarters respectively, were sent but in 1810 only one series of shipments were sent during May, June, and July with a slightly smaller quantity. When considered over the period of April 1809 to December 1810, they yielded a daily ration for 1050 horses, less than a quarter of those that needed to be supplied.(p. 95)

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97. In a letter to Kennedy, February 1812, Herries states that Harding Read, the Consul General in the Azores, had drawn £2000 on account to purchase forage corn in the Azores.(W.O. 58/132, Herries to Kennedy, 27 February 1812) Purcell was able to get the corn purchased by Read released in July 1812. (W.O. 57/41, Purcell to Bissett, 23 July 1812)

[42] Wellington to Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley, 4 November 1810, in *Dispatches*, vol. VI, p. 557.

[43] Redgrave, p. 99. Between 22 December 1810 and 21 September 1811, almost thirty thousand quarters of barley and six thousand six hundred quarters of oats were shipped to Portugal from England. This worked out to an average of about one and a half million pounds per month.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101. Only two records remain which indicate the quantity shipped from Ireland. The total for May and June 1813 was ten million pounds (roughly), equivalent to two months' consumption. The commissariat was able to acquire a six month reserve of oats, barley, and Indian corn by the end of 1812. This also enabled them to pay a large quantity of their Portuguese subsidy in kind. p. 101. Sampaio was not limited to Ireland but was instead tied to a specific price. Because he was tied to a price, he was obliged to go for the cheaper market, Ireland.(W.O. 57/41, Bissett to Pipon, 27 December 1812)

[46] Redgrave, p. 101. Kennedy to Abuderham.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[48] Wellington to Charles Stuart, 14 October 1812, in *Dispatches*, vol. IX, p. 484 and Wellington to Sir Robert Kennedy, 6 February 1813, in *Dispatches*, vol. X, p. 92.

[49] Redgrave, p. 102.

Chapter 5: Transport

[50] Oman (1913), p. 310.

[51] James, p. 185.

[52] Brian Lavery, *Nelson's Navy*, (Annapolis, Md.: 1989), p. 273.

[53] Philip J. Haythornthwaite, *The Armies of Wellington*, (London: 1996), p. 194.

[54] Lavery, p. 273.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 274.

[56] Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh, 7 May 1809, in Dispatches, vol. IV, pp. 284-285.

[57] James, p. 184.

[58] Christopher D. Hall, "The Royal Navy and the Peninsular War" in *Mariner's Mirror*, 1993, 79(4), p. 404.

[59] Ibid., p. 403.

[60] Lavery, p. 273.

[61] Hall, p. 406.

[62] Redgrave, p. 135.

[63] Wellington to Earl Bathurst, 4 June 1813, in *Dispatches*, vol. X, p. 416. Wellington had a letter from Bathust on 13 May about diminishing and limiting the number of transports in the Peninsula. His response was an attempt to defend the use of transports in the area.

[64] Hall, p. 406.

[65] Redgrave, pp. 135-136. Kennedy wrote to Herries about the inconvenience of having vessels arriving at Santander to go to Passages. It was also inconvenient because magazines near the army were very low. (W.O. 57/42, Kennedy to Herries, 17 December 1813) In a letter from Drake to Kennedy, he states that immense amounts of corn are arriving with no way of forwarding them because no vessels can be hired. He wants John Atkins to deliver the corn to Passages on his own expense of freight. It costs the government more to hire than for Atkins' ship to continue. Ships were reluctant to go beyond Santander to Passages. They pleaded damage to the ship during passage. Drake wanted a penalty affixed if a ship did not proceed to Passages when directed.(W.O. Drake to Kennedy, 12 December 1813)

[66] Oman, p. 310.

[67] Wellington to Earl Bathurst, 13 August 1812, in *Dispatches*, vol. IX, p. 352.

[68] Wellington to Earl Bathurst, 7 April 1813, in *Dispatches*, vol. X, p. 273.

[69] James, pp. 184-185.

[70] Herries, pp. 35-36.

[71] W.O. 58/130, Gordon to Kennedy, 18 December 1810.

[72] Colonel H.C.B. Rogers, *Troopships and their History*, (London: 1963), p. 55.

[73] Haythornthwaite, *Armies*, p. 194.

[74] Lavery, p. 273.

[75] Hall, pp. 409-410.

[76] Redgrave, p. 133.

[77] *Ibid.*

[78] Oman, p. 311.

[79] Redgrave, pp. 133-134.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 134.

[81] Oman, p. 312.

[82] Redgrave, p. 135.

[83] Ward, pp. 84-87.

[84] The Hon. J.W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, vol. VIII, (London: 1917), p. 344.

[85] Redgrave, p. 138.

[86] *Ibid.*, pp. 136-137.

[87] General Order, 20 August 1809, in *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. VI, p. 330.

[88] Redgrave, pp. 137-138.

[89] *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.

[90] *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

[91] *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[93] *Ibid.*., p. 144.

[94] Fortescue (1917), vol. VIII, p. 345.

[95] Redgrave, p. 144.

[96] Fortescue (1928), p. 51.

[97] Redgrave, p. 147.

[98] James, p. 184. Since each mule could carry 200 lbs. of supplies in addition to their own feed for the round trip, they could carry six days biscuit for 33 men, rum for 100, or rice for 20. Enormous mule trains were required. (Haythornthwaite, *Weapons*, p. 110)

[99] Redgrave, pp. 147-148. This was intended to hinder the illicit exchange or sale of army mules as well as make it possible to distinguish mules from the commissariat train apart from mules from a private merchant. It made it more difficult, however, to switch mules between formations. (p. 148)

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[101] *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

[102] Fortescue (1928), p. 53.

[103] Redgrave, p. 150.

[104] *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

[105] Fortescue (1928), p. 51.

[106] T. Miller Macguire, *The British Army Under Wellington 1813-1814*, (London: 1907), p. 22.

[107] Fortescue (1917), vol. VIII, p. 343.

[108] Redgrave, p. 151.

[109] *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.

[110] Fortescue (1917), vol. VIII, p. 343.

[111] Wellington to Lieut.-Colonel Torrens in *Dispatches*, vol. VI, 2 November 1810, pp. 547-548.

[112] Haythornthwaite, *Armies*, p. 121.

[113] S.G.P. Ward, "The Quartermaster-General's Department in the Peninsula, 1809-1814" in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol. 23(1945), p. 143.

[114] Redgrave, p. 145.

[115] Haythornthwaite, *Armies*, p. 121.

Chapter 6: Payment

[116] Redgrave, p. 107.

[117] John M. Sherwig, *Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-1815*, (Cambridge, Ma.: 1969), p. 216.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 204.

[119] *Ibid.*, pp. 217-218.

[120] *Ibid.*, pp. 218-219.

[121] *Ibid.*, pp. 221-222.

[122] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

[123] This meant there was £600,000 for the 20,000 Portuguese troops already in British pay, £250,000 for the 10,000 additional troops, and £130,000 for the increase in pay of the Portuguese officers making a total of £980,000.(F.O. 63/74, Bathurst to Villiers, 5 January 1810)

[124] F.O. 63/74, Bathurst to Villiers, 5 January 1810.

[125] Sherwig, p. 227.

[126] *Ibid.*, p. 227n.

[127] The British Aid Office was established to distribute the subsidy.

[128] Sherwig, p. 229.

[129] *Ibid.*, pp. 235-236.

[130] *Ibid.*, pp. 240-241.

[131] *Ibid.*, p. 244.

[132] *Ibid.*, pp. 244-245. There were three forms of aid related to the total susidy: (p. 246n.)

	British Commissariat				
	Money to council	Paid in field	To Portuguese Commissariat	Goods	Total Subsidy
1812	£595,079	£699,593	£511,348	£160,039	£2,276,833
1813	£637,159	£918,061	£634,791	£276,756	£2,486,012
1814	£98,472	£522,969	£649,146	£61,561	£1,345,082
1815	£50,908	£3057	£950	--------	£54,915

[133] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

[134] *Ibid.*, pp. 258-259. Of the £3.9 million Portuguese subsidy between 1813 and 1814, Wellington disbursed approximately 70% either directly or indirectly. Of the £1,820,932 Spanish subsidy in the last year of the war, approximately 80% went through the British commissary. (p. 264)

[135] *Ibid.*, p. 265.

[136] Redgrave, p. 109. The Treasury and the Commissary-in-Chief felt the commissary in the Peninsula was not using the best methods to reduce expenditures and raise the necessary specie while Wellington and the Commissary-General felt that the Treasury willfully obstructed their efforts and deliberately failed to supply as much specie as they were capable of furnishing. (p. 109.)

[137] Sherwig, p. 224.

[138] *Ibid.*, p. 224n.

[139] *Ibid.*, p. 224.

[140] *Ibid.*, p. 223. During 1809, £465,667 in specie was sent to the Peninsula while £2,174,094 was paid in paper form. (p. 223n.)

[141] Redgrave, p. 110n.

[142] W.O. 58/133, Herries to Kennedy, 7 October 1812.

[143] Wellington to Stuart, in *Dispatches,* vol. IX, 22 April 1812, pp. 79-81.

[144] Add. Mss. 57377, Herries to Bissett, 14 May 1812.

[145] Fortescue (1917), vol. VIII, p. 342.

[146] Add. Mss. 57375, Drummond to Herries, 25 November 1810.

[147] Redgrave, p. 122.

[148] W.O. 58/133, Herries to Kennedy, 14 October 1812.

[149] W.O. 58/133, Herries to Bissett, 10 August 1812.

[150] W.O. 58/133, Herries to Kennedy, 16 October 1812. Staniforth decided to leave the partnership with Bount who continued as the exclusive agent. W.O. 58/133, Herries to Kennedy, 4 November 1812.

[151] W.O. 58/133, Herries to Kennedy, 27 October 1812.

[152] W.O. 58/132, Herries to Bissett, 13 April 1812.

[153] W.O. 57/41, Part 1, Bissett to Herries, 12 May 1812.

[154] Add. Mss. 57377, Herries to Bissett, 14 May 1812.

[155] Sherwig, p. 245.

[156] W.O. 58/133, Herries to Pipon, 20 October 1812.

[157] W.O. 58/133, Herries to Pipon, 26 December 1812.

[158] Sherwig, p. 256.

[159] *Ibid.*, p. 256n.

[160] Muir, p. 206. It rose from the 1811 average of £4 15s 6½d per ounce to £5 1s 3d in 1812 for gold bars. Foreign gold coin also rose to £5 11s 0d at one time.

[161] *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207. This was the origin of the "very peculiar transaction" mentioned earlier.

[162] F.O. 72/72, Frere to Canning, 25 April 1809.

[163] W.O. 57/3, Harrison to Gordon, 15 January 1811.

[164] Add. Mss. 57377, Herries to Bissett, 14 May 1812.

[165] W.O. 58/130, Gordon to Kennedy, 3 September 1810.

[166] Add. Mss. 31236, Stuart to Wellington, 17 June 1812.

[167] Sherwig, p. 263.

[168] *Ibid.*, pp. 263-264.

[169] Muir, p. 302.

[170] Elizabeth Longford, *Wellington: The Years of the Sword*, (London: 1969), p. 186.

[171] Sherwig, pp. 223-224.

[172] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[173] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

[174] Add. Mss. 31236, Stuart to Wellington, 17 June 1812.

[175] Add. Mss. 31236, Stuart to Castlereagh, 5 July 1812.

[176] Add. Mss. 31236, Stuart to Castlereagh, 26 September 1812.

[177] Add. Mss. 57375, Drummond to Herries, 3 November 1810.

[178] Add. Mss. 31236, Stuart to Castlereagh, 26 September 1812.

[179] Longford, pp. 185-186.

[180] Wellesley to W. Huskisson, in *Dispatches*, vol. IV, 30 May 1809, pp. 346-347.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

[181] Fortescue (1928), pp. 48-49.

[182] James, p. 133.

[183] John Fortescue, *The Royal Army Service Corps: A History of Transport and Supply in the British Army*, (Cambridge: 1930), pp. 83-84.

[184] M. Glover (1974), pp. 30-31.

[185] Fortescue (1928), p. 56.

[186] James, p. 129.

[187] *Ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

[188] Weigley, pp. 438-439.

[189] *Ibid.*, p. 485.

[190] Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*, (Bloomington and London: 1978), p. 185.

[191] Fortescue (1928), p. 56.

[192] Weigley, p. 500.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. INTRODUCTION

B. SOURCES

I. Original Sources

a) Manuscript Materials

1. British Library, Manuscript Room, London, England
   (a) Herries Papers
   (b) Hill Papers
   (c) Liverpool Papers
   (d) Vansittart Papers
   (e) Wellington Papers

2. Public Record Office, Kew, London, England War Office Papers:
   (a) In-Letters: Treasury to Commissary-in-Chief's office 1810-1814
   (b) In-Letters: Peninsula to Commissary-in-Chief 1811-1813.
   (c) Commissary-in-Chief to Transport Board
   (d) Commissary-in-Chief to Commissioners of Victualling
   (e) Out-Letters: Commissary-in-Chief to Peninsula 1810-1814.
   (f) Documents of A.C.G. Strachan
   (g) Documents of A.C.G. Murray
   (h) The Archer Papers 1814.
   Foreign Office Papers:
   (a). Portugal to Villiers November 1808- January 1810.
   (b) Spain (1809) From Frere, 1809

b) Printed Materials

1. Parliamentary Papers

2. Correspondence, journals, memoirs, and histories

II. Secondary Sources

a) Histories

b) Periodicals

A. Introduction

Much has been written on the Peninsular War and the Napoleonic period in general. The wealth of primary source material, alone, is staggering. Both the Public Record Office at Kew and the Manuscript Room of the British Library have extensive collections of letters and documents. As for memoirs, there is a proliferation of material available, much of which is accessible at McGill.

The most important primary sources for this paper were Wellington's *Dispatches* and *Supplementary Despatches*. They were invaluable in providing information on all aspects of the war in the Peninsula. The *Dispatches*, compiled by Colonel Gurwood, include much of the correspondence of Wellington to key figures back in Britain. The *Supplementary Despatches* fill in most of the gaps in the *Dispatches*. They include correspondence not part of the *Dispatches* as well as correspondence Wellington received and often referred to. One problem with both the *Dispatches* and the *Supplementary Despatches*, however, is the deletion of many names and their replacement by asterisks and dashes. Often it is difficult to know to whom Wellington is referring.

Other useful manuscript sources include the Herries and Vansittart Papers at the British Library and the correspondence between the Commissary-in-Chief and the Peninsula (primarily the Commissary-General) held at the Public Record Office. The Herries Papers are useful since they include correspondence which is not found in the official War Office Papers. Many of these are letters referred to by Herries in his official correspondence. The Vansittart Papers give a different perspective to the situation by encompassing Stuart's correspondence with Castlereagh and Wellington. The most useful source, however, was the correspondence between the Commissary-in-Chief and the Peninsula. It is here that most of the particulars of supply, transport, and payment are found. Figures for supplies sent are found next to accounts of the search for specie.

Without these sources, much of the information used in the payment and other sections, would have been inaccessible.

Other useful primary source material came from the many Peninsular journals and memoirs. The Peninsular War produced a vast array of memoir material, particularly among members of the Rifle Brigade. Although useful in providing a first-hand account of conditions and events, they are somewhat lacking in providing relevant supply information. There are, however, two notable exceptions. The first is August Schaumann's *On the Road with Wellington.* As a war commissary during the Peninsular campaigns, he was ideally placed to provide relevant logistical information. Furthermore, as a commissary officer attached to cavalry units, he was forced to provide fodder for even more animals than most, thus bringing him into contact with the populace more frequently. The second exception is *Memoir of the Public Life of the Right Hon. John Charles Herries.* This memoir was edited by Herries' son. I would have found this much more useful if it had contained more of Herries' actual writing than his son's attempts to defend his father's reputation. While admirable in principle, his spirited defense detracts from the importance that might have been gained from this source. Having said that, there is still some useful information to be discovered if you can work your way past the son's rhetoric. Especially confusing is his failure to properly distinguish between where his father's words end and his own begin. Of much greater use was Herries' correspondence as mentioned previously.

While researching this paper, I found a comprehensive understanding of the structure, both overall and commissariat, was essential. There were so many departments that it was often difficult to keep everything straight. One source which helped to clear most of the confusion was S.G.P. Ward's *Wellington's Headquarters.* His description of the structure was clear and a very helpful chart was included. Another useful source was R.I. Routh's *Observations on Commissariat Field Service and Home Defences.* Routh also gave a clear delineation of commissariat structure and duties. Taken together, they completed the necessary picture.

One of the most complicated problems in the paper was gaining an accurate picture of the scale of the forces used. Often, many of the numbers presented did not clarify whether they referred to effective or total numbers. I found the *Dispatches* and, in particular, the *Supplementary Despatches*, an enormous help. The *Supplementary Despatches* included troop returns which listed both the total number of troops as well as the effective strength of the army which was often much lower. Another useful source was Michael Clodfelter's *Warfare and Armed Conflicts* which contained the most complete numbers on casualty and other figures. It is also vital in obtaining accurate French figures. On the Spanish side, there is no source better than Charles Esdaile. In all aspects of the Peninsular War which impact Spain, he is the most comprehensive source.

One of the most important secondary sources used in this paper is the Ph.D. thesis, *Wellington's Logistical Arrangements in the Peninsular War 1809-14*, by T.M.O. Redgrave. Redgrave was invaluable in providing a starting point and potential framework for this paper. His thesis was most useful when dealing with supply and transport by land. With respect to payment, Redgrave was useful but other sources were clearer. Redgrave was the only source I found devoted entirely to logistics. He deals with a difficult subject comprehensively. He illuminates the difficulties involved in providing for Wellington's army and he touches on the strategical importance of Wellington's logistical system. I found his treatment of the subject mostly fair with a few exceptions. He only mentioned the Spanish resistance in passing. He neglected to give them the credit they deserved. He seems to imply that the principle contribution of the guerrillas was in preventing the French from obtaining supplies. They did much more than that. They forced the French to commit more of their front-line troops to the escort of couriers and the protection of foraging parties. These were troops that could have been used against Wellington's forces. He also does not seem to take into account sufficiently the effect the French logistical system had on their strategy. The dispersal of the French troops was not only to collect food. The French were unable to remain concentrated for prolonged periods because the countryside

was stripped. The British, with the depot system, had a much greater flexibility when it came to strategical matters. I feel that Redgrave did not sufficiently prove his thesis that Wellington's supply on campaigns greatly hampered his strategy, or indeed, that it differed greatly from everyday supply. Overall, however, the subject matter was treated fairly and comprehensively.

Another useful source for supply is Charles Oman's *Wellington's Army, 1809-1814.* This book raised some interesting points but, unfortunately, the lack of supporting documentation made it difficult to substantiate the facts proposed. His comprehensive *A History of the Peninsular War* in seven volumes, while excellent on the progress of the war, is somewhat lacking when dealing with supply.

When considering the question of payment, two excellent secondary sources were available. Both have been meticulously researched and documented with primary source material. The first of these is John Sherwig's *Guineas and Gunpowder*. This book provides an excellent account of the British subsidies as well as the various methods used in raising specie. His explanations are clear and easily understood. He actually makes this rather dry subject readable. The second book is Rory Muir's *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815.* His account of the politics of this period is comprehensive and his use of primary sources is exhaustive. His account of the political machinations helps to balance the more purely military or economic histories by others. Muir also raises many issues hitherto ignored by other scholars.

B. Sources.

I. ORIGINAL SOURCES

MANUSCRIPT MATERIALS

1. Manuscript Room, British Library, London, England.
   (a) Herries Papers, Add. Mss. 57368, 57375-57378, 57393.
   (b) Hill Papers, Add. Mss. 35059.
   (c) Liverpool Papers, Add. Mss. 38361-38362.
   (d) Vansittart Papers, Add. Mss. 64131.

2. Public Record Office, Kew, London, England.
   War Office Papers:
   (a) In-Letters: Treasury to Commissary-in-Chief's Office, 1810-1814, W.O. 57/3-6.
   (b) In-Letters: Peninsula to Commissary-in-Chief, 1811-1813, W.O. 57/40-42.
   (c) Commissary-in-Chief to Transport Board, W.O. 58/56.
   (d) Commissary-in-Chief to Commissioners of Victualling, W.O. 58/57.
   (e) Out-Letters: Commissary-in-Chief to Peninsula, 1810-1814, W.O. 58/130-134.
   (f) Documents of A.C.G. Murray, W.O. 62/18.
   (g) The Archer Papers 1814, W.O. 77/1.
   Foreign Office Papers:
   (a) Portugal to Villiers, November 1808-January 1810, F.O. 63/74.
   (b) Spain (1809) From Frere, 1809, F.O. 72/72.

PRINTED MATERIALS

1. Parliamentary papers.
   House of Lords Sessional Papers, "The First (-Nineteenth) Report of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, etc." 22pt., London, 1806-12 fol.

2. Correspondence, journals, memoirs, and histories.

Aitchison, J.. *An Ensign in the Peninsular War: The Letters of John Aitchison.* edited by W.F.K. Thompson, London: Michael Joseph, 1981.

Badcock, L.. "A light dragoon in the Peninsula extracts from the letters of Captain Lovell Badcock, Fourteenth Light Dragoons, 1809-14" edited by C. Atkinson, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* (*JSAHR*), vol. 34, no. 138, pp. 70-79.

Barnard, Andrew, "Letters of a Peninsular War commanding officer: the letters of Lieutenant Colonel, later General, Sir Andrew Barnard, G.C.B." edited by M. Spurrier in *JSAHR*, vol. XLVII, no. 191, pp. 131-148.

Blakeney, R.. *A Boy in the Peninsular War: The Services, Adventures and Experiences of Robert Blakeney, Subaltern of the Twenty-Eighth Regiment.* edited by J. Sturgis, London: John Murray, 1899.

Bragge, William. *Peninsular Portrait 1811-1814: The Letters of Captain William Bragge, Third (King's Own) Dragoons.* edited by S.A.C. Cassels, London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Browne, Thomas. *The Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne, 1807-1816.* edited by Roger Norman Buckley, London: Bodley Head for the Army Records Society, 1987.

Cocks, E. *Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula: Letters and Diaries of Major the Hon. Edward Charles Cocks 1786-1812.* edited by Julia V. Page, Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount Ltd., 1986.

Cole, Sir Lowry. *Memoirs of Sir Lowry Cole.* edited by M.L.Cole and S. Gwynn, London: Macmillan, 1934.

Creevey, Thomas. *The Creevey Papers.* edited by Sir Herbert Maxwell, London: John Murray, 1923.

Dalrymple, H.. *Memoir written by General Sir Hew Dalrymple, Bart. of His Proceedings as Connected with the Affairs of Spain, at the Commencement of the Peninsular War.* London: Thomas and William Boone, 1830.

Donaldson, Joseph. *Recollections of the Eventful Life of a Soldier.* London and Glasgow [Printed], 1856.

D'Urban, B.. *The Peninsular Journal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban.* edited by I.J. Rousseau, London: Longmans & Co., 1930.

Grattan, William. *Adventures of the Connaught Rangers from 1808-1814.* edited by Charles Oman, London: Edward Arnold, 1902.

Gunn, J.. "The memoirs of Private James Gunn", edited by R. Roy, in *JSAHR*, vol. XLIX, no. 198, pp. 90-120.

Gurwood, Lieut. Colonel (ed.). *The General Orders of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, in Portugal, Spain, and France from 1809 to 1814.* London: W. Clowes and Sons, 1837.

Harris, J.. *The Recollections of Rifleman Harris.* edited by Christopher Hibbert, London: Cooper, 1985.

Herries, C.B., Edward. *Memoir of the Public Life of the Right Hon. John Charles Herries (in the Reigns of George III., George IV., William IV., and Victoria).* 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1880.

Huskisson, William. *The Huskisson Papers.* edited by Lewis Melville, London: Constable, 1931.

Larpent, F.. *The Private Journal of F.S. Larpent, Esq., Judge Advocate General of the British Forces in the Peninsula attached to the Headquarters of Lord Wellington during the Peninsular War from 1812 to its Close.* edited by Sir G. Larpent, 2 vols., London, 1853.

LeMesurier, Esq., Havilland. "A System for the British Commissariat" (1796) in Richard Glover, *Peninsular Preparation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

Robinson, F.. "A Peninsular Brigadier: letters of Major General Sir F.P. Robinson, K.C.B. dealing with the campaign of 1813" edited by C. Atkinson, in *JSAHR*, vol. XXXIV, no. 140, pp. 153-170.

Routh, Sir Randolph Isham. *Observations on Commissariat Field Service and Home Defences.* London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1852.

Schaumann, August Ludolf, Friedrich. *On the Road with Wellington: The Diary of a War Commissary in the Peninsular Campaigns.* edited and translated by Anthony M. Ludovici, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1924.

Tomkinson, W.. *The Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns, 1809-15.* edited by J. Tomkinson, London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1894.

Wellesley, Henry. *The Diary and Correspondence of Henry Wellesley, First Lord Cowley, 1790-1846.* edited by his grandson, Colonel the Hon. F.A. Wellesley, London: Hutchinson & Co., 1930.

Wellesley, Richard Marquess. *The Despatches and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley, K.G. During His Lordship's Mission to Spain as Ambassador Extraordinary to the Supreme Junta in 1809.* edited by Montgomery Martin, London: John Murray, 1838.

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of. *The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, K.G..* edited by Colonel Gurwood, London: John Murray, 1834-1839.

----------. *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, K.G.*. edited by his son, the Duke of Wellington, K.G., London: John Murray, 1858-1872.

Wheeler, W.. *The Letters of Private Wheeler, 1809-1828.* edited by B. Liddell Hart, London: Michael Joseph, 1951.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

a) Histories.

Barnett, Correlli. *Britain and Her Army 1509-1970.* London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1970.

Clapham, Sir John. *The Bank of England: A History.* vol. II, (1797-1914), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944.

Clodfelter, Michael. *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618-1991.* vol. I, Jefferson, N.C. and London: McFarland, 1992.

Cunningham, Audrey. *British Credit in the Last Napoleonic War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910.

Davis, Richard. *The English Rothschilds.* London: Collins, 1983.

Emsley, Clive. *The Longman Companion to Napoleonic Europe.* London: Longman Group UK Limited, 1993.

Esdaile, Charles J.. *The Duke of Wellington and the Command of the Spanish Army, 1812-14.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

----------. *The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War.* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1988.

Fortescue, Sir John. *The Early History of Transport and Supply.* London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1928.

----------. *A History of the British Army*.. vols. VII and VIII, London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1917.

----------. *The Royal Army Service Corps: A History of Transport and Supply in the British Army.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930.

Gates, D. *The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1986.

Glover, Michael. *The Peninsular War 1807-1814: A Concise Military History.* London: David & Charles (Holdings) Limited Newton Abbot Devon, 1974.

----------. *Wellington's Army.* New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1977.

Glover, Richard. *Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army, 1795-1809.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

Guedalla, P.. *The Duke.* London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1931.

Hargreaves, E.L.. *The National Debt.* London: E. Arnold & Co., 1930.

Haythornthwaite, Philip J.. *The Armies of Wellington.* London: Arms & Armour Press, 1996.

----------. *Weapons and Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars.* London: Arms & Armour Press, 1996.

Hibbert, Christopher. *Wellington: A Personal History.* Great Britain: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997.

James, Lawrence. *The Iron Duke.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson Limited, 1992.

Lavery, Brian. *Nelson's Navy.* Annapolis, Md.,: Naval Institute Press, 1989.

Longford, Elizabeth. *Wellington: The Years of the Sword.* London: C. Tinling & Co. Ltd., 1969.

Lovett, G.. *Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain.* 2 vols., New York: New York University Press, 1965.

Maguire, T. Miller. *The British Army Under Wellington 1813-1814.* London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1907.

Muir, Rory. *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996.

Napier, W.. *History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814.* 6 vols., London: Thomas and William Boone, 1853.

Olson, Mancur. *The Economics of Wartime Shortage: A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars One and Two.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963.

Oman, Charles. *A History of the Peninsular War.* 7 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-1930.

----------. *Wellington's Army, 1809-1814.* London: Edward Arnold, 1913.

Paget, Julian. *Wellington's Peninsular War: Battles and Battlefields.* London: Leo Cooper, 1990.

Read, Jan. *War in the Peninsula.* London: Faber, 1977.

Redgrave, Toby Michael Ormsby. *Wellington's Logistical Arrangements in the Peninsular War 1809-14.* Ph. D. Thesis: King's College, University of London, date unknown.

Rogers, Colonel H.C.B.. *Troopships and their History.* London: Seeley Service & Co., 1963.

Rothenberg, Gunther E.. *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon.* Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978.

Sherwig, John M.. *Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-1815.* Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

Short History of the Royal Army Service Corps. Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd., 1944.

Ward, S.G.P.. *Wellington's Headquarters.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957.

Warren, Arnold. *Wait for the Waggon.* Canada: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1961.

Weigley, Russell F.. *The Age of Battles.* Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991.

Weller, J.. *Wellington in the Peninsula, 1808-14.* London: Nicholas Vane, 1962.

b) Periodicals.

Esdaile, Charles, "Heroes or villains? The Spanish guerrillas in the Peninsular War" in *History Today*, vol. 38, April 1988, pp. 29-35.

----------, "War and Politics in Spain, 1808-14" in *The Historical Journal*, vol. 19, December 1976, pp. 859-876.

---------- and Donald D. Horward (commentary), " Contradictions in the Implementation of British Grand Strategy, 1808-1814" in *Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850*, Proceedings 1989(19) Part 1, pp. 544-559.

Glover, Michael, "'A Particular Service' Beresford's Peninsular War" in *History Today*, 1986, 36(June), pp.34-38.

Glover, Richard, " Meals and the Men" in *Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850*, Proceedings 1980(1), pp. 128-135.

Hall, Christopher D., "The Royal Navy and the Peninsular War" in *Mariner's Mirror*, 1993, 79(4), pp. 403-418.

Howard, Donald D., "British Seapower and its Influence upon the Peninsular War (1808-1814)" in *The Naval College Review*, vol. 31, no. 2, Fall 1978, pp. 54-71.

Knight, George D., "Lord Liverpool and the Peninsular Struggle, 1809-1812" in *Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850*, Proceedings 1990 (20), pp. 32-38.

Severn, John K., "In Search of a National Consensus: Parliamentary Debates over the Peninsular War, 1808-1813" in *Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850*, Proceedings 1990 (20), pp. 46-58.

Shore, H.N., "The Navy in the Peninsular War" -series of 15 articles in *United Service Magazine*, 1912-14.

Siberling, N.J., "Financial and Monetary Policy of Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars" in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 38, 1924, pp. 214-233, 397-439.

Teffeteller, Gordon L.; with commentary by Donald D. Horward and Geoffrey James Ellis, "British Field Leadership in 1812: A Study in the Management of Scarce Resources" in *Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850*. Proceedings 1984(14), pp. 213-223.

Thompson, Neville and Donald D. Horward (commentary), "Bathurst and Wellington: Another 1812 Overture" in *Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850*. Proceedings 1989(19) part 1, pp. 530-543.

Ward, S.G.P., "General Sir George Murray" in *JSAHR*, vol. 58 (1980), pp. 191-208.

----------, "The Quartermaster-General's Department in the Peninsula, 1809-1914" in *JSAHR*, vol. 23(1945), pp. 133-154.

Watson, G.E., "The United States and the Peninsular War" in *The Historical Journal*, vol. 19, December 1976, pp. 859-876.

Weller, Jack, "Wellington's Peninsular War Logistics" in *JSAHR*, vol. 42 (1964), pp. 197-202.