

SCOTTISH COMMON SENSE IN GERMANY

1768 - 1800

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF CRITICAL  
PHILOSOPHY

Submitted in partial fulfilment  
of the requirement for the Ph.D. degree  
June, 1980 ©



MANFRED KUEHN

Department of Philosophy  
McGill University

AN ABSTRACT  
of  
Scottish Common Sense in Germany  
1768-1800  
A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy  
by  
Manfred Kuehn.

This work attempts to show that the Scottish common sense philosophers Thomas Reid, James Oswald and James Beattie, had a substantial influence upon the development of German thought during the period of the late enlightenment. Their works were thoroughly reviewed in German philosophical journals and translated into German soon after they had appeared in English. Whether it was Mendelssohn, a rationalist, Lossius, a materialist, Feder, a sensationalist, Tetens, a critical empiricist, or Hamann and Jacobi, irrationalist philosophers of faith, important philosophers read the Scots and found them relevant for the solution of their problems. The Scots were seen as not just opposing Hume's skepticism, but also as complementing his more positive tenets. The most important chapter of this work shows that even Kant, who in this regard is known only for his devastating criticism of the Scots, learned much from them. It is argued that the Scottish influence opens a new perspective for the understanding of the German enlightenment, revealing how central were the twin problems of idealism versus realism, on the one hand, and of philosophical justification versus mere descriptive metaphysics, on the other.

PRECIS

de

Scottish Common Sense in Germany

1768-1800

A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy

par

Manfred Kuehn

Cet ouvrage essaie de montrer que les philosophes écossais du sens commun Thomas Reid, James Oswald et James Beattie ont eu une influence substantielle sur le développement de la pensée allemande pendant la dernière période de l'Eclaircissement. Leurs écrits étaient bien révisés dans les revues philosophiques d'Allemagne, et ils furent traduits en allemand presque immédiatement après leur publication en anglais. Que ce soit Mendelssohn, rationaliste, ou Lossius, matérialiste, ou Feder, sensationnaliste, ou Tetens empiriciste critique, ou enfin Hamann et Jacobi, philosophes irrationalistes de foi, tous ces philosophes importants ont lu les philosophes écossais, et les ont trouvés utiles à la solution de leurs problèmes. Les Écossais n'étaient pas vus seulement comme l'opposition au scepticisme de Hume, mais aussi comme poursuivant le développement de ses principes plus positifs. Le chapitre le plus important de cet ouvrage révèle que même Kant, généralement connu seulement pour sa critique des Écossais, a beaucoup appris d'eux. Enfin, il est conclu que l'influence des Écossais ouvre une perspective nouvelle pour l'interprétation de l'Eclaircissement allemand.

AUSZUG

von

Scottish Common Sense in Germany

1768-1800

A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy

von

Manfred Kuehn

Diese Arbeit versucht zu zeigen dass die schottischen Philosophen des gemeinen Menschenverstandes Thomas Reid, James Oswald und James Beattie einen grossen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung des Denkens in der späten deutschen Aufklärung ausübten. Die Werke der Schotten wurden nicht nur gründlich in den deutschen philosophischen Zeitschriften rezensiert sondern auch bald nach ihrem Erscheinen im Original in die deutsche Sprache übersetzt. Ob es sich um Mendelssohn, einen Rationalisten, Lossius, einen Materialisten, Feder, einen Sensualisten, Tetens, einen kritischen Empiriker, oder um Hamann und Jacobi, die irrationalistischen Glaubensphilosophen handelte, alle wichtigen Philosophen hatten die Schotten gelesen und betrachteten sie als wichtig für die Lösung ihrer Probleme. Man sah in den Schotten nicht nur die Opponenten von Humes Skepsis sondern auch die Ausarbeiter der positiven Ansätze Humes. Das wichtigste Kapitel dieses Werkes zeigt dass sogar Kant, der in diesem Zusammenhang sonst nur für seine vernichtende Kritik der Schotten bekannt ist, viel von ihnen gelernt hat. Es wird erwiesen dass der schottische Einfluss eine neue Perspektive für das Verständnis der deutschen Aufklärung eröffnet, die unter anderem zeigt wie zentral das Doppelproblem von Realismus versus Idealismus und philosophischer Begründung versus blosser Beschreibung war.



#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work could not have been written without the financial assistance I received from the Canada Council in the form of two Doctoral Fellowships in 1976-77 and 1977-78. My first thanks go therefore to this institution.

I would also like to thank the Departments of Inter-Library-loans at McGill University, Montreal and at the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Münster, West-Germany. I am also grateful to the Philosophisches Seminar of the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Münster for allowing me the use of their library and their collection of libri rari. Without their invaluable service in obtaining some of the rarest texts, this work would rest on an insecure foundation.

I have also learned a great deal from discussions with friends, fellow students and teachers. Special thanks go to the late Guy Désautels for making several useful suggestions with regard to my earliest research; to my friends Pastor Hartwig Schulte and his wife Elke, with whom I had many discussions during the early stages of this work; to my former teacher at the University of Waterloo, Professor Rolf George, who read and commented upon an earlier version of the Introduction, and to Professor Giorgio DiGiovanni, who made not only many important criticisms and suggestions of details, but who also had some influence upon the general outlook of this work. If the arguments against the ontological school carry any weight, it is only because he has defended this approach to the interpretation of Kant and the German enlightenment in the most plausible way possible.

However, I am indebted most to Professor David Fate Norton. The very conception of the problem derives from suggestions made by him in a seminar

on David Hume and the Scottish enlightenment. He has not only supervised and directed my research from the very beginning, but also patiently read and commented on most of the many different drafts. The work owes more to him than I care to remember; therefore I am most grateful to him. If the argument is not as convincing as it could be at certain points, that is perhaps because I have not followed his advice as much as I should have. This means, among other things, that the views expressed here do not necessarily coincide with those of Professor Norton. I am, of course, the only one responsible for errors that may remain.

"The science of common sense is critique".

(Immanuel Kant)

"We have been engaged in a critique of reason for a long time; I would wish for a critique of common sense. It would be a true blessing for humanity, if we could demonstrate to the complete satisfaction of common sense how far it can reach. For this is precisely what it needs for perfection in life on this earth".

(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe)

## OUTLINE

### I. INTRODUCTION

- A. The Problem
- B. The Approach
- C. The Goal

## PART I

### PRELIMINARIES

### II. The Nature of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy

- A. The Theory of Common Sense and its Foundation in the Analysis of Perception in the Work of Thomas Reid
- B. Oswald and Beattie's Contribution
- C. The Characterisation of Scottish Common Sense

### III. The German Background

- A. Common Sense in Early German Enlightenment
  - 1. Sensus Communis and Logica Naturalis in the Wolffian School
  - 2. Recta Ratio or Gesunde Vernunft in the Thomasian School
- B. Common Sense in the Philosophical Crisis at the Middle of the Century
- C. The Relevance of Scottish Answers for the Problems of German Thought

## PART II

### THE STORY

### IV. The Reception of Scottish Common Sense in Germany

- A. The Beginnings and Success, 1768-1782
- B. Further Developments in a Changed Philosophical Situation, 1783-1800.

## PART III

### A COMMON SENSE CRITIQUE: REALISM VERSUS IDEALISM

### V. Common Sense and Sensationalism in the Philosophy of Feder

- A. Feder's Arguments Against Skepticism and Idealism
- B. Feder's Sensationalism
- C. Feder's Theory of Common Sense and First Truths

VI. The Attempt of a Materialistic Foundation of Common Sense in the Work of Lossius

- A. The Theory of Truth and its Basis in Physiology
- B. The Theory of Common Sense
- C. What is New in Lossius' Theory?

VII. Common Sense and Metaphysical Speculation

- A. Johann August Eberhard's Attempt of a Rationalistic Reduction of Common Sense
- B. Common Sense as the Principle of Orientation in Metaphysics in Mendelssohn's Late Work.

PART IV

THE CRITIQUE OF COMMON SENSE: EMPIRICAL REALISM AND  
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

VIII. Philosophy as the Analysis of Common Sense in Tetens' Thought

- A. Tetens' Version of the Theory of Ideas
- B. The Origin of our Notions of Objectivity
- C. Common Sense and Subjective Necessity
- D. Laws of Thought and Objective Necessity

IX. Kant's Critique of Common Sense

- A. Kant and the Scots: the Historical Evidence
- B. Beattie and Hume's "Spark"
- C. Justification of Common Sense and Critical Idealism

PART V

THE CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE: RADICAL REALISM AND  
ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

X. The Meta-Critique of Radical Realism and Absolute Idealism

- A. Hamann's Realism of Faith and Language
- B. Jacobi's Radical Realism
  - 1. Jacobi's View of the History of Philosophy
  - 2. Jacobi's Theory of Immediate Cognition and Faith
  - 3. Jacobi's Critique of Kant
- C. The Rejection of Common Sense and Realism in Hegel's Absolute Idealism

XI. CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### A. The Problem

As an important philosophical movement Scottish common sense philosophy influenced not only the further development of Scottish philosophy itself, but also had considerable effects in a number of other countries. The extent and the importance of the Scottish influence in America, France, England, Belgium and Italy are well acknowledged and significant research has been done already.<sup>1</sup> With regard to Germany, however, matters are quite different. It is not generally known that Scottish common sense played a great role there in the last third of the 18th century. If Germany is mentioned at all, it is only in order to say that Scottish common sense was "much less influential" in that country.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the only widely known effect of Reid, Oswald and Beattie in Germany appears to be the devastating criticism they received from Kant in the Prolegomena.<sup>3</sup>

The same superficiality exhibited by the commentators and historians of Scottish common sense can also be observed in all

standard histories of German philosophy. Whereas Johann Wolfgang von Goethe noted towards the end of his life that the Germans had "fully understood the merits of worthy Scottish men for many years" and Arthur Schopenhauer characterised Thomas Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind as "very instructive and well worth reading -- ten times more so than all the philosophical works written after Kant taken together", whereas the early historians of German philosophy were still very much aware of the importance of Scottish common sense for German thought and even Hegel still devoted as much space to the philosophy of Reid, Oswald and Beattie as to that of Hume in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, today this importance of the Scots for late 18th century German philosophy is all but forgotten.<sup>4</sup>

Some of the more extensive historical accounts of German philosophy show, of course, that even the works of Reid, Oswald and Beattie found translators, defenders and imitators in Germany when "Anglomania" seized the Germans after the middle of the 18th century. However, these circumstances are not considered to have had any important consequences for the development of German philosophy. For, though some historians note a Scottish influence upon Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, most record only the effects of Scottish common sense upon the works of the so called "popular philosophers" (Popularphilosophen). But there are several things wrong with this way of treating the Scottish influence. First of all, the term "popular philosopher" is not a very useful one, since it neither serves to differentiate a special class of philosophers (almost all philosophers of the late German Enlightenment attempted to write in a popular style), nor does it

constitute a disinterested characterisation of a certain approach to philosophy, but is rather a pejorative term. "Popular philosopher", as used today, entails already "not worthy of further analysis". Yet we shall see that these contemporaries of Kant were much more important than the histories of German philosophy suggest. Moreover, in whatever way we may use the term "popular philosopher", there were clearly also many thinkers whom nobody would call by this name and who found the works of the Scots useful. Apart from Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi there are Johann Georg Hamann, Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Nicolaus Tetens, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg and Gottlob Ernst (Aenesidemus) Schulze. The fact is that Scottish common sense played a much larger role than most historians of German thought appear to be willing to admit.

The works of Reid, Oswald and Beattie were reviewed in the major philosophical journals of Germany almost immediately after their appearance, were translated soon afterwards and then reviewed again. In this way Scottish thought was assimilated in Germany rather quickly. Reid, Oswald and Beattie were frequently quoted and referred to and almost every important German philosopher in that period can be found to mention their names at one time or other and who cannot be shown to have been affected by the Scottish influence. Whether sensationist or materialist, whether rationalist or empiricist, they all had read the Scots and most could accept certain aspects of their thought. Since the reliance upon common sense provided the common ground upon which the most diverse philosophical views could meet, the Scottish philosophy of common sense may be seen to have been at the centre of many important



philosophical debates. Thus Moses Mendelssohn, an open-minded rationalist of the Leibniz-Wolff-Baumgarten tradition, valued Reid and Beattie highly since they were "not confused by sophistry and (did) not trust any speculation in contradiction to common sense". He believed that common sense was needed to provide us with orientation in speculative philosophy.<sup>5</sup> Johann Christian Lossius, a convinced materialist, used Beattie's conception of truth extensively and believed that common sense was "the touchstone of truth in so far as it can be known by man".<sup>6</sup> Johann Nicolaus Tetens, a critical empiricist whose work was highly regarded by Kant, maintained that "the cognitions of common sense are the field which has to be worked by speculative philosophy" and understood his philosophy as the proper continuation of the work of Reid, Beattie and Oswald.<sup>7</sup> And these philosophers were not the only ones who thought in this way, as we shall see.

How important Scottish common sense was in Germany during the last third of the 18th century can also be seen from G. Zart's Einfluß der englischen Philosophie seit Bacon auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, which is still the standard work for British-German influences in philosophy, even though it was written almost one hundred years ago and is far from being adequate.<sup>8</sup> In fact, it is, apart from a number of papers which trace the British lineage of a particular German philosopher or attempt to survey the influence of a certain philosopher in Germany, the only work in this wide field. Zart convincingly shows that British philosophy in all of its forms was very important for the development of German thought during the 18th century, and that Scottish common sense was certainly not the least influential

one.<sup>9</sup> However, since his work is concerned with the whole extent of British influences in Germany during the 18th century, it often does no more than point out that there are certain influences. In most cases Zart neither gives exact references, nor does he discuss the significance and the extent of the influence sufficiently. His book remains very much at the surface and can only be taken as the starting point for a more thorough discussion.

Other well known historians, writing at the turn of our century, who were mainly interested in Kant and who were still very much aware of the fundamental British influence, suggested that Reid, Oswald and Beattie might be significant for the interpretation of Kant as well. Thus Windelband noted that Kant characterised as "'dogmatic' not only the rationalism, but also the empiricism in earlier theories of knowledge, and that the classical passage in the Introduction of the Prolegomena . . . does not at all oppose Hume to Wolff, but as a matter of fact to Locke, Reid and Beattie. The dogmatism from which Kant declared himself to be freed was the empirical dogmatism".<sup>10</sup> Vaihinger remarked in his monumental Commentary to Kant's first Critique: "Kant's relation to the Scottish school, the internal and systematic one as well as the external and historical one, would require a thorough monographic treatment".<sup>11</sup> Others again had begun a closer examination of Kant's relations to the Scots. Thus Julius Janitsch had shown in his Kants Urteile über Berkeley that Kant in all likelihood did not know Berkeley's works first hand and that Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth was probably the source of most of his judgments about Berkeley. Benno Erdmann had tried to show that the same also held

for Kant's knowledge of the contents of Hume's Treatise. He argued that, since Kant could not read English and since the Treatise was not translated into German until well after the appearance of the first Critique, Kant must have relied on a secondary source, namely Beattie's Essay which appeared in German translation in 1772 and included long quotations and summaries of Hume's first work.<sup>12</sup> But, in spite of these promising beginnings, the "thorough monographic treatment" of Kant's Scottish relations was never written.

In any case, such a work would have faced great difficulties, since, in the light of only two extremely critical overt references to Reid, Oswald and Beattie in all of Kant's writings, the exact historical connections must remain uncertain. The analysis of Kant's texts must be supplemented by external evidence. It must be shown that Kant could not have avoided knowing Reid, Oswald and Beattie in much greater detail than contemporary historians are willing to admit. But this can only be accomplished by means of a broad survey of the philosophical developments in Germany during the time in which Kant worked on his three Critiques. Only if we can establish the role of Scottish common sense in the thought of Kant's contemporaries and the way in which these contemporaries were important for Kant, can we hope to see the relationship of Kant and the Scots clearer.

Such a broad survey of the Scottish influence in Germany and its effects upon Kant has never been undertaken. It seems to have been prevented by several different, though not unconnected, factors. First of all, the interest in Scottish common sense itself was not very great for a long period of time, and it is only now that the full importance

of Thomas Reid especially is recognised.<sup>13</sup> By the way, this long neglect of Thomas Reid appears to have been at least partially the consequence of Kant's harsh criticism in the Prolegomena. This leads to another circumstance which stood in the way of a proper evaluation of the Scottish influence in Germany. Since it is generally accepted that Kant's Criticism is the highpoint of the development of German philosophy in the 18th century, and since Kant's severe reprimand of Reid, Oswald and Beattie appears to preclude any influence of them upon Kant, the Scottish influence could not be very important, or so it is thought. But this is not so. Nobody ever appears to have bothered to ask why Kant took such great pains to disqualify Reid and his followers so thoroughly. Was it only the disinterested attempt to save Hume's good name, was it written only at the spur of a moment, an incidental remark, a cavalier judgment, or was Kant aiming at something more important? If R.G. Collingwood's suggestion that "an intense polemic against a certain doctrine is a certain sign that the doctrine in question figures largely in the writer's environment and even has a strong attraction for himself" is correct, and I believe it is correct at least in this case, then Kant's vehement rejection speaks more for than against the importance of Scottish common sense for Kant.<sup>14</sup>

Another reason for the failure to study the Scottish influence can be found in the general lack of interest of historians of philosophy in this period, resulting from the already mentioned prejudice that the German philosophers of the late 18th century had nothing original to say and were only popularising ideas of others. Most of the philosophers of this period are simply labeled "popular philosopher" and then forgotten.

That by this use of "popular philosopher" almost fifty years of German philosophical development are declared to be worthless would perhaps not be so strange, if this were not the period in which the foundations for German culture as we know it today were laid. Kant developed his critical philosophy during this time. Lessing and Herder, Goethe and Schiller created the literature that is considered to be classic today. Hölderlin, the Schlegels, Novalis, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling grew up in this period (and were educated by teachers deeply influenced by popular philosophy). Is it likely that their achievements are completely isolated from the broad developments of German philosophy during that period? It is not only not likely, but quite false. Kant, Hamann, Herder, Goethe, Schiller and even the Idealists and Romanticists were very much aware of the popular philosophers and all defined their position mainly in regard to the views of these philosophers.

The last, and perhaps also greatest, obstacle in the way of an appreciation of the importance of Scottish common sense in Germany can be found in the profound change in the understanding of the development of German thought which took place between 1900 and 1933. This is the emergence of a more nationalistic point of view which, to a certain extent, still persists in the German interpretation of German enlightenment philosophy in general and the interpretation of Kant in particular. It is closely connected with, though not identical to the so called "ontological" and "metaphysical" interpretation of Kant as advanced by Martin Heidegger, Heinz Heimsoeth and Gottfried Martin. While 19th century historians, such as Vaihinger, Erdmann and Riehl understood Kant's philosophy as a theory of knowledge and tried to relate Kant

mainly to Hume and Locke, as being part of an anti-metaphysical tradition originating in England, the nationalistic historians tried to explain Kant's philosophy from German sources alone. For this reason they lost all interest in any "thorough monographic treatment" of the relations of Kant to the Scottish common sense philosophers.

Robert Sommer had already noted in his Grundzüge einer Geschichte der Psychologie und Ästhetik von Wolff-Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller (1892) that all German psychology was nothing but a lawful development of the germs given in the psychology and Weltanschauung of Leibniz and that this process "developed along its own lines, despite of manifold relations to foreign literature";<sup>15</sup> and Max Dessoir remarked in his Geschichte der neueren Psychologie (2nd ed. 1902) that "the basic direction of this development [of German thought in the 18th century] can be understood even without referring to England".<sup>16</sup> This was done mainly by relating Kant to the later Thomasians and especially Crusius and by arguing that psychology and anthropology became so important in late 18th century thought not because of the British influence, but that this development constituted the effects of a secularisation of pietism. Exactly these tendencies were also worked out by Heinz Heimsoeth, Max Wundt and others, who proposed the "ontological" or "metaphysical" interpretation of Kant which has close affinities with Martin Heidegger's way of reading Kant. But whereas Heidegger was very much aware of the "violence" (Gewaltsamkeit) with which he treated Kantian texts and later even admitted that his interpretation "imputed a foreign problematic to Kant's question",<sup>17</sup> Wundt and Heimsoeth claimed that they brought Kant's own "motives" and "intentions" to light.<sup>18</sup> Similarly as

had literary historians, the ontological school explained what had usually been attributed to the British influence by the secularisation of pietism. The critical question of Kant was seen to arise "from a connection of the subjective and psychological approach of Thomasius with the objective and ontological principles of Wolff" by Wundt. Accordingly he claimed that Kant's "transcendental logic must be derived from this tension within German philosophy and not from foreign influences".<sup>19</sup>

Heimsoeth, somewhat more careful, argued that since "the philosophical interest in history of philosophy aims at the coincidence or discrepancy of the motives of thought (expressed) in systematic conceptions", and since "the question of the historical connection is hereby only of secondary importance (kann dabei zurücktreten)" and since his own philosophical interests were directed towards irrationalism and German nationalism (at that time), Kant had to be related to a German form of irrationalism in order to be interesting in any way.<sup>20</sup> This he does by comparing Kant and Crusius. Careful not to assert an actual dependence of Kant upon Crusius (as Wundt does), Heimsoeth suggests that "the basic tendency is identical in both, in any case". -- "In Crusius as in Kant a new demand of a critique of cognitive reason, of the determination of the limits of human knowledge and of the review of its criteria in accordance with their universal or limited validity grows out of the metaphysical recognition of the irrational".<sup>21</sup> But whatever the interests of certain philosophers in the Germany of the twenties and thirties of this century may have been, they are certainly not binding for the understanding of the history of German thought today.<sup>22</sup>

The "ontological" and "metaphysical" school is, however, not simply identical with nationalism in philosophical history. It is to be taken more seriously than that. Though it tends to pay more attention to the German sources of Kant's philosophy (both real and imaginary ones), it does not go as far as discounting foreign influences altogether.<sup>23</sup> Thus Heimsoeth is quite aware of the importance of Hume for Kant, and he also discusses influences of such philosophers as Collier, Berkeley and Bayle.<sup>24</sup> Dieter Henrich, who has close connections with the ontological school, has shown the importance of Francis Hutcheson, an early common sense philosopher, for Kant's moral philosophy.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, the influence of the ontological school is fading. Recently G. Baum has attempted to show that Jacobi, who has long been regarded as a typical representative of German irrationalism, actually must be understood against the background of Thomas Reid's common sense philosophy.<sup>26</sup> In any case, the ontological way of reading Kant has never really caught on in the English speaking part of the world to any great extent. Thus there are many valuable suggestions with regard to the British influence in Germany to be found in a number of papers written in English, and especially Lewis White Beck's comprehensive Early German Philosophy, Kant and his Predecessors also makes clear how important Kant's contemporaries in Germany and Britain were for the development of German philosophy.<sup>27</sup>

To return to the matter of our immediate concern, there is even an argument for the "usefulness of a study of Beattie" and his influence upon German thought, in which it is suggested that Beattie's influence could be relevant for "a study in the transmission of Humean ideas to Kant and their specific reception in German philosophy" as well as for an analysis of the "psychological turn" of German philosophy with Karl



Philipp Moritz.<sup>28</sup>

But all these are only beginnings and suggestions for further analysis. The history of literature is much further advanced in the discussion and evaluation of the British-German relations in this period than the history of philosophy. The numerous attempts to explain the developments within 18th century German literature along nationalistic lines are now generally discarded. It is seen that the secularisation of pietism is not a sufficient explanation of the literary upswing of Germany in the last third of the 18th century. Comparative literature has not only shown the great dependence of the Germans upon British sources in detail, but has also established its overriding importance.<sup>29</sup> Now, given the various interconnections of literature, literary criticism, philology and philosophy in the 18th century, it is more than just likely that the British influence upon the philosophy of the late 18th century is of a comparable importance, and that any historical account of the development of German thought without an emphasis upon the various British influences is a distortion.

This is also supported by the analysis of the considerable influence of the English language upon the German language. Thus it has been shown that English had not only significant effects upon the everyday vocabulary of Germans and that such German-sounding words as "Nußbraun" go back to English originals, but also that the British philosophical vocabulary influenced that of the Germans writing in that period.<sup>30</sup> Apart from such obvious examples as "Ideen", "Ideenasso-  
ziation", "Immaterialismus", "Selbstaugenscheinlichkeit" (self-evidence), even the apparently typical German "Denker" is not an

indigenous German formation, but "must have been formed under the influence of the English thinker".<sup>31</sup>

In fact, these studies of the influence of the English language upon the German vocabulary even point towards a fundamental contribution of Scottish common sense to German thought. For, as P.F. Ganz shows, the German "Gemeinsinn" "changes its meaning in the 18th century under the influence of the English 'common sense'". While it was previously used as the German equivalent of the Latin "sensus communis" and meant a "sixth sense", in the 18th century it becomes "semantically identical to the English 'common sense'".<sup>32</sup> This, of course, lends a special importance to the fact that the works of Reid, Oswald and Beattie (as well as those of Hutcheson, Lord Kames and David Hume) were so frequently reviewed in the philosophical and literary journals of the time and were so often referred to in the works of the German philosophers.<sup>33</sup>

Hence an analysis of the exact role of Scottish common sense philosophy in Germany appears to be warranted both as a continuation of the research begun by the historians of philosophy of a Neo-Kantian background and as the counterpart of investigations already undertaken by historians of literature and language. Since common sense and the problems which Reid, Oswald and Beattie hoped to solve by means of it (namely those dictated by skepticism and idealism) were also of central importance to Kant and his contemporaries, we may justifiably expect a great deal from the discussion of the Scottish influence upon German thought.

## B. The Approach

It is the usual practice to head studies of this kind with the assurance that they are of "more than purely antiquarian interest", that they "show the historical significance" of the influencing philosopher, that they provide "helpful clues" for the understanding of the philosopher who is influenced, and that they establish some sort of continuity in the history of philosophy. But can studies of influence really deliver all that is promised on their behalf, or do they not remain very much at the surface and, by their very nature, remote from the significant issues? What exactly are we doing in tracing influences, and how does this contribute to philosophy in general? Since this work proposes to study influences, it is not beside the point to attempt to get a clearer understanding of the problems involved in such studies -- this even more so, as the very conception of "influence" has become problematic in literary criticism as well as in philosophy.<sup>34</sup> In any case, such a discussion may be helpful in avoiding some of the more basic mistakes which can be made.

Studies of influence take seriously the fact that no philosopher ever wrote in complete isolation from his predecessors and contemporaries and that the thought of any philosopher is very likely to be greatly formed by the thought of others (be it positively or negatively). But studies of influence usually also have a systematic aim. It is assumed that the work of any philosopher will be clarified or understood better, if it is shown in what way his view of certain problems and his answers to them were determined or influenced by the thought of his contemporaries or predecessors. It is clearly this

systematic interest that makes studies of influence interesting to philosophy in general.

But, since our systematic considerations are to be determined and modified by the historical relations, the establishment of the "fact" of influence takes a certain precedence. This task involves three different, though closely related steps: First of all, the actual historical connections have to be established. It has to be shown that the philosopher who is supposedly influenced by another philosopher actually had such knowledge of the works of the latter that would make a dependence likely. Secondly, similarities or parallels to the work of the influencing philosopher have to be determined, and thirdly it has to be shown that these similarities or parallels are best accounted for as "influence", that is, as effects of the thought of the former upon the latter. Thus both factual evidence (the historical connections) and systematic evidence (similarities, parallels, contradictions, etc.) have to be taken into consideration, and an influence has only been shown when both these factors have been taken into consideration and evaluated. Both the facts and the textual evidence are usually not without ambiguity. Moreover, though it is frequently not too difficult to show either a historical connection or certain similarity, etc. between different philosophers, it is still often very difficult, if not impossible, to establish definite influences, i.e. to show that the systematic similarities are the result of the author's acquaintance with the works of his predecessor or contemporary. Yet, however difficult it may prove to be, this is exactly what studies of influence attempt to do. Only after the actual influence has been established,

can the systematically interesting questions concerning the relations of these philosophers be discussed properly and confidently.

However, the picture just painted is an idealization. It would be philosophically naive to suppose that the historical and the systematic questions could be differentiated in such a neat and convincing way. For, it is very much the question whether there exist such things as "mere facts" in isolation from any theory whatsoever, and it is unquestionable that our philosophical education and herewith our systematic preconceptions have a considerable influence upon our views of the historical facts and upon our understanding of the texts.<sup>35</sup>

While I do not think that this interdependence of systematic and historical interpretation implies the impossibility of any consistent account of the history of philosophy, it clearly introduces a number of further difficulties and increases the tension between the systematic and historical aspects of influence studies.<sup>36</sup> An historical account of the development of philosophical thought faces more difficulties than, for instance, an account of the development of agricultural techniques.

Historians of philosophy have often tried to escape these difficulties by either concentrating very much upon establishing what they took to be the relevant facts or by concentrating more upon systematic parallels and similarities while neglecting the facts. Thus there was a time when historians of philosophy believed that to understand a certain philosopher meant to show all his "sources" and to "deduce" his thought from that of his predecessors, or to show how it was "caused" by it.<sup>37</sup> Such an approach tends to become a positivistic tracing of factual relationships and very often loses sight of the systematic preconceptions

(or even prejudices) which motivated it. In most cases it does not lead to any new understanding of the philosophers involved. In fact, it usually stands in the way of understanding what is at issue in the work of any significant philosopher, and is characteristic of those "scholarly men" of whom Kant says in the Prolegomena that they consider the history of philosophy as philosophy itself. "Nothing can be said which, in their opinion, has not been said before".<sup>38</sup> But philosophical texts neither stand in the relationships of deductive inferences nor are they simply caused by other texts. Any attempt to liken the philosophical discussion carried on between philosophers through their works either to logical inference or to physical causation necessarily leads away from understanding it on its own terms. But if the study of influences has any function at all, then it is just this, namely to allow us to see a certain historical text as much as possible in its historical context, or to come as closely as possible to understanding it on its own terms.

However many unfortunate aspects the positivistic view may have, it does at least offer an account that tries to stay as closely as possible to the historical material. The view which concentrates upon systematic similarities while leaving us in the dark about the actual historical facts is much more misleading. To say that "the philosophical interest in the history of philosophy" is concerned with "coincidences" and "discrepancies" only and that "the question of the historical connection is secondary", as the adherents of the ontological interpretation of Kant hold, for instance, is insidious.<sup>39</sup> It amounts to dealing in mere possibilities; leaving the factual connections as ambiguous as

possible, while suggesting that the systematic similarities do, in fact, constitute "relationships". In this way any philosopher can be "related" to any other philosopher and the history of philosophy becomes mere wish-fulfilment.

If the Neo-Kantians succumbed to factualism at times and were overly concerned with Kant's factual connections with Hume and others, the ontological school has genuine contempt for the "mere" facts. By emphasizing Kant's "(metaphysical) motives", his "intentions" and "the basic tendency" of his thought they can hide the violence they do to Kant's texts. Of course it may be possible to understand the development of German thought "even without referring to England" and it may even be legitimate to concentrate upon "motives of thought" and "metaphysical intentions" of Kant (while neglecting his historical connections), but the question is whether in doing so one is still trying to understand "what really happened" (however difficult that may prove to be) or whether one is still concerned with the history of philosophy. I would rather think that one is no longer doing history of philosophy. For it is not concerned with understanding what is (or was) possible, but rather with what actually is or was. And this consists in history of philosophy mainly in the written texts and the recorded life of a philosopher and not in any independently available or directly accessible "motives" or "intentions", be they metaphysical or otherwise. In fact, motives and intentions are available to us only in so far as they are preserved in the texts and the recorded actions of the philosopher. They can never be played out against the texts themselves, as the ontological school quite frequently has to do.<sup>40</sup> To do this is to

open the door to arbitrariness and wish-fulfilment without any safeguards. In any case, it is more than a little strange for an avowedly historical approach to Kant (or any one) to regard the actual historical facts as of secondary importance or to show open contempt for them.

A historical account of philosophy has to take the factual historical connections into consideration, and, I believe, there are limits to what can be done to the facts. While there is always a variety of interpretations possible, while the criteria used in historical discussions are relatively vague, the work of one historian can be checked and evaluated by another historian. Anybody who goes too far in his neglect of the historical evidence will have to account for it sooner or later. It is the very nature of the history of philosophy that its questions are dictated by the historical evidence or at least corroborated by it.

But we may perhaps go even further and say that the historical relations should not only provide the basis for the systematic questions to be asked, but also guide the formulation of these questions. As we have seen, the determination of "influences" is already a complex task. "Influence" hides a variety of different phenomena and relations that have to be accounted for. Even in the most simple cases such questions as "what was retained and what rejected, and why and how was the material absorbed and integrated, and with what success?"<sup>41</sup> have to be given serious consideration. It is by asking these questions that we get a clearer view of the problems that confronted a certain philosopher and can better understand the way in which he tried to solve them. When we are investigating Kant's peculiar stand towards idealism, for instance, the merits of this approach become especially apparent. For



how can we assess the validity and scope of Kant's strictures concerning idealism and skepticism, if we do not know how they confronted him, and how they figured in his environment? If we did not have the historical "fact" of the Scottish influence upon Kant, we would be largely dependent upon speculation in this regard. The phenomena and relations considered in the study of influences allow us to understand better the way in which a philosophical text came about, what its presuppositions and its historical context was; and since philosophy consists to a great deal of the re-thinking of classical texts, the historical questions may indeed lead to a fresh look at the systematic relationships and supply new perspectives and clues for understanding them. To change a well-known Kantian proposition, we may perhaps say that philosophy without history is empty, and history without philosophy is blind.

### C. The Goal

Apart from the general interest which the Scottish influence upon German thought should have for philosophy, it is clearly of interest to those interested in 18th century British empiricism and those concerned with Kant and his background.<sup>42</sup> For the estimation of Scottish common sense it is particularly important because the German influence is very early. In fact, it is simultaneous with the developments in Scotland. Moreover, in Germany it had to assert itself against philosophical forces quite different from those in any of the other countries. While it was used in France and Britain to combat sensationalism, in Germany it was transplanted into an environment that was still essentially rationalistic. It should be clear even without the invocation of a fully developed

theory of Wirkungsgeschichte that the way in which Scottish common sense was received and used in this rather different situation can open up new and important perspectives upon the character of Scottish common sense.<sup>43</sup> It may also explain its later development in Scotland itself, which was closely connected with the reception of Kant and Hegel on the British Islands. Perhaps Reid came to be so "undervalued and neglected" not so much because "his friends may have 'done him in'", as Baruch Brody suggests, but because Kant's philosophy was just as much an answer to Reid as it was to Hume and that it preserved much that was valuable in Reid (just as it preserved much of Hume).<sup>44</sup>

The investigation of the influence of Reid, Oswald and Beattie is also relevant for the understanding of the way in which Berkeley and Hume were seen in Germany. But not too much should be expected here. The primary concern here is the influence of the Scottish common sense philosophers. Hume and Berkeley are discussed only in so far as it is necessary for an understanding of the influence of Reid, Oswald and Beattie. While it will become clear that David Hume had a much greater influence upon popular philosophy in Germany than has been assumed thus far, and while the necessity of a thorough investigation of Hume's influence upon 18th century German thought in general will also be shown by the Scottish influence, the actual treatment of Hume in Germany would go too far in this context. -- With regard to Berkeley the investigation of the Scottish influence can be seen as further corroborating evidence for the conclusions of Eugen Stäbler and Harry M. Bracken.<sup>45</sup>

But Reid, Oswald and Beattie's influence has perhaps the greatest interest for the understanding of German thought in the late 18th

century. Common sense and the problem of the justification of knowledge, which was intimately connected with a discussion of realism, idealism and skepticism, was of the most central importance to the popular philosophers.<sup>46</sup> Accordingly they could use these Scots very much in their attempt to combine rationalistic elements of thought with a more empiricist outlook. To say that they uncritically mixed empiricistic and rationalistic doctrines and were not at all aware of their incompatibility is not really fair. They were trying to do something very similar to what Kant did in his critical enterprise, namely find a middle road between empiricism and rationalism. Accordingly, much that can be found in Kant's works can already be found in theirs. Clearly, they fell short of Kant's achievements and many of them never realised the important new elements in Kant's thought. But they deserve to be remembered again, if only for their importance to Kant.

It is really almost a scandal of Kant-scholarship that these "popular philosophers", these "indifferentists", as Kant called them, are not just neglected but downright disregarded today. They are the philosophers who occasioned not only criticism from Kant, but were also highly regarded by the developing Kant and demonstrably still interested the mature Kant very much. They worked on the same problems as Kant, and Kant wrote his works with them in mind. They received and passed first judgment on his works and thus determined the way in which we still see Kant today. It is my hope that a closer study of the Scottish influence will contribute to a re-discovery of Kant's contemporaries. As such it will be a sustained argument against the ontological and metaphysical school of Kant-criticism, which brings Kant almost

exclusively into relation to schools of thought which were already dead when Kant developed his critical philosophy.

Certainly Kant (as well as the popular philosophers) may have learned something from Crusius and the other Thomasians, certainly he was even more influenced by Wolffian philosophy in general (as were most of the popular philosophers), but that his critical philosophy must be understood as being essentially a development of Wolff's metaphysics or Crusius' ontology remains to be shown. It appears to me that this thesis could remain plausible for so long only because, despite the meticulous (though somewhat myopic) research with regard to the German school philosophy, "the question concerning the historical connection" of Kant and the Thomasians has been repressed. When we view Kant's philosophy in its actual historical connections -- which mainly concern his contemporaries -- we receive a different interpretation. We will find that Kant was not so much part of the philosophy of the schools (least of all that of Crusius), but was closely related to the so called "popular philosophy". In fact his philosophy has to be understood just as much as a critique of common sense as it has to be regarded as a critique of pure reason, and it is not surprising that Kant's thought should have been rejected by Hegel as "working into the hands of common sense". However much Kant argued against his contemporaries, he was much closer to them than to either the metaphysicians of the preceding generation or to those of the generation after him.

The Scottish influence in Germany, which extends over exactly the same period as the development, success and first demise of Kant's philosophical criticism, namely from 1768 to 1800, was inextricably

bound up with all the important philosophical developments of the time. It was not only important for the contemporaries of Kant and thus for Kant himself, it was also used by those who criticised Kant. Hamann, Herder, Jacobi and Goethe found the Scots useful in their fight against faculty psychology and for a holistic conception of man. Jacobi used Thomas Reid as the source for his realism, which, strange as it may sound, was of the greatest importance for the development of German idealism.

Hence this work is not primarily about the Scottish contribution to Kant's thought. It is about the role which Scottish common sense played in the entire development of German thought between 1768 and 1800. Nevertheless, since Kant's critical philosophy is of the most central importance in this development, the Scottish influence will also be important for the understanding of Kant. For it exhibits the "geistesgeschichtliche Ort" of Kant's thought. Kant's Critique fell neither from the sky, as it were, nor addressed some faceless "posterity". It was firmly rooted in the philosophical discussion of the time and has its "Sitz im Leben" in this discussion with his contemporaries. Kant's criticism represents the specific response to a fundamental problematic common to all philosophers of his time. Common sense played a significant part in this problematic. Kant's solution was without doubt revolutionary. But, as all revolutions, it cannot be properly understood without the developments leading up to it.

Yet I shall not argue that Kant's "critical problem" is already to be found in the works of one or several of his contemporaries (as the ontological school has argued with regard to the later Thomasians). Nor

shall I attempt to show that Kant's philosophy is a mere variation of theories that can already be found in the works of his predecessors, as Lovejoy for instance tried to show.<sup>47</sup> The critical problem of Kant is to be found in Kant alone. But it cannot be properly understood without its historical background, namely the works of his contemporaries, who were all greatly influenced by Scottish common sense.

This study is divided into five parts. Part I, which consists of three chapters, deals with the presuppositions for an evaluation of the Scottish influence in Germany. It attempts to give a clear view of the peculiar character of Scottish common sense (Chapter II), of the particular German background in philosophy, which made the Germans so receptive for the Scottish view (Chapter III). Part II (Chapter IV) will deal with the actual reception of the works of Reid, Oswald and Beattie in Germany. The remainder of the work will explore some of the more significant systematic consequences of the Scottish philosophy in Germany. I attempt to show that the Scottish influence concerned the issues which were very much at the centre of the philosophical discussion, namely those connected with Kant's critical philosophy. Part III deals with the philosophical developments before the appearance of Kant's critical works, i.e., the so called popular philosophers. In it the central importance of Scottish common sense for the German attempt to create an "empirical rationalism" is shown. The Scottish influence was of importance especially with regard to the theory of common sense and the understanding of the theory of ideas, and thus also with regard to the German view of skepticism and idealism. The Germans were, similarly as the Scots, aiming at some sort of common sense realism.

But they could not accept the Scottish theory without modifications. The Scots argued that the theory of ideas, which they saw as underlying all forms of phenomenalism, necessarily leads to skepticism. Therefore they rejected it without qualifications. The Germans felt that phenomenalism could be saved (and set out to do just this). The Germans also believed that they could go further in the theory of common sense than the Scots. While Reid and his followers insisted that common sense neither needed justification nor could be defended or justified, the popular philosophers felt that some form of defense or justification of common sense was not only possible but also desirable from the philosophical point of view. Thus they were setting themselves very contradictory goals. They attempted a realism in the form of a phenomenalism and attempted to justify common sense, while at the same time relying upon common sense. The tensions to which this led can perhaps best be observed in the later thought of Moses Mendelssohn (especially the Morgenstunden).

It became increasingly clear that "empirical rationalism" was possible only if more radical changes were made. These were attempted by Johann Nicolaus Tetens and Immanuel Kant, with whom Part IV of this work will deal. Tetens applied himself to a much more thorough revision of the theory of ideas and developed what may perhaps be called the theory of representation. He also went a step further in the justification of the principles of common sense by claiming that they were expressions of more basic laws of thought. But it was Immanuel Kant who went furthest in this regard. He clearly recognised that our principles of thought and knowledge could not be justified by means of a

descriptive and psychological analysis. His transcendental philosophy is at least in part a response to this problem. It may be said (and I shall argue) that in Kant's thought the contradictory elements of German thought of this period, i.e. phenomenalism and will to realism and justification of common sense, were balanced out. Kant explained why common sense, as giving rise to natural illusions (the antinomies), was in need of justification, and he made clear that the theory of representations allowed only an empirical realism, while necessarily implying a transcendental idealism. Though his contemporaries were quite unwilling to accept it, what they considered to be Kant's scepticism (the doctrines developed in the Transcendental Dialectic) as well as what they tried to discredit as idealism (the conclusions of the Transcendental Analytic) were consequences of their own basic position as well.

As Part V of this discussion shows, Kant's thought represented only a very unstable balance of the tenets of common sense versus justification on the one hand and theory of ideas versus realism on the other. This becomes very clear in the developments following Kant. The so called "philosophers of faith", Hamann, Herder and Jacobi, and their followers, rejected all justification and chose common sense, saying that its principles have to be believed blindly, and argued against any form of the theory of ideas as leading necessarily to nihilism, advocating a "radical realism". The so called "Idealists", Fichte, Schelling and Hegel and their followers, rejected Kant's understanding of philosophy as a clarification and justification of common sense, advocating the view that philosophy can only exist in outright contradiction to common sense as the "inversion" (Verkehrung) of it, that



philosophy is not justification but revision of common sense, and they rejected the theory of representation, saying that our "representations" do not represent things in themselves, independent of the representations. In a sense, everything is the representation of some spirit and idealism the only consequent form of philosophy. Hence, it may be argued that the "theory of representation", which arose as an improvement of the "theory of ideas", led to a form of idealism just as its predecessor.

The history of German philosophy in the late 18th century is in this way shown to have been a struggle for the solution of the problem of knowledge, as the attempt to exhibit and justify the structures of thought that enable us to know the world. It was a battle against idealism and skepticism. This battle was fought more fiercely in Germany than in either France or Britain at that time, but it was fought with weapons forged in these two countries. Kant's contemporaries who are usually disqualified as unoriginal and shallow, had a greater part in this struggle than they have been given credit for. They developed the framework in which the problems were seen, namely the theory of common sense and the theory of representations, and however violently Kant, Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel reacted towards their thought, they themselves took their point of departure from a view of the problem of philosophy as framed by the popular philosophers.

This is clearly shown by the Scottish influence. Not only Garve, Feder, Eberhard, Mendelssohn and Lossius thought highly of Reid, but also Tetens, who transmitted much of the theory of representations and

the theory of common sense to Kant. Hamann, Herder and Jacobi also greatly appreciated Reid and Beattie and made some use of their thought, and since Jacobi had a great influence upon the developing Hegel, Reid may even be said to have had an indirect influence upon certain aspects of German idealism.

There is no pretense that the Scottish influence was the major force in these developments or that it "caused" them in some way. There were many other important philosophical forces connected with them. As Alfred Bäumler has observed, "the 18th century is a historical organism of such delicate and rich structure as will hardly be found again".<sup>48</sup> But the Scottish influence was closely connected with all these developments and is thus extremely relevant to a proper understanding of them. Since the conception of a common sense was a most central guiding concept for all of the German enlightenment thinkers, we may use this strand of their thought to unravel much of the problematic that confronted them.

Common sense and the closely related problematic of ordinary language have become very important in the recent history of Anglo-saxon philosophy. Accordingly, thinkers such as Strawson, Körner, Bennett, Wolff and others have felt a certain kinship to Kant and have attempted to interpret Kant along the lines of their own thinking. This historical investigation of the immediate historical background of Kant's thought shows that such an interpretation is much closer to the "historical Kant" than that of the professed "historians of philosophy" who try to make a traditional metaphysician out of Kant. Certainly, it is correct to speak of Kant's enterprise as "metaphysical" in some sense. But it is certainly not the same kind of metaphysics which Wolff and Crusius

had in mind. It rather has the closest connections to what is called today, somewhat inappropriately, "descriptive metaphysics".<sup>49</sup>

Kant's criticism grew out of the "metaphysics of common sense" of his contemporaries. It was a reaction to it, as well as a limited justification of it. Accordingly, it is no mere historical accident that certain analytic philosophers should feel that Kant was doing very much the same thing as they are doing today and should attempt to make his thought fruitful for their aims. But perhaps this similarity will prove to be too great for comfort for some of our contemporary philosophers, as we shall see in the Conclusion of this work. For, however intimately Kant's criticism is connected to that of his contemporaries, his "transcendental method" cannot simply be characterised as descriptive metaphysics, for it aims quite clearly at justification. This suggests that the difference between descriptive metaphysics and revisionary metaphysics, which may be considered as one of the main dogmas of analytic philosophy, is not as clearly to define as might be thought. But wherever this is realised Kant's successors and especially Hegel "cannot really be ignored for long".<sup>50</sup>

## NOTES : CHAPTER I

1. With regard to America see, for instance, James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, London, 1875; T. Martin, The Instructed Vision: Scottish Common Sense Philosophy and the Origin of American Fiction, Bloomington, 1961; R. Peterson, Scottish Common Sense in America 1768-1850, an Evaluation of its Influence, (dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972); for more recent developments see Keith Lehrer, "Scottish Influences on Contemporary American Philosophy", The Philosophical Journal 5 (1968), pp. 34-42. France: Emil Boutroux, "De l'influence de la philosophie ecossaise sur la philosophie francaise", Transactions of the Franco-Scottish Society, Edinburgh, pp. 16-36 (reprinted in Emil Boutroux, Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie moderne, Paris, 1846-7). Belgium: J. Henry, "Le Traditionalisme et l'ontologisme a Universite de Louvain 1835-1865", Annales de l'institut superieur de philosophie, V, Louvain, 1924. Italy: See the various works of M.F. Sciacca, as for instance "Reid e Gallupi" in Studi sulla Filosofia Moderna, Milan, 1964, pp. 447-60. General: R.E. Beanblossom, Introduction to Thomas Reid's Inquiry and Essays, Indianapolis, 1975 gives a succinct and helpful account of the major influences. So does S.A. Grave, Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, Oxford, 1960.
2. This lack of knowledge can be seen to go back as far as James McCosh. While Hamilton in his edition of Thomas Reid's works, The Philosophical Works of Thomas Reid, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1846, 1863, (7th edition, Edinburgh, 1872, subsequently referred to as "Reid, Works") still refers to various German writers as having

written against the Scots, most notably Tetens, and notes Jacobi as having been influenced by Reid, McCosh says only quite generally that the Germans mention Reid only in order to disparage him (Scottish Philosophy, pp. 303-304.) G.A. Johnston, Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, Chicago, 1915, p. 23 notes that Scottish common sense "has never been appreciated" in England and Germany. Baruch Brody, Introduction to Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Cambridge, 1969, p. xxiv: "Reid was much less influential in Germany". Grave, Scottish Philosophy, p. 4 does not mention Germany; neither does Beanblossom in his Introduction.

3. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis/New York, 1950, pp. 6-8. "It is positively painful to see how utterly his opponents Reid, Oswald, Beattie and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the problem; for while they were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened. . . ."
4. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, Stuttgart, 1902, vol. 38, p. 382. (All translations of works whose titles are given in German are my own; except where otherwise indicated.) Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 2 vols., Berlin/Wien, 1924, vol. II, p. 28.  
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie,

Theorie Werkausgabe, Frankfurt/Main, 1969, vol. 20, pp. 275-287.

J.G. Buhle, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, vol. 5, Göttingen,

1803; von Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und

Metaphysik bei den Deutschen von Leibniz bis auf die gegenwärtige

Zeit, 2 vols., Halle, 1794 are still aware of the Scottish

influence in Germany. See especially Eberstein, 1, p. 358-9,

391-2; 2, 113. To list all, or even most, of the historical

accounts which do not note the Scottish influence (or do so in a

passing remark) would be tedious and unnecessary, I believe,

since I would have to mention every major history of German

philosophy.

5. Moses Mendelssohn, "Die Bildsäule", in Moses Mendelssohn, Schriften zur Philosophie, Aesthetik und Apologetik, 2 vols., ed. Moritz Brasch, Hildesheim 1968, pp. 231-246, p. 242.
6. Johann Christian Lossius, Physische Ursachen des Wahren, Gotha, 1774, p. 238.
7. Johann Nicolaus Tetens, Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie, Bützow & Wismar, 1775, p. 17.
8. G. Zart, Einfluß der englischen Philosophie seit Bacon auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, Berlin, 1881.
9. A mere scanning of the register will show that the influence of Reid, Oswald and Beattie was not inconsiderable. Even though Reid's influence started much later than Berkeley's, both are listed 22 times. Beattie is listed 15 times (compared to Newton's 13 times) and Oswald 4 times. Locke and Hume lead this statistical account (Locke: 157 and Hume: 91). This does not prove anything about the

relative importance of these philosophers in Germany, but it does show that a discussion of their influence is not inappropriate.

10. Windelband, Heimsoeth, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. 14, Tübingen, 1950, p. 461n. (The first edition appeared in 1891).
11. Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1881, I, p. 342.
12. Julius Janitsch, Kants Urteile über Berkeley, Strassburg, 1879 and Benno Erdmann, "Kant und Hume um 1762", Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. I (1887-1888), pp. 62-77 and 216-230. For a more recent summary of the state of discussion with regard to Berkeley, see W.H. Werkmeister, "Notes to an Interpretation of Berkeley", in New Studies in Berkeley's Philosophy, New York, 1966, pp. 163-168, and with regard to Hume, see R.P. Wolff, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie", Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960), pp. 117-23. Neither paper breaks any new ground. W.B. Piper's "Kant's Contact with British Empiricism", Eighteenth Century Studies 12 (1978-79), pp. 174-189, is disappointing, since it neglects much of the literature on the topic and does, apart from some errors, not contribute anything new to the discussion.
13. Though one need not agree with Baruch Brody's estimation of Reid as the most important philosopher of the 18th century beside Kant and Hume, it is quite clear that Reid was of much greater importance than has usually been thought. See Baruch Brody, "Hume, Reid and Kant on Causality", in Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations, ed. S.F. Barker, T.L. Beauchamp, Philosophical Monographs, Philadelphia, 1976, pp. 8-13, p. 8.

14. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, Oxford, 1946, pp. 21-22.
15. Robert Sommer, Grundzüge einer Geschichte der Psychologie und Ästhetik von Wolff-Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller, Leipzig, 1892, p. vi.
16. Max Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren Psychologie, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1902, p. 53. See also pp. 57-8. Quite clearly, even if it were possible to construe the history of German philosophy and psychology in this way (which I doubt), it is neither necessary nor historically correct to do so. I can only agree with Collingwood on this point: genuine history "has no room for the merely probable or merely possible; all it permits the historian to assert is what the evidence before him obliges him to assert" (Idea of History, p. 204).
17. Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 4th and enlarged edition, Frankfurt/Main, 1973, p. xiv and xvii.
18. This is clearly visible in the interpretations of Wundt, Heimsoeth, Heidemann and their followers. For the emphasis upon "motives", "intentions", etc. see especially Heinz Heimsoeth, Metaphysik der Neuzeit, Darmstadt, 1967 (unchanged reprint of the edition München & Berlin, 1934), pp. 82ff. I shall here concentrate mainly upon the criticism of those adherents of the ontological approach, who try to show that Crusius (in some sense or other) anticipated Kant, and who try to derive the empiricistic strand in Kant's work from the Thomasian school (while neglecting the British influence). Gottfried Martin's interpretation of Kant, for instance, does not make this claim. Though I disagree with his interpretation as well,



I find his description of Kant's criticism as being dependent upon German metaphysics and Newtonian science (and philosophy, I would add) quite fair. See Gottfried Martin, "Die Metaphysischen Probleme der Kritik der reinen Vernunft", "Die Probleme einer metaphysischen Kantinterpretation" in Gottfried Martin, Gesammelte Abhandlungen I, Köln, 1961, pp. 55-79 and 80-85. For a short history of the ontological school see Gottfried Martin, "Die deutsche ontologische Kantinterpretation", ibid., pp. 105-109, and Gerhard Funke, "Der Weg zur ontologischen Kantinterpretation", Kant-Studien, 62 (1971), pp. 364-388. For a critique see Gerhard Lehmann, "Kritizismus und kritisches Motiv in der Entwicklung der Kantischen Philosophie", Kant-Studien 49 (1957-58), pp. 25-54. See also Moltke S. Gram, Kant: Disputed Questions, Chicago, 1967 and especially W.H. Walsh, "Kant and Metaphysics", Kant-Studien 67 (1976), p. 376. Walsh concedes that the ontological interpretation may make sense as an account of Kant's "private thoughts", but finds it "to say the least wildly paradoxical" as an interpretation of Kant's published works. I shall argue it is equally implausible as an account of Kant's prejudices. The ontological school which argues so much against the Neo-Kantian "evasion" of opposing Kant's "private opinions" and his "public works", has in fact perpetuated this distinction and made it into one of the corner-stones of its interpretation of Kant. Whereas the Neo-Kantians emphasised the public works, the ontological school speculates about metaphysical motives and intentions and then tries to find them in Kant's texts. This often involves "violence"

towards Kant's written words. I shall not say anything about the questionable aspects of opposing the "private" to the "public" in this way. What Heimsoeth does to Kant's texts is not that different from what is characterised as "committing the intentional fallacy" in literary criticism.

19. Max Wundt, Die Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung, Tübingen, 1945, pp. 250 and 254 (emphasis mine). Some very interesting thoughts on the possibility of a national history of philosophy can be found in Lewis White Beck's Early German Philosophy. Kant and his Predecessors, Cambridge, 1969, pp. 1-15; especially pp. 13-15.
20. See Heinz Heimsoeth, Metaphysik und Kritik bei Chr. A. Crusius. Ein Beitrag zur ontologischen Vorgeschichte der Kritik der reinen Vernunft im 18. Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1926, p. 172. This wilful neglect of the factual connections appears to be an essential pre-supposition of the ontological school. Accordingly it can be found in almost all the learned historical scholarship produced by its members. We have seen already how Dessoir relied on possibilities rather than facts, and how Wundt found it necessary to give priority to "tensions in German philosophy" and to discount "mere" foreign influences. But this bracketing of the question concerning the historical connection can be found in interesting variations in almost any work of this school. See, for instance, Heinrich Schepers, Andreas Rüdigers Methodologie und ihre Voraussetzungen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Schulphilosophie im XVIII. Jahrhundert, Köln, 1959, p. 72. After having argued that there are many things in Kant that could have come from Rüdiger,

Schepers notes that "the establishment of the connections between Rüdiger and Kant has to be relegated to a later work . . ." Why? And why does Schepers mar his otherwise excellent discussion by this? How important this contempt for "mere influences" remains until today can also be seen from Ingeborg Heidemann's "Metaphysikgeschichte und Kantinterpretation", Kant-Studien 67 (1976), pp. 297-8. Gerhard Funke's claim that Heimsoeth has been meritorious doubly "as a historian of metaphysics and as a metaphysician of the historical" ("Der Weg zur ontologischen Kantinterpretation", p. 466) has to be taken cum grano salis.

21. Heimsoeth, Metaphysik der Neuzeit, p. 83.
22. Heimsoeth believed he had to "save" Kant's position between Leibniz and Hegel. But does Kant need such "saving"?
23. Even the insistence upon tensions between Wolffianism and Thomasianism as a peculiarly German tension has the air of paradox. For both Wolff and Thomasius (as well as their respective followers) were deeply influenced by French and British thought. Especially the Thomasians were eclectic philosophers, who took what they needed wherever they could get it, but especially from Locke.
24. See Heinz Heimsoeth, Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants, Köln, 1956 (2nd ed., Bonn, 1971), Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants, vol. II, Bonn, 1970, Transzendente Dialektik, 4 vols., Berlin, 1966-1971.
25. Dieter Henrich, "Hutcheson und Kant", Kant-Studien 49 (1957-8), pp. 49-69. See also his "Über Kants früheste Ethik", Kant-Studien 54 (1963), pp. 404-31.

26. G. Baum, Vernunft und Erkenntnis. Die Philosophie F.H. Jacobis, Bonn, 1969.
27. See footnote 12 of this chapter, for instance, and Beck, Early German Philosophy.
28. F.O. Wolf, "General Introduction: Scottish Philosophy and the Rise of Capitalist Society -- Some Remarks on the Relevance of a Study of Beattie and on the Methodology of the History of Philosophy", James Beattie, The Philosophical Works, vol. I (reprint of the 1770 edition of James Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism), Stuttgart & Bad Canstatt, 1973 (subsequently referred to as "Beattie, Essay"), pp. 5-6. I would like to point out that the study presented here was neither occasioned by Wolf's remarks nor has much in common with the study proposed by Wolf. It neither focusses primarily on Beattie nor is it first and foremost a study of the transmission of Humean ideas, nor does it support Wolf's conjecture about the beginnings of psychology in Germany. Psychology started much earlier than Wolf suggests. Compare Chapter IV, p. 188 and footnote 166 of that chapter.
29. See, for instance, Lawrence Marsden Price, The Reception of English Literature in Germany, Berkeley, 1932 (German translation: München, 1961); Mary Bell Price and Lawrence Marsden Price, "The Publication of English Humaniora in Germany in the Eighteenth Century", University of California Publications in Modern Philology xliv (1955); Horst Oppel, Englisch-deutsche Literaturbeziehungen, 2 vols., Berlin, 1971. See there for further references especially

- to the extensive periodical literature on particular influences.
30. J.A. Walz, "English Influence on the German Vocabulary of the 18th Century", Monatshefte (Madison), 35 (1943), pp. 156-164. See also E. Erämtsae, Englische Lehnprägungen in der deutschen Empfindsamkeit des 18. Jahrhunderts, Helsinki, 1955; E. Erämtsae, Adam Smith als Mittler englisch-deutscher Spracheinflüsse, Helsinki, 1961; P.F. Ganz, Der Einfluß des Englischen auf den deutschen Wortschatz, Berlin, 1957.
  31. Walz, "English Influence", p. 160.
  32. Ganz, Einfluß, "Gemeinsinn" and "common sense".
  33. See Karen Kloth and Bernhard Fabian, "James Beattie: Contributions Towards a Bibliography", The Bibliothek, 5 (1970), pp. 232-45. Their listing is incomplete and misses such important reviews as those of Feder and Herder. E.H. King's "James Beattie's Essay on Truth (1770): An Eighteenth Century 'Best-seller'", The Dalhousie Review (1971-72), pp. 390-403 does not discuss Beattie's effects in Germany in any detail and mentions only Kant's attack in the Prolegomena.
  34. It is impossible to give a complete account of the extensive literature on this topic. I have relied mainly upon the following:  
 W. Höllerer, "Methoden und Probleme der vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft", Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschriften, N.F. 2 (1952), pp. 116-31; I.H. Hassan, "The Problem of Influence in Literary History: Notes toward a Definition", American Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 14 (1955), pp. 66-76. Klaus Lubbers, "Aufgaben und Möglichkeiten der Rezeptionsforschung",

Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschriften, N.F. 14 (1964), pp. 292-302; U. Weisstein, Einführung in die vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft, Stuttgart, 1968; Rene Wellek, "The Crisis of Comparative Literature", in Concepts of Criticism, New Haven & London, 1963, pp. 282-95 and "The Name and Nature of Comparative Literature", and "Comparative Literature Today", in Discriminations, Further Concepts of Criticism, New Haven & London, 1970, pp. 1-36 and 37-54. F.O. Wolf makes a vehement attack upon studies of influence in philosophy in his "General Introduction" to Beattie's Philosophical Works. See the following.

35. The questionable character of "brute facts" has been noted by philosophers of history for a long time. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see W.H. Walsh, Philosophy of History, New York, Evanston, 1967. It has also been emphasized by philosophers (or philosophical historians) of science, such as Norwood Russell Hanson, in Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge, 1965 and Paul Feyerabend in "How to be a Good Empiricist -- A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological", The Philosophy of Science, ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1968, pp. 12-39, especially section five. See also chapter 3 of Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, London, 1975.
36. F.O. Wolf claims that studies of influence are always open to the two lines of criticism that they (1) can always be shown to be essentially incomplete, i.e. "no theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain", and that (2) "the classification and general arrangements of the texts . . . used is (sic) based on principles

not simply contained in them, i.e. we impose an order upon the texts and somebody else might impose a different one upon them ("General Introduction", p. 9). These criticisms are supposed to establish that any interpretation or any random ordering of texts is equally acceptable and that any interpretation "may seem completely unintelligible to another historian reading the same texts" (*ibid.*). But this is just false. If it was true no criticism or discussion of a historical work would be possible. Wolf's criticisms are the expression of a radical skepticism with regard to history and as such neither new nor irrefutable. Wolf can afford such a radical skepticism from the "safety" of his Marxist position. He believes that the inconsistencies of the "subjective-idealistic" approach can be avoided by accepting with Marx the "radical discontinuity" of the philosophical development (p. 14). Philosophy (just as morality and religion) can have no history and no development. It can only be the reflection of the development of the means of production. Therefore, history of philosophy can become consistent only if it is established how it depends upon society and its reality. However desirable the establishment of the connections between philosophical thought and society may be regarded, for a non-Marxist it is not clear how such a connection of philosophy with the realities of society (magically) transforms the history of philosophy into a "science". Wolf's certainty appears to be more a certainty of faith than one of science, and to argue in matters of faith would not prove very helpful, since the function of rational argument in faith is rather

limited. For a more thorough discussion of the problem of objectivity, see W.H. Walsh, Philosophy of History, pp. 93-106. A certain similarity between the arguments of Wolf concerning history and those of Feyerabend concerning science will have been observed, I trust.

37. See, for instance, Benno Erdmann, Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wolfischen Schule und insbesondere der Entwicklungsgeschichte Kants, Leipzig, 1876, p. 24. "One has correctly emphasized that to understand Kant means to deduce him historically. This holds for Kant as for any other historical personality". Though Erdmann himself avoids the inherent dangers of this view quite admirably, it is clear that such a view will tend to concentrate upon "mere externals". It appears also that this view implies a "singularly uncritical" use of "cause" (R. Wellek, Discriminations, p. 35). The concept of "cause" presents special problems in the philosophy of history anyway. See, for instance, W.H. Walsh, "Historical Causation", Appendix B to his revised edition of Philosophy of History, New York & Evanston, 1967.
38. Kant, Prolegomena, p. 3.
39. See footnote 20 of this chapter.
40. This is especially apparent in their tendency to emphasize Kant's pre-critical works at the expense of his critical ones. It is one thing to point out their importance for an understanding of the background of Kant's mature thought and another to claim that his mature thought is nothing but the elaboration of motives of thought to be found in the early work of Kant. Could there not be something



essentially new in Kant's Critiques, something that has not been said before?

41. H.H.H. Remak, "Comparative Literature, its Definition and Function" in Comparative Literature: Method and Perspective, ed. H.H.H. Remak, Carbondale, 1961. -- It is certainly not enough to differentiate simply between certain kinds of influence, such as "positive and determining, negative and repelling, direct and indirect" and "subsequent perfection or formal corroboration" (as Zart, Einfluß, p. 3 does), and to classify all the influences found according to this schema.
42. Wolf, "General Introduction" offers a good summary of the reasons for such a general interest. They all derive from the fact that "the antithesis between the Kantian and the Humean position which would be illuminated by such an historical analysis still determines the present state of philosophical discussion in more essential ways than is often realised" (p. 5).
43. In any case, it is questionable how helpful this theory is in its more extravagant claims. For the development of a theory of Wirkungsgeschichte see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, fourth edition, Tübingen, 1975, especially pp. 284-90.
44. Baruch Brody, "Reid and Hamilton on Perception", The Monist 55 (1971) pp. 423-41, p. 423.
45. Harry M. Bracken, The Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism, 1710-33, revised edition, The Hague, 1965, shows how important the early prejudices towards Berkeley are for the entire Wirkungsgeschichte of Berkeley's philosophy. He also discusses

the earliest effects of Berkeley's thought in Germany. For the later 18th century (and especially also Kant) see Eugen Stäbler, Berkeley's Auffassung und Wirkung in der deutschen Philosophie bis Hegel, (dissertation) Tübingen, 1935. The latter work appears to be completely unknown to most scholars of Berkeley and Kant.

46. This is well acknowledged in all the histories of German philosophy. For an interesting discussion of the central importance of common sense for the entire humanistic tradition, see Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 16-27.
47. The ontological school found "Kant's critical problem" already in various later Thomasians. Thus Wundt felt it originated in Hoffmann's thought, Heimsoeth saw it in that of Crusius and Schepers finds certain aspects of it already in Rüdiger. -- But the ontological school is not alone in its search for predecessors of Kant. Lovejoy, for instance, was very much concerned with showing that Kant was not as original as he is usually considered to be, and that he was not only anticipated by certain British writers ("Kant and the English Platonists", 1908 -- a similar point had already been argued by James Stewart), but that he more or less appropriated certain aspects of Leibnizian theory, while claiming to be original (especially in "Kant's Antithesis of Dogmatism and Criticism"). For a careful analysis and criticism of Lovejoy, see Lewis White Beck, "Lovejoy as a Critic of Kant" in Essays on Kant and Hume, New Haven & London, 1978, pp. 61-79. While he rejects Lovejoy's claims concerning the relationship of Kant and Eberhard, he finds Lovejoy's "insistence that the student

of Kant be also a student of those to whom Kant himself was a student" (p. 79) very fruitful. The study presented here has grown out of the recognition of this very circumstance.

48. Alfred Bäumler, Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft, Darmstadt, 1967 (reprographic reprint of the 1st edition, Halle, 1923), p. viii. But Bäumler himself does not proceed in accordance with his own insight and tries to discount the British influence in this "delicate and rich structure" almost entirely and argues for an autark development with incidental French influences (see, for instance, ibid., p. 162). For an incisive criticism of this aspect of Bäumler's work see Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Princeton, 1951, pp. 319-320n.
49. See, for instance, P.F. Strawson, Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London, 1964, pp. 9-12.
50. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology", in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre, Garden City, New York, 1972, p. 187.

PART I  
PRELIMINARIES

In order to establish whether a certain parallel between German and Scottish thought actually constitutes an influence it is necessary to show that it could not have been the result of an earlier German conception. For this reason a clear grasp of the character of Scottish common sense as well as that of earlier German conceptions is essential. An understanding of the German philosophical background may also prove useful for the explanation of why and how Scottish common sense was received in Germany. Though these preliminary investigations concerning the Scottish and the German background may be said to concern the systematic aspect, they are very important for the discussion of the historical connections. In a certain sense this Part I establishes the presuppositions for the Scottish influence. For, if it should be seen either that Scottish common sense and German philosophy are so radically different from each other that no fruitful discussion between the two could take place, or that both subscribe to exactly identical theories, any talk of "influence" in an interesting sense would be ludicrous. The aim of this part of the work is therefore to show that Scottish common sense and German philosophy are both similar in the problems they face and different in their solutions of these problems, and that the Scottish answers were indeed relevant for the problems facing German philosophers.

## CHAPTER II

### THE NATURE OF SCOTTISH COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY

Though the roots of Scottish common sense philosophy go back to Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Lord Kames, and though even David Hume's mitigated skepticism shares many of the characteristic doctrines of these moral and common sense philosophers, the philosophy of Thomas Reid and his followers arose mainly as a reaction to the skeptical philosophy of the early Hume.<sup>1</sup> While the earlier common sense philosophers were not very much concerned with epistemological skepticism and felt that only moral skepticism (as found in the works of Hobbes and Mandeville, for instance) was dangerous and needed refutation, Reid, Oswald and Beattie found themselves unable to maintain such a distinction between epistemological and moral skepticism. They were convinced that Hume's scepticism in matters epistemological also undermined morality and religion.<sup>2</sup> Therefore they set out to answer or refute David Hume.

But it would be a mistake to consider their philosophy merely as "the Scottish answer to David Hume". As Lewis White Beck has said with regard to the other great respondent of David Hume, "what is a good

answer to Hume may be a very inadequate system of philosophy".<sup>3</sup> If Scottish common sense was merely the attempt to disprove Hume's specific conclusions, it would perhaps deserve the general lack of interest with which it has been treated for a long time. But it is more than that, as will be seen.

A. The Theory of Common Sense and its Foundation in the Analysis of Perception in the Work of Thomas Reid.

Reid's philosophy has two distinct, though closely connected sides. The one is negative and concerns his criticism of the theory of ideas, while the second is positive and consists of his alternative account of perception. Both these sides are intricately bound up in Reid's thought. But for the purpose of representing his thought clearly they are best kept apart. Reid's theory has the appearance of being very straightforward and simple. But this appearance is deceiving. As older and more recent studies of his thought amply demonstrate, the simplicity vanishes as soon as attention is given to the details of Reid's thought. The points Reid makes are extremely subtle and a proper understanding of his thought depends upon an exact understanding of his use of language. In fact, Reid is no more easily understood than any other philosopher who had anything of great interest to say. To convey a sense of this will be at least part of this relatively brief account of Reid's epistemology.

1. Reid's Critique of the Theory of Ideas

Thomas Reid considered Hume's epistemological skepticism as the logical outcome of modern philosophy, whose most distinctive characteristic he saw in what he called the "ideal theory". He traces this

theory back to Plato and Aristotle, but he describes it in greater detail in the form which it acquired in the works of Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley and Hume.<sup>4</sup> The critique of the ideal theory involves both a historical and a systematic claim. Reid maintains not only that the history of (modern) European philosophy until Hume constitutes the gradual working out of the consequences of the ideal theory and amounts in fact to a reductio ad absurdum of this theory, but he also holds that any form of the ideal theory or phenomenalism necessarily leads to a denial of the existence of an external world and the self. Reid confounds these two claims, though perhaps he should have differentiated clearly between them. If he had done so, he might have avoided a great deal of criticism. Both claims are highly interesting in themselves and would deserve further discussion. But I will here concentrate mainly upon the systematic one.<sup>5</sup>

The theory of ideas is founded for Reid upon three distinct premises: (i) we do not perceive things directly, but only by means of mediating mental entities, ideas, images, etc.; (ii) these ideas are the express images of the objects (if not all, at least some fundamental class of them); (iii) the ideas enter our mind simple and uncompounded; complexity is only the result of (more or less conscious) reflection. Reid contests the theory of ideas on all three counts. Each of the claims necessarily leads us to deny certain undeniable facts about the human mind. None of the claims is specifically argued for or defended by those who subscribe to the theory of ideas. In fact, all three amount to nothing more than mere hypotheses, hypotheses not only not supported by facts, but actually contrary to facts.<sup>6</sup> This is argued by

Reid in the following way:

(i) The assertion of the existence of mediating mental entities between objects and the perceiving subject is based upon a confusion of language. There are always two meanings for the particular terms of sensation in their ordinary usage. First of all they are thought to refer to something actually to be found in the external world and secondly they are also used to refer to the particular activity we are engaged in when sensing. Reid discusses this most fully with regard to "smell", but it is clear that the general conclusions reached about "smell" are also supposed to hold for all other species of sensation.<sup>7</sup> Thus when we speak of the smell of a rose or the stench of a sewer, we clearly have something in mind that is quite independent of ourselves, something that confronts ourselves whether we will or not. We expose ourselves to it or extract ourselves from it by means of locomotion of some sort and not by manipulating "pictures" in our mind. But we can also mean by "smell" or "smelling" that which we do when we smell something. Reid expresses this by saying that we can also refer by "smell" to "an act of the mind". This act of smelling has a beginning and an end. It is not a permanent characteristic or quality of ourselves. As an act of feeling it can "have no existence but when . . . felt". There is nothing in sensation over and above the act of sensing or feeling. Philosophers have failed to attend to this distinction carefully and have in fact "confounded" the two meanings of "sensation" in various ways and thus created such mediating entities as ideas. "All the systems of philosophers about our senses and their objects have split upon this rock, of not distinguishing properly sensations which can have no



existence but when they are felt, from the things suggested by them".<sup>8</sup> But in so doing the philosopher "puts a different meaning upon the word, without observing it himself or giving warning to others, he abuses language and disgraces philosophy, without doing any service to truth: as if a man should exchange the meaning of the words daughter and cow, and the endeavour to prove to his plain neighbour, that his cow is his daughter, and his daughter his cow".<sup>9</sup> But this is exactly what philosophers are doing when they say that what we sense are not the objects but (ideal) sensations.

(ii) One of the most characteristic doctrines of modern philosophy since Descartes is, according to Reid that of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is argued by the "Cartesians" (i.e. all modern philosophers) that while the secondary qualities are purely subjective and have no similarity to the external objects, the primary qualities reveal in some sense the "real" qualities of objects. Reid argues that we have no reason to believe that our sensations "resemble" the real objects in any way whatsoever. This has been shown by Berkeley. The "good Bishop" has clearly established that "the qualities of an inanimate thing, such as matter is conceived to be, cannot resemble any sensation; that it is impossible to conceive any thing like the sensations of our minds, but the sensations of other minds. Everyone that attends properly to his sensations must assent to this".<sup>10</sup> Reid fully agrees with Berkeley on this point.<sup>11</sup> But, since Berkeley also holds "that we can have no conception of anything but what resembles some sensation or idea in our minds", he must conclude from the fact that sensations and ideas of our mind can only resemble sensations and ideas

in other minds that we can have no conception of an inanimate substance. Reid argues now that, if we can show that we are in possession of notions that do not have any resemblance to sensations, Berkeley's idealistic conclusion is not warranted and there is nothing illegitimate about our conception of and belief in inanimate substances.<sup>12</sup>

Reid establishes this most thoroughly with regard to our notion of extension.<sup>13</sup> Extension is a good example for two reasons: (a) it is the most basic of all the primary qualities, (b) the adherents of the theory of ideas have always taken for granted that our notion of extension is indeed derived from sensation.<sup>14</sup> By means of an extended series of experiments he tries to show that touch all of itself cannot be the source of our notion of extension, nor that of space and motion. But he does not appear to take these experiments as conclusive evidence, for he closes this discussion with a challenge:

This I would therefore humbly propose, as an experimentum crucis, by which the ideal system must stand or fall; and it brings the matter to a short issue: Extension, figure, motion, may, any one, or all of them, be taken for the subject of this experiment. Either they are ideas of sensation, or they are not. If any one of them can be shewn to be an idea of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all pretence to reconcile reason to common sense in this matter, and must suffer the ideal skepticism to triumph.<sup>15</sup>

Quite clearly Reid does not think that this is possible and has his own account of the origin of the notions of space and extension, as we shall see in the following.

(iii) But the most important criticism of the theory of ideas concerns the assumption that we perceive simple and isolated ideas or

sense data and that complexity is created by our reflection upon these simple constituents of all knowledge. The ideal system, which "teaches us that the first operation of the mind about its ideas, is simple apprehension, that is, the pure conception of a thing without any belief about it; and that after we have got simple apprehension, by comparing them together we perceive agreements or disagreements between them; and that this perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, is all that we call belief, judgment, or knowledge".<sup>16</sup> But this is just false. We do not apprehend first something brown, then perceive "four-leggedness" and several other characteristics and then make the judgment to the effect that there is a table. We first perceive the table and attend only afterwards (if at all) to its particular features. For Reid "nature presents no object to the senses, or to consciousness, that is not complex".<sup>17</sup> The notion that simple apprehension is the most basic activity of the human mind is "all fiction, without any foundation in nature".<sup>18</sup> Instead of saying that belief or judgment arises from the comparison and connection of ideas simply apprehended, we should say that "the simple apprehension is performed by resolving and analyzing a natural and original judgment".<sup>19</sup>

Thus for Reid perceptions are no longer simple, basic or even atomic mental data which cannot be analyzed further. They are not the unproblematic elements by means of which all problems concerning perception and thought can be solved. For Reid perception, though remaining the starting point of analysis, is the problem to be solved, the complex to be analyzed. It is the perceptual process which needs explanation more than anything else. Locke, Berkeley and Hume have for Reid begun their

analysis at too advanced a stage and have overlooked the problematic hidden in sensation just as much as Descartes and his rationalistic followers on the Continent. Though in a sense it is quite correct to say that "Reid . . . reverses the whole epistemological procedure of empiricism" and thereby "undermines the foundation of many of the most characteristic doctrines of Hume", <sup>20</sup> this tells only half the story. Reid does not only criticise empiricism with his critique of the theory of ideas, he also undermines the type of philosophizing of Leibniz and Wolff, which involves a form of the "ideal system" as well.<sup>21</sup> The fact is that Reid's critique of the theory of ideas is a fundamental objection to Western philosophy as a whole from Plato onwards. If Reid had done only this, he would deserve to be remembered as a significant philosopher. But he has much more to offer, since his critique of the ideal system is inextricably bound up with the advancement of his own original theory of perception.

## 2. Reid's Method

Since all of modern philosophy is founded upon a false hypothesis concerning the workings of the human mind in perception, what is needed for Reid is a thorough re-examination of the "various powers and faculties we possess".<sup>22</sup> Hypotheses are to be rejected in this process. In fact, Reid believes that the reform of philosophy can only succeed along the same lines as the reform of natural philosophy. We have to apply the same methods to the philosophy of the mind that Newton applied to natural philosophy. This even more so as Newton's "regulae philosophandi" are maxims of common sense, and are practised every day in common life; and he who philosophizes by other rules, either concerning

the material system, or concerning the mind, mistakes his aim". In the philosophy of the mind as in physics, "a just interpretation of nature is the only sound and orthodox philosophy; whatever we add of our own, is apocryphal, and of no authority".<sup>23</sup>

Moreover, psychology or philosophy aims just as the natural sciences (by means of the analysis of the phenomena) at the establishment of the powers and principles or laws which govern them. For Locke, Berkeley and Hume these powers and principles in themselves were not the aim of their investigations. Their aim was the explanation (and particularly the genealogical explanation) of these laws and powers. Though they thought that this explanation had to come from experiment and observation and not from deductive inference, as the Cartesian rationalists on the Continent, they are in their intention to explain these laws and powers much closer to Descartes than to Newton.<sup>24</sup> Reid is the first who consistently follows Newton's method in the philosophy of the mind. For him the philosopher cannot rest

till he find out the simple and original principles of his constitution, of which no account can be given but the will of our Maker. This may truly be called an analysis of the human faculties; and till this is performed, it is in vain we expect any just system of the mind -- that is, an enumeration of the original powers and laws of our constitution, and an explication from them of the various phenomena of human nature.<sup>25</sup>

Thus Reid's aim in philosophy is a much more modest one than that of the British Cartesians, the empiricists, or that of the Continental Cartesians, the rationalists. Whereas they wanted to analyze and explain or even derive the principles of the mind from more basic ones, Reid sets out to "find" them in order to be able to "enumerate" them

perhaps at a later time. These basic principles or laws of the mind are for Reid the principles of common sense.

But the anatomy of the mind is much more difficult than the anatomy of the body. While the natural philosopher has a great variety of different samples to investigate, the philosopher has really only his own mind to investigate. He must use introspection. While he may also find the observation of the behaviour of other people helpful, it is only this careful introspective analysis of his own mind that can explain the behaviour of others to him.

It should be emphasised that Reid does not think that this psychological and introspective analysis by means of which he hopes to establish the principles of common sense "justifies" or "explains" them in any way. For Reid these principles cannot be justified or explained, since they are the basis for all justification and explanation. Even his emphasis upon the "will of our Maker" is not primarily intended as a final justification of the principles of common sense, but as stressing the factual and ultimate character of these laws for us. They play the same role as the axioms in mathematics. In this way, Reid's reference to God is not greatly different from that of Newton and other Newtonians.<sup>26</sup> Only if we see Reid as being engaged in "justification", God assumes the role of great importance in Reid's thought that has commonly been ascribed to it.

Reid is extremely careful in this anatomy or physiology of the human mind. He notes that "the labyrinth may be too intricate and the thread too fine, to be traced through all its windings", and he is resolved to stop where he "can trace it no further, and secure the

ground [he has] gained". For a "quicker eye may in time trace it further".<sup>27</sup> Caution and humility are necessary to avoid error and delusion. It is this careful and modest approach of Reid that has brought forth many doctrines that were very influential and are still of philosophical interest today.

### 3. The Analysis of Perception

Reid's positive account of perception, consciously developed as the alternative to those involving a version of the theory of ideas, is characterised by the following most characteristic doctrines: (i) the theory of immediate perception, (ii) the doctrine of natural suggestion or belief, and (iii) his theory of common sense. These three elements of Reid's thought are welded into one organic whole by means of the language metaphor. While none of these elements nor the language metaphor are completely new or original creations of Reid, and while all can be traced back to his immediate predecessors (most notably Berkeley and Hume), Reid succeeds in giving a completely new and original account of perception by means of them, and this not as an eclectic synthesis or as a "critique of books and systems", but as a critique of our faculty of knowledge.

(i) Reid holds that we perceive the objects themselves and not some sort of mental entities, which somehow have reference to the objects, which in themselves are unknowable to us. In this sense, we perceive the objects "immediately", that is, without a third kind of object "mediating" between ourselves and the world of objects. This does not mean, of course, that we know the objects without any form of mediation whatsoever, that the objects somehow enter "directly" into

our mind. Perception is in some sense always dependent upon mediation. Reid is very much aware of this. The act of perception itself is for Reid already the outcome of a complicated process, involving "certain means and interests, which, by the appointment of nature must intervene between the object and our perception of it; and by these our perceptions are limited and regulated".<sup>28</sup> These means and interests are: (1) the medium which intervenes between objects and bodily organs (rays of light, vibrating air, effluvia), (2) an impression or action upon our organs, (3) a transmission of these to the brain, (4) a following sensation, and (5) a perception. Some of these operations affect the body only, others the mind. By introspection we do not know anything of the first three steps in the process (they fall into the domain of the natural sciences), and how step four follows upon step three we cannot know at all. We are conscious only of the latter, and they are the proper subjects of investigation of philosophers. Of these we not only can be conscious, but necessarily have to be conscious.<sup>29</sup> Thus all the philosopher is concerned with is sensation and perception and their relationship. Accordingly, Reid's doctrine of immediate perception also concerns only this relationship of sensation and perception.

But what are now sensation and perception for Reid, and how are they related to each other? This much is sure: they are not any sort of mediating entity.<sup>30</sup> "Sensation" is entirely different from "idea" in that the latter refers to some (fictitious) entity or quality in the mind, which has a sort of permanent existence, while Reid's "sensation" does not. It refers to an action or operation of the mind which has a



definite beginning and end in time. Thus smelling, for instance, "is an act of the mind, but is never imagined to be a quality of the mind".<sup>31</sup> A sensation "can have no existence but when it is perceived".<sup>32</sup> "In fact, this is common to all sensations, that, as they cannot exist but in being perceived, so they cannot be perceived but they must exist".<sup>33</sup> "It is essential to a sensation to be felt and it can be nothing more than we feel it to be".<sup>34</sup> In short, with regard to sensation we may say "its esse is sentire, and nothing can be in it that is not felt".<sup>35</sup> This shows two things. First of all, Reid's "sensation" refers to a mental act, something that we do and something that is nothing over and above this action. We sense, i.e. feel pain or smell, or hear, etc. at one moment or other, when this action has run its course, nothing remains of it. And just as it does not make any sense to ask for the continued existence or "quality" of the action consisting of scratching one's head, it does not make sense to ask for the continued existence of the act or sensation. Secondly, sensation is essentially related to perception. In fact, it only exists in so far as it is perceived. To speak of an "unperceived sensation" would make in Reid's terminology just as much sense as to speak of a "square circle".

This last characteristic of sensations shows that there is something very wrong in the attempt to explain Reid's theory of perception by means of his account of sensation. Sensations in themselves, that is, sensations in isolation from perception are impossible. They are accessible to us only in so far as they are given to us in the complex process of perception. This doctrine has, of course, the closest connection to Reid's methodological principle that nature never presents anything simple to the

human mind. Thus, though sensation is, as Reid makes clearer in the Intellectual Powers, "a simple act of the mind", it is only given to us as part of the complex act of perception. In this way, "sensation", although in the order of nature "simple", is arrived at only by "abstraction" or separated "by art and chemical analysis".<sup>36</sup> As such a simple act of the mind, "considered abstractly", sensations do not have reference to objects. In fact, sensation may be characterised as that act of the mind which "hath no object distinct from the act itself" and can thus be differentiated from all other acts of the mind.<sup>37</sup>

But our actual sensations are quite different from these simple acts. For they are "necessarily accompanied" with certain beliefs.<sup>38</sup> Sensation "compels" us to believe not only in "the present existence of the thing" sensed by us, but also in "a mind, or something that has the power of smelling, of which it is called a sensation, an operation or feeling", as well as in a certain "faculty" by means of which we are capable of sensing and in certain other notions such as "cause", "extension", "solidity" and "motion". All these things "are nowise like to sensations, although they have been hitherto confounded with them".<sup>39</sup> In fact, Reid takes great pride in being the first to have established this.<sup>40</sup>

These sensations, when considered together with the beliefs which "necessarily accompany" them, are the perceptions for Reid. Thus, while sensations in themselves do not have any object, but are nothing distinct from what they are felt to be, perception "hath always an object distinct from the act by which it is perceived".<sup>41</sup> But this object is not our sensation, it is

an object which may exist whether it be perceived or not. I perceive a tree that grows before my window; there is here an object which is perceived, and an act of the mind by which it is perceived; and these two are not only distinguishable, but they are extremely unlike in their natures. The object is made up of a trunk, branches, and leaves; but the act of the mind, by which it is perceived, hath neither trunk, branches, nor leaves. I am conscious of this act of the mind, and I can reflect upon it; but it is too simple to admit of an analysis, and I cannot find proper words to describe it.<sup>42</sup>

Reid clearly is too modest here. For, he actually has analyzed the act of perception to some extent in the Inquiry already. He has shown that it is not a simple act of the mind, but consists of several elements, namely a simple act of sensation and certain beliefs which necessarily accompany this act and which lead us to a conception of an object different from the act of perception. This analysis of perception is developed further in the Intellectual Powers, but it is already present in the Inquiry.<sup>43</sup>

(ii) Similarly as acts of sensation, beliefs, which necessarily accompany our sensations are simple. For this reason, belief cannot be defined logically. "Every man knows what it is, but no man can define it".<sup>44</sup> Belief is "like seeing and hearing which can never be so defined as to be understood by those who have not these faculties; and to such as have them, no definitions can make these operations more clear than they are already".<sup>45</sup> In this regard it is very similar to the simple operation of the mind called "sensation". It cannot be defined either. But just as this impossibility of logical definition did not stop Reid to say many interesting and new things about sensation, so it does not with regard to belief.

Reid tries to elucidate the relation of belief to sensation by

means of the "language analogy". In fact, he believes that there is a close natural analogy between language and perception, anyway. For

the objects of human knowledge are innumerable, but the channels by which it is conveyed to the mind are few. Among these, the perception of the external things by our senses, and the informations which we receive upon human testimony, are not the least considerable: and so considerable is the analogy between the principles of the mind, and those which are subservient to the other, without further apology we shall consider them together.

This analogy is spelled out in greater detail as follows:

In the testimony given by the senses, as well as in human testimony given in language, things are signified to us by signs: and in one, as well as the other, the mind, either by original principles or by custom, passes from the sign to the conception and belief of the things signified.<sup>46</sup>

Thus Reid differentiates between two kinds of relation between the sign and the thing signified by it. It can either be based upon experience or upon natural principles of the mind. When "a certain kind of sound suggests immediately to the mind, a coach passing in the street", we are clearly concerned with a belief based upon experience or custom. But, as we have seen already, there are also many beliefs which "necessarily accompany" certain sensations for Reid. "We cannot get rid of the vulgar notion and belief of an external world", for instance, and even if "Reason should stomach and fret ever so much at this yoke, she cannot throw it off".<sup>47</sup> These beliefs are obviously the ones of the greatest interest to Reid, and their description is one of his most fundamental concerns.

But Reid makes quite clear that he does not believe that it is in our power to give an account of why and how these beliefs follow upon, or better, accompany our sensations.<sup>48</sup> These necessary beliefs are

"instinctual".<sup>49</sup> "We are inspired with the sensation, and we are inspired with the corresponding perception, by means unknown".<sup>50</sup> All he will say is that the language analogy is of help here as well. Just as there is a sort of natural language, i.e. the one consisting of "features of the face, gestures of the body, and modulations of the voice",<sup>51</sup> which convey to us what the other person thinks or feels, so there are certain sensations which conjure up these original principles. Reid calls the perceptions in which these sensations occur, "original perceptions" and differentiates them from "acquired perceptions" in which the relation between the sign and the thing signified depends upon experience or custom. Since he cannot explain or define the way in which this happens, Reid "beg[s] leave to make of the use of the word suggestion, because [he] know[s] not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of philosophers, and to which we owe many of our simple notions which are neither impressions, nor ideas, as well as many original principles of belief".<sup>52</sup> Thus the sensations "suggest" to us these basic principles and notions not to be found in sensation itself.

Reid exploits the language analogy even further when he observes that, as there is in artificial signs usually no similarity between the sign and the thing signified, so there is none between the sensation and those things suggested by it. We cannot speak of a necessary relationship between the sensation and those things suggested by it either, just as we cannot do so with regard to artificial signs. Thus "a sensation of hardness, although it hath neither similitude to hardness, nor, as far as we can perceive, any necessary connection with it".

There are three classes of natural signs which have to be distinguished according to Reid so that we may "more distinctly conceive the relation between our sensations and the things they suggest, and what we mean by calling sensations signs of external things". The first class consists of those natural signs "whose connections with the thing signified is established by nature but is discovered only by experience". All the natural sciences are based upon such signs. The second class is constituted by signs "wherein the connection between the sign and the thing signified is not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a natural principle without reasoning or experience". These are the natural signs of our thought, purposes and desires, namely those signs which make up what Reid calls the natural language of mankind. The "third class of natural signs comprehends those which, though we never before had any notion or conception of the things signified, do suggest it or conjure it up, as it were by a natural kind of magic, and at once give us a conception, and create a belief in it". Thus our sensations suggest to us a mind or an identical self to which they belong as well as such notions as that of hardness and extension or our belief in the existence of objects.

It may be observed, that as the first class of natural signs . . . is the foundation of true philosophy, and the second, the foundation of the fine arts, or of taste; so the last is the foundation of common sense; a part of human nature which hath never been explained.<sup>53</sup>

(iii) Whether Reid himself succeeds in giving a satisfactory explanation of this part of human nature is very much in question. He is not all that clear with regard to the number and the characteristics of the principles of common sense.<sup>54</sup> So much is sure, however: Reid believes

that

there are certain principles . . . which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life -- these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd".<sup>55</sup>

The principles of common sense have thus for Reid the characteristics of natural necessity and indispensability. They are at the root of our ability to reason and can thus not be rationally explained themselves, but, and this is important, they can also not be contradicted without absurdity. However, Reid does not understand "absurdity" in a purely logical sense, as Kant does, for instance, but uses it to justify the irony and ridicule with which he treats Hume and his predecessors. As Shaftesbury had already proposed in his essay "Sensus Communis" a "test of ridicule" for even the most serious and solemn opinions, so Reid (and Beattie, though in many respects he resembles much more the zealot rejected by Shaftesbury) may be considered to apply such a test of ridicule. Whatever his reasons may have been for taking "absurdity" in such a sense and choosing irony over argument, his explanation of the basic principles does not gain by it. Reid does not have a clear criterion by which to differentiate an original principle from other generally held beliefs.

But Reid makes still some very important observations in this difficult subject. We have seen already that he thinks that these first principles are necessarily suggested to us in the process of perception, and, though he declines to analyze the way in which we come by them in any detail, it is quite clear that they have to be regarded as the necessary precondition for perception. This limits their number to some

extent already. Reid further shows that these principles are very unlike anything that could be derived from sensation, and while he declines to speculate as to "when and in what order" these principles come to be known by us, it is clear that he regards them as innate or a priori in some sense.<sup>56</sup> Their source is not the external world of objects, but the constitution of our mind. We do not abstract these principles from sense perceptions, but we bring them already with us to sense perception. Our notions of space, motion, the existence of external objects, of our identical self, etc. are in fact the concepts and principles which make perception possible. Yet they are not the result of reasoning either, since

all reasoning must be from first principles; and for first principles no other reason can be given but this, that, by the constitution of our nature, we are under a necessity of assenting to them. Such principles are parts of our constitution, no less than the power of thinking; reason can neither make nor destroy them; nor can it do any thing without them.<sup>57</sup>

The principles of common sense are a priori presuppositions for sensation as well as for thought. Without such first principles we could not know anything at all.

Hence the necessity of an a priori component in all claims of knowledge about the external world has been rather clearly recognised and acknowledged by Thomas Reid. Together with the closely related analysis of the act of perception as a complex phenomenon involving certain judgment-like operations of the mind this may be regarded as one of the most important contributions to the development of philosophy by Reid. One of the consequences of this view is that Reid can differentiate much more clearly between sensation and those things suggested in sensation



but not being of sensation.<sup>58</sup> For Reid sensation is neither a sort of primitive thought as it was for most of the rationalists, nor are our abstract notions of space, etc. rarified sensations for him, as they were to most of the empiricists. The principles of common sense are radically different from sensation, but they are known to us only through sensation. The principles of common sense also allow Reid to bridge the gulf between thought and sensation, which, since the empiricist and rationalist continuum of thought and sensation has been broken, might have arisen. Both thought and sensation rely equally on the principles of common sense and are therefore necessarily related. Though there is no thought in sensation and perception, as Reid makes perfectly understood, and though thought is radically different from anything to be found in sensation, the two share the same basic principles of common sense as basic presuppositions. Reid does not believe to have said the last word on these matters and feels therefore that "a clear explication and enumeration of the principles of common sense, is one of the chief desiderata in logic".<sup>59</sup> But he has clearly made a beginning in this regard, a beginning that could lead to a new understanding of the human mind and its workings.

#### B. Oswald and Beattie's Contribution

Oswald and Beattie were neither the only nor the most important of Reid's early followers. Adam Ferguson and George Campbell are perhaps more important, and we will have occasion to refer to them in the context of the reception of common sense in Germany. But they were never as closely associated with Thomas Reid as Oswald and Beattie. In fact, "Reid, Oswald and Beattie" was very often a reference to what was taken to be one unified theory, as we shall see. To speak of a "contribution"

of Oswald and Beattie to the theory of common sense is perhaps also somewhat misleading. For they contributed very little of substance to the theory of Scottish common sense as developed by Thomas Reid. They were indeed not much more than popularizers of Reid's ideas. As such popularizers they did not usually follow Reid's method of meticulous psychological analysis, but used only the results of his research. Their main aim was the defense of morality and religion and the refutation of David Hume.

James Oswald, whose influential An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion appeared in two volumes, 1766, 1772 in Edinburgh, multiplied the principles of common sense to such an extent as to include even certain theological dogmas among them. His arguments against philosophical proofs in religious matters do not amount to anything more than the preaching of what he considered to be the truth and the exhortation that everybody should follow him. But whatever the weaknesses resulting from Oswald's dislike of philosophy are, the Appeal also points towards a real shortcoming of Reid's theory, which consists in the insufficient characterisation of his principles of common sense. Only because he had not succeeded in giving a clear criterion for them, Oswald could include such doctrines as the existence of God among them. But the Appeal has at least one merit. Oswald emphasizes again and again that the principles of common sense cannot be proved and have to be accepted as facts of the constitution of our mind. As such facts they stand neither in necessity of rational justification nor can they be further elucidated or rationally explained, but have to be accepted. All we can do is describe them. Because our mind is constituted in the way

it is, we cannot think in any other way.<sup>60</sup> But since he has no clear criterion of the principles of common sense, and since he is venturing into the realm of theology and morality, which had not been investigated by Reid, his careless approach allows the "appeal to common sense" to deteriorate into an appeal to "the judgment of the crowd".

Somewhat more significant are the works of James Beattie. They were also much more successful than Oswald's Appeal. Philosophically most significant is his An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, which appeared first in 1770 and went through many editions during the first years after its publication.<sup>61</sup> Today it is scoffed at by most historians of philosophy as mediocre, shallow and rightly forgotten. But actually the Essay is not quite as bad as it is generally made out to be; especially when seen in its eighteenth-century context. While Beattie does not advance beyond anything said by Reid, he also does not seriously misrepresent Reid's theory. His talent as a writer and literary critic allows him to spread Reid's thought further than Reid himself could perhaps have hoped.<sup>62</sup>

The Essay is certainly not a philosophical work of the first order, but it still remains very readable today and his criticisms of Hume (usually taken and adapted from Reid) are often quite well taken. Thus

he challenged the doctrine that ideas are distinguished from impressions only by their weakness or faintness. He found the meanings of "copy" and "resemble" unclear in the doctrine that ideas copy or resemble impressions. He found Hume's denial of the distinction between objects and perceptions untenable, because ordinary discourse tells against it. He was dubious of the scope to be allowed the doctrine that the meaning of words must be accounted for as ideas . . . Finally, he pointed out that by defining the self as a bundle of perceptions, Hume is at a loss to account for a percipient being to perceive these perceptions.<sup>63</sup>

To this list we may add his criticism of Hume's analysis of the concept of "cause" as leaving out the important characteristic of a necessary connection. If only succession were enough, we would also have to hold that the night, for instance, caused the day.<sup>64</sup> Beattie also tries to explicate the meaning of "common sense" to a greater extent than Reid in his Inquiry. He does this by means of a historical discussion of "common sense" and related concepts, and comes to the conclusion that it represents a special "sense of truth", different from, though connected with, reason.

This last aspect of Beattie's work points towards a certain shift in emphasis that had taken place between Reid's early work, the Inquiry, and the works of Oswald and Beattie. While Reid's emphasis was upon original principles and the constitution of the human mind, which were then (often quite incidentally) identified with the common sense of mankind, Beattie and Oswald are stressing "common sense".<sup>65</sup> This is, it appears to me, not just a shift in emphasis, but is indicative of a basic difference between Thomas Reid himself and his popularizers. Whereas for Reid "common sense" was the problem to be analyzed by philosophers as well as the solution to all philosophical puzzles, for Oswald and Beattie common sense does not appear to need any further analysis. Accordingly, they are much more dogmatic than Reid is himself, while lacking his originality. If the works of Beattie and Oswald deserve the consideration of philosophers today, then mainly as the vehicles of "transmission of Reidian ideas".

#### C. The Characterisation of Scottish Common Sense

Scottish common sense philosophy as developed by Thomas Reid and

propagated by Oswald and Beattie has the following basic features: its intention is the refutation of skepticism; its method that of psychological observation and introspection; its subject matter consciousness; its systematic position is characterised negatively by the refusal of any sort of phenomenalism and positively by the affirmation of principles which are prior to and independent of experience, but presupposed in all knowledge whatsoever.

Scottish common sense rejects traditional empiricism as much as traditional rationalism. Both are seen to involve phenomenalism or reliance upon some sort of theory of ideas, and neither follows a scientifically strict method of observation and induction. Scottish common sense offers a "critique of all preceding philosophy", as it were. Yet, its alternative account shares several characteristics with its predecessors. Similarly as the empiricists the Scots begin with experience and use observation and induction, thus reducing philosophy almost completely to psychology. On the other hand, the Scots affirm certain a priori principles, as the rationalists had done. But quite different from the rationalists, they do not begin from these principles. They try to establish them by means of their inductive account of the human mind.

This last characteristic of Scottish common sense has often been taken as indicative of a certain "dualism" in their theory, a dualism consisting of an interesting connection of radical empiricism and intuitionism or rationalism.<sup>66</sup> The principles of common sense, even though they are discovered by the method of observation and induction, are not thought to be established or justified by this procedure. They

are in themselves innate or a priori and constitutive of the human mind, and all the evidence they carry is a result of this. Accordingly, the only certainty they have is intuitive certainty. Because of this "dualism" Scottish common sense may quite appropriately be considered as a synthesis of tenets from the empiricist tradition with those of the rationalist one. It could even be called an "empirical rationalism" or "rational empiricism".

Whether or not such a theory is best described by such a philosophical oxymoron, or whether the "dualism" involved in it led to the dissolution of the Scottish school, need not be decided here.<sup>67</sup> The fact is that Scottish common sense did indeed constitute the most original and most important attempt at such a philosophy in the period between 1764 and 1781 and continued for a long time afterwards to be an attractive alternative for thinkers who felt that rationalism and empiricism were reconcilable, but could not accept Kant's criticism. That Thomas Reid's philosophy constitutes such a break with the past and the beginning of something new has been acknowledged by several well-known German historians of philosophy in the past, though it appears almost forgotten today. Thus J.F. Fries, an early follower of Kant, classified Reid's thought together with that of Kant and of himself as "speculative speculation" as opposed to "speculation", in this way indicating that with Thomas Reid speculation gained a new understanding of itself.<sup>68</sup> G.W.F. Hegel speaks of "a third turn" of philosophy in the works of Reid, Oswald and Beattie. This third turn consists in their attempt to "indicate also the principle of cognition exactly" and he acknowledges that the Scots have made "quite a number of subtle

observations in this way".<sup>69</sup> Eduard von Hartmann emphasizes that in Reid's more exact psychological observations (as compared with Hume) "the transcendental rationalistic factor comes into its own beside the purely immanent sensationalism", and Ernst von Aster notes the close relationship of Reid's "phenomenological description" of the a priori component of all perception to the philosophical approach of Edmund Husserl.<sup>70</sup> I agree with this estimation of Reid's importance, and it appears quite clear to me that there was scarcely anyone in the period under investigation in this work who could not have learned from the Scots in many respects. But in order to evaluate and understand what the Germans learned from them it is necessary to take a closer look at the German background.

## NOTES : CHAPTER II

1. For the connections of Reid to Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Lord Kames and David Hume see David F. Norton, From Moral Sense to Common Sense. An Essay on the Development of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy, 1700-1765, Ann Arbor University Microfilms, 1966.
2. There is, however, a difference between Thomas Reid on the one hand and James Beattie and James Oswald on the other. Reid does not villify Hume to the same extent as the other two. Beattie does not appear to have appreciated this "leniency" with regard to Hume. See E.C. Mossner, "Beattie's 'The Castle of Scepticism'; An unpublished Allegory against Hume, Voltaire and Hobbes", University of Texas Studies in English, 27 (1948), pp. 108-45.
3. Lewis White Beck, "Towards a Meta-Critique of Pure Reason", in Essays on Kant and Hume, pp. 20-37, p. 24.
4. Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, ed. Timothy Duggan, Chicago & London, 1970, pp. 9-12, 32-6, and especially pp. 252-72, or Reid, Works, 1, pp. 99-101, 108-10, 201-18. Duggan's edition is referred to as "Reid, Inquiry" subsequently. Since Reid's influence upon German thought between 1768 and 1800 is first and foremost the result of the Inquiry -- the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man appeared only in 1785 and the Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind in 1788 (that is, after Kant's first Critique) -- I shall concentrate here on the Inquiry. The Essays are taken into consideration only in so far as they further illustrate or clarify a certain point made in the Inquiry. Whether or not there are such basic differences in Reid's earlier



and later works, as John Immerwahr in his "The Development of Reid's Realism", The Monist, 61 (1978), pp. 245-56 notes, is not discussed here. Immerwahr's argument depends greatly upon the meaning of "sensation" in Reid's Inquiry. If it does have the same status as Berkeley's "ideas", then Immerwahr's observations are correct. But does it, or even, can it possibly have? See pp. 51, 52, 59, 60 above".

5. Most commentators follow Reid in confounding the two claims. For a recent treatment of this topic, see Selwyn Grave, "The 'Theory of Ideas'", Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations, pp. 55-61. For a more thorough treatment of the historical claim made by Reid, see Chapter X, B,1: "Jacobi's View of the History of Philosophy" below.
6. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 26, 81, 82, 84-7, and pp. 256-72, or Reid, Works, 1, pp. 106, 128-32, 203-11.
7. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 39-41, and p. 45. (Reid, Works, pp. 112, 114) where he applies the results obtained with regard to smell to sensations in general.
8. Inquiry, pp. 44-45 and p. 83 (Reid, Works, 1, p. 114, 130-1). It appears that most recent interpretations of Reid have "split upon this rock" as well. Timothy Duggan, "Introduction" to Reid's Inquiry, for instance, reformulates Reid's statement that "it is essential to a sensation to be felt, and it can be nothing more than we feel it to be" as "a sensation . . . cannot have characteristics that it is not sensed as having". (Ibid., p. xiii). But if we take Reid's claim that sensation is an activity seriously we should not talk in this way. Duggan talks of sensations in

very much the same way as we would talk of sense data. They are things we "have" or which "pass through the mind", etc.

Immerwahr's use of "sensation" (see footnote 4 of this chapter) is very similar.

9. Reid, Inquiry, p. 40, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 112).
10. Reid, Inquiry, p. 85, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 131)
11. For this and other agreements of Reid and Berkeley see Harry M. Bracken, "Thomas Reid: A philosopher of Un-Common Sense", Introduction to Thomas Reid, Philosophical Works, with notes and supplementary dissertations by Sir William Hamilton, 2 vols., Hildesheim 1967, pp. xvii-xxix. For the theory of vision see Bruce Silver, "A Note on Berkeley's New Theory of Vision and Thomas Reid's Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 12 (1974), pp. 253-63.
12. But note that he does not attempt to show them to be legitimate.
13. He clearly means it to hold for all other sensible qualities as well. See especially David Fate Norton, "Reid's Abstract of the Inquiry into the Human Mind", Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations, pp. 125-32, Sidney C. Rome, "The Scottish Refutation of Berkeley's Immaterialism", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3 (1942-3) pp. 313-25.
14. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 70-71, (Reid, Works, 1, pp. 123-4).
15. Reid, Inquiry, p. 80, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 128). See also Norton, "Reid's Abstract", p. 129.
16. Reid, Inquiry, p. 27, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 106).
17. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Works, 1, p. 376.

18. Reid, Inquiry, p. 27, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 106).
19. Ibid.
20. D.D. Raphael, The Moral Sense, Oxford, 1947, p. 151.
21. It will perhaps be found unusual that Leibniz is characterised as a phenomenalist, but, according to the definition given by Reid, he must clearly be considered as such. Reid treats Leibniz specifically in the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Essay II, section 15 "Account of the system of Leibnitz". For a further discussion of Leibniz's phenomenism or even idealism, see H. Vaihinger, "Zu Kants Widerlegung des Idealismus", Strassburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie, 1884, pp. 85-164, especially pp. 104-11. Erdmann called Leibniz's philosophy a "Halbidealismus" compared with Berkeley's idealism. As Vaihinger points out in the passage given above, for the Leibnizian matter is only an appearance within ourselves (in the monadic soul). Leibniz and his followers differed from the idealist only in so far as they tried to show that the phenomena were bene fundatum. But whether the phenomena were "bene fundatum" or not, they were phenomena.
22. Reid, Inquiry, p. 6, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 98).
23. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 4, 5 and 89, (Reid, Works, 1, pp. 97, 98, and 133)
24. That these writers are in a quite general sense "Cartesian" has been argued by Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Harmondsworth, 1963 and may thus be called common knowledge among Anglo-Saxon philosophers. But recently it has also been argued that they are quite close to Descartes in many of the particulars of their thought. With regard to Locke see Peter A. Schouls, "The

- Cartesian Method of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4 (1975), pp. 579-601 (see also the discussion between Schouls, J.W. Yolton and F. Dechesneau, ibid., pp. 603-21. For Berkeley's Cartesianism see Harry M. Bracken, Berkeley, Toronto, 1974. On Reid's anti-Cartesianism see Paul Vernier, "Reid on Foundations of Knowledge", Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations, pp. 14-24. Vernier sees Reid still as "justifying" and "founding" knowledge, however.
25. Reid, Inquiry, p. 8, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 99). Hume says as much, of course. But, though the intentions of Hume and Reid may be identical, the ways in which they execute their program are very different. For Hume's Newtonianism see James Noxon, Hume's Philosophical Development, A Study of his Methods, Oxford, 1973 and Barry Stroud, Hume, London and Boston, 1977, pp. 1-16.
26. See, for instance, Cote's Preface to the second edition of Newton's Principle Mathematica: "The business of true philosophy is to derive the natures of things from causes truly existent, and to inquire after those laws which the Great Creator actually chose to found his most beautiful Frame of the world, not those by which he might have done the same, had he so pleased". Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and his System of the World, transl. Andrew Motte, ed. Florian Cajori, 2 vols., Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1974, p. xxvii.
27. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 8-9, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 99).
28. Inquiry, p. 214, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 186).
29. Inquiry, p. 216, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 187).

30. This should hardly be necessary to emphasize. But there are several commentators of Reid, who have been confused about this. The oldest one of these is Sir William Hamilton. More recent interpretations in this vein are given by Timothy Duggan and John Immerwahr (see footnotes 4 and 8 of this chapter).
31. Reid, Inquiry, p. 44, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 114).
32. Inquiry, p. 45, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 114).
33. Inquiry, p. 24, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 105).
34. Inquiry, p. 216, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 187).
35. David Fate Norton, "Reid's Abstract", p. 128. -- It is characteristic of Duggan's view of Reid's usage of "sensation" that he fails to see the importance of this characteristic. He mentions: (1) a sensation has no object, (2) a sensation cannot have characteristics it is not sensed as having, (3) sensation is a "natural principle of belief" and (4) we usually do not notice or attend to sensations. (See Introduction to Reid's Inquiry, pp. xii-xiv and his "Thomas Reid's Theory of Sensation", Philosophical Review, 69 (1960), pp. 90-100, pp. 90-91. Both his characteristics (1) and (2) could have led him to see the fundamental characteristic of sensation as an action in Reid. In fact, he refers to Inquiry, pp. 150-1, which makes this point very clear, but does not take further note of it. Instead he uses a quotation of Price, a "sense-datum" theorist, to elucidate what Reid meant (see Introduction, p. xiii and "Theory of Sensation", p. 90.) Immerwahr, who sees a difference between the Inquiry and the Intellectual Powers, wants to show that Reid held a theory of indirect realism, i.e. a

theory which holds "that we are directly aware only of certain mental entities (call them sensa) from which the mind makes some kind of inference or other mental transition to the existence of an external world". Indeed, it "should be obvious . . . that the theory of perception as suggestion in the Inquiry is best characterised as indirect realism". (Immerwahr, "The Development of Reid's Realism", p. 247). I find it difficult to imagine a theory more radically different from the one proposed by Reid than that one ascribed to him by Immerwahr.

36. Reid, Inquiry, p. 27. See also pp. 43-5, (Reid, Works, 1, pp. 107, 113-4).
37. Reid, Intellectual Powers, Works, 1, p. 229. See also Inquiry, pp. 205-6, (Reid, Works, 1, pp. 182-3), where he makes the very same point.
38. Reid, Inquiry, p. 25, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 105); see also p. 30 (Reid, Works, 1, p. 108), as well as several other passages. Duggan's characterisation of sensation as a principle of belief appears to be somewhat misleading in that it suggests that the belief is somehow a part of the sensation.
39. Reid, Inquiry, p. 39, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 111).
40. See, for instance, the chapter "Of Extension" in the Inquiry, pp. 70-6, (Reid, Works, 1, pp. 125-6), as well as the "Abstract", pp. 128-9. See also Sidney C. Rome, "The Scottish Refutation of Berkeley's Immaterialism".
41. Reid, Inquiry, p. 206, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 183). The fact that our sensations are so intimately related to perception is responsible

for the circumstance that "sensation and the perception of external objects by the senses, though very different in their nature, have commonly been considered as one and the same thing. The purposes of common life do not make it necessary to distinguish them, and the received opinions of the philosophers tend rather to confound them; but, without attending carefully to this distinction, it is impossible to have any just conception of the operations of our senses" (Inquiry, p. 205, Reid, Works, 1, p. 182).

nor, we may add, of Reid's theory of perception,

42. Inquiry, p. 206, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 183).
43. I do not want to deny that there is a development in Reid's thought and that he gives a fuller account of perception in the Intellectual Powers. But the differences are not as "interesting" and basic as Immerwahr argues. For an account of Reid's theory of perception, relying mainly upon the Intellectual Powers, see Baruch Brody's Introduction to this work, as well as his "Reid and Hamilton on Perception" and Phillip D. Cummins, "Reid's Realism", Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (1974), pp. 317-41.
44. Reid, Inquiry, p. 28, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 107). See also the following: "Does any man pretend to define consciousness? It is happy indeed that no man does. And if no philosopher had attempted to define and explain belief, some paradoxes in philosophy, more incredible than ever were brought forth by the most abject superstition or the most frantic enthusiasm, had never seen the light".
45. Reid, Inquiry, p. 30. See also p. 25, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 108, 105-6)
46. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 234-5, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 194). For a more

thorough discussion of "natural language" see ibid., pp. 54-8.

47. Reid, Inquiry, p. 78. See also pp. 207-8, (Reid, Works, 1, pp. 127, 183-4).
48. Reid, Inquiry, p. 26, 30, (Reid, Works, 1, pp. 105-6, 108).
49. Reid, Inquiry, p. 209, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 184).
50. Reid, Inquiry, p. 218, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 188).
51. Reid, Inquiry, p. 236, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 195).
52. Reid, Inquiry, p. 38, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 111). It is impossible to discuss here all or even most of the implications of Reid's theory of natural suggestion and we have to be content with the barest of outlines. Compare also P.G. Winch, "The Notion of 'Suggestion' in Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception", Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1953), pp. 327-41, and Norman Daniels, "On Having Concepts 'By our Constitution'", Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations, pp. 35-43, especially pp. 40-1. For a more positive account see Bernard H. Rollin, "Thomas Reid and the Semiotics of Perception", The Monist, 61 (1978), pp. 257-70.
53. Reid, Inquiry, pp. 66-8, (Reid, Works, 1, pp. 121-2).
54. Reid is much more definitive on the number of basic principles in the Essays. There also is a greater emphasis on principles leading to merely probable knowledge in this work. But the basic difficulties still remain. Since we are here concerned mainly with the Inquiry, I will not discuss the list Reid gives in the Essays.
55. Reid, Inquiry, p. 32. See also pp. 268f., p. 82, (Reid, Works, 1, pp. 108, 130, 209f.)
56. Reid, Inquiry, p. 212, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 185).



57. Reid, Inquiry, p. 82, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 130).
58. Reid appears to have been rather proud of this discovery; see the "Abstract".
59. Reid, Inquiry, p. 269, (Reid, Works, 1, p. 209).
60. The same point is also emphasized by Adam Ferguson in his Institutes of Moral Philosophy, Edinburgh, 1769.
61. For a recent account of Beattie's popularity, see E.H. King "James Beattie's Essay on Truth (1770): An Eighteenth Century 'Best-Seller'", The Dalhousie Review, 1971-72, pp. 390-403.
62. King speaks of Beattie's "excellent Addisonian prose-style" as his greatest asset (ibid., p. 395).
63. Elmer Sprague, "James Beattie" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, New York & London, 1967.
64. James Beattie, Essay, p. 318.
65. Beattie also places more emphasis on the instinctual and "sense-like" character of common sense. Reid certainly invited this view of common sense in the Inquiry, where he calls it himself an instinct. In the Essays he approximates it more to reason.
66. See O. McKendree Jones, Empiricism and Intuitionism in Reid's Common Sense Philosophy, Princeton, N.J., 1927; and Torgny T. Segerstedt, The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish Philosophy, Lund, 1935, especially pp. 47ff.
67. This is the position of Segerstedt. He argues that Scottish common sense is "conditioned by the struggle to reconcile these two points of view" (ibid., pp. 150ff).
68. J.F. Fries, Tradition, Mysticismus und gesunde Logik, oder über die

Geschichte der Philosophie, Studien, VI, ed. Carl Daub and Friedrich Creuzer, Heidelberg, 1811. In this category of speculative speculation he lists apart from Reid's common sense philosophy, Kant's criticism and his own anthropological interpretation of Kant's criticism.

69. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III, Theorie Werkausgabe, vol. 20, pp. 281-6, p. 283. Hegel compares Scottish common sense to Kant's criticism and clearly regards them as similar in many respects.
70. Eduard von Hartmann, Geschichte der Metaphysik, 2 vols., 1899-1900, reprographic reprint, Darmstadt, 1969, II, p. 308. Ernst von Aster, Geschichte der neueren Erkenntnistheorie, Berlin & Leipzig, 1921, pp. 389-97.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE GERMAN BACKGROUND

Neither the concept "common sense" nor its use in the fight against skepticism was an original invention of the Scottish philosophers of common sense. By the time they started to make use of "common sense" in their fight against David Hume it had already a long and distinguished tradition. While this appears to be often overlooked today, the Scottish philosophers themselves were very much aware of it.<sup>1</sup> Beattie in his Essay, for instance, sees the history of his most important concept reach as far back as Aristotle's "orthos logos", "koinai doxai" and the Stoic conceptions of "koinonoemosyne" and "sensus communis".<sup>2</sup> But the related concepts of "recta ratio", "notitiae communes", "instinctus naturalis", "naturalis ratio" and "consensus gentium", all developed or brought into prominence by the Stoics in their fight against skepticism, also played an important role in the history of common sense. During the middle ages these concepts lost somewhat in importance, though they were still found useful in discussions of natural theology and natural law. The early

Humanists, however, made the appeal to common sense and the application of the related concepts into central weapons in their fight against the Aristotelian tradition of the schools. Later they were also used to uphold Humanistic values against the attacks of modern science.

Giambattista Vico, for example, admitted that the sensus communis could not be considered as a source of absolutely certain truth, but he argued that as a source of probable and useful knowledge as well as in its social function of uniting the members of a common culture it could not be discarded without serious consequences.<sup>3</sup> Buffier in France used common sense to combat Cartesianism, while the earlier common sense philosophers on the British Islands, most notably Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, found it useful in the refutation of what they considered to be moral skepticism. Germany was no exception. Here common sense played a significant role in the thought of Christian Wolff and Christian Thomasius, "the two founders of the German enlightenment" and became increasingly important in the works of their followers.<sup>4</sup>

#### A. Common Sense in the Early German Enlightenment

##### 1. Sensus Communis and Logica Naturalis in the Wolffian School

That Christian Wolff, the "preceptor of Germany", was a thorough rationalist of Leibnizian persuasion is a stubbornly held prejudice in the history of philosophy. It is still not generally acknowledged that there is a decided tendency in Wolff's works to take experience and common sense into account. This tendency found a significant expression in his doctrine of "the reduction to common sense" ("reductio ad sensum communem") which states that it is often very helpful to show the agreement of the notions of abstract thought with the concepts and sentiments

of common sense and ordinary language.<sup>5</sup> This reduction was, however, employed not merely as a pedagogical device to make the conclusions of his difficult arguments palatable to everybody, but also as an indirect demonstration of the truths of the abstract principles used in the "scientific" investigations of philosophers.<sup>6</sup> Through this reduction to common sense it could be seen how the notions of ontology, how universal truths also asserted themselves in the common sense distinctions of ordinary language.

Another, perhaps less obvious expression of this tendency to take common sense into account is to be found in Wolff's distinction between natural and artificial logic ("logica naturalis" and "logica artificialis"). For Wolff there exists a natural logic, which is expressed in ordinary language and the thoughts of uneducated people. This logic consists of "the rules which God has imposed upon our reason".<sup>7</sup> He makes this natural logic the basis of his artificial logic. "Artificial logic explains the rules of natural logic and teaches us to use them perfectly."<sup>8</sup> Thus natural and artificial logic are for Wolff not opposed to each other, but the latter is the development and clarification of the former one. But this unity can be deceiving, for artificial logic does not only clarify and extend, it also corrects and justifies natural logic and thus improves upon it. Whenever there is a disagreement between natural logic and artificial logic, artificial logic which is based upon clear and distinct principles takes precedence over the obscure and indistinct ones of natural logic. However much Wolff may have been concerned to be in agreement with common sense, rational thought and the method of definition and deduction are the only sources of absolutely certain

truth, and they have therefore priority. While for Reid common sense and its principles have the final judgment in all matters philosophical, for Wolff it is pure reason which alone can serve this purpose. If common sense and natural logic were not to conform with the conclusions established by rigorous arguments from pure reason alone (as they curiously always seem to do in Wolff's works); so much the worse for common sense and natural logic. The same can also be seen on the example of the other point of connection between philosophy and common sense in Wolff's thought, namely his distinction between "mother wit" and "school wit" which is analogous to that of natural and artificial logic. Wolff expressly rejects all arguments which aim at establishing the priority of "mother wit" or natural logic, or which want to show that natural logic and an unadulterated understanding are "sufficient for all the operations of the understanding".<sup>9</sup> Since natural logic and "mother wit" have no clear and distinct knowledge of the rules according to which they operate, they can go amiss.<sup>10</sup> Though the rules are in final analysis identical, since common sense and ordinary language are confused expressions of one and the same basic faculty, many prejudices and falsities are inter-mixed with correct ones. Only when these false judgments have been discarded and when the correct ones have been brought into such a relationship that the more particular ones can be deduced from the more general ones, can we be absolutely certain about their truth. Common sense, ordinary language and natural logic in themselves can only mean accident and arbitrariness for Wolff and only pure reason and its artificial logic grant certainty and justified knowledge.<sup>11</sup>

Wolff's position with regard to common sense is thus almost as

ambivalent as his position with regard to experience. Just as he wishes to be in agreement with common sense and even regards his logic as the clarification and analysis of common sense in some sense, while relying in final analysis on pure reason, so does he want, in matters epistemological, to take sense experience seriously. Ultimately, however, he cannot because of his rationalistic stance. He distinguishes on the one hand very clearly between "two ways of knowing truth", i.e. sense experience and rational thought proceeding from first principles. But he hardly keeps to this distinction himself. In fact, it may be argued that he cannot do so, because he does not make a distinction between "the ground of knowing" ("ratio cognoscendi") and "the ground of being" ("ratio essendi" or "ratio fiendi"). Since "reason", for instance, can mean for Wolff (i) a faculty of the mind, (ii) an insight into the connection of truth, (iii) the ratio or causa of judgments about things and (iv) the ratio or causa of the things themselves, there is not really any problem for Wolff in our knowledge of objects.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, Wolff does not have much of interest to offer in epistemological matters in general and especially with regard to the problem of knowledge which was to become so important to the later German enlightenment. While he supplied much of the terminology and the framework in which this question was originally conceived, he neither conceived of the problem itself nor contributed to its solution in any significant way.<sup>13</sup>

In the works of Wolff's followers, and especially in that of Alexander Baumgarten, a shift towards an investigation of sensational knowledge particularly as represented in the aesthetic experience, is revealed.<sup>14</sup> As true Wolffians Baumgarten and his followers (especially Georg Friedrich Meier) try to explain aesthetics as the "art of the

analogue of reason" (ars analogi rationis"). Though Baumgarten may be said to have made Wolffian principles in this way fruitful for the analysis of sensational knowledge and the aesthetic experience, he also contributed unwittingly to showing the inherent weakness of the Wolffian position with regard to the non-rational sides of human nature and in showing the very importance of the non-rational he may have hastened the demise of Wolffianism. In any case, in Baumgarten's work "the ideal of 'God-like knowledge'", which still dominated Wolff's search for absolute certainty, has given way to an investigation of "human knowledge".<sup>15</sup> In this way the trend from "pure reason" to "common human reason" (say "common sense") in German philosophy slowly asserted itself more and more.

## 2. Recta Ratio or gesunde Vernunft in the Thomasian School

Even more important, however, was a form of common sense for Christian Thomasius and his followers, who were all strongly influenced by Pietism and radically opposed to Cartesianism, Woffianism and all forms of rationalism in general.<sup>16</sup> This conception of common sense was entirely different from that of the Wolffians. Whereas Wolff and his followers were clearly influenced by the secular Humanistic tradition of "sensus communis" and were concerned to show the compatability of their "scientific" (or perhaps better, rationalistic) philosophy with the conception of such a common sense, the Thomasians were very much part of a theological tradition reaching back to St. Augustine and Martin Luther but having its sources in the epistles of St. Paul. This is revealed already in the very name they adopted for their particular conception of common sense, namely the Latin "recta ratio", which was translated into German as "gesunde Vernunft". The phrase means "healthy reason" and can



only be properly understood against the background of "sick", "corrupted" or "perverted reason". This perverted reason is, according to the Paulinan-Augustian-Lutheran tradition, identical with our natural reason. It has been thoroughly corrupted by man's fall from God's grace. Because of his sinful nature man is no longer capable of obtaining true knowledge of anything. His knowledge of the world is dimmed by prejudices and errors which are unavoidable in the absence of God. Only through God's grace can man recover a true knowledge of the matters of this world and have his reason returned to the state of health.

The Thomasians are very much part of this tradition. But Thomasius himself is not willing to accept this traditional theory of the effects of original sin upon knowledge in its most radical form, as it was embraced by most Pietists.<sup>17</sup> In fact, his theory of healthy reason can be understood as the attempt to delimit the scope of this theological doctrine to a certain extent and to show that in all matters concerning solely this life on earth man can very well obtain true knowledge as long as he follows "the natural impulse of healthy reason".<sup>18</sup> The natural light is strong enough to remove all prejudice and error concerning this world and to restore reason in this way to its health.<sup>19</sup> The reason for this lies in the circumstance that the fall has not destroyed reason completely nor even affected it directly. It is the will of man that is corrupt and it is the influence of this evil will that corrupts reason. To make reason healthy means accordingly to eliminate the influence of the evil will.<sup>20</sup> It is therefore quite correct to say that for Thomasius "the obstacles which stand in the way of finding truth are not epistemological ones, but obstacles of the

psychology or even morality of knowledge".<sup>21</sup>

In any case, Thomasius was not so much interested in philosophy or knowledge for their own sake (in fact, he strongly objected to such an approach), but almost exclusively in their usefulness for our daily life. He did not want his philosophy to be taught at the universities and schools alone, but he wanted it to be practised by men of education in their private and public lives. Accordingly it was one of his most important aims to show the application of his philosophy, and to show that the philosophies of the Aristotelians, the Cartesians and the Wolffians over-rated the role of pure knowledge and abstract reasoning.<sup>22</sup>

When, therefore, Heinrich Schepers, who has quite correctly called attention to the theologically saturated background of "healthy reason" in the Thomasian school, argues that the Thomasians "have given new credence to the demand of philosophy just because these thinkers have placed the recta ratio between the corrupted reason with which man is endowed by nature and the reason to which we are restored by God's grace", he does not say anything that is outright false.<sup>23</sup> But his remark is very misleading, if he means to characterise the systematic position of the Thomasians in 17th- and 18th-century thought in general, as he appears to mean. For Schepers tells only half the story. Pietism was only one movement among several in this period and it certainly was not the most powerful of them. In many respects it amounted to not very much more than a reaction to rationalism (represented by Wolff and his followers). But only in the context of Pietism and its anti-rationalistic tendencies it was necessary to give such a defense of philosophy against theological doctrine. The enlightenment in general could only

have ridicule for such a "defense" of philosophy against one of the consequences of the doctrine of original sin, since, if it was united at any one issue, then in its rejection of the doctrine of original sin.<sup>24</sup> Thus the Thomasian enterprise makes sense only in a very esoteric context. From the point of view of the enlightenment in general the doctrine of healthy reason must have looked reactionary. But Schepers' characterisation is even more misleading if we consider how limited the Thomasian "defense" of the claims of philosophy really is. In fact, Thomasius argues more against philosophy and its abuses than for its usefulness. His conception of a recta ratio is much more the attempt to re-introduce the claims of religion and to defend them against the "invasions" of speculation. Thomasius valued philosophy mainly in so far as it was helpful in practical life and could not appreciate the "useless" and abstract arguments of philosophy in general.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly his conception of healthy reason is developed just as much as the attempt to limit the pretensions of speculative philosophers with regard to religious truth as it is the attempt to save useful philosophical knowledge from the zeal of religious enthusiasts.<sup>26</sup>

In these circumstances we cannot expect much original thought with regard to epistemological problems in the work of Thomasius and his followers. Many of the traditional problems of perception and knowledge are regarded as skeptical quibbles of no consequence or as the effects of the Fall upon man's faculty of knowledge. If the influence of the evil will is eliminated, everything will find its proper place and perspective. The Thomasian epistemology is accordingly meagre and not overly interesting. Its most distinctive characteristics are: (i) an

extreme sensationalism and (ii) a correspondence theory of truth. While it bears a great resemblance to the theory of knowledge developed by Locke, everything that makes Locke's theory interesting, namely the detailed investigations of particular epistemological problems, is completely absent from the works of Thomasius, which excel in general discussions of common places.

But it is important for the purposes of this work to note that the doctrine of healthy reason in Thomasius' work goes hand in hand with a sensationalistic epistemology which rejects any form of innate ideas or principles. All thought begins from sense perceptions and originates with them. In fact, all thought remains constantly dependent upon these sense perceptions and can be reduced to the initial perceptions again.<sup>27</sup> As do all common sense philosophers, Thomasius believes that there are certain fundamental truths which have to be taken for granted, that cannot themselves be proved. But for him they are all reducible to one primum principium veritatis, which assures us of the reliability of sensation.<sup>28</sup> This principle is the only one needed and the only one that will enable us to restore our reason to health, namely by pointing to the need to trace all our general concepts to their basis in sense perception. We also have to be always on guard not to depart too far from the evidence of the senses in our speculations about the nature of the world. A healthy reason knows its limits (prescribed by sensation) and only a corrupted reason will attempt to reach further.

However disappointing Thomasius' philosophical achievements may be, this does not detract from the importance of the man. For his achievements are to be found mainly in his practice as a professor of law

and a moralist who was not afraid to speak out on the issues which concerned him. He was both a very religious man and a man who felt he owed it to himself to work for the improvement of society (and did not succumb to a religiously motivated quietism).<sup>29</sup> The doctrine of healthy reason must also be seen in the context of this struggle. Thomasius tried to achieve with it a lasting unification of elements taken from a particular tradition of German Protestantism and certain Humanistic ideals, or of pietistic faith and philosophical criticism. On the one hand he wanted to hold that man can be independent and self-sufficient in all matters of this world, while on the other hand he did not want to reject the theory of original sin and salvation by God's grace alone.<sup>30</sup> But these two tendencies in his thought contradict each other sharply. For, the first, by its belief in the reliability of reason and the senses, implies a mild form of rationalism or at the least a belief in the essential reliability of reason, while the other one undermines the authority of reasoning altogether and tends towards a form of irrationalism. Much of Thomasius' philosophy must be understood as the sustained effort to bring these contradictory tendencies together and to balance them out. He wants to show that reason, though corrupted and dimmed by prejudice, can purify itself by its own power and reach some sort of certainty. Even if Thomasius did not in the final analysis succeed in this task, his importance in the history of common sense consists in having attempted it.

This tension between the secular concerns of Thomasius and his religious convictions also lends a great deal of interest to his philosophy and explains why he is still read today, while most of his

immediate followers are almost completely forgotten. For Johann Franciscus Budde, a friend of Thomasius, who was primarily a theologian without any great concern for secular matters, recta ratio is important only as the instrument by means of which we are able to accept the message of the Bible.<sup>31</sup> The same also holds for Joachim Lange, a student of Thomasius and Budde, who remains largely known today as the first open enemy of Wolff. In his work healthy reason is pushed aside and much more space is given to the description of reason in its corrupted state. Andreas Rüdiger, perhaps the most significant of the followers of Thomasius, places even more importance upon the conception of a recta ratio than Thomasius himself. But similarly to Budde and Lange, he is mainly interested in religious matters, and, though unlike them he deals with natural philosophy and secular issues, he does so from a thoroughly religious perspective. In certain aspects he may even be characterised as a mystic, and the tension between the rationalistic and the irrationalistic tendencies in the thought of Thomasius has given way to a thorough irrationalism. Philosophically there is not much of importance to be found in either Budde, Lange or Rüdiger that would go beyond what is to be found in Thomasius himself, except perhaps certain improvements in their sensationalist epistemology resulting from the increased influence of Locke upon their thought.<sup>32</sup> In any case, apart from their religiously motivated criticism of Wolffian rationalism they did not contribute anything of importance that could not also be found in the works of British philosophers or Continental Newtonians, though they may perhaps be given credit for having mediated some important impulses of these two groups to their later followers.

B. Common Sense in the Philosophical Crisis after the Middle of the Century

When Christian Wolff died in 1754, his philosophy which had dominated German schools and universities for the preceding three decades, had already begun to decline in influence. His philosophy no longer possessed the binding authority which it exerted during the earlier stages of his career. But no new philosopher of similar stature or authority had arisen and the philosophical situation at the time of his death may very well be described as being "anarchy" and as representing "the cognitive crisis of the Enlightenment".<sup>33</sup> While it may not prove very fruitful to speculate about the causes for this breakdown of all the old philosophical authorities (without the emergence of any new ones), it may certainly be useful to consider some of its characteristics and certain circumstances that accompanied it.

First of all it has to be noted that this crisis does not represent a special German phenomenon, but one of European thought in general. While in Britain empiricism and rejection of ambitious all-inclusive speculative systems could already look back on a long tradition, France and Germany were still engaged in the development and working out of such systems. But in the late forties and the early fifties this mood changed dramatically. Condillac writes his Treatise on Systems (1749) in which he differentiates sharply between the "esprit systematique" and "esprit de systeme" and rejects the latter, while finding the former useful. In fact, he goes so far as to ask for a synthesis of the positive or empiricistic approach and the systematic or rationalistic one. Voltaire had already previously published his Lettres philosophiques (1734) and his Elements de la philosophie de Newton (1738), in which he attacked Cartesianism and argued for Newton's approach. Diderot advocated

in his On the Interpretation of Nature (1754) the experimental method and gave expression to his belief that mathematics had run its course and could not develop any further. Rousseau's Discourse on the Arts and Sciences was published in 1750, and Buffon began to exert a great influence when the first volume of his Natural History came out in 1749. To sum up, the number of significant works which opposed "the spirit of systems" and advocated a more empiricistic approach, as being scientifically more promising and more useful for the common man, is so great that we cannot even begin to do justice to them in this context.<sup>34</sup>

Given the close relationship of French and German thought in this period, it was inevitable that these developments would also have a profound effect upon German thought. For France this empiricistic turn was closely connected with a new appreciation of British natural science and British philosophy (indeed with an enthusiasm for anything British). The same also happened in Germany. As one of the earliest historians of this period put it:

Around the middle of the century which has just passed the German scholars familiarized themselves more and more with the languages and especially with the beautiful and philosophical literatures of the French and the English. This more familiar knowledge did not only make them aware of the deficiencies and imperfections of the German language and the German national taste in the sciences and fine arts; it created not only the most lively passion to educate, to refine the sciences and the arts and to compete with the foreigners in all kinds of beautiful representation, but it also made the Leibniz-Wolffian method of the school hitherto followed distasteful to the better talents. The strict systematic form, which the Wolffians had accepted, appeared to put oppressing chains upon the free flight of philosophical genius. Moreover, in a number of philosophical works by foreigners there was also thoroughness and systematic spirit, but without betraying pedantry and coercion . . . even the textbooks of foreign philosophers were much more readable than those of the Germans.<sup>35</sup>



But this foreign, and especially British, influence extended much farther than to mere matters of style. Since the Germans had thus far been mainly occupied with the rational side of man, with logic and metaphysics, and had neglected the sensitive side of man (or treated it in "analogy to reason"), the works of British philosophers brought this aspect forcefully home to the Germans. The younger German philosophers tried to supplement the Wolffian theory in this regard or simply rejected Wolffianism altogether. Psychology and anthropology, aesthetic and educational theories based upon empirical principles began to replace logic and metaphysics as the key sciences for an understanding of human nature.

Moreover, the new generation of philosophers finally addressed the public directly. Fewer and fewer works were written in Latin. Philosophical treatises were not designed for the professors and students at the universities and high schools only but were devised with the general public in mind. Even the most difficult and abstruse philosophical problems were held to be susceptible to this treatment. Philosophy was not only supposed to be capable of "popular" treatment, but in a certain sense "popularity" became a de facto test for the meaningfulness of philosophical theories.<sup>36</sup>

Moses Mendelssohn, one of the best known and most important philosophical talents of this period, described the philosophical situation as one of "general anarchy". Philosophy "the poor matron", who according to Shaftesbury has been "banished from high society and put into the schools and colleges . . . had to clear out even this dusty corner. Descartes expelled the scholastics, Wolff expelled Descartes

and the contempt for all philosophy finally also expelled Wolff; and it appears that Crusius will soon be the philosopher in fashion".<sup>37</sup>

Christian August Crusius, one of the last adherents of the Thomasian school helped Thomasianism to gain the upper hand in its relentless fight against Wolffianism. But Crusius' works never attained the same powerful and influential position as Wolff's works had done before. In fact, Wolff's philosophy was far from being dead, and, since Crusius did not offer an all-inclusive and decisive alternative to Wolff's system, but rather an eclectic approach to philosophy that not only incorporated much of Wolff's thought but also the pedantic and thorough style of the Wolffian school, many philosophers could follow Crusius in some respects while still remaining Wolffians in their basic outlook, and many more rejected Crusius' school philosophy together with that of Wolff.<sup>38</sup>

Following the earlier Thomasians, Crusius criticises rationalism from a pietistic point of view, objecting strongly to the optimistic rationalistic faith in the omnipotence of reason. Reason has to be limited and shown to be dependent upon sense perception. But Crusius no longer accepts Thomasius' simple minded sensationalist account of the origin of knowledge -- though he himself has nothing new to offer in this regard:

At the occasion of external sensation the ideas of certain objects arise. We say at that time that we sense these objects. There are two possible explanations for this. Either the ideas themselves lie already beforehand in the soul and are made lively by these concurring conditions . . . or there is only the immediate cause and the power to form them at the moment of the concurrent condition in accordance with it. We cannot know for certain which of these two possibilities is the true one. But one assumes less, when one assumes the latter.<sup>39</sup>

Thus Crusius tends toward the Thomasian position, but does not want to reject the Wolffian position either and leaves the matter undecided. Crusius is quite often as evasive on important issues as he is here. But there is also much of importance to be found in his work that appears to point already to Kant. Thus he rejects Wolff's identification of the epistemological with the ontological.<sup>40</sup> Another important insight is his clear recognition of the difference of the relation of cause and effect from that of logical ground to consequence, and in his moral philosophy he develops views which have appeared to several commentators to be very similar to those of Kant. But there is hardly anything to be found in the work of Crusius that could not also be found in the works of other philosophers. To say that Crusius is the most important philosopher "after Wolff . . . around the middle of the 18th century" in Germany appears to me a gross over-estimation of Crusius' importance, and one that is hardly warranted considering the fact that "the question concerning Crusius' influence in general has thus far remained as much as untreated", and considering that Crusius' influence upon Kant, though a "relatively frequently treated topic", is characterised by a neglect of the actual facts.<sup>41</sup> In any case, the following shows that Crusius was not the only philosopher who held such a view and that especially the British influence became very strong.

The work of Crusius is also representative of the way in which the two conceptions of "common sense" in the early enlightenment, namely "sensus communis" and "recta ratio", developed during the fifties of the 18th century. As already in the work of his teacher A.F. Hoffmann, the sharp distinction between "recta ratio" or "gesunde Vernunft" (healthy

reason) and "sensus communis", which was commonly translated as "gemeiner Menschenverstand" is lost almost entirely.<sup>42</sup> "Recta ratio" is no longer a central term in the works of Hoffmann and Crusius.<sup>43</sup> Though Crusius speaks of "gesunde Vernunft", it is quite clear that he does not have the Thomasian conception in mind but rather the Wolffian "sensus communis" (indeed Crusius often also uses "sensus communis" itself).<sup>44</sup> Accordingly, every effort to show that appeals to the corruptness of human reason are not legitimate is made by Crusius as well.<sup>45</sup>

The opposition of Thomasians and Wolffians on the doctrine of common sense (and the related epistemology of rationalism and sensationalism) disappears altogether and "gesunde vernunft" (healthy reason) and "gemeiner Menschenverstand" become synonyms in the philosophical language around the middle of the century. This process was so quick and so thorough that many philosophers writing at the end of the eighteenth century do no longer know of the theological background of "gesunde Vernunft" and its initial difference from "gemeiner Menschenverstand". Thus the historian of philosophy von Eberstein wonders in 1794: "To me the expression 'healthy reason' instead of common sense (Gemeinsinn) always seemed peculiar: for it sounds as though the cultivated reason, which judges in accordance with distinct knowledge, is not healthy."<sup>46</sup>

If the two original conceptions were not very clear, the new one originating from the confusion of the two was so broad and indistinct as to mean almost anything whatsoever. It was no longer connected with any particular theory, but was used by philosophers of all persuasions (and usually without any attempt to define it). Most often the appeal to common sense was understood as addressing itself to what the average

person in a certain society would believe without any formal education. Such an appeal would certainly not commit the philosopher to any particular theory and it could be used to establish almost any theory.

This conceptual imprecision also showed itself in the many equivalent expressions which could be used in order to refer to common sense.

Whereas before "gesunde Vernunft" and "gemeiner Menschenverstand" could fairly well be regarded as standing expressions, now such combinations as "gemeine Vernunft", "gesunder Verstand", "gesunder Menschenverstand", "gesunde Menschenvernunft", etc. became more and more common.<sup>47</sup>

At the same time the importance of common sense increased dramatically for the philosophers of that period, since they were not only concerned with presenting their views in a popular fashion, that is, in such a way that the average reader could understand them, but also wanted to use common sense as a criterion for the meaningfulness of metaphysical statements. Thus the paradoxical situation arose that a clear conception of common sense became increasingly important for German philosophers, while their actual use of "common sense" steadily degenerated so that "in accordance with common sense" soon meant no more than "according to public opinion".

But there were other developments as well. First of all, there were several philosophers who for various reasons rejected the approach of German school philosophy altogether and who developed under the influence of British philosophers their own theories of common sense in conscious opposition to the philosophy still taught at most universities. Some of the most important of these philosophers were Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, Johann Bernhard Basedow and Friedrich

Justus Riedel. Secondly, there was a small group of young and very active philosophers in and around the capital of Prussia, Berlin, who set out to accomplish the synthesis of the empiricistic and rationalistic approach for which the French philosophes had asked as well. They did not reject the German philosophy of the school in its entirety, but set out to supplement and further particularly Baumgarten's analysis of the aesthetic experience by a more empirical approach and by taking British sources into account as well. The most important members of this very influential group were Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn, Friedrich Nicolai, Thomas Abbt and Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz.

Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, a mystically inclined cleric from the state of Swabia who is sometimes called "the Magus of the South", and who is unjustly still very much neglected today, used Shaftesbury's conception of a sensus communis to establish his own Lebensphilosophie.<sup>48</sup> Oetinger was a vehement enemy of Leibniz and of rationalism in general. His own philosophy advocates irrationalism. Accordingly, his sensus communis is not to be likened to the usual Menschenverstand or human understanding of the German enlightenment, but is a sense in the true meaning of the word. It is implanted into us by God as the "sensus tacitus eternitatis", as the instinct directed to eternity. Sensus communis is what the Scriptures signify by "heart" and it has found its most perfect expressions in the Proverbs of Solomon.<sup>49</sup> Therefore it may also be considered as "that which responds to the wisdom calling in the streets ("id quod respondet sapientiae in plateis clamanti")<sup>50</sup> But most importantly "sensus communis" means for Oetinger our sense for

life: "Nothing is more obvious to the sensus communis than life, and nothing darker to the understanding than life".<sup>51</sup> "In sensus communis kindred comes into contact with kindred, equal with equal, life with life, one could say, individual life with all-life (All-Lebendigkeit)".<sup>52</sup> As such a sense for life Oetinger's common sense can become the source of a mystical awareness or even mystical union of man and nature (and thus also of man and God). In this capacity it is called "central cognition" ("cognitio centralis"). But not everybody is capable of such an experience and only especially gifted persons can partake in it.

While Oetinger's philosophy was much too esoteric to have found many adherents,<sup>53</sup> Johann Bernhard Basedow, a student of Crusius, Reimarus and Wolff who was deeply influenced by Rousseau, Hutcheson, Hume and Lord Kames, was very successful and even created something of a philosophical sensation with his Philalethie (1764) and his subsequent Theoretisches System der gesunden Vernunft (1765).<sup>54</sup> For Basedow philosophy is nothing but the representation of useful knowledge. In fact, he argues that usefulness is the perhaps best criterion or test of truth we possess.<sup>55</sup> His healthy reason is constituted by certain basic truths derived from sense perception and by certain first principles to which "everybody gives just as immediate consent as to his own experience as soon as he understands [them]".<sup>56</sup> But since there are many propositions which are undoubtedly useful and should be accepted as true, while they are neither perceptual truths nor first principles, Basedow feels he has to supplement the principles of healthy reason with principles which we have the duty to believe.<sup>57</sup> He is fully convinced that natural and revealed religion is based to a great

extent upon such a duty to believe. But it also applies to other aspects of human existence. We have to believe, for instance, many kinds of testimony by others in order to know anything about the past or about things of which we have had no experience ourselves. "Since doubt is against all the ends of individual human beings as well as against those of society", we have the duty to believe in these cases as well.<sup>58</sup> In this fashion Basedow also tries to re-inforce our belief in the first truths of healthy reason. For, he argues,

even if you could doubt the first truths, you still would have to recognise that this doubt is not useful, but harmful. In this case it would be your duty not to doubt with regard to these truths. You would have to reject the doubt as something despicable and pernicious and could not promote it but would have to hinder it.<sup>59</sup>

This last argument shows quite well in what way Basedow usually establishes his own views and in which way he discredits the objections of others. It should also be sufficient explanation as to why his theoretical system of healthy reason remains so barren in philosophical respects.

While Oetinger was moved mainly by religious concerns and Basedow was a philanthropist interested in developing a more adequate pedagogic theory (and praxis), Friedrich Justus Riedel was almost exclusively concerned with literary criticism and aesthetic theory. In his Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften (Theory of the Fine Arts and Sciences) of 1767 and his Briefe über des Publikum (Letters on the Public) of 1768 he attempted to provide the relatively new discipline of aesthetics with a fixed place of equal right to logic and moral philosophy in the systematic context of philosophy. He did this by trying to show that aesthetic theory consisted of the analysis of a



special faculty of the human mind, just as logic and moral philosophy. He was thus the first German to divide the human mind into three faculties, one concerning the true, another the good and the third the beautiful, and to base the division of philosophy upon these faculties.<sup>60</sup> All three faculties are faculties of sensation for Riedel.<sup>61</sup> But they are governed by certain laws, which may be said to constitute the respective faculties of sensus communis (the sense of truth), conscience (the sense for good and evil), and taste (the sense of beautiful and ugly).<sup>62</sup> This differentiation of the mind into three basic faculties was to play a great role in the subsequent developments of German philosophy. Riedel himself, however, did not contribute much more than these bare outlines of this theory and his name was forgotten very soon.<sup>63</sup>

Though the three philosophers just discussed contributed all in their own way to the further development of German thought, they were not as important as the group of philosophers in Berlin, which began its activities during the fifties as well. Lessing, Mendelssohn, Nicolai, Abbt and Resewitz were not only the founders of three of the most important and influential periodicals, which shaped the general outlook and course of the German enlightenment to a great extent, they also wrote important works of their own and worked actively to achieve a synthesis of more rationalistic and more empiricistic doctrines.

In their three periodicals, the Briefe die neueste Literatur betreffend (1759-1765), the Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste (1757-1765) and the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek (1765 ff.) they reviewed almost every important German publication in

literature, philosophy and theology and commented upon almost every intellectual development of their time; and they were feared and hated by certain people just as much as they were admired by others.<sup>64</sup> But even more important were their original works on aesthetic and philosophical problems. Apart from Lessing, who will not be discussed in this work since he was not so much of a philosopher but a theologian and man of letters, Moses Mendelssohn was clearly the greatest thinker. In his Philosophische Gespräche (Philosophical Conversations) and his Briefe über die Empfindungen (Letters on the Sentiments), which appeared both in 1755, he laid the foundation for much of the work to be done in German philosophy and psychology during the sixties and seventies of the 18th century, defending Leibniz in the former and calling attention to the necessity of a careful analysis of man's sensationally based knowledge of man.<sup>65</sup>

Though Mendelssohn was firmly rooted in the German enlightenment, and never ceased to admire Wolff and Baumgarten, he is also deeply influenced by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and other British writers.<sup>66</sup> This shows itself also in his discussion of "bon sens". Thus in his short essay "Verwandtschaft des Schönen und Guten" ("Kinship of the Beautiful and the Good"), which appeared first in the Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste in 1757, he draws a parallel between bons sens and Hutcheson's moral sense, and he argues in a somewhat Baumgartian fashion that both, though apparently independent faculties of the mind, have to be reduced to reason itself. All the judgments of bons sens "can be reduced to correct inferences of reason".<sup>67</sup> This reduction to reason may appear more difficult in the case of moral

judgments, since our moral judgments "as they represent themselves in the soul are completely different from the effects of distinct rational principles",<sup>68</sup> but that does not mean that they cannot be analysed into rational and distinct principles. Our moral sentiments are "phenomena which are related to rational principles in the same way as the colours are related to the angles of refraction of the light. Apparently they are of completely different nature, yet they are basically one and the same".<sup>69</sup> In this way Mendelssohn is enabled to accept almost everything said by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Lord Kames in their analysis of moral and aesthetic knowledge, while not having to renounce any of the basic tenets of Wolffianism. But he has set for himself also another very important task, namely the explication of how the rational principles are actually related to the completely different moral sentiments. The colour analogy is very suggestive, of course, but it does not explain anything about the actual relation between rational principles and moral judgments (or aesthetic ones, for that matter). Even the relationship between bon sens or common sense and reason is not as clear as Mendelssohn appears to believe in this early period of his thought, and will, as we shall see, trouble him greatly even in his latest works.

In fact, the problematic resulting from the attempt to find the balance between a more empiricistic approach and the traditional rationalistic one, determines not only the further development of the thought of Moses Mendelssohn, but may be characterised as the problem facing the German philosophers during the sixties and seventies of the eighteenth century. Whether it was Feder or Meiners in Göttingen, Eberhard or Platner, Lambert or Tetens, they were all

concerned with the problems resulting from this attempted synthesis of empiricism and rationalism.<sup>70</sup> They wanted to investigate sense experience just as seriously as the rational faculties of man and were concerned to show in what way they inter-acted or were dependent upon one another. Thus most philosophers were doing exactly the same things as Immanuel Kant, an outsider in Königsberg, at that time. But it was this outsider who finally achieved some sort of balance between the rationalistic and the empiricistic in the explanation of objective knowledge and whose criticism established itself as the middle road between the two traditional doctrines.

#### C. The Relevance of Scottish Answers for the Problems of German Thought

Given this general aim of the late German enlightenment to develop an "empirical rationalism" or "rational empiricism", and to try a synthesis of the empiricistic and the rationalistic approach, the philosophical answers of common sense, especially as given by Thomas Reid, can be seen to be extremely relevant for German thought. For Reid just as for the late German enlightenment, the traditional answers in philosophy had become questionable and seemed to lead to skeptical conclusions. But while the Germans still hoped to gain very much by a synthesis of (traditional) empiricism and (traditional) rationalism, Reid pointed out that there was something fundamentally wrong with both. The one just as well as the other was based upon a form of the theory of ideas and involved phenomenalism, and this phenomenalism was thought to lead automatically to a denial of the existence of the external world and to make objective knowledge problematic or illusory. And it

was just this problem of objective knowledge that lay at the very center of the crisis of the enlightenment.

Moreover, Reid also offered an alternative to the traditional theories of rationalism and empiricism, an alternative that could accommodate radical empiricistic tenets as well as rationalistic ones; introspective or psychological analysis with induction and the acceptance of a priori principles, for instance, or the acknowledgement that all knowledge begins with sense impressions while emphasizing the activity of the mind.

Reid's theory also showed that the traditional view of perception as consisting of rather simple and unstructured ideas which mediate between ourselves and the objects was indefensible and that perception itself was much more complicated and structured. Neither the rationalists nor the empiricists had anything to say on this matter, since they all based their view on some form of the theory of ideas. But this recognition of the structuredness of the perceptual act could (and did, as we shall see) serve as a very good starting point in the establishment of a theory which took account of the sensible component in knowledge as well as of the rational principles required by it. For Reid already had differentiated sharply between sensation and certain principles or notions suggested by sensation. These latter were to be found "in" sensation or perception, but they were not "of" sensation, but supplied by the mind. Thus Reid broke the continuum of sensation and thought that was accepted by both the empiricists and the rationalists, but showed at the very same time how they were related by depending upon the very same principles.

Since these principles were identified by Thomas Reid with the principles of common sense, and since the Germans were not very clear about their concept of common sense, even though it had become so central in their thought, Scottish common sense could be helpful in this regard as well. By describing common sense as the set of principles necessary for all knowledge and action it could lead the German philosophers away from their understanding of "common sense" as good sense or educated judgment within a certain society. The principles of common sense and the principles of rational thought, as developed by the Wolffians, could in this way be identified and lead philosophers who had gone over to the empiricistic side back to a more rationalistic outlook.

But, though Scottish common sense and the philosophy of the late German enlightenment have indeed much in common and though the Germans could have learned very much from the Scots, there is one basic difference between Scottish common sense and German philosophy which should not be overlooked. It concerns the so called "spirit of Gründlichkeit". Even though the Germans wanted to learn from British empiricism and were willing to accept a more empiricistic outlook, they still aimed at justification.<sup>71</sup> The means had changed, but the goal remained the same. But the Scots had quite clearly seen that the method of psychological analysis and reliance upon the principles of common sense could not give such final justification. In fact, they believed that such justification of our knowledge could not be had and that any attempt to supply it would have to lead to skepticism. For Reid all we can do is describe the way in which the human mind works, but not show why it necessarily has to work in this way and why we do not have other

principles than we have. Philosophy can show that our knowledge depends upon certain first principles and it can also show what these first principles are, but it cannot give any foundation or justification for these principles themselves, other than pointing out that these first principles are in fact the ones according to which our mind operates.

## NOTES : CHAPTER III

1. S.A. Grave in his Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, for instance, discusses only the immediate predecessors of Scottish common sense. For a concise but very interesting and suggestive, though not always accurate, account of the history of common sense, see Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 16-27. Gadamer believes that "sensus communis" constitutes one of the most central concepts ("Leitbegriffe") of the humanistic tradition, which he regards of the greatest importance of the self-understanding of the Humanities or Geisteswissenschaften. See also Ernesto Grassi "Vorrang des Gemeinns und der Logik der Phantasie", Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 30 (1976), p. 497.
2. James Beattie, Essay (1770), pp. 33ff.
3. G.B. Vico, On the Study Methods of our Time, transl. Elio Gianturico, Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City, 1965.
4. For a general account of Wolff and Thomasius' thought see Max Wundt, Aufklärung; and Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 243-75.
5. Christian Wolff, Philosophie prima sive ontologia, 1730, Part I, Section II, Chapter II, § 125; Philosophia Moralis, Part I, Chapter III, §§ 241-246, Part III, §§ 19-21.
6. Fritz Pinkuss, "Moses Mendelssohn Verhältnis zur englischen Philosophie", Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres Gesellschaft 42 (1929), pp. 449-90, p. 450 argues that Wolff's sensus communis "has nothing to do with" the common sense of Reid and



the German popular philosophers, since Wolff does not regard it as an "independent faculty of cognition". He also argues that Wolff uses the reduction to common sense only as a pedagogic device of clarification. -- While I agree with Pinkuss that there are fundamental differences between the common sense of Reid and that of the German popular philosophers, I do not think that it is correct to say that they are completely dissimilar and unrelated. We shall see how the common sense of the popular philosophers is determined by a struggle between more Wolffian and more Scottish conceptions of common sense. That Wolff did not understand the reduction to common sense merely as an explanatory expedient may be seen from § 125 of Wolff's Ontologia, a section not referred to by Pinkuss.

7. See Christian Wolff, Vernunftlehre, Chapter 16, 3. For the distinction between the two kinds of logic see also Philosophia rationalis sive logica, 1728, §§ 6-11.
8. Wolff, Vernunftlehre, Chapter 16, § 3, see also Ontologia, § 125.
9. Wolff, Vernunftlehre, Chapter 16, § 3 and § 4.
10. Ibid., § 4.
11. The German term "Gründlichkeit" which is often applied to Wolff's approach is always translated as "thoroughness". This translation is entirely correct, but it does not convey the connotation of "justification" and "foundation" which this term can also carry in German because of its close relationship to "begründen". Thus when Kant speaks, for instance, of the "spirit of Gründlichkeit", he does not simply have "thoroughness" in mind,

but also the anti-naturalistic stance of wanting to justify and not simply to explain. See also Ernst Cassirer, Enlightenment, p. 342.

12. I do not have to point out how much I am indebted to Lewis White Beck's discussion of Wolff's philosophy in this regard. See his Early German Philosophy, pp. 266-71.
13. For a general characterisation of Wolff's position, see ibid., p. 267: "Wolff's philosophy is a confused mixture of rationalistic and empiricistic elements, and it is impossible to classify it as consistently one or the other. . . . it is intellectualism with a vengeance, but it fails as rationalism. Unlike Leibniz' philosophy it is not even a good compromise between empiricism and rationalism . . . . Seldom has a man tried harder to be empirical but remained a rationalist malgre lui, or tried harder to be rational but found himself unable to leave the bathos of trivial experience". Something similar could be said about his relation to common sense.
14. For a more detailed account of Baumgarten, on whom Wundt is almost silent, see Ernst Cassirer, Enlightenment, pp. 338-60 ("The Foundation of Systematic Aesthetics -- Baumgarten"); Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 283-6 and Armand Nivelle, Kunst- und Dichtungstheorien zwischen Aufklärung und Klassik, Berlin, 1960.
15. Ernst Cassirer, Enlightenment, p. 354.
16. These two characteristics serve better than any other to describe the general outlook of the Thomasian school. Since they were

consciously eclectic in their philosophical approach and felt they should "accept truth wherever they found it", particular doctrines may differ very much in the works of different Thomasians. G.

Tonelli lists the following characteristic doctrines of Thomasianism (which, however, are immediate consequences of the characteristics given in the text): "the independence of revealed theology from philosophy; the psychologistic treatment of logic; the emphasis of the role of experience and of the limits of human reason in methodology; the close relation of essence and reality as well as the impenetrability of the essence of substance in ontology; moreover the dislike of the ontological proof, the influxus physicus between body and soul, the merely probabilistic value of the knowledge concerning nature; in ethics the independence of will from reason, psychologism and anthropologism, the dependence of the moral laws upon God's free will and the impossibility of their derivation from the mere concept of nature". See G. Tonelli, Introduction to Christian August Crusius, Die philosophischen Hauptwerke, vol. I, Hildesheim, 1969, pp. xvii-xviii.

The most important members of this school are Christian Thomasius, Johann Franciscus Budde, Joachim Lange, Andreas Rüdiger, and very remotely A.F. Hoffmann and Christian August Crusius. -- Less important are Johann Jakob Lehmann, Johann Christian Lange, Johann Polycarp Müller, Konrad Friedrich Bierling and August Friedrich Müller. Special mention deserves perhaps Johann Jakob Brucker. His very influential Historia critica philosophiae a

mundi incunabulis ad nostram aetatem agitur, 5 vols., 1742-44 is supposed to have been the source of Diderot's articles on the history of philosophy in the Encyclopédie. See Peter Gay, The Enlightenment, 2 vols., London, 1967, 1971, I, pp. 346-348.

17. As indeed by most orthodox German protestants as well; that he accepts the theory of original sin and its consequences for man's reason can be seen very clearly from the following passage: "in the state of innocence, in which man had no imperfections whatsoever, all people would have been learned; they probably would not even have needed any education. But since our understanding has been darkened so much through the Fall, and since it (now) has to be illuminated by different means, the difference between the learned and the unlearned has arisen" (Christian Thomasius, Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre, Halle, 1691, ed. W. Schneiders, Hildesheim, 1968, p. 76.
18. Christian Thomasius, Ausübung der Vernunftlehre, Halle, 1691, ed. W. Schneiders, Hildesheim, 1968, p. 15 (underling supplied).
19. See Thomasius, Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre, p. 90: "in some people the natural light is so strong that they are capable to remove the clouds of prejudices without any education". See also the quotation in footnote 17 of this chapter.
20. Ibid., p. 177.
21. W. Schneiders, Introduction to Thomasius' Ausübung der Vernunftlehre. This is also the reason why he discusses moral problems in his logic. See also Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 251.

22. Thomasius first proposed this view at great length in his Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam (Introduction to Court Philosophy) in 1688, but it remained his goal in all the later works as well. See also Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 248-9.
  
23. Heinrich Schepers, Andreas Rüdigers Methodologie und ihre Voraussetzungen, p. 35. Though I disagree sharply with the conclusions which Schepers draws from his discussion, I have benefited greatly by his account of healthy reason. While he represents it only as a "digression" in his context (pp. 32-33n.), he offers a detailed and thorough analysis of this concept in the Thomasian school.
  
24. For a discussion of this issue see especially Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 137-60 ("The Dogma of Original Sin and the Problem of Theodicy"), especially p. 141: "The concept of original sin is the common opponent against which all the different trends of the Enlightenment join forces. In this struggle Hume is on the side of English deism, and Rousseau of Voltaire; the unity of the goal seems for a time to outweigh all differences as to the means of attaining it."
  
25. In fact, Thomasius often shows contempt for philosophy and philosophers. See, for instance, Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre, p. 154, where he ridicules the philosophers for wanting to establish in what the first truth consists. He himself does not find this difficult: "We shall let the philosophos fight about it bravely and continue our way without stumbling over it. We cannot go

amiss, if we say that the primum principium must be a concept which comprises all truths".

26. Thomasius shares this will to limit philosophy with most of the later popular philosophers and also with Kant. But the later German enlightenment did not know Thomasius very well (see Wundt, Aufklärung, pp. 60-1 and Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 255-6). Moreover, the rich theological background of Thomasius' thought is almost entirely missing in that of the later Germans. Here philosophy is not limited from the outside, as it were, but attempts to find its boundaries from the inside.
27. This becomes very clear in Thomasius' formulation of his primum principium. He answers to the question whether external objects agree with our reason or with our senses as follows: "My dear friend, this confusion is your own fault, since you oppose, misled by the heathen philosophy, the senses and the ideas to each other. But they both belong to the understanding. Therefore truth must agree with the senses as well as with the ideas. -- The senses are the passive thoughts, but the ideas are the active thoughts of the understanding. The former have to do immediately with the individuis, the latter with the universalibus. -- Those are the beginning of all human knowledge, these, however, follow them" (Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre, p. 156).
28. See footnote 26; also relevant are Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre, pp. 152, 154-5, 157. -- It has often been argued that Thomasius was fundamentally influenced by Locke in this (and several other) aspect(s) of his thought (see Zart, Einfluß, pp. 33-44, for

instance). Wundt, Aufklärung, pp. 31-32n. attempts to show that Thomasius had already developed the outlines of his theory before he read Locke. But nothing much depends on this, given the meagreness of Thomasius' epistemology. Lewis White Beck quite correctly characterises it as consisting of a "simple correspondence theory of truth based upon an uncritical belief in a natural conformity of the mind to its object. Nominalism, a sensationistic theory of the origin of ideas, a recognition of the importance of probability in life, and a belief in healthy common sense as a substitute for speculation were recommended" (Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 249).

29. For an interesting and stimulating account of Thomasius, the man, see Ernst Bloch, Christian Thomasius, ein deutscher Gelehrter ohne Misere, Frankfurt/Main, 1967.
30. Lewis White Beck notes this contradiction in Thomasius when he finds it "odd that Thomasius ever was a Pietist and a Naturphilosoph" (Early German Philosophy, p. 300), and though he also describes Thomasius' religious struggles, he does not appear to realize how very much at the centre of all his philosophy this contradiction lies.
31. For Budde a healthy reason is one for which it is "reasonable that there are things divine which cannot be comprised by human understanding" (Johann Franciscus Budde, Historische und theologische Einleitung in die vornehmsten Religions-streitigkeiten, ed. Johann Georg Walch, Jena, 1724, pp. 83-4). "The most basic truths which lead to spiritual happiness . . . are contained and

represented in the Holy Bible so distinctly that even the most simple person can grasp them in such a way that he is immediately convinced that they are truths. The only presuppositions are that he has a healthy reason and reads the word of god with proper attentiveness" (*ibid.*, Introd.). See also his Institutiones Philosophiae Eclecticae, 1703, p. 6: "Namque quae viam saltem ad Philosophiam paudent animumque praeparant, disciplinae, instrumentalis Philosophiae nomine designo". Budde also tries to prove many theological doctrines by appeals to healthy reason. Thus the Lutheran teaching is the only true one for him, since among other things it does not teach anything which would contradict our natural concept of God and his qualities (Religionsstreitigkeiten, p. 82).

32. This is shown by Zart, Einfluß, pp. 40-72 and more or less acknowledged by Wundt, Aufklärung, pp. 62, 63, 72, 84, 85, 87 and 121. One may very well wonder what this does to the "ultimate roots of the increasingly strengthening spiritual movement, . . . (which) reach down to the biological" (*ibid.*, p. 4).
33. Leonhard P. Wessell, G.E. Lessing's Theology; A Reinterpretation, The Hague, 1977, p. 79ff. speaks of such a cognitive crisis as well, and he suggests that Thomas Kuhn's conception of a crisis phase of a scientific revolution when a paradigm of scientific research breaks down may be used to describe what went on.
34. The best account of this decisive phase of the European Enlightenment is still to be found in Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 3-36.



35. See Buhle, Geschichte, VI, pp. 503-4, see also V, pp. i-x, and von Eberstein, Versuch I, p. 289. All contemporaries were very much aware of this British influence, which was indeed vast and has by no means been exhaustively treated. Especially Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Lord Kames, David Hume and Adam Ferguson were extremely important. For Shaftesbury see Christian F. Weiser, Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben, Leipzig & Berlin, 1916, and the older but more important essay of Oskar F. Walzel, "Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben des 18. Jahrhunderts", Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschriften, 1 (1909), pp. 416-37. For Henry Home, Lord of Kames see Joseph Wohlgemuth, Henry Homes Ästhetik und ihr Einfluß auf deutsche Ästhetiker, Berlin, 1893, and W. Neumann, Die Bedeutung Homes für die Ästhetik und sein Einfluß auf die deutschen Ästhetiker, Halle, 1894; Leroy R. Shaw "Henry Home of Kames: Precursor of Herder", Germanic Review, 35 (1960), pp. 116-27. For a general account of the state of discussion concerning Home's influence in Germany see Helen W. Randall, The Critical Theory of Lord Kames, Smith College Studies in Modern Languages, Northampton, Mass., 1944, pp. 71-88. On Ferguson not so much work has been done. But see, for instance, Edward S. Flajole, "Lessings Retrieval of Lost Truths", Proceedings of the Modern Language Association, 74 (1959), pp. 52-66. See also R. Pascal, "Herder and the Scottish Historical School", Publications of the English Goethe Society, XIV (1939), pp. 23-42.
36. The similarity to much of the early "ordinary language philosophy"

should be evident. But one of the important differences of the ordinary language philosophers is that they are quite aware of this approach. Further, most philosophers of the 18th century were concerned with the truth and falsity of particular philosophical theories and principles, the ordinary language philosophers are concerned with their meaningfulness.

37. Moses Mendelssohn, Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend I (1759, March 1), pp. 129-34.
38. The best known and most important of these philosophers who followed Wolff and Crusius is Joachim Georg Darjes (see Wundt, Aufklärung, pp. 304-6). But Crusius' philosophy never appears to have found general acceptance in Germany. As late as 1759 he was still regarded as an outsider by Moses Mendelssohn, who feels that philosophy would reach its lowest low should Crusius become the philosopher in fashion, which he fears might happen soon. But as the examples of Oetinger, Basedow and Riedel show, he was soon overshadowed by such British thinkers as Hutcheson, Lord Kames and many others in Germany. Neither the philosophers of Berlin, nor Hamann and Herder, who might be expected to appreciate him for his religious outlook, thought much of his achievements. Nicolai's Sebaldus Nothanker of 1773 shows Crusius' philosophy to be very much out of style already. But in the light of the fact that there exists no definitive (nor even a preliminary) study of Crusius' historical influence, nothing definite about Crusius' historical importance can be said (see also footnote 41 below).
39. Christian August Crusius, Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit

der menschlichen Erkenntnis, Leipzig, 1747, Hauptwerke, vol. III, p. 153. When he says, however, that sensations supplies us only with the material of knowledge, while the form is supplied by the laws of thought (ibid., p. 754) he appears to have made some kind of decision and sounds very much like Lambert and Kant.

40. See Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 396ff. It appears to me, however, that Beck is somewhat too generous to Crusius when he suggests that he did indeed succeed in keeping the epistemological and the ontological apart. I do not see why his law of the inseparable ("Whatever two things cannot be thought apart one from another cannot exist apart (or be possible) apart from one another"), for instance, does not confuse thought and reality or epistemological criteria with ontological ones. In any case, he is just as much a phenomenalist as Wolff and Thomasius. He only refuses to make a clear decision between a rationalistic phenomenism and a sensationistic one.
41. See G. Tonelli, Introduction to Crusius' Hauptwerke, vol. 1, pp. xi, xxi. Tonelli himself gives a short account of Crusius' Wirkungsgeschichte and his relation to Kant as well (pp. xlvi-lii). But he does not succeed in showing that any significant philosopher of this period is fundamentally a Crusian. Johann Bernhard Basedow, who is characterised as an independent student of Crusius, for instance, was just as much (or more) dependent upon Rousseau and British philosophy in general. In fact, Basedow rejects one of the most important tenets of Crusianism, namely the importance of ontology. For Basedow ontology is no special discipline of

thought at all. Riedel can only be understood against the background of British thought, as we shall see, and the inclusion of Gottlob Ernst (Aenesidemus) Schulze, as "continuing the Crusian direction" of thought is highly questionable. Schulze is much more dependent upon Jacobi and Thomas Reid in his criticism of Kant than on anything written by Crusius, as we shall see as well.

See also footnote 20 of Chapter I.

42. See Adolf Friedrich Hoffmann, Vernunft-Lehre, darinnen die Kennzeichen des Wahren und Falschen aus den Gesetzen des Verstandes hergeleitet werden, Leipzig, 1737.
43. The concept of healthy reason has lost so much in importance for Hoffmann that it is not even included in his "Register of Important Concepts" at the end of his work. Just as Wolff, Hoffmann distinguishes now between natural and learned logic, and learned logic is nothing but the development "of the reasons and rules upon which our understanding founds its judgments without being aware of them". Learned logic is "nothing but explained natural logic" (*ibid.*, pp. 46, 47): -- Wundt is quite correct when he speaks of a synthesis of the Wolffian and the Thomasian approach in the work of Hoffmann (see Aufklärung, pp. 245-54). For a short but substantial account of Hoffmann in English see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 300-5.
44. When Crusius says that he wants his philosophy to be compatible with the sensus communis as well as with Christian religion, he clearly cannot have anything close to the Thomasian conception of "healthy reason" in mind, since the agreement with the truths of Christian

religion was the defining characteristic of healthy reason.

(Crusius makes this claim in the Introduction to the 2nd edition of his metaphysics. I have quoted it according to Festner, Crusius als Metaphysiker, Halle, 1892, p. 3). Compare also with his Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten, Leipzig, 1745, p. 450. Here he uses "healthy reason" to refer to "sensus communis" in expressing a similar thought: "it is known how boldly the doctrine of the Trinity is rejected by many immediately as though it would contradict healthy reason . . ." -- Incidentally, Thomasius himself also used the expression "sensus communis". But he refers by means of it to an outer sense in general (see Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre, pp. 105-6).

45. In Crusius the corruption of reason loses all its importance. Though he admits that there are corruptions, reason itself is essentially uncorrupted and reliable in its natural state (see Weg zur Gewißheit, pp. 804-5, 825 and Dissertationis de corruptelis intellectus a voluntate penditibus, Lipsius, 1740. Crusius refers to this work on pp. 804-5, but I have not seen it). There is not really a radical break between Thomasius and Crusius here. Thomasius also held that reason itself was not directly corrupted, but only through the will. But whereas Thomasius often speaks of reason in general as corrupted, Crusius tends to speak of (isolated and limited) corruptions, which can be easily identified and removed.
46. Von Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik, I, pp. 336-7n.

47. For this reason I will no longer sharply differentiate in translation between these terms in the later chapters of this work and all translate them by "common sense" (except where a philosopher makes distinctions between different forms of common sense, as Eberhard or Kant, for instance).
48. Oetinger has long been forgotten, but slowly he is being acknowledged as an important figure of the mid-18th century. The most important works about Oetinger are Johannes Herzog, Friedrich Christoph Oetinger. Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild, Stuttgart, 1902; Otto Herpel, Friedrich Christoph Oetinger. Die heilige Philosophie, München, 1923; Elisabeth Zinn, Die Theologie des Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, Gütersloh, 1932; Robert Schneider, Schelling und Hegels schwäbische Geistesansichten, Würzburg-Amühle, 1938 (important, but marred by national-socialistic propaganda); Wilhelm-Albert Hauck, Das Geheimnis des Lebens. Naturanschauung und Gottesauffassung Friedrich Christoph Oetingers, Heidelberg, 1947 (fundamental); W.A. Schulze, "Oetinger contra Leibniz", Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, II (1957), pp. 607-17. Also Hans-Georg Gadamer's Introduction to Oetinger's Inquisitio in sensum communem et rationem (reprint of the edition Tübingen, 1753), Stuttgart, 1964 and Gadamer's paper "Oetinger als Philosoph" in Kleine Schriften, III, Idee und Sprache, Tübingen, 1972, pp. 89-100. See also Henry W. Fullenwider, Friedrich Christoph Oetingers Wirkung auf Literatur und Philosophie seiner Zeitgenossen, Göppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik, Göppingen, 1975.
- The importance of Shaftesbury for Oetinger is somewhat neglected in the most recent literature, (Schneider, Hauck and Schulze do not mention Shaftesbury at all), though Oetinger himself does not

only acknowledge him (Inquisitio, p. 263), but even includes a translation of Shaftesbury's essay on the sensus communis in his Die Wahrheit des Sensus Communis oder des allgemeinen Sinnes in den nach dem Grundtext erklärten Spruchen des Prediger Salomo, 1753, "in order that everybody may see how this naturalist thought of the sensus communis". See also Weiser, Shaftesbury and Zinn, Die Theologie.

49. See Otto Herpel, Oetinger, pp. 185ff. Oetinger has indeed devoted a whole work to showing this (see previous footnote).
50. Otto Herpel, Oetinger, p. 188.
51. Hauck, Geheimnis, p. 33.
52. Ibid.
53. Thomas Wizenmann appears to have been a follower of Oetinger to some extent. At least, he admired him very much, as his letters show. See A. Golz, T. Wizenmann, der Freund F.H. Jacobi's in Mitteilungen aus seinem Briefwechsel und handschriftlichen Nachlass, wie nach Zeugnissen von Zeitgenossen, 2 vols., Gotha, 1859, I, 39 and 139.
54. For an indication of this see Buhle, Geschichte, vi, p. 550.  
  
While Kant appears to have thought very highly of Basedow as an educator, Herder and Goethe despised him. The two organs of the Berlin popular philosophers, the Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend (letter 300) and the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek (1766, vol. III, 1, p. 69) did not regard Basedow's works very highly either.
55. Basedow rejects any formal definition of truth. Such a definition

would be "superfluous". Everybody knows what "truth" means anyway. Truth is "the general quality of true sentences" (System III, p. 69). The real difficulty does not lie in the meaning of this concept, but in the determination of the criteria by which we determine whether a certain proposition is true or false. The correspondence theory of truth is rejected as "very confusing. For how does the warm oven, which gives me warmth, agree with my thoughts?" (ibid., p. 79). "True is a proposition which must be believed" (ibid., p. 69). Reason gives such constant consent to some propositions because (1) it is aware that all attempts to doubt are completely futile, and because (2) it recognises that it is naturally inclined to believe and that the consent according to such rules is the proper means to reach its aims, and that doubt would lead the wrong way, a way on which there would be danger without usefulness.

56. Ibid., I, p. 50.
57. "Whenever a proposition is probable and practical, whenever the danger of doubt and consequently the advantage of belief is great, the duty to believe exists" (ibid., III, p. 77-8).
58. Bernhard Basedow, Elementarwerk, 3 vols., Dessau and Leipzig, 1774, I, p. 346. -- The relationship of Basedow's duty to believe to Kant's postulates of practical reason has thus far not found any treatment, though it could be important for an understanding of Kant. Contemporaries of Kant were very much aware of the connection between these two doctrines. See, for instance, Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's Prüfung der Mendelssohnschen Morgenstunden oder



aller spekulativen Beweise für das Dasein Gottes, 1786, pp. 310ff., which clearly makes the connection of Kant and Basedow in this context. Kant, who wrote a Foreword to it, did not object to it. See also J. G. H. Feder's Leben, Natur und Grundsätze, ed. K.A.L. Feder, Leipzig, Hannover, Darmstadt, 1825, p. 253.

59. Basedow, Elementarwerk, I, p. 345.
60. For Riedel the soul has three kinds of laws, according to which it must function, namely for the true, for the good and for the beautiful (Briefe, p. 39. Compare with Theorie, p. 6.)
61. There are three different ends to which human beings strive, "the True, the Good and the Beautiful. For each one Nature has supplied us with a special faculty (Grundkraft). For the True the sensus communis, for the Good the conscience and for the Beautiful the taste. All these three are based upon the necessary laws of action to which the soul, just as any other substance, is subject". (Theorie, p. 6) -- Kant could have been influenced by Riedel in the three-partition of the soul either directly or indirectly (through Feder). In any case, Riedel's theory is more clear cut in the partition of the soul into three faculties than either Sulzer, or Mendelssohn or Tetens.
62. But they are all laws of feeling as Riedel makes very clear. See Theorie, p. 7.
63. Riedel was quite successful in the beginning. Lessing noted for instance that "Riedel promise(d) to become an excellent thinker; 'promise(d)' in so far as he had already shown to be such a thinker in many respects" (in his Theorie). See Lessing's "8th

Antiquarian Letter", Sämtliche Schriften, ed. Lachmann and Muncker, 3rd ed., vol. 10, Stuttgart, 1894, p. 250. Herder, however, did not like the Theorie at all and reacted violently towards the faculty psychology proposed in it in his fourth Kritisches Wäldchen. -- Riedel was, of course, not so much an original thinker, but an eclectic philosopher. And he made, contrary to many of his contemporaries no secret of it. In fact, he seems to ridicule not only himself, but also his contemporaries, when he describes his approach as: "il compilait, compilait, compilait" and "there are more foreign thoughts than my own", going on to give a list of "the writers whose work (he) ha(s) pillaged mostly" (a list which includes Home and Gerard as well as the writers of the Literatur-briefe, but not Crusius by the way -- see footnote 41 of this chapter) and remarks playfully that "everybody may take back his own, if he wants" (Theorie, p. 9). Chapter III "Of the Great and Sublime" is called a "compilation of Longin, Mendelssohn, Gerard and Home" (ibid., p. 37). His contemporaries punished him cruelly for this mockery by using it as the ammunition for his denigration. Riedel left out all these remarks in the second edition (according to Kasimir Filip Wize, Friedrich Riedel und seine Ästhetik, Leipzig, 1902, p. 2n. I have only seen the first edition). But the damage was done. Only today the importance of Riedel's work is seen again. Thus Rita Terras notes quite correctly in Wilhelm Heinses Ästhetik, München, 1972, p. 28 that "the two works of Riedel offered without doubt the most advanced ideas in aesthetic theory at the time of their appearance".

64. Their feud with and final destruction of the "Klotzians" is a well known fact in literary history. But the Literaturbriefe also "introduced" such important thinkers as Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann to the educated public of Germany through their favourable reviews.
65. It is impossible in this context to deal in any greater detail with these important works of Mendelssohn. See especially Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohns Frühschriften zur Metaphysik, Tübingen, 1969 and Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn; A Biographical Study, Alabama, 1973. For a short account see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 324-39.
66. The Philosophische Gespräche, for instance, are patterned after a dialogue of Shaftesbury (see Altmann, Frühschriften, pp. 1-2 and Biography, pp. 37-9). His Briefe über die Empfindungen are even more indebted to Shaftesbury's style (Altmann, Frühschriften, pp. 86-90). Mendelssohn also began a translation of Shaftesbury's essay on the sensus communis, which he liked very much because of Shaftesbury's suggestion that ridicule could serve as a test of truth (Altmann, Biography, pp. 109-12). -- Hume's Enquiries also played a large (though mainly negative) role in Mendelssohn's thought. In fact, his essay "Über die Wahrscheinlichkeit" is at least in part an attempt to answer Hume's doubts with regard to experiential judgments based upon analogy and induction (see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 321n. and Altmann, Frühschriften, p. 233).
67. Mendelssohn, Schriften (ed. M. Brasch), II, p. 288.

68. Ibid., p. 289. His discussion of moral sense is clearly dependent upon Hutcheson. "Hutcheson says god has given us a sense with which we know and love the good, a sense, completely different from the understanding and all other faculties. Just as we cannot perceive the qualitates sensibiles through the understanding, so we differentiate the agreeable from the disagreeable, the beautiful from the ugly, through an independent sense, whose expressions cannot be analysed into more simple concepts". Mendelssohn believes "this theory has good reason, but it needs explanation" (ibid., p. 288).
69. Ibid., pp. 289-90.
70. This is a well acknowledged general characteristic of the late German enlightenment, but very little detailed work on the particulars of it has been done. For this reason significant distortions of the importance of certain philosophers (most notably the Thomasians) are still possible. -- For the general tendencies see Sommer, Wundt, Dessoir, and especially Cassirer, but see also Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy.
71. See also footnote 11 of this chapter.

PART II  
THE STORY

If this study were interested only in the question of "coincidences" or "discrepancies" of the Scottish common sense philosophy and German thought in the late 18th century, the task would have been completed and the "relationship" between them established, since "the basic tendency is the same in both, in any case". But since the aim is to show that Scottish common sense actually influenced the further development of German thought, it is not sufficient to show that there exist certain parallels and that the Scots had something of relevance to say to the Germans. It has to be shown that they knew the works of the Scots and that they made use of them. Part II attempts to show exactly this.

In a certain sense the establishment of the factual historical connections between Scottish common sense and German philosophy is also a necessary preliminary for the discussion of the Scottish influence. It is not this discussion itself. Interesting as the story of the success and demise of Scottish common sense philosophy may be in its own right, it cannot replace the investigation of the systematic connections between the Scottish and the German theories. This part only tries to indicate in rough outlines the background which enabled the Germans to acquaint themselves with the works and thoughts of the Scots. The implications for the systematic conceptions of German philosophers are discussed in the parts following this one.

CHAPTER IV  
THE RECEPTION OF SCOTTISH COMMON SENSE  
IN GERMANY

After the middle of the 18th century, that is in the midst of what has been called the "cognitive crisis of the enlightenment", both the French and the Germans exhibited the greatest interest in British philosophy. British journals and books were carefully studied by most younger philosophers of that period. It is therefore not really surprising that Scottish common sense also came to be closely scrutinised in continental Europe. But, given the traditional account of 18th century German philosophy, the sheer extent of this critical discussion of common sense in German journals and books will perhaps be found surprising.

A. Beginnings and Success, 1768-1782

Up to the middle of the 18th century the knowledge of the English language was an exception among German scholars, and even after the middle of that century the majority of philosophers was still not capable of reading or speaking English.<sup>1</sup> But even those who could read

English had the greatest difficulties in obtaining copies of works printed in Britain.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, new philosophical works in English became known in Germany only after some delay, and their initial success often depended upon mere accidents. Though this situation generally improved during the sixties and seventies of the century, the works of British authors never were easily available in the original in Germany.<sup>3</sup> French on the other hand was fluently read and spoken in Germany, and French books and journals were easily obtained throughout the German countries. Therefore works by British authors often became first known in Germany through reviews in French journals or French translations.<sup>4</sup>

This appears to have happened to the works of the Scottish common sense philosophers as well. In 1767 the Bibliothèque des Sciences et des Beaux Arts published an extract of Thomas Reid's Inquiry, which appears to represent the introduction of Scottish common sense to Germany.<sup>5</sup> A French translation of Reid's entire work appeared in the next year.<sup>6</sup> From this time on this first work of the most important philosopher of Scottish common sense was generally available on the continent. Even though there appear to have been no early reviews of either the original or the French translation of the Inquiry in German journals, it slowly became known in the philosophical circles and gained some sort of a reputation. Johann Georg Hamann in Königsberg possessed the French translation of this first work of Reid and thought highly of it. From 1772 on he referred to it in his writings.<sup>7</sup> Moses Mendelssohn became curious enough to want to read the Inquiry not only in translation, but to possess the original. In

1770 he asked his friend and publisher Friedrich Nicolai to secure the book for him in English. He must have been very much impressed by it, because in a letter, dated July 24, 1774, which outlines a basic reading course in philosophy for a young man, he included Reid's Inquiry as the authoritative critique of sensationism and recommended that Condillac should be read in conjunction with Reid.<sup>8</sup>

But there were also early public acknowledgements of Reid's importance for the philosophic discussion of the time. Johann Georg Heinrich Feder referred the reader of his very popular textbook Logik und Metaphysik nebst der philosophischen Geschichte (1769, 2nd ed. 1770) to Thomas Reid in the context of the discussion of truth and objective knowledge and noted that it was well worth reading.<sup>9</sup> The historical importance of this reference to Reid's Inquiry should not be underestimated, since Feder's textbook was used in most German universities and high schools at that time (even Kant is said to have held lectures in Philosophische Encyclopädie according to it). Equally important were Christian Garve's early comments on the relevance of Thomas Reid. Thus in the last paragraph of the short printed announcement of his Introductory Lecture at the University of Leipzig, Legendorum philosophorum veterum, praecepta nonnulla et exemplum (1770), he calls attention to Reid's criticism of the theory of ideas and his common sense approach to philosophy;<sup>10</sup> and in his very successful German translation of Ferguson's Institutes of Moral Philosophy (1769), which appeared in 1772 as Grundsätze der Moralphilosophie, übersetzt und mit einigen Anmerkungen versehen von Christian Garve, he made an extensive and sympathetic, though somewhat misleading, note on Reid's theory of



sensation, which clearly showed how relevant Reid's theory was for the ongoing discussion of German philosophers.<sup>11</sup> Adam Ferguson's references to Thomas Reid certainly also helped very much to spread the name of his friend in Germany, since Ferguson himself became very popular there.

Much more important for the fate of Scottish common sense in Germany became, however, the works of James Oswald and James Beattie, which were much more controversial and therefore also received a more extensive treatment in the German journals of that time. The Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen had already published a very favourable review of James Oswald's Appeal on March 6, 1769, three years after the appearance of the first volume of this work in the original and three years before the appearance of the second volume.<sup>12</sup> From this time on every new publication of Oswald and Beattie received extensive treatment in the German philosophical journals.

The first reviewer in the Göttingische Anzeigen begins his discussion by noting that the work constitutes

a curious phenomenon in this enlightened age, since it shows a writer who accuses the philosophers and theologians of not knowing common sense ("Menschen-Verstand") and of having argued themselves out of all the sciences by means of logical deductions.

but, he continues, though the work has several shortcomings (not the strictest order and logical connection, as well as murky refutations of enemies and insufficient development of the own position),

we have through careful reading found this work to be important. It is important for stopping the dangerous mania for demonstration (Demonstriersucht); for deciding the dispute about innate ideas; for judging the system of the modern British philosophers which dissolves all moral obligation into feelings, and for showing the folly of the skeptics and infidels

in the proper light. For all these reasons we consider a complete extract of this work to be very instructive and entertaining.<sup>13</sup>

He praises the author for showing what common sense consists of, what weight and reputation it has in the sciences and how much damage has been done by going beyond the judgments of common sense. At the end of his discussion, that is, after having tried to show how important the contributions of the author of the Appeal are, he again advances his criticisms concerning the style of the work. But he hastens to reaffirm the validity of the basic principles put forth in Oswald's work:

However the author appears to us to go too far in his crusade for the reputation of common sense (Menschen-verstand) at times, as for instance when he declares all arguments against infidels and proofs of god's existence as put forward by Derham, Ray or others in similar form to be superfluous. But it is not possible to judge his aim until the second volume, which he promises on p. 380, will show the application of his principles to religion. The present work contains only the general principles, which, with their proper limitations and after subtraction of that which is added by mere wittiness and declamation, are true indeed.<sup>14</sup>

The second volume of the Appeal, which appeared in 1772 and delivered the promised application of the principles of common sense to religion, was of course also reviewed in the Göttingische Anzeigen. It is characterized as an "important book", whose "great aim" is "healing people of the mania for demonstration and disputation and drawing their attention to the homely (häuslich) principle of truth and virtue".<sup>15</sup> But the reviewer appears to be somewhat disillusioned and is much more critical than in the review of the first volume. He clearly expected much of the author and has to admit now that his

"expectation has not been fulfilled completely". Though he still finds that "the unknown author writes in a very lively and interesting manner" and still has many good things to say about particular aspects of the book, he concludes the review on a rather sour note:

There are things which rightfully could be criticized in this work. Is it not really only a dispute about words when the author rejects all proofs of basic principles? Because the proper representation of basic principles which he calls for is just what others call proof. Thus Clark, Derham, Ray and others have done in their proofs of the existence of god really nothing else than made the basic principles sensual (sinnlich gemacht) or have represented them in a proper fashion. At times the author also expresses himself very vaguely so that we could accuse him of impending the spirit of investigation.<sup>16</sup>

Yet, the praise of the first review is not lost completely:

Still, the great merits of having represented the basic truths of religion in an as enlightening as sympathetic fashion and of having uncovered the absurdities of the skeptics quite disconcertingly cannot be denied to the author. His work is a strong remedy for both the mania of demonstration and that of doubt.<sup>17</sup>

Given this favourable review of the original in one of the most important philosophical journals of Germany at the time, it is no surprise that a translation of the entire work appeared very soon. In fact, the translator notes in his Preface to the translation that it was the favourable reaction to this work in England as well as in Germany that induced him to translate it, and this even though he assures his readers that the work "is in fact directed against a kind of enemy of religion which does not yet exist in Germany".<sup>18</sup>

In spite of the fact that the original of the Appeal was reviewed rather extensively in the "Gottingische Anzeigen" the translation of

this work was also discussed in some detail in this journal. Whereas the reviewer of the translation confesses to think of the book in very much the same way as the one of the original, his judgment of Oswald's work is somewhat different (or has changed in the meantime).<sup>19</sup> The assessment of the work is much more critical. He does not find in the Appeal an adequate remedy for exaggerated rationalism and for skepticism and is very critical of most of the details of Oswald's work, even though he is clearly sympathetic to its basic approach:

The author has a great and meritorious aim, and his main thought is correct. But he does not develop it with the complete clarity and distinctness that would make it convincing and reliably applicable. There are basic truths, immediately evident propositions; our understanding has the capability to know them and is therefore forced to accept them in the same way that it is forced to accept the conclusion of a thorough and evident proof; we should not be tempted to try to prove the basic truths, but should be content to see whether somebody has enough common sense (Menschenverstand) and sincerity to grasp them. All this is correct. But the questions: What in fact are basic truths? Which propositions come close to the basic truths in that they are conclusions, but conclusions of such immediacy that they can just as little be forced upon us as basic truths as they can be proved geometrically by means of principles not closely related? And, how can objections against these two species of truths be answered by an explanation of the expressions, a determination of the kind and degree of approval which is demanded, or by any other means? All these important questions are neither in general nor in application treated by the author in sufficient thoroughness. Instead he has engaged in the uncertain determination of the difference between the cognitive faculties of animals and humans, and has succumbed too much to the impulse of passion and ridicule.<sup>20</sup>

Thus the work which was first hailed as a strong antidote to extreme rationalism and skepticism, which, though blemished by minor stylistic deficiencies, was regarded as promising an advance in philosophical thought, is now seen much more soberly. It does not deliver what it promises. The zeal and the constant use of ridicule, which were first

seen as mere stylistic shortcomings of the work, are judged much more severely and considered to stand in the way of proper philosophical examination. The reviewer now emphasizes that all propositions which are not basic truths in the strictest sense of the word can be proved or justified. "To simply invoke common sense in these cases, and to decry the enemy's disagreement as evil and nonsensical, or to ridicule him without refutation is, though suitable for dim-witted zealots and enthusiasts, not thorough (nicht gründlich), and can even be detrimental to the truth".<sup>21</sup> In the review of the second part of the translation the reviewer becomes still more critical. He says:

This is not the language of the proper disposition for the investigation of the truth, nor even the way to argue in order to convince and win over those who are in error. Children can be frightened off by means of such scoldings but not men. -- If the author had less fire of imagination and more penetration, if he had more calmly and precisely investigated the philosophical systems which he wanted to hurl away in this way, he would have gone to work differently in many cases and would have been even more useful.<sup>22</sup>

But these strictures of the Göttingische Anzeigen are mild in comparison to those of the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, which reviewed the first and second part of the German translation in 1776.<sup>23</sup> Though the Göttingische Anzeigen had become increasingly critical of the actual outcome of the Appeal, it agreed to Oswald's aims and his basic approach and clearly considered it to be useful even in its last review of 1775. But the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek levels all its criticisms against Oswald's aims and his approach. In fact, the review of this work is very much used to discredit all philosophers of common sense and asks "what is it if not a kind of despair that makes several new defenders of religion in Great Britain, somebody like Reid, Brattie (sic) and the

author of the work here reviewed, leave all philosophy behind and take refuge to common sense (schlechter Menschenverstand) in the fight against Hume and other opponents of religion".<sup>24</sup> Oswald should have fought his enemies with the same weapons as they had used, namely philosophical arguments, and they should not have turned against philosophy by appealing to common sense.<sup>25</sup> To give common sense the function of the highest judge in all matters philosophical is not only anti-metaphysical, but also non-philosophical. The philosophers of common sense have really a mistaken view of common sense and its nature. Common sense is not a constant and basic faculty of humans and as such independent of philosophy. It is clearly not the same for all nations and at all times in the history of man, and it has developed to its present state together with philosophical thought.<sup>26</sup> In fact, it is dependent upon philosophical reasoning. For, how often has common sense been modified by rational argument or scientific investigation? For this reason the philosophers of common sense, the "anti-metaphysicians", deceive themselves when they appeal to common sense in order to censor philosophy. Philosophy, that is, rational investigation, is the last judge of common sense; and common sense without reason is nothing but superstition. Therefore Oswald, just as Reid and Beattie, must be considered an enemy of philosophy. But, he finds,

to save the honour of speculative philosophy to some extent would require a treatise and not a review such as this. We can allot only so much space to a foreign book in the German Bibliothek, and this holds even more so for a book of such slight importance, a book which is hardly worthy of the toil of such a skilled translator as Mr. Wilmsen (for Oswald is undoubtedly the most lightly armed of the three fighters for common sense).<sup>27</sup>

Concurrent with this reception of Oswald's Appeal was that of James Beattie's Essay. In fact, of all the works of the Scottish common sense philosophers none was more quickly taken note of and assimilated in Germany than this work of James Beattie. It appeared in 1770; and it was reviewed in January 1771 by the Göttingische Anzeigen and in April of the same year by the Bibliothèque des sciences et des beaux arts.<sup>28</sup> The latter thought this work so important that it offered a very detailed abstract of it in French (77 pages in three instalments between January and September of 1772) and thus enabled a good insight into the contents of the work.<sup>29</sup> But in the very same year a very good German translation of the entire work was also published, making the work available to the general public in Germany.<sup>30</sup>

Like Oswald's Appeal, Beattie's Essay was not received uncritically either. The reviewer of the Göttingische Anzeigen of 1771 (who in all probability was Johann Georg Heinrich Feder) found many shortcomings in Beattie's work as well. Attempting to put Beattie into the proper perspective, he begins his review with a reference to the earlier attempts to refute skepticism found in Reid and Oswald. He sees Beattie as agreeing with Reid and Oswald in all essential points, but holds that

he is different from the others in that he attacks the matter more polemically and at the same time at its basis and in its whole extent. But he assaults Hume in such a way that he does not only talk to Hume without any reservations and without the moderation customary to the others, but also tries to prove by means of a full register of examples how dangerous the doctrines and how shallow the proofs contained in Hume's books are.<sup>31</sup>

The course of the argument in the Essay is charted as follows:

In order to be able to determine which arguments deserve to be accepted and which deserve to be

rejected, he [Beattie] shows first that in all kinds of cognitions and science the arguments depend finally upon basic principles which cannot be proved themselves and which we are forced to accept instinctively (through the essential laws of thought, or at least through the nature of our understanding). For this purpose he runs through the different kinds of cognition (Erkenntnisarten) and proves his proposition especially with regard to mathematics, physics, the proofs of the existence of objects, the qualities of our most inner nature, the belief in testimony, etc. From all this he draws the conclusion that all arguments, however evident and methodological in appearance, are nonsensical and unfounded, when they contradict such immediate sensations and principles which the instinct forces upon us . . . and there is supposed to be a special faculty, different from rational thought, which enables us to comprehend these principles and to hold on to them, namely the sensus communis (we do not dare to use here the usually common German expressions "gemeiner Verstand", "gesunde Vernunft" for the "common sense" of the original).<sup>32</sup>

The reviewer finds the differentiation between common sense and reason as the faculty of inference "still a little hasty", but believes that Beattie's conception that "truth is for us what we are forced to believe and falsity what we are forced to reject, can be brought to a correct principle", and considers Beattie's enterprise important.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, the author is praised for his good intentions, his great knowledge of antiquity and his excellent style of writing. "One also finds many correct and exact thetic and anti-thetic remarks [in the work]", but in a project such as Beattie's.

great penetration is necessary in order to see the strength of an objection which may be hidden at times and to notice all the difficulties so that they may be resolved at their basis, or, where this is impossible, to save the contested opinion through a more exact examination. Moreover, it is necessary not to reject the premisses for the sake of a consequence, when the mistake is really to be found in the consequence. We have to develop and form our reasons in such a way that they do not only have an influence upon somebody who



has already accepted our system, but meet the (full) strength of the enemy. All these virtues we have not always found in our author. For this reason a Hume would still have an easy game with him; as, for instance, when he wants to maintain against Hume that the principle of causality has another basis than our experience.<sup>34</sup>

He also objects to Beattie (and others) for accepting too many principles as immediately evident, arguing that it would be better and more thorough to accept as few first principles as possible, nor does he like Beattie's mockery of metaphysicians, but concludes that even though Beattie may not be capable of winning over any enemy to his side and to show the usefulness of truth (as Search, for instance), he "is a good fighter" and expects much from a treatment of moral truths, promised by Beattie.<sup>35</sup>

As such a fighter for the truth Beattie is praised exuberantly in the review of the German translation of the Essay in the Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen of 1772, the literary organ of Storm and Stress.<sup>36</sup> This review is especially important since it shows how Beattie was received by the most important literary movement in Germany at that time, which was centred around Herder (and Hamann, though against his will) and which brought forth such important authors as Friedrich Schiller and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The reviewer of Beattie is Herder himself.<sup>37</sup> He begins the article with an emphatic praise of the author of the Essay for his anti-metaphysical stance:

Finally again a man who has philosophized about man as a whole and with man as a whole in mind. Head and heart and artery of life in him do not yet appear to be so immeasurably far removed from one another as in most metaphysicians. Beattie is a friend of, a fighter, a zealot for the truth. But not for that colourful iridescent kind of truth, which a few rays of sunlight paint upon the dark, cloudy and watery brain of so

called philosophers, which shines upon fumes and dissolves with them. Our author is one of those robust (baumstarken) people with whom healthy reason (gesunde Vernunft) is everything, and with which even the "understanding" (Verstand) cannot so much as compare itself (for we Germans, and that should have been noticed by the translator! call common sense in this opposition to the understanding rather Vernunft). He thus boldly attacks the hair-splitters, quibblers, metaphysicians, idealists, skeptics, and whatever else I should call them, and shows or wants to show that all their sophistries are only shadows on the wall which, however beautiful, cannot displace anything of substance, since they have no substance themselves.<sup>38</sup>

The Essay is greeted as extremely relevant in "our times which certainly are more characterized by quibbling than by common sense, and more by hair-splitting (vernünfteln) than by reason (Vernunft)".<sup>39</sup> All lovers of philosophy are advised to read the first part "Of the Standard of Truth" and especially the third one, which deals with the "imperfections of School-logic", the "present degeneracy of Moral Science" and the "Consequences of Moral Scepticism". They constitute a "strong sermon against such shadow play and hair-splitting, -- a sermon which on the whole nobody can deny to be true, valuable and important".<sup>40</sup> Herder also endorses Beattie's characterisation of common sense as an immediate sense of truth and falsity far superior to all the logic taught at schools and universities. Beattie's most valuable insight is that "man does not exist for metaphysical speculation, and when he begins to separate reason from healthy understanding (gesunder Verstand), speculation from feeling and experience -- then Daedalos and Ikaros have left the secure ground of mother earth, whereto can he lose himself with his waxen pennis homini non datis, whereto can he sink?"<sup>41</sup>

Thus Herder praises Beattie not only for his negative stand with

regard to metaphysics, but also for his positive view on the nature of man. He sees Beattie as advocating a holistic view of man in very much the same way as Hamann and he himself. Common sense, this "healthy sense of truth", these "simple and strong nerves and drives of humanity", this "divine organ", as analyzed by Beattie appears to be important for this view.<sup>42</sup> With great approval he quotes Beattie's claim that "every kind of knowledge can be reduced to first and simple principles and that all evidence becomes finally intuitive, that common sense is the true (eigentliche) standpoint (standard) of man".<sup>43</sup> In fact, Herder's review is designed to show that Beattie is a witness to the legitimacy of the aspirations of Storm and Stress. Beattie is stylized as a man of genius after the taste of the movement spawned by Herder. The rudeness and apparent simple-mindedness, the dogged determination to fight for the truth, all the things which are most severely criticized in Beattie by philosophers, are what appeals most to Herder in this review. It is a "strong and wholesome sermon" for strong minds and not the wishy-washy talk usually offered by mere "thinkers". It is this basic agreement in the Weltanschauung of Beattie and Herder that appears to determine much of the tone of the review.

But the conclusion of the first instalment of Herder's review allows us already a glimpse at what he takes to be the shortcomings of Beattie's work:

Here, apprentice, you are led a very straight and simple path. You leave here to the right the swamp full of facetious false lights, and to the left you leave that ruin of demonstrations in the mathematical manner, where you always would have to crawl idem per idem up and down, and you walk straight away -- but

whereto now? The author says: toward the truth. But what this truth would look like, and what it would really be, our author himself may not know. Otherwise he probably would not want to force us with fervour to it, but lead us tenderly towards it and show it to us softly and quietly. But this he does not do, and which mortal has ever done it? Yet, that at this time he forces us upon the correct path and praises it to us from afar so much, is good. Let a few start out and walk: perhaps they will find the land of gold, and he even says that we all have it all around us, if we only open our eyes.<sup>44</sup>

The second part is much more negative. It deals with the second part of Beattie's Essay, which in its bulk attempts to characterize and refute idealism and skepticism. In fact, Herder begins by saying that he is not really satisfied with this part of the work and that he does not think that Beattie has refuted either Berkeley or Hume. There are three considerations which show, according to Herder, that Beattie's very purpose in the second part of the Essay is self-defeating:

- (1) All declamations are useless against cold sophists such as Hume; they are not warmed by heated oratory.
- (2) It is wrong to judge any system of thought strictly by its consequences. People do not always act in accordance with their theoretical convictions, and therefore the practical consequences of a theory can only be ascertained with difficulty. Moreover, even the best theory can be applied to evil ends.
- (3) "Hume is indeed a bad reasoner in metaphysical matters, but the idealist Berkeley has been treated unjustly. I regard his system, just as those of Spinoza, Fenelon, Leibniz and Descartes as fiction, as poetry (which system is ever anything else and should be regarded as something else); and Berkeley's poetry is great, discerning and well written throughout. As poetry it is also difficult, I believe, indeed impossible to refute with other arguments of poetic reason (dichtende

Vernunft). Beattie certainly did not refute Berkeley".<sup>45</sup> Herder concludes his discussion of Beattie's work by evincing genuine regret that the author of the Essay has "humiliated the splendour of his truth to apish shapes" and goes on to quote a key passage of Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia as saying "with a few subtle strokes perhaps more than the entire book" of Beattie.<sup>46</sup>

The very qualities that endeared Beattie's Essay so much to Herder and others and caused them to overlook some of the shortcomings of the work, predictably caused the more rationalistically inclined thinkers close to the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek to react even more negatively towards Beattie and the other Scottish philosophers of common sense. This can be seen very clearly on the example of the review of the German translation of Beattie's Essay in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek,<sup>47</sup> where his animosity to the over-reliance upon reason in metaphysics is taken to be enmity against reason itself. As was Oswald, Beattie is understood as abandoning reason altogether and as taking refuge to common sense. In particular he is scolded for not having defined his "conception of truth so exactly and so correctly that there could not be any ambiguity in this regard at least".<sup>48</sup> Because of this failure, it is argued, Beattie's entire system is pervaded by obscurity. To say that truth is what our constitution determines us to believe and falsity what our constitution determines us to reject is not a sufficient criterion for this concept and it invites ambiguity and confusion.

But the reviewer is willing to accept Beattie's "unusual" distinction between immediately certain or intuitive truths, and truths

which require proof, between truths of common sense and proofs of rational argument, that is. He argues, however, that "such an important and essential difference as the author claims, is not established herewith".<sup>49</sup> In other words, the distinction does not suffice to differentiate between common sense on the one hand and reason on the other. First of all, the basic principles are really limited to only two, namely the law of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. All other propositions are, says the reviewer, capable of proof. But we usually accept many other propositions without proof, and a superior mind, for instance, is capable of seeing the truth of a greater number of propositions intuitively, as it were, than a dim-wit. Moreover, different cultures hold different principles for intuitively certain.<sup>50</sup> These considerations show sufficiently how vague and uncertain the distinction of Beattie really is, and how it allows him to increase the number of first principles beyond all limits. We need an objective criterion, not a merely subjective or psychological criterion.

While the reviewer believes that his short account shows already "how shallow and unsatisfactory this theory is", he nevertheless believes it to be worth his while to investigate the arguments by means of which Beattie supports his theory of common sense. But all his criticisms of these arguments are based again upon his view that Beattie is an enemy of reason. Thus he can find it strange that Beattie uses reason in order to establish and defend the rights of common sense. According to his understanding of common sense the Scotsman is not allowed to do this. Beattie is seen as demeaning the

understanding (Verstand), and as inhibiting the progress of science by making the understanding the servant of common sense and by thus placing the latter beyond any criticism.<sup>51</sup> But the distinction is as false as it is dangerous. Understanding and common sense cannot be separated in the way in which the reviewer sees Beattie separating them. Common sense and understanding are one and the same power. We only call it by different names in accordance with the different functions which it fulfills. The truths of the common sense are the truths of the understanding which have been established long ago and have become almost instinctual by their constant use in daily life. If Beattie's distinction were to be understood in this way, it would be correct. But it would neither be as fundamental nor as important as Beattie made it out to be, since common sense would then have no prerogative over the understanding. Therefore, he holds,

the whole edifice of the author is based upon ambiguities and unproved propositions; and if it was correct to say that common sense was the highest judge of truth, it would also have to be true that we can measure the degree of warmth or cold in the air better by natural feeling than by means of a carefully constructed thermometer.<sup>52</sup>

and:

This may be enough to show the weakness of this enemy of speculative philosophy. Would space and time allow it, I could also show him to the reader as one of the most unlucky and silly maker of consequences (Consequenzmacher). For he fig'ts against the theories which he does not like especially by means of spiteful conclusions. Most of all he attacks Berkeley's doctrine of the non-existence of matter and the theory of the necessary determination of human actions. But these consequences are in their majority so childish that we have to believe he has not understood the theories of his enemies at all. He succeeds best against Hume, who in his book about human nature, has driven skepticism to such heights and entangled himself in his own web so

much that it does not require outstanding discernment to convict him by means of his own word as well as by consequences.<sup>53</sup>

This review of the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek is also very interesting because of its comments upon the translations of Beattie's "common sense" and "standard of truth". Thus he finds that Beattie's "common sense" would be "more properly and closer to the intentions of the author if it had been translated as gemeiner Wahrheitsinn (general sense of truth) and not as gesunde Vernunft (healthy reason).<sup>54</sup> "Standard" should have been rendered as "Maaßstab" (literally: measuring rod) and not as "Standpunkt" (standpoint); a mis-translation of some consequence as it appears.<sup>55</sup>

A more critical stance towards Reid, Oswald and Beattie appears to have been re-inforced also by early reports of the British reactions to these philosophers. Not only included several German journals regularly general summaries of the articles and reviews in the major British journals, many German thinkers made every effort to obtain as many of the British journals as they could through their friends and their publishers.<sup>56</sup> But there were also other avenues. Thus Joseph Priestley's An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, Dr. Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common Sense, which appeared in 1775 was also immediately reviewed in the "Göttingische Anzeigen". The reviewer (who says it was he who reviewed Beattie's Essay in 1771 and the German translation of Oswald's Appeal in 1774, and who is most probably Feder)<sup>57</sup> takes this occasion to note as "strange" that "the English philosophers have kept so quiet, while first Reid in a fine



and witty manner, then Beattie with strong eloquence and with a noble heart shining through, and at last Oswald with insulting fervour, have attacked the basic principles not only of Locke's, but of all philosophy".<sup>50</sup> The "new dialectic" of Reid, Oswald and Beattie would deserve a thorough examination, and as such an examination he welcomes Priestley's work:

The author has in most points identical principles with this reviewer. Though he has answered all the objections of these new dialecticians against the Lockian psychology and has uncovered the shallow, insufficient incoherent and dangerous elements in their philosophy, he could have been more moderate in the estimation of their aims and in the interpretation of their main thoughts, as well as more restrained in the consequences and softer in his expression.<sup>59</sup>

But the reviewer shows himself to be much closer to Reid and Beattie than Priestley. He defends, for instance, a great deal of Reid's argument against idealism and does not agree with Priestley that Beattie's conception of truth leads to relativism.<sup>60</sup>

All these negative criticisms of Reid, Oswald and Beattie appear not to have hindered the further spreading of their ideas in Germany. Indeed the vehemence with which the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek attacked the works of Scottish philosophers in 1776 may very well be occasioned by their growing success and the irritation which this caused among philosophers of a more rationalistic background. For by 1775 not only all the major writings of Scottish common sense, namely Reid's Inquiry (in French), Beattie's Essay (in German) and Oswald's Appeal (in German), were readily available in Germany and had been reviewed in the major journals, their arguments had also found their way into the philosophical discussion of the time. Feder had already

made reference to Reid and Oswald as relevant for the philosophical discussion in his widely used textbook on logic and metaphysics, and Garve, who had gained the highest reputation by this time, had also called attention to the importance of Reid, and thus they were introduced into the consciousness of academic and non-academic philosophers alike.

Some minor philosophers and theologians seized the opportunity and attempted to bring their own thoughts to market as common sense by discrediting established philosophy. Thus Johann Friedrich Jacobi, the uncle of the famous Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, whose Nähere Entdeckung eines neuen Lehrgebäudes der Religion nebst einer Prüfung desselben, which appeared in Zell in 1773 made much use of the principle of common sense as developed by Beattie and Oswald, and G. von Storchenau's Grundsätze der Logik (Augsburg 1774) made common sense the central concept of logic. Both works were reviewed very unfavourably in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek. The latter in the expressed context of Oswald's and Beattie's work.<sup>61</sup> Even the Göttingischen Anzeigen noted with some disdain that Ulrich, one of the earliest followers of Feder, in his Erster Umriss einer Einleitung zu den philosophischen Wissenschaften, vol. 1, Jena, 1772, "appealed too abruptly to feeling, just as Beattie and other recent Englishmen (pp. 151ff.)".<sup>62</sup>

But not only minor writers showed themselves to be influenced by Scottish common sense. Most of the major writers also found it useful. In fact, there are at least four different groups of philosophers which, however different their basic outlook, considered Reid, Oswald,

or Beattie important in some way or other. There was first of all the group of writers close to the movement of Storm and Stress, namely Hamann, Herder, Goethe and many of their followers (including the young Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi). Secondly, there were certain materialistically inclined philosophers, such as Johann Christian Lossius, Dietrich Tiedemann, Ernst Platner and von Irwing. Thirdly, the philosophers of Göttingen, Feder, Meiners and Lichtenberg and their students, and fourthly even the philosophers of Berlin, Resewitz, Mendelssohn and Eberhard and their followers.

We have seen already that Beattie's Essay was most probably translated by Wilhelm von Gerstenberg, a writer who was very close to the literary movement of Storm and Stress, and that it was reviewed by Herder in the Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen of 1772. In addition Thomas Reid was held in high esteem by Hamann, as early as 1772, and James Beattie was also not unknown to him.<sup>63</sup> On August 1, 1772 Herder wrote to Hamann about Beattie's Essay. Comparing Beattie to Ferguson and Millar, he says: "Beattie is undoubtedly the greatest of these three: but the good man has said less in an entire book than you have said on the one page about Socrates' faith and ignorance".<sup>64</sup> Hamann certainly also read the review by Herder and thus knew of Herder's preoccupation with Beattie. In any case, when the first volume of an anonymous philosophical novel, Lebensgeschichte Tobias Knauts des Weisen, sonst der Stammeler genannt, appeared in 1774, Hamann and his friends in Königsberg read it, liked it, and supposed Herder to be the author, mainly because they found that his "predilection for Beattie and the physiology of Unser shimmer(ed) through in the Knaut".<sup>65</sup>

How important Beattie was for Herder in this period of Storm and Stress during the early seventies may also be seen from the extant fragments to his Provinzialblätter an Prediger (Provincial Letters to Preachers). These letters seek to defend the ministers against the accusations of David Hume. At the same time they also represent Herder's rejection of the theology of the enlightenment and single out the well known Berlin cleric Johann Joachim Spalding for an attack.<sup>66</sup> Philosophical theologians such as Spalding are incapable of refuting Hume. "The casuistics of these new Sunday theologians" are, in fact, no help at all in fighting Hume. Religion has to be defended not by words but by deeds. Such weaklings as Spalding who water down Christianity in order to make it more acceptable are in opposition to such a robust man as Martin Luther. "Where is", Herder asks, "a strongman, a second simple-minded and uneducated Luther, a Luther of head and heart and breast and writing?" Again it appears to be Beattie whom he regards, at least for a time, as coming closest to this idol. For, as one fragment to the Provinzialblätter shows, he planned to write a "dialogue between Spalding, Beattie and Hume" on "whether there is still a church and a common interest of the priests".<sup>67</sup>

That he regarded Beattie not only as a witness to his basic Weltanschauung in this period, but also accepted some of Beattie's doctrines becomes clear in his Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts (The Oldest Document of Humanity) of 1774. In this "monstrum horrendum" of a book (Hamann), Herder further develops his theory of feeling as the basis of all more refined understanding. "Dark" feelings and beliefs are seen to lie at the basis of all knowledge.

The comparison of the soul with sight and knowledge with light is disqualified by Herder as a mere play with words, though a play with words that had serious consequences for philosophy. For this "mere play is responsible for the fact that the most important doctrines of humanity, the philosophy of intuition, of evidence, of sign and of experience are still so deep in night and doubt".<sup>68</sup> Beginnings to such a philosophy of intuition, evidence, sign and experience Herder sees in Lambert's Phänomenologie, in Mendelssohn's essay on evidence, and in Beattie's Essay.<sup>69</sup> The fact that Beattie is mentioned as an equal together with the two leading philosophers in Germany of that time attests already to the importance of Beattie for Herder.

Storm and Stress had certain definite connections with the materialistic philosophy in Germany of that period. Thus materialism as we have seen Hamann claim already, had through Unzer's physiology a great influence upon Herder. Schiller, who was still a young student at that time but already dabbling in literature and philosophy, also was deeply affected by materialism. Johann Christian Lossius, perhaps the most important philosopher of this persuasion, depended to a great extent upon Beattie's theory of truth and common sense and made no secret of this in his Die physischen Ursachen des Wahren (The Physical Causes of Truth), Gotha 1774, as we shall see in detail later on.<sup>70</sup> Ernst Platner, who also advocated a mild form of materialism in his early works, knew Reid, Oswald and Beattie very well and referred to them throughout his writings.<sup>71</sup> Especially Thomas Reid appears to have had some influence upon his thought, as his tests concerning the acquisition of the concept of space in blind persons show.<sup>72</sup> In any

case, he considered Thomas Reid together with Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, Hume and Tetens (with whom we shall have to deal as well) as one of the most important analysts of the human mind before Kant.<sup>73</sup>

Also very interesting is the position of Dietrich Tiedemann with regard to Scottish common sense, though not so much through its dependence upon Scottish common sense, as through the way in which it expresses certain prejudices against it. His Untersuchungen über den Menschen (Inquiries on Man), which appeared in three volumes in Leipzig from 1777 and 1778, also represents a mild form of materialism which does neither involve the denial of either God's existence nor that of the immortality of the soul. In certain respects it is better described as "anti-idealism" than as materialism.<sup>74</sup> In his investigations about the idealistic position he could not avoid becoming acquainted with the works of Scottish common sense as the enemies of this philosophical "disease", and therefore has to say something about them.

Tiedemann rejects the theories of the Scots outright as irrelevant and as being without any philosophical merit. In the Introduction to Volume II of his Untersuchungen he claims:

One has thus far regarded the proofs of the Idealists so insuperable that one has left the way of reasoning altogether and has fought them only with the agreement of all human beings under the new name of common sense (Menschen-Verstand). Reid and Oswald have therefore, without being aware of it, conceded the victory to the Idealists. For, if the principles of the Idealists are not to be refuted by reasoning, such an appeal to the general belief of the human species will not make them suspicious to the penetrating thinker.<sup>75</sup>

If common sense and reasoning are contradictory to each other, we either have to agree to what reasoning shows to us, or we have to reject both the results of reasoning and the sentiments of common sense. But we can

never rely upon common sense to overthrow the conclusion of a demonstrative proof.<sup>76</sup> In fact, "the authority of common sense stands always upon very weak feet, and it cannot overturn the strength of irrefutable demonstrative proofs . . . Nothing can supercede demonstrative and irrefutable proofs. We would fall into complete skepticism, if we were to take away the authority of these proofs".<sup>77</sup> Thus Tiedemann takes a strongly rationalistic position against any appeal to the opinion of the masses. After having disposed of the Scots in this fashion, he goes on to boast that he has

believed it necessary to oppose the idealists not with common sense but with reasoning. One has already won much, if one can show to them that their proofs do not establish in any way what they are supposed to establish, and one has won completely if one opposes them then with still other and more powerful reasons. Both I have tried to do and I flatter myself to have ended these disputes by these means.<sup>78</sup>

Given the general acquaintance of German philosophers with the works of the Scots, it cannot come as a surprise that Tiedemann was soon taken to task for his misinformed and boastful statements. The reviewer of his work in the Erfurtische gelehrte Zeitung finds, for instance, that he does "not know what to think with regard to these statements".<sup>79</sup> He asks when it was that the proofs of the idealists came to be regarded as irrefutable and does "not want to believe that the author wished to go as far as to say that he was the first one to oppose the idealists with reasoning". But

perhaps it was only supposed to hold of Reid and Oswald. But how can one corner an enemy better than by admitting so much of his view as can be done without endangering the truth, and then inferring the opposed conclusion from the principles of the enemy, just as Reid has done it. And this did not happen

altogether without proofs either. Does that give the sword into the hands of one's enemy, if one defeats him with his own weapon? So much is true: not all non-idealists have had the aim to get involved in a bull-fight with the idealists. They have only listed principles with which idealism is not compatible. But this was not their main purpose. Who wants to accuse them of having conceded victory to the idealists because of this? Others did not think it worth their while to refute the idealists point by point, since their assertions are contrary to all sensation and all common sense, and they either made only mockery of them or said we have to start from a common point of departure if we want to unite. This point of departure they regarded to be: we want to hear what the nature of our sensations tells us and others, common sense shall be the judge of this matter. But this, the author believes, is not the correct way.<sup>80</sup>

Tiedemann was so stung by this review that he found it necessary to give a rejoinder to it in the Appendix to the third volume of his Untersuchungen. There he argues that first of all he had never claimed to have been the first who opposed the idealists with reasoning and arguments, and secondly that he had not misrepresented the Scottish philosophy of common sense, since Oswald saw indeed "in common sense such a criterion of truth which decided everything without reasoning, that he always opposed common sense to reasoning and regarded its perceptions as intuitions which are not allowed to be further developed or proved".<sup>81</sup> To the charge that he had misrepresented Reid in particular, who had opposed the idealists with arguments, he answers: "in order to decide this completely I would have to have his book, and I do not have it", thus claiming not to know Reid's Inquiry.<sup>82</sup> With disingenuous generosity he concedes "thus he may have done it [used arguments, that is]", but only to continue that, if he has used reasoning against the idealists, "then he has not been faithful to his basic principles".<sup>83</sup> For, "if one wants to refute skepticism and



idealism with the weapons of common sense, one has to stop reasoning, or one does not say anything whatsoever".<sup>84</sup> If Tiedemann's treatment of Reid was certain to cause some surprise, his actual "reasoning" against the idealists would perhaps be even more surprising, since almost everything that is brought forward by Tiedemann as "irrefutable proof" was also used by James Beattie. But, while Beattie made ironical use of it and mocked his adversaries by means of it, Tiedemann offers it with great seriousness as the truth.<sup>85</sup> Accordingly the reviewer of the Untersuchungen in the Erfurtische gelehrte Zeitung pointed out quite directly that Tiedemann had nothing new to offer and that his approach comes down to an appeal to common sense just as much as that of the Scots.<sup>86</sup>

The third major influence of the Scots is centered around the University of Göttingen, the "Georgia Augusta" and the affiliated Göttingische Anzeigen. The university had been founded only in 1734. But it had become in a very short period one of the most modern and most successful institutions of higher learning in Germany.<sup>87</sup> It was unique in Germany because of its distinct Anglo-Saxon outlook, and it was of the greatest importance in the transmission of British thought and literature to Germany.<sup>88</sup> We have seen already something of the role which the Göttingische Anzeigen played in the reception of the works of the Scottish common sense philosophers in Germany, and also how the textbook of the most significant philosopher of Göttingen, Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, was significant in this process. Since he thought highly of the Scots and knew their works very well, references to them can be found in most of his works.<sup>89</sup> Much like his

student and friend, Christoph Meiners, he appears to have appreciated James Beattie most of all.<sup>90</sup> The same may also be said of their (today) much better known and much more important friend Georg Christoph Lichtenberg.<sup>91</sup> He appears to have become acquainted more closely with Beattie's work during a visit to London in 1775 and then to have continued to study it upon his return to Göttingen in 1776. Lichtenberg clearly thought much of Beattie, and many of his aphorisms written during this period show how preoccupied he was with Beattie's common sense philosophy.<sup>92</sup> Though commentators tend to discount Beattie's influence as a short-lived "temporary disavowal of his own nature" without any lasting consequence, there is reason to believe that Beattie was much more important to Lichtenberg.<sup>93</sup> But however that may be, it is significant that such an astute and sensible thinker as Lichtenberg felt together with many of his contemporaries that mere metaphysical speculation should be left to those who could not do anything better:

Much good and useful can be done and said without leaving the diocese of Beattian philosophy; nay more than when we lose our way in exquisite subtleties. His philosophy is for human beings, the other for professors. Analysis of feeling.<sup>94</sup>

To refute the skeptic is truly impossible. For, which argument in the whole world will convince the man who can believe absurdities? And does everybody who wants to be refuted deserve refutation. Not even the greatest rowdy fights with everyone who challenges him. These are the reasons for which Beattian philosophy deserves esteem. It is not a completely new philosophy. It only starts higher. It is not the philosophy of the professor but that of human beings.<sup>95</sup>

And it is certainly telling when Lichtenberg observes:

I do not want to determine whether the subtle metaphysical hair-splicers may be very good people, when

the refutation of similar but evil-minded thinkers is needed. But I do know this much from my own limited experience: the most sensible people, the practical and independent thinkers (Starkdenker), who always see the best without deception, the inventors of useful things, the trusted advisors, who express themselves concisely and forcefully, all these people like (sind zugetan) the Beattian philosophy.<sup>96</sup>

But even among the rationalists in Berlin, connected with the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, Reid, Oswald and Beattie were appreciated much more than the negative reviews suggest. Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz (1725-1806), an early friend of Mendelssohn, Nicolai and Lessing and a collaborator in the project of the Literaturbriefe refers to the German translation of Beattie's Essay in his pedagogical treatise Erziehung des Bürgers zum Gebrauche des gesunden Verstandes (Education of the Citizen to the Use of Common Sense) of 1773 and finds:

It is strange. Everybody thinks highly of common sense. Everybody appeals to it as a certain criterion of correctness. But we know it better by a kind of feeling than by investigation. Few have inquired what it may be; and those who have done so, such as Beattie in his Essay, recognize its value, but rely upon it more as an inexplicable or not fully explainable feeling than that they try to determine exactly what it is and what it is not, as they should do. It would indeed deserve the meditation of a philosophical mind.<sup>97</sup>

Thus, though Resewitz is not satisfied with Beattie's discussion of common sense, he still feels that Beattie has at least tried to shed light on this neglected issue. He himself does not attempt to give a more exact account of common sense, since this would lead him too far away from his topic, which is the improvement of pedagogical practice. But what is offered by Resewitz as the rough outlines of such a more exact account of common sense, is indeed deeply influenced by Beattie.<sup>98</sup>

But in general the Berliners appear to have been more impressed

by Thomas Reid than by James Beattie or James Oswald. We have seen already that Moses Mendelssohn appreciated Reid's critique of sensationism greatly. Similarly his follower and friend Johann August Eberhard can also be shown to have known Thomas Reid's Inquiry, for his Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens (General Theory of Thinking and Feeling) which had won the prize of the Berlin Academy for 1776 does not only allude to Reid's position but also expressly refers to the Inquiry.<sup>99</sup> Even if it might be an exaggeration to say "that no other book can give such a clear insight into the state of the doctrine of sensation at this time as this work of Eberhard, which most distinctly exhibits the most remarkable connection of Lockean and Leibnizian thoughts with aesthetic elements," it is quite clear that Eberhard's Theorie, which was quite successful, is extremely important for the understanding of the epistemology of the late German enlightenment, and the fact that Reid and his predecessor Hutcheson play a prominent role in it should not be underestimated.<sup>100</sup> In his Introductory Lecture at the University of Halle, Von dem Begriffe der Philosophie und ihren Theilen (On the Concept of Philosophy and its Parts), Berlin 1778, Eberhard objects in very much the same way as Reid and Beattie to the usage of "idea" as referring to all mental contents. He himself wants it to apply only to the concepts of the understanding and thus asks for a return to the usage which Plato made of "idea".<sup>101</sup>

But of greater historical consequence and more philosophical importance than the role which Scottish common sense played in the works of the adherents of Storm and Stress, or of materialism, or those by the philosophers in Göttingen and Berlin, was its influence upon

Johann Nicolaus Tetens, whose Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie (On General Speculative Philosophy) of 1775 and vol. I of Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung (Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and its Development) of 1776 represent without a doubt the highest philosophical achievement of the German enlightenment before Kant.<sup>102</sup> In these two works the fundamental influence of Thomas Reid is so pervasive that it would appear to be impossible to overlook it. Reid, Oswald and Beattie are referred to in almost every section;<sup>103</sup> and Tetens' own thought, which attempts to steer an independent course between rationalism, sensationism and skepticism by attempting to supply speculative philosophy with its true foundation in the nature of human knowledge, may very well be considered as continuing the tradition of Scottish common sense, as we shall see in greater detail later. For him just as for Reid and his Scottish followers "the cognitions of common sense are the ground to be worked in speculative philosophy".<sup>104</sup> Moreover, even though Tetens thought that this cultivation of the ground of common sense requires

the investigation of the nature of human cognition up to its first beginnings, and even more the explication of the procedure of the power of thought in the attainment of knowledge in a more exact and careful way than either Reid or Beattie or Oswald appear to have done, in spite of their otherwise superior perspicuity,<sup>105</sup>

even though he thinks this, he also acknowledges at numerous occasions that they were the first to begin the proper way of analyzing common sense and usually begins his discussion from the state of discussion as established by the Scots. Whether it is sensation, or the problem of the objective existence of objects, or the difference between subjective

and objective necessity of thought, or common sense and its relation to reason, he always begins with references to the doctrines of the Scots, and his discussion often consists of a sustained critical analysis of the Scottish view.<sup>106</sup>

Thus toward the end of the seventies of the eighteenth century "Reid, Oswald and Beattie" had become something of a standing formula for a well known approach to philosophy. Their works had become standard texts in psychology and their thought had firmly established itself in Germany. Idealism and skepticism in general and Berkeley and Hume in particular could not be discussed without a mentioning of their enemies in Scotland. Michael Hissmann's bibliography of philosophical literature Anleitung zur Kenntnis der auserlesenen Literatur in allen Teilen der Philosophie, makes this status of the works of the Scots clear as well (if it were not clear from the preceding already).<sup>107</sup> But this notoriety as the enemies of Hume and Berkeley also had its drawbacks. For it not only tended to shift the attention from the thought of Thomas Reid to that of Beattie and Oswald, who clearly had much less to say, but it also stood in the way of a general appreciation of the positive aspects of the Scottish doctrines and made it easier for such people as Tiedemann to disqualify the Scottish common sense approach to philosophy as enmity to reason itself. Yet this touch of controversy appears to have helped their popularity more than hindered it.<sup>108</sup>

Accordingly, Christoph Meiners was quite correct when he remarked in his Preface to the German translation of Beattie's Essays, which appeared in 1779, that Beattie did not really need any introduction to the German public, implying that he was well known already.<sup>109</sup> Even

the Essays themselves were not unknown to the Germans at that time, since the Brittisches Museum fur die Deutschen and the Musikalisch-Kritische Bibliothek had already published long reviews of this work of Beattie.<sup>110</sup> The review in the Brittisches Museum actually consists of nothing more than a summary of the main points of Beattie's different essays with copious quotations from the text. It concludes with an expression of satisfaction about the imminent appearance of a German translation of the Essays. The Musikalisch-Kritische Bibliothek gives a translation of the excerpt which appeared in the Monthly Reviews of July 1777. Though it is somewhat critical of Beattie's treatment of music, it also closes by expressing delight at the announcement of a German translation. Very positive is the review of the actual German translation in the Altonaischer gelehrter Mercurius. Beattie's new essays "deserved to appear in our language just as the previous splendid work (the Essay on Truth). The many new and important arguments and observations of which they are full, as well as the transporting style of his writing make them into a very interesting reading matter".<sup>111</sup>

Meiners clearly shared this high opinion of Beattie's Essays. While he objects to "the fierce polemical tone" of Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth and "cannot agree to many of his principles", as developed in that work, he is full of praise for the other essays.<sup>112</sup> They are for him "of all the philosophical works on these topics the ones in which I have found the greatest and most noticeable agreement with thoughts that I had thus far reason to call my own"; and he continues: "if it did not sound conceited after these remarks . . . I would not have any scruple to predict that every

reader, even the most advanced thinker would find new and important thoughts in every section".<sup>113</sup>

How important Beattie became for Meiners in aesthetic matters may be seen very well from his Grundriss der Seelenlehre which appeared in 1786. Zart finds that Meiners relies on Beattie "in the representation of the laws of association of ideas", that in his aesthetic theory he "appropriated Beattie's theory of instincts and followed Gerard's teachings only in so far as they are mediated by Beattie", and sees him as consulting Beattie in his fight against Berkeley and Hume as well as on "many other issues".<sup>114</sup> But perhaps we may go so far and say that he consulted Beattie on every issue he raised. For it is very difficult to find a particular discussion in the Grundriss in which he does not refer directly or indirectly to Beattie. Section three of the sixth chapter of the Grundriss, entitled "On Wit and Humour", for instance, reads as follows:

The ridiculous, the main object of wit or comic does not happen without a certain incongruity [English in the original]. But not every incongruity causes laughter or makes objects ridiculous (a). To be ridiculous, to become ridiculous, to be made ridiculous are very different things. No object is so great, so holy or so worthy that it cannot be made to appear ridiculous without really being so by some parody or other (b). Things can become ridiculous through incongruities of parts or qualities or of the causes and effects between them (c), or with regard to space and time (d) or through incongruities resulting from relations of similarity or dissimilarity, identity or non-identity, dignity or baseness, greatness or smallness and finally through diminishing and increasing (e).

(a) Beattie explains the ridiculous not quite correctly in my opinion. II, p. 37, 38, 173.

(b) The opinion of Lord Shaftesbury is well known. See Home I, p. 484, Beattie at the passage already referred to as well as pp. 69-71, 82-85, 99, 111, 112.



- (c) Beattie I, c., pp. 54, 56, 124.
- (d) Beattie, p. 45.
- (e) Beattie I, pp. 58-61, 69-71, 83-85.<sup>115</sup>

Most other sections in this work exhibit the same dependence upon Beattie. Whether Meiners is dealing with memory, imagination the distinction between reason and understanding, language, truth or error, he always refers to Beattie and often relies on Beattie's distinctions and course of argumentation even when he professes disagreement. Moreover, he cannot be said to use Beattie's doctrines and arguments in the establishment of new and interesting facts or theories, but he simply repeats them with minor (and often pedantic) modifications.

Reid's Inquiry appeared finally in German translation in 1782.<sup>116</sup> Since it was available in French since 1768, the need for a German translation had not been as great as for Oswald's Appeal and Beattie's Essay. This explains to a certain extent why this most important work, though announced as being translated many years before its actual appearance, appeared only ten years after Beattie's Essay. By this time its contents were widely known (or at least thought to be known) by German philosophers. Accordingly the reviewer in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek does not make any reference whatsoever as to the arguments advanced by Reid and restricts himself to an evaluation of the translation. On comparison with the original, he finds it very good and truthful to the original, though he notes a few minor mistakes.<sup>117</sup>

By the time Reid's Inquiry appeared in German Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was already one year out of the press. Though it had not yet made a name for itself, the translator of Reid is already aware of Kant's first Critique.<sup>118</sup> He notes that Reid's work is essentially an

attempt to answer Hume's skepticism as developed in the Treatise, a work "unknown" in Germany and "having for well known reasons become rare even in England".<sup>119</sup> But since it applies also to Hume's Enquiries, which are known in Germany, Reid is still useful. For,

though there have been notes and additions by a famous German philosopher added to the German translation of the Enquiries, Reid still appears to have come closer to the source of the evil -- if indeed there is evil in this matter -- than any other enemy of Mr. Hume. If I except the particular passages in which Mr. Kant (in the Critique of Pure Reason) contests him.

In fact,

Reid appears to know the location of the disease fairly exactly; perhaps he suffered himself a little from it. The others gossip, in part beautifully, about the harm it causes, of its symptoms and perhaps they can at times be of service to people who imagine themselves to be sick. But they do not make the body more healthy. They do not administer preventive medicine, and they do not bring order into the parts from which the sickness can originate. They are more useful to those who fear the disease or who dislike it than to those who suffer from it. They are doctors without the knowledge of anatomy.<sup>120</sup>

Whether Beattie also belongs to this latter group the translator does not want to decide.

At least the work has been received pretty well among us; it is, as far as I know, printed twice already. But -- et habent sua fata libelli. -- And it does indeed have such an alluring title! And the tone of Mr. Beattie is so preachingly philosophical! Not philosophically preaching, but just so that the book can be read even between sleeping and awakening. Moreover, the author carefully sprinkled his road with dainty flowers taken from old and new poets. What better thing could he have done to receive the general applause? -- This much is certain to me, however, he would have left his essay unwritten if Reid had not written before him.<sup>121</sup>

Thus whatever the judgment on Beattie's Essay is, Reid's Inquiry

deserves a thorough study on its own. Moreover, even if the Germans did not know anything about what Hume wrote, the Inquiry would still have value to us. "It is a healthy, beautiful and strong tree, a credit to the forest. The birds of the sky can find nourishment and shelter under it and it fulfils all of its purposes. It is not just planted in order to spend a little shade in the heat of the sun".<sup>122</sup>

However, the translator feels that he also has to show that he does not agree with everything put forward by Reid in the Inquiry, and thus prove his impartiality. He approves of Reid's attempt to show that the representations of the soul are completely different from the qualities of the external objects, but he finds his rejection of the theory of ideas in its entirety as a misuse of language very superficial. "For the use of language and figures of speech are in fact made in accordance with appearances and not in accordance with nature and truth".<sup>123</sup> Moreover, much could be said not only against the way in which Reid uses common sense against speculative philosophy, but also against his way of arguing against Berkeley and Hume in general. "But a Preface cannot be allowed to become a book".<sup>124</sup> Among the particular passages of Reid's work, "which deserve perhaps a little rejoinder", the translator significantly chooses Reid's geometria visibilium, "which Mr. Reid opposes to the common geometry, and whose basic principles he presents in a manner that suggests he believes he has found a completely new idea. But thoroughly considered this geometry is nothing but perspective".<sup>125</sup>

By 1782, therefore, all the fundamental works of Scottish common sense were available in German and Reid, Oswald and Beattie were well

known in Germany as the enemies of idealism and skepticism. But from 1782 on they had to contend with different philosophical forces. While it may be said that until 1782 their arguments against idealism and skepticism were better known than idealism and skepticism themselves, and that Reid, Oswald and Beattie, though not received uncritically, did not really have an enemy and were essentially in agreement with the main stream of German thought, after 1782 their approach to philosophy came to be judged as obsolete by Kant and his followers. While in 1775 Reid, Oswald and Beattie were considered to be enemies of speculative metaphysics, their arguments were now used to fight a philosopher who had attacked traditional metaphysics even more radically. Rather suddenly Reid, Oswald and Beattie had found an enemy in Germany as well, and since the theory of this enemy was just as much a development of their own doctrines as of those of Berkeley and Hume, they did not usually fare very well.

B. Further Developments in a Changed Philosophical Situation, 1783-1800

The judgment which did the greatest harm to the reputation of Scottish common sense in Germany, as well as in most other countries, was clearly Kant's scathing attack upon Reid, Oswald and Beattie in the Prolegomena in 1783. Yet this attack in all its negativity and spite also serves to show the predominance of the Scottish approach in German thought of that period. It was clearly more than just a passing remark upon some minor critics of David Hume. The vehemence of his criticism points to a powerful and lively philosophical force to be reckoned with if his own philosophy was to succeed in Germany. In fact, the whole thrust of the Prolegomena shows that Kant considered the philosophy of

common sense as the enemy of critical philosophy, for the work is among other things also a sustained argument against the common sense approach in philosophy.<sup>126</sup>

Further Kant must not be understood as primarily rejecting the philosophical convictions of Thomas Reid and his followers. Kant is much more concerned with their method, which he clearly identifies with naturalism. He is very much aware that his positive doctrines are not all that different from those of the Scots and their German followers, and he objects mainly to the way in which they have been too "cheaply acquired".<sup>127</sup> His own work, similarly as that of Johann Nicolaus Tetens, must be understood as attempting to give a more secure foundation to the common sense doctrine by penetrating "very deeply into the nature of reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking -- a task which did not suit them (Reid, Oswald and Beattie)".<sup>128</sup>

It is quite apparent that Kant's philosophy was successful against Reid, Oswald and Beattie and those Germans who were close to them (indeed, perhaps too successful; for Kant ended up discrediting not only their method but also the positive doctrines for which he also stood). But the victory was neither immediate nor was it ever a complete one. Scottish common sense continued to play a significant role in German thought.

Thus Eberhard found it necessary to include in his Vermischte Schriften of 1784 a dialogue entitled Clairsens und Tiefheim oder von dem gemeinen Menschenverstande in which he tried to delimit the function of common sense in philosophy and to secure the rights of speculative philosophy against the claims of common sense.<sup>129</sup> How important common

sense and related concepts continued to be may also be seen from the so called Pantheismusstreit between Mendelssohn and Jacobi, which constituted something of a philosophical sensation in the eighties of the 18th century. Both parties can be seen to rely openly upon theories of common sense developed from Scottish sources. But while Mendelssohn emphasized the rationalistic aspects of the Scottish view, Jacobi was more interested in what has been called the empiricist component of Scottish common sense and advocated a fideism that came very close to an outright irrationalism.<sup>130</sup> This paradoxical similarity in spite of all the opposition resulted in different responses by contemporaries. Thomas Wizenmann, a close friend of Jacobi, maintained in his Die Resultate der Jacobischen und Mendelssohnischen Philosophie von einem Freywilligen of 1786 that Mendelssohn's conception of "common sense" and Jacobi's principle of "faith" (Glaube) were in final analysis identical, while Immanuel Kant, who stood much closer to Mendelssohn, found it necessary to point out the basic differences between Mendelssohn's overly confident rationalism and Jacobi's pessimistic anti-intellectualism in his "What is Orientation in Thinking".<sup>131</sup> But neither Wizenmann nor Kant appear to have been able to free themselves from the "climate of opinion" of their time sufficiently enough to see that the paradoxical similarity revealed in the opposition of Jacobi and Mendelssohn was much more fundamental and underlay the thought of the entire age.<sup>132</sup>

Yet the further fate of Scottish common sense was to be mainly the opposition to Kant's philosophy. While D. Jenisch, the translator of George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetorik (1776), which appeared as

Die Philosophie der Rhetorik in 1791, always referred positively to Kant and his Critique (to the great dissatisfaction of the reviewer of this work in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek) and tried to show in his notes that the faculty of pure reason is "in a way nothing else than common sense with its first and highest principles" and that the results of Kant's philosophy, namely his doctrines of morals and religion "are nothing else than the irrefutable consequences of the principles of common sense, with which they also stand or fall", most philosophers saw common sense and Kantianism as opposed to each other.<sup>133</sup> Another notable exception was Ernst Platner. He did not object to Kant as a "dangerous skeptic and idealist", but argued:

Honestly, I find it difficult to persuade myself that I am Kant's enemy, or that he disputes even one well-understood principle of the philosophy I adhere to. There is, I believe, only one philosophy and that is the true one. It begins its investigations from the principle that the certainty of human cognition can be shown only in relation to the faculty of cognition, and it withdraws at the end of its speculative course to the thought: experience, common sense (\*) and morality -- these are the best things in all the wisdom of this world. This true philosophy Kant wants, this true philosophy I want. For those two main propositions are, if we are not quite mistaken, the real aim of the critique of reason.

(\*) However many bad things Kant appears to be saying of this common sense under the name of healthy understanding (he only rejects it as the judge in metaphysics), what he says in his theory of judgment on the one hand, and especially about doctrinal belief on the other hand, is a very distinct reference to the great rights of common sense in our worldly way of thinking.<sup>134</sup>

Platner sees Kant's enterprise as a mere continuation of what has been "especially in more recent times a major objective in philosophy", namely "the critique of the faculty of cognition".<sup>135</sup> He fails to

understand what he regards as Kant's exaggerated claims to originality with regard to this critical approach. For "the works of philosophers like Locke, Leibniz, Wolf, Hume, Reid, Tetens are full of investigations which aim at this".<sup>136</sup> But Platner also uses this agreement of Scottish common sense and Kant's critical philosophy in order to criticize Kant, as for instance in the case of the doctrine of freedom. He finds

it is not at all surprising that Beattie (on Truth II.3 in the Essays, pp. 119ff.) and Reid (Ess. on the intell. powers of man, pp. 1589ff.) appeal to the feeling of freedom as a claim of common sense, when they attack determinism instead of refuting Hume, but that the critical philosophy, which rejects the decisions of common sense in metaphysical disputes everywhere else, counts on this feeling here is strange indeed.<sup>137</sup>

A similar objection to Kant's theoretical philosophy is put forward by Johann August Eberhard, who does not appear to have grasped the significance of Kant's transcendental justification of our knowledge claims, and who wonders therefore:

The critical philosophy assumes forms of thought, laws of the understanding, functions of the understanding. How does it prove the universality and necessity of these laws of the understanding and of reason, since it denies absolutely objective truth of cognition? From the fact that I have to think in accordance with them, it does not follow that everybody has to think in accordance with them. With what right can critical philosophy reject the refutations of Humean skepticism according to Reid, Beattie and Oswald's method? It is true, the principles of common sense are assumed as certain by these Scottish philosophers without proof and only on the basis of subjective grounds, but do the forms of thought and of pure intuition have another certainty, and can they be regarded as universally certain with more right?<sup>138</sup>

But it was much more common to identify Kant's philosophy more or less



with the "idealism" and "skepticism" of Hume and Berkeley and to oppose it with essentially the same reasons that were used already by Reid, Oswald and Beattie. Thus Meiners, who, as we have seen, objected to "the fierce polemical tone" of Beattie's Essay in 1779, has much more understanding for Beattie's approach now. He argues in the Preface to his Grundriss der Seelenlehre of 1786 with expressed reference to Beattie:

Anybody who has had occasion to notice the impression which the Kantian writings have made upon young people will really feel the truth of the remarks which Beattie certainly made on the occasion of similar experiences: Nothing is more injurious to the taste and good judgment than the subtleties of the older and newer metaphysicians, which favour verbal disputes and lead to nothing but doubt and obscurity. These musings exhaust the power of the spirit without reason, deaden the love of true learning, draw the attention away from the concerns of human life as well as from the works of art and nature which warm the heart and heighten the imagination. Finally they unsettle the powers of the understanding, spoil good principles and poison the sources of human happiness.<sup>139</sup>

Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, whose Über den Raum und die Causalität, zur Prüfung der Kantschen Philosophie, which appeared one year later than Meiner's Grundriss, is somewhat more subtle. He does not accuse Kant of corrupting the character of the young, and never stoops to such mere Konsequenzenmacherei as his younger colleague (and many other contemporaries). But he does accuse Kant of confusion of language in very much the same way as Thomas Reid had accused Berkeley and Hume of such a confusion. His section "Anti-Idealism in Accordance with the Simple and Solid Principles of Common Sense" is in fact an attempt to show that Kant neglects the fundamental distinction between a representation and its object, and is essentially a repetition or re-statement of

Reid's arguments against Berkeley and Hume.<sup>140</sup>

If Feder accuses Kant of not having observed a fundamental distinction, Herder claims that Kant creates too many artificial distinctions. In his Vernunft und Sprache. Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft of 1799, which despite its late date of appearance belongs to the context of the early reactions to Kant, characterises Kant's philosophy as a "splitting" (zerspaltende) one, as a "philosophia schismatica". Wherever Kant looks antinomies and splits arise; dichotomies are the work of critical philosophy.<sup>141</sup> Along essentially Reidian lines he argues further that Kant is herewith only fulfilling the legacy of David Hume, who

has seduced critical philosophy against her own will. In his sloppy way of philosophizing he assumed impressions and ideas and believed all knowledge to consist of them. For this and especially the unfortunate name of ideas he was accused by his countrymen more than he deserved. The critical philosophy follows Hume in this regard and reaches a goal Hume did not want to reach. Through an incidental remark to the effect that there are two sources of human cognition, sensibility and understanding, whose common root is unknown, a dichotomy is created in human nature".<sup>142</sup>

Ironically alluding to Kant's criticism of the Scots in the Prolegomena, he finds in the very Introduction of his work:

everything is whole only for the common sense; first the philosophical knife a priori has to do its work; then, if the thingless things on the one hand and the allthingful un thing are about to appear to the critical idealist, we can judge from mere concepts alone (i).

(1) Chisels and hammers may suffice to work a piece of wood, but for etching we require an etcher's needle. Thus common sense and speculative understanding are each serviceable, but each in its own way; the former in judgments which

apply immediately to experience, the latter when we judge universally from concepts (Prolegomena . . .). And against whom is this said? Against Reid and Beattie. They are supposed to have used chisel and hammer. I hope that in the following Metakritik the etcher's needle has been applied as well and can be used even more acutely.<sup>143</sup>

Thus there was still a considerable interest in the Scottish philosophy of common sense even after Kant's criticism had succeeded and become the major philosophical force in German thought. But the interest Reid and Beattie had for these thinkers of the most varying backgrounds appears to have consisted mainly in their capacity as suppliers of weapons against Kant's supposed idealism and skepticism. This can also be very well observed in the course of the reception of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, which appeared in 1785.

The Essays appear to have been reviewed first by the Kantian Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of Jena in April 1786. The reviewer notes at the very outset that Reid is already known in Germany through his Inquiry, and he characterizes the Essays as providing a greater number as well as improved weapons against skepticism.<sup>144</sup> Though the basic principles of this work are already known through Reid's earlier Inquiry as well as through the works of Oswald and Beattie, it is still worthwhile to be read, and

is commended by a great variety of informations, by clarity, precision and a very beautiful philosophical diction. He is a more thorough and calmer investigator than either of his two colleagues. What Hume said of them, namely that they are in philosophical war what the drummers and trumpeters are in political war, does not hold for him. Since the investigations upon which Reid concentrates are now also lively in Germany, we believe it will not be disagreeable to our readers to hear such a good foreign writer as Reid is about these matters.<sup>145</sup>

The review then gives a short account of Reid's discussion of the ideal theory and characterizes his answer as follows:

He differentiates (Essay I, ch. I, p. 16) conception, which we could translate as klare Vorstellung (clear representation), for he defines it as a modification of the soul connected with consciousness, and perception, which is perhaps best rendered as Empfindung (sensation). Now his proof of the reality of the world of bodies is extremely easy of course. If the perception is a representation which has no inner object, but must have one in order to be different from other kinds of representations, it must have an outer object. But here all the difficulties from which the dualist wants to escape through Reid's theory return regrettably. How do the representations come into the soul from external objects? How does what was motion in the bodies become representation in the soul? What are conceptions which are no perceptions? And, most importantly, how can we think a change, a modification, which does not belong to some definite kind? It does not belong to the motions, since it is no modification of body, not to the thoughts, since these must have an immediate object. The soul must think something, and this something, which it thinks, is an idea. Thus the break which idealism has created between the spiritual and the material world does not appear to be healed in this way.<sup>146</sup>

However ill taken some of the criticisms of the reviewer may appear, and however confusing his general characterisation of Reid may be, the review does commend the work and certainly could awaken interest in its contents.<sup>147</sup>

How differently the review affected such different people as Christian Garve and Johann Georg Hamann may be seen from the following. Garve wrote on May 1, 1786 to a friend whom he appears to have asked before to obtain the Essays for him: "Reid's Essay on the Intellectual Powers (or however the exact title may read) I no longer want to possess after having read the review. It contains well known, already too often said and repeated matters. In fact, not very much new can be

said about the human faculties in general terms".<sup>148</sup> While Hamann wrote to Jacobi:

Kant sent me the Latin Newspaper up to pr. 8 [April 8?] but nothing about you or Mendelssohn. Reid, whose Inquiry into the human mind I possess in French, has published Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, which excite all my attention and whose review I wish<sup>149</sup> and hope to read at least in the Monthly Review soon.

In the following months he does not cease to remind his friend of this work and to ask him to obtain a copy of it so that he can read it on his planned visit to Jacobi's home at Pempelfort.<sup>150</sup>

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, who felt he was "cornered" by Mendelssohn and his rationalistically minded friends and being branded as an enthusiast and enemy of reason, clearly found Reid useful as well. Moreover, in his David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus (with an Appendix Über den transzendentalen Idealismus) he uses the rather positive characterisation of Reid's theory of natural belief in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, which sided more or less with Mendelssohn, to show the acceptability of his own doctrine of faith.<sup>151</sup> In fact, he used Reid's theory extensively in the development of his own form of radical realism and his critique of Kant. But Jacobi, who appears to have become aware of the significance of Reid for his own purposes through Hamann, was not too grateful to Thomas Reid. It may perhaps even be said that Jacobi, consciously or unconsciously, wanted to hide this fundamental importance of Thomas Reid for his thought. While Hamann found that Jacobi was "more concerned about Hume, Reid and Spinoza than about the subject matter" and felt that he wanted to "justify and extenuate his justification by means of their doctrines" in his David Hume and while Wilhelm von Humboldt testified

how greatly Jacobi was preoccupied with Thomas Reid as late as 1788, Jacobi himself is peculiarly silent about Thomas Reid.<sup>152</sup> This silence of Jacobi concerning his dependence upon Thomas Reid certainly did not help Reid's reputation in Germany and made it possible that many of the characteristically Reidian ideas came to be seen as original thought of Jacobi.<sup>153</sup>

But the review of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung and Jacobi's David Hume "über den Glauben" were not the only effects of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers in Germany. The Göttingische Anzeigen published a review of this work on April 21, 1787. The reviewer was Johann Georg Heinrich Feder.<sup>154</sup> He introduces the work as follows:

The author has been known for some time as the defendant of the natural way of thinking against the exaggerated subtleties of speculative philosophy and the resultant wrong-headed (verkehrte) skeptical and dogmatic way of thinking. Indeed, he is known as the leader of the Scottish philosophers of this persuasion, who have arisen by and by. Moreover, his system is still entirely the same as that in his Inquiry into the human mind (sic). He only deals now more extensively with the higher faculties of cognition, whereas he was more concerned with the external sense in the earlier work and showed the consequences of the resulting basic cognitions only in application for the higher faculties of cognition.<sup>155</sup>

Feder also notes that the tone in which the Essays are written is no longer that of ridicule, irony and wit, but much cooler and more detached. The repetitiousness of the Essays is also acknowledged but excused by the old age of Reid. In fact, Reid's philosophy "has in many of its parts the highest approval of the reviewer" himself.<sup>156</sup> Feder objects only that Reid wants to make the case for the natural way of thinking stronger than it can and need be made by declaring too many doctrines as basic truths.

A pet argument (Lieblingsargumentation) of the author is that from the universal characteristics of the languages to natural and basic cognitions. This way of inference is indeed proper in natural philosophy. He only infers . . . at times too much from this basis.<sup>157</sup>

The rest of the review is taken up by a short summary of the contents of the Essays and it concludes, just as the review in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung by noting that Reid appears to know Wolff's philosophy.<sup>158</sup>

As Feder says in the review of the Essays in the Göttingische Anzeigen, he does not think it is necessary to translate this work of Reid in its entirety into German, and believes that extracts of the most important passages of it are sufficient. In fact, he promises to give such extracts in some other place. This promise is fulfilled in 1788, when Feder offers an extract of Reid's discussion of basic truth with critical notes in the first volume of his Philosophische Bibliothek, a journal whose task is mainly prescribed by Feder's opposition to Kant's philosophy.<sup>159</sup> The extract itself is 19 pages long and consists of 11 pages of exposition and quotation of Book VI (pp. 555-632) of Reid's Essays and of 8 pages of critical notes. Feder makes quite clear how important Reid seems to him; and the Essays are greeted as

the most important foreign product of speculative philosophy which has become known during the last years. It is the work of an old thinker, long famous in and out of England. I have voiced my opinion on the contents, on what is good and what is deficient in it, in the Göttingische Anzeigen Nr. 63 of 1787 already. A translation of the entire work would be something very superfluous. It contains too many, too cumbersome and too often repeated discussions of disputes which have been cleared up or elucidated either better or equally well among ourselves. The most interesting article is the one on basic truths . . . and of it the most important things shall be exhibited and discussed here.<sup>160</sup>

In the second volume of the Philosophische Bibliothek Feder also offers a rather detailed account (35 pages) of Reid's Essays on the Active Powers of Man. But he is more or less content with representing Reid's views without criticism, and he does not deal with the more general aspects of Reid's theory, believing it too well known already in order to be interesting and thinking that he has sufficiently discussed it in other places.<sup>161</sup>

The first chapter of Essay VIII, entitled "Of Taste in General" also appeared in German translation in the Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste, number xxxi, 1786, under the title "Versuch über den Geschmack. Aus Dr. Reids neuesten Versuchen über die geistigen Kräfte des Menschen".<sup>162</sup> Thus, though Reid's late works were never translated into German in their entirety, their contents were known in Germany through reviews and abstracts even to those who could not read English. But, since by this time the knowledge of English among the educated and philosophically interested public in Germany was no longer a rarity, but rather the rule, the fact that Reid's Essays were not translated does not mean that they were unknown or even little known in Germany. In fact, the works of Schulze, Reinhold, Fries, Brentano and others show that quite the contrary is true.<sup>163</sup> Reid continued to be held in high esteem by philosophers of a more empiricistic persuasion and was never forgotten entirely.

Even James Beattie continued to play a role. Though his reputation as a philosopher appears to have been damaged beyond repair, he was still highly regarded as a critic of the arts and literature, as can be seen very clearly in the reception of his Dissertations Moral



and Critical. This work appeared in 1783 and was translated into German by K. Grosse in 1789. The German title read Moralische und kritische Abhandlungen. It appeared in three volumes and the translator substituted the entire translation of Beattie's Theory of Language for a translation of the shorter essay on language contained in the original Dissertations.<sup>164</sup>

This work by Beattie received perhaps more attention in the German journals than any other work of his before or after. Not only did three lengthy excerpts of the work appear in German translation in several periodicals (one on dreams, one on language, and another one on the sublime), both the original and the German translation were reviewed in all of the major journals. It was understood in general, as also admitted by the translator, that this was not so much the work of a speculative philosopher but that of a literary critic. But, as a literary critic James Beattie had something of interest to say for anybody attempting to understand literature philosophically.<sup>165</sup>

Kant's Critique of Judgment appears to have displaced most of the interest which the Germans might have had in Beattie's works before that time. This development becomes very much apparent in the reception of Beattie's Elements of Moral Science. The first volume of this work appeared in English in 1790 and was translated in the very same year into German by Karl Philipp Moritz, a close friend of Moses Mendelssohn and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.<sup>166</sup> Moritz quite clearly wanted to save Beattie's name as a philosopher to some extent by arguing that he was not a speculative philosopher but only a moral philosopher, that is, a philosopher who investigated "metaphysical matters never further than

up to a certain point, namely up to the point from which they still can have a noticeable influence upon human conduct".<sup>167</sup> But Moritz did not succeed. What he understood as self-limitation the reviewer of the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek interpreted as shallowness and inconsistency.<sup>168</sup> Moritz's explanation was taken to be a mere excuse. For

the true philosopher never stops his investigation before he has found what really motivated him all along, namely an answer satisfactory to the demands of reason, or until he has found at least a reason which shows to us that what is sought lies beyond the limits of our faculty of knowledge. This book could have remained untranslated forever. For, what are we Germans to do with a hasty sketch in which the most significant discoveries and investigations, which are being made with regard to the important matters of human thought and our faculty of knowledge in our fatherland today are not even considered?<sup>169</sup>

Equally condemning was the review of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of Jena. It reviewed the original in 1792, obviously unaware of the fact that a German translation had already appeared in 1790 and been reviewed by the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek in 1791, for it argues

for German philosophy it would be no gain, if it was tried to transplant this book to German soil by means of translation. We would not as easily as his countrymen excuse that he always dismisses the more difficult investigations, that he declaims and preaches more often than he investigates, and that he illustrates more than he explains . . . In one word, the book will hardly be successful in Germany now.<sup>170</sup>

The reviewer has no trouble whatsoever in classifying the kind of philosophy Beattie is advancing. It is Popularphilosophie. This term "sufficiently characterizes its merits, its indigenous deficiencies and errors and at the same time the class of readers, which will find satisfaction in this book".<sup>171</sup> It is quite certain that this "class of readers" to which the reviewer refers somewhat contemptuously does not

include anybody he would consider to be a true philosopher. "Popular-philosophie" has become a term of abuse. Philosophical thought no longer consists in the clarification and development of the principles of common sense, as it did for Kant and his contemporaries. Kant's followers detach philosophical justification and common sense beliefs from each other. The one does no longer appear to have anything to do with the other.<sup>172</sup>

Hegel, who wrote his first philosophical studies during this period, later characterised the nature of philosophy quite clearly as consisting in the very opposition of common sense. "The world of philosophy is an und für sich a world turned upside down for common sense."<sup>173</sup> Scottish common sense could not contribute very much to this form of philosophy, which did not want to work "into the hands of common sense" any longer, but aimed at complete independence from its Beschränktheit.

Thus, while a follower and commentator of Feder such as Tittle considered Reid to be very important and too difficult for the beginner of philosophy to understand, while such people as Schulze (Aenisedemus) and his follower Schopenhauer regarded Reid's critique of idealism as valid and well taken, the main stream of German thought dismissed Reid and his followers without so much as having read them.<sup>174</sup> Though Hegel in particular still appears to have appreciated Reid to some extent, most of the German idealists and their followers could not find anything of interest in Reid.<sup>175</sup> With the success of German idealismus Scottish common sense ceased to be a philosophical force in Germany (and ultimately also abroad). Though there were always thinkers interested in Reid and though Reid may have continued to have some effect upon what

might be called an "empiricistic undercurrent" of German thought and which was mediated through such thinkers as Fries, Reinhold, Lotze, Bolzano, Helmholtz, Brentano, Mach and others, it never became as widely known again as during the last third of the 18th century.<sup>176</sup>

## NOTES : CHAPTER IV

1. See M. Blassneck, Frankreich als Vermittler englisch-deutscher Einflüsse im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Bochum-Langendreer, 1934, p. 76 et passim, especially pp. 81f. How great the interest in the acquisition of English was in the younger generation may be seen in the example of Herder who was taught English by Hamann with Shakespeare's Hamlet as the "textbook".
2. Blassneck, Frankreich als Vermittler, pp. 45-6. Blassneck believes that the causes for this consist in the facts that there was no central "Mess-Katalog" of all new publications in England (as there was in Germany), and the circumstance that the British publishers depended greatly upon subscription (which limited the number of freely traded copies).
3. This difficulty in the acquisition of English books can very well be observed in the correspondence of most of Kant's contemporaries. Inquiries after British sources and requests for the original English versions of certain books abound. See also p. 139 footnote 7 and pp. 183-4 footnote 148-50 below. But many other examples can be given. Whether it was Garve or Lessing, Herder or Hamann, Mendelssohn or Nicolai, they all had difficulty in obtaining the original English editions of works that interested them. It is, however, this very difficulty that enables us today to find out what these philosophers were interested in most. See, for instance, Edward S. Flajole, "Lessing's Retrieval of Lost Truths", p. 52f.; Moses Mendelssohn, "Anweisung zur spekulativen Philosophie für einen jungen Menschen von 15 bis 20 Jahren",

Werke (Jubiläumsausgabe) 3.1, p. 306: "Dialogues entre Hylas et Philonous, par Berkley. The original is in English, but the French translation is easier to obtain".

4. Blassneck, Frankreich als Vermittler. The entire work of Blassneck is concerned with showing this. It does not deal with Reid, however. The Inquiry appeared at a time when German thinkers were already turning to the British sources themselves.
5. Bibliothèque des Sciences et des Beaux Arts, ed. Pierre Grosse et Daniel Pinet, Le Haye, vol. xxxviii (1767), July, August, September, part I, article I, pp. 1-26. The review offers a summary of the first five chapters of the Inquiry and gives a good account of all the important epistemological principles of Reid. It represents Reid's theory of the ideal system, shows why he rejects the doctrine of the similarity of ideas and objects, recounts his arguments against simple apprehension and the ones for the existence of original principles in perception, describes his views on natural suggestion and his theory of natural and artificial signs, and thus characterises the Inquiry as a very important work. The reviewer promises a second instalment (*ibid.*, p. 26), but this instalment appears to have been forgotten. I could not obtain a complete set of this journal, but the review of Beattie's Essay (see footn. 28 of this chapter) refers only to this one instalment and does not mention a second.

I have not undertaken a thorough research of the reception of the works by Scottish common sense philosophers in France, but the Journal Encyclopédique published several reviews of the works of

Reid and Beattie. Reid's Inquiry was reviewed first in December 1764, pp. 29-41. The translation of this work (see footn. 6 of this chapter), was reviewed in the issues of November 1768, pp. 19-37 and December 1768, pp. 29-37. The Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man were reviewed in the same journal 1786, ii, pp. 3-7 and the Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind in 1791, i, pp. 429-50, and 1791, ii, pp. 3-18. Beattie's Dissertations were reviewed in 1784, iii, pp. 3-10.

6. Thomas Reid, Recherches sur l'entendement humain d'après les principes du sens commun, Amsterdam, 1768.
7. Hamann first mentions Reid in his Philologische Einfälle und Zweifel of 1772. See Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, vol. 3, p. 40.
8. See Neuerschlossene Briefe Moses Mendelssohns an Friedrich Nicolai, Stuttgart, 1973, pp. 32-3. For the second letter see Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften (Jubiläumsausgabe), Berlin, 1929ff., 3.1, pp. 305-6.
9. Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, Logik und Metaphysik nebst der philosophischen Geschichte im Grundrisse, 2nd. enlarged ed., Göttingen und Gotha, 1770, p. 256. This reference is probably also to be found in the first edition of 1769 (but I could not obtain a copy of the first edition). Feder's Grundriss was extremely successful. See p. 239 below.
10. Christian Garve, Legendorum philosophorum veterum. Praecepta nonnulla et exemplum, Leipzig, 1770. Reviewed in the Göttingische Anzeigen of November 8, 1771. Reprinted in Georg Gustav Fülleborn's Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Stück xi

and xii, Jena 1799, pp. 132-96. The section on Reid is to be found on pp. 195-6.

11. See pp. 320ff. of the translation: "Berkeley who came after him (Locke), proved that even density and figure cannot be body in so far as they are sensed. He concluded therefore that all qualities which we know of a body are merely ideas and that therefore there are no bodies at all. Reid, whom our author has in mind, admits Berkeley's premisses but denies the conclusion. -- First he gives a long explanation of the proposition which our author assumes, namely that no sensation can really be similar to the quality of the body by which it has been occasioned. But he concludes from this: since none of them are in a special sense pictures of the objects, they are all equally arbitrary signs of the objects, and nature has determined that we should have concepts of objects only through them. That we all, in fact, think external objects in the presence of these signs, that we must think them whether we want to or not, and this despite the fact that our sensations do not resemble the qualities of bodies in the way in which a picture resembles its original, -- all this shows that bodies must exist. Otherwise we would not be able to give any reason whatsoever for this necessary and arbitrary representation of outer objects.

This theory, which appears to have abandoned Locke's difference between basic and derived qualities, is assumed by our author. But he re-affirms the distinction in a different way. And this difference is real, even if we did not know how to explain in what it consists.



In all sensations, Ferguson says, I ascribe certain qualities to bodies. These qualities are seen as the occasions of the sensations. This is shown by the common usage of our language, which ascribes warmth and colour to the body. But while there are some sensations with regard to which I only suppose what it would consist of, as for example with regard to warmth and colour, there are others which I do not only assume but conceptualize, as figure and solidity.

This matter, if pursued, would lead us too far astray, for there is indeed still some obscurity here, which would warrant perhaps a more exact investigation of the senses and their instruments. . . ."

Exactly this "more exact investigation of the senses and their instruments" was to preoccupy German philosophers during the next decade, and the works of Reid provided not only very often the starting point, but also some valuable suggestions for the attempted solution. When Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man appeared almost 15 years later, German philosophers were still finding it interesting for very much the same reason. See p. 182 above.

12. "Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1769, number 28 (March 6), pp. 265-75.
13. Ibid., p. 256-7.
14. Ibid., p. 274 (emphasis supplied).
15. Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1773, number 35 (March 22), pp. 289-99 and number 44 (April 12), pp. 370-1, p. 289.
16. Ibid., p. 371.

17. Ibid. The reviewer approves in particular of Oswald's discussion of basic truths (pp. 290-1), his exposition of the doctrine of predestination (p. 295), his theory of conscience as a form of common sense (p. 370) and he believes that Bolingbroke's and Hume's confusions are convincingly uncovered by Oswald (p. 371).
18. Jakob Oswald, Appelation an den gemeinen Menschenverstand zum Vortheil der Religion, 2 vols., transl. F.E. Wilmsen, Leipzig, 1774, pp. vii-viii. This seems to imply that Hume was not very well known in Germany. But compare this with Mendelssohn's Über die Wahrscheinlichkeit of 1755 which intimates that the German translation of the Enquiries was "in every hand".
19. Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1774, number 97 (August 13), pp. 834-38; see especially p. 834. It is not clear whether the reviewer is actually the same person. But it seems very likely that the reviewer is in all cases Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, who began reviewing philosophical works for this journal in 1769 and who expressed identical views on Oswald throughout his writings.  
See Chapter V, p. 240, footnote 13 below.
20. Ibid., pp. 834-5.
21. Ibid., p. 837.
22. Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1775, number 8 (January 19), pp. 60-1, p. 61.
23. Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, vol. 28, i, (1776), pp. 157-9.
24. Ibid., p. 157.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 158.

27. Ibid., p. 159.
28. Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1771, number 12  
(January 28), pp. 91-6. Bibliothèque des sciences et des beaux arts, xxx, 1771, (April-June), pp. 429-31.
29. Ibid., xxxvii (January-March), pp. 110-46; ibid., (April-June), pp. 444-64; ibid., (July-September), pp. 1-21.
30. James Beattie, Versuch über die Natur und Unveränderlichkeit der Wahrheit im Gegensatz der Klügeley und Zweifelsucht, aus dem Englischen, Kopenhagen und Leipzig, 1772.
31. Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1771, number 12  
(January 28), p. 92.
32. Ibid., pp. 92-3.
33. Ibid., p. 93.
34. Ibid., p. 94 (underlining supplied).
35. Ibid., p. 96.
36. Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen, lxxxiv (October 20) 1772, pp. 665-9, ibid., lxxxv (October 23) 1772, pp. 673-7. The importance of this review for the immediate reception of Beattie's Essay among the younger generation of Germans cannot be under-estimated. Goethe referred to this review as "pure gold".
37. The review is reprinted in Herder's Werke, ed. Suphan, vol. V, 456 ff.
38. Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen, p. 665.
39. Ibid., p. 666.
40. Ibid., p. 667.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 668.
43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 669.
45. Ibid., p. 675.
46. Ibid., p. 676. Herder quotes the following passage: "our own existence and the existence of things outside of us must be believed and cannot be determined in any other way. . . . What one believes does not, therefore, have to be proved, and a proposition can be ever so incontrovertibly proven without being believed. There are proofs of truths which are of as little value as the application, which can be made of the truths themselves; indeed one can believe the proof a proposition without giving approval to the proposition itself. The reasons of a Hume may be ever so cogent, and the refutation of them only assumptions and doubting; thus faith gains and loses equally with the cleverest pettifogger and the most honorable attorney. Faith is not the work of reason, and therefore cannot succumb to its attack, because faith arises just as little from reason as tasting and seeing do . . ." The translation is taken from James C. O'Flaherty, Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, A Translation and Commentary, Baltimore, 1967, pp. 167-9. I have substituted "feeling" for O'Flaherty's "sensibility" as a translation of Hamann's "Empfindung".
47. Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, supplement to volumes 13-24 in three volumes, i, 1776, pp. 497-503. The reviewer has the signum "Bm".
48. Ibid., p. 407.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., pp. 498 and 502.
51. Ibid., p. 502.
52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., pp. 502-3
54. Ibid., p. 498 and 503. The reviewer believes that the translation becomes confused (dunkel) because of this mistake.
55. Kant appears to use "standpoint" in the same unusual manner as the German translator of Beattie's Essay, as we shall see in Chapter IX of this work. See also Chapter VI, pp. 283 and 298n. below.
56. The correspondence of Hamann, Herder, Garve and other writers of this period is full of inquiries and requests concerning the original English copies of books and journals. See also p. 139 (footnote 8) above and pp. 183ff. below.
57. Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1775, number 92, (August 17), pp. 777-83. This review also makes explicit reference to the anonymous critique of Beattie in the Monthly Review of July, 1773.
58. Ibid., p. 777 (underlining supplied).
59. Ibid., p. 778 (underlining supplied). That the reviewer calls the Scots "new dialecticians" and their philosophy a new dialectic which puts into question "the basic principles of all philosophy" is certainly significant. Compare also with the quotation from the review of Beattie's Essay given on p. 147-8 above, namely that "many correct and exact thetic and anti-thetic remarks" can be found in Beattie's work.
60. The entire dispute about idealism is characterized as merely verbal. Reid and Berkeley were in reality in full agreement. Therefore Priestley could have accepted much of Reid's position with regard to our belief in external objects. See especially pp. 778-80 of the review.
61. The review of Johann Friedrich Jacobi's work is to be found in vol.

25, i, 1775, pp. 75-96 and that of Storchenau's in vol. 25, ii, 1775, pp. 505-8. Both Jacobi and Storchenau are accused to be enemies of reason and metaphysics, because they rely on common sense. The reviewer does not notice their dependence upon British sources, even though he notes that Storchenau identifies his common sense with that of Newton. Only in the review of the German translation of Oswald's Appeal the connection is made. The reviewer argues that he does not have to offer a detailed refutation of Oswald, since the "shallowness of the pseudo-philosophy of common sense has been shown to some extent already in the review of the German translation of Beattie's Essay and the review of Jacobi's Lehrgebäude. See also pp. 144-5 and below.

62. Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1772, number 125 (October 17), p. 1070.
63. See footnote 7 of this chapter.
64. Herder to Hamann, August 1, 1772, in Johann George Hamann, Briefwechsel, ed. Walther Ziesmer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden, 1955 f., vol. III, p. 13. Compare with the review of this work of Beattie by Herder. See footnote 46 of this chapter.
65. Briefwechsel III, p. 75. One day earlier Hamann had written: "For heaven's sake do please tell me, do you have part in the Knaut? So many inner characteristics, but no external one of your damned twisted (rot-deutsch) style. I would swear to it in my heart, but I haven't had the heart to say it with my mouth". Herder, of course, did not write the Knaut and he answers on May 27, 1774 (ibid., p. 92): "I have not written (gemacht) the Knaut, and I

do not know how, having read one page, you could have suspected me of having done it. As far as I came, the gold-nuggets swam in the water". Compare footnote 36 of this chapter for the image of gold.

The name "Beattie" occurs again in a letter of Hamann to Herder dated August 5, 1781 (Briefwechsel IV, pp. 316-7). Hamann reports to Herder what he is reading at the time: "Yesterday I finished the third part of Malebranche's Recherches as a source of the Humean philosophy, as well as Berkeley, whose first part I have gone through together with Beattie's two volumes".

66. Rudolf Haym, Herder nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken, 2 vols., 1880-5, I, p. 605.
67. Herder, Werke, ed. Suphan, vii, p. 175.
68. Ibid., vi, p. 270.
69. Ibid.
70. See Chapter VII below.
71. Platner's theory of the human mind and its principles changed greatly during his life. These changes were mainly occasioned by the works of Tetens, Kant and Aenesidemus Schulze. Accordingly, he constantly re-wrote his major work, the Philosophische Aphorismen in order to accommodate it to his theory. The first volume, which appeared in 1776 in Leipzig, re-appeared greatly changed in 1784 and then again completely re-written in 1793. The second volume, concerned with practical philosophy appeared first in 1782 and was also re-written for its second publication in 1800. The changes between the different editions, namely the conversion from

materialism to empirical criticism and from the latter to skepticism, have been investigated by Arthur Wreschner, Ernst Platners und Kants Erkenntnistheorie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Tetens und Aenesidemus, Leipzig, 1882.

There is no doubt that Platner was thoroughly familiar with the works of all three Scottish common sense philosophers. He differentiates clearly between Thomas Reid on the one hand and James Oswald and James Beattie on the other. Whereas Reid is mentioned usually favourably, Oswald and Beattie are usually only mentioned in order to be dismissed. As enemies of Hume's skepticism they are not to be taken seriously, since their arguments amount to not much more than "mere declamation" and "preaching". See, for instance, Philosophische Aphorismen I, 2nd ed., 1784, p. 262, p. 273, p. 364 and 3rd ed., 1793, pp. 142 & 225; also Ernst Platner, Gespräch über den Atheismus, 1781, p. 262.

Especially relevant he finds Beattie in the context of his discussion of determinism, though he clearly does not agree with him: "Beattie (on Truth II, 3 in the Essays p. 191ff.) attacks the system of determinism instead of refuting Hume. But he does so, as is his habit, not with reasons but with constant appeals to common sense, which however, as Mr. Kant has shown many times, cannot be allowed to be allowed as the highest judge in metaphysical disputes" (Philosophische Aphorismen I, 2nd ed., 1784, p. 364). In the third edition of the same work, Platner takes Beattie more seriously. He draws attention to the basic similarity between Beattie's account of freedom and that of Kant, as we



shall see later in this chapter and uses it to criticize Kant.

72. Platner's estimation of Reid's arguments against Hume also changed in accordance with his changing view on skepticism. In the second edition of the Aphorismen I he still held that Reid's Inquiry could be read "with great profit also with regard to skepticism" and obviously accepts Reid's theory that skepticism is the logical consequence of the "system of ideas" (ibid., p. 262, see also p. 250 and 280). In the third edition of this work he argues that skepticism is irrefutable and that therefore Reid could not have achieved anything against Hume either, though "he alone distinguishes himself". But he distinguishes himself "more through perfections of his work than through very striking reasons against Hume" (Aphorismen I, third edition, 1793, p. 368).

These "other perfections" of Reid's Inquiry clearly consist of Platner in Reid's account of sensation. For it is in the context of discussions of perceptual problems that explicit references to Reid can still be found in the latest edition of the Aphorismen I. He refers to Reid's Inquiry "vol. I, ch. 3, sect. 3ff." in the context of sensory illusion (ibid., p. 99, second edition, p. 66), and he still finds him "very instructive" with regard to the "nature of the sensory representations of space apart from sight" (Aphorismen I, 2nd ed., 1784, p. 301, 3rd ed., 1793, p. 433). But Platner's own treatment of sensory illusion is so general that it is impossible to establish any definite influence of Reid upon Platner, and Platner's actual account of our concepts of space, though clearly influenced and perhaps even occasioned by Reid's,

is quite different from it. While Reid held "that there is very little of knowledge acquired by sight that may not be communicated to a man born blind", and that extension in particular is already "suggested" by the sensation of touch, Platner holds the opposite view. He argues: "with regard to the representations of space and extension apart from sight, my observation and examination of a man born blind, which I have since undertaken (1785) . . . and have continued for a full three weeks, convinced me again that the sense of touch for itself is thoroughly ignorant of anything belonging to extension or space and does not know anything of spatial separation. To make it short, the man without sight does not perceive anything else than the existence of something acting, which is different from the feeling of self, passive with regard to it, as well as the numerical difference of -- what shall I say, the impressions or the objects?" (Aphorismen I, 3rd ed., p. 440, compare with the similar statement in the 2nd ed., p. 305). In the light of this quotation, Zart's claim (Einfluss, p. 202) that Platner "teaches that the extension of matter is not the object of the sense of sight, but alone, as Reid said, and Platner's observations on a blind man confirm, of the sense of touch, even though he does not want to admit that the representations of externality, hardness and softness have to originate in an original belief", is clearly false, unless Zart bases his claim upon the first edition of the Aphorismen I (which I could not obtain, in spite of several attempts). But it appears unlikely that there is such a fundamental difference between the earlier and the later

opinions of Platner on this matter, since he does not say himself that he changed his views on this matter. See also Hamilton's note on Platner in Reid's Works, p. 125n. Some insight into the contents of Aphorismen I, 1st ed., 1776 can be gained from the review of this work in the Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1777, number 20 (February 15), pp. 153ff. In any case, Zart's account is quite inadequate.

73. Platner, Aphorismen I, 3rd ed., 1793, pp. 334-5. This estimation of Reid by a philosopher of the reputation of Platner is certainly significant. For an account of Platner's reputation see Wreschner, op. cit., pp. 9-10. Kant quotes Platner's Aphorismen approvingly and draws attention to his "acuteness". See Kant, Prolegomena, ed. Lewis White Beck, p. 97n. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, one of the earliest and most important followers of Kant in the 18th century, calls Platner, together with Eberhard, Tiedemann, Reimarus, Feder, Meiners and Selle "the most renowned philosophers of our nation". See Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, Prag and Jena, 1789, p. 155 and 310.
74. Dietrich Tiedemann was a student of Feder and Meiners in Göttingen. Max Wundt regards him as especially influenced by Meiners (Max Wundt, Aufklärung, p. 300, compare also Überweg, Geschichte, vol. III, p. 474 which characterizes Tiedemann as a philosopher "who tried to connect Lockean elements with Leibnizian doctrine . . . in him the change from rationalistic enlightenment psychology to the newer psychological direction can be observed").

His biographer characterizes the Untersuchungen as "a product of antagonism towards the idealistic system" and notes that "this polemic tendency towards idealism gave the whole work a strange outlook" (Dietrich Tiedemann, Handbuch der Psychologie, ed. and biographical and bibliographical account by Ludwig Wachler, Leipzig, 1804, p. xv). However strange this anti-idealism may have seemed in 1804, in 1777 it was rather the rule. Idealism and skepticism were regarded as the enemies of all serious philosophy. See also Eugen Stäbler, Berkeley's Auffassung und Wirkung in der deutschen Philosophie, diss. Tübingen, 1935. This central concern with the refutation of skepticism and idealism also explains the interest which the Germans developed for the Scots.

75. Untersuchungen II, p. iv.
76. This squarely contradicts what Zart maintains, namely that Tiedemann "regards common sense and experience as the highest principles of knowledge just as Irwing and Lossius" (Einfluss, p. 166). He also gives a wrong reference on pp. 167-8 and confuses Berkeley with Reid and Oswald.
77. Tiedemann, Untersuchungen II, pp. iv, v.
78. Ibid., p. v.
79. Erfurtische gelehrte Zeitung, vii, 1778 (Thursday, January 22), pp. 57-62; p. 57.
80. Ibid., p. 58.
81. Tiedemann, Untersuchungen III, Anhang, p. 54.
82. It could perhaps be argued that Tiedemann is saying only that the Inquiry is not at his disposal at the moment. But wouldn't he

have said then that he doesn't remember what Reid had said? In any case, he cannot have studied Reid very carefully.

83. Ibid., p. 55.
84. Ibid. This "reasoning" is certainly strange. After admitting that he does not know Reid he dares to accuse Reid of being unfaithful to his basic principles. Even if we were to accept Tiedemann's characterisation of the structure of the appeal to common sense ("common sense decides clearly that there is matter, therefore you, the idealist, are out of your mind, when you maintain the contrary", ibid.), it is not clear why this should necessarily preclude any use of reasoning.
85. Compare, for instance Beattie, Essay, pp. 284-5 with Tiedemann, Untersuchungen II, pp. 19-23, 29 and Beattie, Essay, p. 255 and Tiedemann, Untersuchungen II, p. 28. Beattie argues that "material food will nourish me, while the idea of it will not" and Tiedemann asks "who has ever been hurt by the lack of a certain idea? . . . The lack of a certain idea of food is supposed to deprive us of our powers". Both Beattie and Tiedemann also use the example of intoxication and argue that only real wine can intoxicate us but not the idea of wine.
86. Erfurtische gelehrte Zeitung, pp. 59-60: "To begin with the idealist from such a common fact, which nature and sensation teaches all men" means to appeal to common sense. "In this way the dispute has been resolved by Reid, Beattie, Search and others long ago".
87. For an interesting account of the merits of this institution see Gedicke's report to the Prussian ministry of education, which is

available in English translation in European Society in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Robert & Elborg Forster, New York, Evanston, London, 1969, pp. 312-20.

88. Since Hannover, of which Göttingen is part, belonged to England by Personalunion, and since the King of England took a great interest in the new university established in Göttingen, it assumed a distinctly Anglo-Saxon outlook.
89. Feder's debts to Scottish common sense will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
90. Feder appears to have understood and appreciated Thomas Reid more than Meiners ever did. In any case, his position resembles that of Reid more.
91. Lichtenberg is, however, just as much a "Göttinger" as Feder and Meiners. His opinions are in fact quite similar to those of his two friends. Though these three founded together with another colleague a philosophical club, though there are various references which attest the importance of Feder and Meiners to Lichtenberg, commentators simply brush over this relationship as unimportant. Even Franz H. Mautner's comprehensive biography of Lichtenberg, Lichtenberg, Geschichte seines Geistes, Berlin, 1969, manages to restrict his treatment to four passing remarks. For Lichtenberg's early (quite amicable) relationship with Feder and Meiners see Johann Georg Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, ed. Wolfgang Promies, München, 1973f., vol. iv, p. 281, 312, 313, 448, 733, as well as the aphorisms B 388, C 52 (I shall quote the aphorism according to this edition as well, but I will refer to

them only be means of the customary combination of letters and numbers). For the philosophical club see especially his letter of December 19, 1776, Werke, iv, p. 281. For his later rather hostile view of Meiners, the compiler, see J 862, J 508, J 1155 and his letters, Werke, iv, p. 716, 736, 738, 800. He always held Feder in high esteem, however. Though he came to see the shortcomings of his philosophical thought, Lichtenberg himself advocated a theory that came very close to that of Feder (and his reception of Kant's philosophy was strongly influenced by Feder's interpretation of Kant). See B 388, E 242, F 741, F 871, J 258, J 400, J 429 and his letters, Werke, iv, p. 218, 281, 312, 313, 384, 448, 733.

92. See especially the following aphorisms in which Beattie is mentioned by name: Reisebemerkung 201, Werke, ii, p. 692 (written between November 25 and 28, 1775 in England), D 666, E 257, E 400, E407, E 408, E 415, E 420, E 450, Werke, iii, p. 380. See also E 453 for a mentioning of Priestley's critique of Reid, Oswald and Beattie, as well as a number of other aphorisms in which Beattie is not mentioned by name but clearly meant: E 338, E 377, E 380, E 460, E 513, F 56, F 202, F 204, F 205, F 233, F 245, F 323, F 441, F 448, H 142, J 251, J 439, L 401 and others in which the connection is perhaps less clear.
93. The most important commentators of Lichtenberg who hold this view are Wilhelm Grenzmann (Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Leipzig, 1939) and Franz H. Mautner (in the biography referred to in footnote 91 of this chapter). Grenzmann argues on p. 244-5 that "against his real philosophical convictions" Lichtenberg "relies upon intuitions of

sensation and forgets all claims of critical thought in a moment of taking a fresh breath" (while reading Beattie). Mautner uncritically follows this account and elaborates it: Lichtenberg learns first of Beattie's Essay in London in 1775 (Mautner, op. cit., p. 208). He studies Beattie then in greater detail during the first months after his return from London, mainly "in order to recreate through this study an essential part of the lost intellectual atmosphere which may most succinctly be described as a consideration of all things from the point of view of common sense" (ibid.). But this influence of Beattie can only be passing and superficial, since "the radical surrender to the undoubting philosophy of Beattie, hostile to all analysis and abstraction, could not be agreeable to Lichtenberg in his deepest convictions (konnte Lichtenberg im tiefsten nicht liegen), (ibid., p. 211). "Such dogmatic doctrines were thoroughly contradictory to Lichtenberg's most characteristic stance in philosophical matters", they constitute "a temporary disavowal of his own nature" (ibid., p. 142). As a mere expression of his exaggerated England-sehnsucht during the period of re-adjustment in Göttingen, this high estimation of Beattie could not last. Accordingly Beattie's influence fades soon and thoroughly. One year later Lichtenberg adheres only to the objects of Beattie's inquiries but not to its method. Doubt becomes more and more important again and Hartley's materialism pushes Beattie's common sense philosophy aside. Lichtenberg's "enthusiasm for Beattie's brave philosophy has expired", he returns to his "natural way of thinking (Denk-Charakter)" (see



ibid., pp. 211-25). Common sense remains important only in practical contexts. "The miraculously closed curve which Lichtenberg's thought has taken between the polar possibilities of relating to thought and life which are dangerous for a decided thinker as he was finally ended in a wise balance. This is a symbolic expression of his nature in temporal extension" (ibid., p. 258).

Mautner's miraculously closed curve of Lichtenberg's thought appears to belong into the realm of myth, however. Apart from the difficulty I have to conceive of Lichtenberg's "real philosophical convictions" (as opposed to what?), his "most characteristic philosophical stance", his "deepest philosophical convictions" or of the "symbolic expression of his nature in temporal extension", there are several facts and circumstances which show that the view of Grenzmann and Mautner is somewhat questionable. (1) Lichtenberg knew Beattie probably before 1775 at least by reputation. His first remark on Beattie reads "Beattie wird fast wie Bjättie ausgesprochen" (Reisebemerkung 201). Does this not suggest very strongly that he had heard this name differently pronounced before (in Göttingen)? (2) Lichtenberg read Beattie in England already (D 666 is a quotation of Beattie's characterisation of Descartes in English). All this speaks against Mautner's theory that Lichtenberg read Beattie overly enthusiastically and uncritically because of his German environment. In fact, some of his early pronouncements on Beattie and common sense are very critical. (3) The radical opposition between skepticism and common sense, which Mautner has to claim in order to make his argument plausible, is unhistorical.

In the Göttingen of his time, common sense and a mild form of skepticism went hand in hand, as we shall see in the next chapter.

(4) The same also holds for Mautner's claim that Hartley's materialism was incompatible with Beattie's doctrine of common sense.

In fact, Johann Christian Lossius had just attempted a synthesis of these two philosophical theories in his Physische Ursachen des Wahren of 1774 (see Chapter VII below). Lossius' book was reviewed in the Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1775, number 62 (May 25), pp. 525-6, and it is very likely that Lichtenberg discussed this work with Feder and Meiners in their philosophical club. In any case, Lichtenberg's comparison of common sense with the estimate in arithmetic in F 202 (September 1776) sounds very similar to what Lossius says on p. 238 of his Physische Ursachen. Compare also Lichtenberg's aphorisms E 407 and F 205.

(5) Neither Grenzmann nor Mautner show actually that there are no Beattien influences in Lichtenberg's later work. I suggest that there are such influences, though I cannot deal with them in this context. But Lichtenberg's reception of Kant's philosophy and his later thoughts on the role of ordinary language bear a striking resemblance to the views of other philosophers of the Scottish persuasion. In any case, there is no explicit rejection or disavowal of Scottish common sense in any of his aphorisms. For a somewhat more positive assessment of Lichtenberg's relation to the Scots see Herbert Schöffler's short remark in Deutsches Geistesleben zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung, Frankfurt, 1956, p. 228:

"The Scottish school which is known in the history of philosophy as

'the school of self-observation' understandably had to interest him [Lichtenberg] the self-observer kat'exochen". Lichtenberg's exact relationship to Beattie (and Feder and Meiners) would require a more thorough treatment. Schöffler thinks that "the way through British philosophy . . . brought Lichtenberg as hardly any other of the spiritual leaders of Germany in high time and almost automatically to the gate of Kantian thought" (*ibid.*, p. 229).

94. E 408.
95. E 415.
96. E 400.
97. Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz, Erziehung des Bürgers zum Gebrauche des gesunden Verstandes, 1773, p. 20. See also the review in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, 22, 1, (1774), pp. 325ff, esp. 327.
98. Reswitz unites older doctrines of German rationalism with Scottish elements of thought. Common sense "is the embodiment of those principles which the human being has unconsciously collected from his intuition, his natural sensations and the immediate judgments following them" (*ibid.*). Resewitz differentiates clearly between "common sense" on the one hand and "healthy understanding" on the other. While common sense is characterized as being "intuitive", as giving rise to "natural sensations" and "immediate judgments", just as Beattie's, healthy understanding is characterized very much after the fashion of the Wolffian sensus communis. But, unlike Wolff, Resewitz makes common sense the basis of the understanding and reason (*ibid.*, pp. 21-2). Healthy understanding is an "elevation" or "development" of common sense, unadulterated by prejudices.

The fact that intuition is the basis of the "higher faculties" of the human mind for Resewitz has of course great consequences for his theory of education. Students have to learn how to see, before they can reason correctly.

99. Johann August Eberhard, Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens, Berlin, 1776, pp. 187-8 (edition of 1786, pp. 186-7). For a discussion of Eberhard's relations to Scottish common sense, see Chapter VII below.
100. Sommer, Grundzüge, p. 232. von Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte, I, p. 421 finds that this work of Eberhard "appears to have brought the Leibniz-Wolffian psychology to its highest perfection". Another philosopher, closely connected with Mendelssohn, Lessing, Nicolai and Eberhard is Hermann Samuel Reimarus. He also found Reid useful. See Zart, Einfluss, p. 100.
101. Johann August Eberhard, Von dem Begriffe der Philosophie und ihren Theilen, Berlin, 1778, p. 15. Compare especially with Reid, Inquiry, pp. 256ff. and Beattie, Essay, p. 155. See also Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 312-21, B 368-77, and Eberhard's Philosophisches Magazin, I (1788-9), pp. 16-17, 19 and 49.
102. See Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 412-25. Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 125ff. We shall discuss Tetens in greater detail in Chapter VIII below.
103. Johann Nicolaus Tetens, Über die allgemeine spekulativische Philosophie, 1775, p. 10, 11, 12, 70. Johann Nicolaus Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung, 1776, p. 55, 298, 329, 331, 332, 333, 335, 365, 367, 372n, 382,

392, 412, 441, 461, 478, 496, 503, 515, 517, 518, 530, 567n.,  
570, 571, 572, 631. (I quote in accordance with the reprint of  
Berlin, 1913.)

104. Tetens, Speculativische Philosophie, p. 17.
105. Ibid., p. 12.
106. See Chapter IX of this work.
107. See Michael Hissmann, Anleitung zur Kenntniss der auserlesenen  
Literatur in allen Teilen der Philosophie, Göttingen & Lemgo, 1778,  
section 73, p. 156, section 75 (On Sensation and the Senses),  
section 96 (Truth and Error), section 145 (On Religion, especially  
proofs of God's existence). But Hissmann can also be very critical:  
"Our concepts are true if they agree with the objects of which they  
are concepts. The essence of truth does not consist in our acclaim  
or in the confidence with which we believe them to be true. Whole  
nations have believed falsities to be true and only recognized it  
after some time. In recent times the Scots have tried to defend  
the theory of truth attacked by skepticism. But their first prin-  
ciples are already mostly false. In fact, through their common  
sense, their declared sense of truth, they deliver the strongest  
weapons against truth to sophistical philosophers, though they want  
to save it" (ibid., pp. 86-7). Compare with the review of Beattie's  
Essay in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek discussed on pp. 144-5  
of this work.
108. How "common sense" was regarded can perhaps be seen from the review of  
Johann Christian Lossius', Unterricht der gesunder Vernunft, vol. I,  
Gotha, 1777 in the Göttingische Anzeigen 1777, number 94 (August 7),

p. 751. The reviewer would have preferred "Introduction to Philosophy" as a title, since he finds that Lossius' work is just that. He believes "Education of Common Sense" does not give a determinate concept and "awakens only the suspicion that the author is ashamed of the name of philosophy or wants to create a sensation". See also Johann August Eberhard, Vermischte Schriften, Halle, 1784, p. 143, who calls "common sense" a "Zauberwort", a "magic word".

109. Jakob Beattie, Neue philosophische Versuche, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1779, vol. 1, p. 7: "I do not write this little Preface to commend this Scottish philosopher to the German lovers of wisdom( for such a recommendation, at least by myself, Beattie does not need) . . ."

It is not clear whether this is the only edition of Beattie's Essays or whether there existed also another (perhaps illegitimate) re-print. The translator of Reid's Inquiry (see pp. 172-4 of this work) mentions that Beattie's Essay is contained in his Philosophische Werke. But the Neue philosophische Versuche in Meiners' edition do not contain the Essay on Truth. Mellin, Enzyklopädisches Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie, 11 vols., Züllichau & Leipzig, 1797-1804, "Hume-Beattie", Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 11 vols., Leipzig, 1798-1819, vol. II, p. 481, Buhle, Geschichte, V, p. 263, Krug, Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 6 vols., 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1832-8, "Beattie" all refer to Beattie's Werke of 1779-80 as containing another translation of the first Essay. They also refer to another translation of Beattie's Essay on Truth supposedly based on the 5th edition (1774) of the original. Neither Heinsius nor Kayser

mention these two works (Beattie's Werke and the second translation). Fabian and Kloth (see footn. 33 of Chapter I of this work) do not mention them in their bibliography either. I have not been able to obtain more information on them either.

110. Brittisches Museum fur die Deutschen, ed. J.J. Eschenburg, vol. I, 1777, pp. 63-8. Musikalisch-Kritische Bibliothek, ed. J.N. Forkel, Gotha, 1778, vol. II, pp. 341-55.
111. Altonaischer gelehrter Mercurius, XVIII (1780), pp. 28-32, p. 28.
112. Jakob Beattie, Neue philosophische Versuche, p. 9. That Meiners does not like Beattie's Essay on Truth is also shown by the circumstance that he does not include the complete work in the German translation, but gives only a few pages of the most important changes of the last edition (ibid., p. 12).
113. Ibid., p. 9.
114. Zart, Einfluss, p. 153.
115. Christian Meiners, Grundriss der Seelenlehre, Lemgo, 1786, pp. 90-1. He mentions Beattie: once on p. 48, twice on p. 49, once on p. 67, three times on p. 73, four times on p. 75, once on p. 77, once on p. 78, once on p. 79, once on p. 85, once on p. 86, twice on p. 89, three times on p. 92, twice on p. 93, etc., etc. No wonder that Lichtenberg spoke of Meiners' works as "paltry compilations".
116. Thomas Reid, Untersuchung über den menschlichen Geist, nach den Grundsätzen des gemeinen Menschenverstandes, Leipzig, 1782.
117. Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, lxi (1783), p. 417.
118. The first review of Kant's Critique appeared in the Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1782, number 3 (January 19), pp.

40-8. It is not much earlier than this Foreword. This makes the Foreword one of the earliest published reactions to Kant's first Critique.

119. Reid, Untersuchung, p. iii.
120. Ibid., p. iv.
121. Ibid., p. iv/v.
122. Ibid., p. vi.
123. Ibid., pp. vi/vii.
124. Ibid., p. vii.
125. Ibid., p. viii.
126. More about this is found in Chapter IX, pp. 400ff. below.
127. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena, ed. Lewis White Beck, p. 61.
128. Ibid., p. 7. It might prove interesting to compare this passage with that of Tetens, given on p. 132 above.
129. Johann August Eberhard, Vermischte Schriften, 1784, pp. 135-76.  

That Reid, Oswald and Beattie are the ones meant primarily becomes clear in the Preface and on p. 161 (where they are mentioned by name). For a further discussion of this dialogue, see Chapter VII, pp. 307ff. below.
130. Mendelssohn's publications of the last two years of his life, 1784-6, namely "Die Bildsäule", in the Berlinische Monatsschrift, August 4, 1784, pp. 130-54, Morgenstunden oder über das Dasein Gottes, 1785, and Moses Mendelssohn an die Freunde Lessings, 1786, show a similar degree of dependence upon the Scots similar to that of Jacobi's David Hume über den Glauben, 1787. Both Mendelssohn and Jacobi are discussed in greater detail further below.



131. See Immanuel Kant, Werke, 6 vols., ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, Darmstadt, 1966, vol. III, pp. 267-83. See also his "Bemerkungen zu den Prüfungen der Mendelssohnschen Morgenstunden", ibid., pp. 286-91.
132. I am quite aware that these remarks must appear somewhat cryptic at this point. For a further discussion see the Conclusion of this work.
133. George Campbell, Die Philosophie der Rhetorik, transl. Dr. D. Jenisch, Berlin, 1791, p. 167. See also p. 3: "Hurd, Beattie, Reid, Oswald and others have been translated and have been read with approval by some". For the relation of Kant and Campbell see ibid., pp. 166-9n., especially p. 166: "I have here translated at least a part of the long note of the English original in order to give my readers an idea of a dispute about common sense which is indeed important for philosophy and which has been led by such important men as Priestley, Beattie and Reid with great acuteness. If I may say so, our author is really on the right track, even though he could not be said to have exhausted the matter in all its depths. The speculative philosophy has taken such a turn through the newest revolution in philosophical literature among the Germans that these matters can best be discussed here among us. For Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which has turned the wheel of our speculative philosophy so entirely from the opposite side, is indeed nothing else than the explanation of our power of thought . . ." The reviewer of the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, cxi (1792), pp. 98-101 (signum: "Pk") finds that "Mr. Jenisch takes every occasion, whether appropriate or inappropriate, to sound the praise of Mr. Kant in the highest tones (mit vollen Backen). If this reviewer knows this truly great man, he will not

be pleased by praise uttered in such a tone". I suspect that this translator of Campbell is identical with the Jenisch who was close to Hamann in Königsberg and who went to Berlin and whom Hamann described as a "philologico-theologische Glücksritter wozu er gute Aussichter hat". See Hamann, Briefwechsel, vol.

VI, p. 349 and 373. See also Chapter IX, p. of this work.

134. Ernst Platner, Philosophische Aphorismen, 3rd ed., 1793, pp. v/vi.

135. Ibid., p. 334.

136. Ibid., pp. 334-5 (underlining supplied).

137. Ibid., p. 507.

138. Johann August Eberhard (editor), Philosophisches Magazin, 4 vols., Halle, 1788-92, vol. iv (1792), p. 101 (underlining supplied).

139. Christoph Meiners, Grundriss der Seelenlehre, Lemgo, 1786, Preface.

140. Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, Über den Raum und die Causalität zur Prüfung der Kantschen Philosophie, Göttingen, 1787, pp. 65ff. For discussion of this see the next chapter, pp. 244ff.

141. Herder, Vernunft und Sprache. Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2 vols., 1799, vol. II, p. 335.

142. Ibid., p. 331.

143. Ibid., pp. xiii/xiv. Thomas M. Seebohm, "Der systematische Ort der Herderschen Metakritik", Kant-Studien 63 (1972), pp. 58-73, p. 61. remarks that Herder "appeals in overbounding polemical frenzy to any arbitrary predecessor of the Kantian philosophy as a crown-witness against it". This is essentially correct and shows that Herder's references to the Scots in this work must be carefully considered. But I believe that the references to Beattie and Reid

still show that Herder found their works relevant even late in his life.

By the way, while Herder's historical relations to Beattie are firmly established, those to Reid are much less so. Robert T. Clark, Herder, His Life and Thought, Los Angeles & Berkeley, 1955, p. 204, claims, for instance, that "the Scottish philosopher Reid, whose system would undoubtedly have appealed to Herder, was probably not read by him until our author's last year, when Reid's criticism of Berkeley is mentioned in the Adrastea". Several circumstances speak against Clark's view, however. First of all there is internal evidence in the very text to which Clark refers, a note on Berkeley's Theory of Vision. Probably because Berkeley's work itself was not easily available in Germany, Herder refers the reader to Reid's account of Berkeley's theory: "See Thomas Reid's judgment of it in his Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Verstand in which he utilized the work very much himself". (Herder, Werke, ed. Suphan, vol. XXIV, p. 404 (Adrastea). The reference is to the German translation which appeared in 1782. Herder has the title wrong in two places and thus probably refers to it from memory. He refers to it as "Untersuchungen", not "Untersuchung" and as being about the "menschliche Verstand" and not about the "menschliche Geist" as it is. This seems to point towards an earlier reading of the work. It is indeed more than likely that Herder, who was very much interested in psychology and always up to the latest developments, read the Inquiry in 1782, if not earlier in the original or in French translation --- and especially Reid's Inquiry played a significant role

in Hamann's thought, with which Herder was thoroughly familiar. The Philologische Einfälle und Zweifel, in which Herder had a burning interest (since it constituted Hamann's rejection of Herder's theory of language) refers to Reid at a crucial phase in the argument. Hamann wrote this work in 1772. It was never published, but Herder was able to obtain the original of Hamann's transcript. See Rudolf Haym, Herder, vol. I, p. 530, and Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, vol. III, pp. 423-4. But as late as September 25, 1772 Herder does not appear to know Reid. In number LXXVII of the Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen, Werke, ed. Suphan, V, p. 452, he does not mention Reid where one would expect him to do so: "The spirit of British philosophy appears to have made its way beyond Hadrian's Wall and have collected a small group of its kind in the Scottish Highlands. Ferguson, Robertson, Gerard, Beattie and Millar are people who outrate the dull Search by far, and because they have chosen their field in unison, as it were, their philosophy becomes still more valuable. For it is mostly philosophy of the shapes and changes of human kind in agreement with history and experience". It could perhaps also be argued that the passage quoted on p. 160 below shows that Herder did not know Reid in 1774, but the passage of the Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen does show that Ferguson, Robertson, Gerard, Home and Beattie were not without influence upon Herder's philosophy of history.

144. Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 1786 (April), pp. 181-3, p. 181.

145. Ibid. Compare with footnotes 11 and 113 of this chapter.

146. Ibid., p. 182.
147. The reviewer appears to have been especially annoyed by Reid's reference to Wolff. He interprets this as the expression of a vain desire on Reid's part to pretend that he knows German philosophy. Reid does refer to Wolff's Psychologia empirica.
148. Christian Garve, Briefe an Christian Weisse und einige andere Freunde, Theil 1.2, Breslau, 1803, p. 248.
149. Hamann, Briefwechsel VI, p. 230. See also Johann Georg Hamann's, der Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 6 vols., ed. C.H. Gildemeister, Gotha, 1857-73, vol. V, p. 196. The letter is dated January 5, 1786, but the review appeared only in the April issue of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of the same year. It is therefore likely that Hamann refers to the proof sheets of this issue. Because of Kant's close connections with this journal, this is quite possible. "Latin Newspaper" is Herder's and Hamann's term for the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung which, as will be recalled, published Kant's reviews of Herder's Ideen.
150. On June 8, 1786 (Gildemeister, Leben und Schriften, vol. V, p. 348, Briefwechsel VI, p. 421). Hamann reminds Jacobi of his wish to read Reid's Essays, probably asking Jacobi to buy the book: ". . . have a good voyage to England and let me find the Reid at your home, so that I have something to read for such an unfortunate occasion when I can neither speak nor think". But before Hamann departs on his visit, Jacobi's David Hume über den Glauben appears. On June 10, 1787 Hamann reminds Jacobi again of his wish to read Reid: ". . . one meal I hope to enjoy at your place: Reid's Essays."

I was almost annoyed to find it referred to by you only in accordance with a German review. Such a work you must possess. In this regard I still allow myself a little curiosity, though I do not expect even here in time a clarification of the question what man is." Not quite a month later, now convinced that Jacobi has the work (on what basis I do not know since Jacobi's letters of this period are published only very incompletely), he is able to write to Herder: "I am looking forward to a fine meal at Pempelfort [Jacobi's residence], namely to Reid's Essays, which lie ready for me there" (Hamann to Herder, July 2, 1787, Johann Georg Hamann, Schriften, 8 vols., ed. Friedrich Roth and Gustav Adolph Wiener, Berlin & Leipzig, 1821-43, vol. vii, p. 360.

151. As a Kantian journal it sided more with rationalism than with the more or less irrationalistic doctrines of Jacobi.
152. Hamann to Jacobi, April 27, 1787, Hamann, Werke, ed. Gildemeister, vol. V, p. 508. The correspondence of Hamann and Jacobi as published in vol. IV, 3 of Jacobi's Werke leaves out most of the references to Reid. For Humboldt's testimony see Chapter X, footn. 54. Jacobi certainly did nothing to hinder this development. When Friedrich Bouterwek, a philosopher at the University of Göttingen, remarked with regard to G.E. Schulze's Kritik der Philosophie, that the work "finally reminded philosophers again that in the state of intuition we are not aware of the intuition itself as an act of connection between the knowing subject and the known object" (See Baum, Vernunft und Erkenntniss, p. 71). Jacobi protested that Bouterwek ascribed an honour to Schulze that really

he himself deserved the most. For, Jacobi argued, "the third between the knowing subject and the object to be known, which has been assumed since Locke, has been removed thoroughly by myself first, as far as I know" (Jacobi to Bouterwek, ed. W. Meyer, Gottingen, 1868, vol. p. 64. Quoted in accordance with Baum, Vernunft und Erkenntniss, p. 70. Baum notes that Jacobi appears to have been fully convinced of this "historically indefensible opinion". Jacobi is not only preceded by Reid in this regard, but also fully dependent upon his work, as we shall see in Chapter X of this work).

It should perhaps also be noticed that Jacobi's boast was rather uncalled for, if only for the reason that Bouterwek did not even ascribe originality to Schulze (as a Göttinger he was well aware of both Reid and Jacobi). Bouterwek only said that Schulze "reminded" philosophers "again" of this, indicating that there had been (several) others before. But Jacobi might not have been angered so much by the remarks of Bouterwek as by Schulze's text. For Schulze claims that "Reid is the only one among all the modern philosophers who has disputed the truth of the doctrine that all sensations and intuitions consist only of representations mainly because of its paradoxical consequences; see his Untersuchungen (sic) "über den menschlichen Geist", second chapter, third section and sixth chapter, section twenty" (Gottlieb Ernst Schulze, Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie, 2 vols., Hamburg, 1801, vol. 2, p. 22n. Schulze obviously knew Jacobi's work very well and his failure to mention it in this connection could very well be construed as a

conscious slighting of Jacobi. Schulze's criticism of Kant follows Reid's criticism of Hume, by the way.

154. Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1787, number 63 (April 21), pp. 626-30, pp. 627-7. The reviewer is Feder. See p. 186 and footn. 160 of this chapter.
155. Ibid., p. 628.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid., p. 630.
159. It was edited by Feder and Meiners and may be said to constitute a "last ditch effort" in their defense against Kant's philosophy. It lasted only from 1788 to 1791 (four volumes).
160. Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. I (1788), pp. 43-62, p. 43. The reviewer is identified as Feder.
161. Ibid., vol. II (1789), pp. 83-118, p. 107: "incidentally, what I think of the author's basic principles I have made known already in the third part of my Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Willen and at some other occasions, especially also in my judgment about the Kantian Critique of Practical Reason".
162. The very selection of the topic shows already in which regard Reid could still be found important in the Germany of 1786. Kant's Critique of Judgment appeared only in 1790.
163. Schulze criticized Kant with the help of Reid's theory of perception. Reinhold clearly also moved closer and closer to Reid in his later works, as has been shown by Gunther Baum in "K.L. Reinholds Elementarphilosophie und die Idee des transzendentalen Idealismus",



Kant-Studien, 64 (1973), pp. 213-30. Fries, who in certain respects returns to Tetens' approach, regards Reid very highly. See especially J.F. Fries, Tradition, Mysticismus und gesunde Logik, oder über die Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 404, 441-6. Compare Chapter II, p.73 above.

164. Dr. Jakob Beattie, Moralische und kritische Abhandlungen, 3 vols., transl. Carl Grosse, Leipzig, 1789, 1790.
165. James Beattie, "Über das Erhabene", Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste, XXX, i, (1785), pp. 5-52, ii, (1785), pp. 195-228.

J.B. "Über das Träumen", Magazin für die Naturgeschichte des Menschen, Zittau & Leipzig, vol. I, part I (1788), pp. 35-70. Since it headed only by "J.B." it has been missed by Fabian and Kloth in their bibliography of Beattie.

James Beattie, "Etwas über die Sprache" (Auszug aus seiner Theory of Language), Magazin für die Naturgeschichte des Menschen, vol. III, part I (1790), pp. 1-53.

Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste, XXIX (1783), pp. 182-4, p. 182: "Dr. Beattie, who has already gained a considerable reputation among critical writers, even though we would not count him among the first philosophical writers of his nation, re-affirms his merits through these essays.

Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1784, number 165 (October 14), pp. 1649-55.

Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. III (1790), p. 250.

Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1789, number 143

(September 5), pp. 1433-4.

Ibid., 1791, number 12 (January 20), p. 120.

Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 1789 (October), pp. 6-8.

Ibid., 1790 (October), p. 14. The reviewer of 1789 finds that "Beattie is long known and appreciated in Germany as a philosopher and poet".

Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, vol. XCIV (1790), pp. 467-70.

Ibid., vol. CI (1791), pp. 136-7. The first reviewer (pp. 467-8) says: "As a speculative philosopher Beattie does not have the best reputation, but as an acute and tasteful writer, well acquainted with the spirit of classical literature, concerned with matters of taste and the philosophy of life, we have done justice to him. His remarks are usually subtle, at times new and surprising. When he begins to reason, however, we miss firm and certain principles as well as connection of concepts and plausibility of proofs".

The Theory of Language of Beattie was reviewed in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of 1788 (July), pp. 286-8.

For Beattie's reputation see also the Preface by the translator of the Dissertations: "The universality with which the merits of my author are known makes the usual speech of a translator unnecessary . . . Anybody who seeks deep metaphysical speculation in this work will be very much amiss. Anybody who sees a deficiency in this, given the present situation of philosophy, may not be quite wrong either. A plain, light, yet spirited course of ideas, acute use of ordinary experiences and not infrequently keen inference from this

experience make this book useful reading. The elegant diction, the calm and well-bred colorit, the elastic construction of the periods also make it pleasant reading" (Beattie, Moralische und kritische Abhandlungen, Preface of the translator).

166. James Beattie's Grundlinien der Psychologie, natürlichen Theologie, Moralphilosophie und Logik, vol. I, transl. Karl Philipp Moritz, Berlin, 1790. Volume II never appeared. Friedrich O. Wolf in his Introduction to Beattie's Philosophical Works, vol. I, p. 6 argues on the basis of the fact that Karl Philipp Moritz translated this work and was also the editor of the "first psychological journal of the world", the Magazin für Erfahrungsseelenkunde, that "it has been mainly Beattie by whom the psychological turn has been handed on to the first group of professed psychologists". This is clearly an exaggeration. First of all, Moritz belongs already to the second generation of professed psychologists. Lossius, Platner, Tiedemann, Meiners and many others saw themselves as psychologists as well. Secondly, Beattie was certainly not the only author advocating psychological analysis. Reid, Oswald, Ferguson, Lord Kames, Search and many other British philosophers also advocated psychological analysis as the only promising method of philosophical investigation. Moreover, it is very difficult to establish any far-reaching influence of Beattie upon Moritz. Because many of Beattie's views had become Gemeingut at the period, and because Moritz was well versed in the psychological literature of his time, it is almost impossible to say from whom he took over a particular theory or observation. See also footn. 18 of Chapter

I of this work for a further discussion of Wolff's views.

167. Beattie, Grundlinien, Preface.
168. Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, civ (1791), pp. 220-2.
169. Ibid., p. 221.
170. Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 1792, (January), pp. 63-4, p. 64.

The appearance of the original was already noted in the "Intelligenzblatt" of this journal of November 20, 1790. The Philosophischer Anzeiger, 1795, number 6, p. 48 referred its readers to the review of the second volume of this work by Beattie in the Critical Review of 1794: "Even though the English reviewer remarks that other writers have dealt with these matters in a more detailed fashion, he still praises the book very much because of its content, its thoroughness and its beautiful and entertaining style. This part contains moral economy, politics and logic.

The book is determined for academic lectures".

171. Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 1792 (January), p. 64.
172. For an account of the philosophical alternatives which appeared to be the only possible ones for the German thinkers towards the end of the 18th century see, for instance, David Theodor Suabedissen, Resultate der philosophischen Forschungen über die Natur der menschlichen Erkenntnis von Plato bis Kant, Warburg, 1805, especially pp. 439-44. It seemed clear to Suabedissen that a universally accepted theory of knowledge was needed, but that it had not been found yet. "Dogmatists, Criticists and Idealists are still in opposition to one another and maintain . . . to possess all principles of knowledge, while the skeptic disputes everything"

(ibid., pp. 439-40). But some advances have been made: (1) "The problem (in so far as it allows of a solution at all) has been reduced to three distinct points of view": either subjectivity and objectivity are both original and exist in isolation (dualism), or the subjective has to be derived from the objective (materialism), or the objective has to be derived from the subjective (idealism); (2) it seems that the first two approaches do not afford a solution; (3) therefore it has to be solved by transcendental idealism or it cannot be solved at all. The last is maintained by the skeptic. He concludes: "I hope that nobody will reject this result because the choice between idealism and skepticism, which is the only possible one resulting from the philosophical situation, is considered to be a dangerous choice. For idealism and philosophical skepticism . . . will always be restricted to a small number of independent thinkers. Common sense is the most incurable dogmatist, and it should and will remain it. The skeptic is so much the friend of common sense that his entire doctrine consists in the claim that we cannot advance beyond the claims and facts of common sense. The idealist, however, will never dare the ridiculous enterprise of converting common sense, since he aims at explaining it" (ibid., p. 444). Suabedissen is very much aware of Reid and his Scottish and German followers. See op. cit., pp. 200-3 and 210. He claims that Reid, Oswald and Beattie's "new doctrine, which was opposed to Hume, necessarily had to spread Hume's way of thinking" (ibid., p. 203). Compare this with Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte, I, p. 358 and pp. 391-2.

But see also vol. II, p. 113.

173. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Theorie Werkausgabe, Frankfurt/Main, 1971, vol. 2, p. 182.
174. Gottlob August Tittel, Erläuterungen der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie nach Feders Ordnung, 6 vols., Frankfurt/Main, 1783-94, Logik, p. 421. See also Metaphysik, pp. 292-3 and p. 297. On p. 297, Tittel refers also to Isaac de Pinto as a French follower of Reid. His works were also translated into German. For Pinto see Richard H. Popkin "Hume and Isaac de Pinto, II, Five New Letters", in Hume and the Enlightenment, Essays presented to E.C. Mossner, ed. William Todd, Edinburgh, Austin, 1974, especially p. 118.
175. Schopenhauer, who appears to have followed Schulze Aenesidemus in this regard, regarded Thomas Reid very highly. See Chapter I, footnote 4 above, for instance. Hegel, by the way, appears to have appreciated Reid much more than many of the Kantians. See Chapter I, footnote 4 and Chapter II, footnote 69, as well as Chapter X, footnote 95 of this work.
176. The investigation of the influence which Reid's thought might have had upon these thinkers, as well as upon Brentano and Husserl, goes far beyond the limits of this work, however.

### PART III

#### A COMMON SENSE CRITIQUE : REALISM VERSUS IDEALISM<sup>\*</sup>

In Chapters II and III it has been shown that the doctrines of Scottish common sense could indeed be seen to be of extreme relevance for the problems confronting German philosophers during the "cognitive crisis" of the enlightenment. In Chapter IV it was established that the Germans were, in fact, very well acquainted with the works of Reid, Oswald and Beattie and that these works were not only available in Germany but were also debated hotly. Thus, both the systematic and the historical pre-conditions for a more profound influence of Scottish common sense upon German thought existed. With this chapter we shall turn to the actual investigation of this influence and attempt to trace the effects of Scottish common sense upon the further development of German philosophy between 1768 and 1800.

The entire second part which begins with this chapter will be concerned with the Scottish influence upon the so called "popular philosophers". It will be argued that the latter attempted to establish their "empirical rationalism" by means of an approach which may very well be called a "critique of pure reason on the principles of common sense".

To characterize this group of "philosophical journalists", as serious critics of philosophy and to ascribe a project of such magnitude to them may appear paradoxical. How could these "dogmatic", "uncritical", "shallow", "platitudinous" and "a-historical" writers have anything of interest to say on this subject? The fact is that these characterisations and value judgments were never seriously questioned and do not

---

<sup>\*</sup> Notes to this are found together with the notes of Chapter V, pp.260-270.

stand up to criticism. They amount to nothing more than mere prejudices. They arose during the last third of the 18th century because the Classical writers, the Kantians, the Romanticists and the Idealists all found it equally necessary to discredit these Enlighteners in order to succeed themselves. The classical writers of Germany, Goethe, Schiller and their followers attacked them as mediocre bourgeoisie, who could not appreciate genius. The Kantians disqualified them as dogmatic and uncritical. The Idealists, who accused even Kant of being too much of a common-sense philosopher, found them shallow and a-historical, and the Romanticists took every opportunity to ridicule their "Alltagsverstand" (literally: "everyday-understanding", meaning common sense). But their characterisations clearly cannot be taken at face value. These "descriptions" were dictated by polemical needs, and as such they were certainly justifiable in the works of the Classics, the Kantians, the Idealists and the Romanticists. But they are more than questionable when used uncritically as descriptive and classificatory terms in the history of philosophy. Feder, Lossius, Platner, Eberhard, Mendelssohn and the other Enlighteners were far from being uncritical. They took great pride in their critical attitude and are much better described as moderate skeptics than as dogmatic philosophers.<sup>1</sup> That they came to be seen as dogmatic and uncritical is perhaps one of the ironies of history.<sup>2</sup>

While their method is usually called "eclecticism" or "syncretism", it is perhaps better to characterize it as "indifferentism" or "methodical skepticism". "Eclecticism" and "syncretism" not only imply already a negative value judgment, they are also more characterizations of the final outcome of their thought than of their endeavours. They did not set out simply to give a collection of different philosophical



opinions, but tried to develop a consistent philosophical system. Their study of different philosophical theories was no end in itself, but a methodological tool. Feder said, for instance: "In order to protect oneself from the delusions of one-sided representations and to reach well-founded insights it is necessary to compare different ways of representation and to study several systems".<sup>3</sup> In this approach skeptical reserve was just as necessary as a sound common sense, and all the arguments against radical skepticism should not obscure the fact that most of the Enlighteners considered themselves as moderate skeptics.

In fact, it appears to have been this skepticism towards all philosophical theories which brought these thinkers to common sense. They found that philosophers often aimed too highly in their conception of philosophy and attempted to obtain knowledge out of reach for human beings. But, "whatever else man may try, he can only think with his own understanding" and not with some super-human faculty of thought which grants absolutely certain knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Our understanding is very limited and not the best we can imagine, but it is all we have. "To despise it for this reason, not to be satisfied with it . . . would neither be philosophy nor wisdom".<sup>5</sup> Philosophy has to become more modest. It has to learn from common sense, which is stronger than speculation. Indeed the circumstance

that common sense and the principles of morals, upon which human happiness depends most, have been conserved in spite of all the many artificial webs of error shows the beneficial frame of nature, which does not allow us to drift too far from these wholesome truths in the course of exaggerated speculation. Dark feelings indicate them for us and instinct leads us always back to them.<sup>6</sup>

Accordingly, the real task of philosophy can only be to establish these

principles of common sense and morality more clearly and to defend them against the exaggerated speculations of certain philosophers.<sup>7</sup> In this task the Germans found allies in Reid, Oswald and Beattie.

They tried to show that the world which common sense represents to us is the real world in conscious opposition to idealism, skepticism and rationalism. But, as we will see, in the end they escape neither rationalism nor idealism, and their attempt at the development of a "rational empiricism" failed rather miserably.

## CHAPTER V

### COMMON SENSE AND SENSATIONALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF FEDER

Johann Georg Heinrich Feder (1740-1821) is in many respects typical of the philosophers of his generation. Not only is the eclectic tendency of these thinkers and the general outlook of their philosophy most clearly seen in Feder's work, but so is his career as a "professional philosopher" typical in that it can be clearly divided into two different periods, namely that before the success of Kantianism and that after its success. During the first period Feder enjoyed an early success as a professor of philosophy at one of the most modern and most highly regarded universities of Germany at that time, the Georgia Augusta of Göttingen, as a very influential and powerful philosophical critic for the Göttingische Anzeigen and as an author of widely used textbooks for metaphysics and moral philosophy. The second period is characterized by a sudden change for the worse in all these respects. He lost his reputation, his influence, renounced his position as a university professor and even ceased reviewing. The cause for this decline was the review of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in the Göttingische Anzeigen. After Kant had

shown his great indignation at the review and assaulted the anonymous reviewer as a hopeless simpleton, after it became known that Feder had "mutilated" the original review by Garve and actually inserted just those passages which had angered Kant the most, Feder's reputation was damaged beyond repair.<sup>8</sup> He himself was greatly shaken and lost confidence in his abilities. Later he spoke of "the amputation of my reputation as an author and lecturer by the critical revolutions in philosophy".<sup>9</sup>

Feder's most important works, apart from the reviews and articles for the Göttingische Anzeigen and other journals, are his Logik und Metaphysik nebst der philosophischen Geschichte im Grundrisse, Göttingen, 1769, his Lehrbuch der praktischen Philosophie, Göttingen, 1770, his Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Willen in four volumes, Lemgo, 1779-93, and his Über den Raum und die Causalität, zur Prüfung der Kant-schen Philosophie, Göttingen, 1787. Important are also the Philosophische Bibliothek, which he published together with Meiners between 1788 and 1791, and his posthumously published autobiography Johann Georg Heinrich Feder's Leben, Natur und Grundsätze, Leipzig, Hannover, Darmstadt, 1825. How great Feder's reputation was may already be seen from the number of editions which his textbooks underwent, even though they were used regularly at many universities (and thus reprinted there as well).<sup>10</sup> His textbook on logic and metaphysics appeared in seven editions under the original title between 1769 and 1790, as well as an eighth time under the title Grundsätze der Logik und Metaphysik in 1794. The Latin adaptation of this work, the Institutia logicae et metaphysicae also appeared in four editions between 1777 and 1797, and his textbook on practical philosophy went through seven editions.

It is very easy to show that Feder had a detailed knowledge of the works of Reid, Oswald and Beattie. There are many references to them throughout his works, which draw attention to their importance for psychology and the theory of knowledge.<sup>11</sup> He also reviewed most of the writings of these Scots for the Göttingische Anzeigen and his Philosophische Bibliothek.<sup>12</sup> In these reviews Feder never neglected to draw attention to "the great and meritorious aim" of the Scots and to his belief that their "main thought is correct".<sup>13</sup> Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man are called by him "the most important foreign product of speculative philosophy that became known in recent years".<sup>14</sup> Moreover, since Feder called himself also a philosopher of common sense, and since his student, friend and colleague Christoph Meiners also made no secret of his great debts to Beattie in psychological and aesthetic matters, the Göttinger philosophers came to be regarded as the spokesmen for Scottish common sense in Germany. This, by the way, proved to be a rather mixed blessing for the fortunes of the Scottish philosophy. For, though it may have helped initially, it was clearly also responsible for the disregard into which it fell through Kant's harsh criticism in the Prolegomena.<sup>15</sup>

But Feder never became a follower of the Scots in the sense of accepting most of Reid's theory of knowledge. In fact, it is not even clear that he understood Reid's view in all its subtleties. He is really only interested in Reid's pronouncements on first truths and neglects his analysis of perception (even though, as we have seen in Chapter II, the first truths cannot be understood in isolation from his account of perception). As Zart points out, "early in his life he was

not greatly interested in the investigation of problems of logic and the theory of knowledge and only later was he concerned to mediate between Locke and Wolff as well as between Reid and Hume".<sup>16</sup> Accordingly, even though there are references to Oswald and Reid in the earliest editions of his textbook on logic and metaphysics, his appreciation of the details of their theory appears to have developed rather slowly.

Of course there are parallels between Reid and Feder from the first works until the last: He relies on Reid's principle of veracity in his discussion of the trustworthiness of human testimony.<sup>17</sup> He appropriates Reid's appeal to ordinary language and its distinctions and rules as relevant for metaphysics.<sup>18</sup> His understanding of skepticism and idealism is clearly coloured by Reid's account.<sup>19</sup> He accepts Reid's theory that our sensations and the objects do not stand in a pictorial relation and, just as Reid, he accepts at the very same time the validity of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.<sup>20</sup> But there can be no doubt that Reid's importance for Feder increases towards the end of his life. This shows itself clearly in his arguments against Idealism.

#### A. Feder's Arguments Against Skepticism and Idealism

Feder sees in skepticism and idealism the main enemies of common sense and all sound philosophy. Their refutation is one of the most important goals of his philosophy. In some way it would not be inappropriate to call his philosophy "anti-idealism" for the same reasons that that of his student Tiedemann is so called. But it is not even clear whether when he first begins to argue against them, Feder knows any idealistic philosopher first hand. In the second edition of his textbook on logic and metaphysics (1770) he does not yet refer to George

Berkeley, whom he later regards as the idealist par excellence but simply refers to "the idealist". It could very well be that he knows of the position of this "idealist" only through secondary sources, that is, mainly through Oswald and Reid's work.<sup>21</sup> In any case, Feder finds it necessary to argue against this position of a skeptical idealist, believes that "the dispute with the skeptic is usually made more difficult than it has to be, since philosophers want to prove too much and do not allow the skeptics to be correct where they are correct".<sup>22</sup> The real problem must be seen as follows:

Nobody seems to have gone so far as to deny his own existence and the existence of the sensations of which he is aware. The existence of the qualities which we notice in the sensations cannot be denied either. That we feel some things with pleasure, others with repulsion, others as external cannot be doubted. But all this means in general terms only that we sense what we sense actually as we sense it, or whatever appears appears. But whether what appears is real, whether there really are objects external to us, and if there are, whether they are of the kind in which they appear to us, and finally if there is truth and foundation for science in this appearance in and for itself, about this one can dispute.<sup>23</sup>

But Feder believes he is in possession of an effective weapon against these doubts. Employing a strategy very like Reid's he argues that the idealists have fallen victim to a confusion of language. But the actual arguments advanced by Feder are not at all the same. Answering the idealist, he says:

As far as I can see, you have the same representations of objects as I have. You see them as though they were external to yourself. This is proved by your behavior with regard to them. You know very well the difference between a merely occasional or temporary appearance which is refuted by the much more constant appearance and by countless other representations, and the many things which constantly appear in the same way in innumerable instances and to innumerable persons, as long as they are in an

orderly frame of mind. These latter appearances are in accordance with the nature and end of human beings. This constant appearance in the orderly and most perfect state of human nature as well as in the correct sensation I call together with the rest of humanity "being". And this you call, together with a few others, incorrect. But if it does not cause any discomfort to call "being" what appears to all humans in this way . . . why do you not want to speak as all other people speak, and why do you want to cause confusion in our whole system of concepts and thought by banishing one word.<sup>24</sup>

Compared to Reid's analysis of the matter, Feder sounds certainly rather naive and ill-informed, and, though this last appeal to the idealist appears to put him in very much the same league as Oswald and Beattie, his preceding analysis shows that he has a quite different view of the entire issue than either Reid, Oswald or Beattie. While the Scots clearly rejected any form of mediating mental entities, such as "ideas" or "appearances", Feder just as clearly still relies on them.<sup>25</sup> For his entire argument amounts to claiming that "constant appearance in sensation" means "to be", which does not appear to be very different from Berkeley's claim that "to be" is "to be perceived". Whereas Berkeley, arguing against materialism, said that to be is to be perceived, Feder, arguing against what he takes to be idealism, says that to be perceived (in a certain way) is to be (at least for us and our limited minds). Nevertheless, Feder's strictures appear to have been generally accepted as realism, while Berkeley's position was commonly rejected as idealism probably because the Germans did not know the writings of the "idealist" Berkeley very well.

After having established the reality of "external" objects in this way, Feder goes on to show that the qualities of objects are real in the same sense. It is quite clear to him that we cannot perceive things as



they are in themselves, "for we sense only a modification of ourselves, even though we usually say that we sense an object".<sup>26</sup> But this only means that "the true qualities of objects, which cause our sensations are not revealed through sensation and that through sensation we only know what an object is for our organs (of sensation)".<sup>27</sup> Since appearance is the only possible reality for us, we must also be allowed to attribute those qualities which constantly recur to the objects themselves.

Thus, when Feder claims in his "Über den Raum und die Causalität" that he never "was an anti-idealist of the usual sort" and that he always opposed the "supposed demonstrations of the reality of the world of objects" and therefore agrees "in substance with Kant on most points with regard to what he has to say about idealism", he is quite correct. His realism is not so different from Kant's empirical realism as is usually thought. In fact, the only criticism Feder has to make is that Kant has removed himself too far and "without need" from the common way of talking about this matter.<sup>28</sup>

But Feder's own treatment of idealism in this latter work is much more careful. In the section "Anti-idealism in Accordance with the Simple and Solid Principles of Common Sense" he still holds that the main danger of idealism is the confusion of language ("it certainly is not a doctrine which would cause murder and manslaughter"), but he now emphasizes that idealism is the symptom of more fundamental mistakes in a philosophical system. Contradicting his earlier analysis, he says that the claim that the objects are nothing but representations within our mind is "so contrary to the nature of our understanding that the

principles and basic concepts which necessarily lead to it must be rejected for this reason".<sup>29</sup> Clearly relying upon Reid, Feder now finds that the common distinction between a representation and its object is fundamental for all of our thinking and should not be obliterated by philosophers or be declared mistaken. Moreover, the fact that in sensation the object asserts itself as real marks the distinction between sensations on the one hand and imaginations and remembrances on the other, a distinction which is also well observed in ordinary language and accepted as obvious by everybody.<sup>30</sup> While in the earlier account "being" meant "constant appearance", in Über den Raum und die Causalität

the term reality, being means exactly, or at least first and foremost, what is the case in a sensation and not in a mere representation. Or someone should try to explain and develop the concept of reality without a relation to sensation. The soul has no other proof of its existence than this feeling either. Through the difference of this feeling it knows itself as something real and different from its representations of other mental powers and states".<sup>31</sup>

The second important distinction which common sense makes between representations and objects is that it regards the latter as being external to the mind. This is also denied by the idealist. But Feder argues, just as had Reid, that there is really no reason to deny what our sensations and common sense witness so vividly. The dispute with the idealist has however brought other characteristics of the objects to light. While common sense and ordinary language are merely concerned with the reality and externality of objects, philosophers have also argued for the independence of these objects from ourselves. This independence does not imply that the objects exist in the same way as we perceive them, but only that they exist apart from our mind. What these objects may be

apart from their relations to our instruments of perception cannot be decided by us in principle. That they must be thought to exist independently of us, however, is clear from some simple considerations.

As we have seen already, in this later discussion of idealism, Feder is much more dependent upon Reid than in his earlier one. In fact, all the major characteristics of Reid's critique of the idealistic position can be found in Feder's critique of Kant as well. Not only the distinction between perception and object of perception, its establishment through comparison with other acts of the mind such as imagination and remembering, his emphasis upon our feeling for reality and his discussion of the difference between primary and secondary qualities are almost identical to Reid's account, even many of the details of his arguments can be traced back to Reid's works. Thus he employs arguments from the perceptual experience of blind persons (and criticizes Kant severely for not having made any note of this in his discussion of space).<sup>32</sup> In fact, it is difficult to see any difference between Feder and Reid in their criticism of the idealistic position, if we consider Feder's "Über den Raum und die Causality" alone. If there are any differences between the two, however, we may be sure that they are the result of Feder's rejection of Reid's diagnosis of the sources of idealism, namely the "theory of ideas". Even in his later work Feder is not willing to follow Reid, Oswald and Beattie in their rejection of "mediating mental entities" for one of his basic philosophical convictions is his sensationism.

#### B. Feder's Sensationalism

However useful Feder found Reid, Oswald and Beattie as allies in his fight against idealism, he could not accept their basic criticism of

phenomenalism. In his review of Beattie's Essay of 1771, he comments upon Reid's rejection of the theory of ideas and finds that this theory "could very well be correct, even though we can easily go wrong in its interpretation and employment", and in his review of Priestley's Examination he claims that the dispute between Reid and Berkeley can only be resolved by "showing how this dispute depends entirely upon words and that the disputants are completely at one in the matter, which basically appears to have been Berkeley's opinion as well".<sup>33</sup> Thus Feder does not accept Reid's argument that phenomenalism necessarily leads to skepticism and idealism. It is merely a historical accident that Berkeley and Hume have followed Descartes and Locke. Even though the "theory of ideas" is very difficult to understand and employ, it can be made to work. And one of the things Feder sets out to do is just this, to interpret and employ the theory of ideas properly.

Accordingly his theory is in many respects more reminiscent of Lord Kames and Riedel than of Thomas Reid. In his Logik und Metaphysik (2nd ed., 1770) he gives a completely sensationalistic account of knowledge. External and internal sensation are the only original sources of knowledge. Reason can only work with the materials supplied by these senses and has therefore only a limited function. This function of reason or "higher cognition" is "to find the concepts which sensation does not give to us immediately, though their basis lies in sensation already".<sup>34</sup> Therefore "the sensations always have to remain authoritative in particular cases in so far as we can neither demonstrate their existence away, nor can reason overturn our accepted rules. For the general propositions have to be based upon the agreement of particular

sensations".<sup>35</sup> To illustrate the relation between these two basic faculties Feder uses the following allegory:

Sensation is like a sailor who always keeps close to the coast, reason like a sailor who crosses the ocean. If there is more danger in the latter, there is also more hope of gain. But the basic laws of sensation must be to reason what the compass is to the sailor.<sup>36</sup>

Thus sensation does not only provide the materials to all rational thought, it also remains the guide of reason in the formation of general conceptions. Even the principles of truth, justice and beauty are not so much principles of reason as principles of sensation. We feel what is true, what is just and what is beautiful. We know it immediately and not through discursive thought. Our human understanding is essentially tied to sensation and to think as a human being means for Feder to think in accordance with our sensations and feelings and the laws which govern them. Reason has to stay within the bounds of sense, and "if reason opposes the natural sensation, it works against itself and is no longer healthy reason".<sup>37</sup> All this shows already in what way the Scottish conception of a common sense with certain basic laws could become of importance to Feder.

#### C. Feder's Theory of Common Sense and First Truths

Feder's conception of healthy reason or common sense has the closest connection with his theory of first truths.<sup>38</sup> It is in this respect that the Scots are most important to him. Throughout his philosophical works Feder emphasizes that he is convinced of the importance of the Scottish common sense theory that common sense consists of certain basic principles or first truths. In 1771, in his review of Beattie's Essay he argues: "the conception of truth, that truth for us is what we have

to believe and falsity what we are forced to reject, can be reduced to a correct principle".<sup>39</sup> In 1774, in his review of the German translation of Oswald's Appeal, he finds:

the main thought is correct . . . there are basic truths, immediately evident propositions, our understanding has the capability to know them and is therefore forced to accept them just as it has to accept the conclusion of a thorough and evident argument; we should not be tempted to prove them, but should be content to see whether somebody has enough common sense to grasp them -- all this is correct.<sup>40</sup>

And in 1788, in his review of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, "the most important foreign work of speculative philosophy that has become known in recent times", he claims that the article concerning basic truths is "the most interesting one" and that "the characteristic outlook" of Reid's philosophy "mainly derives from it".<sup>41</sup> But this basic agreement of Feder with the Scots does not mean that he uncritically accepts their entire account of common sense and basic truths. In fact, he advances several fundamental criticisms, thus modifying the Scottish view considerably.

First of all, he rejects Beattie's claim that common sense constitutes a special human faculty, a kind of intuition, different from our rational faculty. The "differentiation between the sensus communis and the faculty of inference is somewhat too hastily made".<sup>42</sup> Accordingly, for Feder common sense is rather a certain part or aspect of our understanding. This leads to a second closely connected criticism, namely that the Scots have not determined the nature and extent of these first truths carefully enough. They have failed to give a sufficient definition of first truths and have therefore been led to assume too many first truths. Feder argues that there are many propositions which are not

basic principles, though they come very close to them, for they are immediate inferences from these basic principles. They are such obvious conclusions that they cannot be proved by means of any other principles in a geometrical fashion. To say, however, that they are first principles is just as wrong as trying to give elaborate proofs of them. These immediate inferences from basic truths or principles share with other truths the characteristic that they can be doubted. In fact,

all propositions which are not basic truths in the strictest sense can be doubted in a certain manner and for some time without nonsense; they can be proved or justified by giving reasons (either apagogic or apodictic, a priori or a posteriori).<sup>43</sup>

Basic truths in the strictest sense are not capable of any proof, since they do not depend upon any mediating concepts. They are of such a kind that "our understanding must accept them without any reasoning whatsoever". For this reason, Feder goes on to say

such propositions can only be those which indicate what lies immediately in our inner or outer sensation and which indicate this only as an appearance (*Schein*). It seems to me that there are such and such things; I am aware that the whole is equal to all its parts. About such propositions we cannot dispute. Moreover, nobody who has understood the meaning of the words in these propositions has ever doubted them seriously.<sup>44</sup>

But to say, for instance, that what appears to us in sensation really exists is to draw a conclusion already. "It is an inferred truth a judgment which has its real logical reason in the mediating thought that the mediating expression 'externally existing visible object' should not and cannot mean anything else than just this conscious and enduring appearance of the natural sensations".<sup>45</sup> Even the principle of causal relation is an inference or a judgment presupposing reasoning:

The proposition that the same conjunction of objects, qualities and changes which we have observed thus far will hold always and everywhere, a proposition upon which most of our inferred knowledge about reality are based, is in itself in no way a first principle in the strictest sense. To some extent it has its basis in the natural association of ideas. This is the only basis which Hume gave for this proposition. Through this he has caused not only so much commotion, but also all the lively activities of the preachers of common sense and the fear of the proposition that all our knowledge is based upon particular perceptions (Gewahrnehmungen) of sensation. But this proposition is also based upon imitation and has its logically sufficient reason on the one hand in the fact that we cannot regard that which has never happened as a certain possibility and on the other hand (and most importantly) in the experience that the causal proposition is never or at least very rarely deceptive, and that we are much better off in accepting it than we would be in accepting any other proposition.<sup>46</sup>

For Feder "all our general propositions concerning nature and especially the law of causality are nothing else than extended experience".<sup>47</sup> But this "extending" of particular experiences into general propositions does, of course, presuppose certain principles which enable us to differentiate between valid and invalid extensions.

These "basic principles of the human understanding" are "the generally accepted law of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason".<sup>48</sup> They are, in fact, the only two immediate principles of common sense Feder is willing to admit. As he remarks already in his review of Beattie's Essay,

to accept only a few propositions as immediate principles, as principia formalia veritatis, namely those which everybody accepts as such, and to prove with their help all the others (at least whenever this is requested), is in final analysis better than declaring very many propositions as immediately evident, as our author does together with most patrons of common sense. Exacting investigators of the soul know how rare the really immediate and pure judgments of sensation (Empfindungsurteile) are in any case.<sup>49</sup>



But at times Feder does not even appear to be satisfied with these two basic laws as principles presupposed in all knowledge. In his "Über den Raum und die Causalität" of 1787 he seems to reject them as first principles in the strict sense and to reduce them to empirical propositions. This clearly would show Feder not only in complete opposition to German rationalism, but also to Scottish common sense. If Feder attempted to give a completely empiricist and sensationalistic account of the origin of these two laws, and thus of all knowledge whatsoever, it would not be clear in what way the Scots could have been important to him. But a careful reading of Feder's text and his answers to his critics shows that Feder never intended to reduce these two principles to sensation.

To be sure, the Kantians interpreted him as having given a completely empirical and sensationalistic account of the law of contradiction, and Johann Schulze, Kant's friend and follower in Königsberg, criticized Feder severely for it in his Prüfung der Critik der reinen Vernunft.<sup>50</sup> To be sure, Feder himself speaks of a "deduction of our necessary concepts and judgments from feelings and perceptions" and discusses the law of contradiction in this context. He traces the law of contradiction to experience and tries to explain how it could have arisen in experience.<sup>51</sup> But the question is whether this means for Feder that the law of contradiction has its source or foundation in experience alone. In any case, Feder never actually said this, and a closer look at the context of his argument shows that he does not imply it either.

The relevant argument is most fully developed against Kant's theory of space. Since Kant argues that the representation of space is completely independent of experience, Feder believes it to be another version of the theory of innate ideas and he treats it as such.<sup>52</sup> The

dispute about innate ideas is, according to Feder, greatly hampered by misunderstandings. If philosophers mean by "innate ideas" concepts contained in the mind prior to all experience, as Plato did, they are obviously wrong and have been disproved by Locke. But most philosophers do not hold such a view. They understand by "innate ideas" certain "determinations", faculties, powers or tendencies of the understanding which make it possible that at the occasion of certain modifications of the senses (impressions), certain perceptions, and at the occasion of certain sensual representations, certain concepts, arise".<sup>53</sup> If philosophers attempt to prove "innate ideas" in this sense they are arguing for the obvious. Feder claims:

I admit gladly and believe it to be evident that there must be a predisposition or certain character of the human soul without which it could never obtain a representation of space. Without the precondition of a human soul hardly anyone will believe human cognition possible.

But this holds not only for our representation of space, but also for all our other representations, such as impenetrability, motion, light and air, of colours and sounds and all of our sensations.<sup>54</sup>

In the same way it holds also, of course, for the law of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.

Thus Feder agrees with Kant that the human mind has an essential part in the formation of knowledge, that it does impose the form upon it. But Feder disagrees with Kant with regard to the sources of the imposed form and necessity. Whereas he sees Kant as declaring reason and its a priori concepts to be the only source of necessity and form, he sees this source in the senses. In order to counter Kant's claim that space must be an a priori form of representation, since, if it

was not, geometry would depend upon perception (Wahrnehmung) and thus be only accidental and not apodictically certain, Feder wants to show that necessity and apodictic certainly not only can but must arise from sensation. For, he asks, "can I know anything without perceiving it? Therefore can there be any necessary knowledge and any general truth whatsoever for us, if all perceptions contain only accidental truth?"<sup>55</sup> This question brings Feder straight to the principle of induction and the problems Hume had formulated with regard to it. How can one isolated experience, or how can even repeated experiences of the same kind teach us anything about all of experience? How do necessary connections arise? Feder finds that

we feel necessity whenever we feel we cannot do something. This is often enough the case. For necessary is that of which the contradictory cannot be. What we cannot change we have to leave as it is, and what we cannot leave as it is we have to change . . . In the particular case this is . . . only necessity of the present state. It is recognized as conditioned as soon as we can change this state so that the necessity disappears. But if we can never and in no way change this state, if we cannot remove this necessity and cannot show or make understandable how it could be removed, what should we call this necessity then? . . . an absolute necessity, at least for us. . . . And if we were to find out that all people we know are under the same necessity, if we had not the least reason to suspect that it might perhaps be different, if we could not even imagine how it could be different in another human being or any other being which feels, wills and thinks, would we still have to have any scruple to call this necessity . . . absolute and general?<sup>56</sup>

But Feder does not want to claim on the basis of this argument that this necessity is the product of sensation and experience alone, it only begins with sensation and perception, or it arises from them. In his reply to his critics he admits that his account was not entirely clear

and could have given rise to this interpretation, but claims that he has not said anything wrong. With some clarifications and changes, he believes, the argument will be seen to be valid and sound:

If I had answered the question in such a way that I had only described how several particular perceptions could reveal or teach the understanding a reason which necessarily determined it to create or accept a general judgment; if I had shown how this reason is contained absolutely a priori in the nature of our understanding with regard to the law of contradiction, even though the general concepts of being and non-being, of contradiction . . . are created little by little through several particular perceptions in us, and even though they always have to lead us back to the particular, if real knowledge of the object in intuition is to take place; if I had done all this . . . I still do not see where I erred and deserved reproof for my attempt to deduce the law of contradiction from sensation or particular perceptions. For, to say it again, I do not see how one can regard the skeptic as sufficiently refuted, if one has not shown that the basis of general and absolutely certain judgments can be found in the particular perceptions of the understanding.<sup>57</sup>

All this shows that Feder clearly is not a sensationalist in the same sense as Locke, Berkeley or Hume. He does not hold that an account of the origin of our general concepts and principles in sensation exhaustively describes all the necessary conditions of their origin. As had Reid and Kant, Feder claims that all of our knowledge begins with sense experience, but it does not all originate from particular sensations. There are principles which govern our senses and these principles are not the result of any particular perceptions. Every human being qua human being is endowed with them. They are natural sensations or conceptions, which necessarily arise in sensation and only at the occasion of particular sensations. Perhaps one would not go wrong in saying that they are suggested in these sensations, and

that their necessity results from the fact that we cannot perceive anything without these natural perceptions. But this is not all that different from Thomas Reid's account of the origins of the principles of common sense.<sup>58</sup> The fact is that Feder has accepted not only Reid's emphasis upon first principles as principles of common sense but also much of his account of how these first principles arise in perception.

The differences between Reid and Feder arise mainly from two circumstances. First of all, Feder is a German and firmly convinced of the validity of the laws of contradiction and sufficient reason. Even though he rejects the method of trying to deduce all of human knowledge from these two first truths (as the earlier rationalists had done) he still believes that everything can be explained by means of these two principles and the materials given in sensation. Because he felt so confident in this, he could reject Reid's principles of common sense as too numerous. Paradoxically as this may sound, because Feder was more of a rationalist than Reid, he could afford a more sensationalist outlook than Reid supported. Because of this he could also reject Reid's critique of phenomenalism, and attempt instead to revise the theory of ideas so that Reid's criticisms no longer applied.

Nevertheless, Feder has to be criticized for not seeing the full force of Reid's critique, for not seeing that the theory of ideas could not be saved by means of minor terminological changes. Though Feder claimed that much thought was necessary to see that the ideal theory involved a fundamental confusion of language, he himself does not appear to have spent enough thought on this problem. Instead he more or less followed Locke and went on as though Reid had not said anything valuable

in his criticism of the way of ideas. In doing so he felt he was more thorough than Reid. Because not all principles of common sense are basic principles or first truths in the strictest sense, because only two are constitutive of the human mind, and all the other ones can be reduced to these formal principles and the materials given in sensation, for Feder the appeal to common sense cannot amount to an appeal to irreducible truths which are not in any need of justification. Most of the principles of common sense can be justified and need justification. Therefore Feder wants to hold that the appeal to common sense does not block the further investigation into the origin and scope of human knowledge. To say that a judgment is a judgment of common sense only means that it is more basic than others and therefore accepted by everybody. It was in this way that the justification of common sense became a problem for Feder. Whereas the Scots could not have thought of anything more preposterous than a justification of common sense, to Feder (and many other Germans), such a justification appeared a natural and necessary enterprise: for them, most common sense truths could be justified by means of the two most basic principles of common sense. In the details of this justification Feder is very much dependent upon Locke and Reid, just as much as upon Hume and Wolff, and hence he has little original to offer. But it is significant that he recognized the importance of the problem of basic truths and their relationship to, and role in, knowledge, and that he sought a solution of this problem.

It is also clear that Feder's conception and formulation of this problem were highly dependent on Reid, Oswald and Beattie, and that these Scottish philosophers provided him with hints for his attempted solution. If

Feder's account seems in the end even less satisfactory than that of the Scots, this may be the result of two basic stances which he took with regard to the theory of the Scots: First, Feder more or less rejects Reid's critique of the theory of ideas and does not seem to take it seriously enough. For this reason he in many respects follows Locke and Hume just as slavishly as he follows Wolff in others. Secondly, Feder accepts Reid's theory of common sense and first truths, but finds it necessary to give a more "thorough" (more "gründlich") account of it, which involves a justification of most of the principles of common sense. But it is not clear on the basis of which other principles common sense principles can be justified. For the two principles which he accepts as not needing proof have already been found (in the works of his rationalist precursors) to be incapable of reproducing all truths of experiential knowledge.<sup>59</sup> They are reduced in Feder's thought to two rules which should govern all thought and which will enable us to find out all errors. They are: (1) be cautious and do not accept opinions which contain a contradiction and, (2) examine the basis of your judgments and take care that they are not based upon fleeting appearances, but upon natural representations. "'Be guided by the firmly founded and unchanging parts of your inner and outer perception' can therefore be regarded as the basic rule of the correct use of the human understanding or common sense which contains everything".<sup>60</sup> It was this principle which guided Feder in his criticisms of philosophical systems and in the development of his own. But he never really freed himself from the views and theories of his predecessors and did not get very far in the development of an original system. But Feder was not simply a shallow and indifferent

mediator of British influences in Germany. He was a responsible thinker who attempted his best at developing a synthesis between German rationalism and British empiricism. His intentions were not very different from those of Immanuel Kant in his pre-critical period. That Feder found the Scottish theory of common sense as basic principles important for this synthesis, and that he not only considered this theory as extremely relevant for the goals of German philosophy at this time is certainly significant. It is also important historically because of Feder's great influence upon the teachers and students of philosophy between 1770 and 1785.

Whatever else may be said of Feder, he brought the problem of first principles of knowledge as principles of common sense into the focus of philosophy. He may not have been entirely too clear about these principles himself, but it was clear enough for other philosophers to follow suit (as the work of Lossius shows). He saw the importance of these principles and by showing with Reid and Beattie that these principles are essentially connected with sensation, he argued that pure reason could not be considered as an absolute and infallible criterion of truth. Though Feder appears to want to criticize philosophy on the principles of common sense, he usually simply uses common sense as a regulative device; though he recognises clearly that Reid "attacked the basic principles not only of Locke's, but of all philosophy", he himself wanted to continue to philosophise in a more moderate but still very traditional way.<sup>61</sup>



## NOTES : CHAPTER V

1. Johann George Heinrich Feder, for instance, describes himself as having "wavered between Wolffian dogmatism and skepticism" early in his life, a skepticism which he characterises as "unrefined", "unchecked" and "without system" (See Johann Georg Heinrich Feder's Leben, Natur und Grundsätze, ed. K.A.L. Feder, Leipzig, Hannover, Darmstadt, 1825, pp. 60, 71). Later Feder developed this skepticism into an approach that is best described as mitigated skepticism. Kant called it in his first Critique "indifferentism".

The same may also be said of the early Meiners. His Revision der Philosophie of 1772 relies openly upon the "wise Locke", who has elevated him above "the desolate chaos of scholastic interpretation of signs into the bright region of distinct concepts" and the "brave and good natured Hume" (op. cit., p. 161, p. 202; see also pp. 153-4). He finds that for philosophy proper, or esoteric philosophy, "no other method is as favorable as the skeptical method" (ibid., p. 132).

Lichtenberg, their colleague, also believes that skepticism or thinking for oneself is the most fruitful method for philosophy. See the aphorisms F 441, F. 448, J 1276, K 303, for his early relation to Meiners see C 236.

Platner is also best described as a moderate skeptic in his early work. See Wundt, Aufklärung, p. 308. Through the negative influence of Kant and the positive influence of Schulze Aenesidemus

he became later a more radical skeptic. See Arthur Wreschner, Ernst Platners und Kants Erkenntnistheorie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Tetens und Aenesidemus, Leipzig, 1892.

Important for the estimation of Platner's early skepticism is especially his Gespräch über den Atheismus, 1781.

Lossius wanted to find a middle way between radical skepticism and dogmatism, which is also nothing else than moderate skepticism. See Physischen Ursachen des Wahren, p. 3 (see p. 274 of this work). As a frontispiece to his work he uses a picture of the bust of Carneades.

Similar evidence could be brought forth with regard to most other "popular philosophers", with the possible exception of the popular philosophers of Berlin. They all were moderate skeptics, who like David Hume in his Enquiries, found common sense helpful (though they were willing to give common sense a more important role than Hume ever appears to have been willing -- and in this they found Reid, Oswald and Beattie helpful). See also Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 319-24.

2. They are "uncritical" in Kant's use of the word only, but in no other sense of the word. For Kant's usage see, for instance, Critique of Pure Reason, B xxxv/xxxvii. That historians of philosophy continue to describe these thinkers as "dogmatic" in a pronounced un-Kantian sense is regrettable.
3. Feder, Leben, p. 60. See also Platner, Aphorismen, I (1793), pp. iv/v and Meiners, Revision, p. 61, 64, 75. Meiners sees a close connection between skepticism and eclecticism.

4. Feder, Leben, p. 249; Platner, Aphorismen, pp. v/vi: "Experience, common sense and morality -- these are the best things in all the wisdom of this world". Christian Garve, Eigene Betrachtungen über die allgemeinsten Grundsätze der Sittenlehre, Breslau, 1798, pp. 2-3; Christian Garve "Von der Popularität" in Popularphilosophische Schriften über literarische, ästhetische und gesellschaftliche Gegenstände, 2 vols., ed. Kurt Wölfel, Stuttgart, 1974, II, pp. 1064-6. For the entire problem see especially Kurt Wölfel's Nachwort to this edition, vol. II, pp. 1-76.
5. Feder, Leben, p. 249. See also Lichtenberg, Aphorisms E 415, J 417, J 249, J 250, who prefers to oppose the language of philosophers to that of ordinary life, and makes a similar point.
6. Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, 2nd ed., 1770, pp. 57-8. See also Meiners Revision, pp. 87-9.
7. This may be said to have been the task of all the philosophers of that period. See Johann Nicolaus Tetens, Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie, pp. 11-13. See also the discussion of Mendelssohn in Chapter VII. To list all the authors who held this view would be tedious and unnecessary, because this is one of the fundamental tenets of popular philosophy.
8. It is very much a question whether Feder actually mutilated the review. His additions are very much in keeping with the spirit of the work, and it has been argued that Feder actually improved the review. For Feder's own view, see Leben, pp. 118-9.
9. Feder, Leben, pp. 129-30. What happened to Feder rather suddenly all other popular philosophers had to experience sooner or later.

Their reputation has not yet recovered from this blow.

10. Feder, Leben, p. 88. "My philosophical textbooks were used at almost all universities and many high schools and were thus reprinted many times. But even the original publishing house printed the one six times and the other four times". It is not clear when Feder wrote this passage of the autobiography, but it could have been written before the seventh printing. The information about the seven printings is taken from Kayser. Kayser lists the following dates: 1769, 71, 72, 74, 77, 86, 90. I have seen, however, a copy identified as the 2nd edition, dated 1770 from the library of the University of Münster (call number S<sup>2</sup> - 583).
11. Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, p. 256, pp. 513-4, p. 571 (the very last page of the book). Feder, Institutionis logicae et metaphysicae, Göttingen, 1781, p. 12, p. 14, p. 28, p. 29, p. 79, p. 111, pp. 258-9, p. 320. Feder, Leben (Otium senile), p. 447. See also Philosophische Bibliothek I (1788), pp. 219-20 and IV (1791), p. 112. Compare this discussion with Zart, Einfluss, pp. 129-39.
12. Since the reviews of the Göttingische Anzeigen appeared anonymously, it cannot always be said with certainty that Feder is the reviewer. But Feder says in his autobiography that he reviewed for this journal from 1769 on. The reviews about which there cannot be any doubt are the latest, namely those of Reid's two Essays. Both the review in the Philosophische Bibliothek I (1788), pp. 43-62 and in the same journal, vol. II (1789), pp. 83-118 have Feder's signum "F". About the review in the Göttingische Anzeigen of April 21, 1787 we can also be sure, because Feder identifies himself as the reviewer

in Philosophische Bibliothek I, p. 43.

I possess photocopies of the reviews of Beattie's Essay in the Göttingische Anzeigen of January 28, 1771, and of the German translation of Oswald's Appeal found in this journal of August 13, 1774 and January 19, 1775. The photocopies are taken from the set of the Göttingische Anzeigen at the University of Göttingen. The author of the reviews is identified as Feder in (identical and obviously very old) handwriting in the margin beside the heading of these reviews. (All other reviews of this set, which I have seen, are similarly identified according to their author). But that Feder is the reviewer is also supported by the fact that the reviewer puts forward the views that Feder holds in his own works. The reviewer of Priestley's Examination in the Göttingische Anzeigen of August 3, 1775 claims to be identical with the reviewer of Beattie's Essay and the German translation of Oswald's Appeal. It is therefore almost certain that Feder is the reviewer of all these reviews.

By the way, the review of Beattie's Dissertations, Göttingische Anzeigen, October 14, 1784 is identified as that of Meiners (in still the same handwriting). The earliest reviews of Oswald's Appeal in this journal (1769 and 1773) could also be by Feder, but I cannot be sure. (I have not seen them in the set of the University of Göttingen, but have a photocopy taken from another set.) But Feder seems to say in the review of the German translation of 1774 that he was not the reviewer of the original: "the original has been extensively reviewed . . . the present reviewer thinks of the book in the very same way as it has been judged there".

13. Göttingische Anzeigen, August 13, 1774, number 97, p. 835. See also Göttingische Anzeigen, April 21, 1787, p. 628 (review of Reid's Essays): "He spoils his philosophy, which has in many of its parts the highest approval of the reviewer, by . . . wanting to base the natural way of thinking upon stronger and more scientific reasons than it actually has". See also Philosophische Bibliothek, III, p. 115.
14. Philosophische Bibliothek, I, p. 43.
15. A close reading of the Prolegomena shows that Kant's criticism of the Scots does not concern first and foremost Reid, Oswald and Beattie but has to be considered as a thinly veiled (at least for his contemporaries) attack upon the German followers of the Scots in Göttingen, namely Feder and Meiners. By refusing to refer to them by name and by attacking their originals he was putting them down even more than he could have done by doing them the honour of naming them. But there are allusions to Meiners, the philosophical historian (see especially Prolegomena, ed. Lewis White Beck, p. 3) and to Feder (see op. cit., p. 61; see also "Vorarbeit zu den Prolegomena . . ." Kant, Werke, Akademie Ausgabe, vol. XXIII, p. 59 and p. 61). But whomever Kant may have in mind first and foremost, his criticism had just as serious consequences for Reid, Oswald and Beattie as it had for Feder and Meiners.
16. Zart, Einfluss, p. 129.
17. See especially Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, 2nd ed., 1770, pp. 253ff.
18. Ibid., p. 231: "Since instinct is so opposed to the doubts concerning the existence of external objects, some people have considered it

best to regard the idealists as madmen and not to honour them with a refutation . . . But what if the entire dispute is merely a verbal one". See also Göttingische Anzeigen, August 3, 1775, p. 779: "The reviewer still believes that this peculiar dispute cannot be resolved in any other way than by showing how it is based solely upon words, and that the disputants are fully at one in the matter. Basically this appears to have been Berkeley's opinion as well. However, one must have thought a great deal about our concepts of existence in order to find this treatment thorough". Compare pp. 243-244 above, Göttingische Anzeigen, April 21, 1787, p. 628 (review of Reid's Essays): "A pet argument of the author is that from the general characteristics of the languages to natural basic truths; and this kind of inference is appropriate in natural philosophy. He only infers . . . too much from this principle at times".

19. See Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, pp. 227ff., especially p. 231 (the passage quoted in footn. 19) in which he seems to allude to the Scots. He refers to Reid several pages later by name.
20. See the following discussion, especially the passages taken from Feder's Logik und Metaphysik.
21. Later Feder was quite aware of the fact that Berkeley had employed arguments similar to Reid's. See the passage of the review of 1775, quoted in footn. 19 above.
22. Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, p. 228.
23. Ibid., pp. 228-9.
24. Ibid., pp. 231-2. Compare Chapter II, pp. 59-63 above.
25. See especially Beattie, Essay, pp. 283-8.

26. Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, p. 233.
27. Ibid., p. 234. Compare this with Lossius. See pp. 276ff. below.
28. Feder, Raum und Caussalität, p. 65.
29. Ibid., p. 67.
30. This argument is clearly identical with that which Thomas Reid advanced in his Inquiry, Chapter II, section 3, pp. 24-6, Reid, Works, 1, pp. 105-6.
31. Feder, Raum und Caussalität, pp. 69-70.
32. Platner criticises Kant for similar reasons in his Aphorismen.
33. Göttingische Anzeigen, January 28, 1771, p. 91; ibid., August 3, 1775, p. 779. See also ibid., April 21, 1787, pp. 627-8.  
 (review of Reid's Essays): Reid's "main attack is still directed to the principle that the ideas are the immediate object of all the perceptions of the soul. This he regards as the basic error of these philosophers Hume, Berkeley, Locke, Malebranche, Descartes. (Here is still more verbal dispute than the author seems to notice, and his investigation is not varied enough, especially with regard to the several kinds of pathological illusion). Indeed, 'idea' is not the fitting expression for the most inner modifications from which the perceptions of the soul originate. To say that all objects of sense perception are ideas is to sacrifice the fact, to deny consciousness, to confuse language, and all this for a hypothesis. But if these modifications, which originate from sensations and sensible perceptions, are called in fact ideas, so is it also certain that the perceptions, remembrances and judgments of all kinds depend to a much greater extent upon these ideas and



have less of an immediate basis than the author wants to maintain".

34. Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, p. 242.
35. Ibid., p. 247.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid. Compare all this with Lichtenberg's Aphorisms E 415, E 420, E 450 "We should follow our feeling . . . in so far I recommend Beattian philosophy". E 456.
38. In this Feder is following the Scots as well. See Chapter II of this work, and especially Harry M. Bracken, "Thomas Reid: A Philosopher of Un-Common Sense", Introduction to Thomas Reid, Philosophical Works I, Hildesheim, 1967, pp. xix/xx.
39. Göttingische Anzeigen, January 28, 1771, p. 95. See also pp. 91-2. Feder finds, however, that Beattie's formulation of this principle remains ambiguous. Meiners, by the way, rejects such basic principles in general, and Beattie's special form of it in particular. See Meiners, Grundriss der Seelenlehre, p. 182. Zart, Einfluss also ascribes, quite mistakenly, as the quotations of Feder show, Meiners' point of view to Feder (ibid., p. 134).
40. Göttingische Anzeigen, August 13, 1774, p. 834.
41. Philosophische Bibliothek, I, p. 43.
42. Göttingische Anzeigen, January 28, 1771, p. 93. Compare this with Zart, Einfluss, p. 131, who claims that Feder follows the Scots in accepting a special common sense "in so far as it allows of a sensationalist interpretation". Zart is quite wrong. Feder does not think that what the Scots have described as common sense is a special faculty, and the importance of the Scots for him consists

exactly in their theory of common sense as the source of basic truths.

43. Göttingische Anzeigen, 1774, p. 837. See also Philosophische Bibliothek I, p. 54: "The only strict and certain conception of a basic truth is that it is a judgment which arises with necessity from the mere representations of subject and predicate".
44. Göttingische Anzeigen, 1774, p. 835.
45. Ibid., pp. 835-6.
46. Ibid., p. 836.
47. Feder, Raum und Caussalität, p. 166.
48. Ibid., p. 167.
49. Göttingische Anzeigen, 1771, p. 95.
50. Johann Schulze, Prüfung der Kantischen Critik der reinen Vernunft, 2 vols., Königsberg, 1789-92. Feder is accused of offering an argument involving a vicious circle. Feder attempts to answer this criticism in the Göttingische Anzeigen, 1789, number 21, and in his review of Schulze's work in the Philosophische Bibliothek IV (1791), pp. 201-2. Zart also accepts the Kantian view and finds that Feder "does not want to base his system upon immediately evident truths in the sense of the Scottish school, since their characteristics are too uncertain" (Einfluss, p. 131). He sees him as following Locke and Hume in "tracing the law of contradiction to external sensation exactly as Locke does it", as explaining "the idea of causality in Humean fashion, i.e. strictly empirically". But matters are not quite so simple. Feder is closer to Locke and Hume than Reid is. But Feder himself is more of a

Reidian than a Lockean or Humean. Compare with footn. 43 above.

51. Feder, Raum und Caussalität, pp. 37ff.
52. This is, of course, a mistake on Feder's side.
53. Ibid., p. 13.
54. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
55. Ibid., p. 31.
56. Ibid., pp. 35-7.
57. Philosophische Bibliothek, IV (1791), p. 203. Compare this account of Feder with Jacobi's criticism of Kant, see Chapter X below.
58. For Reid the first principles of common sense are also suggested in sensation and can therefore be traced back to sensation, though they are not the product of sensation. Thus Reid, Feder and Kant agree on the general relationship between basic principles and sensation, and disagree "only" in the particulars of this relationship. (But it is, of course, the particulars that count most in this matter, and make their accounts interestingly different).
59. See Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 266-8, et passim.
60. Feder, Raum und Caussalität, pp. 40-1. See also Feder, Leben, p. 249.
61. Göttingische Anzeigen, 1775, p. 777.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ATTEMPT OF A MATERIALISTIC FOUNDATION OF COMMON SENSE IN THE WORK OF JOHANN CHRISTIAN LOSSIUS

Johann Christian Lossius (1743-1813) was from 1770 until his death a professor of philosophy and theology in Erfurt. Like Dietrich Tiedemann, Ernst Platner and many others, Lossius was persuaded that man's nature and his faculties of knowledge could be explained best by means of a materialistic account.<sup>1</sup> But it was Lossius who appears to have gone the furthest in the acceptance of physiological explanations of the workings of the human mind. He may be considered as the materialistic philosopher of the German enlightenment. In any case, Lossius' most significant work, Die physischen Ursachen des Wahren (Gotha, 1774), is often taken as the example for a materialistic philosophy in German enlightenment. In this work the last step in the direction of replacing logic, ethics and theology as the key disciplines with anthropology and psychology is taken. Usually Die physischen Ursachen des Wahren is considered to be something of an oddity, as an unwitting reductio ad absurdum of crude materialism. For Lossius appears to want to "explain

contradictions as 'conflicts of nerves'". But the work has also been acknowledged by Ernst Cassirer as important in its own right.<sup>2</sup> It would warrant a closer examination, if only for the important role it played in the philosophical discussion of that time.<sup>3</sup>

Even though Lossius professes to follow strictly the method of observation, even though he developed a clear-cut theory and is far from being an indifferentist, he also adhered to the eclectic and popular approach to philosophy.<sup>4</sup> He depends upon others to supply him not only with his issues but also with his theories. His originality consists therefore not so much in the creation of a completely new theory, but rather in a new and unexpected combination of given theories. By far the most important philosophers for him are Beattie and Bonnet.<sup>5</sup> Their works, together with Garve's German translation of Ferguson's Institutes of Moral Philosophy, are not only the ones most frequently quoted, but Lossius' philosophy must be characterised as the attempt of a synthesis of the common sense approach with a materialistic account of human nature. He wants to supply Beattie's theory of truth with its foundation in the physiological organisation of man, to show the basis of Beattie's "instinct". The physiological theories used by Lossius are those of Hartley, Priestley, Bonnet and Condillac.

What he hopes to establish by means of this materialistic reduction is how at the very same time "our conception of reality is rooted in the categories of our understanding without having to vanish into complete subjectivity".<sup>6</sup> In other words he wants to develop a theory of truth which would answer the skeptic once and for all. Cassirer believes that in this attempt of Lossius a "novel conception" shows itself, which,

though "still completely embedded in unclear and dogmatic presuppositions", became of central importance for the German enlightenment (and in fact for the theory of knowledge in general) when more clearly formulated by Tetens.<sup>7</sup>

#### A. The Theory of Truth and Its Basis in Physiology

Lossius' synthesis of the common sense approach and materialism attempts to keep two different levels of explanation as independently of each other as possible. First of all there is the attempt to give a psychologically or phenomenologically correct description of the human mind, its concepts and its principles, and secondly the attempt to explain the features established in this way by means of their supposed basis in the physical organisation of man. With regard to the first aspect Lossius depends to such an extent upon the works of the Scottish common sense philosophers, and especially James Beattie, that one may almost speak of unqualified acceptance and simple repetition, while with regard to the second he is following Hartley, Bonnet and others.

The very Introduction of the Physische Ursachen des Wahren shows already the fundamental importance of the Scots for Lossius. Since it is as a defense against skeptical arguments that he develops his theory of truth, he begins with a short historical account of the opposition between skeptics and dogmatists. While the dogmatical and skeptical philosophers are usually seen to be so radically opposed to one another that no fruitful discussion could have taken place, Lossius finds that this is not so. Actually the arguments of the dogmatists and the skeptics are not all that different; only the conclusions differ radically. Skeptics and dogmatists have always learned more from each other

than they cared to admit. As Carneades admitted that he could not have developed his theory without Chrysippus, so one might say in more recent times that

perhaps Beattie and Hume stand in the opposite relation to each other as Carneades and the Stoic Chrysippus; and Reid would perhaps not be the one he is, if Berkeley had not existed. Beattie opposes instinct to Humean doubt, and Reid assumes Berkeley's principles for doubting the reality of bodies and proves the opposite argument. But all this does not satisfy somebody like Garve. This excellent philosopher still sees darkness where they see light.<sup>8</sup>

The discussions of the skeptics and the dogmatists show not only that a simple affirmation or negation of absolutely certain criteria is a fruitless exercise, but they can also supply us with hints for the solution of the problem of truth. Lossius believes he has learned enough to see that there is a middle way in the doctrine of truth, a way "which shows itself as soon as we differentiate between the reality of objects, their representations and the way in which representations of things originate within ourselves".<sup>9</sup> This distinction allows us to see that we should not be concerned with the reality of external objects at all when dealing with truth. This so called "metaphysical truth" is in reality no truth but a necessary presupposition of all talk of truth.<sup>10</sup> As such it clearly cannot be investigated by us. All that is left for us is the examination of truth attainable for human beings (that is, truth dependent upon the presupposition of the existence of thing in themselves). But such an investigation must be concerned mainly with our representations of objects, with their mode of origination as well as with their relations to our judgments and concepts.

Instead of identifying truth in perception with the reality of external objects, we should realise, Lossius argues, that truth is the

relation, or perhaps better, is a property of the relation between ourselves and these external objects. All truth attainable for human beings must be relative, therefore. In fact, it must be relative in two respects: (1) it must be of things which are related to us and, (2) it must be truth in accordance with our (human) mental organisation, i.e. we cannot know truth absolutely but only truth as it is for us.<sup>11</sup> These two ways in which truth is relative are closely connected for Lossius. They are aspects of one and the same thing. But Lossius argues for them separately. The discussion of both aspects shows a pronounced dependence upon the arguments and theories of Thomas Reid, James Beattie and Adam Ferguson.

To bring home the second point, Lossius compares human beings to complicated machines, such as clocks. Just as clocks work in accordance with certain fixed laws dependent upon their mode of construction, so human beings have to perform their actions in accordance with laws governing their physical and mental organisation. The only difference between men and machines consists in the fact that men can know certain things about their internal constitution, while we do not usually assume this of machines. But even here the difference is far from being absolute. For, "as soon as we admit that man is a finite being, we also have to admit that we demand something impossible when we ask him for an exact analysis of his inner constitution. Only for the creator of human nature are we what the machine is for its artisan".<sup>12</sup> It depends only upon God "how far human beings can come in spiritual perfection, in the knowledge of truth and what is truth for them. And this is how I understand Beattie when he says: the truth does not depend upon man, but upon the



creator of nature".<sup>13</sup> In fact, this second aspect of Lossius' claim that truth is only truth in relation to our mental organisation is nothing but a variation of Beattie's claim that truth is that "which the constitution of my nature determines me to believe and falsity that which the constitution of my nature determines me to disbelief".<sup>14</sup> Moreover, Lossius does not make any secret of his basic agreement with and dependence upon Beattie in this regard, but draws attention to his view that "Beattie is correct", and that he expands on what he "understand[s] Beattie" to say.<sup>15</sup>

In order to support his view that truth is, essentially, only possible through a relation between ourselves and the objects, Lossius offers a sort of ordinary language argument. He maintains that it would be nonsensical to speak of truth in abstraction from human beings and objects. In a world without human beings and without objects the notion of truth could not arise. Truth without human beings and objects "does not constitute a concept at all".<sup>16</sup> Objects in complete isolation from human beings would be whatever they are, but they would neither be true nor false. In the same way, for a mind without any body and any relation to other objects no other truth than perhaps that of its own existence would arise.<sup>17</sup> Truth and knowledge require both a subject and an object, and when we talk of truth we are not concerned with objects in themselves but with the relation of objects to ourselves. The appeal to ordinary language is reminiscent of Reid and there appears to be just as much dependence of Lossius upon Reid in the discussion of the first aspect of relativity as there was dependence upon Beattie in the discussion of the first aspect. If there were any doubts, they would be dispelled by the

following passage, in which Lossius finds that

it is not necessary to note that each organ notifies us of the being of bodies which are essentially different from our own body. If the objects which cause our sensations were not really existing external to us, we could not understand how these sensations could arise as effects within us, as Reid has maintained.<sup>18</sup>

His next step is to determine the relationship between the knowing subject and the known object in greater detail. The mind or "the substance which thinks in ourselves" cannot experience things directly or immediately. It can only do so by means of its organs of perception, the nerves and the brain. Thus, "with regard to its cognitions the soul can be no more than what the body allows it to be".<sup>19</sup> This brings us back to the second aspect of truth. Even though truth is possible only because of a relation between subject and object, it is really only the subject that is open for examination. For we cannot be certain whether things are actually as we perceive them.

Whether or not the objects really are as we think they are does not matter, but only whether we are capable of thinking them in a different way as we actually do think of them. It would have been possible for the creator of nature . . . to fit the human eye in such a way that a space delineated by three lines appeared circular. We would be just as proud of the certainty in our cognition then as we are now. For, who is qualified to say whether the objects do not also possess other qualities than we can perceive now . . . The proposition "these objects are contradictory" implies therefore only what they are for our organs. They may otherwise be in nature really this way or not. Nothing depends on this here. Reid has proved the former quite a while ago.<sup>20</sup>

Since Reid has proved to Lossius' satisfaction that "our ideas are not to be regarded as copies or pictures of the external objects", the dispute about the nature of things in themselves is an idle one for

Lossius.<sup>21</sup> We have to concentrate upon the nature of our representations and concepts.

In the further characterisation of these representations and concepts Lossius is dependent upon Beattie as well. For, he argues that our representations allow us to know one thing about the external objects, namely that they exist. Of this we can be just as sure as of our own existence. Using the very arguments and examples employed by Beattie, Lossius wants to establish that this knowledge of the existence of objects is "a basic fact, which has to precede all investigations. Without it we could not explain the origin and development of thought. Our nature forces us, if we listen attentively, to accept the real being of the matter and the world of objects without further investigation". And where Beattie had argued that the idealist who attempted "to get out of the way of a coach and six horses at full speed . . . acts just as inconsistently with his belief, as if he ran away from the picture of an angry man, even while he believed it to be a picture", Lossius finds that "anyone who would want to regard the material world as a bundle of ideas and thus give only ideal existence to the world, deserves as little a refutation as the person who sees a horse racing towards himself and believes it is only an idea".<sup>22</sup> Ridicule is the only response such doubts really deserve. Accordingly, Lossius finds "the mockery with which Beattie treats Berkeley to show the ridiculousness of his whim very well", and in order to underscore this point he goes on and cites two full pages of Beattie's mockery of Berkeley.<sup>23</sup>

We cannot but believe in the existence of external objects and must reject any argument that supports the contrary. The same holds also for

our belief in the existence of our self. We have to reject Hume's arguments against the self, Lossius argues, but it is not even clear whether he knows Hume's Treatise at all. Again he is dependent upon Beattie. Though he does not indicate it as such, he quotes Beattie's version of Hume's argument against the existence of a substantial self and he "refutes" Hume with almost the same words as Beattie had done.<sup>24</sup> In this dependence upon the nature of our constitution the beliefs in the existence of the self and of the external objects constitute models for all other recognition of true and false. Our acceptance of truth is always accompanied by "a certain necessity which the rules of truth force upon us so that we cannot but reject something through which they would be overturned. This is how I understand the instinct which Beattie requires for truth".<sup>25</sup>

But for once Lossius is not quite satisfied with Beattie's characterisation of truth: "Whether truth consists in instinct itself is another question. For the belief in or approval of a certain matter is already an effect or consequence of the preceding principles of truth. Therefore we have to go further".<sup>26</sup> In "going further" he finds another Scottish philosopher very helpful, namely Adam Ferguson, who attempts to develop the rules or principles of truth from the history of the human mind.<sup>27</sup> We know from experience that certain sensations occur always in the presence of certain objects. From this we conclude that there is a certain relation between these changes and the objects, namely a relation of cause and effect. Lossius calls this the "material connection" and believes that it "suggests" (uberfuhren) not only the existence of the sensation itself and that of the object, but also a certain principle of

truth, namely the "material or metaphysical principle of truth". It states that it is impossible that one and the same sensation should not occur, if the same object acts under the same circumstances upon our organs. Lossius contrasts it with his second or "formal or logical principle of truth" which states that whenever we notice a certain change in our organs of sensation, a certain thought necessarily arises; in fact, always the identical though with an identical change in an organ. These two principles are the foundation for our feelings of necessary approval with regard to truth and necessary rejection with regard to falsehood. They are the basis for what Beattie calls instinct.

In connecting this psychological or phenomenological account of the workings of the human mind with its materialistic Unterbau, Lossius finds Beattie useful again. He adopts Beattie's characterisation of truth as being "sensed" or "intuited"; but he gives this feeling the further quality of being pleasant, when approving something as true, and being painful when rejecting something as false.<sup>28</sup> In answering the question of how these feelings of pleasure and pain arise in the human soul, Lossius brings in all of his theories about "systems of fibres", "nerve juices", and "life spirit" (he never does make up his mind which of these theories is the best) and tries to show how this explains the workings of our mind. Whether he does so successfully or not need not be decided here, for after this materialistic "interlude" Lossius turns again to psychological description and maintains:

If all these causes which we have required for truth are present, it is impossible that their effect should fail to appear. Accordingly, there is a certain necessity according to which we have to accept something as true when we see it as such. We cannot but give in to the evidence, as the excellent Feder says,

though this necessity does not rule out error. And thus Beattie is correct, when he calls truth that which the character of my nature determines me to believe, and falsehood that which the character of my nature determines me to reject.<sup>29</sup>

Thus, all of Lossius' arguments in favour of a more thorough account or explanation of the facts concerning the human mind by means of a reduction to the physiology of the human body should not obscure the fact that for Lossius as for Beattie it is in the final analysis God who determines what is true or false. But, while Beattie is content to explain truth merely in terms of our "nature" and its "organisation", of "instinct" and "common sense", Lossius believes there is gain in reducing these terms to "fibre systems" and "nerve juices". But it is not clear how this makes our concept of reality as "rooted in the categories of our understanding" any the less "chimerical" or "subjective" than Beattie's account. All Lossius has done is the addition of an intermediate step between our principles and our creator. Accordingly it is no surprise that he returns to Beattie's way of talking after he is through with his materialistic reduction.

Just as Beattie, who wanted to establish in his Essay that

except we believe many things without proof, we never can believe any thing at all; for that all sound reason must ultimately rest on the principles of common sense, that is on principles intuitively certain, or intuitively probable; and consequently that common sense is the ultimate judge of truth to which reason must continually act in subordination. To common sense, therefore, all truth must be conformable, this is its fixed and invariable standard.<sup>30</sup>

so Lossius finds that

the truth of a demonstration or argument cannot be judged by itself. There have to be certain principles which existed prior to demonstration. But, if we do not want a regress ad infinitum, we have to stop with

such principles which are based upon the basic facts of human nature and are principles or basic laws of thought. These presuppositions are of such a kind that we could not explain and comprehend the progress of thought without them. These basic principles cannot be demonstrated in any way. They are by their very nature not capable of demonstration. For I cannot postulate anything prior to them, and therefore they carry their own evidence.<sup>31</sup>

And, though Lossius believes these principles to precede common sense, his theory issues also in a theory of common sense.

#### B. The Theory of Common Sense

The main conclusion of Lossius' theory, namely that truth is neither absolute nor objective, but only subjective is in radical contradiction to the traditional rationalistic account of truth. For Lossius truth is not essentially different from beauty. Both are subjective and relative, both depend upon our feeling or sensation and the laws which govern it, and neither one of them has any foundation in some ontological order of the universe itself.<sup>32</sup> All this must have appeared very much like skepticism to Lossius' contemporaries. In fact, Lossius himself admits at the very beginning of the Physische Ursachen des Wahren that he found himself bothered by the fact that "the uncertainty of human cognition appeared to be an immediate conclusion of the principles accepted by me".<sup>33</sup> But when he investigated this point further he found that there appeared to be many things with regard to which all human beings finally have to agree. And this is, he claims, how the treatise of common sense, or Part II of the Physische Ursachen des Wahren, which he regards as the most important one, came into being.

In this part of the work Lossius shows himself just as much under the influence of Reid, Beattie and Ferguson as in the first. Just as had

Beattie, so did Lossius reject a formal definition of common sense and proposes as the only possible one a nominal definition through an enumeration of the objects and characteristics of common sense. Again just as had Beattie, Lossius begins his discussion with a consideration of the different senses of "common sense": "sensus communis", "public sense", "koinonoesyne", "koinai doxai", etc. The only exception is that Lossius deals also with the German "gesunde Vernunft" and its cognates. But he decides in favour of Beattie's usage of "common sense":

Finally it is also differentiated from reasoning, and this is the meaning of the word which Beattie accepts. He understands by this term that faculty of the soul which recognises truth and produces belief (Glauben) not through a chain of arguments, but by means of immediate, instinctual and irresistible impressions. This faculty is neither founded upon education nor habit but upon nature. It does not depend upon our will, but judges according to a certain determined law as soon as an object which falls into its realm shows itself. As such it is quite properly called sense, and since it operates, if not upon all, so upon the majority of men, in the same way it is called common sense.<sup>34</sup>

This common sense is for Lossius "the touchstone of truth in so far as it can be known by men. It is here what the test of an arithmetic example is in arithmetic, or it does the same service".<sup>35</sup> Lossius proposes to undertake a broad investigation of the proper field and the function of common sense. The question of how common sense becomes the "standpoint" of truth for human beings, naturally divides itself into the following three questions for Lossius: "(1) How do doubts with regard to the senses vanish through common sense? (2) what influence does common sense exert upon reasoning? and finally (3) how is it possible not to give in to probability and moral certainty?"<sup>36</sup>

The first question addresses itself to the problem of the reliability of the senses. If we do not know anything of the objects themselves,



but know only the effects they have upon us, how can we be certain of the reliability of our knowledge? Lossius points out that we really have no reason to doubt our experience. Examples of sense deception, such as a bent stick in the water or the apparent size of the moon, are only apparently in contradiction to our ordinary experience. If we consider the medium through which we perceive them and the distance, we have to come to the conclusion that they have to look differently. Since all the qualities of objects are dependent upon their relationship to us, the qualities must change if the relations of the objects to us change. The question that arises now is "How can we reach certainty or how can common sense become the point of union between the appearance (Schein) of the senses and the truth of objects which we feel?"<sup>37</sup> Lossius does not simply argue that it consists in the agreement of human beings, but rather that it consists in the necessary agreement of all human beings. We cannot but come together in our sensations of objects, since we are all organised in the same way. We must feel pain when we come into contact with fire. We have to believe in the existence of external objects when we sense them.

Secondly, common sense does not only assure us of the reliability of the senses, it is also "the judge of all products of the understanding".<sup>38</sup> Common sense is concerned with all natural or philosophical truths. Among these natural truths there are a number which do not need any proof whatsoever, as for instance, that one half of the horse will follow the other, even when we spur it only on one side; that the sun will rise tomorrow as it did yesterday; that  $2 + 2 = 4$ ; that God is God; that I possess a body which belongs to nobody else. But even those proposi-

tions which are in need of proof "do not fall completely outside of the realm of common sense".<sup>39</sup> For, why do we ask for a proof, if not for the reason that the truth of a proposition should be made evident, and this is nothing but demanding that a mediate truth should be changed into an immediate truth, or enabling common sense to comprehend a proposition which it could not comprehend before. As soon as the proof has been understood "that which goes on in the soul is identical with what goes on in the soul when it apprehends immediate truth".<sup>40</sup>

But common sense is also responsible for the basic premises of all inference, namely the law of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. As the basic principles of all human thought they cannot be proved but have to be intuited by common sense. All other propositions of "artificial reasoning" can be reduced to them (in principle, to actually try to do so would seem ridiculous to Lossius).

Therefore even derivative truths belong to the realm of common sense, partly because of their principles, partly because of the evidence of the proof through which they are derived from their premisses. From all this it becomes clear that the approval that common sense gives has to be regarded as the test of the truth of a proposition.<sup>41</sup>

Just as with regard to the senses and to the products of thought, so with regard to morality it is common sense that makes agreement between human beings possible. But Lossius has little to say about this topic which lies somewhat outside of his basic concern. He notes only that most nations praise and reject the same actions and believe that certain circumstances require certain actions, and he asks: "What is this belief, if not nature or common sense? And this means that we cannot give further reasons why the observation of certain duties is just. All we

can say is that reason teaches us thus and not other".<sup>42</sup>

Thus common sense is for Lossius not only the foundation of human knowledge, but also for human conduct. Moreover, it is even the foundation for our hope for a future life and our belief in the immortality of the soul. While those philosophers who want to include even mysterious or revealed truths in common sense (it appears Lossius has Oswald in mind here) go too far, since revealed truths are not "products of the understanding", common sense is all we need in order to see the moral certainty of the two above mentioned propositions. In any case, in moral matters common sense is a much better guide than pure reason. For "common sense thinks these concepts of morality in accordance with the senses and by means of examples, almost in the same way as the poet".<sup>43</sup> Therefore it is much more effective in influencing the behaviour of common man who would only be confused by the abstract reasoning of the philosophers of pure reason. If common sense and literary taste unite they can truly bring progress to any nation on earth.<sup>44</sup>

### C. Lossius' Originality

In the preceding sections it has been shown, I believe, that Lossius has taken his theory of truth and common sense directly from the Scottish sources and modified them only slightly. There is not only a striking similarity between the theory of Beattie, Ferguson and Reid on the one hand and that of Lossius on the other, a similarity which often extends to the terminology, phraseology and form of argument, but also Lossius' own admissions of having used the Scottish theory at crucial points in his argument. It almost appears as though the German translation of Beattie's Essay always lay open upon the table while Lossius was writing his

Physische Ursachen des Wahren. In so far as it is possible to prove the dependence of one philosopher upon another, it has been shown that Lossius depends for the establishment of his laws of thought upon the Scots.

For this reason Cassirer's assertion, that a "novel conception" shows itself in Lossius' conviction that the "concept of being can only be thought in accordance with the laws of thought", while at the same time holding on to the "objectivity", better would be "intersubjectivity", must be taken cum grano salis. It was perhaps novel when the Scots first proclaimed this, but it was certainly no longer a novelty when the Physische Ursachen des Wahren appeared in 1774 in Germany. It was not even a novelty in Germany. Feder and Meiners had already developed a sort of "instinct theory of truth" on the lines of the thought of Reid, Oswald and Beattie. Garve had drawn attention to the importance of Reid and Ferguson in this regard in 1772 as well. Lossius expands their views and applies them more radically. Taken as a characterisation of the general outlook of German philosophy around 1775 Cassirer's claim is quite right. Several German philosophers had concluded at this time, under the influence of such thinkers as Hutcheson, Lord Kames, and most importantly Thomas Reid and James Beattie, that what we call truth does not have so much to do with the way in which the universe as a whole is structured, but is dependent upon the constitution of ourselves:

Here is, as can be seen, a new thought still completely embedded in unclear and dogmatic presuppositions. We can determine the concept of being only in accordance with the laws of thought; but the laws of thought are in final analysis nothing but an arbitrary choice of the creator of nature, i.e. they are based upon a metaphysical basis. Could this inner ambiguity be removed, could this view that our concept of reality is

rooted in the categories of our understanding, without making this concept chimerical and letting it evaporate into the mere "subjective", It is again the achievement of Tetens to have asked this question in a concise way.<sup>45</sup>

And, as will be seen, Tetens had great help from Thomas Reid and James Beattie as well as from Lossius in formulating the question in the way in which he did.

If Lossius did anything, he showed how difficult it was to justify our beliefs in the reality of the objective world. Reid, Oswald and Beattie were not greatly interested in justification, but Lossius and most other Germans were convinced in its necessity. For how else could idealism and skepticism be refuted? But Lossius' materialistic Unterbau for the "instinct theory of truth" was not acceptable to the Germans either, since it seemed to push the problem only one step further back.<sup>46</sup>

But Lossius' theory still reveals an interesting twist in the approach to the justification of our notions of truth and falsity. In order to explain certain "appearances" Lossius finds it necessary "to go somewhat further back and search for the basic principles which have to be presupposed in order that we may call something true or false".<sup>47</sup> One might indeed be tempted to call this approach a transcendental deduction. But it is clear that Lossius, though believing that he was undertaking such a "deduction" is not concerned with the justification of these laws, but with their reduction or analysis into processes within "system of fibres", or a "certain phlogiston", or a "nerve juice", or even a "life spirit".<sup>48</sup>

In summary, Lossius' theory does not really offer anything radically new to the "instinct theory of truth" as it can be found in Feder, Meiners, Lichtenberg and several other German thinkers of this period. But it very clearly shows again the tendencies present in German thought

at the middle of the seventies of the 18th century. Lossius clearly does not feel inclined in any way to reject phenomenalism. In fact, his materialistic account is only possible because he accepts phenomenalism. But Lossius feels very much the importance of basic principles, and just as his contemporaries, he wants to go "further" than the Scots. He is not satisfied with description, but wants to account for these principles in some sense. Where Feder felt a psychological account of the origin of these principles in sensation and thought would do, Lossius attempts a physiological reduction. Both seem to realise in the end that they have not succeeded, both fall back upon common sense. Lossius reassures himself as follows:

But could this doctrine not be dangerous, if regarded from a different point of view? Could it not open the doors to skepticism? Could it perhaps not even be possible to draw from it conclusions dangerous for morals? Could not the difference between virtue and vice and the morality of our free actions, be abolished through it? I do not think so in the least. The protection of instinct and common sense is my guarantor for this. This is the middle way between the all too strict dogmatism and the squinting skepticism<sup>49</sup>

## NOTES : CHAPTER VI

1. Important also was Karl Franz von Irwing's Erfahrungen und Untersuchungen über den Menschen, Berlin, 1772, 2nd and emendated edition in 4 vols., Berlin 1777-85. See Zart, Einfluss, pp. 154-6, Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren Psychologie, 2nd ed., 1902, pp. 103-7. In many respects the theories of the materialists constitute a more radical application of the principles of Feder and Meiners. While Feder and Meiners were content with a careful consideration of various theories and often suspended final judgment, the materialists had a strong bias towards materialistic or physiological explanations. But they were not radical materialists. They neither denied the existence and immortality of the soul nor the existence of God. For a thorough, though somewhat one-sided, discussion of the German materialists in the 18th century see Otto Finger, Von der Materialität der Seele, Beitrag zur Geschichte des Materialismus im Deutschland der 2. Hälfte des XVIII. Jahrhunderts, Berlin (Ost), 1961. Finger acknowledges the Scottish influence upon these philosophers (and especially Lossius), but he declines to discuss it, since it is not part of his topic (op. cit., p. 9).
2. See Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 332n. See also Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, pp. 116-7, and especially Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit, vol. II, Berlin, 1907, pp. 448-56.
3. Johann Gottlieb Buhle, Geschichte, VI, pp. 565f. and Wilhelm L.G.

von Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte, I, pp. 328-38 consider Lossius' work as an important contribution to the philosophical discussion of the time. See also the review of Physische Ursachen in the Göttingische Anzeigen, May 25, 1775 (number 62), pp. 525-6 and Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, pp. 520, 530-3.

In comparison with his first work, all other publications of his are of lesser importance. His second major work, Unterricht der gesunder Vernunft, 2 vols., Gotha, 1776, 1777 is actually only a compendium for the use of his students in connection with his lectures. Though it appears to have been successful as well, it does not develop his position much further. Its character of a compendium in need of explication is very evident. Often Lossius refers to a certain problem or topic only in order to say that he will deal with it in his lectures. In his discussion of primary and secondary qualities, for instance, he only gives a summary introduction and says in a note: "Of what Locke, Berkeley, Reid, Ferguson and Garve have said of the primary qualities we will talk in the lectures" (op. cit., I, p. 245). The reviewer of this work in the Göttingische Anzeigen, 1777, August 7, pp. 747-51, notes that Lossius is much more moderate in his use of physiological explanations than in his previous work, the Physische Ursachen.

4. The method of observation is "the only one possible in these matters" (Physische Ursachen, Preface). "In order to investigate the nature of the soul, there is no other way than the investigation of its effects" (ibid.). The science of logic will profit much. For logic "should be nothing but a summary of rules of thought, abstracted



from the history of the human mind" (ibid.). Logic has become for him dependent upon psychological observation. Compare this with Meiners, Revision der Philosophie, p. 53: Psychology and logic "are related to each other as the Aesopian fable and the appended moral lesson".

In fact, however, Lossius' psychology is not based upon his own observations, but upon other books. He uses and quotes other sources frequently and makes no secret of it: "I do not have to tell the experts where I have used somebody like Locke, Shaftesbury, Bonnet, Condillac, Beattie, Search, Hume, Berkeley, Reid, Ferguson, Helvetius, Montaigne, d'Argens and others. The experts may judge what belongs to myself and what belongs to others. But for certain people I will allow myself to add the thoughts of these great men wherever they support my own theories" (ibid., p. 7).

5. Beattie is quoted or mentioned by name on pp. 3, 7, 15, 27, 59, 145, 230, 236, 238; Reid is referred to on pp. 3, 7, 55, 95. See also Lossius, Unterricht der gesunden Vernunft, I, p. 245, pp. 333-4; II, p. 159.
6. Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem, II, p. 451 (underlining supplied).
7. Ibid.
8. Lossius, Physische Ursachen, p. 3.
9. Ibid., p. 6.
10. This, however, does not mean that the existence of external objects is in any sense doubtful for Lossius. In fact, he thinks "the existence of objects has alone absolute certainty" (ibid., p. 234).
11. Ibid., pp. 6f. Compare this with Meiners, Revision, p. 242, and

Lichtenberg, Aphorismen C 236 and L 253, as well as the passages of Feder, quoted in the previous chapter. Lossius knows of course of the connection between Feder and Beattie, as the long quotation on pp. 280-1 of this work shows.

12. Ibid., p. 15.
13. Ibid., p. 15, compare also p. 27, p. 59, pp. 85-6, p. 145, pp. 228-32, p. 238 and p. 255.
14. Beattie, Essay, p. 30.
15. Lossius, Physische Ursachen, p. 59, see also p. 27.
16. Ibid., p. 16.
17. Ibid., p. 16f. But even this is doubtful for Lossius. For it is not clear whether a mind "could be the object of its own observation without being connected to a body, because we have no reason to believe that the mind could think or be capable of securing materials for observation without a body" (ibid., p. 17).
18. Ibid., p. 95.
19. Ibid., p. 18.
20. Ibid., pp. 54-5.
21. Ibid., p. 72. Compare also Zart, Einfluss, p. 158.
22. Beattie, Essay, p. 289; Lossius, Physische Ursachen, p. 147.
23. Lossius, Physische Ursachen, pp. 230-2. The passage quoted by Lossius is from Beattie's Essay, pp. 284-5 (German translation pp. 218-20).
24. The entire passage reads: "The rejection is an effect of the lack of evidence and conviction. If the rejection is irresistible, it is a hint which nature gives us in order that we may either look for better reasons or give up all hopes for a proof. This is especially

the case when the reasoning contradicts sensation and established experience: Hume maintains that nobody can have an impression of self and that therefore nobody can have a concept of self either.

My dear sir, says he, you do not consider that this assertion contradicts my hypothesis of impressions and ideas. How then is it possible that it should be true?<sup>\*</sup> -- And what is this hypothesis? Here it is: all concepts are either impressions or ideas. But all ideas are only copies of impressions. For this reason we cannot have an idea of something of which we have had no impression.<sup>\*\*</sup>

-- If I did not know where the false conclusion of this philosopher is to be found, it would still be impossible for me to accept it. Therefore I am forced to reject the argument, even if Hume offered more reasons. I am forced because I would have to deny an obvious sensation. I am even more forced to reject the assertion of this philosopher that bodies do not have any existence, but are only bundles of concepts whose existence consists in their being thought and that the soul is in the same way only a bundle of concepts.

<sup>\*</sup> Abhandlung "über die Natur des Menschen, vol. I, p. 437.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Ibid., p. 123." (Lossius, Physische Ursachen, pp. 228-30).

A comparison of this text with Beattie's Essay shows that Lossius has all this simply "lifted" from Beattie. Lossius' passage "Hume maintains that nobody can have an impression of self and that therefore nobody can have a concept of the self either" reads in Beattie's Essay, p. 263 (German translation, p. 203)

". . . says Mr. Hume; I maintain, that no man ever had or can have, an impression of self and therefore no man can have any idea of

it.\* (\* Treatise of Human Nature, vol. I, p. 437, 438)". Clearly, Lossius has simply rephrased Beattie. He then skips one sentence in Beattie's Essay, namely "if you persist, and say, that certainly you have some notion or idea of yourself:", but only in order to repeat the next sentence in Beattie word for word (according to the German translation): "My dear sir, says he, you do not consider that this assertion contradicts my hypothesis of impressions and ideas". The question "And what is this hypothesis?" seems to be Lossius' own formulation, but it serves him only to connect the previous unacknowledged quotation with another copying from the German translation of Beattie's Essay. "All perceptions are either impressions or ideas", Lossius skips one sentence in the Essay, and then takes another sentence straight out of this work: "now all ideas are only copies of impressions. For this reason we cannot have an idea of something of which we have had no impression". (The last sentence differs slightly from the text to be found in Beattie's Essay. This is the result of re-translation. The German translation is somewhat imprecise. See Beattie, Essay, p. 262, German translation p. 202). Even the references to Hume's Treatise are identical to those found in Beattie's Essay. It appears, therefore that Lossius took those passages in which Beattie lets Hume talk himself as quotations, and since he wanted to create the impression of having read this work of Hume to which Beattie refers, he does not acknowledge his debt to Beattie here. (There are no other references to Hume's Treatise in the entire work).

Given that the pages 228-30 are nothing but a "medley" of

quotations from Beattie's Essay, and that the pages 230-2 are straight quotation from Beattie, there are four consecutive pages of Beattie in Lossius' work.

How dependent Lossius is on Beattie may also be seen from pp. 145-6 of the Physische Ursachen. There he finds that all to strict dogmatism hurts truth just as much as "squinting skepticism". While "the former does not dig deeply enough and causes those who think to take the first step in the direction of skepticism, because it replaces sensation by demonstration. The latter thinks that one could never dig deeply enough and could never find a foundation. For this reason it transforms human cognition into sophistry. Beattie believes we can find the sources of Hume's skepticism in Descartes. It could be true, but not in the way in which Beattie believes". Given this last statement, one would expect Lossius to go on to criticise Beattie, and he certainly wants to give the impression that he does criticise Beattie when he says: "But if Descartes and Malebranche has had more respect for the philosophers of ancient times, many of his (sic) doctrines would have been supported by better reasons, if they had not been completely abandoned. Certainly this has done more harm than his principle of the necessity to doubt everything . . ." Compare this with Beattie's Essay, p. 233: "If Descartes and his disciple Malebranche had studied the ancients more and indulged their own imagination less, they would have made a better figure in philosophy". Thus, even when Lossius seems to criticise Beattie, he is simply repeating what Beattie had said already.

25. Lossius, Physische Ursachen, p. 27. Compare Lichtenberg, Aphorisms E 377, E 380, L 956, but see also E 460.
26. Ibid., p. 28.
27. Ibid., p. 27n.: "I have called these propositions principles, partly because they are abstracted from basic facts in the history of the human mind, facts at which we have to stop and are not allowed to regress ad infinitum (see Ferguson, Moral-philosophie, Introduction, section 4, p. 7), and partly because they have to be presupposed if we want to call something true or false".
28. Ibid., p. 371.
29. Ibid., p. 59.
30. Beattie, Essay, p. 42, see also p. 51.
31. Lossius, Physische Ursachen, pp. 85-6.
32. For the philosophers of the Berlin enlightenment there still existed a radical distinction between the conceptions of truth and beauty. While beauty was subjective and dependent upon feeling, truth was thought to be objective and dependent upon reason. For Lossius, as to a certain extent already for Feder, Meiners and Lichtenberg, both depend upon the laws of the human mind, and neither one has any foundation in some ontological order of the universe itself. Moreover, both are grasped by feeling. Thought has become for Lossius a "truthful feeling, since we cannot think that we think, but have to feel it" (ibid., p. 61). The only difference between truth and beauty is that "beauty or the feeling of beauty does not sympathise with completely obscure concepts" (ibid.). In Lossius' theory, as

in that of Feder already, sensation or feeling (Empfindung) has become the criterion of thought. The understanding and pure reason are no longer absolute and infallible judges of reality, they have come to be dependent upon sensation as the criterion of truth. "Apart from sensation we cannot demand another criterion of truth. Sensation is the last criterion and we have to stop here, if we want to realise our ideas" (ibid., p. 76).

33. Ibid., p. 8.

34. Ibid., p. 238. In fact, this is taken again word for word from Beattie's Essay, p. 41 (German translation p. 34, slight differences between Beattie's original text and this translation are the result of re-translation; the German of Lossius and Beattie's German translation is identical). Again Lossius does not identify this passage as a quote. The preceding two pages of Lossius' work, pp. 236-7 are also nothing but a summary of Beattie's long discussion of the different meanings of "common sense" adapted to the German situation.

35. Lossius, Physische Ursachen, p. 238.

36. Ibid., p. 260. Note also the use of "standpoint" for "standard".

Lossius uses the word in exactly the same way as the German translation of Beattie's Essay. Compare Chapter IV, p. 155 and footn. 55 of this work. Lossius' phrase "common sense as the standpoint of truth for men" is identical to the phrase which Beattie uses as part of the heading of Chapter II of his Essay.

37. Lossius, Physische Ursachen, p. 263.

38. Ibid., p. 250. Compare this with Beattie, Essay, p. 51: ". . . for

all that is sound reasoning must ultimately rest on principles of common sense, that is, principles intuitively certain, or intuitively probable; and consequently, that common sense is the ultimate judge of truth, to which reason must continually act in subordination" (underling supplied).

39. Lossius, Physische Ursachen, pp. 242-3.
40. Ibid., p. 243.
41. Ibid., pp. 245-6.
42. Ibid., p. 274.
43. Ibid., p. 276.
44. See ibid., pp. 249-54.
45. Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem, II, p. 451.
46. See p. 291 above and Chapter VIII, D below.
47. Lossius, Physische Ursachen, p. 20.
48. For this see especially Lossius, op. cit., p. 10, where he calls attention to Lambert's observation that Locke had made an anatomy of concepts, while Leibniz had engaged in an analysis.
49. Ibid., pp. 144-5. See also p. 8: "The uncertainty of all human cognition seemed to be an immediate consequence of my assumed principles. But the investigation of this doubt showed to me where all human beings have to come together in all their relative knowledge of truth. This is how the treatise on common sense originated".



## CHAPTER VII

### COMMON SENSE AND METAPHYSICAL SPECULATION

The popular philosophers of Berlin and those close to them, such as August Adolf Friedrich Hennings, Hermann Samuel Reimarus and his son Johann August Heinrich Reimarus, for instance, always kept more of a rationalistic outlook than their contemporaries in Göttingen and other parts of Germany. Wolff and Baumgarten remained always at the very centre of their thought. But this does not mean that these philosophers did not also know and appreciate the works of the British thinkers. In fact, they knew them at least as well as most of the other Germans.<sup>1</sup> But they were a great deal more critical of British theories than Lossius or Feder, for instance.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly it is very significant that the works of the Scottish philosophers also found their way into the libraries of these rationalists, and that the Germans made a great effort to incorporate certain aspects of the Scottish theory of common sense into their works. Moreover, the stance of the Berliners towards Scottish common sense is to a certain extent exemplary for most of the popular philosophers. They also wanted to supply common sense with its foundation,

namely in reason. They did not want to give up rational thought as the final judge in all matters. But their "final testament" could be interpreted as a complete reversal and to institute "common sense as the highest tribunal of truth".<sup>3</sup>

A. Johann August Eberhard's Attempt of a Rationalistic Reduction of Common Sense

Johann August Eberhard (1739-1809) was one of the best known followers of Moses Mendelssohn. During the seventies and the early eighties of the 18th century he was also one of the most famous philosophers of Germany. Today he is only known as one of the most reactionary and obstinate enemies of Kant's critical philosophy. This is unfortunate. Eberhard's earlier works, such as the Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens and many of his essays not only give a good insight into the problems preoccupying the German philosophers during the seventies of the 18th century, but they also constitute a genuine attempt at a synthesis of Wolffian and Leibnizian principles with the results of British philosophy.<sup>4</sup>

Eberhard certainly knew the writings of the Scots, and he found them useful in many contexts. There are numerous references and allusions to them throughout his many works.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, there are also far-reaching influences of the Scots upon Eberhard. Most of these are to be found in connection with his theory of sensation. As the title of his important Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens indicates already, Eberhard is concerned to develop a general theory that accounts for both thought and sensation. Since the earlier Wolffians had mainly been interested in man's rational nature and the British philosophers had concentrated upon

sensation, it is not surprising that Eberhard relies with regard to thought mostly upon the Germans, while with regard to sensation he finds the British theories most helpful. But it is clearly the latter aspect of his theory that is most interesting and important to him as well as to his contemporaries. For they believed that the Wolffian account of the rational nature of man was essentially correct, though somewhat one-sided, because it did not account for the sensitive side of man and did not show how these two aspects were connected.

In fact, Eberhard sees "most recent speculative philosophy" characterised best "by its discoveries in the theory of sensation".<sup>6</sup> The older philosophers had completely neglected these sensations and had looked upon "the lower faculties of the soul with proud disdain".<sup>7</sup> The two events which occasioned this change with regard to the theory of sensation are identified by Eberhard as Leibniz's discovery that what Newton had said of the secondary qualities also applied to the primary qualities. In this way Leibniz "advanced psychology a great deal beyond Locke".<sup>8</sup> The second agent in this change was "the observations about moral sensations" by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and their British followers.<sup>9</sup> Eberhard wants to present a unified theory that accounts for these discoveries and observations. The theories of Hutcheson with regard to internal sense and of Reid with regard to the external senses are not satisfactory to Eberhard. They are not gründlich enough. Philosophy has to go "further". Hutcheson and Lord Kames "have stopped half-way in their explanation of the appearances of internal sense, just as Reid has stopped half-way with regard to the external senses in the Inquiry on human mind on the principles of common sense (sic)".<sup>10</sup>

But it is significant that Eberhard can go at least "half-way" with Hutcheson and Reid. They do not only supply him with a starting point, but also guide him for quite a while on his way to a unified account of thought and sensation. Thus Eberhard sees the distinction between sensation (Empfindung) and cognition (Erkennen) in very much the same way as Thomas Reid sees the difference between sensation and perception. Both Eberhard and Reid believe that sensation is non-referential, i.e. suggests no object apart from itself, while perception or cognition, as Eberhard says, necessarily has an object. But Reid does not want to give an account of why we necessarily perceive an object. He simply says that our constitution forces us to believe in such an object as being necessarily connected with perception, that these things are suggested to us in the act of perception, and that this does not involve reasoning. Eberhard identifies the state of cognition with that of reasoning:

In thinking the soul regards the object with which it is concerned as external to itself, whereas in the use of the faculty of sensation it believes to have to do with its own state. The psychological deception is unavoidable according to the nature of these states. When I see objects themselves distinctly, and when I differentiate their parts well from one another in the state of thought, I have to extend this distinctness also to myself. I have to differentiate myself as the one who thinks from the object as that which is thought. This is enough. When I think the two things, the subject and the objects of thought which concern myself as different, my soul represents the objects as being external to myself.<sup>11</sup>

There are certain systematic and terminological similarities between Eberhard and Reid. But there are also fundamental differences. The differences are all the result of Eberhard's basic rationalistic stance.

Eberhard clearly wants to go further than Reid, and explain what Reid had described as 'suggestion'. Eberhard feels that rational thought can serve this function, and he uses the terminology of Leibniz and Wolff in order to explain it. This involves phenomenalism. Like many of the other Germans, Eberhard clearly does not accept Reid's critique of the theory of ideas, and this is the reason why he talks of "psychological deception" in the difference between sensation and perception. But all these differences cannot obliterate the great similarity between Reid's and Eberhard's account of the distinction, a similarity that extends even to the terminology. Both use "belief" in order to describe the difference of perception from sensation, and both characterise this belief as "unavoidable".<sup>12</sup>

But by allowing thought to play a role in the perception of objects, Eberhard has created a problem for himself, a problem that may be called one of the most fundamental problems of his Allgemeine Theorie, namely

how things which appear to be so different as thought and sensation can still consist of one and the same material, and how this common material had to be differently modified in order that two so different appearances could arise.<sup>13</sup>

In this context it is interesting to observe what he takes the Scottish view to be, namely the approach that wants to explain everything by sensation. But, Eberhard finds, this gives "the faculty of sensation an estimation which it does not deserve according to its nature".<sup>14</sup> When the Scots use a certain feeling of truth and of good, a sense of truth and a moral sense, to explain all of our knowledge they are turning away from philosophy, for "it is the duty of philosophy to banish this feeling from science itself and to show to it its true function".<sup>15</sup> An "inexplicable feeling of truth" is neither a secure guide in our investigations

nor would it allow us to communicate our convictions to others.<sup>16</sup>

For Eberhard it is thought that lies at the basis of both our rational faculty and sensation. Accordingly common sense and moral sense have to be explained as forms of thought. It can be easily shown, according to Eberhard, that the understanding necessarily contradicts common sense in many cases, and that it is correct in doing so. The understanding can comprehend, for instance, that the asymptote of a hyperbola can never meet the latter, while this appears to be contradictory to common sense. Therefore the true is not what is felt to be true, but what is understood to be true. "True is what can be comprehended, false is what cannot be comprehended", and, "if we want to explain this comprehensibility, we will have to show that we cannot assure ourselves of this in any other way than by step by step reduction to undeniable basic principles."<sup>17</sup> The true function of feeling is

not to be a source of truth, but to be a depository of all clear judgments which are kept in the soul by consideration or unconscious abstraction, so that they may express themselves in all cases with a rapidity that is characteristic of sensation. That there is a moral sense in this sense cannot be doubted. It is differentiated from conscience through the circumstance that it (1) feels morality in general, and (2) also in the actions of others. But conscience is concerned only with the judgment of one's own actions. Therefore we can say that the former acts only as a lawgiver and the latter only as a judge. In this way we avoid both errors (Auswege), namely on the one hand an over-exaggerated estimation of the moral sense, according to which it becomes a first principle independent of reason, a highest judge of all moral matters, and on the other hand a just as exaggerated contempt which denies the usefulness of a moral sense. It is useful to show the closest sources of approval and choice to people. It is also possible to stop with these observations, as long as one does not declare the inner senses observed hereby to be independent sources, as Hutcheson, Home and others do.<sup>18</sup>

The same holds of course also for common sense. Moral sense and common sense are not really senses at all. They only function like senses.<sup>19</sup> They are "depositories" of truths of reason, and can therefore be rationally explained.

But it is important to note that Eberhard does not object to common sense and moral sense as such, but only to the use Hutcheson, Reid and others have made of them as absolutely independent tribunals of truth and reality. Moral sense and common sense derive their validity from the understanding and always have to be checked by the understanding. However great the evidence of common sense may be

it is a mistake to rely solely upon it. Plato summarizes what I have dealt with here . . . as follows: wisdom, science and opinion are the three kinds of perfection of our faculty of cognition. Wisdom is the immediate intuition of eternal truths themselves. Science is the certain knowledge, which we obtain through meditation and education. Opinion, however, is the approximate estimate which arises suddenly and which usually leads the business of the men concerned with the administration of the republic. Since opinion acts with the greatest rapidity and presses towards the greatest decisions, Plato believes that one must ascribe a divine origin to it. We cannot fail to recognise that what is called opinion by Plato is identical with the quick, strong but uncertain effects of this instinct of the understanding (Verstandesinstinkt) and feeling of truth (Wahrheitsgefühl), which we have just described. Plato characterises it correctly when he relegates a role in busy life to it, but regards the science alone as capable of certain cognition.<sup>20</sup>

This characterisation of common sense and its principles certainly would have struck the Scots as rather unfair. They certainly did not feel that common sense consisted of such various components and would not have accepted the characterisation of common sense as being identical to Plato's opinion. Common sense for the Scots was characterised as the

source of the first principles of human thought, as "immediate intuition" of "eternal truth", and thus much more similar to what Plato called wisdom.<sup>21</sup>

Accordingly, Eberhard's criticism does not really meet the Scots. But it certainly does meet the half-hearted adaptations of the theories of the Scots by such people as Resewitz who mixed Wolffian principles and British theories in a rather arbitrary fashion.<sup>22</sup> That he could not clearly differentiate these faint echoes of the Scots from the Scots themselves shows how little he was capable of appreciating the more subtle aspects of the Scottish theory of common sense.

It appears, however, that Eberhard came to see the true character of the Scottish theory of common sense more clearly and to appreciate it to a greater extent. In any case, the unfairness and incorrectness of his characterisation of the Scots is rectified to some extent in his "Clairsens und Tiefheim oder von dem gemeinen Menschenverstande" in the Vermischte Schriften of 1784. In this work he differentiates clearly between what he calls "healthy human understanding" and "common human understanding". This distinction has a marked similarity to the one Thomas Reid makes between common sense on the one hand the common understanding on the other. By "healthy human understanding" Eberhard means

the undeniable truths which are contained in the basic principles of human cognition and in immediate experience . . . those are the first truths from which I have to start all investigations. To go beyond them is impossible, since they are in and for themselves undeniable and there can be no other truths which are more evident . . . doubts which are brought forward against such truths of healthy human understanding should not confuse me, since it is impossible to advance genuine doubts against undeniable truths; though it may be useful for the sciences to show the baselessness of even such doubts.<sup>23</sup>



Thus Eberhard's "healthy human understanding" is identical in meaning with "common sense" as defined by Thomas Reid and James Beattie. By "common human understanding" Eberhard understands on the other hand

that degree of understanding of which most people are capable. It comprises therefore all those cognitions which do not require a higher degree of training through education and meditation. The experiential knowledge of common sense can therefore only be that which can be obtained from common experience, that is, without a higher degree of attention, without deeper investigation, without artificial instruments and without preparation. Everything that comes to us through artificial experiments and careful investigation is unattainable for the common human understanding and must be excluded from its realm.<sup>24</sup>

It is not difficult to recognise in this "common human understanding" the "common understanding" of Thomas Reid, "the more obvious conclusions drawn from our perceptions by reason . . . by which men conduct themselves in the common affairs of life and by which they are distinguished from idiots".<sup>25</sup>

The only difference between Reid and Eberhard consists in the fact that Eberhard accepts fewer basic principles than Reid does (Eberhard mentions only such propositions as "Every quantity is equal to itself" and "What is is"),<sup>26</sup> and that Eberhard wants to draw a sharp dividing line between science on the one hand and the common human understanding on the other, while Reid sees a continuity between the common understanding and science. For Reid science consists merely of "the more remote conclusions drawn from our perceptions by reason".<sup>27</sup> And it is difficult to see how Eberhard is going to maintain the sharp distinction between his common human understanding and science. What does count as an instrument for the acquisition of knowledge? Certainly a microscope or a telescope counts as an instrument, but do eye-glasses count as

instruments? Certainly, the differential calculus counts as a theory and requires a higher degree of attention, but what about simple arithmetic?

In any case, despite these minor differences, Eberhard's distinction between healthy human understanding and common human understanding is clearly identical to that of Reid. It is therefore somewhat surprising when Eberhard suggests that this distinction is his own invention, and when he criticizes the Scots mainly for not having made this distinction: "the Scottish philosophers Beattie, Reid and Oswald (sic) have caused much confusion in this matter through their oversight of this distinction".<sup>28</sup> By not differentiating clearly between healthy human understanding and common human understanding "they have opened the door to Schwärmerei on the one hand, while facilitating a certain skepticism on the other by assigning the very same status to judgments which we accept only on the basis of certain obscure feelings as to proper axioms". Eberhard finds that "this feeling is so very different in different persons that it cannot possibly serve as a certain criterion and touchstone of truth".<sup>29</sup>

But it is not clear that Eberhard has done anything different from the Scots. He does not give any clear criteria for the distinction between "genuinely first truths" and those of the common human understanding either. But this is very important for the aim of his dialogue. For he wants to reject the appeal to the common human understanding as a principle of orientation in philosophy, while keeping the appeal to the healthy human understanding.<sup>30</sup>

It has been shown already that it is not clear either how he distinguishes

between science and the common human understanding. What is clear, however, is why he wants to make these two distinctions. If there was no clear distinction between science and the common human understanding the same maxims would apply to both. Reid had made this inference and identified them with Newton's regulae philosophandi.<sup>31</sup> But Eberhard, talking through Tiefheim, the philosopher at home in the depths of knowledge, finds these rules too restrictive. He answers Clairsens:

In this way you will greatly limit the dimensions of the map of philosophy, nay, even of knowledge in general. . . . Consider in how many respects you have to remain backwards when you restrict yourself only to the truths of the common human understanding.<sup>32</sup>

Because Eberhard has so narrowly defined the common human understanding and differentiated it so sharply from science, he can argue:

The realm of the common human understanding is far too limited to enable a nation which wants to deserve the name of being an enlightened one not to go beyond it(.) But if you allow the philosopher to go beyond the limits the common human understanding in the field of experience, why do you want to prohibit it in the field of speculation?<sup>33</sup>

Eberhard believes that

the investigation must transgress completely into the field of the insensible ideas, if it is to be brought to its final completion; just as much in order to convince us of the reality of substances in whose changes all appearances which we perceive in the body are founded. How can I even hope to obtain in such investigations the same evidence as in the truths of the common human understanding.<sup>34</sup>

For this reason Tiefheim, and with him Eberhard, really have no choice, if they do not want to give up the kinds of investigation German philosophers traditionally have engaged in:

I know that some people who still call themselves philosophers have taken this position, viz., that we have to be satisfied with "the quick feeling of truth of healthy

human understanding". Whether they have done so for reasons of convenience or because of desperation, I do not want to decide. I cannot take this position for the following reasons: (1) Common sense (Gemeinsinn) often needs to be rectified by science, unless they mean common sense as consisting only of genuine first truths. Common sense says the earth is standing still, science says: it is moving; and people believe the latter. Next: several questions asked by nature and reason are not answered at all by this very same common sense (Gemeinsinn). How do the representations of the qualities and changes of body come into the soul? The Cartesian philosophy says: the soul itself supplies them or God supplies them instead at the occasion of the impressions which the sense organs receive from the bodies. The philosophers of common sense in England (sic), Reid, Beattie and Oswald say: they impress themselves in the soul as the seal in the wax. If you make objections to this answer, they stop you and request you to cease the inquiry.<sup>35</sup>

Eberhard does not want to cease his inquiry, but wants to push it "into the field of non-sensible ideas". He does not want to be restricted or held back in his speculations by common sense.

Thus for Eberhard common sense and rational thought are in final analysis quite different. Philosophy has absolute priority over common sense, since it is not only more certain, but also covers a much wider field. Philosophy is a science, that is, it is rational. Common sense is unscientific and lives by approximations. Though Eberhard is willing to approximate the results of philosophy to common sense, and hopes that as the majority of people become more and more used to the difficult enterprise of metaphysics, they will also accept the results of philosophy. But Eberhard's hopes were quite unfounded, at least for the immediate future. Not only the majority of people came to reject the claims of pure reason, but the speculative philosophers of the same persuasion as Eberhard also came to doubt the absolute priority of pure

reason, and came to use common sense in order to accommodate their speculations. This is clearly shown by the example of Eberhard's own teacher, Moses Mendelssohn. Eberhard's "Clairsens und Tiefheim" is a rear-guard action fought by speculative philosophy against the common sense critics of pure reason. Eberhard shows himself to be just as much of a reactionary in this field as in the fight against Kant's critical philosophy.<sup>36</sup>

B. Common Sense as the Principle of Orientation in Metaphysics in Mendelssohn's Late Work

Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) is perhaps the most famous of all the philosophers discussed in this part of this work. He has been described by Lewis White Beck as "the epitome of popular philosophy at its best. . . . To understand Mendelssohn is to know the final will and testament of popular philosophy".<sup>37</sup> This lends, of course, a special significance to any influence of the Scots upon Mendelssohn, and this both in systematic and historical respects.

About the fact that there exist such fundamental Scottish influences upon Mendelssohn there has never been any doubt. They have been acknowledged by the biographers of Moses Mendelssohn from the very beginning, and Mendelssohn's relations to the Scots have been discussed by Zart in his Einfluss, and more thoroughly by Fritz Pinkuss' Moses Mendelssohn's Verhältnis zur englischen Philosophie.<sup>38</sup> Since Mendelssohn was thoroughly familiar with all of British philosophy, and had read Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Lord Kames and David Hume very thoroughly (and very early), he was one of the first Germans to become interested in Thomas Reid.<sup>39</sup> In 1770 he tried to obtain Reid's Inquiry in English through his friend

Friedrich Nicolai.<sup>40</sup> He must have obtained a copy of the Inquiry soon after and must have liked what he read. For there is an extant letter of Mendelssohn which outlines a course of philosophical readings for a young student, written at Bad Pyrmont on July 24, 1774. It refers to Thomas Reid as the authoritative critique of the type of sensationalism advanced by Condillac.<sup>41</sup> The way in which Reid's Inquiry is pitted against Condillac's Sur l'origine de connaissances humaines shows clearly in what way Mendelssohn found the Scottish philosophy important, namely as a refutation of sensationalism. This is corroborated by the essay "Die Bildsäule", which appeared in 1784, that is, almost ten years later than the above mentioned letter. In this "psychological allegorical dream" Mendelssohn refers "with special appreciation", as Fritz Pinkuss says, to Reid and Beattie.<sup>42</sup> "Beattie, Reid and the other friends of common sense, who have gone to war against the Bishop [Berkeley] are not fooled by these false subtleties and do not trust any speculation which is opposed to common sense".<sup>43</sup> One of the most characteristic doctrines of these Scots he takes to be that "philosophy must not confuse again what common sense has separated and differentiated".<sup>44</sup>

How important the Scots became to Mendelssohn during his years of silence can also be seen from his two last major works, namely Morgenstunden, oder Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes of 1785 and An die Freunde Lessings of 1786. In these works Mendelssohn accords to common sense as a principle of orientation in metaphysics almost the same rôle that the Scots had given it. Mendelssohn confesses that he also does not trust any speculation which is opposed to common sense and that he himself will not be confused by false subtleties either.

Though the Morgenstunden were written well after the appearance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the work itself belongs really much more into the seventies of the 18th century. Mendelssohn claims himself that a nervous disability has made it impossible for him to analyse and think through the works of "Lambert, Tetens, Platner and even those of the all-crushing Kant". He declares to know them only through reviews and from reports of his friends. For him philosophy "still stands at the point at which it stood at approximately 1775".<sup>45</sup>

There are many similarities and parallels between the arguments advanced by Mendelssohn in his last two works and the ones advanced by the Scots; similarities and parallels which almost certainly are the result of direct or indirect influence. Similarly as Reid (and Eberhard) Mendelssohn makes a phenomenological distinction between the "thought", "the object which is thought" and the "subject which thinks" within every act of thought. As had Reid he also uses this distinction to establish our belief in the existence of objects. Just as Reid and Beattie, Mendelssohn speaks of "immediate sensation" and its evidence and as had Reid, Beattie, Feder, Lossius, Meiners and Lichtenberg, Mendelssohn also relies upon appeals to ordinary language and believes that many philosophical paradoxes are based upon misuses of language.<sup>46</sup> Mendelssohn even agrees with these philosophers that certain questions are unanswerable, and he "criticises with almost identical words, as the Scottish school used them, the methods and results of philosophical speculation".<sup>47</sup>

But all this should not mislead us into thinking that Mendelssohn is simply copying the Scots, for he is not. His position remains quite different from that of Reid and Beattie. Though Mendelssohn avails

himself of the Scottish arguments against sensationalism, he himself does not want to go as far as rejecting phenomenalism altogether. He remains an adherent of the theory of ideas and seems to feel that it could be made to work with certain appropriate modifications.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, with all his criticisms of speculative philosophy, Mendelssohn himself still remains a speculative philosopher. He is far from wanting to give up all the rights of pure reason.

This is also shown by the most important and most discussed new principle introduced by Mendelssohn in the Morgenstunden, namely the principle of the necessity of orientation in metaphysics by common sense. As has been seen already, in this principle Mendelssohn is most dependent upon the Scots. (In fact, the appeal to ordinary language and the rejection of certain questions as illegitimate may be said to belong to the same pattern of thought.) In a certain sense Mendelssohn simply follows the Scots, and so far his principle constitutes a radical departure from Wolff's thought. However, it is not a simple "defection" to Scottish common sense. Common sense is used to re-inforce speculation.

Wolff and his early followers allowed that common sense and natural logic was already in the possession of some of the truths to be discovered by speculation or pure reason, but they clearly favoured the judgment of pure reason. Whenever there was a difference or contradiction between ordinary language or common sense and pure reason or scientific philosophy, the decision of the latter was thought to be binding. Johann August Eberhard still held this view in 1784.<sup>49</sup> For Mendelssohn this has changed. Speculation is no longer to be trusted. It is suspect and needs to be constantly checked, if it is not to lead us to absurdities.



The criterion for these controls of pure reason is the agreement of speculation and common sense:

Whenever reason lags so far behind common sense or even strays from it and is in danger of losing its way, the philosopher will not trust his reason and he will not contradict common sense; instead he will silence reason, whenever he does not succeed in leading reason back to the beaten path and to catch up with common sense.<sup>50</sup>

This is why Mendelssohn espouses the regulative principle of orientation in thought:

As soon as my speculations lead me too far away from the highway of common sense, I stand still and try to orientate myself. I look back to the point from which we have departed and I try to compare my two guides. Experience has taught me that in most cases the right is on the side of common sense and that reason has to favour speculation decisively if I should leave common sense and follow speculation. Nay, in order to show me that the steadfastness of common sense is only ignorant stubbornness, reason has to show to me how common sense could possibly have strayed away from the truth and could come upon the wrong way.<sup>51</sup>

Thus even a decision against common sense is possible, though highly unlikely. In fact, Mendelssohn even goes so far as to say that, whenever he finds a contradiction in speculation and has thoroughly considered the arguments for both sides, he allows common sense to make the final decision. And

under these conditions I recognise common sense as the highest tribunal of truth. And its judgment seldom fails under these circumstances.<sup>52</sup>

Thus common sense has become of the highest importance for Mendelssohn, of a similar importance as it was for the Scots.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, Mendelssohn has clearly been influenced by the Scots in this regard, as the quotations given above show.<sup>54</sup>

But, as with the Scots, common sense is not for Mendelssohn an

absolute or infallible criterion of truth, as some have maintained.<sup>55</sup> Both common sense and reason "can lose their way, both can stumble and fall". Yet, and in this the importance and usefulness of common sense consists, "if this happens, it is at times harder for reason to get up again".<sup>56</sup> Neither reason nor common sense have any kind of priority. For both are in final analysis expressions of one and the same faculty. "Common sense and reason are basically one and the same".<sup>57</sup> They "flow from the same source".<sup>58</sup> In this Mendelssohn is very similar to Eberhard. Both hold that common sense is not really a sense, but only acts like a sense. But Mendelssohn has drawn the final conclusion from this position. If common sense and reason are expressions of one and the same faculty, then they also stand on one and the same level and it is not clear how one could have absolute priority over the other. The same principles must apply to both and speculative reason must have the same limits as common sense and submit to the same criteria. Pure Reason can be criticised on the principles of common sense, just as common sense can be criticised on the principles of pure reason. In fact, this latter enterprise is most important in philosophy, namely to find how any "particular assertion of common sense . . . can be converted into rational cognition".<sup>59</sup> Accordingly, "the only task", Mendelssohn assigns to his "speculations is to correct the assertions of common sense and to convert them as far as possible into rational knowledge".<sup>60</sup>

This is, of course, a far cry from the theory advocated by the more traditional followers of Leibniz and Wolff. Mendelssohn's pronouncements have the ring of resignation. Whereas Eberhard still wants to uphold the right of speculation to go beyond the field of experience and common

sense, Mendelssohn accepts these limits (and is not even sure, it seems, whether all of the claims of common sense can be rationally understood). There is certainly some irony in all of this. Opposing common sense as a preliminary and imperfect expression of the same truths that reason gave a rational and scientific foundation and justification the early Wolffians had started out. The later Wolffians such as the early Mendelssohn and his follower Johann August Eberhard still gave absolute preference to reason and tried to understand common sense in analogia rationis, but their "final testament" seems to show a complete reversal and to institute common sense as the highest tribunal of truth.

This theory of common sense is usually described as mere makeshift, an uncritical mixing of principles taken from German rationalism and British empiricism, and one that reveals the fundamental weaknesses of all of popular philosophy. Though the Germans wanted to go beyond the theories of the Scots, they actually were lagging far behind. Philosophers like Feder, Lossius, Eberhard and Mendelssohn started out to develop something like a synthesis between the epistemologies of German rationalism and British empiricism in the hope of being able to offer a new and more consistent account of knowledge and to avoid idealism and skepticism. But it appears they under-estimated the difficulties. One of the things the German common sense philosophers did not see was that there was a fundamental difference between wanting to describe and account for the origin of knowledge on the one hand, and the justification of our knowledge claims on the other. They did not realise that accounting for the origin of knowledge, whether psychologically as Feder, or physiologically as Lossius, or rationally as Eberhard, did not really show the validity of this knowledge. They also did not see that they were just as little

realists as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, that by accepting the theory of ideas they could not be direct realists.

The Germans could have learned from the Scots in both respects. And they did learn from the Scots in both respects. But they did not take Reid's "critique of philosophy", as Feder had called it, seriously enough. They found their discussion of the origin of principles of thought in sensation helpful, and they saw that their criticism of the term "idea", as used by Locke and his followers, showed that Locke had not used it correctly. But the Germans identified the principles of common sense too readily with the principles of German rationalism (and felt that they were more "gründlich" by doing so) and by trying to evade the Scottish criticisms of the theory of ideas by means of a few semantic modifications, Feder as well as Lossius and Eberhard and Mendelssohn simply returned to pre-Humean and pre-Reidian patterns of thought, ending up with very much the same theories as the earlier Lockean and Wolffians. But because all of them "orientated" themselves, in actual fact, on common sense, their theories were much more modest and missed much that made the theories of the earlier philosophers most interesting.

In spite of their great dependence upon Scottish common sense, they did not follow the Scottish critics of philosophy far enough in final analysis, and it is positively painful to see how utterly the German followers of Reid, Oswald and Beattie not only missed the point of Hume's problem, but also misconstrued the valuable suggestions of Thomas Reid, so that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened. But fortunately there were also other German philosophers, such as Tetens, for example, who were well acquainted with the works of the Scottish common sense philosophers and who could do something more with the suggestions of Thomas Reid.

## NOTES : CHAPTER VII

1. Lessing, for instance, translated Hutcheson's System of Moral Philosophy into German (Sittenlehre der Vernunft, Leipzig, 1756). Sulzer published the translation of Hume's Enquiries (1755). The greatest literary idol for the young Moses Mendelssohn was Shaftesbury (see Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohns Frühschriften zur Metaphysik, Tübingen, 1969, pp. 87-90). In 1761 Mendelssohn, Nicolai and Abbt decided to translate all of Shaftesbury's essays into German. Mendelssohn himself was to translate the treatise Sensus communis: An Essay on Freedom of Wit and Humour (See Alexander Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn. A Biographical Study, Alabama, 1973, pp. 109-12). But Mendelssohn and the other Berliners were also very much aware of Hutcheson, Lord Kames and David Hume. Karl Philipp Moritz, a follower of Mendelssohn, translated the first volume of Beattie's Elements of Moral Science. British thought played a very important part in the intellectual life of all these philosophers.
2. This can already be seen from a comparison of the reviews of the works by British authors in the Göttingische Anzeigen and the Berlin Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek. See also pp.144ff above.
3. Moses Mendelssohn, Letter to Winkopp, March 24, Gesammelte Schriften, 7 vols., ed. G.B. Mendelssohn, Leipzig, 1843-5, vol. 5, p. 565. See also p. 316 above.
4. von Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte, I, p. 421, suggests that the Allgemeine Theorie brought Leibniz-Wolffian psychology to its highest perfection. Sommer, Grundzüge einer Geschichte, p. 232, asserts that "no other book can give such a clear insight into the state of the

doctrine of sensation at this time". This appears to be an exaggeration; Tetens' works do this at least equally well. See also Wundt, Aufklärung, p. 287.

5. See, for instance, Eberhard, Allgemeine Theorie, pp. 187-8n; Vermischte Schriften, Halle, 1784, Preface, p. 161; Neue vermischte Schriften, 1788, p. 100; Handbuch der Ästhetik für gebildete Leser aller Stände, 4 vols., 1807-20, vol. II, p. 469 (Campbell), Philosophisches Magazin, IV (1792), pp. 101-2. For Hutcheson see especially Sittenlehre der Vernunft, Berlin, 1781, pp. 46-50, 132-3. For the entire Scottish influence upon Eberhard see also Zart, Einfluss, pp. 119-27, especially pp. 120-1.
6. Eberhard, Allgemeine Theorie, p. 5.
7. Ibid., p. 7.
8. Ibid., p. 9.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., pp. 187-8.
11. Ibid., p. 45.
12. Ibid., pp. 44-6.
13. Ibid., pp. 34-5.
14. Ibid., p. 184.
15. Ibid., pp. 184-5. This appears to be also directed against such philosophers as Feder and Meiners.
16. Eberhard's argument is that common sense and moral sense have not hindered the adoption of the most immoral practices in otherwise highly developed societies. He gives the examples of thievery and infanticide in ancient Sparta (op. cit., p. 182). But these examples appear to be just as telling against reason, it seems to me.

17. Ibid., p. 187.
18. Ibid., pp. 185-6. See also Eberhard's Sittenlehre der Vernunft.
19. This is also Mendelssohn's view. See pp. 316ff. of this work.
20. Eberhard, Allgemeine Theorie, pp. 192-3.
21. See especially James Beattie, Essay, p. 42, quoted on p. 281  
above.
22. See also pp. 166ff. above.
23. Eberhard, Vermischte Schriften, p. 145.
24. Ibid., p. 149.
25. Thomas Reid, Inquiry, pp. 212-3, Reid, Works, I, pp. 185-6.
26. Truths concerning the nature of God, for instance, are rejected as  
first principles by Eberhard. They can be proved. See Eberhard,  
Vermischte Schriften, pp. 145-6. This appears to be directed  
against Oswald.
27. Reid, Inquiry, p. 213, Reid, Works, I, p. 185.
28. Eberhard, Vermischte Schriften, Preface.
29. Ibid.
30. But at times he appears to reject even this appeal. See, for instance,  
the quotation given on p. 310 (footn. 34) of this Chapter.
31. Thomas Reid, Inquiry, p. 4, Reid Works, I, p. 97.
32. Eberhard, Vermischte Schriften, pp. 148-9.
33. Ibid., pp. 149-50.
34. Ibid., p. 162.
35. Ibid., pp. 160-1.
36. He seems to be employing some of the same techniques already. Thus he  
ascribes at the beginning of his book something to Leibniz that

really seems to come from Berkeley and Reid, namely the view that primary and secondary qualities are both not original qualities of the objects. See p. 302 of this work.

37. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 323-4.
38. See Meyer Kayserling, Moses Mendelssohn. Sein Leben und seine Werke. Nebst einem Anhang ungedruckter Briefe von und an Moses Mendelssohn, Leipzig, 1862 (2nd ed., 1888), pp. 406-9; Fritz Pinkuss, Moses Mendelssohns Verhältnis zur englischen Philosophie, (dissertation) Würzburg, 1929, reprinted under the same title in Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft, vol. 42 (1929), pp. 449-90. I quote in accordance with this edition. See also Zart, Einfluss, pp. 111-19 and Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn, p. 285 and pp. 659-61. Altmann writes that enlightenment was to Mendelssohn "not merely an attitude, as it was to Kant, but a clearly defined system of thought". This system was "a modified version of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, enriched by insights gained from the English empiricists, and fortified by the Scottish common sense thinkers" (*ibid.*, p. 661). I agree fully with this characterisation.
39. See p. 139 of this work and footnote 1 of this chapter.
40. Neuerschlossene Briefe Moses Mendelssohns an Friedrich Nicolai, ed. Alexander Altmann & Werner Vogel, Stuttgart, 1973, pp. 32-3.
41. Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin, 1929ff., vol. 3.1. pp. 305-6.
42. Pinkuss, "Verhältnis", p. 453.
43. Moses Mendelssohn, Schriften zur Philosophie. Ästhetik und Apologetik, introd. and ed. by M. Brasch, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1880, vol. II, p. 242 (subsequently referred to as "Mendelssohn, Schriften").



44. Ibid., p. 242.

45. Ibid., I, p. 299. But see Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn, pp. 302f.

Altmann suggests that Mendelssohn often used his "illness as a pretext to avoid commenting on writings he could not praise but was unwilling to criticise".

46. For this and his claim that certain questions cannot be answered he was taken to task severely by Kant. See Kant, Werke (ed. Weischedel), vol. III, pp. 288-90.

47. Pinkuss, "Verhältnis", p. 452.

48. See, for instance, Mendelssohn, Schriften I, p. 337. There Mendelssohn claims that certain concepts must be accepted as Darstellungen and not just as Vorstellungen. The discussion of necessary or natural belief is clearly influenced by Reid (perhaps indirectly through Tetens, see the chapter below). But Mendelssohn is clearly a phenomenalist. See also Mendelssohn, Werke, I, pp. 278-9 for instance.

49. See pp. 307ff. above.

50. Mendelssohn, Schriften, I, p. 370.

51. Ibid., pp. 371-2.

52. Mendelssohn, Letter to Winkopp, March 24, 1780, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. V (1844), p. 565.

53. It is difficult to say in what way Mendelssohn's theory is different from that of the Scots and especially that of Thomas Reid. Pinkuss, "Verhältnis", pp. 453-5, argues that the relationship between reason and common sense is different in Mendelssohn's work. For the Scots oppose common sense to reason, while Mendelssohn claims that

they are identical, and that Mendelssohn uses common sense as a regulative principle, while the Scots see in it the "necessary pre-supposition of all knowledge". But these differences are not as fundamental as Pinkuss believes. First of all, Reid himself more or less identifies common sense with reason in his latter Essays. (See Reid, Works, I, p. 425 and also Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, p. 115. Reid says that reason has two functions, an intuitive function and a deductive function, and that "common sense is alternative name for reason in its intuitive function). Secondly, Reid and Beattie certainly understood common sense also as a regulative principle. In fact, it has been argued that this is the primary understanding of "common sense" for Reid. See Richard Taylor, review of S.A. Grave's The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, in Philosophical Review, July 1961. Thirdly, Mendelssohn also speaks of first principles or axiomata which are necessary for all knowledge (See Mendelssohn, Schriften, I, p. 320, pp. 335-6, pp. 364f., for instance). Thus the difference, if there is any, is only one of emphasis.

54. See pp. 312-3 above.
55. See, for instance, W. Uebele, Johann Nikolaus Tetens, Kant-Studien Ergänzungsheft 24, Berlin, 1911, p. 147.
56. Mendelssohn, Schriften I, p. 325.
57. Ibid., p. 325.
58. Ibid., p. 341. Compare this with Eberhard's view, as represented on p.305-6 of this work and even with Feder's criticism of Beattie's claim that common sense is a special faculty, p.249 of this work.
59. Mendelssohn, Schriften, I, p. 337.
60. Ibid., p. 477.

#### PART IV

##### THE CRITIQUE OF COMMON SENSE: EMPIRICAL REALISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

Even though the popular philosophers were often very critical of common sense, they never really subjected common sense per se to a critical analysis. This was only done by Tetens and Kant. For these two thinkers philosophy became just as much a critique of common sense as a critique of pure reason. But Tetens and Kant remained still close to their contemporaries. They struggled not only with essentially the same problems but their particular "solutions" grew out of the discussion with their contemporaries. Accordingly, the philosophical theories of Tetens and Kant show as much about the presuppositions of late German enlightenment as those of their contemporaries. As will be seen, Scottish common sense played an important role in the thought of Tetens and Kant as well. It may perhaps even be said that it was the Scottish example that guided these two important German philosophers in their development of "transcendental philosophy". For Reid, Oswald and Beattie showed not only the dangers of "naturalism" to them but also gave them some inspiration in avoiding skepticism.

## CHAPTER VIII

### PHILOSOPHY AS THE ANALYSIS OF COMMON SENSE IN TETENS' THOUGHT

The two main works of Johann Nicolaus Tetens constitute the highest point of philosophical development in Germany before the appearance of Kant's first Critique.<sup>1</sup> These, his Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie of 1775 and his Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung, vol. I, 1776 are also among the most influential works of this period.<sup>2</sup> They not only deal with very much the same topics as Kant's first Critique, they also approach them in a comparable way.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly it has been argued that they had an important influence upon Kant.<sup>4</sup> But Tetens' philosophy is also important in its own right as a sustained attempt to base metaphysics upon a careful psychological analysis of the human mind.

As almost every other important work of this period, Tetens' two main works must be characterised as the attempt of a synthesis of certain tenets of German rationalism with those of British empiricism, as a new foundation of the "science" of metaphysics. But this

characterisation is somewhat imprecise, since it does not make clear in what way Tetens attempted to achieve this synthesis. It has been observed that Tetens takes every important philosophical work of his period into consideration.<sup>5</sup> Besides Locke and Leibniz he also relied upon or argued against Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Beattie, Oswald, Lord Kames, Condillac, Diderot, Hartley, Priestley, Lossius and Kant. However, the most important influences clearly came from Bonnet, Locke, Hume, Leibniz and Reid. Bonnet and Hume were mainly important as enemies; Locke, Leibniz and Reid constituted mainly positive influences. Skepticism, sensationalist materialism and extreme rationalism were seen by Tetens as the greatest dangers of true philosophy, and he attempted to steer a clear and independent course between these dangers by tracing speculative philosophy to its true sources in the nature of human knowledge. Dissatisfied with the state of German speculative philosophy as he found it, Tetens turned to observational psychology for his method and to common sense for the subject matter of philosophy. Thus he declares "the method I used . . . is that of observation; the one which Locke and our psychologists have used in their empirical psychology", and "the cognitions of common sense are the field which has to be worked in philosophy".<sup>6</sup>

In fact, traditional metaphysics has overlooked the fact that

there is a theory of reason which is independent of all systems of metaphysics. The concepts and principles of the understanding are used without having been exactly determined, distinctly analysed or having been brought into a system. There are no preceding general speculations about substance, space and time, etc. Reid, Hume, Beattie, Oswald as well as several German philosophers have removed all doubts about this through the examples they have brought forward. Indeed, it would not have

needed as much declamation for this purpose as especially Beattie and Oswald have used.<sup>7</sup>

The true function of speculative philosophy cannot be to suspend or fight this common-sense theory of reason, but only "to secure and clarify it".<sup>8</sup> The task of metaphysics is thus essentially the analysis of common sense, or perhaps better, the clarification of the "metaphysics of common sense". Speculative philosophy is the "friend" of common sense, and it has "descended from" common sense.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, the Scottish common sense philosophers could be very helpful for Tetens in his task, and it should come as no surprise that Tetens refers to them frequently throughout his two main works.<sup>10</sup> In fact, it may be said that Tetens always starts his discussion at the point at which the Scots have left off, and that his own discussion is greatly determined by the Scottish analysis of his problems. Granted, he does not think the Scots have satisfactorily resolved the problems they took up.

For this it would have been required to investigate the nature of human cognition up to its first beginnings, and even more to explicate the procedure of the power of thought in the attainment of knowledge more exactly and more carefully than either Reid or Beattie or Oswald, in spite of their otherwise superior perspicuity, appear to have done;<sup>11</sup>

But they have made a start and Thomas Reid especially has "made many beautiful observations which belong here".<sup>12</sup> The Scottish influence is especially evident in those four areas which also constitute Tetens' most important contributions to the philosophical discussion of his time, namely (1) his analysis of perception, (2) his genetic account of the origin of our notions of objective reference, (3) his theory of common sense, and (4) his treatment of the laws of thought as being objectively necessary.

#### A. Tetens' Version of the Theory of Ideas

Much like all the other Germans discussed so far, Tetens is unable to follow the Scots in rejecting phenomenalism. In fact, the "principle" that "all external objects are only judged in accordance with their representations within ourselves" expresses for Tetens one of the most fundamental presuppositions of all philosophy.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, he does not accept Reid's criticism that the theory of ideas necessarily leads to idealism and skepticism. Though he admits that certain philosophers have been led by this theory towards idealism and egoism, he does not think that this is the fault of the theory of ideas. Tetens does not offer any arguments against Reid, however, but simply claims that idealism is not necessarily connected with the theory of ideas, and that

what Reid calls the ideal philosophy or the principle that all judgments about objects originate only from impressions or representations of objects is certainly innocent in this regard . . . the British philosopher should not have denied this principle in accordance with his usual insight.<sup>13</sup>

But Tetens, unlike many of the other German philosophers, not only read the works of Reid and Beattie very carefully, he also took their critique of the ideal system much more seriously. Though he does not think that the Scottish criticism warrants an outright rejection of the theory of ideas, he clearly thinks that these criticisms point toward real weaknesses in the theory of ideas, and toward necessary modifications. Thus Tetens tries to revise the theory of ideas in such a way that the Scottish critique no longer applies.

He accepts Reid's criticism that sensations and the sensed objects cannot be similar in any way, and that they cannot be said to stand in

a pictorial relationship to each other.<sup>14</sup> For there is no way in which we could determine whether the sensations and their objects are similar or not, since we do not have any acquaintance with the objects apart from our sensations. Tetens also agrees with Reid and Beattie that the mind is both active and passive in perception, and that the earlier empiricists had been wrong in ascribing complete passivity to the mind in this regard. But most important is Tetens' realisation that ideas are not simple or atomic mental contents by means of which all other mental contents and actions are to be explained. Tetens agrees with Reid that we have to differentiate not only between the act of perception, its subject and its object, but also different aspects within the act of perception itself, namely a sensible and a judgmental component.<sup>15</sup>

For Tetens there are three different kinds of mental contents, namely Empfindungen or sensations, Vorstellungen or representations, and Gedanken, Ideen or ideas. Though it has to be kept in mind that these sensations, representations and ideas are for Tetens mental states or even mental objects (whereas Reid does not admit such things) his understanding of "sensations" is clearly influenced significantly by Reid's use of the term, and it is not difficult to see the dependence of his description of ideas upon Reid's account of perceptions. As had Reid, so does Tetens decline to explain sensation itself;<sup>16</sup> as had Reid, so does Tetens believe that we can only sense what is present, and he contrasts sensation to memory and imagination;<sup>17</sup> as had Reid, so does Tetens differentiate between ideas and sensations, arguing that ideas have objects. In fact, at times Tetens even uses the word



"perception" instead of his usual "idea" (Idee); further when he finds it necessary to talk about Reid in this context he makes clear that his "idea" corresponds to Reid's "perception".<sup>18</sup>

But if the correspondence between Reid's and Tetens' usage of "sensation" and "idea" or "perception" is beyond doubt, it is also clear that Tetens' "representations" do not correspond to anything to be found in Reid's work. Tetens considers these representations to be some sort of mediating entities between sensations and ideas. Sensations do not disappear without a trace, but leave certain lasting effects, consequences or marks. "These marks are a kind of picture (Zeichnungen), which the soul retains of its changes and can recover at will whenever it wants to use them".<sup>19</sup> Similarly to Hume's ideas, Tetens' representations are "copies" of our sense impressions. They do not necessarily have to resemble those previous states, but they usually do and are differentiated from them only "by a lesser degree of vivacity".<sup>20</sup>

However, the similarity between representations and sensations is not what is important for Tetens. It is their correspondence or analogy with each other, which is "the general analogy between effects and causes", that is important.<sup>21</sup> In fact, "this reference of representations to other preceding modifications is their essential characteristic".<sup>22</sup> Yet this analogical or referential characteristic does not allow us to say anything about the sensations in particular. We can only say that there pertains an identity with regard to the relations to be found in the qualities of sensations and those in the representations.

The analogy between sensations and representations

is only an analogy of the identity in the relations of the qualities, not a similarity of the absolute

qualities themselves. It is not the complete similarity between the lamb and the mother sheep, but the similarity between a statue of stone or metal with the body of the animal or the human being which it represents.<sup>23</sup>

Since the sensations of which the representations are marks have been caused either by previous states of ourselves or by external objects, we may not only say that the sensations immediately correspond or refer to the external objects which have caused them, but also that the representations correspond or refer to these objects by the mediation of the sensations, though it is not clear how we come to relate particular sensations to particular objects.

It is not difficult to see that Tetens develops here a variation of Hume's theory of impressions and ideas (though he does so by means of the Wolffian conception of representation). He is thus trying to improve the very theory Reid and Beattie were arguing against. Tetens is very much aware of this, and he explicitly rejects Beattie's arguments against Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas:

"Beattie's objections to this true principle of Humean skepticism should not mislead us. They are based upon a misunderstanding, as so many views of this author".<sup>24</sup> Tetens is also quite aware that "according to Reid's philosophy there is no similarity between the impressions of sense and the representations", or, as he should have said, the perceptions,<sup>25</sup> but he is undeterred and develops this part of his theory in conscious opposition to Reid as well:

Reid says that the sensation of hardness is not in any way similar to the hardness in the body, and that is certainly true . . . But he adds to this that the sensation has also nothing in common with the perception or idea of hardness, which represents the objective quality to us, as in a picture. I answer

to this that the feeling is indeed different from the idea. But does this mean that the feeling is not the material for the idea?<sup>26</sup>

For Tetens the sensation is the material for the idea. The idea is a representation, that is, the "trace" of a sensation that has been made more distinct. But everything that is contained in the idea must, he thinks, already have been contained in the representation, and therefore also in the sensation, even if in an obscure form.<sup>27</sup>

However, again Tetens does not simply reject Reid without learning from him. For the account he gives of the relationship between sensation, representation and idea is influenced by Reid and goes far beyond anything said by Hume. Just as Reid had argued that our sensations are "natural signs" of objects, so Tetens argues that representations are "natural signs" of sensations. The account so far given

does not exhaust the complete significant nature of representations. Representations are not simply and conveniently used by us as signs and pictures of things, because they have an analogy with them. They also have a characteristic which reminds us automatically, as it were, that they are signs of other things. This characteristic refers us to other things as objects, which are different from their representations, and it allows us to see these objects through the representations and in the representations. The reason for our natural inclination to believe that we are not dealing with pictures and representations of things, but with . . . things themselves, consists in this characteristic given here.<sup>28</sup>

Tetens uses not only the very same terminology as Reid and Beattie and speaks of "natural inclination" and "natural sign" in order to characterise the significant or referential character of representations, he also gives a similar account of its origin.<sup>29</sup> As had Reid, who argued that all our sensations are necessarily accompanied with a

belief of the present existence of their object, so does Tetens hold that each of our sensations contains the "occasion" for the judgments that they are sensations of objects. But whereas Reid declined to give an answer to the question, "why sensation should compel our belief of the present existence in a thing", since he believed that "no philosopher can give a shadow of a reason, but such is the nature of these operations. They are all simple and original and therefore inexplicable acts of the mind", Tetens believes he can go on to a more fundamental level.<sup>30</sup> For him sensations are simple and original, but representations and ideas are not. Representations are marks of sensations and certain rudimentary judgments connected with them. Reid had argued in his Inquiry that sensations are connected with certain natural judgments or beliefs. When we smell a rose, for example, the belief in the existence of the rose is inevitably suggested to us. Tetens agrees and finds that these "judgments, which are already connected with the sensations, have been drawn together with the sensation into their reproduction", that is, representation.<sup>31</sup> Though these judgments have their "occasion" in sensation, they are for Tetens "effects of reflection, or of the faculty of thought, or of that of judgment, or however else one may want to call it".<sup>32</sup>

Under the influence of Reid, Tetens has come to the conclusion that thought is much more closely connected to sensation than the traditional empiricist doctrine had allowed. Thought does not simply consist in the comparison of ideas, but must already play a role in our acquisition of ideas, representations and sensations. But Tetens is not so clear on what role thought has to play in sensation. While he is confident about

the role of thought in representation, he is not at all confident about the role of thought in sensation. Thus, whereas he says at times that there are already judgments "connected with the sensations", at other times he is not so sure:

If we conclude in analogy with those cases which can be observed with some degree of distinctness, we must say that the activity of thought does not connect immediately with the sensations about which we think, but with its representations.

Reid is of the opinion that some of our first judgments must precede the simple apprehension of objects, that is, precede the ideas of subject and predicate. He was led to this, without doubt, because of the rapidity with which the actions of thought follow the actions of sensation in several cases, so that they merge into one noticeable activity of the soul.

It is difficult to observe the real limits, to say where the preceding sensation and representation ends and where thought begins.<sup>33</sup>

Tetens is more certain about the role which thought plays in the formation of ideas:

Representations become ideas and thoughts. By themselves representations are not ideas or thoughts. The picture of the moon is only the material for an idea of the moon. The representation still misses form: the idea contains apart from the representation also a consciousness, a perception and differentiation. An idea presupposes comparison and judgments, if we are to consider it as the idea of a certain object. These latter are effects of feeling and thought, which can be separated at least in theory, though in nature they are intimately connected with the idea.<sup>34</sup>

An idea is first and foremost "a representation with consciousness, a picture that has been made into the sign of an object".<sup>35</sup>

Tetens has modified the traditional theory of ideas to a great extent. He has realised that ideas cannot be uncomplicated and unstructured basic elements of all knowledge, which explain everything without needing explanation themselves. He has rejected the particularistic

interpretation of ideas and tries to exhibit the role which thought processes necessarily play in the acquisition of knowledge of objects. But to what extent does Tetens' version of the theory of ideas succeed in avoiding the idealistic consequences Reid discusses? Has Tetens shown that the theory of ideas is not "the Trojan horse" that Reid claimed it to be? Certainly Tetens avoids a number of the mistakes made by Locke and his followers. He recognizes the complex nature of the perceptual process and makes the mediating mental objects between the perceiving subject and the perceived object into signs with a structure, a structure which leads us to take them as signs of external objects. But the basic problem of the theory of ideas or phenomenalism remains: how can we be sure of the objective validity of our knowledge? How can we say that we know objects, if we are not in any way directly acquainted with them? Tetens is, of course, very much aware of this problem. In fact, the solution of it is one of his most central concerns.<sup>36</sup>

#### B. The Origin of Our Notions of the Objective Reference of Our Perceptions

Tetens may be said to attack the problem of objective knowledge in two steps. The first step is concerned with showing how our notions of objectivity arise, while the second step deals with our reasons for accepting our sensations, representations and ideas as signs of objects. The first step, which will be dealt with in this section, is not in any way concerned with the legitimacy of our claims to objective knowledge, but merely with a description of the genesis of our notions of objectivity.<sup>37</sup>

Again Tetens begins his discussion from the state of the problem

as established by Thomas Reid and James Beattie, and again Tetens makes no secret of this. He loses no time in making clear that the Scottish theory, which claims that our judgments about the objective reference of our acts of perception are the immediate results of instinct, is the starting point of his own discussion. Not only is the first section of the essay which deals with this problem entitled: "Whether the Knowledge of the Existence of the External Objects Can be Regarded as Instinctual Judgments of the Power of Thought", but Tetens also says that he finds the Scottish account satisfactory up to a point, and that he is willing to go along with it, as far as it goes. His only criticism is that the Scots have not gone far enough:

The thought that we represent other objects to ourselves is so immediately woven into our ordinary ideas of sensation that we are hardly aware of any preceding act of reflection. Therefore we cannot blame Reid, Home, Reimarus and others too much if they considered the thought of objectivity and subjectivity as the effects of instinct. In a certain sense they have not said anything false either. The expressions of the power of thought are all expressions of one basic faculty, which finally can be analysed into certain general, naturally necessary kinds of actions, which can only be observed as existing. And we are not allowed to derive these from other, farther removed principles. But on the other hand, it is a mistake to appeal immediately to instinct with regard to every particular effect.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, even though there are "innumerable cases in which we believe that we are immediately concerned with the sensed objects", it means "to stop the investigation all too prematurely", if we were to rely too much upon instinct. To do so is almost the same as the old convenient appeal to the so-called "qualitas occulta".<sup>39</sup>

There are general instinct-like laws of judgment (allgemeine instinktartige Urtheilsgesetze), or at

least, there are things we have to assume as such, because they are basic laws for us, according to which the faculty of thought must think objects as identical or different. There can be several of these laws, which we cannot reduce to one general principle. But the question is now: To what extent are our judgments about the objectivity of representations, if I may say so, or about the internal and external reality of the represented objects, effects of the power of thought, which can be understood on the basis of other general and necessary natural laws of this faculty, or to what extent they require their own basic laws, with which they are in accord.<sup>40</sup>

Yet, after these great promises, Tetens' own answer must appear rather disappointing, for in the end, his view is very like that of the Scots. After some debate as to how we come to differentiate between two different classes or "heaps" (Haufen) of sensations, namely those of inner sense and those of outer sense, Tetens concludes, with the help of Lord Kames to whom he refers several times approvingly, that our judgments about the objectivity of our representations are indeed natural judgments.<sup>41</sup>

It is just as natural, just as necessary and in accordance with the very same laws of the faculty of thought, when I think: my body is a really existing object, and it is not my self, the tree, which I see and feel, is a really existing object for itself, and neither my soul nor my body, as it is natural and close to the first activities of reflection when I think: I, as a soul, am a really existing thing. This conclusion is against Hume and Berkeley. But I will not use it any further.<sup>42</sup>

The only difference between Reid and Beattie's account and that given by Tetens seems to be Tetens' emphasis that these judgments concerning the reality of objects are judgments of thought. In some sense this difference is minimal, as Tetens admits himself, though it foreshadows the way in which Kant will attack the problem.<sup>43</sup>

So it must appear somewhat strange and thankless that Tetens takes



several occasions to point out that the Scots have really not answered Hume and have not been fundamental enough, that "Reid and Beattie have not achieved this aim, because they have opposed Hume and Berkeley with common sense in an indeterminate way".<sup>44</sup> Common sense does not really need any philosophy. It will always be victorious over people like Hume and Berkeley. But Reid and Beattie "have included old prejudices, which have long been discarded by true philosophy, among the principles of common sense. They denied together with the principles of skepticism also the principle that all external objects are only judged in accordance with their representations within ourselves", and, Tetens goes on, "they overthrew the tribunal of analytic and deductive reason, so that one might say that common sense should come to the aid of the skeptics and idealists in defending some propositions against Reid and Beattie".<sup>45</sup> This quotation shows clearly why Tetens is most upset with the Scots, in spite of his fundamental dependence upon them. It is because of their rejection of the theory of ideas, and because of their failure to emphasize the importance of reason. But it has to be said that Tetens himself promises more than he delivers. He himself does not give a satisfactory explanation of the role of thought in perception either.

Tetens notes several times that the theory of ideas or phenomenalism "is completely innocent" with regard to idealism, but he does not advance any arguments against Reid or Beattie to show this. His claims sound very much as though he finds it necessary to re-assure himself, to persuade himself that phenomenalism and idealism have nothing in common. It appears that Tetens is not altogether sure that Reid is wrong, and that phenomenalism does not constitute the first

step on the road to skepticism. But this is not all Tetens has to say on this matter, since he also addresses himself to the question concerning the justification of our belief in the existence of external objects in the context of his discussion of objective laws of thought.<sup>46</sup> But before this is considered more thoroughly a representation of Tetens' views on subjective necessity is needed.

### C. Common Sense and Subjective Necessity

As did most of his German contemporaries, Tetens also takes his point of departure in the discussion of common sense from what he takes to be the essential characteristic of the Scottish conception of it, namely "its opposition to discursive reasoning".<sup>47</sup> Tetens agrees to this general characterisation of common sense. In fact, his only objection to the Scots is that they have not adhered strictly enough to their own definition of common sense. Especially Oswald and Beattie have ascribed things to common sense, which common sense could never supply as a sense, things "which are incomprehensible without a very highly developed understanding, sharpened by deliberation, reflection and knowledge".<sup>48</sup> But, if the distinction between common sense and reason is to be plausible, we cannot speak of common sense wherever we encounter conscious thought, i.e. distinct concepts, inferences and general theories.<sup>49</sup>

But if these remarks of Tetens suggest that he himself makes a sharp distinction between common sense and reason, they are misleading. Common sense and reason are for him, just as for Eberhard, Mendelssohn and (at least the later) Reid, different expressions of the same basic faculty, namely that of thought.<sup>50</sup> "Common sense is nothing else than

the faculty of thought in so far as it judges about objects by being immediately related to them".<sup>51</sup> Discursive thought is just another branch of this faculty of relations, and common sense is a sort of unconscious thought. It involves certain "unnoticed transitions from one judgment to another, transitions which are, more carefully considered, indeed confused and contracted deductions or inferences".<sup>52</sup> Since common sense and reason are expressions of the same basic faculty, since both function in accordance with identical principles and in very much the same way, common sense and reason are not different in kind, but only in degree. The only difference between them consists in our awareness of their respective functions. While the thought processes of common sense are unconscious, those of reason are conscious.<sup>53</sup> It thus appears that we become immediately aware of common sense knowledge, and it is for this reason that we describe common sense as a sense. The Scottish characterisation of common sense is therefore quite correct for Tetens. But again he believes that we have to "go further" and be "more thorough" than the Scots. Since Tetens believes that common sense involves unconscious reasoning, he tries to make this reasoning conscious.<sup>54</sup>

Because common sense is no distinct faculty of the human mind, and because there is no clear demarcation line between thought and common sense, Tetens does not find it as "fruitful" to define "common sense" primarily in reference to its place in the geography of the human mind, but defines it rather in reference to the body of knowledge to which it gives rise.<sup>55</sup> "Common sense" and "reason" in Tetens' work do therefore refer not so much to subjective mental faculties but to certain classes

of judgments. The class of judgments referred to by "common sense" is further subdivided into three subclasses, namely common sense proper, cultivated human understanding and learned human understanding.<sup>56</sup> The latter two are higher developments of common sense proper. But Tetens does not make much of this distinction, and he usually talks exclusively about common sense proper. The subdivisions only show again how common sense and reason shade off into each other for Tetens. The learned human understanding and reason are very difficult to differentiate, in any case.

That degree of the human understanding "which all healthy and fully intact human beings, endowed with the ordinary senses, have obtained when they are fully grown and judge about things and qualities . . . is the common sense. Its cognitions amount to the universal human opinions, to the sensus communis hominum".<sup>57</sup> "Common sense" refers to that stage which "all human beings usually reach through the internal organisation of their nature and the influence of external factors".<sup>58</sup> These descriptions of common sense by Tetens show that he understands "common sense" in a wider sense than Thomas Reid. Tetens' common sense comprises also what Reid called the "common understanding".<sup>59</sup> This has certain consequences for the function which Tetens gives to common sense. He can say on the one hand that we have given a "great authority" to common sense and this "not without reason", and can note on the other hand that common sense cannot be an absolute tribunal of truth.<sup>60</sup> Common sense makes agreement between human beings possible, and it suffices for the most complicated matters of daily life. Neither the hunter, nor the sailor needs more knowledge than

common sense can give. Even scientific disputes can be solved at this level, and moral philosophy does not have to go beyond common sense either. For all normal concerns we do not need any further developed concepts than those of common sense.<sup>61</sup> But the fact that all human beings agree on something, the fact that a certain proposition is sanctified by common sense, does not show that this proposition is true.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, though all the judgments of common sense appear to be necessary judgments, they are only subjectively necessary, i.e. they are necessary for us. Secondly, they are not all necessary in the same way.<sup>63</sup> For this reason the mere acknowledgement of the necessity of the judgments of common sense is not enough for the philosopher. He has to inquire into the sources for this necessity.<sup>64</sup> Reid, Oswald and Beattie have neglected to do this, and have stopped their inquiries too early:

It would have been the real task of the British philosophers who made it their business to justify the principles of common sense against Hume and Berkeley, to have become involved in the particulars of this problem. They should have shown with regard to every kind of common sense cognition how much of it necessarily has to be accepted as true through the nature of the understanding, and how much depends upon an association of ideas.<sup>65</sup>

What Reid, Oswald and Beattie have neglected to do, Tetens (again) sets out to achieve. But in his discussion of the different kinds of necessity to be found in common sense, Tetens is again depending upon the Scottish theory of common sense.

Tetens differentiates the following subjectively necessary ways of thinking in accordance with the basis upon which this necessity is founded: (1) Subjectively necessary forms of judgment. These are founded upon

the nature of the faculty of thought. We know at least some of these general laws of nature to which the understanding qua understanding is just as much subject as the light is subject to the laws of refraction.<sup>66</sup>

Among these are the laws of contradiction, of the excluded middle, of identity, etc.<sup>67</sup>

(2) There are necessary judgments "in which the necessity of thought depends upon the ideas and their qualities, i.e. upon the material of the judgment". Among these Tetens counts what he calls "particularly necessary judgments", namely laws of geometry, such claims as "nothing can be without a cause", and "a multitude of such propositions which Reid and Beattie have called suggestions of reason".<sup>68</sup> The first kind of necessary truth is above all skepticism. They are formally necessary principles of all thought. The second kind may be doubted, though they cannot be disproved either. "The subjective necessity of the latter kind is also a physical necessity, and the circumstances and presuppositions upon which their necessity depends cannot be separated from the understanding".<sup>69</sup>

There is also a third kind of necessity for Tetens, a necessity which is accidental. These are (3) judgments which are subjectively necessary because of habit. "Mr. Hume and several others after him have mistaken this necessity for the first kind of natural necessity, or rather, they have recognised it as the only kind of necessity".<sup>70</sup> Given this distinction between different kinds of subjective necessity, Tetens can run through the catalogue of principles of common sense given by Reid, namely "the judgments about the existence of a real world, about the causal connections of objects within the world; the distinction

of the present in sensation from the past in memory and the future in anticipation, our belief in foreign witness", and find that

the one is an association of ideas and a generalization of particular experiential judgments, the other, however, a natural law of thought; and in a certain sense the faculty of thought is always determined by a combination of the two in these cognitions. And this makes the approval and the conviction necessary.<sup>71</sup>

In fact, "we may take the word common sense in whatever sense we want, it is obvious from the nature of common sense that the kinds of subjective necessity differentiated above will be found among its effects".<sup>72</sup> It is for this reason that common sense principles have to be investigated further and cannot be accepted as absolutely true without inquiry. Since common sense depends upon the principles of thought, just as reason does, and since philosophical investigation is essentially a rational enterprise, an investigation of the principles of common sense must necessarily lead to an investigation of the principles of all thought. Only in this way can we hope to differentiate mere prejudices and habitual judgments from genuine principles of common sense. The examination of the subjective principles of common sense must necessarily lead to an examination of the objectively necessary laws of thought. This is something, which, according to Tetens, the Scots have not realised.<sup>73</sup> In fact, all the other criticisms of the Scots by Tetens seem to be reducible to this.

#### D. Laws of Thought and Objective Necessity

Up to this point Tetens has always relied on the Scots to supply him not only with the starting point for his own discussion, but also to guide him in the course of his own inquiries and to supply him with

hints for his attempts at a solution of his problems. Now he appears to have reached a point at which the Scots can no longer help him. But this is not actually so. In spite of Tetens' grand claims about the investigation of the role of the objective laws of thought in knowledge and his supposed advances beyond the Scots, he not only starts from a position greatly determined by that of the Scots, but also concludes with a theory that is not all that different from that of Scottish common sense. He starts with a critical discussion of Lossius' theory that truth consists essentially in subjective necessity, and his conclusions amount to saying that truth is essentially objective because "necessary laws of thought lead common sense towards the existence of external objects, as the causes of its external sensations".<sup>74</sup>

The question concerning objective truth arises for Tetens in the following way:

The subjective necessity which forces us to think in accordance with general laws of the understanding we know from observation. We feel that we cannot think square circles . . . upon this subjective necessity we found the objective necessity: The impossibility of thinking differently is ascribed to the objects external to the understanding. Our ideas are no longer ideas within ourselves. They are things external to ourselves. The qualities and relations, which we perceive in the ideas, are represented to us as qualities and relations of the objects themselves. They belong to the objects even apart from our thought and they would have to be recognised by any other thinking being. This is a consequence of instinct. It is an effect of common sense. The old metaphysics has recognised something correct in this approach and has accepted as its axiom that truth is something objective.<sup>75</sup>

Lossius had seriously questioned this metaphysical conception of truth, and he had argued that truth was just as subjective and without founda-



tion in the ontological structure of the universe as beauty.<sup>76</sup> But Tetens finds "this is the fiercest attack which skepticism could make upon reason".<sup>77</sup>

In order to answer the question posed by Lossius' Physische Ursachen des Wahren it is necessary to determine first "what really counts with regard to truth, and what the belief that the objects are really of the kind in which they are represented to us amounts to. Then we have to consider the way in which we reach this judgment and the reasons which lead us to it".<sup>78</sup> First of all it is clear that when we define truth as the correspondence of thought and objects we cannot mean anything else than analogy by "correspondence". Ideas have the same relations to one another as the objects to which they correspond. Comparing objects with ideas is really nothing more than comparing representations. Thus the question amounts to asking whether we have any reason, or whether there is any law which forces us, to consider the relations of the ideas as relations of the objects themselves. The problem is whether or not "the relations which we perceive in our ideas are merely subjective relations, i.e. relations depending on the nature of the kind of perceptions we have. The point of the matter is to be found in this question".<sup>79</sup>

The second matter in need of clarification is the meaning of the claim that our knowledge is objective. What does it mean to say that the objects "really" have the characteristics we ascribe to them?<sup>80</sup> Since we do not perceive the objects directly and immediately (as Reid had argued but Tetens rejected), but only by means of impressions, representations and ideas, this claim cannot be taken literally either.

What we have to mean, according to Tetens, is that the objects do not just appear to me in a certain way, under certain circumstances and a certain time, but that they necessarily have to appear in this way to everybody at all times.<sup>81</sup>

After these qualifications the "true sense" of Lossius' question emerges:

Thoughts consist in the relations which we perceive in our impressions . . . If the relations which we note in our impressions are simply dependent upon this kind of impressions, their entire analogy is merely subjective, and the incompatibility of, for instance, square and round in one figure is only an incompatibility for us. But if these relations are independent of the nature of impressions, and the same as every other thinking being must see in his impressions, then the impossibility of a square circle is an absolute and objective impossibility.<sup>82</sup>

Further, Tetens believes, the question cannot go. He has resolved the problem of the objectivity of our cognitions into that of the inter-subjectivity of the cognitions, and by doing so he has shifted the problem from sensation to thought. For Tetens, as for most other German enlightenment philosophers including Kant, inter-subjectivity is only granted by thought. While the impressions and suggestions of thought are merely subjective, rational thought and its laws afford intersubjective or objective truth. Against the objection that there might be other beings with different laws of thought, he argues that this objection abandons the first aim of the inquiry and establishes a new one. We cannot think an understanding that can think square circles. Therefore, if there was such a thing, it would not be an understanding. This shows for Tetens that the question is irrelevant.<sup>83</sup>

The problem concerning the objectivity of knowledge is now re-

formulated as follows:

We replace the words objective and subjective with the words unchanging subjective and changing subjective, then we do not have to take the faculties of thought of other beings of which we have no concepts into account . . . For it is the same as when we ask what depends upon the special organisation of our organs or upon our constitution, and what is necessarily and always in this way and remains so even if the bodily organs of thought are changed, as long as our self remains a thinking being.<sup>84</sup>

After these re-formulations Tetens' answer to the question concerning the objectivity of our knowledge, or, as it reads now, "whether the laws of thought are only subjective laws of our faculty of thought or whether they are laws for any faculty of thought whatsoever", has become surprisingly simple. Since we cannot think any other faculty of thought than our own (for, if there was such a faculty of thought with other laws, it could not be called "thought" in the same way as our faculty), the truths of reason "are objective truths, and the fact that they are objective truths is just as certain as the fact that they are truths in the first place. We cannot doubt or deny the former, just as we cannot doubt or deny the latter".<sup>85</sup>

More difficult is the question whether our knowledge based upon the sensations of external objects is objective, or whether it is "at most a steady subjective illusion".<sup>86</sup> Tetens agrees with most of his contemporaries that a great part of our knowledge obtained through the senses is indeed such a subjective appearance, but he wants to show that there are also cases in which we can be sure about the objectivity of our representations. And in those cases our belief in the objective reality is "so necessary that it is impossible for us to think the contrary".<sup>87</sup> Though

I can make mistakes and ascribe erroneously characteristics of my representations to the objects themselves, there are also cases "which I cannot doubt without exaggerating skepticism very much".<sup>88</sup>

But is this a satisfactory answer, given Tetens' own pronouncements on this matter? That we "are often assured" or "strongly believe" that objects really are what they seem to be to us has never been in doubt. What has been in doubt is whether we are ultimately justified in holding these beliefs or whether they are illusory. The Scots believed that these beliefs belonged among the basic principles of thought and perception and that as such they neither could be justified nor needed to be justified. Tetens rejected this approach as too simple and unphilosophical. But again, after much discussion, he in the end adopts a theory that is not all that different from the Scots. He assumes, just as do Reid, Oswald and Beattie, that our sensations are much more reliable than the skeptic wants to make us believe. But, whereas the Scots had claimed that this reliability of sensation was granted immediately by certain basic principles or beliefs, Tetens, who believed that these basic principles were principles of thought and furthermore that thought could not be immediately related to sensation, wanted to give an account of the reliability of knowledge as being mediated by representations. He wanted to be more thorough than Reid. He wanted to "investigate the nature of human cognition up to its first beginnings", and especially "to explicate the procedure of the power of thought in the attainment of knowledge more exactly and more carefully than either Reid, or Beattie or Oswald," but he does not really succeed.<sup>89</sup> Reid's theory of suggestion and natural belief served not only as a starting point for Tetens, but it remained his model

from the beginning to the end, and he does not appear to have been capable of freeing himself from it. Accordingly his conclusion is very much the same as that of the Scots:

Necessary laws of thought lead common sense towards the existence of external objects as the causes of external sensations. Just such laws bring forth the judgments about impressions. But the same laws lead common sense to the thought that the relations of the impressions are, under certain conditions, also the relations of objects.<sup>90</sup>

Apart from the fact that Tetens' account is formulated in a phenomenalist terminology, there is little substantial difference from Reid and the other Scots. Tetens himself does not show "more exactly" how the laws of thought enable us to know in the first place. He says that the belief in the existence of objects originates by means of a natural law of thought, but Reid had already said that "we must regard our impressions as corresponding signs of objects," and that this was a natural law. Moreover, Tetens himself uses Reid's term of a "school of nature" in order to explain how we come to consider our representations as signs of real objects.<sup>91</sup>

In spite of all his claims to the contrary, Tetens has not succeeded in going beyond Reid. But, under the influence of Reid and Beattie, Tetens has made an interesting move. He has re-formulated the question concerning the objective validity of knowledge in close connection with his conception of laws of thought and has tried to answer the question by means of connecting these laws of thought with sensation. Though Tetens himself does not give a satisfactory account of this matter, he has at least asked the question and formulated it very clearly. It remained for someone else, namely Immanuel Kant, to give a more satisfactory account of the interdependence of thought and sensation.<sup>92</sup>

## NOTES : CHAPTER VIII

1. For some details of Tetens' life and thought, as well as an interesting discussion of his theory in relation to that of Kant, see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 412-25. See also Giorgio Tonelli's article on Tetens in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Paul Eward). The standard work on Tetens is still W. Uebele's Johann Nicolaus Tetens, Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte, 24, Berlin, 1911. See also Uebele's "Herder and Tetens", Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, XVIII (1905), pp. 216-49, and his "Johann Nicolaus Tetens zum 100jährigen Todestag", Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 1908, pp. 137-51.
2. See Max Dessoir, "Des Johann Nicolaus Tetens Stellung in der Geschichte der Philosophie", Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 16 (1892); see also Max Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren Psychologie, pp. 120-31. But one only has to look through the works of his contemporaries in order to see how important Tetens was. See, for instance, Ernst Platner, Aphorismen I (1793), pp. vii/viii: "Indeed, apart from Tetens' Philosophische Versuche no other recently published work in philosophy has interested me as much as Kant's Critique of Reason. If the first mentioned work had advertised itself a little more (ever since I know the worthy author, I can explain to myself why he did not do it), and if it had appeared at a time when several thinkers, inclined by insight and enabled by their literary relations to support a revolution in philosophy, it might, just as the Kantian work, easily have achieved that degree of influence upon our age

which we call epoch making". It will, of course, not be possible to discuss all that is important in Tetens here.

3. These two works are Tetens' most important ones, and the only ones discussed here. His other works are of less importance, though still very interesting and well worth reading. See Tonelli "Tetens", Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See also Jeffrey Barnouw, "The Philosophical Achievement and Historical Significance of Johann Nicolaus Tetens", Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture, vol 9, ed. Roseann Runte, Madison, 1979.
4. See Uebele, Tetens, H.J. Vleeshouwer, The Development of Kantian Thought, London, 1962, pp. 82-8. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 412ff. rejects any fundamental influence of Tetens upon the critical Kant. But Beck seems to view Tetens too much from the point of view of the mature Kant. In 1775 and 1776 Tetens might have meant more to Kant than his position after 1781 suggests.
5. See, for instance, Uebele, Tetens, p. 70; Sommer, Grundzüge, p. 263; J. Lorsch, Die Lehre vom Gefühl bei Tetens, Giessen, 1906, p. 3; G. Störriing, Die Erkenntnistheorie von Tetens, Leipzig, 1901. Störriing's attempt to explain Tetens' thought as a synthesis of Hume and Leibniz shows the inadequacy of this view best. On p. 140 of his work he notes a basic agreement between Tetens and John Stuart Mill. Both point out that causality does not only require succession but also necessity, and both use the same example of the night following the day, as being an example involving succession but not causality. Störriing is excited about this "coincidence" and takes it as an example of Tetens' acuity (having preceded Mill

on this). But both Tetens and Mill probably relied on Beattie in this regard.

6. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, pp. iii/iv; Speculativische Philosophie, p. 13 (all quotations are given in accordance with the reprint of the Kant-Gesellschaft).
7. Ibid., p. 10, see also p. 3-9, p. 12, and Philosophische Versuche, pp. 558-77.
8. Tetens, Speculativische Philosophie, p. 12.
9. Ibid.
10. Tetens refers to them by name in Speculativische Philosophie, pp. 10, 11, 12, 70; Philosophische Versuche, pp. 55, 298, 329, 331, 332, 333, 335, 365, 367, 372n., 382, 392, 412, 441, 461, 478, 496, 503, 512, 515, 517, 518, 530, 567n., 571, 572 and 631. To Berkeley he refers, by comparison, only on p. 391, 392, 394, 400, 467, 480, 485, 489, 515, 516, 571, 591. Given these many references and acknowledgments of the Scots, the dependence of Tetens upon the Scots could not go completely unnoticed. See, for instance, Sommer, Grundzüge, pp. 265f.; Dessoir, Geschichte, p. 54; Zart, Einfluss, p. 170, 172n., p. 177; Uebele, Tetens, pp. 72-3, 93, 142 and Walther Schlegelndahl, Johann Nicolaus Tetens Erkenntnistheorie in Beziehung auf Kant, Leipzig, 1888, pp. 46-7. But the exact nature and extent of the Scottish influence upon Tetens has never been discussed.
11. Tetens, Speculativische Philosophie, p. 12.
12. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 372n.
13. Ibid., p. 367. See also p. 392: "Reid and Beattie . . . denied



together with the principles of skepticism also the principle of philosophy that all external objects are only judged in accordance with their representations within us . . ."; Tetens, Speculativische Philosophie, pp. 3-5 and 27 are also relevant in this connection. Compare also Kant, Prolegomena, ed. Beck, pp. 36-7.

14. Tetens, Speculativische Philosophie, pp. 4-5. That Tetens is very much aware of Reid in this context becomes clear especially from Philosophische Versuche, p. 333: "Reid says that this sensation of hardness has nothing in common with the hardness in the body, and this is certainly true. It is something subjective in the soul, while the hardness of the body is something objective in the object".
15. For a more thorough discussion of this aspect of Reid's thought see Chapter II, pp. 53ff. For Tetens' view on this see below.
16. Reid, Inquiry, Chapter II, section 3, p. 25: "They are all simple and original and therefore inexplicable acts of the mind". Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 165: "What is feeling or sensation? I admit at once that I am incapable of explaining it. It is a simple expression of the soul, which I do not know how to analyse into more simple ones".
17. Ibid., p. 165. On p. 166 Tetens even seems to be arguing specifically against Reid's view that there are no mental representations involved in memory.
18. Ibid., p. 162: ". . . ideas, or as Reid says, perceptions . . .", p. 333: "Reid says . . . the perception or the idea . . ."
19. Ibid., p. 16; see also p. 13.

20. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
21. Ibid., p. 20.
22. Ibid., p. 17.
23. Ibid., p. 20.
24. Ibid., p. 55n.
25. Ibid., p. 412.
26. Ibid., p. 333.
27. Ibid., pp. 93ff.; see especially p. 94; see also pp. 327-36.
28. Ibid., p. 21; see also Tetens, Speculativische Philosophie, p. 3, where he speaks of "a natural inclination to identify ideas and objects", because of which common sense believes that "we are dealing immediately with objects and not with impressions and representations". Tetens is very much aware of Reid's theory of suggestion and natural signs, as his Philosophische Versuche, pp. 329-36, pp. 365-9, 372 and p. 503 show. Tetens also employs the language metaphor and speaks ideas as written words (see pp. 363ff. and 432).
29. Ibid., pp. 77 and 83. On p. 77 he even refers obliquely to Reid and Beattie: "it is not difficult to give the reason for this phenomenon or 'natural inclination', as some call it".
30. Reid, Inquiry, Chapter II, Section 3, p. 25, Reid, Works, I, pp. 105-6.
31. Ibid., p. 75.
32. Ibid. Compare this with Eberhard's account. See pp. 303ff. above.
33. Ibid., p. 461. See also pp. 337-43 and 365: "It cannot be denied . . . that the notion of the objective reality of objects is an expression of the faculty of thought, which arises only when the

sensations of objects have already become a representation, and that thought presupposes this representation as an apprehension of the object. . . ." It seems that there is a contradiction between this quotation and the one given previously (notes 31 and 32). For there Tetens says that thought is already connected with sensation, and that representations consist of these rudimentary judgments and sensation. But here he seems to claim that thought does not connect immediately with sensation.

34. Ibid., p. 26; see also p. 413.
35. Ibid., p. 94. This, by the way, shows as much about Tetens' understanding of ideas as it does about his understanding of representations. For it becomes clear that we are not conscious of representations qua representations. This is connected with the Leibnizian theory of apperception, which Tetens accepts.
36. Ibid., pp. 369-70 and 363.
37. Ibid., p. 393.
38. Ibid., p. 365; see also pp. 372ff. The long note there shows that Leibniz, Locke and Reid are most important for Tetens in this context. But he also refers to the German translation of Ferguson's Institutes by Garve.
39. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 366. See also p. 372n.: "Reid in his Inquiry into the Human Mind and his followers consider these judgments about the objective reality of things as instinctual effects of the understanding, of which no other reason could be given. But he supplies many nice observations which belong here". See also p. 412.

40. Ibid., pp. 366-7.
41. Ibid., p. 395 (reference to Lord Kames, Versuch über die Grundsätze der Moralität, 3rd essay); p. 396: "The phenomenon is really just as Mr. Home has observed it. The only question is from what cause its character is determined. Is it so by nature and is it immutable, or does it depend upon accidental circumstances and can therefore also be changed?"
42. Ibid., p. 400. But Tetens' discussion of the self is very interesting in its own right as well as in regard to Hume: Tetens begins: "Hume, as the author of the infamous work about the human nature declared\* (\* Treatise of human nature 3, vol. 8 (sic)) the idea we have of our self or of our soul 'to be a sum of multitude of particular, successive, singular but divided, and dispersed sensations, of whose connection phantasy has created the idea of one whole, which contains the particular sensation as a quality within itself'. He drew from this the conclusion that we can maintain nothing more of the soul with evidence than that it is a sum of qualities and changes, which exist while they are felt immediately. But we cannot say that it is one thing, a single whole, a real thing. On the basis of this, his opponents have accused him of sophistically arguing the existence of the soul away, and of admitting only the reality of his thoughts and changes. This was indeed the limit of rational skepticism. . . . What the Herren Reid and Beattie have objected to this is well known, namely that this is against common sense. The answer is not false, but unphilosophical, as long as another answer is still

possible, which also shows the reason for this error". Tetens tries to answer Hume by showing that we never perceive ideas in complete isolation from other ideas, that ideas are always noticed against the general background of other ideas. In his answer he makes use of the Leibnizian theory of perception and apperception again.

43. Ibid., p. 365: "Reid, Home, Reimarus and others . . . have in a certain respect said nothing false;" p. 441: "I would therefore say without hesitation together with Reid that it [the judgment connected with sensation] is the effect of an instinct". See footnote 47 below.
44. Ibid., p. 392. See also p. 331. Talking about the differences between ideas and representations, Tetens finds: "Herr Reid and his followers have entangled themselves in these difficulties, and in order to get out of them again they have accepted the opinion that no other reason or explanation of the origin of the first ideas of sensation could be given . . . than that they are essentially different from sensations and that they are made by the faculty of perception of the soul and are only effects of an instinct. With regard to them we can only ask of what kind are they, but not how do they originate? There is no doubt that they are effects of the instinct, which means, effects which originate from the nature of thought. Locke and the other philosophers, whom one wants to contradict with this, have not denied this. But the question which they have answered affirmatively is whether the kind of activity of the natural faculty and its laws cannot be

analysed and reduced to general rules. If this is successful, we do not have to stop and say: this or that idea is the immediate work of the instinct". See also pp. 333-5, 517, and Tetens, Speculativische Philosophie, p. 12.

45. Philosophische Versuche, p. 392. All this sounds very much like Kant's pronouncements on the role of common sense.
46. See pp. 349-352 below.
47. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, pp. 507-8: "In spite of all the differences in the meaning in which more recent philosophers have understood the terms Menschenverstand (sensus communis, common sense (sic), gemeiner Verstand and others), its general characteristic is seen to consist in its opposition to discursive reason. This is how Reid, Beattie and Oswald understood the term, though their explanations of it are otherwise indeterminate".
48. Ibid., p. 508. See also p. 512: "What Oswald has passed off as cognitions of common sense truly does not belong to it". Tetens refers especially to the problem of the existence of God and Oswald's attempt to solve it by a simple appeal to common sense. The point is, of course, that for the Scots common sense was never common sense in the strict meaning.
49. Ibid., p. 508, p. 559, Tetens, Speculativische Philosophie, pp. 5-10.
50. This is very similar to the opinion of Mendelssohn and Eberhard. Accordingly Tetens has also a very similar conception of the relationship between speculative thought and common sense. "Both need to be investigated, the judgments of common sense and the judgments of reason. Indeed the one is no more and no less suspect

than the other, even though the one may have in special cases more presumption in its favour than the other" (Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 573). "To declare the question, whether a true subjective natural necessity has been confused with an accepted habit at times, as unnecessary, and to rely in accordance with Reid, Beattie and Oswald's principle, only upon the uninvestigated common sense, means to reject rational inquiry" (ibid., pp. 572-3), see also p. 574. Tetens seems to believe that Beattie thinks geometry is opposed to common sense). But to neglect common sense, as the idealists and the harmonists have done, is equally wrong. Common sense and reason have their own spheres and need each other. They can never really contradict each other in their principles. Both can fail (ibid., p. 565). Both can correct each other (ibid.).

51. Ibid., p. 510. The influence of Reid's theory of immediate sensation should be obvious.
52. Ibid., p. 509. Examples of such "reasoning" are given by Tetens in the first sections of his Speculativische Philosophie.
53. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, pp. 508ff.; Speculativische Philosophie, pp. 6-8.
54. It is also for this reason that Tetens finds it difficult to differentiate between sensation and thought at times. See p. 336 (especially footn. 33) above.
55. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 511.
56. Ibid., pp. 511-514.
57. Ibid., p. 511.
58. Ibid.

59. See Reid, Inquiry, Chapter VI, Section 20, pp. 212-3. By the way, the German term Tetens uses most often to refer to common sense is "gemeiner Menschenverstand", which literally translated means "common human understanding". See also footn. 47 above.
60. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 511 and p. 512.
61. Ibid., pp. 508-14; Tetens, Speculativische Philosophie, pp. 6-11.
62. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, pp. 507f.
63. Ibid., p. 515.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid. See also what follows: After having explained what is necessary for a refutation of skepticism, Tetens goes on:  
 "However, if one goes to work as Reid, Beattie and Oswald and assumes as an absolute principle that the fact that common sense thinks of a certain matter in such and such a way is a secure criterion of truth . . . if the judgment of analytic and deductive reason is not heed, and if even reason's right to vote in matters of truth, prejudice and error is taken away, how can the thinking skeptic ever be convinced? Is it too much to say that this approach is contradictory to common sense?" (ibid., p. 517).  
 Compare with p. 340 (footn. 44) above.
66. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 500.
67. Tetens says he does not know whether all these laws can be reduced to the law of contradiction, as the Wolffians hold, but that he in any case cannot do it (ibid., p. 502).
68. Ibid., p. 503. See also pp. 495-6. After having talked about the causal connection, Tetens says: "There are still more of such relational thoughts, which do not result from the comparison of



two related things but from the idea of one of them . . . Herr Reid has called this latter class of judgments judgments of suggestion (Suggestionenurtheile), judgments from a natural propulsion, or from inspiration". More than two pages of discussion of this notion follow. Tetens obviously agrees that there are such judgments.

See also pp. 478-9: "There is a subjective necessity in geometrical demonstrations, another one in the principles of dependence, and another one in general kinds of thought, which may be called propositions of suggestions (Suggestionssätze). They are also in sensible judgments and in the belief with which we accept testimony by others. Herr Beattie has endeavoured to show the nature of this necessity. But he does not seem to have reached its foundation and origin. For in order to do this it is not sufficient to note here and there the kind of subjective necessity in the thoughts. Though the objective necessity is judged in accordance with this subjective necessity, we also must show the basis of this necessity in the understanding, or at least the universal law of thought which determines the naturally necessary ways in which thoughts and judgments behave. This entire fertile field has been left as obscure as it was before by Mr. Beattie and his predecessors. I cannot make up for everything. But several places, which are most elevated and from which an outlook upon the most important areas is open, I shall try to emphasise somewhat more". This passage clearly shows the great extent Tetens is dependent on Reid and Beattie.

69. Ibid., p. 504.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p. 515.
72. Ibid., p. 514-5.
73. But for them the natural judgments were already objective, even though connected with sensation. Moreover, why are laws of thought more "objective" than laws of sensation? See also Chapter X, pp. 467ff. below.
74. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 548.
75. Ibid., p. 519.
76. See Chapter VI (especially footn. 32) above.
77. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 520.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p. 523.
80. Ibid., pp. 523-5.
81. Ibid., p. 524. This is not unlike Feder's "constant appearance".
82. Ibid., pp. 525-6. Compare with Feder. See pp. 254ff. above.
83. Ibid., pp. 526-7. Quite clearly Tetens' answer is not satisfactory. He wants to reduce the question concerning objective truth to that of intersubjective truth. The objection aims at showing that this reduction does not capture everything that is claimed when we say that an object really exists and really has the qualities we perceive.
84. Ibid., pp. 527-8.
85. Ibid., p. 533.
86. Ibid., p. 534. It seems, Tetens is alluding to Feder here. His

tactics of "re-formulation" also remind somewhat of Feder. See Chapter V (especially pp. 243ff.) above.

87. Ibid., p. 541.
88. Ibid., pp. 540-1.
89. See notes 11 and 68 above. See also Chapter IX, note 6 below.
90. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 548.
91. Ibid.
92. It should perhaps be pointed out here that the connections between Kant and his contemporaries will not be explored in detail, since this would require an extended discussion.

## CHAPTER IX

### KANT'S CRITIQUE OF COMMON SENSE

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was born approximately twenty years earlier than most of the philosophers discussed so far. The beginnings of his career as a philosopher coincide with the beginnings of the so called cognitive crisis of the enlightenment. As a very sensitive man, Kant could not escape this crisis. There are effects of it to be found all through his early works, and especially in his Dreams of a Ghost-Seer Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics of 1766. For Kant, as for many other Germans, the cognitive crisis of the enlightenment was first and foremost a crisis of the "science of metaphysics". Accordingly, some of Kant's most critical remarks about metaphysics are found in his earlier, or "pre-critical" works.<sup>1</sup> Kant realised, with Basedow, Feder, Meiners and Lichtenberg, Platner, Lossius and many others, that metaphysics needed to be "revised" and "reformed". He also agreed with most of these thinkers that a moderate skepticism is the best method available "to pull off the dogmatic dress of metaphysics".<sup>2</sup> Kant, the

elegante Magister, shares not only the same Weltanschauung as his younger colleagues and friends in Königsberg, Berlin, Göttingen, Leipzig and most other cultural centres of Germany, he is one of them and is seen as one of them.<sup>3</sup>

Kant's critical problem arose from this cognitive crisis, and was at the very beginning almost indistinguishable from the problem faced by Feder, Meiners, Tetens and Eberhard at about the same time. All these philosophers were concerned with a "revision of metaphysics, and more particularly with the differentiation of the sensible from the intellectual" in the field of theoretical and moral philosophy,<sup>4</sup> far from such "universal theory of thought and sensation" an answer as to the status of metaphysics was expected. Given this basic agreement of Kant and his contemporaries, it is only sensible to suppose that he could find their thought helpful in many respects, even if in the end his view differed very much from theirs.<sup>5</sup>

Kant understood his critique mainly as a critique of pure reason, as an investigation of the legitimacy of the extravagant claims of the "science" of metaphysics. But it is also a critique of common sense. In fact, it may be argued that it arose first and foremost as such a critique of common sense, and that it was in final analysis formulated with a polemical orientation against the philosophy of common sense.<sup>6</sup> It is now clear that some of Kant's contemporaries hoped to gain a great deal from the introduction of common sense into philosophy: Feder, Meiners and Lossius believed that common sense secured a way between dogmatism and radical skepticism. But Kant could no more accept their view than he could accept the view of the more traditional

metaphysicians (such as Eberhard) who believed not only that metaphysics was already sufficiently founded, but also that it need have no particular concern should it contradict common sense. In Kant's eyes a critique of common sense was as necessary as was the critique of pure reason.

Kant's contemporaries had found the works of the Scottish philosophers extremely helpful for their critique of pure reason on the principles of common sense. Especially Feder, Lossius and Tetens relied on Reid and Beattie to a great extent. Why should Kant, who had, according to his own admissions, learned much from the progenitor of Scottish common sense philosophy Francis Hutcheson, be an exception in this regard?

As has been noted frequently, there were basically two "answers" to Hume's skepticism in the 18th century, namely, a Scottish answer and a German answer. The Scottish answer, as given by Reid and his followers, is not only similar in its basic stance to the German answer, as given by Kant, but also in many of its particulars. This is very well known.<sup>7</sup> Brentano emphasised this basic similarity and criticised Kant and Reid together (claiming that the differences were more or less irrelevant). Dugald Stewart not only argued that everything in Kant's works could already be found in British thought, but even went so far as to suggest that Kant had plagiarised Reid, Oswald and Beattie.<sup>8</sup> Clearly, Brentano and Stewart go too far. There is much that separates Kant and the Scots. But, given the fact that Scottish common sense precedes Kant's critical philosophy by 15 years and that it was well known in Germany, the question concerning the dependence of Kant upon Reid,

Oswald and Beattie is certainly defensible. If it can be shown that Kant had some knowledge of the Scottish theories, it will be difficult to reject the view that the similarities between Kant and Reid are, in fact, the result of influence and not simply explainable as historical parallels.

In any case, an investigation of the way in which the Scottish answer to Hume represented itself to Kant is very necessary, if Lewis White Beck's characterisation of the "strategic question" faced by Kant is correct. This is:

How could he maintain skepticism in metaphysics -- to which he was pushed by his study of Hume and his own discovery of the antinomies . . . without falling victim to eudaemonism in ethics and to a jejune appeal to common sense in the conduct of life and the development of science? How could he oppose Hume without falling in with Reid, Beattie, and Oswald, who he thought were very uninspiring company? How could he give up a supernatural metaphysics without making a metaphysics out of naturalism?<sup>9</sup>

Beck finds that what makes Kant's "answer to Hume possible -- the rules of relating representations to each other introduce a synthetic element a priori into our empirical knowledge -- also makes an answer to Leibniz possible: there is a perceptual or intuitional element in all a priori knowledge that is not merely and emptily logical".<sup>10</sup> Could it be that Kant's "synthetic element a priori", "the perceptual or intuitional element in it" is not uninspired by Reid, and that Reid was more "suggestive" than is commonly supposed? Could it be that the German answer to Hume is not only a development of the principles of David Hume, but also of those of Thomas Reid? This is what Windelband long ago hinted at when he said that the Scottish theory of common sense and original judgments is very much relevant for the discussion of Kant's

synthetic a priori judgments, and that Kant "begins at the very point at which the Scots had stopped".<sup>11</sup> To show that this is true historically as well as systematically will be one of the most important concerns of the remainder of this chapter.

#### A. Kant and the Scots: The Historical Evidence

Quite clearly, Kant was very much aware of the Scots. This is shown by several expressed references and many thinly veiled allusions to them. The earliest reference of Kant to common sense can be found in the Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie. In the section entitled "Metaphysics" Kant points out that metaphysics needs critique. We can do without criticism in mathematics, since there we have propositions upon which we can rely.

but in metaphysics the critique of pure reason is most essential. A more recent Englishman has written an Appeal to Common Sense. He maintains that everything is already contained in common sense. But this is false. For when I say, for instance, everything that happens has a cause; if I do not examine this sentence, and consider its origins, but say that everybody can understand it just like that, then the proponent can scream very much, but I can still ask where the proposition originates. For, in this case all intuition which I have in mathematics . . . is absent. He could say that everything I have ever found has had a cause, but I cannot say this universally. I have here a proposition that is not borrowed from the object itself. For, in my concept nothing can be found than that something comes to be that did not exist before.

I say: everything that originates must originate from something that also originates: therefore it must also follow that there is no first beginning. But it is also clear that in a series of subordinated cognitions there must be a beginning. These two propositions are equally clear. But they still contradict each other. The middle is this: I say myself that these propositions are not as clear as  $2 + 2 = 4$ , but we must investigate here. Therefore I say the investigation concerning the origin of the actions of reason is the business of metaphysics. I will say



therefore that all actions are only valid under the conditions of sensibility, and if this reason, restricted by sensibility, puts us into circumstances to think completely a priori and apart from experience, then our knowledge is universal. It is a very special procedure of the understanding to think by itself, completely separated from experience.<sup>12</sup>

The other explicit references to the Scots are to be found in the Prolegomena. Here Kant is even more critical. He is not simply content to point out that the Scottish approach is wrong, but goes on to attack it sharply. The context is again that of the causal principle. "Hume has demonstrated irrefutably that it was perfectly impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of concepts such a combination. . . . For it implies necessity". And, though Hume drew false conclusions from this important discovery and claimed that the concept of causality was fictitious (and metaphysics impossible), his discovery should have led philosophers to re-think the foundations of metaphysics. But this did not happen

Hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians, of not being understood. It is positively painful to see how utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the problem; for while they were ever taking for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened. The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a perhaps more extended use not restricted merely to objects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was solely a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of using the concept.<sup>13</sup>

Singling out Beattie, Kant goes on to attack the Scottish appeal to common

sense as a "subterfuge" and an "appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed". Moreover, "Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as Beattie and, in addition, to a critical reason (such as the latter did not possess)". After this blazing attack upon Beattie, Kant finds it necessary to "openly confess" that it was "die Erinnerung des David Hume . . . which many years ago interrupted his dogmatic slumber and gave his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction".<sup>14</sup>

Throughout the Prolegomena further attacks upon common sense as a tribunal of truth in metaphysics can be found.<sup>15</sup> Further, there are passages in other works which clearly show that Kant knew Scottish common sense rather well.<sup>16</sup> Just as interesting are Kant's allusions to the Scots in the Critique of Pure Reason (if only because they have been neglected so far). In the "Postulates of Empirical Thought" Kant calls attention to the fact that his use of "postulate" differs greatly from that of the Scots. He observes that he interprets the word

not in the sense in which some recent philosophical writers, wresting it from its proper mathematical significance, have given to it, namely, that to postulate should mean to treat a proposition as immediately certain, without justification or proof. For if, in dealing with synthetic propositions, we are to recognise them as possessing unconditioned validity, independently of deduction, on the evidence merely of their own claims, then no matter how evident they may be, all critique of understanding is given up. And since there is no lack of audacious pretensions, and these are supported by common belief (though that is no credential of their truth), the understanding lies open to every fancy, and is in no position to withhold approval of those assertions which, though illegitimate, yet press upon us, in the same confident tone, their claims to be accepted as actual axioms. Whenever, therefore, an a priori determination is synthetically added to the concept of a thing, it is indispensable that, if not

a proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy of such an assertion should be supplied.<sup>17</sup>

There cannot be much doubt that "the recent philosophical writers" Kant has in mind here are the Scots, and that he is singling out James Beattie in particular.<sup>18</sup>

He objects to them mainly because their reliance upon intuitively certain principles or axioms of common sense cuts off all critical investigation of our knowledge-claims. If we accept such axioms in empirical thought, then no matter "how evident" the axioms may be, "all critique of understanding is given up". And that means for Kant, all attempts to raise metaphysics to the level of a science are also given up. All this sounds very much like Tetens' criticism of the Scots. But Kant has more to say. On the Scottish account only naturalism is possible.

The naturalist of pure reason adopts as his principle that through common reason, without science, that is, through what he calls sound reason, he is able, in regard to the most sublime questions which form the problem of metaphysics, to achieve more than is possible through speculation. Thus he is virtually asserting that we can determine the size and distance of the moon with greater certainty by the naked eye than by mathematical devices.

This is mere misology, reduced to principles.<sup>19</sup> For Kant such naturalism is an evasion of the issue. Metaphysics is not concerned with the analysis or description of the origin of our concepts and judgments, it is concerned with the justification of these concepts and judgments in knowledge-claims. Only because philosophers have found it impossible to succeed in metaphysics by means of strictly rational proof, have they resorted "boldly to appeal to the common sense of mankind -- an expedient which is always a sign that the cause of reason is

in desperate straights -- rather than to attempt new dogmatic proofs".<sup>20</sup>

Thus common sense philosophy or naturalism and Kant's criticism are fundamentally opposed regarding the proper method of metaphysics. The common-sense naturalist has given up the attempt to raise metaphysics to the level of a science, Kant says, and therefore he cannot be considered as a serious contender from Kant's point of view. The dogmatic naturalist has nothing to offer to the critical Kant. For, though he may be the "defender of the good cause", his defense is very weak. Alluding to Oswald or Beattie, Kant finds that "ridicule and boasting form his whole armoury, and these can be laughed at, as mere child's play".<sup>21</sup>

But these attacks of Kant upon common sense in general and the Scots in particular not only show that Kant is opposed to the Scots, they also show that he knows them rather well. He knows of their fundamental opposition to David Hume, and mentions them in special connection with regard to the causal principle. He knows of their appeal to common sense, and seems to be acutely aware of their having insisted that the principles of common sense are axioms of all thought. And no matter how negatively Kant is reacting to the Scots, their criticism of Hume's skepticism and their theory of common sense, his reaction to the Scots shows at the very least that he, in fact, knew the Scottish answer to Hume and was well aware of the fundamental characteristics of this answer.<sup>22</sup>

All this is only to be expected, considering the important role Scottish common sense played in German thought between 1768 and 1785. The Scots were the enemies of Hume and Berkeley for the Germans, and wherever Hume was discussed, the names "Reid, Oswald and Beattie" were sure to be

mentioned.<sup>23</sup> All major German journals had reviewed some of the works of Scottish common sense (and by doing so, they had drawn attention to the others). Kant almost certainly read at least a few of these reviews. In fact, some of his criticisms sound very similar to those offered in the reviews. On these grounds one could say that Feder's review of Beattie's Essay in the Göttingische Anzeigen (1771) must have been read by Kant. Herder's review of the German translation of Beattie's Essay in the Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen (1772) could hardly have escaped him either, for Kant followed not only the work of his former student very closely himself, but Hamann (for whom this review had a special significance) also had every reason for calling Kant's attention to it.<sup>24</sup> The reviews of Beattie and Oswald in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek (1776) and the reviews of Oswald's Appeal in its German translation in the Göttingische Anzeigen (1774-5) can also be assumed to have been read by Kant. But there are also the references to the Scots in the works of Garve, Feder, Eberhard, Lossius, Platner, Tiedemann and (most importantly) Tetens, any or all of which might have called Kant's attention to the Scots. Hamann and Kraus, who were "honoured" by Kant with the title of "misologists", and with whom Kant demonstrably discussed Hume, certainly also must have mentioned Reid, Oswald and Beattie in their many discussions with Kant.<sup>25</sup> Especially Hamann thought very highly of Reid (and knew Beattie). But there is also the English merchant Green and the Scotsman Hay with his partner Motherby. Kant often dined with them, and Hamann reports that philosophy was discussed on occasions.<sup>26</sup> Kant himself took some pride in his supposed Scottish ancestry, and may be expected to have had a

predilection for all things Scottish. This in itself might have been enough to awaken his interest in "Reid, Oswald and Beattie". In any case, Reid's Inquiry was available in Königsberg in French (in the library of Hamann), and the German translation of Beattie's Essay could be found in the library of the University of Königsberg.<sup>27</sup>

Both the state of the general philosophical discussion in Germany in the early 1870's and the personal surroundings of Kant in Königsberg called Kant's attention to the works of the Scots. Could he have resisted studying them in more detail, or is there any reason that would have made him want to resist such a study? I do not think so. In fact, Kant clearly claims that he has studied their works. For how else can he say that "it is positively painful to see how utterly . . . Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the problem?" Thus Kant knew the works of the Scots at least in 1783, and he knew them well it seems -- well enough to offer a criticism that is both germane and accurate.

But more can be said. Kant was a voracious reader with a good memory. He read, according to Hamann, "everything current (alles Neue)" and he wrote, according to Mendelssohn, for "those few adepts who are up on the latest things, and who are able to guess what lies undisclosed behind the published hints".<sup>28</sup> Why should it be assumed, therefore, that Kant needed the published hints of his contemporaries to become aware of the works of the Scots? Is it not much more likely that Kant learned of the Scots at around the same time as the other German philosophers, who were "up on the latest things"? Mendelssohn, Garve and Feder, who certainly belong in this category, knew of Reid before 1770.<sup>29</sup>

Hamann owned the 1768 French translation of Reid's Inquiry. The work must, therefore, have been available in Königsberg.<sup>30</sup> It cannot be ruled out, then, that Kant, who could read French, read Reid's Inquiry soon after the French translation appeared.

This opens the extremely interesting possibility that Kant's view on the epistemological status of our conceptions of space and time on the one hand, and those of possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc. on the other, are influenced by Reid's theory of natural suggestion. One of Reid's central claims was that extension, figure, motion, and space were not abstracted from sensation, and he proposed the derivation of these concepts as an experimentum crucis "by which the ideal system must stand or fall".<sup>31</sup> For Reid these conceptions, together with those of existence, cause and others, are natural suggestions, that is, effects of instinct or of natural laws planted in our mind. Kant comes to very similar conclusions in his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, that is, two years after the appearance of the French translation of Reid's Inquiry. What makes this agreement of Reid and Kant very conspicuous is that in 1768 Kant had held that space was objectively real and independent of the human mind. Between 1768 and 1770 something changed Kant's mind, so that he could say in the Inaugural Dissertation that space and time have been obtained

not by abstraction from the sensing of objects indeed . . . but from the very action of the mind, an action of co-ordinating the minds sensa according to perpetual laws, and each of the concepts is like an immutable diagram and so is to be cognised intuitively. For sensations excite this act of the mind but do not influence the intuition. Nor is there anything else here born with us except the law of the mind according to which it joins its own sensa together in a fixed manner as a result of the presence of an object.<sup>32</sup>

Kant speaks of the importance of the "action" of the mind, of "immutable laws", which govern this action, of "intuition" and of "exciting" and believes that the presence of the object is necessary. All this sounds very much like Reid's account of natural suggestion, and it could be a further development of that theory of Reid.<sup>33</sup> The same also holds of Kant's account of the intellectual concepts. They are "concepts abstracted out of the laws planted in the mind (by attending to its actions on the occasion of an experience) and they "never enter sensual representations as parts and so could not be abstracted from it in any way at all" either.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, both Reid and Kant feel that an empirical derivation of the concepts of space would necessarily undermine all certainty of knowledge and lead to idealism and skepticism. Finally, even Kant's basic systematic outlook in the Inaugural Dissertation greatly resembles that of Reid. For here Kant is what he would later have described as a transcendental realist. He thinks that the intellectual concepts, suggested to us on the occasion of sensation, allow us to think the objects as they really are. Both Reid and the Kant of 1770 base their realism upon certain "laws planted in the mind", upon laws of which we become aware in sensation but which form no part of sensation. The similarity is striking. Whether the similarity itself is sufficient to establish an influence of Reid upon Kant may be doubted, but there is a systematic parallel that would deserve a more detailed treatment than is possible here. One can add, though, that Tetens noticed this similarity, for though he believed that Kant was the first to say that space is the action of co-ordinating objects, his characterisation of Kant's conception of space as "a certain instinctual



means of ordering co-existing objects" draws attention to the similarity of the Kantian and the Scottish views. For, several pages before this discussion of Kant's theory of space, Tetens has given a rather lengthy critique of Reid's tendency to say that "this or that is the immediate work of instinct".<sup>35</sup>

But, while a Scottish influence from 1769 on is possible only, such an influence is almost certain after 1772. In this year Kant read Beattie's Essay in German translation; and from this time on he most likely followed the further development of Scottish common sense philosophy in Germany rather closely. The references in the Enzyklopädie-vorlesung and the allusions in the Critique of Pure Reason, just as the attack in the Prolegomena attest to this.<sup>36</sup>

To sum up: all the evidence speaks for Kant's close acquaintance with the works of Scottish common sense philosophers. The Scots were very much part of the general philosophical discussion in the Germany of the seventies and eighties of the 18th century; the works of Scottish common sense were available in Königsberg; and the nature of Kant's acquaintance with Kraus, Hamann, Motherby and Green makes it likely that Reid, Oswald and Beattie would be discussed; further Kant himself indicates that he has read Reid, Oswald, Beattie and Priestley, and that he has found it to be a painful experience. This implies, among other things, that the works of the Scots were for Kant a reading experience that stood out from among the many others of Kant, the voracious reader. Accordingly, the systematic similarities of Kant's answer to Hume and that of the Scots should no longer be swept aside or belittled. How uninspiring did Kant find the Scots? The relationship

of Kant and the Scots should receive the "thorough treatment" it really deserves and which Vaihinger demanded so long ago. I hope that this chapter will be a first step towards such a more thorough assessment of Kant's Scottish relations.<sup>36</sup>

#### B. Beattie and Hume's "Spark"

The claim that Kant relied for his information about Berkeley's "idealism" and Hume's Treatise upon the German translation of Beattie's Essay of 1772 constitutes almost a dogma of Kant-scholarship.<sup>37</sup> Though some of the more specific claims made in connection with this dogma are clearly exaggerated, the general claim is just as clearly supported by the research thus far presented.<sup>38</sup> Kant seems to have relied to a great extent upon Reid, Oswald and Beattie (and British and German philosophers influenced by them) for his views on Berkeley.<sup>39</sup> But the theory that Kant relied upon Beattie's Essay as a sort of "source book" for Hume's early philosophy is less plausible. While most of Berkeley's works were not available in German translation and were not well known by Kant's contemporaries, Hume's Enquiries were very well known, and his Treatise had a great reputation.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, two of Kant's closest friends in Königsberg, namely Krauss and Hamann, knew the Treatise very well. Hamann owned a copy of the English original of this work, and he reported to Jacobi on two occasions that Krauss knew Hume's Treatise "almost by heart".<sup>41</sup> But Krauss and Kant not only dined together very often, they also undertook long walks almost every day. Philosophical questions must have been discussed frequently by these two philosophers. Is it thinkable that Krauss never talked to Kant about Hume's Treatise, a book so dear to him and so much in the centre of the philosophical

discussion in Königsberg? I think not. Kant did not need Beattie for factual information about Hume's early work, and Kant's debt to Hume is not merely a debt "via Beattie", as has been argued on the basis of Kant's "open confession" in the Prolegomena.

But, if Kant does not confess that he needed Beattie as a textbook for Hume's early skepticism, if "die Erinnerung des David Hume" does not simply mean that Beattie's "transmission of Humean ideas" occasioned Kant's criticism, what does it mean? Why does Kant find it necessary to "openly confess" after his fierce attack on Beattie that the "Erinnerung des David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted his dogmatic slumber and gave his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction"? I suggest that Kant acknowledges herewith a greater debt to Beattie than that of being the cause of his recollections of Hume. After a scathing attack upon a philosophical enemy, Kant gives credit where credit is due. But what could Kant have learned from, of all people, Beattie?

It might be objected that Beattie could not have had any influence upon Kant because Kant rejects the Scots in general and Beattie in particular with such a vehemence. Moreover, Kant goes on to talk more about Hume than about Beattie. These objections are not really to the point. For, first of all, Beattie's influence might be primarily a negative one, and secondly the very vehemence with which Kant rejects Beattie serves to re-inforce the importance of Beattie to Kant. Kant says that he "owe[d] the first spark of light" to Hume.<sup>42</sup> But to abuse this metaphor, sparks usually fly where there is extreme friction, or where things clash with each other, or where there are opposite poles. All these comparisons

are applicable in some way. Beattie and Hume certainly represent opposite poles on the philosophical field, their views certainly clash and there was extreme friction between their views. If Hume could appear to have pushed skepticism to its absolute limit, Beattie could appear to have pushed dogmatism and insolence to the limit. Both appeared equally anti-metaphysical, and if Kant had asked himself honestly on whose side he really was in this clash, he must have come -- with great horror -- to the conclusion that it was Beattie's side. For Kant in his "dogmatic slumber" had dreamt up a position very similar to that of the Scottish common sense philosophers. Beattie's position could appear to be nothing more than the logical consequence of Kant's own position in 1770.<sup>43</sup>

This would also explain why Kant found the reading of Beattie (and the other Scots) so "positively painful". He was torn between his allegiance to common sense on the one hand, the science of metaphysics on the other. Kant could not accept Hume's skeptical conclusions, but he found Beattie's refutation of Hume's account just as distasteful. Neither the simple recollection of Hume nor the outright rejection of Beattie by themselves would explain Kant's pain adequately, I believe. Both are necessary as the positive and negative poles for "Hume's spark of light". Because Kant found himself either on the side of Beattie or sufficiently close to Beattie, he could find the reading of Beattie so "positively painful". But these pains, to abuse another metaphor of Kant, were already the first labour-pains of the birth of Kant's critical philosophy. That this interpretation of Kant's confession is indeed reasonable can be shown by a more detailed comparison of

Kant and Beattie on the question of causality.

There are many things in Beattie's Essay which Kant must have liked. The Introduction to the second part of this work clearly must have found the highest approval of Kant, who was at that time attempting to write a treatise on The Limits of Sensibility and Reason and asking himself very similar questions. For Beattie asks himself how he can differentiate genuine judgments of common sense from mere prejudices of education and raises in this connection the question concerning the relation between reason and sense:

Must every principle be admitted as true which we believe without being able to assign a reason? then where our security against prejudice and implicit faith? Or must every principle that seems intuitively certain, or intuitively probable, be reasoned upon, that we know whether it be really what it seems? then where is our security against the abuse so much insisted on, of subjecting common sense to the test of reasoning. -- At what point must reason stop in its investigations, and the dictates of common sense be admitted as decisive and final?<sup>44</sup>

Beattie is thus very much aware of the problems confronting his account of knowledge (and these questions show him in a different light than the traditional view). And if Kant can be supposed to have appreciated this passage, he must have liked what follows even more. For Beattie goes on to point out that

it is much to be regretted that this matter has been so little attended to: for a full and satisfactory discussion of it would do more real service to the philosophy of human nature, than all the systems of logic in the world; would at once exalt pneumatology to the dignity of science by settling it on a firm and unchangeable foundation; and would go a great way to banish sophistry from science, and rid the world of skepticism. This is indeed the grand desideratum in logic; of no less importance to the moral sciences, than the discovery of the longitude to navigation.<sup>45</sup>

Beattie does not want to be so vain or ignorant as to imagine that he could do this all by himself, but, he finds, "to have set an example may be of consequence". And perhaps it had its greatest consequence in the critical philosophy of Kant. Kant's pronouncements do sound very similar to those of Beattie. There certainly is a "coincidence of motives of thoughts" or "metaphysical intentions", and the "basic tendency is identical in both, in any case," as Heimsoeth would say. But the similarity extends even to the details. Both Kant and Beattie feel confident that they can "settle the boundaries", and they feel confident because "in some of the sciences [they have] been long settled with the utmost precision, and to universal satisfaction". The sciences in which the boundaries have been settled are identified by both Kant and Beattie as "mathematics and natural philosophy".<sup>46</sup>

But if these passages, which show Beattie at his best, must have found Kant's highest approval, there are equally many which no doubt angered him even more. For Beattie's mockery of Hume's Gründlichkeit applied a fortiori to the type of metaphysics Kant was accustomed to as a German. Thus Beattie writes

A celebrated writer on human nature hath observed that 'if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must lie deep and abstruse' and a little afterwards he adds 'that he would esteem it a strong presumption against the philosophy he is going to unfold, were it so very easy and obvious'. I am so far from adopting this opinion, that I declare, in regard to the few things I have to say on human nature, that I should esteem it a very strong presumption against them, if they were not easy and obvious . . .<sup>47</sup>

Beattie's tendency to make popularity into the criterion for the truth of a metaphysical theory Kant could not accept. When Beattie mocks Hume,

saying "a witch going to sea in an eggshell or preparing to take a trip through the air on a broomstick is really a surprising phenomenon; but nothing to Mr. Hume, on such a bottom 'launching out (as he well expresseth) into the immense depths of philosophy'", we find an example of the "impudence" that Kant castigated in the Prolegomena and the first Critique.<sup>48</sup>

But again Kant's very criticism of the Scottish treatment of Hume re-affirms his dependence upon the Scots. Kant accuses the Scots of having missed the point of Hume's problem by taking for granted what Hume had doubted and by proving what he had never doubted. For "the question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature". Rather, Hume's problem "was solely the question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of using the concept". By saying this Kant seems to be addressing himself to and playing with a specific passage in Oswald's Appeal, that is, a passage of a work that Kant had already singled out for critique in his Enzyklopädievorlesungen.

Mr. Hume's observations on the connection of ideas are just; and all he says on the particular connections he mentions, is worthy of attention; but not to the present purpose. The question is not, whether we actually believe the connection between cause and effect? for of that there can be no doubt; but, what reason we have to believe it? Through custom and habitual association of ideas, we fall into many absurd ways of thinking, and also of believing in contradiction to the plainest evidence . . . By resolving the belief of a truth so fundamental as is the connection between cause and effect, into habitual association of ideas, Mr. Hume hath given countenance to the dogmatism of the bigots . . .<sup>49</sup>

To some extent Kant's criticism is certainly justified. Oswald seems to ascribe to Hume the project of questioning the validity of the causal

connection. Yet Oswald is very much aware of Hume's attempt to establish the origin of the causal principle, and he has clearly grasped that the question of origin has consequences for the application of the causal principle. Oswald agrees with Hume that the connection of cause and effect is not one of reason and feels that "Hume did well in pointing out the prevailing absurdity of resolving our belief of primary truths into the force of reasoning: but he would have done better still if he had resolved it into the authority of common sense".<sup>50</sup> One of the reasons why Oswald feels that it is necessary to resolve this principle into the authority of common sense, or, to establish it as a first principle of all knowledge, is certainly that he needs this principle for the establishment of the existence of God. This shows that Kant's criticism is at least to some extent unfair. For, as Kant emphasises himself in other contexts, the question concerning the origin has important consequences for the extent of the use we can make of this concept. It is not solely a question of the origin, but also a question of the validity of certain applications of this concept.<sup>51</sup>

Beattie is also aware of this, for he pronounces it as an axiom, clear, certain, and undeniable, that whatever

beginneth to exist, precededeth from some cause'. I cannot bring myself to think, that the reverse of any geometrical axiom is more absurd than the reverse of this; and therefore I am as certain of the truth of this, as I can be of the truth of the other; and I cannot without contradicting myself, and doing violence to my nature, even attempt to believe otherwise.

And he finds that this principle

is one of the principles of common sense, which every rational mind does and must acknowledge to be true;  
 . . . because the law of nature determines us to



believe it without proof, and to look upon its  
contrary as perfectly absurd, and inconceivable.<sup>52</sup>

Thus Beattie in fact argues in very much the same way as Oswald that the causal principle must be believed, because it is a principle of common sense. Kant's criticism meets, therefore, Beattie just as much as it meets Oswald. But Beattie and Oswald do not simply claim that Hume is wrong because the causal principle is indispensable. They also try to show why it is so. They attempt to explain the necessary element in it by saying that the causal principle is a principle a priori, that is, a principle that cannot be derived from experience, but is always presupposed in experience. This Kant himself clearly accepts as well. What he objects to is only the way in which this knowledge has been "cheaply acquired", and the unquestioned use Beattie and Oswald make of the causal principle in arguing about matters beyond the limits of experience. One of the expressed purposes of Beattie's defense of the causal principle is to save "the most important argument that ever employed human reason", namely that argument, "which from the works that are created, evinces the eternal power and godhead of the Creator".<sup>53</sup>

This is extremely interesting and relevant to a peculiar but fundamental and long-standing problem of Kant scholarship. Kant has given two different accounts of what "first awakened him from his dogmatic slumber". Apart from the account in the Prolegomena, which suggests that the critical problem arose in close connection with Hume's analysis of causality (and James Beattie's rejection of it), there is another account in which Kant claims that it was the antinomies which caused the revolution.<sup>54</sup> The discussion of which account is the true or most

plausible one has pre-occupied many Kant scholars for a number of years. On the basis of a communication of Kant to the effect that the year 1769 gave him "great light" and that he then seriously concerned himself with proving certain propositions as well as the contraries, it has been argued that Kant already discovered the doctrine of the antinomies in 1769. Others have argued, on the basis of the passage in the Prolegomena and the famous letter to Herz, that 1772 is the year in which Kant awoke from his dogmatism.<sup>55</sup>

But we have also Kant's claim that "it was not the investigation of the existence of God, immortality, and so on, but rather the antinomy of pure reason -- the world has a beginning; it has no beginning, and so on . . . that is what first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of pure reason".<sup>56</sup> Attention to Kant's Scottish relations can go a long way toward showing that the alleged contradiction between these two accounts is apparent only. In reality, these two accounts are perfectly compatible. Kant was led to critical philosophy in 1772 both by the criticism of Hume's principle of causality and the problem of the antinomies. The so called antinomy of pure reason and the causal principle are different aspects of the same problem for Kant and they are especially so for the Kant of the seventies.<sup>57</sup> It is especially the first antinomy (the world has a beginning -- it has no beginning), that has close links with the causal principle. But the same connection is to be found in Beattie's Essay.

Beattie finds that the causal principle is the "foundation" of the argument that God is the creator of the universe, and in "so far as it resolves itself into this argument [it] is properly a demonstration,

being a clear deduction from self-evident principle".<sup>58</sup> He argues

that many of the objects in nature have had a beginning, is obvious to our own senses and memory, or confirmed by unquestionable testimony: these, therefore, according to the axiom we are here considering, must be believed to have proceeded from a cause adequate, at least to the effects produced. That the whole sensible universe has to us the appearance of an effect . . . cannot be denied: and that it is, what it appears to be, an effect, that it had a beginning, and was not from eternity, is proved by every species of evidence the subject will admit. . . . What is the universe, but a vast system of works and effects, some of them great and others small, some more, and some less considerable? . . . Each link of a great chain must be supported by something, but the whole chain may be supported by nothing . . . are not these assertions too absurd to deserve an answer?<sup>59</sup>

Thus Beattie argues that the world is an effect and therefore must have had a beginning and be caused by something. But this is not all Beattie has to say on this matter. After having argued for his own point of view, he also presents the opposite position in order to show the antithesis to his thesis:

The reader, if he happens to be acquainted with Mr. Hume's Essay on a particular providence and a future state will see, that these remarks are intended as an answer to a very strange argument there advanced against the belief of Deity. 'The universe', we are told, 'is an object quite singular and unparalleled; no other object that has fallen under our observation bears any similarity to it; neither it nor its cause can be comprehended under any known species; and therefore we can form no rational conclusion at all concerning the cause of the universe' . . .<sup>60</sup>

In all fairness to Beattie it must be said that this representation of Hume's doctrine is free from any distortion and shows it at its strongest. He does not take the easy way out; and because his final answer to Hume is not much more than a re-statement of his original arguments, the clash of the two positions becomes just as apparent as the strength

of the arguments for each position. Beattie tries to reduce Hume's claim ad absurdum by showing that it involves a contradiction. Each thing in the universe

had a beginning . . . What thing in the universe exists uncaused? Nothing. -- Is this a rational conclusion? So it seems. It seems, then, that though it be rational to assign a cause to everything in the universe; yet to assign a cause to the universe is not rational!<sup>61</sup>

All in all, Beattie's discussion of the application of the causal principle in connection with the argument that the world has a beginning is particularly suited to call attention to the fact that both conclusions, "the world has a beginning" and "the world has no beginning", are equally rational and can both be argued for rationally. As Kant says somewhat later in the Encyklopädievorlesungen (in the context of a reference to Oswald): "these propositions are equally clear, but they still contradict each other".<sup>62</sup> Kant's solution to this problem is to show that the causal principle is applicable only in sense experience, but cannot be used to extend our knowledge beyond sense experience, as the Scots clearly wanted to do. Kant agrees with Beattie "if the universe had a beginning, it must have had a cause . . . we necessarily assent to it, such is the law of our nature", but he also agrees with Hume (as represented by Beattie), namely that the world or the universe is not caused, and that therefore it does not have any beginning. Here is one example of the kind of tension that Kant might have experienced while reading Beattie's Essay.

To be sure, the final version of Kant's first Antinomy does not resemble the discussion of Beattie as much as the discussion to be found in the Encyklopädievorlesungen. For, whereas the lectures make a clear

connection between the temporal beginning and the causal principle, the final version represented in the Critique of Pure Reason refers only to time and space.<sup>63</sup> The causal principle is much more apparent in the third and fourth Antinomies. But this does not mean that there are no similarities. In fact, Kant uses an argument to establish the first part of the thesis (the limitedness of the world in regard to time) that is also hinted at by Beattie: "the Atheist will never be able to elude the force of this argument, till he can prove, that every thing in nature exists necessarily, independently, and from eternity".<sup>64</sup> Kant argues for the thesis by trying to disprove that the world has no beginning; and he believes he can do so because this theory implies the claim that "up to every given moment an eternity has elapsed".<sup>65</sup> No matter how different the final version of this argument is from Beattie's account, I believe it is fairly clear that Beattie's account of the application of the causal principle in "the most important argument that ever employed human reason" could very well have been the starting point for the first Antinomy. In that case, the formulation of this argument as found in the Encyklopädievorlesungen would appear to be a link in the evolution of Kant's final formulation of this Antinomy, which is not only the first of the Critique of Pure Reason, but also the first one discovered by Kant.<sup>66</sup>

But there are also reasons to suppose that the discussion of liberty and necessity as Beattie's "second instance" of "showing the danger of carrying any investigation beyond the dictates of common sense" had some influence upon Kant's discussion of the extension of the principles of the human understanding "beyond the limits of experience". In fact, the third

antinomy not only poses the very same problem as Beattie's discussion of liberty and necessity, but the resolution of this issue is much the same in Kant and Beattie. Both argue that the answer to the question of liberty and necessity is not at all "indifferent", both argue that we have mainly a "practical interest" in the resolution of it; and both regard the possibility of freedom as a "mystery", which cannot possibly be explained.<sup>67</sup> In this antinomy Kant is clearly on the side of common sense and James Beattie. Indeed, the entire doctrine of the "Antinomy of Pure Reason" is intricately connected with the problematic of common sense, as Kant makes very clear.<sup>68</sup> It is the confusion of common sense that makes rational investigation necessary.

Given this substantial similarity between Beattie's Essay and Kant's Critique, it is only to be expected that Kant's contemporaries, who were still very much aware of the Scots, should have noted it. And they did note it. Ernst Platner, for instance, argued that Beattie and Reid had some right to appeal to feeling in this context, but he found it rather "strange" that Kant would do the same; and the Philosophische Bibliothek found it necessary to call attention to the fact that Hume, Reid, Kant and Jacobi all agreed on the fact that with regard to practical reason the appeal to "instinct" was necessary.<sup>69</sup> Thus it cannot be said that the attempt to argue for a connection between Beattie and Kant with regard to the antinomies is altogether far fetched.

Beattie's discussion of causality and freedom had, in any case, the greatest effect upon German philosophers. Eberhard went so far as to define the different sides in the dispute concerning liberty and necessity as that between "determinists and Beattians".<sup>70</sup> And Beattie's

tendency to "oppose metaphysic to metaphysic" was also noted by Germans other than Kant. Feder, for instance, in 1775 called the Scots "the new dialecticians" and their thought "the new dialectic" and found many "correct and exact thetic and anti-thetic remarks" in Beattie's Essay as early as 1771.<sup>71</sup> But Feder like Kant believes that Beattie does not in final analysis refute Hume, and that

a Hume would still have a fair game with him, as for instance when he maintains against Hume that the principle 'everything that happens has a cause' has a wider field (Grund) than experience.<sup>72</sup>

Thus Feder does not only note the dialectical character of Beattie's philosophy, but he also calls attention to the causal principle as an example in which Hume "would still have a fair game" with Beattie. The determination of the field of valid application of the principle of causality is seen by Feder just as by Kant as the problem of the Beattie-Hume dispute. But whereas Feder hopes for an answer to Hume along the lines of Beattie, i.e. an answer in which Hume "no longer" has a fair game, Kant takes Hume more seriously, and he tries to generalise the problem of causality.

Kant describes this process of the development of his own doctrine as follows:

I . . . first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only concept by which the understanding thinks the connection of things a priori, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such concepts. I sought to ascertain their number, and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts which I was now certain were not derived from experience, as Hume had attempted to derive them, but sprang from the pure understanding.<sup>73</sup>

But the generalisation of the problem of a priori principles can already be found in the works of the Scottish common sense philosophers. In trying to prove that the causal principle is indeed an axiom, and that "it is on the same footing with other intuitive axioms; that is, we believe it, because the law of our nature renders it impossible for us to disbelieve it", Beattie makes a point of his discovery that "Mr. Hume has not enumerated all the relations which, when discovered, give rise to certainty".<sup>74</sup> Beattie mentions on that occasion only the principle of personal identity, but he is quite clear that this is not the only principle of common sense. For his entire discussion is designed to prove that

except we believe many things without proof, we never can believe anything at all; for that all sound reasoning must ultimately rest on principles intuitively certain, or intuitively probable . . . this I shall prove by a fair induction of particulars.<sup>75</sup>

Moreover, Reid in the Inquiry had already called attention to his belief that "a clear explication and enumeration of the principles of common sense, is one of the chief desiderata in logic".<sup>76</sup>

Thus it is not at all unreasonable to suppose that even with regard to the generalisation of Hume's objection Kant was helped along by suggestions of Reid and Beattie. Kant acknowledges that he has read their works, and the passages cited show very clearly that Reid and Beattie have already generalised Hume's objection. They argued that the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only concept by means of which a priori connections are suggested to us, and Reid especially had "considered such of them as occurred in the examination of the five senses".<sup>77</sup> Could it be that Kant is acknowledging this debt in an



underhanded way by means of his simile concerning the chisels and hammers of Scottish common sense and his own etcher's needle critical reason?

"Chisels and hammers may suffice to work a piece of lumber, but for etching we require an etcher's needle".<sup>78</sup> Does this not suggest that Beattie was doing something similar to Kant's criticism, though in a very rough fashion? In any case, in the Introduction to the first Critique Kant explicitly calls attention to the fact that "even common sense is never without certain a priori cognitions" and calls special attention to the causal principle in this context.<sup>79</sup>

To be sure, Kant's theory, and especially as expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena, is quite different from anything to be found in Reid, Beattie or Oswald. Kant does not talk about "faith" and "belief" in first principles of "common sense". He speaks of "cognitions a priori" and "pure understanding". Where Reid confesses ignorance and invokes such terms as "suggestion" and "inspiration", Kant claims certitude and formulates the problem concerning "a priori determinations", which are "synthetically added to the concept of a thing". Reid and Beattie try to show or are groping their way towards showing, that the principles of common sense are based on "laws of our nature", Kant tries to make clear that they "sprang from the pure understanding". Reid, Oswald and Beattie unhesitatingly use the principles of common sense, which "overstep all possible empirical employment", Kant's major concern is with showing how far these principles reach. Reid and Beattie introduce their principles of common sense in something of a cavalier fashion; Kant deduces his "starting from a single concept". In all this Kant was on his own. In this "most difficult task", the Scots could offer

him no more assistance than the other metaphysicians. What holds of the Kant of the late sixties also holds of the Kant in the seventies. As Beck has said: "The most serious occupation of Kant in these years was the thinking of thoughts that no one had thought before".<sup>80</sup> But this does not mean that the Scots could not have inspired Kant. For in 1772 they had a great deal to offer to Kant. Both the positive influence of their generalisation of Hume's problem and the negative influence of their "uncritical" extension of the validity of the principles of common sense beyond the limits of all possible experience provide starting points for Kant's critical development and it seems likely that they had a greater significance for Kant's answer to Hume than is commonly thought. Kant, together with many other thinkers of that period, started off his critical inquiry where the Scots had stopped theirs. And, as Kant said himself, "if we start from a well-founded, but undeveloped, thought which another has bequeathed to us, we may well hope to advance further than the acute man to whom we owe the first spark of light".<sup>81</sup>

In any case, the similarity of the views of Kant and the Scots on a priori concepts is greater than Kant's criticisms would make us think. Both insist against Hume that these concepts are a priori and necessary. Both argue that they cannot be explained by their origin in experience, but are presuppositions of experience, and both find that while they are only found in experience, they are not thereby shown to be of experience or derived from experience. Whether the similarities are greater than the differences I do not pretend to determine. From a certain point of view the similarities are decisive, while from another the differences are what is philosophically interesting. Brentano is a very good example

of one who emphasises the former, while most followers of Kant are good representants for the latter view. But nothing much depends here on deciding this issue. For, even if it were argued that Kant had developed his view entirely on the basis of a radical rejection and in conscious opposition to the Scottish view, the historical and systematic connection would still have been established, for, as we know, often the views of a philosophical enemy have a greater influence upon a philosopher than do those of philosophical allies; the Scots themselves, of course, are, in their response to Hume, a clear example of such influence.

There are many reasons for Kant's polemics against the Scots and their unusual sharpness.<sup>82</sup> But one (perhaps unconscious) reason could very well be the wish to distance himself as much as possible from the Scots in order to show the absurdity of any comparison, or to forestall any criticism that there was a dependence. That Kant was very much aware of the possibility of such a criticism is shown by his criticism of those "scholarly men to whom the history of philosophy . . . is philosophy itself". For, Kant seems to expect them to be able "to discover analogies for every new idea" of his.<sup>83</sup> And if those were his fears, they were certainly not unfounded. Ernst Platner not only detected a peculiarly Beattian quality in Kant's resolution of the third Antinomy, he also felt that "the works of philosophers like Locke, Leibniz, Wolf, Hume, Reid, and Tetens are full of investigation which aim at this" critique of reason.<sup>84</sup> Johann August Eberhard likewise found a great similarity between the Scots and principles of common sense of the Scots and the Kantian forms of thought, laws of understanding and functions of thought, and criticised Kant on this basis.<sup>85</sup>

Whether or not Eberhard's criticism of Kant is fair is not the question (I had rather think it is not, for Eberhard clearly misses the significance of the Transcendental Deduction). What is significant is that Eberhard, a contemporary of Kant, clearly recognises the family resemblance between Kant's a priori judgments and the Scottish principles of common sense. Given the historical evidence and the systematic similarities, it is clearly more than just likely that this central doctrine of Kant's criticism is in fact a distant 'relative' of Scottish common sense. To argue, as I do, that Kant's philosophy arose out of a "family quarrel of Scottish philosophy" is no more ridiculous than to say that it is "possible" to explain Kant's criticism without referring to Britain.<sup>86</sup>

In summary, then, Windelband's claim that Kant started where the Scots had left off can very well be supported and further specified. The Scots' discussion and rejection of Hume's analysis of causality was peculiarly suited to call Kant's attention to the scope and importance of Hume's problem. I think the historical evidence obliges us to say that there is a definite connection between Scottish common sense and Kant, a connection that would deserve to be explored further and in as much detail as Kant's connections with Leibniz Wolff and their German followers and enemies, and I think that the "Scottish connection" goes a long way in resolving the question of what occasioned Kant's criticism (the antinomies or Hume's discussion of causality). Nor is it unreasonable to suppose that it might also be helpful in the resolution of other problems facing Kant-scholarship.

### C. Justification of Common Sense and Critical Idealism

In a certain fundamental respect Kant always remained a common sense philosopher. No matter how vehemently he rejected common sense as a methodological principle in metaphysics, no matter how violently he was opposed to naturalism and the appeal to common sense, the clarification and justification of common sense remained always one of Kant's main concerns.<sup>87</sup> Thus Kant rejects common sense on the one hand, but assigns a very important role to it on the other hand. He calls naturalism a "misology reduced to principles" and the appeal to common sense a "wretched subterfuge", spelling the death of all true philosophy.<sup>88</sup> But he holds at the very same time that common sense is the source and the field of philosophy, that the fate of metaphysics is intricately connected with common sense, and that philosophy cannot transcend common sense.<sup>89</sup> Metaphysics "can never cease to be in demand -- since the interest of common sense is so intimately interwoven with it

..."<sup>90</sup> The final agreement of common sense and critical philosophy is the best confirmation of the correctness of the above assertions. For we have thereby revealed to us, what could not at the start have been foreseen, namely, that in matters which concern all men without distinction nature is not guilty of any partial distribution of her gifts, and that in regard to the essential ends of human nature the highest philosophy cannot advance further than is possible under the guidance which nature has bestowed even on the most common sense.<sup>91</sup>

Thus common sense and philosophy are far from contradictory to each other. They share the very same limits and are "each serviceable", though in different ways. They are not mutually exclusive but they complement each other.<sup>92</sup> This is especially apparent in moral philosophy. For

without in the least teaching common reason anything new, we need only to draw its attention to its own principle, in the manner of Socrates, thus showing that neither science nor philosophy is needed in order to know what one has to do in order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous.<sup>93</sup>

and in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant goes even as far as to say that "the justification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason could be made with sufficient certainty through merely appealing to the judgment of common sense".<sup>94</sup> A role of similar importance is given to common sense in the Critique of Judgment.<sup>95</sup> But these topics are somewhat outside of the context of our discussion and cannot be treated here with the thoroughness they most certainly would deserve.

It is clear, however, that even in Kant's theoretical philosophy common sense plays an important role; and such an important role that it is not false to call Kant a philosopher of common sense. His contemporaries saw this feature of his work very clearly and praised or attacked him accordingly.<sup>96</sup> The outcome of naturalism and popular philosophy was not entirely different from Kant's criticism, and he himself was very much aware of this, as the Prolegomena clearly shows:

Many a naturalist of pure reason (by which I mean the man who believes he can decide in matters of metaphysics without any science) may pretend that he, long ago, by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense, not only suspected but knew and comprehended what is here propounded with so much ado, or, if he likes, with prolix and pedantic pomp: "that with all our reason we can never reach beyond the field of experience". But when he is questioned about his rational principles individually, he must grant that there are many of them which he has not taken from experience and which are therefore independent of it and valid a priori. How then and on what grounds will he restrain both himself and the dogmatist, who makes use of these concepts and principles beyond all possible experience because they are recognized

to be independent of it? And even he, this adept in sound sense, in spite of all his assumed and cheaply acquired wisdom, is not exempt from wandering inadvertently beyond objects of experience into the field of chimeras.<sup>97</sup>

Thus Kant seems to be both an enemy and a friend of common sense in theoretical philosophy. Does that mean that he is contradicting himself or is confused about the philosophical role of common sense or that he could not make up his mind whether to accept or reject common sense in philosophy? The latter has been suggested by Helmut Holzhey in his important book Kants Erfahrungsbegriff: "Kant's position with regard to the philosophical role of common sense . . . is ambivalent and in any case not decidedly negative".<sup>98</sup> But I do not think that this characterisation of Kant's public stand with regard to common sense is quite correct. In fact, in the context of Kant's theoretical philosophy it is downright misleading.

Kant makes a clear distinction. He rejects common sense as a criterion or tool of philosophical inquiry. All his polemic against common sense is directed against such a use of common sense in philosophy. But Kant just as clearly accepts common sense as the field of philosophical inquiry, as the subject matter of metaphysics. His contemporaries (with the notable exception of Tetens) were somewhat confused about these two roles of common sense in philosophy. They thought that philosophy was somehow both the clarification and justification of common sense, and also the application of common sense. Philosophy was to justify common sense by common sense, so to speak.<sup>99</sup> Kant differentiates between these two roles. He accepts it as that which is to be investigated, but he rejects it in its latter role as a

tool of rational investigation.

The acceptance of common sense as the field of rational investigation shows Kant to be in a certain respect as much a philosopher of common sense as Feder, Eberhard, Mendelssohn, Lossius or Tetens. That this characteristic of Kant's philosophy could be neglected for so long is mainly to be traced back to his terminology. For Kant does not speak so much of common sense, but about "common human understanding" and "common human reason".<sup>100</sup> For Kant believes with most other philosophers of his time that the principles of common sense are in final analysis reducible to the principles of rational thought.<sup>101</sup> From here the importance of the opposition of common sense and rational thought, which dominated so much of the thought of the sixties and seventies of the 18th century, becomes understandable. For, either the hypothesis of the ultimate identity of common sense and reason was wrong (and common sense and reason had really different principles), or a correct and reasonable explanation of the differences between common sense and reason had to be given. Most philosophers were unwilling to accept the first alternative and opted for the second. Some tried to show that the principles of common sense were more basic than those of reason, others tried to hold on to most of the tenets of German rationalism. But no matter what alternative was accepted philosophy became a questionable enterprise. It became necessary to orient oneself in thinking and "indifferentism" seemed to be inevitable.

Kant can be seen to have taken this conflict between common sense and reason more seriously than any of his indifferentist contemporaries. His critical philosophy arose as a radicalisation of certain tendencies



in the thought of his contemporaries. For Kant came to realise slowly and painfully that, if common sense is reducible to reason (and if both are based on identical principles), then the conflict between common sense and reason could very well point to a basic problem with regard to the principles of rational thought itself.<sup>102</sup> This is the more general systematic background of the Antinomies. Because common sense and reason contradict each other, the critical investigation of both is necessary; and this is why "the tribunal of the critique of pure reason" is instituted by Kant. It will, he is quite certain, "assure reason to its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws".<sup>103</sup>

To the very same end the Scots had instituted the tribunal of common sense. In accordance with the "eternal and unalterable laws" of common sense, all "groundless pretensions" of rational thought were to be rejected. For Kant, however, common sense acted by means of "despotic decrees". The validity of these decrees could only be established by showing how they issue forth from the very nature of rational thought itself. The inquiry into the human understanding on the principles of common sense had to be pushed further; there also had to be an inquiry into common sense on the principles of pure reason. That is, common sense appeared to Kant as a singularly bad point to cease inquiries. Philosophy for Kant was first and foremost a critical enterprise, and common sense appeared to him as importantly uncritical of itself and its claims. Reason or rational thought on the other hand could be expected to be critical of itself. It seems much better

suites to "undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely that of self-knowledge".<sup>104</sup>

It is thus quite understandable that Kant criticises the Scots for not having pursued their inquiries as far as they should have. Following Hume, Kant may say that "to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking".<sup>105</sup> So much is certainly true: the Scots did not "satisfy the conditions of Hume's problem". But, and this is important to remember, not because it simply "did not suit them", as Kant alleges, but because they felt that it was impossible in principle to satisfy the conditions of Hume's problem. They thought that human beings could never attain the kind of knowledge that an answer to Hume's problem required, and hence that Hume's problem must be solved by showing that, in accordance with the make up of the human understanding, we cannot but accept, e.g., the principle of causality.

Kant just as staunchly believes that Hume's problem can and must be solved. We have to justify the principles which enable us to make knowledge-claims. Everything that is most distinctive and most interesting in Kant's thought is connected with this justification of our knowledge claims. But he does not appear ever to argue for his belief in the necessity and possibility of justification. In very much the same way that the Scots -- especially Beattie -- had done it, Kant tried to answer the questions "How is Pure Mathematics Possible?", and "How is Pure Science of Nature Possible?"; he also conceives in analogy the questions "How is Metaphysics in General Possible?" and

"How is Metaphysics Possible as Science?"<sup>106</sup> But to answer the Scots Kant also would have had to answer the question "How is Critical Philosophy Possible?" For just this the Scots had questioned most seriously.

Does Kant give an answer to this further question? Current Kant-scholarship, which seems to be very much aware of this problem, generally answers in the negative. In fact, some of the characterisations of Kant's final foundation for his critical philosophy sound peculiarly familiar to anybody acquainted with Reid and his followers. Thus W.H. Walsh finds that,

what Kant does in the Critique is build on facts we all take as obvious in our non-philosophical moments, such facts as that we can make mathematical judgments, discriminate objective from subjective successions, make determinate statements about what is happening in ourselves, generally distinguish the real from the apparent. As thus stated, these are facts of a highly general kind; behind each of them lies a vast number of more particular facts. It is these which form the ultimate basis of Kant's philosophy.<sup>107</sup>

The Scots built on exactly the same kinds of facts, and argued therefore that philosophical justification was impossible, and that description had to replace deduction. Does not Kant beg Reid's question, if Walsh's characterisation is correct? Does not Kant take for granted that which Reid doubted and does he not demonstrate with Gründlichkeit and at times with impudence that which Reid never thought of doubting? To be sure, that is what Hamann, Herder and Jacobi thought, and those are the topics of their Metakritiken.<sup>108</sup> Though it is impossible to answer these far-reaching questions in this context, it is important to show that they necessarily arise where Kant's "Scottish connection" is discussed.

Further, Kant may even be criticised for not having paid enough attention to the "facts we all take as obvious in our non-philosophical

moments". Reid had criticised philosophers for having seriously distorted the true character of sensations by describing them as some sort of mediating mental entities.<sup>109</sup> Phenomenalism, he argued, necessarily leads to idealism and skepticism. Kant obviously accepts phenomenalism as one of the basic premisses of critical philosophy. This is shown very clearly by Kant's famous letter to Herz of 1772.<sup>110</sup> But Kant never argues explicitly for phenomenalism. He claims in the Prolegomena that

long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has been generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things that many of their predicates may be said to belong, not to the things in themselves, but to their appearances, and to have no proper existence outside of our representations. Heat, colour and taste, for instance, are of this kind. Now if we go farther, and, for weighty reasons, rank as more appearances the remaining qualities of the bodies also, which are called primary . . . no one in the least can adduce the reason of its being inadmissible.<sup>111</sup>

This clearly shows that he does not think phenomenalism has any detrimental consequences for philosophy. But it certainly is no argument for phenomenalism either. Phenomenalism is simply another basic premiss of Kant's critical philosophy. Indeed it is very difficult to envisage his critical philosophy without phenomenalism.

The question whether Kant's "transcendental idealism" is the outcome of his acceptance of phenomenalism is certainly relevant and interesting to ask. His contemporaries generally rejected Reid's critique of phenomenalism, but they muddled the issue to such an extent that they persuaded themselves that they were realists in very much the same sense as Reid. Kant saw clearer on this issue as well. Phenomenalism involves "transcendental idealism" and allows only "empirical

realism".<sup>112</sup> This aspect of Kant's thought may also be characterised as a radicalisation of tendencies already present in the thought of his contemporaries. But, as has been frequently argued in the past, it is not clear in any obvious way what the fundamental difference between Berkeley's immaterialism and Kant's critical idealism is. Feder, one of the earliest critics of Kant, felt that Kant's thought was basically similar to that of Berkeley and more recently it has been argued that Kant more or less consciously appropriated the "insights" of the "eccentric Irishman" and that "Berkeley's point of view (was) secretly preserved by Kant".<sup>113</sup> Whether or not this radical view is correct does not matter here too much. So much is sure, inspite of all the refutations of idealism and all the polemic against Berkeley, Kant, just as Feder and many other contemporaries of Kant, shares many fundamental characteristics with Berkeley.<sup>114</sup> Do not therefore Reid's criticisms of Berkeley also apply to a certain extent to Kant? Again, Hamann, Herder, Jacobi and many of their followers (most notably Aenesidemus Schulze) certainly thought so.

But Kant has learned from the Scots as well, or has come to very similar conclusions all by himself. Kant agrees with Reid that our conception of space cannot be abstracted from sensation and constitutes one of the "original furnitures" of our mind. Kant agrees with the Scots that there are many other such original principles. The importance of the investigation of the extent to which these original principles could be used seems to have dawned on Kant mainly because of the quarrel between Beattie and Hume, and the Scots appear to have given Kant further suggestions on his way towards criticism.

Windelband's observation "Kant begins at the very point at which the Scots had stopped" is well supported by historical and textual evidence. Accordingly, Scottish common sense is very important for an understanding of Kant's point of departure. But this has the most profound consequences for the interpretation of such notions as "justification", "naturalism", "idealism", "thing in itself", etc. Especially the problems of justification and idealism show how relevant the systematic and historical connections of Scottish common sense and critical philosophy are for the understanding of Kant's problems. They are all, as Hamann might have said, "materials for a Metakritik of the critique of pure reason".<sup>115</sup> Should not Kant-scholarship spend at least as much time and effort in investigating Kant's "Scottish connection" as it is spending in investigating his "German background"?

## NOTES : CHAPTER IX

1. This speaks clearly against the ontological school, which tries to argue that Kant carried his "metaphysical motives" of the pre-critical period over into his critical philosophy. See Kant, Werke, ed. Weischedel, Vol. I, pp. 621, 630, 952, 959, 974, 982, for instance. Kant compares metaphysics with a "bottomless abyss", a "slippery ground", a "land of milk and honey" (Schlaraffenland), "airship", and he shows something approaching contempt for it.
2. Kant to Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766 in Kant, Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, ed. Arnold Zweig, Chicago, 1967, p. 55. The entire letter is interesting for the discussion of Kant's position with regard to metaphysics at the time in which he wrote his Dreams of a Ghost-Seer.
3. This is witnessed by Hamann's characterisation of Kant as "Socrates" in the early letters to Kant. The same becomes also clear from Mendelssohn's correspondence with Kant. Kant's student and friend Krauss seems to have remained always at that stage of development at which Kant was in the late sixties and early seventies. Feder and Meiners considered Kant to be somewhat of a "dilettante" in philosophy, as a well known anecdote of Krauss shows. They probably considered Kant to belong to the same category as Lichtenberg. The Dreams of a Ghost-Seer certainly provided some justification for this view. Goethe mentions Kant in immediate connection with Sulzer, Mendelssohn and Garve in the Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen of 1772 (see H. Hettner, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert, 3 vols.,

Leipzig, 1928, Vol. 3; 2, p. 238).

For Kant's Weltanschauung see especially Lewis White Beck's excellent discussion in Early German Philosophy, pp. 426-30. He comes to the conclusion that Kant's Weltanschauung is identical to that of most of his contemporaries, that is, the popular philosophers and the professors of the Berlin enlightenment. The only differences between Kant and his contemporaries, according to L.W. Beck, are that "there is more Newton and more Rousseau" to be found in Kant and that his whole world-picture has "a Stoic-Christian patina of pietism". As to the first and rather minor difference, it is not clear whether there is more Rousseau to be found in Kant than in Feder, for instance, who wrote a work entitled Der neue Emil, or more Newton than in Lichtenberg, a practising physicist (or any other popular philosopher for that matter). The second "charge" -- and I am sure that Kant would have considered it to be a charge -- is more serious. Kant's supposed pietism is often used to fill in the background of his "metaphysical motives and intentions" with Crusius' voluntaristic metaphysics (which has the closest connections with pietism). Kant was not a pietist in any sense. He rejected not only the "two important tenets, viz., that morality consists in servile obedience to the revealed will of God and that the motive for morality is the love and fear of God and the hope of a future life", as Beck observes himself, but he rejected everything connected with pietism. He objected to the great reliance upon prayer, the highly emotional language, the missionary zeal and



religious activism and fundamentalism in the interpretation of the Bible. Kant's formalistic rigorism in moral philosophy and his attempt to defend morals from religious incursions is much better explained as a reaction to and outright rejection of pietism. It is much better explained as a consequence of Kant's Prussian education. In any case, Kant shares his Stoicism with Frederick the Great, his contemporary and convinced atheist, whom -- I believe -- no-one has suspected as a pietist so far. It should also be remembered that the only enemy of Kant at the University of Königsberg (so far as we know) was a convinced Crusian (See F. Th. Rink, Ansichten aus Kant's Leben, Königsberg, 1805, p. 44: "Kant was loved and well esteemed by all his younger colleagues . . . of whom the most had been his students. Only a single man, a private lecturer (Privatdozent) and an enthusiastic Crusian, allowed himself several primitive attacks upon Kant in his class room. He also attacked the reputation of Leibniz, Wolff and others. . . . Apart from several other unimportant and tasteless writings, he also published, if I am not mistaken, such a work against Kant's Only Possible Proof for the Existence of God" .

4. See Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII above.
5. But Kant's contemporaries were still capable of recognising themselves in Kant's criticism. Platner and Eberhard clearly thought that Kant's critical enterprise was only an extension of the philosophy they themselves adhered to. See Chapter IV, pp. 178-81 above. Feder claimed that "what Kant calls the critique of pure reason has always been the only kind of metaphysics I

could appreciate and the one I have tried to teach. . . . in 1768 . . . I differentiated between two different kinds of common metaphysics, the synthetic dogmatic and the analytic dogmatic. After having expressed my reservations with regard to both, I declared myself in favour of a third kind, which I called metaphysica indagatrix (investigatory metaphysics), probably because I was afraid of the sensation which the name analytic-skeptical metaphysics would have caused (Feder, Über den Raum und die Causalität, pp. vii/viii). Feder could not understand why Kant objected when his criticism was called "skepticism". "For is it not just as much in accordance with the original etymological meaning of that term as with the usage common among philosophers up to now to understand by mitigated skepticism exactly that which Kant calls criticism? . . . And why should we not be allowed to call the examination of principles, either examination, or investigation, or enlightenment or skepsis simply because Kant calls it criticism?" (*ibid.*, pp. xxiv/xxxi, see also the Preface to the third volume of Feder's Über den menschlichen Willen, p. xvi).

Kant and his followers seem to have been worried very much about the claims that the Critique of Pure Reason did not offer anything new; and this from the very beginning and not just after Eberhard's attack. This is shown to some extent by the very Introduction to the Prolegomena: "There are scholarly men to whom the history of philosophy . . . is philosophy itself . . . nothing can be said which, in their opinion, has not been said

before . . . it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of past ages" (Kant, Prolegomena, ed. Beck, p. 3). See also Ludwig Heinrich Jakob, Prüfung der Mendelssohnschen Morgenstunden oder aller spekulativen Beweise Gottes in Vorlesungen. Nebst einer Abhandlung von Herrn Professor Kant, Leipzig, 1785, p. x: "Nothing is less fair than the objection which is often made to the Critique in lectures, in private conversations and at times also in published writings, namely that the Critique contains nothing new" (underlining supplied). That Tetens did not think too highly of Kant's originality is known from a remark by Feder (Feder, Leben, p. 108). Tetens' silence on Kant may perhaps partially be explained as a consequence of this. As a polite man Tetens did not want to get involved in a brawl. Feder also wanted nothing less than a fight with Kant. Eberhard, however, had no scruples. He claimed that everything to be found in Kant could already be found in the works of the Leibniz-Wolffian school (he meant, of course, the Leibniz-Wolffian school as represented by himself and other contemporaries, not so much the historical Leibniz).

Early on in his dispute with popular philosophy Kant is still rather open on his basic material agreement with that form of philosophy. His remarks about "indifferentism", which is not "shallow" but "a profound habit of thought" show that he felt at one with popular philosophy (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axi-Axii). What Kant attempts in the Critique the popular philosophers also proposed to do.

In fact, at the beginning Kant expected much from his contemporaries. When the first Critique appeared he was anxious to hear Mendelssohn's judgment about it and was "very uncomfortable at Mr. Mendelssohn's putting my book aside". He hoped that it would "not be forever". He also makes quite clear why Mendelssohn is so important for him: "He is the most important of all the people who could explain this theory to the world; it was on him, on Mr. Tetens and on you [Herz], dearest man, that I counted most" (Kant, Correspondence, ed. Zweig, p. 96). But Kant also tries to enlist Christian Garve "to use [his] position and influence to encourage . . . the enemies of my book . . . to consider the work in its proper order" and to make his problem understood. "Garve, Mendelssohn, and Tetens, are the only men I know through whose co-operation this subject could have been brought to a successful conclusion before too long, even though centuries before this one have not seen it done" (Ibid., pp. 102-3). In the same vein he writes to Mendelssohn "to encourage an examination of [his] theses", since this way "the critical philosophy would gain acceptability and become a promenade through a labyrinth, but with a reliable guidebook to help us find our way out as often as we get lost". But Kant is not too optimistic about this. For "Mendelssohn, Garve and Tetens have apparently declined to occupy themselves with work of this sort, and where else can anyone of sufficient talent and good will be found?" (ibid., p. 107). Thus Kant expected not only to be understood by the foremost philosophers of his time, but he also expected that

they would help him to spread his critical philosophy. He felt that they could accomplish what he himself could not, namely, give a popular expression to his thought. Given his belief and their recognition that they all were up to very much the same thing, these expectations of Kant were not as preposterous as they appear today. Perhaps it is one of the ironies of the history of German thought that Kant had to fight those who believed in the same things as he did; and that in doing so he helped along a philosophy for which he did not have much sympathy.

6. See, for instance, Kant, Werke (Akademie Ausgabe), Vol. XVI, reflexions: 1567, 1568, 1573, 1574, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1579, 1585, 1586, 1589, 1591, 1595, 1602, 1612, 1614, 1619. It seems that Kant formulated the final version of his criticism (as it appears in the first edition of the first Critique) in conscious opposition to naturalism. Compare the section "The Transcendental Doctrine of Method", especially A855-A856=B833-B884, with Kant's remarks on this subject in Immanuel Kant, Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Logik, Vol. I, Vorlesungen über philosophische Enzyklopädie, ed. Gerhard Lehmann, Berlin, 1961, pp. 52-3. In the lectures naturalism is not even mentioned. He opposes the dogmatic method with the skeptical method. Tetens seems to have called Kant's attention to the importance of naturalism. See, for instance, Kant, Werke (Akademie Ausgabe), Vol. XVIII, p. 23: "Tetens investigates the concepts of pure reason merely subjectively (human nature), I [do so] objectively. His analysis is empirical, mine is transcendental". And, "I am not concerned with

the evolution of concepts, as Tetens (all actions through which concepts are created), not with analysis, as Lambert, but only with the objective validity of concepts. I am in no competition with these men". But Kant clearly was influenced by Tetens. See Chapter VIII, footnote 4 above. See also Uebele, Tetens, p. 185; Riehl, Kritizismus, Vol. I, 2nd. ed., p. 234 and Vaihinger, Commentar, Vol. I, pp. 152ff.

7. Vaihinger, Commentar, Vol. I, p. 342n. gives an extensive account of the literature on the similarity of the Scots and Kant. But see also A. Pringle Pattison (Seth), Scottish Philosophy: A Comparison of Scottish and German Answers, Edinburgh, 1885; Torngy Segerstedt, The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish Philosophy, Lund, 1935. Passing (though usually uninformed) remarks concerning the relationship of Reid and Kant can be found in almost any historical account of the 18th century. For more recent comparisons see Bernard Peach, "Common Sense and Practical Reason in Reid and Kant", Sophia, Vol. 24 (1956), pp. 66-71; and Baruch Brody, "Hume, Reid and Kant on Causality", in Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations, pp. 8-13. See also Rolf George, "Kant's Theory of Perception", Proceedings of the Ottawa Congress on Kant, Ottawa, 1976, pp. 508-15, especially p. 509.
8. Franz Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, ed. A. Kastil and F. Mayer-Hildebrand, Hamburg, 1970, pp. 5-11, for instance. Brentano claims that "Reid in England (sic) and Kant on the Continent" have endorsed "blind prejudices" against "scientific philosophy". Brentano seems to have been very much pre-occupied with Thomas

- Reid, and comparisons between Reid and Kant can be found in many of his works. See especially "Was an Reid zu Loben", Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1 (1975), pp. 1-17. For Stewart see Segerstedt, The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 37-8.
9. Lewis White Beck, "Kant's Strategy", in his Essays on Kant and Hume, pp. 3-19, p. 6. Obviously, I agree with Beck on this.
  10. Ibid., p. 16.
  11. Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Vol. II, Leipzig, 1909, p. 54. See also Wilhelm Windelband, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. Heimsoeth, p. 461n. Zart, Einfluss, pp. 255-6 disagrees. He argues that the similarity of Kant and Reid does not prove that Kant is dependent upon Reid. Since there are also similarities between Stewart and Kant, Kant should also be dependent upon Stewart. But Kant wrote ten years earlier than Stewart. This "argument" of Zart is singularly bad. Stewart was clearly influenced by Reid; and, if Kant was also influenced by Reid in any fundamental way, the similarity is only to be expected. Zart's claim that "a more intimate relationship between Scottish and Kantian doctrines can hardly be observed" (p. 225), must therefore be received with the greatest caution.
  12. Kant, Enzyklopädievorlesungen, pp. 59-60.
  13. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, pp. 6-7.
  14. Ibid., p. 8.
  15. Ibid., pp. 24-5, 61, 83, 118, 119, 120.
  16. Ibid., p. 26: "When judgments a priori are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be admitted (for what is declared to be

known a priori is thereby announced as necessary)." The Scots allowed probable principles of common sense, or probable principles a priori; p. 36: "Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it has been generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things that many of their predicates . . . belong . . . to their appearances." The critique of the ideal theory was, of course, one of the most distinctive doctrines of Scottish common sense. See also Prolegomena, p. 84n. and p. 119. Here he seems to meet the Scottish theory of the principles of common sense as first principles of all knowledge head on: "It is the common subterfuge . . . that there must surely be at all events some propositions which are immediately certain and of which there is no occasion to give any proof, or even any account at all, because we otherwise could never stop inquiring into the grounds of our judgments".

17. A232-3=B285-6. Compare also Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 119 (see previous footnote).
18. The phrase "some recent philosophical writers" certainly reminds one of the other phrase "a more recent Englishman has written" (see the quotation from the Enzyklopadievorlesungen, footnote 12 of this chapter). It was Beattie who used "axiom" in the most conspicuous way for the principles of common sense. But see also Oswald, Appeal, pp. 260f., 357, 360, for instance.
19. A855=B833. See also Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 61.
20. A783-4=B811-2.
21. A743-B771. This is a foreshadowing of the accusation of the Scots



- as being "impudent" (Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 6).
22. This influence seems to have had consequences even with regard to certain details of Kant's position. Compare, for instance, Kant's summary of his perceptual vocabulary -- and especially the rejection of "idea" in its common broad philosophical usage -- in A319-20=B376-7 with Beattie's Essay, p. 155. But see also Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 257ff. (Works, 1, pp. 204f.) Compare with Chapter IV, footnote 101 above.
  23. The standard argument for the theory that Kant did not know Reid relies to the greatest extent upon the claim that, if Kant had known Reid, he would not have bracketed him in this way with Oswald and Beattie. See, for instance, Sidgwick, "The Philosophy of Common Sense", Mind, new series, number 14 (April 1895), pp. 145-58, p. 147. But it has been shown that this way of bracketing was common philosophical usage in 18th century Germany.
  24. This review represents Herder's return to Hamann's position. See Haym, Herder, Vol. I, p. 533. For Hamann this return of Herder must have meant a great deal. This explains perhaps also the relatively frequent references to Beattie in Hamann's correspondence with Herder.
  25. See Kant, Correspondence, ed. Zweig, p. 93, for instance. Hamann used "misologist" also as a pseudonym for himself in some of his later writings.
  26. See, for instance, Hamann's report concerning the discussion of Hume's Dialogues in Königsberg (Hamann, Briefwechsel, Vol. 4, pp. 205ff.) or Hamann's frequent messages to Jacobi concerning

Kant's position in the so-called Pantheismusstreit (see Chapter X of this work). For an extended discussion of Hamann's relationship to Kant see Heinrich Weber, Hamann und Kant, München, 1904.

27. For the significance of Hamann's library see Immendorffer, Johann Georg Hamann und seine Bücherei, Königsberg & Berlin, 1938. For the availability of the German translation of Beattie's Essay see Julius Janitsch, Kants Urteile über Berkeley, p. 36n. Janitsch reports that he has seen a copy of Beattie's Essay in German translation from the University Library of Königsberg, which somehow found its way into the "Library of Strassburg". I do not know whether the work is still in Strassburg. I do not know either what supported Janitsch's guess that this "was perhaps the exemplar that Kant himself used". Since I could not obtain any information concerning the relationship of the Schlossbibliothek at Königsberg for which Kant worked until 1772 (and did most of the work, including acquisition and listing), and the Library of the University of Königsberg, I do not know whether Kant might have listed and catalogued this work himself. This is not altogether unlikely.
28. See Hamann to Jacobi, November 20, 1785, Jacobi, Werke, ed. Friedrich Roth & Friedrich Köppen, Vol. 5, Part 3, p. 114 and Mendelssohn to Kant, December 25, 1770, Kant, Correspondence, ed. Zweig, p. 68.
29. See Chapter IV, pp. 138f. above.
30. Kant lived in the book dealer Kanter's house between 1766-9. The French translation of Reid's Inquiry appeared in 1768. According to Karl Vorländer, Immanuel Kants Leben, Leipzig, 1911, p. 58,

"professors and other writers often met there. Each day on which the mail arrived the newly published books were laid out at 11 o'clock. . . . One conversed, disputed and wrote letters in Kanter's office, as if one were at home". Kant could have learned of Reid immediately after the appearance of the French translation of the Inquiry in this way.

31. Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 80 (Works, 1, p. 128-9).
32. Immanuel Kant, Selected Pre-Critical Writings and Correspondence with Beck, transl. and introd. G.B. Kerferd and D.E. Walford, Manchester, New York, 1968, p. 74. See also pp. 72 and 69.
33. I do not want to claim that Kant's theory is actually such a development of Reid's suggestions. The evidence is rather slim. But the similarities are obvious. They are also observed by Charles Sanders Peirce. See the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, 8 vols. Cambridge, Vol. V (1934), pp. 39, 53; Vol. VI (1935), p. 73. Peirce traces these similarities back to the doctrine of immediate perception which he regards as shared by Berkeley, Reid and Kant.
34. Ibid., p. 59; see also p. 58.
35. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, p. 350 and pp. 331-3. For Tetens' view of Kant's theory in the Dissertation see also Speculativische Philosophie, pp. 21, 35, 40.
36. It hardly needs pointing out that this chapter cannot be more than just such a first step. A careful discussion of the similarities and differences of Kant's criticism and Scottish common sense, and the thorough establishment of their historical relationship

would require another book.

37. To name only the most important sources, see Julius Janitsch, Kants Urteile über Berkeley, Strassburg, 1879; Vaihinger, Commentar, 2 vols., 1881, Vol. I, pp. 342, 348. Eugen Stäbler, Berkeley's Auffassung, 1935, pp. 46-67; Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, New York, 1962 (reprint of 2nd ed. 1923), pp. xxviii/xxix, xxxin.; Colin M. Turbayne, "Kant's Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism", Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. V (1955), pp. 225-44; W.H. Werkmeister, "Notes to an Interpretation of Berkeley", New Studies in Berkeley's Philosophy, pp. 163-8; R.P. Wolff, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie", Journal of the History of Ideas, 21 (1960), pp. 117-23; George Miller, "Kant and Berkeley: The Alternative Theories", Kant-Studien, 64 (1973), pp. 315-35. See also footnote 113 below.
38. Beattie certainly played an important role in the "transmission of Humean ideas" to Germany. But Wolff's attempt to specify the very passages upon which Kant relied appears somewhat inappropriate. There are several other sources from which Kant could have become acquainted with the very aspects of Hume's theory to which Wolff pays most attention. Tetens discusses both the causal maxim and the problem of personal identity (see Chapter VIII, note 42 above for instance). Lossius calls attention to Hume's theory of personal identity (see Chapter VI, note 24 above; Lossius, however, relies on Beattie). See also Tetens, Philosophische Versuche, pp. 303-19 for a rather fair account of Hume's theory of causality (especially pp. 304-7). There is good reason to suppose

that there are also many other references to these theories of Hume in other works by Kant's contemporaries.

39. Berkeley was not very well known. See Stäbler, Berkeley's Auffassung and Janitsch, Kants Urtheile. Even Tetens, who appears to have known Hume's early work, is very hazy in his references to Berkeley. Though the Dialogues were translated by his teacher, Eschenbach, the two main works of Tetens do not show any influence.
40. Though the Treatise was rare, it was known in Germany. The Enquiries, which were extremely popular in Germany must have drawn some attention to this work.
41. Hamann to Jacobi, April 22, 1787, in Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 4, Part 3, pp. 339-40: "Crispus knows Hume by heart". Hamann to Jacobi, April 27, 1787, ibid., pp. 348-9. It is usually argued that Hamann did not know Hume's Treatise before 1781 (it is known that he owned a copy of the work since at least that time). But this is clearly false. Hamann published a translation of the last chapter of Book I of the Treatise in the Königsberger gelehrte und politische Zeitungen, Beylage zu Stück 53, July 5, 1771 ("Nachtgedanken eines Zweiflers"), as Charles Swain, "Hamann and the Philosophy of David Hume", Journal of the History of Philosophy, 5 (1967), pp. 343-51, p. 351 has shown. This destroys Erdmann's claim that Kant could not have heard of this work through Hamann before the appearance of the first Critique (Erdmann, "Kant und Hume um 1762", Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 1 (1887-8), pp. 62-77, 216-30, p. 65; see also R.P. Wolff, "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie", p. 118n.). This

also takes care of Karl Groos' objection that Kant's comparison of skepticism with a stranded boat shows that Kant knew Hume's Treatise in the original (see Karl Groos, "Hat Kant Hume's Treatise gelesen?", Kant-Studien, 5 (1901), pp. 177-81, pp. 178-9), for Kant could have read at least this part of the Treatise in German translation. This shows both how seriously shared analogies in the works of 18th century German and Scottish philosophers must be taken, and how dangerous it is to say that somebody "could not have known" a work written in English simply because he was living in Germany and could not read English.

42. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 9.
43. This would account for the vehemence of Kant's rejection. See also p. 7 above.
44. Beattie, Essay, pp. 157-8.
45. Ibid., p. 158. See also pp. 141-2: "We sometimes repine at the narrow limits prescribed to human capacity. Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further, seems a hard prohibition, when applied to the operations of mind. But as, in the material world, it is to this prohibition man owes his security and existence; so, in the immaterial system, it is to this we owe our virtue, and our happiness".
46. Ibid., p. 160.
47. Ibid., p. 17.
48. Ibid., p. 255. See also p. 167.
49. Oswald, Appeal, pp. 130-1. I regret that I cannot say anything about the further agreement of the German translation of the Appeal and

Kant's criticism. I noticed this analogy only after the German translation was no longer accessible to me.

50. Ibid., p. 133.
51. But Oswald is not so naive as to believe that the existence of God could be proved by means of it. The belief in the existence of God is just as inexplicable as our belief in the causal connection. See Appeal, pp. 106-7 for instance.
52. Beattie, Essay, p. 111.
53. Ibid.
54. Kant to Garve, September 21, 1798, Kant, Correspondence, ed. Zweig, p. 252. Both accounts can be supported by other references. Thus in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant repeats that it was "Hume's skeptical teaching" and especially "the doubts raised by the Scottish philosopher concerning the concept of causality" (Critique of Practical Reason, transl. L.W. Beck, p. 54). In the Prolegomena (ed. L.W. Beck, p. 86) he speaks of the Antinomies "as a powerful agent to rouse philosophy from its dogmatic slumber and to stimulate it to the arduous task of undertaking a critical examination of reason itself".
55. The discussion is too extended to sum up by means of a bibliographical account here. Norbert Hinske's "Kant's Begriff der Antinomie und die Etappen seiner Ausarbeitung", Kant-Studien, 55 (1966), pp. 485-96 can give a sense of the importance of this controversy. Erdmann argued that the doctrine of the antinomies was developed by Kant in 1769 and that this doctrine awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Kant does say that 1769 gave

him "great light" and that he tried to prove both propositions and their contradiction in 1769. But there is a great difference between simply proving propositions and their contradiction and the doctrine of the Antinomies as found in the first Critique. There are many circumstances that speak against 1769 as the date in which Kant discovered the antinomies. For there is not only no trace of them to be found in the Dissertations of 1770, which otherwise seem to sum up Kant's position of that time, but there are also no fragments or notes of Kant's literary estate, which would show a pre-occupation of Kant with this problem at such an early date. Most scholars agree that Kant "woke up" only in 1772 (immediately after the famous letter to Herz). But see also Joseph Schmucker, "Zur entwicklungs-geschichtlichen Bedeutung der Inauguraldissertation", Kant-Studien 65 (1975), pp. 261-82. For a short discussion and further references see, for instance, L.W. Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 462n. Schmucker's claim that the Dissertation "presupposes" that the problem of the Antinomies was "known and developed" ("Zur entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung", p. 267) is not convincing. As Hinske has pointed out, in some sense Kant was always aware of this problem.

56. Kant to Garve, September 21, 1798, Kant, Correspondence, ed. Zweig, p. 252. See also L.W. Beck "A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant" in Essays on Kant and Hume, p. 119n. Beck asks whether this statement could be "due to a lapse of memory"? If the account given here is correct, there is no need to offer such unverifiable speculations.



57. The way in which this antinomy is formulated in the Critique of Pure Reason makes it difficult to see this. But see the following.
58. Beattie, Essay, p. 111.
59. Ibid., pp. 113-5.
60. Ibid., p. 115.
61. Ibid., p. 117.
62. See the quotation of the Enzyklopädievorlesungen given on p. 260 above.
63. Thus in the version that is found in the first Critique the first Antinomy looks indeed as though it originated directly from the problematic of the Dissertation (mainly that of space and time). But if we look at the way in which the first Antinomy represents itself in the Enzyklopädievorlesungen, it becomes clear that this is only the result of hard labour. For Kant seems to have confounded the problematic of a beginning in time with that of the causal maxim at first. This confusion is very understandable, for Hume's question is "for what reason we pronounce it necessary, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, shou'd also have a cause" (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 78). The Prolegomena in any case show that it is "the extended use" of this principle, i.e. the use which Oswald and Beattie want to make of it, gave rise to Kant's critical investigations.
64. Beattie, Essay, p. 118 (underlining supplied).
65. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A427=B455ff. It is the only one clearly developed in the Enzyklopädievorlesungen. The others are still in a very incomplete state.

66. Kant, Enzyklopädievorlesungen, pp. 64-5. In this context a re-statement of the first Antinomy can be found as well: "In order to show the Antinomy we will try to prove that there is no first beginning. We want to infer synthetically (from above)."

I cannot know anything save through a reason/cause (Grund). Therefore I cannot know the first in any other way than that it must have a reason/cause. The first must have begun to act as well, and then something must have preceded it, a change through which it was made to (bewogen) act. -- This can also be applied to freedom in the transcendental sense and can talk of it pro et contra. Moreover, there is a necessary being and there is none". This shows again how intimately the causal problem and the problem of causality are connected for Kant.

67. Beattie, Essay, p. 304, p. 328, pp. 324ff. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Ax, A462-B490ff (the entire Section 3 of the Antinomy).
68. See especially Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A466-B494ff. But see also Aviiiff. The entire discussion of the Antimony relies greatly upon common sense concepts, such as "common human reason", "inclination of reason", etc.
69. For Platner see Chapter IV, p. 179 above. See also Philosophische Bibliothek, Vol. IV (1791), p. 112.
70. Eberhard, Neue vermischte Schriften, p. 100; Kant -- a "Beattian"?
71. Beattie's phrase occurs in the Essay, p. 107. But the entire Section 3 of Part 3 of the Essay is concerned with this problem, and could very well have re-awakened Kant's interest in the problem of provable contradictory statements, which had given him "great

light" in 1769. For Feder's remarks see Göttingische Anzeigen of 1775, Number 92 (August 3), p. 778.

72. Göttingische Anzeigen, 1771, Number 12 (January 28), p. 94.
73. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 8.
74. Beattie, Essay, p. 105 (emphasis mine).
75. Ibid., p. 51.
76. Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 269, Works, I, p. 209. See also p. 8:  

"analysis of the human faculties; and till this is performed, it is in vain we expect any just system of the mind; that is, an enumeration of the original powers and laws of our constitution, and an explication from them of the various phenomena of human nature". See also Oswald, Appeal, pp. 85-6: "The anatomy of the human body hath been long a serious study . . . but the human mind hath never yet come under the same careful inspection. . . . its objects are not enumerated, its extent is not known, and its authority is little regarded: for which reason a standard of theologic, ethic and political truth, is to this hour a desideratum with the learned. On all these subjects we are become expert reasoners, but hardly know when or where to stop, or how to form a firm and steady judgment.
77. Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 269, Works, I, p. 209.
78. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 7.
79. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 3 (I have substituted "common sense" for Kemp Smith's "common understanding"); but there are also other passages where Kant freely "appeals" to common sense; see, for instance, A184=B227.

80. L.W. Beck, Early German Philosophy, p. 457. But this does not mean, of course, that there are no influences upon Kant by other writers of this period. Especially Tetens' two main works were clearly important. This is shown especially by the Transcendental Deduction in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. How important a role Reid and his followers played in Tetens' thought has been shown already.
81. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 9.
82. Though Kant could not be sure who had written the review of the first Critique in the Göttingische Anzeigen, he suspected Feder, the renowned anti-idealist or one of his followers, most likely Meiners. They were regarded perhaps as the followers of Scottish common sense in Germany. By attacking their Scottish originals he added insult to injury. See also pp. 164ff. above. Moreover, naturalism was one of Kant's most important concerns at that time.
83. Kant, Prolegomena, p. 3. See also p. 61, as well as footnote 5 of this chapter.
84. For the full quotation see Chapter IV, p. 179 above.
85. For the full quotation see Chapter IV, pp. 179f. above.
86. See also p. 9 above.
87. Friedrich Nietzsche, for instance, perceived this very clearly:  

"Kant's joke. Kant wanted to prove in a way that would dumbfound the common man that the common man was right: that was the secret joke of this soul. He wrote against the scholars in favour of the popular prejudice, but for scholars and not popularly". (The Gay

- Science, sect. 193, quoted according to The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann, New York, 1954, p. 96).
88. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 7, p. 24, p. 40, p. 61, pp. 118-9, and 120; Critique of Pure Reason, A855=B883ff.
  89. See especially Critique of Pure Reason, A830=B858. See also Hegel's criticism of Kant, p. 474 below. See also footnote 100 below, footnote 87 above and Chapter XI, p. 514 below.
  90. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 5. See also Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxxif.
  91. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A830=B858. I have replaced Kemp Smith's "most ordinary understanding" with "most common sense" as a translation for the German expression "gemeinster Verstand".
  92. See Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, pp. 7-8, p. 25. The positive role of common sense becomes especially apparent in moral philosophy (which is beyond the limits of this discussion).
  93. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, transl. L.W. Beck, Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City, 1959, p. 20. The passage (pp. 20-2) in which this remark occurs is extremely important for an understanding of the role of common sense in Kant's practical philosophy.
  94. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, transl. L.W. Beck, p. 95, italics mine.
  95. Kant, Critique of Judgment, transl. James Creed Meredith, Oxford, 1952, pp. 82-5, pp. 150-6 (Sections 19-21 and 40). What Kant has to say about common sense and communicability in this context is also very important for an understanding of what he means by

in the theoretical and practical contexts. All this should be supplemented by Kant's pronouncements on common sense in his "Was heisst: sich im Denken Orientieren?"; "Einige Bemerkungen von Herrn Professor Kant zu Ludwig Heinrich Jakobs Prüfung der Mendelssohnschen Morgenstunden . . ."; see Kant, Werke, ed.

Weischedel, Vol. 3, pp. 265-91. Kant develops an elaborate theory of common sense, which is not too different from what can be found in Tetens' works. The principles of common sense as common human understanding can and must be reduced to principles of pure reason. But "taste can with more justice be called a sensus communis than can sound understanding" (Critique of Judgment, transl. Meredith, p. 153). See also note 100 below.

96. Platner, for instance, praised Kant for it, while Eberhard and Hegel attacked Kant because of his common sensism (if for quite different reasons). The quotation given on p. 516 below is also important here.
97. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 61.
98. Helmut Holzhey, Kants Erfahrungsbegriff, Basel & Stuttgart, 1970, p. 301.
99. Kant's relationship to his contemporaries may perhaps be usefully compared with the relation between those "analytic" philosophers who believe that ordinary language is best understood by analysing it with the help of formal languages (which is more "rigorous" and "scientific") and those who believe this is a "mere dream", that ordinary language can never be adequately represented by any formal language, and that philosophy has to argue "with expressions and about those expressions in one and the same breath.

We are trying to register what we are exhibiting; to codify the very logical codes which we are then and there observing".

(G. Ryle, "Ordinary Language", in Philosophy and Ordinary Language, ed. Charles E. Caton, Chicago, London, 1970, pp. 108-27). Kant is clearly on the side of the formalists, while his contemporaries are ordinary language philosophers. Kant, by the way, has to grapple with very much the same problems as the formalists, i.e. he must develop also a meta-critique to his critique. The question is to what extent he realised this and successfully dealt with the problem.

100. Kant seems to differentiate in accordance with his faculty theory of the human mind, between "common human understanding" and "common human reason" and "common human judgment" (sensus communis aestheticus). All three together constitute what is commonly called "common sense". That Kant chose to call these functions "understanding" and "reason" rather than "sense" does not mean that his theory is fundamentally different from that of his contemporaries. The most common term for "common sense" was "gemeiner Menschenverstand" or "gemeiner Verstand", as I have previously noted. It has been argued that Kant learned to differentiate clearly between "Vernunft" and "Verstand" through Tetens' Philosophische Versuche. It could also be argued that Kant's "Verstand" is a further development of "gemeiner Verstand" or "common sense", and that this is an etymological connection between them. This would further strengthen the thesis that Kant's critical philosophy was occasioned by common sense philosophy.

101. See the chapters on Eberhard and Tetens. How close Kant is in this theory to Mendelssohn can be seen from his "Was heisst: Sich im Denken Orientieren?", Kant, Werke, ed. Weischedel, Vol. 3, p. 268. He rejects (against Jacobi) an independent sense of truth and wants to show that common sense and reason are in final analysis identical.
102. How long it took Kant to see this as a conflict within reason itself is shown very well by Norbert Hinske, "Kant's Begriff der Antinomie".
103. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axi/xii.
104. Ibid., Axi.
105. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, p. 7. Compare this with Tetens' criticism of Reid, Oswald and Beattie; see p. 329 above.
106. This is how Kant formulates the problem in the Prolegomena. L.W. Beck has on several occasions called attention to the fact that Kant's account, as given in the Prolegomena, is in principle identical with the Scottish account. But there is even a similarity between the outline of the Prolegomena and Beattie's Essay. For just as had Kant, Beattie begins with the principles of mathematics and argues that philosophy must accept similar principles if it is to be convincing.
107. W.H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics, Chicago, 1976, pp. 253-4. See also Nicholas Rescher, "The 'Special Constitution' of Man's Mind; The Ultimately Factual Basis of the Necessity and Universality of A Priori Synthetic Truths in Kant's Critical Philosophy", Akten des IV. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (1974),



Part II.1, pp. 318-37. I am not sure, however, whether this view of Kant's "ultimate basis" is quite correct. It appears to attribute a too elementary blunder to Kant. How could he oppose naturalism so vehemently, if his own justification rested ultimately upon the facts of human nature. Clearly, the "ultimate" needs some analysis. Perhaps it is the starting point of Kant's criticism -- something that is to be expected after the account given here -- but that does not mean that criticism is ultimately founded upon the facts, which constitute the domain of empirical psychology. Kant clearly rejects the argument from de facto to de jure. By means of an "empirical deduction" nothing is won, since metaphysics is concerned with the legitimacy of certain concepts or classes of concepts. But Kant's bald remarks with regard to his transcendental deduction are not as helpful as they could be. Locke and Reid never believed they were giving merely an empirical deduction. They thought that this was the only deduction that could possibly be given. Kant in contrast believes he can go beyond the empirical to a justification that is somehow dependent upon facts, and yet somehow independent of them. But he does not make clear how. A more thorough discussion of this question is needed; but is not possible here. In any case, a comparison between Rescher's paper on Kant and Norman Daniels' paper on Reid, entitled "On Having Concepts 'By our Contribution'" might prove rather interesting in this context.

108. See the next chapter below. See also Sidgwick, "The Philosophy of Common Sense", Mind, Vol. 14 (new series), 1895, pp. 145-58, p. 147.

109. See Chapter II above.
110. Kant, Correspondence, ed. Zweig, pp. 70-6, p. 71: "I asked myself: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 'representation' to the object?" Kant finds that this "constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics". Reid, of course, would have agreed with Kant on the estimation of the importance of this question, though he answered it quite differently. It is really to be regretted that Kant never found it necessary to discuss this basic premiss of this thought explicitly.
111. Kant, Prolegomena, ed. L.W. Beck, pp. 36-7. Kant is speaking of Berkeley in this context. Could it be that he is relying on Reid here? Even if Kant did not see the French translation of the Inquiry before 1781, he probably did read the German translation of this work, which appeared in 1782. This also has important consequences for the understanding of the "Refutation of Idealism" in the second edition of the first Critique. Perhaps the similarities to Berkeley can be explained as "debts to Berkeley via Reid". That would both vindicate and disprove Colin M. Turbayne's account in "Kant's Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism". For a more thorough discussion of the problem of idealism in Kant H. Vaihinger's Zu Kants Widerlegung des Idealismus is still most important.
112. In a certain sense this scarcely needs pointing out. If I am only acquainted with mental entities, I cannot know anything but those mental entities. Berkeley had said as much already. What needs explanation, however, is why Kant, as well as most other philosophers did not feel it necessary to argue for phenomenalism.

113. Colin M. Turbayne, "Kant's Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism", p. 244. This article has generated a great deal of discussion. For a critical account of this discussion see especially Gale D. Justin, "Re-relating Kant and Berkeley"; Kant-Studien, 68 (1978), pp. 77-9. For my own suggestion concerning a solution of the problem see the previous footnote.
114. It could very well be that this influence of Berkeley was not only direct, but also indirect, and that Kant was not at all aware of his "Berkeleyan stance", since it was more or less Gemeingut. A similarly ambiguous position with regard to Berkeley can be found in Feder's thought, for instance. See Chapter V, pp. 241ff. above.
115. For further literature on this topic see Lewis White Beck, "Toward a Meta-Critique of Pure Reason", Essays on Kant and Hume, pp. 20-37.

## PART V

THE CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE:  
RADICAL REALISM AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

Kant's "self-critique of reason" can be looked at from many different points of view and there certainly is not any one "mold" according to which Kant has to be interpreted, as Lewis White Beck has pointed out, but for the purposes of this discussion (as well as for a better understanding of some of Kant's aims as expressed in his critical works) it may be considered as the attempt to explode the old and worn opposites of realism versus idealism and common sense versus metaphysical science. Kant believed that he had clearly demarcated the limits of rational justification and in some sense re-asserted the claims of common sense scientifically, and that he had shown that transcendental idealism did not preclude empirical realism. He wanted to show that common sense realism and critical idealism were far from contradictory to each other and actually re-inforced each other.

Kant believed that he had been "gründlicher" than anybody before him, and that he had not only been more careful but had also gone to the very roots of the problem. Hamann, Herder, Jacobi and their followers disagreed. They felt that Kant had completely neglected the roots of his problems in the make-up of the human mind and human language, that he had neglected the facts because of his "purism of reason". Hegel criticised Kant also for not having been thorough enough, mainly because he found that Kant had left the theoretical presuppositions of his thought unexamined. Common sense played an important, though quite different, role in both of these Metakritiken.

## CHAPTER X

### THE META-CRITIQUE OF RADICAL REALISM AND ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

Johann Georg Hamann and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi understood themselves first and foremost as Christian thinkers. As such they were fundamentally opposed to the very ideals of enlightenment. Faith and Christian traditions were more important to them than rational investigation and secular "progress". For this reason Hamann and Jacobi as well as their friend Herder are often characterised as representing the so-called "Counter-Enlightenment". But this term is misleading. For it suggests on the one hand that Hamann, Herder and Jacobi have little in common with the enlightenment, and on the other hand that their thought is exhausted by their criticism of the prevailing philosophy and literature of this period. Both suggestions are false. Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were very much influenced by the "climate of opinion" of late German enlightenment. Nevertheless, their thought went far beyond any of the suggestions of their contemporaries and may very well be characterised as defining "the aims of a new epoch".<sup>1</sup>

Hamann and Jacobi specifically rejected "the spirit of Gründlichkeit", arguing that philosophy could not and need not supply human knowledge with any sort of foundation and that justification was impossible. The principles of knowledge have to be believed blindly. They have to be accepted on faith in very much the same way as religious doctrines. The principles governing the testimony of the senses are identical with the principles governing religious testimony. Far from securing knowledge, justification will only undermine it and lead necessarily to skepticism or nihilism.

In this fight against the enlightenment, Hamann and Jacobi found welcome allies in the Scottish philosophers of common sense.<sup>2</sup> Especially the Scottish critique of phenomenalism, the theory of natural belief and natural language became important for these Germans, and they used these Scottish doctrines effectively as weapons in their battle with rationalism.

#### A. Hamann's Realism of Faith and Language

Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) was the oldest and perhaps most important of the so-called "philosophers of faith". He lived for most of his life in Königsberg and was a neighbor and friend of Immanuel Kant. But Hamann's philosophical outlook was radically different from that of Kant. Whereas Kant was convinced of the ideals of enlightenment, Hamann developed his Christian Weltanschauung in conscious opposition to these ideals.<sup>3</sup> Kant's criticism was seen by Hamann as the epitome of the enlightenment, and rejected by him accordingly.<sup>4</sup>

Most of his works are violent reactions to major and minor works of the German and French enlightenment, and bear thus an occasional

character. They are also extremely personal. Hamann often shifts from the discussion of a generally known and widely discussed problem to merely personal issues, known only to his friends. Because of this occasional and personal character of Hamann's works it is difficult to give a short and faithful summary of his theory. It is at least as much a "doctrine of scattered occasions" as that of Lichtenberg, a thinker with whom Hamann has much in common.<sup>5</sup> But a summary and discussion of Hamann's thought is made even more difficult by his peculiar use of language and quotations.<sup>6</sup> Hamann plays with language and uses it obscurely on purpose. The same may also be said of his use of quotations. He refers to fictitious authors, uses quotations to establish exactly the opposite of what the quoted author wanted to show, transforms key concepts of other authors ironically and satirically, disguises quotations and confuses or mystifies the reader as much as he can.<sup>7</sup> Though Hamann's quotations show that he had at least as wide a knowledge of all kinds of literature as did the popular philosophers, it often is not clear in what way he is using this literature. In any case, he did not use the thought of others simply as building blocks for his own system. Accordingly, great care is necessary in the evaluation of Hamann's "sources".

Hamann was well versed in the philosophical literature of Britain. He knew Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, just as he knew Reid, Oswald and Beattie.<sup>8</sup> Especially have Hamann's relations to David Hume attracted attention in the more recent discussions of his philosophy. It has been argued that Hamann's so-called "doctrine of faith", which states that "our own existence and the existence of all things outside us must be believed, and cannot be determined in any other way" has been taken

straight out of Hume.<sup>9</sup> But this is quite false. Hamann objects to Hume and finds that Hume is asking for proof and rational justification where he should know that none is to be had, where Glaube, that is, belief or faith, is all we can ask for.<sup>10</sup> In certain respects Hamann's reaction to Hume is very similar to that of Reid. Both Hamann and Reid hold on to Hume's conception of belief and transform it for their purposes. Both reject any attempt to derive belief or faith from other, more basic mental occurrences, but accept it as a basic fact or principle from which all others have to be explained. Both use a religiously coloured terminology to describe these beliefs. As some of the Scots, most notably Oswald, Hamann places the principles which govern sense perception and our daily actions on the same level as religious beliefs. But Hamann goes much further in this regard than any of the Scots. Whereas they never identified natural beliefs with Pauline faith, and gave a much broader role to rational argument and psychological analysis, Hamann uses natural belief to develop an irrationalistic position. But the purposes of the Scots and of Hamann are very similar. Both believe that the basic tendency of all modern thought becomes most clearly identifiable and visible in Hume's skepticism, and both believe that by refuting Hume they are refuting modern thought.

This is also the way in which Hamann was interpreted by Herder, his immediate follower. In his review of the German translation of Beattie's Essay he characterises Hume as "a bad thinker in metaphysical matters" and concludes his discussion with a long quotation from Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, saying that this passage says "with a few subtle strokes more than perhaps the entire book" of Beattie.<sup>11</sup>



Given this affinity between Scottish common sense philosophers and Hamann, it was only natural that he would greatly appreciate Reid's philosophy once he became acquainted with it. When exactly this happened is not clear. But it is very likely that he came across Reid's Inquiry very early. Hamann not only owned a copy of the French translation of the Inquiry of 1768, but he also referred to Reid as early as 1772 (in Philologische Einfälle und Zweifel).<sup>12</sup> In any case, he thought very highly of Reid and was very excited when he heard in 1786 that Reid had published his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.<sup>13</sup> He clearly hoped to learn much from this new work. Hamann also knew the works of James Beattie, as his correspondence with Herder shows,<sup>14</sup> and there can be little doubt that he knew Oswald's Appeal as well. Hamann was as well acquainted with the works of Scottish common sense as any popular philosopher in Gottingen, Erfurt, Berlin or Leipzig, and his works show it.

Hamann's Philologische Einfälle und Zweifel were directed against Herder's treatise Über den Ursprung der Sprache of 1772. Herder had claimed in this work that human beings, unlike animals, are not governed by instinct. And he argued that language could have arisen only because of this absence of instinct in humans. Against Condillac and others, who tried to explain the origin of language by saying that man had learned to associate signs and objects, Herder objects "this account presupposes the really important step as already taken", that is, it presupposes "that some things can stand for others, that there can be such a thing as a sign".<sup>16</sup> Herder finds:

Man, placed in the state of reflection which is peculiar to him, with his reflection for the first time given full freedom of action, did invent language. For what is reflection? What is language?

This reflection is characteristically peculiar to man and essential to his species; and so is language and the invention of language.

Invention of language is therefore as natural to man as it is to him that he is man.<sup>16</sup>

Reflection or Bessonnenheit is the expression of man's freedom, or the absence of instinct characterised positively.<sup>17</sup>

Hamann disagrees strongly with Herder especially for his use of "invention" with regard to language. He agrees with Herder that human beings are essentially free beings. Without freedom we could not talk of guilt and could not be called good or bad. "Therefore neither instinct nor sensus communis determine the human being; neither natural nor international law the sovereign".<sup>18</sup> But this absolute freedom of man does not mean that he is not also naturally predisposed to certain things rather than others. Even if sensus communis and instinct do not rule man absolutely, this does not mean that they do not play a role. Man is very similar to animals in his organisation and has therefore also natural faculties. This means that he has also instincts. But man's instincts are different from those of other animals in that they are modifiable. While instinct prescribes a certain limited sphere to animals, the "point of view of man extends to the universal and loses itself in infinity, as it were".<sup>19</sup>

This description of instinct and sensus communis allows Hamann to introduce Reid as a witness against Herder, namely in order to show that, even though we have to learn a language, we no more invent it than we invent walking. For Reid language belongs to those "powers of which nature has only planted the seeds in our minds, but has left the rearing of them to human culture", and the theory of natural and acquired

language together with natural and acquired perception plays an important role in Reid's thought. In fact, in Inquiry, Chapter VI, Sections 20 and 24, entitled "Of Perception in General" and "Of the Analogy Between Perception and the Credit we Give to Human Testimony", Reid develops a surprising parallel between perception and language, an analogy at which he hints throughout his work. Reid finds that "there is a much greater similitude than is commonly imagined, between the testimony given by our senses, and the testimony of men given by language". Indeed, he says somewhat later, "so remarkable is the analogy between these two, and the analogy between the principles of the mind, which are subservient to the one, and those which are subservient to the other, without further apology we shall consider them together".<sup>20</sup>

Hamann appears to agree fully with all of this. He agrees with Reid that language is both natural and has to be learned:

Man learns to use and master all his limbs and senses, he must and wants to learn equally much. Therefore the origin of language is as natural and human as the origin of any other of our actions, faculties and skills. However, though every apprentice contributes to his education according to his inclinations, faculties and the occasions which he has to learn: learning in the proper sense is just as little invention as it is mere remembering.<sup>21</sup>

Hamann employs Reid's very terminology and characterises the origin of language as a "twofold education of sensual revelation and human testimony".<sup>22</sup> And similarly to Reid, who maintains that without natural language we could not possibly attain artificial language, and that natural language, original perception and their respective principles are the presuppositions for all thought, Hamann also argues that "invention and reason presuppose already a language and allow as little of being

thought without language, as arithmetic allows of being thought without numbers".<sup>23</sup>

Reid is also very important for Hamann in his "description" of the relationship between the understanding and the senses, which also has some consequence for Hamann's understanding of language. Using a comparison that sounds very "Hamannian" indeed, Hamann finds that the relationship between the senses and the understanding is "probably" very similar to the relation between the stomach and those "vessels, which secrete the finer and higher juices of the blood, without whose circulation and influence the stomach itself could not fulfill its functions".<sup>24</sup> But however "Hammanian" this comparison sounds, it may well have been lifted out of Reid's Inquiry. Arguing against certain physiological accounts of what happens in sensation, Reid asks ironically:

Is it not as philosophical, and more intelligible, to conceive, that as the stomach receives its food, so the soul receives her images by a kind of nervous deglutition? I might add, that we need only continue this perisaltic motion of the nervous tubes from the sensorium to the extremities of the nerves that serve the muscles, in order to account for muscular motion. -- Thus nature will be consonant to herself; and as sensation will be the conveyance of the ideal ailment to the mind, so muscular motion will be the expulsion of the recrimentionitious part of it. For who can deny, that the images of things conveyed by sensation, may after due concoction, become fit to be thrown off by muscular motion? I only give these hints to be ingenious, hoping that in time this hypothesis may be brought up into a system as philosophical, as that of animal spirits, or the vibration of the nervous fibres.<sup>25</sup>

Hamann obviously liked this kind of satire; and being a voracious, though self-conscious, eater himself, who often used analogies between foods and philosophical matters, this ironical comparison must have

appealed very much to him; especially so, because Herder (against whom all this is directed) had a "predilection" for materialistic accounts.<sup>26</sup> Accordingly, the entire passage following Hamann's analogy must be seen against the background of Reid's account of natural and artificial language. This becomes clear when one sees that Hamann goes on to say:

Nothing is in our understanding without having been in the senses first: just as there is nothing in our body that has not gone first through our own stomach or that of our parents. The stamina and menstrua of our reason are therefore in the most authentic sense revelations and traditions, which we receive as our possessions, transform into our juices and powers and become thus capable to fulfil our destiny to partially reveal and partially transmit the critical and archontic dignity of a political animal. . . . even if it was also assumed that man came into the world as an empty skin: just this deficiency would enable him to gain more enjoyment of nature through experiences and of the community of his own kind through traditions. Our reason at least originates from this twofold education of sensual revelations and human testimonies, which are communicated through similar means, namely signs, as well as in accordance with similar laws.\*

\*See Recherches sur l'entendement humain d'après les Principes du sens commun par Thomas Reid. Ouvrage traduit de l'anglois a Amsterdam, 1768.<sup>27</sup>

The similarity of all this to Reid's account of the parallelity of language and sensation is striking. Hamann does not only use the very same words as Reid, namely "revelations", "signs" and "tradition", and "common sense", but he also puts forward very much the same views. However, it would be too much to say that Hamann and Reid held the same theory of perception and belief, for neither Reid nor Hamann really develop a full-fledged theory. Especially Hamann, who is not a very systematic thinker in any case, offers little more than suggestions for further thought. But in these suggestions Reid's contribution cannot be overlooked. It is thus not surprising that James C. O'Flaherty's

important Unity and Language: A Study in the Philosophy of Johann Georg Hamann, which attempts to construct a consistent theory of language from Hamann's many suggestions (and which does not contain a single reference to Reid), should present a view that is significantly similar to that of Reid.<sup>28</sup> In fact, the very headings of O'Flaherty's discussion show this similarity between Reid and Hamann. For instance, "The Primacy of Natural Language", "Natural Language as a Clue to the Nature of Reality", and "Hamann's Tendency to Draw Inferences from Natural Language to Reality". There can be no doubt that Reid had a significant formative influence upon Hamann's views on the nature of language; and these views are thought to represent Hamann's most important contribution to philosophical discussion.<sup>29</sup> It should be clear that Hamann's original contribution to the philosophy of language can only be determined after a detailed consideration of Reid's theory and influence, something that is not possible here.

In any case, Hamann's most fundamental criticisms of philosophy, and especially of Kant's critical philosophy, has the closest connections with his understanding of language. All of metaphysics is suspicious to Hamann. Metaphysics, he says, has

its school and court language; both are suspicious to me, and I am neither capable of understanding it nor of using it myself. Therefore I almost assume that our entire philosophy consists more of language than of reason. The misunderstandings of innumerable words, the prosopopoeias of arbitrary abstractions, the antitheses tes pseudonymou gnoseos, nay even the most common figures of speech of the sensus communis have created a whole world of questions, which have been brought up with just as little reason as they have been answered. We still have to do without a grammar of reason, of writing and of their common elements.<sup>30</sup>

That these criticisms of the misuse of language by philosophers are

not without connection to Reid's influence may be seen again from the Philologische Einfälle und Zweifel. Immediately after his reference to Reid's Inquiry, Hamann criticises philosophers for always having given "the bill of divorce to truth by differentiating what nature has joined together and by perversely" joining together what nature has set apart.<sup>31</sup> Against this background we have to see also Hamann's remarks in the Metakritik. Kant has artificially separated reason from language and common sense. Since for Hamann rational thought is impossible without language, and since language depends to a certain extent upon "natural language", "sensual revelation" and "human testimony", the "purifications" or "purisms" of critical thought do not in fact aid a better understanding of reason, but rather destroy reason altogether.<sup>32</sup>

But Hamann could have learned from the Scots also in other respects. Thus there is almost certainly some effect of the Scots to be found in his doctrine of faith, though the exact nature and extent of this influence is difficult to determine. It is certainly true that Hamann's early pronouncements on faith (made in connection with Hume) "can hardly be taken as a systematic presentation of 'the doctrine of belief'", that in the Socratic Memorabilia Hamann "preaches more than he conceptually develops",<sup>33</sup> and that only in connection with his later statements on this subject -- all made after he knew Reid and Beattie -- certain faint outlines of such a theory emerge. Reid says that "original and natural judgments are . . . the inspiration of the Almighty, no less than our notions of simple apprehensions", and Beattie even uses the English word "faith" in this context.<sup>34</sup> Both tried to account for this by means of the theory of suggestion and

perception. But Hamann still gives only suggestions towards such a theory, and perhaps even less of the theory itself than the Scots. Thus in 1776 Hamann counts faith among "the natural conditions of our faculties of knowledge, and the basic drives of our soul".<sup>35</sup> In the correspondence with Jacobi in the eighties he argues that faith cannot be defined and that definitions only confuse us.<sup>36</sup> Yet, even "facta rest on faith".<sup>37</sup> These remarks, though far from developing a theory of the role of faith or belief in sense perception, suggest an account similar to that of Reid and Beattie. But, considering the sparseness and compactness of Hamann's utterances, no definite influence of Reid upon Hamann with regard to the doctrine of faith can be established.

Perhaps most visible is the Scottish influence upon Hamann with regard to his analysis of the history of modern philosophy and the role idealism and skepticism played in it. For Hamann as for the Scots modern philosophy was a gradual development towards idealism. Thus Erwin Metzke evaluates the Scottish influence as follows: Hamann, he says, characterises Hume,

as standing in an idealistic tradition . . . Hamann, however, is thoroughly concerned with reality, with being itself. He wants a historical and physical realism . . . Hamann rejects Hume exactly for attempting to give a theory and justification of his belief . . . Therefore the rejection of the idealistic conception of causality by Hume . . . From here Hamann's great interest in Reid is understandable as well.<sup>38</sup>

As a realist Hamann found Reid indeed very important, and it may be said that through Reid and Beattie Hamann learned much about the connections between realism and idealism in philosophy. Thus, when Hamann writes to Herder in 1781 that he has just "finished the third part of Malebranche's Recherches as a source of the Humean philosophy, as well as Berkeley,



whose first part [he has] read through together with Beattie's two volumes",<sup>39</sup> we can see how central the Scots were for his understanding of the history of modern thought. And in the first two sections of his Metakritik the fruits of this research becomes clear:

A great philosopher has maintained "that general and abstract ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification and makes us recall that signification on the occasion of individual things". This assertion of the Eleatic, mystic and enthusiastic Bishop of Cloyne, George Berkeley, Hume declares to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries, which has been made in the republic of letters in our time.

First of all it appears to me that the new skepticism is infinitely more indebted to the older idealism than this accidental, individual and occasional remark shows to us. Without Berkeley Hume would hardly have become the great philosopher the Kritik declares him to be from similar gratitude. But what concerns the important discovery itself: it lies open and revealed in the mere usage of language of the most common perception and observation of the sensus communis, and it does not need special penetration.<sup>40</sup>

Extending the Scottish view of the relation Berkeley-Hume to the relation Berkeley-Hume-Kant, Hamann indirectly accuses Kant of being an idealist as well as of being inconsistent in praising Hume so much while rejecting Berkeley so violently. Without Berkeley, there would not have been a Hume, without Hume there would not have been any Kant. Therefore without Berkeley there would not have been any Kant.

Against this background Hamann's cryptic judgment that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason contained too much mysticism also becomes, perhaps, a little clearer. For Reid had already described a certain "article of the skeptical creed" as "indeed so full of mystery, on whatever side we view it, that they who hold that creed, are very

injuriously charged with incredulity: for to me it appears to require as much faith as that of St. Athanasius".<sup>41</sup> Hamann may be taken as echoing this judgment while directing it at Kant, the "German Hume". However tenuous some of these connections may appear, it is clear that Hamann knew Reid and Beattie, and he knew them very well, as his play with Reid's analogy between stomach and sensation witnesses especially. It is also clear that Hamann found in Reid an important source of his theory of faith and language. However, because Hamann's writings are very compact, cryptical and unorganised, it is very difficult to determine with certitude how far Reid's influence reaches. Nonetheless, it is hoped that we now have a better understanding of why it was that Hamann became so excited about Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Why the review of this work "excited all his attention", why he was so anxious to read it and why he asked Jacobi so many times to obtain the work for him becomes understandable only if we accept the fact that Reid's Inquiry was of the greatest importance for Hamann. Though Hamann himself did not develop a consistent theory and offered only suggestions for a theory, suggestions which give glimpses of the possible role of Reid's thought for the development of a realism of faith, the importance of this role is not to be underestimated, both for Hamann himself and for later philosophers. Reid may have influenced Hamann to make only suggestions toward a system, but these suggestions may have been more important than some of the well-developed systems. Certainly this is true so far as Jacobi's thought is concerned, for Hamann was clearly the greatest influence on Jacobi. Furthermore, in Jacobi's thought the contribution of Reid and the Scots can be isolated much more clearly.

### B. Jacobi's Radical Realism

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) was more systematically inclined than Hamann. But it is not clear whether this inclination is matched with an equal philosophical talent. In the first place, Jacobi's works consist more of criticisms of other philosophical systems than of a systematic representation of his own views. Furthermore, neither are distinct concepts and clearly developed arguments his strength. Jacobi often appeals to feeling and his writings are highly emotional in part. In his writings many of the weaknesses of the approach of the philosophers of faith become very much apparent, while many of the stylistic qualities that make Hamann and Herder enjoyable reading are missing.<sup>42</sup> Though it has to be admitted that Jacobi was not only greatly interested and well versed in philosophical literature, though his critique of Kant's critical philosophy was very effective (systematically as well as historically), one cannot help but agree with Goethe that Jacobi was not born for philosophical speculation and that philosophical speculation became his personal misfortune.

Jacobi's importance in the history of philosophy derives to a great extent from the fact that he managed to involve in controversies some of the most famous men of his time. Thus he fought with the most important representative of popular philosophy, Moses Mendelssohn, attacked Kant's critical philosophy and later accused Wilhelm Joseph Schelling of pantheism and atheism.<sup>43</sup> Jacobi is truly a figure of transition. He was instrumental in destroying the reputation of popular philosophy, and contributed greatly to the development of German idealism through his criticism of Kant's philosophy.<sup>44</sup> But Jacobi himself had the closest

connections with popular philosophers. He also aimed at realism and fought idealism, though much more radically than the popular enlightenment philosophers. As a follower of Hamann and Herder, Jacobi rejected any form of phenomenalism and justification in philosophy and emphasised sensation and description instead.

Jacobi's thought is highly dependent upon that of Thomas Reid. About this there has never been much doubt. In fact, in most historical accounts of German philosophy Jacobi is referred to as the only significant German philosopher influenced by Scottish common sense. However, there was no extended discussion of Jacobi's relationship to Reid until Günther Baum's Vernunft und Erkenntnis appeared in 1969.<sup>45</sup> Though Baum's work is not primarily concerned with Jacobi's historical and systematic relations to Scottish common sense, but with a fundamental re-interpretation of Jacobi's thought as a whole, Reid's influence upon Jacobi is discussed at some length.<sup>46</sup> Beattie is neglected altogether, however; and since Baum does not show how important Scottish common sense was for German philosophy in general during this period, he is not always as convincing as he could have been.

Jacobi's references to Reid are, especially in the light of Reid's pervasive influence upon him, rather sparse.<sup>47</sup> But there are enough references to show that Jacobi knew Reid and found him important for the development of his epistemology.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, given Herder's "predilection" for the philosophy of Beattie and Hamann's high estimation of Reid, Jacobi must have come across Scottish common sense rather early.<sup>49</sup> In fact, Jacobi's particular intellectual background of Storm and Stress makes it almost certain that he learned of Beattie's Essay

immediately after the publication of the German translation of this work. The "pure gold" of Herder's review in the Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen of 1772, the most important organ of Storm and Stress, must have made this work something of a sensation in Jacobi's circles. Jacobi also was a close friend of the German translator of the Essay, namely, Heinrich Wilhelm von Gerstenberg (who had also the closest connections with the movement of Storm and Stress), and Johann Georg Heinrich Feder called Jacobi one of his "oldest friends among the philosophical writers of Germany".<sup>50</sup> Jacobi's uncle Johann Friedrich Jacobi, a cleric in Celle, whom Hamann regarded as one of his precursors, and whom Jacobi considered as one of his dearest friends as well as a relative, had already espoused views very similar to those of the Scots in 1773. The older Jacobi was, in fact, criticised by the reviewer in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek in close conjunction with the German translation of Beattie's Essay.<sup>51</sup>

If the references to Reid in the correspondence between Hamann and Jacobi are added, it seems very clear that Reid assumed a special importance for Jacobi from 1786 on.<sup>52</sup> However, it is likely that Jacobi had read both Reid's Inquiry and Beattie's Essay before this time, and it is also likely that he acquired Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man on his voyage to England in 1786. That Jacobi must have been impressed by Reid's thought becomes apparent from two sources given by Baum. The one is a distant echo of this reading of Reid communicated by Jacobi himself in a letter to J. Neeb of 1814:

Together with the praise I also owe you a few critical remarks; most notably about Thomas Reid, whose Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,

which appeared in 1786 (sic), you certainly have not read. For, if you had read this work you could never have placed this great man with Oswald and Beattie in one row. And you could not have said that with all his weapons he had not even touched Hume, this giant of thinkers. Kant who made a similar judgment in the Prolegomena . . . could not have read the Essays, this masterwork of the matured thinker, either. For the Prolegomena appeared earlier.<sup>53</sup>

The second testimony is from Wilhelm von Humboldt's journal of his journey through Germany in 1788. Jacobi had said to Humboldt:

We do not perceive, as is usually maintained, merely the picture of external objects. We perceive these objects themselves (however, modified according to our standpoint towards the objects, which we perceive and all the other things in the world). This perception occurs, as Reid said quite correctly, by a sort of revelation [English in the original]. Because of this we do not demonstrate that there are objects external to us, but believe it. This belief is no acceptance in accordance with probable reasons. It has a greater and more imperturbable certainty than a demonstration can ever give.<sup>54</sup>

Yet in the dialogue David Hume Jacobi never refers directly to Reid, but only to the German review of the Essays in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung. It is in the later edition of his Woldemar that he mentions the Scottish philosopher and hints at his importance.<sup>55</sup> But it is quite clear that Jacobi kept himself very well informed about Scottish common sense in general and Thomas Reid in particular, and that he knew, for instance, Dugald Stewart's Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid.<sup>56</sup>

1. Jacobi's View of the History of Philosophy as Leading to Idealism or Nihilism

"Nihilism" became a fashionable term in the 19th century. It is used to express the experience of triviality, meaninglessness and emptiness of modern life and the world. Jacobi has been credited with having been the

first to have used the term with a definite meaning.<sup>57</sup> For Jacobi nihilism was the necessary result of all philosophy, aiming as it does at the rational justification of matters that cannot be justified but have to be accepted on faith or feeling. Baum comes to the conclusion that,

in essence (der Sache nach) Jacobi's aim to reveal the development of thought towards nihilism as the tendency of the history of Western thought is already fully contained in the views of Thomas Reid. Given Jacobi's intimate knowledge of the work of Reid, there need not be any doubt that Jacobi has received the most important suggestions for his theory of nihilism from Reid.<sup>58</sup>

It appears that Baum is quite correct. Jacobi's scattered remarks on nihilism -- whether they actually deserve to be called a theory need not be debated -- bear a striking resemblance to the view of the history of philosophy as developed by Reid and also held by Beattie.<sup>59</sup> Both the Scots and Jacobi see in philosophy a basic tendency to move further and further away from the natural beliefs revealed in sensation, and to rely more and more upon rational thought. In this way an ever greater part of reality is denied, until universal skepticism, i.e. the denial of self and external objects is reached. The Scots, Hamann and Jacobi all believe that the existence of our self and of the objects must be grasped intuitively, while to philosophy it is a "scandal" that we cannot rationally prove the existence of external objects.

The basic mistake or the "original sin" of philosophy, as Hamann would say, is that the philosophers do not begin with objective knowledge, but with subjective states, and that they try to prove the existence of objects from these subjective states. But in this way philosophers will never establish the existence of real objects. All they will be able to

reach is some sort of ideal objects. For the understanding in isolation from the senses is, in fact, cut off from all objective knowledge, since only in sensation the objects themselves appear. When philosophical understanding finally becomes conscious of this, it discovers necessarily, according to Jacobi,

that what philosophy has hitherto generally called nature and its general laws are nothing else than the human mind itself with its thoroughly subjective representations, concepts and connections of thought. Nature, thus far believed to be objective . . . vanishes for the philosophical understanding into nothing when it is severed from external sensation. Everything whatsoever, the knowing and the known, dissolves in the face of the faculty of cognition into a superficial imagining of imaginations, that is, into something that is objectively nothing. There remains only a strange intellectual realm of strange intellectual dreams without sense (Deutung) and reference (Bedeutung).<sup>60</sup>

In trying to grasp reality by means of rational thought philosophy finds nothing (or nothingness), a mere appearance. By transforming the objective reality known in sensation into mere representation reality vanishes altogether. The end result of all philosophy is nihilism. Neither I nor anything else exist.<sup>61</sup>

In this regard, most of the differences between Reid and Jacobi are the result of the different kind of realism they have to deal with. While Reid sees the final stage of idealism, that of universal idealism in which there is "neither matter nor mind in the universe; nothing but impressions and ideas", as having arrived with the philosophy of David Hume, Jacobi finds it in Kant's critical philosophy. But, according to Baum, Jacobi regards nihilism as the necessary or inevitable outcome of all philosophy. For Reid, however, idealism is only the factual outcome of Western thought. It is necessary only when we accept certain premisses,



namely the ones connected with the acceptance of certain mediating mental entities between the self and its objects. Philosophy itself may not be at fault. "We ought not to despair of a better", Reid says, and his philosophy is indeed the attempt to furnish an alternative. If Baum is correct about Jacobi, there exists a basic difference between Jacobi and Reid in this matter. But, though Jacobi appears to be somewhat more pessimistic than Reid, though some of his utterances may be taken to suggest that nihilism is the necessary result of all philosophy, he nowhere actually says so.<sup>62</sup> However, Jacobi does claim that,

ever since Aristotle an increasing tendency has asserted itself in philosophical schools, namely, to quite generally subjugate immediate cognition to mediate cognition, the faculty of perception, which was originally basic to everything, to the faculty of reflection, which is dependent upon abstraction, the original to the copy, the meaning to the word, reason to the understanding. This went even so far as to let the former completely submerge and disappear in the latter.<sup>63</sup>

In doing so he sounds very much like Reid. Idealism or nihilism is the result of a certain basic stance taken very early in Western thought and not the necessary result of all philosophising. Further, Jacobi even agrees with Reid on the nature of this mistaken view, namely the acceptance of the theory of ideas.<sup>64</sup>

That "idealism" and "egoism", the terms used by Reid to signify what Jacobi later calls "nihilism", were indeed also used by Jacobi at first is shown very clearly by Baum. But it may perhaps be added that even in his later works Jacobi often uses the phrase "nihilism or idealism" and that in his famous letter to Fichte he himself states that he uses "nihilism as an abusive term for idealism".<sup>65</sup> Baum does not see, however,

any connection between Reid and Jacobi with regard to the term "nihilism" itself. He shows that the term was used in German already before Jacobi (though in a different sense).<sup>66</sup> But a relation to Scottish common sense does not appear unlikely even in regard to the term. James Beattie had described the final state of philosophy as follows:

So that we are now arrived at the height of human wisdom, that intellectual eminence, from whence there is a full prospect of all that we can reasonably believe to exist, and of all that can possibly become the object of our knowledge. Alas, what is become of the magnificence of external nature, and the wonders of intellectual energy . . . All around, above and beneath, is one vast inanity, or rather an enormous chaos, encompassed with darkness universally and eternally impenetrable. Body and Spirit are utterly annihilated; and there remains nothing (for we must again descend into the jargon of metaphysics) but a vast collection, bundle, mass, or heap, of unperceived perceptions.<sup>67</sup>

In fact, terms such as "annihilation" occur several times in this context of Beattie's Essay. The German translation uses "vernichtet" in this context, but it could very well be that Jacobi read or re-read Beattie in the original. In any case, Jacobi resembles in his philosophical style more Beattie than Reid, and the evocation of despair given by Beattie is very similar to some of Jacobi's own outpourings.<sup>68</sup>

## 2. Jacobi's Theory of Immediate Cognition and Faith

In Reid's thought the critique of the history of Western philosophy was intimately connected with an alternative account of the perceptual process. Instead of the ideal system Reid proposed a realism, a realism which does away with mediating "mental entities" between the perceiving subject and the perceived object. The same also holds for Jacobi. His view of the history of philosophy is also founded in his theory of

perception. In fact, one of the things in which Jacobi took special pride was his particular form of realism. Late in his life he boasted that he was "a realist as nobody else had ever been before . . . and there is no reasonable middle system between total idealism and total realism".<sup>69</sup> Jacobi even went so far as to claim that the "third [thing] between the knowing subject and the object to be known, which has been assumed ever since Locke, was thoroughly removed by myself first, as far as I know".<sup>70</sup> But Berkeley and Reid had done so long before Jacobi, and Jacobi should have known it. Moreover, it can be shown that he did know it in 1788 at least, when he told Wilhelm von Humboldt that "we do not perceive as is usually maintained, merely the picture of external objects. We perceive the objects themselves . . . as Reid said quite correctly, by a sort of revelation".<sup>71</sup> Jacobi's views on the removal of the "third" between subject and object are taken from the works of Reid.

That Jacobi found Reid's theory of immediate perception so useful has its cause in the development of his dispute with Mendelssohn. In 1785 Jacobi had published his private correspondence with Mendelssohn under the title Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn. In it he had not only tried to show that Lessing was really a Spinozist (and, according to public opinion and Jacobi, therefore an atheist), but also tried to discredit Mendelssohn. But his attempt to discredit Mendelssohn backfired. Instead of exposing the Berlin enlightenment philosophers as clandestine atheists, Jacobi found himself accused of being a religious fanatic and enemy of rational thought. And this not without reason, for Jacobi had argued in his letters that

sensation and revelation, belief in epistemic contexts and faith in religious contexts were of the same kind. Using the language of Pauline-Lutheran theology, he had claimed that we are all "born into faith and have to remain in faith". Playing on the ambiguity of the German "Glaube" he suggested religious significance even in mere epistemic contexts.<sup>72</sup>

Jacobi's David Hume über den Glauben oder Idealismus und Realismus is essentially the attempt to show that the accusations levelled against him were completely unfounded. He argues that the terms "faith" and "revelation" are commonly used in epistemic contexts and that this has nothing to do with religion. As had Hamann and Herder before him, Jacobi found David Hume and his Scottish opponents very helpful in this context,<sup>73</sup> for he argues that in the discussion of these philosophers the terms "faith" and "revelation" had already been used in exactly the same sense.

Hume's "Essays" are characterised as "a book in defence of faith", and many long passages of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding are quoted in order to show that Hume does use the term in the very same sense as Jacobi did in the letters to Mendelssohn.<sup>74</sup> But, even though Jacobi refers several times to Hume in this context, it seems to be Reid's theory of natural belief that is his most important source here. Hume is used merely in order to show that even the philosopher who is commonly regarded as the greatest enemy of religious faith, uses the word in the same sense as Jacobi does.<sup>75</sup> In fact, Jacobi makes it clear that Hume is no "authority" for him and that his own theory of faith is in the end quite different from that of Hume.<sup>76</sup> For, though

he argues that the phrase "revelation of sensation", which corresponds to "faith", is common usage in German, French, English and several other languages, he admits that Hume could never have said that the "objects reveal themselves through the senses":

This idiom cannot occur in Hume with the same emphasis I have placed upon it, because he always leaves undecided, among other things, whether we really perceive external objects or whether we perceive objects merely as though they were external to ourselves. For this reason he also says in the passage, which I just read to you: "realities, or what is taken for such". According to his entire way of thinking he had to be more inclined to skeptical idealism than to realism in speculative thought.<sup>77</sup>

Only "the decided realist" will use the expression in the way in which he, Jacobi, has used "revelation". Reid was such a "decided realist", and he used "revelation" in the sense in which Jacobi uses it in this dialogue, though Jacobi does not bother to point this out.

That Reid is the source for this doctrine of faith and revelation becomes clear also from the following:

By what other name shall such a decided realist call the means through which the certainty of the independent existence of external objects, apart from representations, comes to him? He has nothing upon which he could base his judgment, nothing but the thing itself, nothing but the factum that the objects are really in front of him. Can he use a more fitting word than revelation for this? Is not here truly the root of this word, the source of its usage? . . . That this revelation deserves to be called truly wonderful follows automatically . . . for we have no other proof of the existence of such an object than the existence of this object. Therefore we must find it simply incomprehensible that we can become aware of such an existence.<sup>78</sup>

But of even more interest for Jacobi's relation to Reid is the next step in his exposition. Believing that it has indeed been established that our awareness of the existence of external objects is "a truly wonderful

revelation", the interlocutor muses: "but at least it is not an immediate revelation, or is it?"<sup>79</sup> This allows Jacobi to go on and show that our belief in the existence of external objects is indeed immediate.<sup>80</sup> First of all the revelation is "immediate with regard to ourselves. For we do not know what really mediates it. But to deny it for this reason, or to reject this factum as contradictory to reason itself, as the idealist does, this is not in accordance with the true philosophical spirit".<sup>81</sup> If we try to explain this basic fact by means of an account of its origin in certain operations of the understanding, as most philosophers actually do, if we try to show that our knowledge of the existence of objects is mediated by the understanding, we will "necessarily fall into the trap of the idealist".<sup>82</sup> In reality,

I experience that I exist and that objects external to myself in one and the same indivisible moment; and in this moment my soul is as passive with regard to the object as it is passive with regard to itself. No representation, no inference mediates this twofold revelation. Nothing in the soul steps between the perception of the reality external to the soul and the reality within the soul. Representations are not yet existing; they originate only afterwards in reflection, as shadows of things which were present.<sup>83</sup>

For Reid and Jacobi "sensible revelation" or "inspiration" and "natural belief" or "faith" are indeed only two different sides of one and the same problem. The reality which reveals itself in external sensation does not need any other witness, since it is itself the strongest witness of all reality.<sup>84</sup>

All this sounds very much like Thomas Reid, and Baum is quite correct when he finds that Reid's philosophy can "frankly be declared as the main source of Jacobi's theory of knowledge".<sup>85</sup> Anyone who knows the works of Thomas Reid and his Scottish followers will find little new

in Jacobi's epistemology. It is thoroughly dependent upon Reid not only in its broad outlines, but also in many of its details.<sup>86</sup> Jacobi's doctrine of immediate cognition and natural faith is almost identical to Reid's theory. It is only less consistent and rigorous, since Jacobi does speak of "representations" at times, and has not removed thoroughly the "third" between subject and object.<sup>87</sup> In many respects Jacobi's relationship to Reid is similar to that of Beattie, and if Tetens deserves perhaps to be called the "German Reid", Jacobi has the honour of deserving to be called the "German Beattie".

Because Jacobi simply follows Reid in regard to the doctrine of natural faith and immediate cognition, as well as in regard to the general view of the history of Western philosophy, these aspects of his thought are not particularly interesting in themselves. They become interesting only because of the use Jacobi makes of them in his criticism of Kant's "universal idealism". Jacobi's critique of Kant is a critique on the principles of Scottish common sense. They are also important because of the historical importance they attained. In fact, much of what is originally Reid's came to pass as Jacobi's "geistiges Eigentum". Since, in Germany Jacobi overshadowed Reid so completely, the effects of this are felt until today.

### 3. Jacobi's Critique of Kant

The Scottish critique of Hume's philosophy concentrated mainly upon the issue of the reality of external objects. Jacobi's critique of Kant concentrates on the same problem. For, Jacobi finds,

what we realists call real objects, or objects independent from our representations, the transcendental idealist regards only as internal beings. These internal beings do

not represent anything at all of the object that could be external to us, or to which the appearance could be related. They are completely devoid of all real objectivity and are merely subjective determinations of the soul.

Moreover,

even the order and regularity in the appearances, which we call nature, we introduce ourselves, and we could not have found it, if we had not, or if the nature of our mind had not introduced it originally.

All this is proof enough for Jacobi to say that

the Kantian philosopher leaves the spirit of his system completely behind, when he says that the objects make impressions upon the senses, occasion sensations in this way, and give rise to representations. For according to the Kantian doctrine, the empirical object, which can only be an appearance, cannot be external to ourselves and thus at the same time something else than a representation . . . The understanding adds the object to the appearance.<sup>88</sup>

But however much it is contrary to the Kantian view to say that objects make impressions upon our senses, it is impossible to understand how the Kantian view could even get started without this presupposition.

The very word 'sensibility' is without any meaning, if we do not understand a distinct and real medium between two realities, and if the conceptions of externality and connection, of active and passive, of causality and dependency are not already contained as real and objective determinations in it; and contained in it in such a way that the absolute universality and necessity of these conceptions as prior presuppositions is given at the very same time.<sup>89</sup>

In other words, one might say, Kant's categories of the understanding presuppose Read's suggestions of sensation.

Jacobi asks thus, in effect, why and how the understanding rather than the senses grants universality and necessity. In this, it seems, he reveals one of the major prejudices of almost all enlightenment philosophers, a prejudice that played a great role in the discussion of



Scottish common sense by German philosophers. Why are "laws of reason" more necessary than "laws of sensation"? Why are laws of thought "objective", while laws of sensation are only "subjective"? These questions can be asked with regard to Feder, Eberhard, Mendelssohn and Tetens just as they can be asked with regard to Kant. All these philosophers criticised the Scots for having stopped short in their inquiry, for having been satisfied with mere subjective necessity, for not having traced this subjective necessity to the objective laws of thought.<sup>90</sup> Jacobi criticises the Kantians for this prejudice. More particularly, he argues that the Kantian system presupposes such laws of sensation and that the categories are faint copies or shadows of the basic principles of sensation. Without presupposing such principles of sensation we cannot enter the Kantian system, and with them we cannot remain within the system.

The transcendental idealist cannot even attain the conception of an object that is "external to us in a transcendental sense".<sup>91</sup> For the conception of such an object is based upon the "truly wonderful revelation of sensation". Only the realist can attain the conception of such an object, since for him sensation is the passive state of being acted upon. But this feeling is only "one half of the entire state, a state which cannot be thought merely in accordance with this one half".<sup>92</sup>

It necessarily involves an object that has caused this state. External sensation necessarily suggests a really existent external object, and the laws which lead common sense towards these objects are not laws of thought but laws of sensation.

With these criticism Jacobi is in accord with Hamann and Herder. All

the philosophers of faith argue that Kant's philosophy has removed itself too far from sensation and ordinary language. By trying to "purify" thought of the influence of the suggestions of sensation and the concepts of thought from the influence of ordinary language, critical philosophy becomes nihilism. There is no such thing as "pure reason". Reason is always "contaminated" by sensation and ordinary language. Thus any critique of reason must necessarily involve a critique of the pre-conditions of reason, namely a critique of sensation and ordinary language. Therefore, when T.M. Seebohm remarks in "Der systematische Ort der Herderschen Metakritik" that Herder develops essentially a pre-critical philosophy, he is quite correct, though he does not seem to notice that the Metakritik is not just pre-critical in a historical sense. The frequency of references to philosophical works written before the appearance of Kant's Critique is no accident. Herder's Metakritik is most importantly pre-critical in a logical or an epistemological sense.<sup>93</sup> For, Herder, Hamann and Jacobi want to exhibit the preconditions and presuppositions of critical philosophy. In this task they found the works of the Scottish common sense philosophers very helpful. Of special importance were the Scottish doctrines of natural language and natural sensation. The Scots had tried to show that all of our thought depended upon certain principles revealed in sensation and ordinary language, principles which, however humble they might appear, are absolutely basic to all other mental functions. These principles cannot be further justified, because they are presupposed in any justification. Thus justification is impossible in a fundamental sense. But the justification of our claims of knowledge is not only impossible, it is also unnecessary, if we realise that we have knowledge of the

objects themselves and not knowledge of certain "mediating mental entities".

The philosophers of faith accepted all this. They rejected both phenomenalism and justification. In fact, they pointed out that there seemed to be a certain necessary connection between these two basic philosophical convictions. Realism is incompatible with philosophical justification of knowledge claims as well as with phenomenalism. Common sense and ordinary language are opposed to both, because common sense implies realism. Critical philosophy is deluded when it claims that it can offer logical justification for our knowledge claims. For, if it is true that metaphysics depends in the final analysis upon the constitution of the human mind, then it depends in the final analysis upon facts and not upon principles. And one of these facts is that human reason depends upon language. Moreover,

no deduction is required to prove the priority of language over the seven holy functions of logical propositions and inferences and their heraldry. Not only the entire faculty of thinking and depends upon language . . . but language is also the centre of incongruity of reason with itself.<sup>94</sup>

Thus Kant's antinomies are not antinomies of reason but antinomies of language. Philosophers are misled by language. Accordingly, a critique of language and its functions is of greater necessity than overly subtle philosophical inquiries into the nature of pure reason. On this Reid, Oswald, Beattie, Hamann, Herder and Jacobi agreed, and on this presupposition Hamann, Herder and Jacobi founded the Metakritik.

The rejection of the Kantian "thing in itself" was only a part in this project. But it was the part which proved most influential. When Jacobi pointed out that Kant's acceptance of "things in themselves" was

inconsistent, he meant to reduce Kant's transcendental idealism ad absurdum. But Fichte and especially Hegel saw this differently. Though they accepted Jacobi's criticism that the assumption of "things in themselves" was not in keeping with the spirit of Kantian philosophy, they themselves felt that this inconsistency was best removed by rejecting any attempt to develop an "empirical realism" and by embracing an "absolute idealism".

#### C. The Rejection of Common Sense and Realism in Hegel's Absolute Idealism

Though Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831) does not appear to have been directly influenced by Scottish common sense, his philosophy is relevant for the discussion of the fate of Scottish common sense in Germany. Even if there were not the substantial indirect influence through Jacobi, something would have to be said about Hegel, for the success of his philosophy marks most clearly the end of the Scottish influence in Germany. Kant's predecessors, Kant's contemporaries, Kant's immediate followers and even Kant himself all had a great (and rather peculiar) fear of idealism. Though they all accepted some form of phenomenalism, they hated idealism. Whatever the sources of this fear and hate may have been, it clearly went hand in hand with the desire of justifying and solidifying the claims of common sense. Hegel does not appear to understand either one of these things. He neither understands what is so wrong about idealism, nor does he feel bound by common sense. For him the traditional rejection of idealism, the half-hearted attempt at realism, and the traditional belief that one must justify common sense are inconsistent and unphilosophical.

It is more than just likely that Hegel knew the theories of

the Scots, though how well he knew them is not clear. But his representation of Reid, Oswald and Beattie in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy is fair, and, according to the standards of his time, adequate.<sup>95</sup> In any case, Hegel is more sympathetic and seems to think more highly of Scottish common sense than of David Hume, whom he disqualifies as "platitudinous". Given Hegel's appreciation of Hamann, Herder and Jacobi, as well as his early education, this should not come as much of a surprise.<sup>96</sup> There is even an essay by Hegel, "On the Judgment of Common Sense about Objectivity and Subjectivity", which suggests that early in his life Hegel was concerned with very much the same problems as Feder, Lossius, Tetens and Jacobi. Unfortunately, this essay is not extant for, as H.S. Harris suggests, it would be interesting to have it "because we might perhaps learn from it what Hegel made of the Critique of Pure Reason".<sup>97</sup> It would certainly also be interesting with regard to Scottish common sense. But we do not have it, and its loss is, at least for the purposes of this discussion, not as serious as it might be because we know perfectly well what Hegel thought of common sense in his later life.

The so-called "Jenaer Schriften" (1801-1807) do not leave any doubt about Hegel's opinion of the role of common sense in philosophy. He does not accord any role to common sense in philosophical speculation:

"Speculation . . . understands common sense very well, but common sense does not understand the activity of speculation"

"Common sense cannot understand how that which is immediately certain for common sense, can for philosophy be at the very same time nothing at all".

"Not only can common sense not understand speculation, but common sense must hate, despise and persecute speculation . . ."<sup>98</sup>

But philosophy is needed. For, though common sense suffices for the purposes of ordinary life and supplies us with "points of view which seem correct to us, points of view from which we begin and to which we return", we cannot rely upon common sense absolutely:

as soon as such truths of common sense are taken separately and isolated, merely sensibly, as the form of knowledge, they appear to be queer and mere half-truths. Common sense can be confused by reflection.<sup>99</sup>

But to remove these confusions and contradictions is the task of philosophy.<sup>100</sup> Accordingly, philosophical speculation cannot hope to gain anything from common sense. In fact, philosophical speculation cannot even hope to make itself understood to common sense. Therefore "popular philosophy" is a contradiction in terms:

Philosophy is essentially esoteric and as such is neither made for the mob nor is it capable of adaptation for the mob. It is only philosophy because it is exactly opposed to the understanding, and herewith even more to common sense, which is understood as the local and temporal limitation of a race. The world of philosophy is an und für sich a world turned upside down for common sense.<sup>101</sup>

Because philosophy is "exactly opposed" to common sense for Hegel, it is only natural that "large portions of his work can be read as a running polemic against common sense", as Hannah Arendt observes.<sup>102</sup> "True thought and scientific insight is only to be gained through the labour of the concept"; not through the "common indeterminacy and poverty of common sense".<sup>103</sup> For Hegel

philosophy . . . does not consider the unessential determination, but only determination in so far as it is essential. The abstract or non-real is not its element and content, but the real, that which posits itself and lives within itself, the being in its concept. It is that process which creates and runs through its own moments; and the entire movement amounts to the positive and its truth.

This includes thus just as much the negative, that which could be called false, if it could be regarded as something from which one must abstract. That which disappears is rather to be considered itself as the essential . . . The appearance is this originating and passing away, which does not originate and pass away itself, but is in itself and amounts to the reality and movement of the life of truth. The true is thus the bacchanalian revel, in which no m is not drunken; and since every member dissolves as soon as it separates itself from the revel, the revel is just as much a state of transparent, unbroken quiet.<sup>104</sup>

Clearly, neither Scottish common sense nor critical philosophy could look particularly inviting from the point of view of such a "drunken revel" of speculation. Their sobriety and self-limitation had to look all too ordinary. Hegel had to reject "the exoteric doctrine of Kantian philosophy that the understanding is not allowed to transgress experience", since in this way "science and common sense worked into each other's hand in order to destroy metaphysics".<sup>105</sup> In order to save "the speculative mysteries", the links between speculation and common sense, which Kant and his contemporaries had worked so hard to establish and to maintain, were finally cut by Hegel.<sup>106</sup> Common sense and metaphysical speculation had not only nothing in common any longer, but were actually incompatible. For some philosophers this may appear to be comparable with "the cutting of apron strings", while for others (including myself) it most certainly will appear more like the cutting of "the lifeline", or the "severing of the roots" of philosophy.

But in a certain respect Hegel's philosophy constitutes clearly also the "radicalisation of Kant's theory of knowledge".<sup>107</sup> Kant's criticism aims at the legitimisation of our knowledge claims, and especially at the legitimisation or justification of the a priori components

that enable us to make such claims of knowledge in the first place. The Scots and the philosophers of faith believed that such justification was in final analysis impossible, and that, unless we accept certain principles on trust, we could not make any claims of knowledge whatsoever. Kant disagreed. But he himself did not show how his own critical enterprise was possible. It appeared that his criticism depended upon pre-suppositions, which were neither formulated nor acknowledged. The Critique of Pure Reason is designed as the self-critique of pure reason, not as a critique of the critique.<sup>108</sup> As Lewis White Beck has pointed out quite correctly, "the Critique, like any large philosophical work, asks to be judged by its success in answering the questions it itself asks, though we want to evaluate it externally by asking whether its own pre-suppositions -- its meta-critical positions -- are true or not".<sup>109</sup> Hamann, Herder and Jacobi had asked these "external questions" shortly after the appearance of the first Critique. They showed that the Critique did indeed create the illusion of being "suspended from nothing in heaven and supported by nothing on earth".<sup>110</sup> Hegel "radicalises the approach of criticism by undertaking a self-critique of the presuppositions of criticism".<sup>111</sup> Hegel attempts the justification of the justification. But this project clearly involves an infinite regress, since the justification of the justification also needs to be justified, and so on. No single step in this process can give ultimate justification. Hegel realises this and seems to relegate the justification to the process as a whole.<sup>112</sup> This shows another, perhaps more "sober", side of Hegel's "revel" of speculation, and it shows how it arose with a certain degree of necessity from Kant's very enterprise of the justifi-



cation of common sense. If Hamann, Herder and Jacobi had concentrated on that which supports Kant's thought "on earth", i.e. the "facts" of language and perception, Hegel concentrates upon that by which it is suspended from the "heaven" of speculation. It appears that Hegel is quite right; once the business of justification is started, it cannot be stopped at any arbitrary point. Common sense beliefs and the body of scientific statements may be very appealing as such points for ceasing inquiry, but there does not seem to be anything that would compel us with absolute necessity to stop with them. Why is faith in those rational principles which justify Newtonian science and common sense more rational or "scientific" or "critical" than faith in Newtonian science and common sense itself? Why is the Kantian more of a "true philosopher" than the common sense philosopher? From Hegel's point of view both stop at an arbitrary point.

Kant's conception of philosophy as the justification of those conceptual structures which enable us to know seems to lead "necessarily" to Hegel's view.<sup>113</sup> By attempting to give a justification of common sense and experiential knowledge, by attempting to justify Newtonian science and to limit the pretensions of speculative thought, Kant created new avenues for speculation and led, as Hölderlin saw it, the German nation "from the Egyptian debility into the free and solitary wilderness of speculation". Thus, if Kant's exoteric philosophy worked into the hands of common sense, his esoteric philosophy, which was conceived as the justification of common sense, actually worked to eliminate it as a philosophical concern.<sup>114</sup>

Even the general outlook of the philosophical speculations by Hegel

and others can be traced back to the fundamental characteristics of Kant's criticism. "Transcendental idealism" seems to be the legitimate forebear of Hegel's "absolute idealism". Thus Hegel's idealism may be considered to be just as much a "radicalisation" of Kant's criticism as his "revel" of speculation. Whatever the differences between the "subjective idealism" the popular philosophers feared and hated so much and Hegel's "absolute idealism" may be -- it would certainly be philosophically naive to identify those two in any simple way -- Hegel's thought is just as much the outcome of German enlightenment as it is a reaction to it. There is some sort of continuity from popular philosophy through Kant to Hegel.<sup>115</sup> The Scottish influence plays a significant role here, a role that should not be under-estimated. For it was the Scottish inspired criticism of Kant's philosophy as a form of "higher idealism" that dominated its reception and further discussion. Though disagreeing on most other issues, many German philosophers agreed that Kant's thought was idealism of the form analysed by Reid and his followers: Feder and Meiners in Göttingen (with pupils teaching at many German universities), Mendelssohn and Eberhard in Berlin (who commanded the highest respect among the educated public in Germany), Hamann, Herder and Jacobi (who could exert the greatest influence in literary circles), and Gottlob Ernst (Aenesidemus) Schulze (one of the brightest and most influential philosophers of the generation between Kant and Hegel, all regarded Kant an idealist. They attacked Kantianism with weapons developed by the Scottish common sense philosophers in their fight against Hume's scepticism, and they applied these weapons effectively. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel did not accept very much from these critics of Kant. But they

accepted the verdict that Kant was an idealist and an inconsistent one at that. Accordingly they set out to make idealism consistent in order that the criticisms of Feder, Meiners, Mendelssohn, Eberhard, Hamann, Jacobi -- and thus ultimately that of Thomas Reid -- would no longer apply. In this process common sense became discredited not only as a philosophical tool but also as a legitimate critical faculty of the German bourgeoisie.<sup>116</sup> Never again were the works of Thomas Reid and James Beattie published in German. The "Schottische Schule" ceased to be a living force in German philosophy and gradually came to be considered as a philosophical oddity of no great consequence.<sup>117</sup> Moreover, even Reid's successors in Scotland began to find the "German answers" more appealing than those of their forebears, as Hamilton's works amply testify. So it came about that "until a few years ago, the works of Thomas Reid were known only by specialists in the history of philosophy, and in so far as people did think at all about Reid and his school of common sense philosophy, it was generally thought that Kant had been right in dismissing them as naive thinkers . . . ." <sup>118</sup>

## NOTES : CHAPTER X

1. This is argued with special reference to Herder by Charles Taylor, Hegel, pp. 1-50.
2. It is perhaps something of an "irony of history" that Hamann and his followers relied on exactly the same authors as the enlightenment philosophers. Hamann fought the enlightenment with the same tools that the enlighteners used to fortify their position. Hamann knew Shaftesbury (he translated the entire essay on the sensus communis, the very essay, that is, that Mendelssohn liked best and also attempted to translate), Hutcheson, Lord Kames and David Hume. See Johann Georg Hamann, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Nadler, IV, pp. 155-91, 133-53, 474-5; V, p. 77. See also Johann Georg Hamann, Schriften, 8 vols., ed. Friedrich Roth and Gustav Adolph Wiener, Berlin & Leipzig, 1821-1843, III, p. 198, et passim.
3. This becomes especially clear when we consider Hamann's relationship to Moses Mendelssohn, which is rather strange. On the one hand, Hamann was anti-semitic and found Mendelssohn's rational religion most distasteful, but on the other hand he calls Mendelssohn a friend. On the one hand he raves against Mendelssohn in his letters, but on the other hand he seems to respect him. When Moses Mendelssohn came to Königsberg in 1777, he and Hamann had long discussions; and when Mendelssohn died, Hamann was genuinely moved and claimed that he never wanted to hurt "his friend". But he clearly encouraged Jacobi in his fight against Mendelssohn and even tried to enlist Kant to Jacobi's cause. Hamann's last major

- published work, Golgotha und Scheblimini, is an attack upon Mendelssohn. This inspite of the fact that Mendelssohn's reviews of Hamann's early works in the Literaturbriefe introduced Hamann to the public and made his name well known throughout Germany.
4. This becomes especially evident in the Metakritik, a work which Hamann did not publish, because of his respect for his "benefactor" Kant.
  5. Lichtenberg's late aphorisms on the nature of language bear a striking resemblance to the theories advanced by Hamann.
  6. For a discussion of Hamann's style and its significance, see James C. O'Flaherty, Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, A Translation and Commentary, Baltimore, 1967, pp. 61-124; W.M. Alexander, Johann Georg Hamann, Philosophy and Faith, The Hague, 1966, pp. 51-61; Sven Aage Jørgensen, "Zu Hamanns Stil", Germanisch-Romanische Monatshefte, N.F., XVI (1966), Heft 4; and Johann Georg Hamann, Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten/Aesthetica in nuce, ed. Sven Aage Jørgensen, Stuttgart, 1968, p. 175.
  7. Hamann calls this aspect of his writing "meta-grabolisieren". This has been translated into English as "meta-obscuring". For a short but "gehaltvoll" summary of Hamann's thought in English, see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 374-82.
  8. See footnote 2 above.
  9. See Philip Merlan, "From Hume to Hamann", The Personalist, 32 (1951) pp. 11-18; Philip Merlan, "Hamann et les Dialogues de Hume", Revue de Metaphysique, 59 (1954), pp. 285-9; Philip Merlan, "Kant Hamann-Jacobi and Schelling on Hume", Rivista critica di storia

della filosofia, 22 (1967), pp. 481-94, and Charles W. Swain, "Hamann and the Philosophy of David Hume", Journal of the History of Philosophy, 5 (1967), pp. 343-51.

10. That Hume was one of the contributors to Hamann's "doctrine of faith" is quite clear. But it is not at all clear whether Hamann felt he "followed" Hume. In the relevant passage of the Socratic Memorabilia Hamann quite clearly objects to Hume. (See Socratic Memorabilia, transl. O'Flaherty, pp. 167-9). Hamann objects mainly to Hume's attempt to prove our ignorance. In other places Hamann wishes "if Hume were only sincere, consistent with himself" (see Hamann's letter to Kant of July 27, 1759, Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, ed. Arnulf Zweig, p. 42; see also p. 41 and 20. Hume "falls into the sword of his own truth" (Letter to Lindner, July 3, 1759). "The last fruit of all philosophy consists in the awareness of human ignorance and weakness" . . . This is at the same time the corner-stone and pre-grindstone which crushes all his [Hume's] sophistries (Hamann, Werke, ed. Roth, Vol. 1, p. 405). Merlan, accordingly, has to admit that "at first blush" Hamann's text "may be misleading. The reference reads as if Hamann quoted Hume only to contradict him" (Merlan, "From Hume to Hamann", p. 13, p. 14). In order to make good the claim that Hamann is positively influenced by Hume Merlan finds it necessary to "restate some points of this doctrine of belief in Hume sufficiently adapted to and simplified for [his] purposes", and to rely upon later pronouncements of Hamann (ibid.). "If we remember what Hamann said in his letter to Jacobi", it becomes clear that Hamann only seems

to contradict Hume but is really "convinced that his is a completely legitimate extension of Hume's fideism" (Ibid.). But, if we look at the context of the famous passage in which Hamann says that he was "full of Hume", when he was writing his Socratic Memorabilia and that the passage discussed by Merlan has reference to Hume, -- if we look at the context of this passage, we will see that it does not support Merlan's claim that Hamann felt he was following Hume. The passage in its entirety reads: "Which Jew and philosopher can imagine that on p. 162 Hume's belief is in question. Is revelation of nature so nearly related to Hume that one can chance upon it all by oneself? And the transition to the religion of Christians through a kind of conjunction which needs excuse, and, I am tempted to say, a plea for forgiveness on your side, -- is this not a horrible soup?

I was full of Hume, when I was writing the Socratic Memorabilia and to this p. 49 of my booklet refers. Our own existence and the existence of all things outside us must be believed and cannot be proved in any other way. Do you know Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I, of the understanding, Vol. II, of the passions, and Vol. III, of morals, which appeared in 1739, his first work? Crispus is always thankful to me, whenever he thinks of it, that he became first acquainted with the book through myself. Here Hume appears in such raw nature, with its weakness and strength. Crispus can really boast to know Hume almost by heart. I have nothing but a ghost in my head and I have some excerpts, but I can neither read nor understand them. Spinoza is your main

key, and his glasses are perhaps ground for your eyes. But they are of impure and tinted glass. How can you accuse Mendelssohn on p. 23 of having burdened you with a Christian conviction that was neither Christian nor yours, and (say) 'this without the slightest cause'? To be born into faith, is that Humean or philosophical or . . .? Now you oppose Mendelssohn not with Christian, but even with Jewish authorities of a Hume and a Spinoza. You want to deny yourself what you are accused of, and you defend yourself in a dialect in which you are fluent. But no reader will be able to hold on to it, because it is as slippery as an eel" (Johann Georg Hamann's der Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 6 vols., ed. C.H. Gildemeister, Gotha, 1867-1873, Vol. V, p. 506).

Hamann makes clear in letters from the same period that he can neither remember what Hume has written nor what many of the passages in his own earlier works mean: He criticises Jacobi for misrepresenting Hume, but qualifies his criticisms because, as he says, "if I had to die, I cannot remember" and excuses himself by drawing attention to the fact that he had studied Hume "even before he wrote the Socratic Memorabilia, and this is the source to which I am indebted for my doctrine of faith" (ibid., pp. 492-3); he finds with regard to his own works: "I do not understand myself and do not know how this is possible -- these dunghoops" (ibid., p. 495, see also p. 47, p. 40, p. 338, and Briefwechsel V, p. 358 for very similar comments). Important is also the quotation given in footnote 36 below.

Thus Hamann nowhere "insists" that he "borrowed" anything



from Hume, as Swain claims, nor does he say that he is "accepting rather than rejecting Hume" and "drawing correct conclusions from Hume's doctrine of belief", as Merlan would have us believe.

Hamann only says that he is "indebted" to Hume and that he has some rather hazy recollections of Hume and the connection of his study of Hume with the Socratic Memorabilia. All this hardly allows us to re-interpret the text of the Socratic Memorabilia in such a way that it appears to say exactly the opposite of what it actually does say. I do not want to deny that Hume's doctrine of belief influenced Hamann greatly, just as I do not want to deny that Hume's doctrine of belief influenced Reid greatly. But to transform Hamann into a faithful follower of Hume, interested in making correct deductive inferences from Hume's theory, is even more absurd than claiming that James Beattie, who also shares important parts of his doctrine of belief with Hume, is "accepting rather than rejecting Hume".

11. See Chapter IV, p. 114 and footnote 46 above.
12. See footnote 27 of this chapter.
13. See the letters of Hamann to Jacobi of January 13, 1786, Briefwechsel 6, p. 230 (Werke, ed. Gildemeister, 5, p. 230); June 8, 1786, Briefwechsel 6, p. 421 (Werke, ed. Gildemeister, 5, p. 348); April 27, 1787, Werke, ed. Gildemeister, 5, p. 508; June 10, 1787, ibid., p. 552; and Hamann to Herder, July 2, 1787, Hamann, Schriften, ed. Roth, Vol. 7, p. 360. Compare also Chapter IV, pp. 184ff. above.

How important Reid's Essays appeared to Hamann can be seen

not only from the way in which the work "excited all [his] attention", when he first heard of it, but also from his repeated requests to Jacobi. His interest was sustained for the period of almost a year and a half.

14. See the correspondence between Hamann and Herder, Briefwechsel, III, p. 74, p. 75, pp. 75-6, p. 92. See also Briefwechsel, 4, pp. 316-7. Compare with Chapter IV, pp. 158f. and footnotes 63-5 of that chapter above.
15. Charles Taylor, Hegel, p. 19. Taylor's entire account is relevant in this context.
16. Johann Gottfried Herder, Essay on the Origin of Language, transl. Alexander Gode, in On the Origin of Language: Rousseau and Herder, transl. Moran and Gode, New York, 1966, p. 115.
17. Ibid., pp. 103-15.
18. Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, Vol. III, p. 38.
19. Ibid., p. 39. This is roughly also Hume's point of view.
20. Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 210, pp. 234-5. (Works, 1, pp. 184, 194-5).
21. Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, Vol. III, p. 41.
22. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
23. Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 238, see also p. 55 (Works, 1, pp. 196, 197f.) and Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, Vol. III, p. 21. Compare also ibid., p. 31: "If thus man, according to the universal testimony and example of all nations and continents, is not capable of learning to walk without the help of the social influence of his keepers and parents . . . how can anybody have

the idea to regard language . . . as an independent invention of human art and wisdom?" Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 241 (Works, 1, p. 197): "It is the intention of nature that we should be carried in arms before we are able to walk on two legs, that our belief should be guided by the authority and reason of others before it can be our own reason . . ."

24. Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, Vol. III, pp. 39-40.
25. Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 199 (Works, 1, pp. 181-2).
26. Compare Chapter IV, pp. 158ff. above.
27. Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, Vol. III, pp. 39-40.
28. This similarity extends even to the details of Hamann and Reid's accounts. See, for instance, their great agreement on the "expressive nature" of natural language. Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 57 (Works, 1, pp. 118-9): "Abolish the use of articulate sounds and writing, and every man would be a painter, an actor and an orator". Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, Vol. II, p. 197: "Poetry is the mother tongue of mankind, as gardening is older than farming, painting than writing, singing than declamation, similes than demonstration, and bartering than trade".
29. O'Flaherty, for instance, argues that "the source of all that is most positive in his [Hamann's] thinking is to be found in his philosophy of language" (Unity and Language, p. 1).
30. Hamann to Jacobi, December 1, 1784, Briefwechsel, 5, p. 272 (Werke, ed. Gildemeister, 5, pp. 21-2).
31. Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, Vol. III, p. 40.
32. Ibid., p. 284. Similar pronouncements can be found all through

Hamann's work. Thus he draws attention to the fact that philosophers "deceive and are deceived" by the "confusion of language" (*ibid.*, p. 31). "Without word, no creation -- nor world; here is the source of creation and government. What is sought in eastern cisterns lies in the sensu communi of linguistic usage, and this key transforms our best and most desolate philosophers into senseless mystics, and the most simple Galileans and fishermen into the most profound searchers and harbingers of God's wisdom" (Hamann, Briefwechsel, 5, p. 272; Hamann, Werke, ed. Gildemeister, Vol. 5, pp. 21-2). But "all languages in general are based upon one language, namely nature, whose master and creator is a spirit which is everywhere and nowhere . . ." -- "What God has joined together, no philosophy can separate, just as philosophy cannot join what God has separated. Adultery and sodomy are sins against nature and reason. They are the elements of the original sin of philosophy and the dead works of darkness, done with the organs of our internal and external life, of our physical being (= nature) and of our metaphysical being (=reason)" (Hamann, Briefwechsel, 5, p. 95; Hamann, Werke, ed. Gildemeister, Vol. 5, p. 7).

33. Swain, "Hamann and the Philosophy of David Hume", p. 345, and Erwin Metzke, J.G. Hamann's Stellung in der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts (Eine Preisarbeit), Halle, 1934, p. 72.
34. Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 268 (Reid, Works, 1, p. 209.)
35. Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, p. 190.
36. "I do not understand what Hume means by belief, nor what we both

understand by it, and the more we would talk or write about it, the less we would be able to catch this quicksilver" (Hamann to Jacobi, April 30, 1787, Hamann, Werke, ed. Gildemeister, Vol. 5, p. 517). This remark shows why Hamann could put forward a doctrine of faith only in a very limited sense. It also raises further questions about Marlan's account.

37. Hamann to Jacobi, May 24, 1787, Hamann, Werke, ed. Gildemeister, Vol. 5, p. 668. See also ibid., p. 505: "Knowledge from faith is essentially identical with the nil in intellectu". In this context Hamann offers arguments very similar to Reid. Reid had argued that "it is with the operations of the mind . . . as with bodies . . . nature does not exhibit these elements [apprehension and belief] separate to be compounded by us; she exhibits them mixed and compounded . . ." (Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 27. Works, 1, pp. 106-7.) Hamann argues against Jacobi's sharp distinction between reason and sensation that "compounded beings are not capable of a simple cognition. Sensation can in human beings just as little be separated from reason, as reason can be separated from sensibility" (Hamann to Jacobi, April 27, 1787, Hamann, Werke, ed. Gildemeister, Vol. 5, p. 505.)
38. Erwin Metzke, Hamann's Stellung, p. 76 and 76n. See also Rudolf Unger, Hamann und die Aufklärung. Studien zur Vorgeschichte des romantischen Geistes im 18. Jahrhundert, Halle, 1925, p. 185; Unger finds that Hamann appreciated Reid "obviously as a counterweight to Hume's skepticism". This is too vague to be particularly helpful. Unger's earlier Hamanns Sprachtheorie im Zusammenhang

seines Denkens, München, 1905, which also refers to the Scots (p. 99n.), is just as general: "Mainly because of the opposition to Hume he values the philosopher Thomas Reid".

39. Hamann, Briefwechsel, 4, pp. 316-7.
40. Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, Vol. 3, p. 283.
41. Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 245 (Works, 1, p. 199). See also footnote 32 of this chapter. Hamann charges that the "sensu communi of linguistic usage" is the key that transforms philosophers into "senseless mystics". Reid says in the very context of the passage just quoted that "ideas, in the gradual declension of their vivacity, seem to imitate the inflection of verbs in grammar" and seems to think that this is one of the most mysterious "articles of the skeptical creed".
42. For a criticism of Jacobi's philosophical style see, for instance, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Theorie Werkausgabe, 2, pp. 333-93 ("Glauben und Wissen . . ."). Neither Goethe nor Herder thought very highly of Jacobi as a philosopher and author. But his actual importance in the philosophical situation created by the impact of Kant's philosophy is difficult to over-estimate. Jacobi had significant influence upon (Aenesidemus) Schulze's skepticism, for instance, as well as upon Hegel and many others. For Jacobi's thought in general see V. Verra, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, 1743-1819, Torino, 1967.
43. In many respects Jacobi was a greater Konsequenzenmacher than either Oswald or Beattie. Some of his attacks border on character assassination, and there is a certain continuity between his

approach and that of Lavater (who was a friend of his).

44. Hegel's so called "Jenaer Schriften" attest to this. I am not aware of any extended discussion of Jacobi's contribution in this regard. In any case, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel had to fight Jacobi, and his followers (who formed some sort of loose "coalition" with the remnants of popular philosophy and skepticism) just as much as Kant had to fight popular philosophy.
45. Günther Baum, Vernunft und Erkenntnis. Die Philosophie F.H. Jacobis, Bonn, 1969.
46. Though I have learned a great deal from Baum's work, I disagree with his general interpretation of Jacobi. Baum argues against the view that Jacobi is a precursor of modern Lebensphilosophie and existentialism. (This view was argued, convincingly I would say, by F.O. Bollnow, Die Lebensphilosophie F.H. Jacobis, Stuttgart 1933 (2nd unchanged ed. with a new Foreword, 1966) and Klaus Hammacher, Die Philosophie Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis, München, 1969). Baum argues that this view depends upon a "one-sided" interpretation of Jacobi's early works as an expression of Storm and Stress. With regard to these early works Baum argues for a fundamental influence of Francis Hutcheson. However, this influence is far from adding a "new side" to Jacobi's work, for it too can be explained by reference to Jacobi's Storm and Stress background. Reid's influence is also taken as evidence for the view that Jacobi was not concerned with developing irrationalism but was most concerned with the investigation of reason. However, Reid's influence does not support the desired

conclusion, for his views are just as much compatible with irrationalism as with rationalism.

Also, Baum's attempts to explain away the Neo-Platonistic influences of Hemsterhuis and others are rather lame. He argues that Hemsterhuis' influence was too late to have had any effect upon Jacobi, since it began only in 1772, and thus "at a time when Jacobi had already the most important influences upon his philosophical development behind him, namely the study of the writings of Bonnet, Berkeley, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Spinoza, the pre-critical Kant and probably also of the early work of Reid" (Baum, Vernunft, p. 147). But this is ludicrous in light of the fact that he has established a definitive Reidian influence on Jacobi only after 1786 and that he is unable to show when Jacobi read Berkeley. The fact is that Jacobi was a follower of Storm and Stress and that tendencies towards irrationalism assert themselves throughout his work. The British influence enabled him to check and modify these tendencies, but it cannot be used to explain these tendencies away. See also footnotes 85 and 86 below for further criticisms of Baum's views.

47. Hammacher, in a review of Baum's work, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 24 (1970), pp. 625-33, p. 626, admits that there are parallels between Jacobi and Reid and that there is an "extensive material agreement", but he objects to Baum's claim that there is a historical connection. Klaus Düsing, in another review of this work, Philosophische Rundschau, 18 (1971), pp. 105-16, p. 108, is somewhat more positive, but he also objects to



Baum for having "over-emphasised its importance". (See also the review of G. Höhn, in Kant-Studien, 62 (1971), pp. 113-20 and that of Reinhard Lauth, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 54 (1972), pp. 97-103 and Karl Homman, F.H. Jacobis Philosophie der Freiheit, München, 1972, pp. 251-3. To a certain extent the objections of Hammacher and Dusing are justified. Baum seriously distorts the Reid-Jacobi relation by arguing on its basis for something that is not supported by it. He tries to reduce Jacobi's thought to epistemology, and he assumes that there is no development from Jacobi's earliest philosophical novels to his latest work. But both moves seem mistaken. There appear in Jacobi's thought changes of a rather fundamental nature, and epistemology is only one aspect of his philosophy (perhaps not even the most important one for the understanding of his fundamental Weltanschauung). Reid had indeed the greatest influence upon Jacobi's epistemology. But this does not necessarily show that all other aspects of Jacobi's thought can be explained from Reid's influence.

48. For the role of Reid in Jacobi's correspondence with Hamann between 1786 and 1787 see footnotes 14 and 15 of this chapter and Chapter IV, pp. 184ff. and pp. 225ff. above. Jacobi's letters of this period are published only incompletely and fragmentarily. Those that are published make no reference to Reid. However, Jacobi must in one of his letters have told Hamann that he had bought Reid's Essays, for in one of his last letters from Königsberg Hamann tells Herder that Reid's Essays lie ready for him in

Jacobi's library in Pempelfort.

In the dialogue David Hume über den Glauben oder Idealismus und Realismus he refers only to the German review of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man in the Jena Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung. The passage is concerned with the validity of the use of "Glaube" in the context of sensation: "I: . . . There you find the word in the very same meaning; and in this meaning you will find it wherever one philosophises about this matter. Again, language has no other word. -- He: What, in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung? -- I: Here, read p. 182: He (Reid) differentiates conception from perception . . . for, according to this definition it is the representation of a thing connected with the belief (Glaube) in its external object. -- He: I have to laugh at the way in which you have right away an example from the very journal which has made you the most painful remonstrances" (Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Werke, 6 vols., ed. Friedrich Roth and Friedrich Köppen, Vol. 2, p. 147). Furthermore in a later edition of his early philosophical novel Woldemar he refers to Reid and hints at the importance of the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. He introduces a young man, named Carl Sidney, who is supposed to have studied philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. He is described as a follower of Ferguson, whose most important other teacher was Thomas Reid. Sidney values Reid so highly that Woldemar is astounded. In order to explain his high estimation of Reid, Sidney says: "I am certain that you will remember my judgment with approval at some

time in the future, namely when the long and deeply pondered last word of this thinker about the human understanding and the will, a masterwork, which he will perhaps hold back for a few years in order to bring it closer to perfection, will reach you" (Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, p. 170; the novel is written long before the appearance of Reid's Essays, and the added pieces have to account for this).

49. As an alert participant in the cultural and philosophical developments in Germany in the seventies and eighties of that century, he could hardly have avoided Reid and Beattie. His close acquaintance with the works of Hutcheson and Ferguson also makes such an acquaintance likely.
50. Feder, Leben, p. 213.
51. The review of the German translation of Oswald's Appeal closes as follows: "Moreover, it has already been shown to some extent in the reviews of James Brattie's (sic) Essay . . . and of Mr. Jacobi's Entdeckung . . . how shallow and unreliable this false philosophy of common sense is . . ." (Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, 28, i, (1776), p. 159).
52. In any case, from a philosophical point of view the works written after 1786 are Jacobi's most important ones. In them he attempts to supply an epistemological foundation for his views.
53. F.H. Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's auserlesener Briefwechsel; ed. Fr. Roth, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1825-1827, Vol. 2, p. 445.
54. Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Tagebuch der Reise nach dem Reich 1788", 14. Gesammelte Schriften, 15 vols., ed. Albert Leitzmann. Berlin,

- 1903-1918, Vol. 14, p. 58.
55. See footnote 48 of this chapter.
  56. Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, p. 54.
  57. See Theobald Süss, "Der Nihilismus bei F.H. Jacobi" in Der Nihilismus als Phänomen der Geistesgeschichte in der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion unseres Jahrhunderts, ed. Dieter Arendt, Darmstadt, 1974, pp. 65-78, p. 65.
  58. Baum, Vernunft, p. 43.
  59. Reid's account is to be found in his Inquiry, especially Chapter I, Sections 3-7 and Chapter VII; and Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay II. Beattie's very similar account is to be found in his Essay, Chapter II, Section I. Baum only mentions Reid in this context.
  60. Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 3, p. 372; see also p. 210 and Vol. 2, p. 19, 105, p. 216, as well as Baum, Vernunft, p. 35.
  61. Reid finds, very similarly, that there is "neither matter nor mind in the universe; nothing but impressions and ideas" (Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. Brody, p. 199, Reid, Works, I, p. 293.
  62. Baum, Vernunft, p. 35, claims that for Jacobi "nihilism is the result, the last aim of all thought". He refers to Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 3, pp. 371f. But Jacobi refers especially to Kant there; and Kant is seen by him as the epitome of Western thought. Werke, Vol. 2, pp. 71ff., 78ff., 105, 107; Vol. 3, pp. 20ff., 92, 101, 210, 392ff., 414, 417 also referred to by Baum, do not support Baum's view. All quotations show only that thought in isolation from

sensibility leads to nihilism for Jacobi. On p. 36 of his Vernunft Baum claims that nihilism "is a necessary development which follows from the structure of discursive thought itself", but he does not make any reference to Jacobi's work to substantiate his claim. It seems, therefore that Baum reads more into Jacobi's remarks than is to be found in them.

63. Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, pp. 11-2. Baum notes that Jacobi differs from Reid in letting the ideal system begin only with Aristotle and not with Plato (and criticises Jacobi as being less consistent than Reid in this regard), but Reid also makes an exception for Plato at times. See, for instance, Reid, Inquiry, ed. Duggan, p. 257.
64. Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, pp. 36ff., for instance.
65. Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 44.
66. Baum, Vernunft, pp. 44-5. Baum has discovered the term already in a handbook on medieval philosophy, edited by Johann Andreas Cramer, which appeared in 1786. Another writer who used "Nihilismus" before Jacobi already was J.H. Obereit. See Karl Homann, F.H. Jacobi's Philosophie der Freiheit, p. 152n (who also gives references to earlier literature on this problem).
67. Beattie, Essay, pp. 266-7 et passim. Even Reid speaks at times of "annihilation", though with much less emphasis.
68. Hamann suggests that Jacobi is "more successful in exclamations than in rational inferences" (Hamann to Jacobi, Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 4, Part 3, p. 384). Much in Jacobi's philosophical style reminds of Beattie. But Jacobi does not share Beattie's elegance and

- clarity, which made his Essay an "eighteenth century best-seller".
69. Jacobi to Jean Paul, March 16, 1800, Vol. 1, p. 239.
  70. Jacobi to Bouterwek, January 1, 1804, in Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis Briefe an Friedrich Bouterwek ed. W. Meyer, Göttingen, 1868, p. 64.  
Quoted after Baum, Vernunft, p. 70. Compare also with footnote 153 of Chapter IV above.
  71. See footnote 54 of this chapter. That Jacobi discussed philosophy with Wilhelm von Humboldt he himself testifies in a letter to Georg Forster of November 1788. See Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 3, pp. 513-4.
  72. See, for instance, Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 4, Part 1, pp. 210-1: "Dear Mendelssohn, we are all born into faith and have to remain within faith, as we are all born into society and have to remain within society. How can we strive for certainty, if certainty is not already known to us; and how can certainty be known to us in any other way than through something that we know already with certainty. This leads us to the concept of an immediate certainty, which does not need any proof, but really excludes all proof. It consists alone and only of the representation itself, which agrees with the represented thing (has thus its basis within itself)  
. . . If now every acceptance of truth, which does not originate from reasons, is faith, then the conviction on the basis of reasons must itself come from faith and derive its power from it.

Through faith we know that we have a body, that there are other bodies and other thinking beings. A truly wonderful revelation! For we feel indeed how our body is modified in this or

that way, and while we feel it being modified we become aware not only of its changes, but also of something completely different, neither sensation nor thought, namely other real objects; and we do so with the same certainty with which we become aware of ourselves. For without a Thou an I is impossible.

In this way, therefore, we have a revelation of nature.

This revelation does not only us, but it forces all and every human being to believe and to accept eternal truths through faith". This account bears the greatest resemblance to that given by Hamann and the Scots.

73. Jacobi's relationship to Hume is almost the same as Hamann's. He does not "follow" Hume, though this has been repeatedly asserted. Even Baum thinks so. See Baum, Vernunft, pp. 19-20 (he gives the relevant older literature on this topic). Merlan's "Kant, Hamann-Jacobi and Schelling on Hume" comes to similar conclusions. But Merlan's paper has the merit of placing greater emphasis on Jacobi's dependence upon Hamann, to which Baum does not pay enough attention. This relationship of Jacobi to Hamann and Reid as well as many of his own pronouncements make quite clear that Jacobi does not simply expound Hume's doctrine.
74. Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, pp. 152-3, 156-63; the quotations are given both in English and German.
75. This is a merely tactical move, and a questionable one at that. Hamann more or less accused Jacobi of dishonesty in this regard. To Jacobi's claim that Mendelssohn has "burdened" him without reason with "Christian convictions" which were neither Christian

nor his (Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, p. 144), Hamann objects: "How can you accuse Mendelssohn on p. 23 of having burdened you with a Christian conviction that was neither Christian nor yours, and this without the slightest cause? To be born into faith, is that Humean or philosophical or . . .?" (Hamann, Werke, ed. Gildemeister, Vol. 5, p. 506). And in the same context he criticises Jacobi for confusing the issue ("is revelation of nature so closely related to Hume that one can chance upon it all by oneself?") In a closely related context Hamann calls Jacobi a "liar" outright. See also Renate Knoll's excellent discussion of this letter in Johann Georg Hamann und Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Heidelberg, 1963, pp. 43-56.

By the way, this letter of Hamann to Jacobi of April 27, 1787 is also reprinted in Jacobi's Werke, Vol. 4, Part 3, pp. 346-52. While the references to Hume and Spinoza are mostly retained, the passage in which Hamann refers to Reid is deleted without any acknowledgment" "Are these not assertions of a human authority, when you are more concerned about Hume, Reid and Spinoza than about the matter itself, and when you justify and extenuate your justification by means of their doctrines, and . . .? If you were born into faith, such late, maggoty and suspect authorities could not be to the point. The Christian faith would always be preferred to all philosophical . . . But the Christian faith is again only a mere back-door for withdrawal, a pallium for the naked truth" (Hamann, Werke, ed. Gildemeister,



Vol. 5, p. 505). Why has this passage not been retained? Why have Hamann's references to Reid in his letters to Jacobi been eliminated? The letter of January 13, 1786 is not printed in Jacobi's works at all. The letters of June 8, 1786 and April 27, 1787 are edited in such a way that the references of Reid do not appear. Only the letter of June 10, 1787 contains a reference to Reid. Jacobi supervised a substantial part of this edition of his letters. As Roth says in the Preface, he "would not have dared to publish certain passages . . . without Jacobi's expressed content" (Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 4, Part 3, p. v). Roth professes to have followed the criterion of including "only what concerns Jacobi and his works" (Ibid., p. iv). Does not Hamann's judgment that Jacobi is "more concerned about Hume, Reid and Spinoza than about the matter itself" and that he wanted to "justify and extenuate" his justification by means of the doctrines of Hume, Reid and Spinoza, -- does not this judgment concern Jacobi's work?

76. Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, pp. 149-50. Jacobi (the I in the dialogue) says ironically that he has to offer something better than mere arguments, namely an authority. This authority is Hume. He draws attention to the similarity of his approach to that of Descartes, who dedicated his work to the Sorbonne, because it was an authority and because truth itself counted for so little. "That the Sorbonne was for Descartes no authority does not need any reminder". Does it need a reminder that Hume was no authority for Jacobi?
77. Ibid., pp. 164-5. The very appeal to ordinary language reminds one of Reid.

78. Ibid., pp. 165-6.
79. Ibid., p. 167. This is especially interesting because immediacy of belief or faith was not in question in Jacobi's letters to Mendelssohn. It is something new. Jacobi probably realised the importance of this immediacy only through his more careful reading of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers or Inquiry.
80. Ibid., p. 168.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., p. 173.
83. Ibid., p. 175.
84. Ibid., p. 19, p. 59, p. 107, p. 178, pp. 142ff.
85. Baum, Vernunft, p. 74, p. 92. But Baum appears to be somewhat frightened by the magnitude of Jacobi's dependence upon Reid. For, if Jacobi's thought is reduced to epistemology, there remains little that is original in Jacobi's position. Jacobi's epistemology is not much more than a representation and application of Reid's realism. Thus Baum argues with regard to Jacobi's doctrine of faith that "David Hume always has to be regarded as the great historical original (Vorbild) for the conception of belief in Jacobi's doctrine" (ibid., pp. 19-20); and with regard to "the basic systematic outlook of Jacobi's theory of knowledge", Baum goes as far as to say that it "is completely determined by the philosophy of Berkeley" (ibid., p. 13). But how can these three claims be all true together? How can Reid be the "main source for Jacobi's theory of knowledge", while "the basic systematic outlook of Jacobi's theory of knowledge is completely

determined by the philosophy of Berkeley" and the doctrine of faith is taken over from Hume? By trying to argue for a direct influence of Berkeley, Hume and Reid upon Jacobi, Baum weakens his argument considerably. It is Reid who is most important for Jacobi. He has influenced Jacobi directly and mediated the doctrines of Berkeley and Hume. Not only are all the elements which Baum wants to trace to either Hume or Berkeley also to be found in Reid's work, they are also to be found in Reid's works in exactly the same combination and with the same modifications as they are found in Jacobi's works.

Baum is rather unfair to Reid also in other respects. Thus he describes Reid as a "sensationalist" and as a "naive realist" at the very same time (ibid., p. 40, p. 93, and the entire Chapter II). But Reid's position involves a radical critique of sensationalism and is importantly anti-sensationalist (see Chapter II above); and if "the complete passivity of our organs of cognition (sic)" (Baum, Vernunft, p. 123) is the essential characteristic of naive realism, Reid certainly is no naive realist. For he insists against sensationalism that even in sensation the soul is partially active and partially passive. Jacobi's philosophy certainly does not constitute an advance over Reid's realism, as Baum wants to show on p. 106 of his Vernunft.

86. Jacobi agrees with Reid that rationalism just as sensationalism involves a theory of ideas and thus leads to skepticism and idealism (Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, p. 29). In the same way as Thomas Reid, Jacobi calls the idealism of Descartes, Malebranche

and Berkeley an "imperfect and half idealism" and contrasts this half idealism with the higher idealism of Hume, who does not only deny the material world but also the self. Jacobi also takes over Reid's "natural belief" (Naturglaube) and uses it in the same way as Reid.

87. See Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, pp. 230ff., for instance.
88. Ibid., pp. 299-304. The presupposition Jacobi is talking about is thus first and foremost sensibility and its laws (i.e. common sense) and not primarily the thing in itself. The latter is relevant as a consequence of course, but it is not the presupposition. Our belief in the existence of such a thing in itself is only one among several principles of (common) sense. It should perhaps be pointed out that this interpretation of Jacobi's criticism of Kant differs considerably from the one usually given. It shows how important Reid's principles were for Jacobi's criticism of Kant.
89. Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, pp. 303-4. Compare this also with Feder's view as presented, pp. 253ff. above. Feder also emphasises sensation.
90. See especially the chapter on Tetens, (VIII), pp. 346ff. above.
91. Jacobi, Werke, Vol. 2, p. 308.
92. Ibid., p. 309.
93. Seebohm, "Der systematische Ort", p. 61.
94. Hamann, Werke, ed. Nadler, Vol. III, p. 286 (Metakritik).
95. See Chapter I, p. 2, Chapter II, p. 64, Chapter IV, pp. 155-6, Hegel Werke (Theorie Werkausgabe), Vol. 20, pp. 281-6. The very beginning on the section of the Scots is already interesting: (Referring to

the end of the section on Hume, which reads "Hume abolished (aufheben) the objectivity, the Anundfürsichsein of the determinations of thought", Hegel says) "Among the Scots, however, something else came forth. The opponents of Hume are at first Scottish philosophers. Another opponent we have to see in Kant in the contexts of German philosophy. . . . What is opposed to Hume is the inner independent source of truth for religious and moral matters. This coincides with Kant, he opposes an internal source of truth to external perception. But the internal source has a quite different form in Kant than it has in the Scots. This internal, independent source is not thought or reason as such. The content which derives from this internal source is concrete, and it also requires external material, experience. Those are concrete, popular principles, which are opposed both to the externality of the source of knowledge and to metaphysics as such . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 281-2). Somewhat later Hegel adds regarding Reid, Oswald and Beattie: "In these Scottish philosophers a third turn has happened, namely that they also attempted to indicate the principle of knowledge in a certain fashion. On the whole they aim at the same principle as the Germans. Especially a great number of Scottish philosophers have often made exquisite (feine) observations in the course of this investigation". (*ibid.*, p. 283; underlinings have been supplied).

96. For Hegel's education see especially Rudolf Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit, Berlin, 1857 and H.S. Harris, Hegel's Development; Toward the Sunlight, 1770-1801, Oxford, 1972. It is perhaps interesting to note that the period of Hegel's life covered by Harris' book is

almost the same period as the one covered in this discussion. But when Scottish common sense was at the highest point of its influence, Hegel was not yet ten years old. Hegel's excerpts and notebooks show that he knew Feder, Meiners, Eberhard, Garve, Mendelssohn and many other philosophers of this period rather well. It has been argued that early in his life, during the dispute between Mendelssohn and Jacobi, Hegel was on the side of Mendelssohn. Later he clearly appreciated Jacobi more. See especially, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Theorie Werkausgabe, Vol. 20, pp. 315-29, especially pp. 316-7. See also Vol. 2, pp. 333-93.

97. Harris, Hegel's Development, p. 87.

98. Hegel, Theorie Werkausgabe, Vol. 2, pp. 31-2 (Differenzschrift).

The section in which these quotations occurs is called "Verhältnis der Spekulation zum gesunden Menschenverstand". See also the section "Bedürfnis der Speculation" (ibid., pp. 20-5). Similar pronouncements on the relation of common sense and speculation can be found all through the Jenaer Schriften. See Theorie Werkausgabe, Vol. 2, pp. 159-60, 181-2, 188-207, 219-20, 240-1, 279, for instance.

99. Ibid., p. 31.

100. Ibid., pp. 20f. So far Hegel is not all that different from Kant.

101. Ibid., p. 182.

102. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. I, Thinking, ed. Mary McCarthy, London & New York, 1977, p. 89. The chapter in which this quotation occurs is entitled "The Intramural Warfare Between

Thought and Common Sense. I obviously agree with Hannah Arendt on the relation of common sense and philosophy in Hegel's work.

But see also Charles Taylor, Hegel, p. 127.

103. Hegel, Theorie Werkausgabe, Vol. 3 (Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 65.
104. Ibid., p. 46.
105. Hegel, Theorie Werkausgabe, Vol. 5 (Wissenschaft der Logik, I), pp. 13-14.
106. This phrase occurs ibid., p. 14.
107. This is argued very convincingly by Jürgen Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse, Frankfurt/Main, 1973, pp. 14-35. Relevant in this context is also Charles Taylor's "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology" and Richard J. Bernstein, "Why Hegel Now?", The Review of Metaphysics, 31 (1977), pp. 29-60, especially pp. 38-43.
108. Beck, "Toward a Meta-Critique of Pure Reason", pp. 30ff.
109. Ibid., p. 30.
110. Ibid.
111. Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse, p. 29.
112. This becomes especially clear in the Phenomenology. See pp. 473-4 above.
113. This has to be taken cum grano salis, of course. But, if we consider the history of the German enlightenment, using the conception of common sense as the "Leitfaden", the continuity between the thought of such different people as Feder, Hamann, Kant and Hegel becomes quite clear.
114. To abuse a much abused conception of Hegel even more, it might be said that Kant wanted the Aufhebung of common sense mainly in the

sense of "conservation", but that he accomplished its Aufhebung in the sense of "obliterating" it. See also Chapter IX, footnote 87 above.

115. Compare this with Taylor, Hegel, Chapter I, "Aims of a New Epoch".  
I do not think that the shift German culture was taking from "Sturm und Drang" was as "decisive" as it is represented there. Hamann and Herder, however much they argue against certain tendencies of the enlightenment, are still very much part of it.
116. This only in passing; but this consequence is perhaps more important than what happened in the narrow circle of the philosophers. To document and discuss this claim would, however, require another book.
117. This can already be observed in the earliest historical accounts of 18th-century German philosophy, as for instance in those of Buhle and von Eberstein. Most 19th-century historians mention the Scottish influence only with regard to Jacobi.
118. Brody, "Reid and Hamilton on Perception", p. 423.



## CHAPTER XI

### CONCLUSION

If one thing has become clear in the preceding discussion of the Scottish influence in Germany, it is that Scottish common sense philosophy had a much greater impact upon German philosophy than has been previously thought. Whatever may be objected to some of the more specific claims advanced in the preceding chapters, it is now apparent that Scottish common sense philosophy was certainly not any less influential in Germany than in France, Belgium or Italy and that it played an important role in the development of German thought from after Leibniz and Wolff through Kantian criticism and beyond. This is sufficiently testified to by the sheer mass of references to "Reid, Oswald and Beattie", as the enemies of idealism and skepticism. Everyone seemed to know the Scots to some extent, and as a result it became the philosophical fashion of the 1770's and 80's to oppose "empty philosophical speculation" by "sound common sense". The Scots, though they did not bring this fashion about all by themselves, certainly contributed greatly to it.<sup>1</sup>

It might be said that philosophical fashions can fade away without leaving any significant trace on the important philosophical developments of their time. But Scottish common sense was not just a passing "fad" without consequence. The discussion of the Scottish influence upon Feder, Lossius, Eberhard-Mendelssohn, Tetens, Kant and Hamann-Jacobi has shown that the Scots had a significant role in altering philosophical conditions, in preventing philosophical stagnation, and that their works gave German thought impulses which were just as important as those of Hume's supposed skepticism. The Germans not only used Scottish common sense to oppose Hume, but also to supplement, expand and safeguard the more positive aspects of Hume's thought.

Hume had already used common sense as a sort of safeguard in his Enquiries. The German indifferentists and skeptics in Göttingen and other parts of Germany realised that the enemies of Hume were not as different from Hume as might be thought, and that the insistence upon first principles as principles of common sense was not altogether incompatible with Hume's theory.<sup>2</sup> They also realised that the usage Hume and his predecessors made of "idea" was full of dangerous pitfalls for the philosopher, and that it too had to be modified. The German "theory of representations", which had its roots in Wolffian school philosophy, was significantly altered because of the Scottish critique of the ideal theory. This was especially visible in the thought of Tetens. Scottish common sense also showed to the Germans the connections between the thought of Descartes, Malebranche, Berkeley and Hume and made clear to them that their own problems were not radically different from those found in these other philosophers, especially those of the British

tradition of philosophical empiricism. All in all, the Scots were very important mediators between German thought and British sensationalism, especially as represented in Hume.

Further, Scottish common sense became important for the Germans not only as the "vehicle" for the "transmission of Humean ideas" (though it was also important in that regard, as has been shown already). Especially the Scottish insistence upon the importance of a priori principles as principles of common sense was greatly appreciated by the Germans. This showed not only how Hume's skepticism could be "checked" and "refined", but could also be of great help in the establishment of an empirical rationalism, since it gave an example of principles which were a priori, as are the principles of Leibniz, without being merely logical and empty at the same time. The Germans recognised that the Scottish theory of common sense allowed them to connect the Leibnizian emphasis upon the a priori with the Lockean and Humean physiology of the human understanding. Reid showed to them that there need not only be nothing confused about perception, but also that our perceptions do not consist of simple and unstructured mental tokens which are referred by thought to external objects. In this way he showed a way to improve phenomenalism as well. Reid also made it clear to them that the principles which govern our judgments about the world must in some sense already govern our perception of objects, that judgments must precede "simple apprehension". Accordingly, Scottish common sense proved very helpful to the Germans in their development of a unified account of rational thought and sensation.

But this does not exhaust the Scottish influence. There were

basically four groups which were influenced by the Scots. First of all, there were the Göttingers and their followers (including such philosophers as Lossius and Tiedemann). These were basically sensationalists with a strong inclination to materialism. They praised the Scots (usually) most highly, and many of them were clearly identified as followers of Scottish common sense. In a certain respect this identification was rather unfortunate, for the sensationalistic and materialistic tendencies of their thought made them singularly incapable of appreciating the more subtle aspects of Thomas Reid's thought. Secondly, there were the Berlin philosophers (Eberhard, Mendelssohn, Resewitz). These were of a more rationalistic bent of mind. Though they often argued against Scottish common sense, they were also far from being uninfluenced by it, as especially the thought of Moses Mendelssohn shows. But neither can these thinkers be said to have had for Thomas Reid's theory the appreciation it deserved. Because of their rationalistic background they seem to have neglected Reid's analysis of perception and the foundation of the principles of common sense in this analysis. They reduced the principles of common sense to the principles of (Wolffian) pure reason and thus emptied them of exactly that content that made them most interesting.

The third group is constituted by a number of independent thinkers who were not clearly aligned with either of the two former schools of thought, and the group presents an even less unified outlook than did these. Such different thinkers as Garve, Platner, Tetens, perhaps even Kant during the seventies, may be classified here. They could appreciate Scottish common sense and especially Reid's analysis of perception to a much greater extent than either the sensationalists or the stricter rationalists. Accordingly they learned a great deal from the Scots.

But they strove to be even more thorough than the Scots and were determined to push the analysis further. It is here that the Scottish suggestions found the most fertile soil. The fourth and final group is that of the so-called philosophers of faith, Hamann, Herder and Jacobi. They were opposed to almost everything the enlightenment stood for, and they found the works of the Scots extremely helpful in this anti-enlightenment fight. Though Hamann, Herder and Jacobi thought more highly of the Scottish philosophy of common sense than any of the others, they were not really capable of putting the Scottish theory to any better use than as a weapon against one-sided rationalism and faculty-psychology. While they were highly influential, they hardly developed the Scottish theory further.<sup>3</sup>

In a certain sense, then, it might be said that Reid's most valuable suggestions were lost or misconstrued -- and in a fashion often painful to observe. German philosophers went on to philosophise in very much the same way as they had done before. Many of their changes in terminology and method turned out to be half-hearted. They finally rejected both Reid's critique of phenomenalism and his critique of philosophy as justification, and what makes this rejection so painful is not the rejection itself but the way in which it took place.

Neither Feder, nor Eberhard, nor Tetens, nor Kant (nor indeed any Kantian) offered any arguments for the rejection of phenomenalism. They simply did not seem to feel the force of Reid's objections against mediating mental entities, and they simply re-asserted the validity of the principle of ideal philosophy that "all external objects are only judged in accordance with their representation within us". Feder found that

this principle "could very well be correct, even though we can easily go wrong in its interpretation and employment". Tetens claimed that it was "certainly innocent" of causing idealism and skepticism and that Reid should not have rejected it "in accordance with his usual insight". Kant baldly stated that it could be "assumed and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things". But these assertions in themselves do not constitute satisfactory arguments against Reid's criticisms, as Hamann, Jacobi and Schulze Aenesidemus were later to point out.<sup>4</sup> The fact remains that the theory of ideas or representations was never specifically argued for by either Feder, Lossius, Eberhard-Mendelssohn, Tetens or Kant. It remained a presupposition of their philosophical systems in very much the same way that it was a presupposition for most modern philosophers. Whether the ideal theory is indeed a Trojan horse, as Reid claimed, cannot be decided here. What is interesting to note, however, is that no one offered any arguments (worth mentioning) against Reid's critique of the ideal theory. It is perhaps even more interesting and philosophically rewarding to speculate about why such arguments were not offered. Could anyone have accepted Reid's fundamental critique of phenomenalism and still have developed a philosophical system of the kind that Kant put forth? Is philosophy in any form compatible with the rejection of phenomenalism, or does this rejection of phenomenalism necessarily involve "naive" realism? The Germans, in any case, seem to have believed that Reid's principle of ideal philosophy was one of the principles of all philosophy, and that by rejecting this principle the Scots were rejecting philosophy altogether.

Much the same also holds for the problem of justification. Though

Kant and certain other philosophers offered some arguments against naturalism, these arguments are not entirely satisfactory. They simply amount to claiming that naturalism is unscientific and that the necessary principles of the human understanding need justification. Reid, Oswald and Beattie had argued that first principles qua first principles neither need nor can be justified, and that all we can do is to exhibit their existence and to describe their functioning. Kant believed that justification was necessary (indeed, he claims that his philosophy can only be understood, if this necessity for justification is seen), and therefore clearly also thought that it was possible.<sup>5</sup> But Kant does not lose many words showing how this justification of the a priori components of our knowledge claims is itself possible. Kant's German predecessors had felt that the anatomy of the human mind constituted in some sense already the justification of the principles. It is Kant's merit to have pointed out again that naturalism and description are completely different from justification. He also went a long way toward clarifying the kind of justification that he had in mind, namely transcendental deduction. But Kant is open to the criticism of not having shown how transcendental deductions are possible, as one can see by looking at the work of Hamann, Herder, Jacobi and Hegel, who show that Kant's Critique calls for a Metacritique.

Kant meant to justify the principles of common sense. Hegel showed that Kant's justification needed itself a justification, and thus raised the spectre of infinite regress. Kant believed that philosophy had a fixed point of reference in common sense, ordinary experience and Newtonian science. Hegel showed that, if one begins the process of justification, one cannot stop it at any one point but is lost in the "revel" of speculative thought. Justification seems to be fundamentally opposed to common

sense. Common sense might be the starting point of the process of justification, but it neither is a tool of philosophical justification nor is it the necessary subject matter of philosophy. Common sense and philosophy may very well become opposites. They need not be subservient to each other. Though philosophy might start out as an exercise in the justification of common sense or experience or science, it invariably seems to end up being concerned with justifying first and foremost itself and its justification. If Hegel is right, the German enlightenment, including Kant, set themselves a self-contradictory aim. Philosophy can never be the justification of common sense. If philosophy is understood first and foremost as justification, then "philosophy of common sense" is a contradiction in terms in the same way as "popular philosophy" is a contradiction in terms.

The question might even be raised whether it is not contradictory from any strictly philosophical point of view. Has there not always been something like the "intramural warfare between thought and common sense", as Hannah Arendt observed in her The Life of the Mind?<sup>6</sup> In any case, this fight between common sense and philosophy seems to have played the greatest role in German enlightenment thought between 1768 and 1807 (the appearance of Hegel's Phenomenology). It can already be observed in the works of the so-called popular philosophers, the moderate skeptics and indifferentists. In Kant's critical philosophy the struggle (or dialectic) between common sense and philosophy emerged as an important formative influence on the development of philosophy. With Hegel philosophy re-asserted itself very strongly, and ever since Hegel common sense has played a quite insignificant and negligible role in German thought.

No matter how great a role Kant played in this development of German



philosophy away from common sense and toward unrestrained speculation, Kant himself was very clearly of the opinion that philosophy could not do without common sense (just as common sense could not do without philosophy). For Kant a "philosophy of common sense" was far from contradictory. In so far as philosophy is of or about anything it is first and foremost of or about common sense. Moreover, philosophy is also of such a kind that it can be grasped by common sense. In an open letter on Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre (August 7, 1799) Kant leaves no doubt about this:

Since some reviewers maintain that the Critique is not to be taken literally in what it says about sensibility and that anyone who wants to understand the Critique must first master the requisite "standpoint" (of Beck or of Fichte), because Kant's precise words, like Aristotle's, will kill the mind, I therefore declare again that the Critique is to be understood in accordance with the letter, and is to be understood exclusively from the point of view of common sense, which only needs to be sufficiently cultivated for such abstract investigations.<sup>7</sup>

What is the relationship between common sense (ordinary language) and philosophy? What is common sense and what is philosophy? Are we in a better position in answering these questions than Kant and his contemporaries? I think not. Kant's critical philosophy still represents the most plausible and rewarding attempt of a synthesis of common sense and philosophical analysis. Kant was, along with David Hume and Thomas Reid, one of the greatest of all the common sense philosophers.

The question is why this has been realised so seldomly. Kant is known for many things, but he is not often referred to as a common sense philosopher. Historians of philosophy have spent much time investigating Kant's connections with German rationalism, with German irrationalism, with David Hume and with the German idealists, but they neglected to look

at his connection with the Scottish and German enlightenment. This certainly has to do with what the greatest successor of European enlightenment, Friedrich Nietzsche, has called "the hostility of the Germans to the Enlightenment". It seems to be true that "the whole great tendency of the Germans ran counter to the Enlightenment" and that they cannot appreciate their philosophes in the same way as other European nations.<sup>8</sup>

Lessing, Kant and Lichtenberg, who are perhaps considered as the best representatives of late German enlightenment, are usually regarded in complete isolation from such figures as Feder, Lossius, Eberhard, Mendelssohn, Nicolai, Meiners, Garve, Platner and Tetens. In fact, their friendship with these other enlightenment thinkers often seems to be considered as an embarrassment to intellectual integrity. But the fact is they were friends, and the works of Lessing and Lichtenberg no less than those of Kant arose from their dialogue with their contemporaries. But they not only arose from this dialogue and have their "Sitz im Leben" in this dialogue, they also owe some of their limitations to this dialogue. If, as Hegel claimed, and all studies of influence presuppose, "no philosophy transcends its age", then a significant part of the meta-critique of Kant's critique must consist in the investigation of Kant's historical presuppositions. Scottish common sense figured greatly among them. Therefore the investigation of the Scottish influence in Germany constitutes perhaps already an important aspect of the "Metakritik" and "demythologization" of the Critique of Pure Reason.<sup>9</sup>

But, however that may be, the sequence "Reid, Kant, Hegel" (and I am very much aware that the other philosophers discussed in this work should not be neglected) has important implications for the understanding

of any of these three philosophers. Though the discussion has perhaps overly concentrated upon Kant, the investigation of the way in which Reid's theories fared in Germany shows to us how central Reid was for the concerns of the European enlightenment. He was, together with Hume and Kant, perhaps the most important thinker of the late enlightenment. Kant claimed, possibly in anger, that because of the Scottish common sense philosophers "everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened", that is, as if Hume had not attacked metaphysics. Apart from the fact that this claim of Kant shows in an indirect way the very importance of these Scots -- for he seems to say that they were the ones who could have made the difference -- apart from this, he is clearly wrong. Exactly the opposite might be argued. It was to some extent because of the Scots that philosophy changed. Hamann said that without Berkeley there would not have been a Hume and without Hume there would not have been a Kant. This discussion of the Scottish influence in Germany raises the question: could there have been a Kant if there had not been a Reid?

Yet, no matter how this question -- which is unanswerable in any strict sense anyway -- is approached, this study has made one thing clear: Scottish common sense was important for German thought. For almost exactly a third of a century Scottish common sense was one of the major philosophical forces in Germany. Kant's criticism in the Prolegomena shows only the tip of the iceberg. Strangely enough, this third of a century was not only decisive for German thought, but also for the fate of Scottish common sense philosophy. It appears that its reputation never really recovered after the blow dealt to it by Kant. But many of the

ideas of the Scots survived "aufgehoben" in Kant's critical thought; others deserve to be revived, if only because of their importance for a "Meta-Critique of the Critique of Pure Reason".

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe claimed that the Germans had "fully understood for many years the merits of worthy Scottish men". I believe it will be quite a long time until we can say again that we understand fully the merits of the Scottish philosophers of common sense. But, if German thought, as represented by Immanuel Kant, played a most important role in the dismissal of Scottish common sense, a better understanding of the developments of German thought that led to Kant's criticism can perhaps play a similar role in the re-evaluation of Thomas Reid and his followers.

## NOTES : CHAPTER XI

1. See especially Chapter II above. For a short but very interesting account of the general role of common sense in German thought and especially in the developments leading to Kant's Critique of Judgment see also Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 20-31.
2. Hume himself makes this connection in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. See also Norman Kemp Smith's interpretation of Hume as advanced in his The Philosophy of David Hume, London, 1941. Kemp Smith assimilates Hume's naturalism perhaps too much to the Scottish philosophy of common sense.
3. This is in stark contrast to the developments concerning the philosophy of history. Here Herder could build to a much greater extent upon the thought of Lord Kames and Ferguson, for instance. Part of the reason for this can clearly be found in the fact that, in my opinion, neither Hamann nor Herder were really interested in metaphysics per se.
4. Since (Aenesidemus) Schulze's account of these matters is rather similar to that of Jacobi, he has not received separate treatment. But see pp. 225-257 above.
5. See, for instance, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A xvi.
6. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. I, pp. 80ff.
7. But Kant's connections with Scottish common sense also show how different Kant's transcendental philosophy is from common sense philosophy in its "intentions". The Scots wanted what is called today "descriptive metaphysics". They thought that all we could do

is to describe the phenomena. Kant was not at all content with description and analysis. In fact, some of his most vehement attacks are directed against such merely descriptive metaphysics. But neither can Kant's criticism be classified as "revisionary metaphysics", for he is not at all interested in producing "a better structure" of our thought about the world. Kant did not want to create anything new in that sense. He was concerned with that which we all know already in some sense, with our actual structure of thought about the world (as it shows itself in common sense and science). Kant wanted to give the justification of this structure. He wanted to show that it is the only correct structure, and that no other structure of thought is really possible.

The question may be raised whether an enterprise such as mere descriptive metaphysics is possible at all. For, does not even description involve the claim that what is described is the essential or the most important? The current interest in transcendental arguments shows that philosophers become more and more aware of this. It seems that the problem of description gives rise to the problem of justification today, just as it did in the 18th-century. Does this mean that the same contradictions that shaped 18th-century thought are also present in the philosophical discussions of today?

8. The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 84-5.

9. Beck, "Toward a Meta-Critique of Pure Reason" and W.H. Walsh, "Philosophy and Psychology in Kant's Critique", Kant-Studien, 57 (1966), pp. 186-98.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED

## A. PRIMARY SOURCES

Basedow, Bernhard. Philalethie oder neue Aussichten in die Wahrheiten und Religion der Vernunft. 2 vols. Altona, 1764.  
Reviews: Briefe die neueste Literatur betreffend 22 (1765), Letters 300 and 301.

Theoretisches System der gesunden Vernunft. Altona, 1765.  
Reviews: Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek 3 (1776), p. 69.

Elementarwerk. 3 vols. Dessau and Leipzig, 1774.

Beattie, James. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism. Edinburgh, 1770.  
Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1771, number 12 (January 28), pp. 91-6.

Bibliothèque des sciences et des beaux arts, XXX (April, May, June, 1771), pp. 429-31; XXXVII (January, February, March, 1772), pp. 110-46; (April, May, June, 1772), pp. 444-64; (July, August, September, 1772), pp. 1-22.

Versuch über die Natur und Unveränderlichkeit der Wahrheit im Gegensatz der Klügeley und Zweifelsucht. Aus dem Enlischen. Kopenhagen and Leipzig, 1772.

Reviews: Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen, LXXXIV (October 20, 1772), pp. 665-9; LXXXV (October 23, 1772), pp. 673-7.

Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek. Supplement to vols. 13-24 in 3 vols., Vol. I (1776), pp. 497-503.

An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism. Edinburgh, 1770. James Beattie, The Philosophical Works. Vol. I. Edited by F.O. Wolf. Stuttgart and Bad Canstatt, 1973.

Essays on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism; on Poetry and Music, as they Affect the Mind; on Laughter, on Ludicrous Composition; on the Utility of Classical Learning. 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1776.

Reviews: Brittisches Museum für die Deutschen, I (1777), pp. 63-8.

Neue philosophische Versuche. 2 vols. Edited by Christoph Meiners. Leipzig, 1779.

Reviews: Musikalisch-Kritische Bibliothek, II (1778), pp. 341-55.

Altonaischer gelehrter Mercurius, 3. Stück, February 3, 1780, pp. 28-32.

Dissertations Moral and Critical. London, 1783.

Reviews: Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der

freyen Künste, XXIX (1783), pp. 182-4.

Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1784, number 165 (October 14), pp. 1649-1654.

"Über das Erhabene" (Translation of one chapter of the Dissertations). Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste, XXX, i (1785), pp. 5-52; ii, pp. 195-228.

"Über das Träumen" (Translation of a chapter of the Dissertations, author indicated with "J.B."). Magazin für die Naturgeschichte des Menschen, I (1788), pp. 35-70.

Moralische und kritische Abhandlungen. 3 vols. Translated by Carl Grosse. Göttingen, 1789-1790.

Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1789, number 143 (September 5), pp. 1433-4; 1791, number 12 (January 20), p. 120.

Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, October 1789, pp. 6-8; October 1790, p. 14.

Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, XCIV (1790), pp. 467-70; CI (1791), pp. 136-7.

The Theory of Language. London, 1788.

Reviews: Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, July 1788, pp. 286-8.

"Etwas über die Sprache" (Extract from The Theory of Language). Magazin für die Naturgeschichte des Menschen, III, i (1790) pp. 1-53.

Elements of Moral Science. Vol. I. Edinburgh, 1790.

Review: Intelligenzblatt der Allgemeinen Literatur-Zeitung, November 20, 1790, p. 1268.

Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, January 1792, pp. 63-4.

Grundlinien der Psychologie, natürlichen Theologie, Moral-philosophie und Logik. Vol. I. Translated by Karl Philipp Moritz. Berlin, 1790.

Reviews: Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, CIV (1791), pp. 220-3.

Brucker, Johann Jakob. Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostram aetatem agitur. 5 vols. Leipzig, 1742-1744.

Budde, Johann Franciscus. Historische und theologische Einleitung in die vornehmsten Religionsstreitigkeiten. Edited by Johann George Walch. Jena, 1724.

Buhle, Johann Gottlieb. Geschichte der neuern Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften. 6 vols. Göttingen, 1800-1805.



Campbell, George. Die Philosophie der Rhetorik. Translated by Dr. D. Jenisch. Berlin, 1791.  
Reviews: Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, CXI (1792), pp. 98-101.

Crusius, Christian. Die philosophischen Hauptwerke. 3 vols. Edited by Giorgio Tonelli. Hildesheim, 1969.

Eberhard, Johann August. Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens. Berlin, 1776 (2d. ed. Berlin, 1786).

Von dem Begriffe der Philosophie und ihren Theilen. Berlin, 1778.

Sittenlehre der Vernunft. Berlin, 1781.

Vermischte Schriften. Halle, 1784.

Neue vermischte Schriften. Halle, 1788.

ed. Philosophisches Magazin. 4 vols. Halle, 1788-1792.

Handbuch der Ästhetik für gebildete Leser aller Stände. 4 vols. Halle, 1807-1820.

Eberstein, Wilhelm L.G. von. Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bey den Deutschen von Leibniz bis auf die gegenwärtige Zeit. 2 vols. Halle, 1794-1799.

Feder, Johann Georg Heinrich. Logik und Metaphysik nebst der philosophischen Geschichte im Grundrisse. 2d. ed. Göttingen and Gotha, 1770.

Institutionis logicae et metaphysicae. Göttingen, 1781.

Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Willen, dessen Naturtriebe, Veränderlichkeit, Verhältniss zur Tugend und Glückseligkeit und die Grundregeln, die menschlichen Gemüther zu erkennen und regieren. 4 vols. Göttingen and Lemgo, 1779-1793.

Über den Raum und die Causalität zur Prüfung der Kantschen Philosophie. Göttingen, 1787.

ed. Philosophische Bibliothek. 4 vols. Göttingen, 1788-1791.

J.G.H. Feder's Leben, Natur und Grundsätze. Edited by K.A.L. Feder. Leipzig, Hannover and Darmstadt, 1825.

Ferguson, Adam. Institutes of Moral Philosophy. Edinburgh, 1769.

Grundsätze der Moralphilosophie, übersetzt und mit einigen Anmerkungen versehen von Christian Garve. Leipzig, 1772.

Fries, Jakob Friedrich. Tradition, Mysticism und gesunde Logik, oder über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Studien IV. Edited by Carl Daub and Friedrich Kreuzer. Heidelberg, 1811.

Garve, Christian. Legendorum philosophorum veterum. Praecepta nonnulla et exemplum. Leipzig, 1770.  
Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1771 (November 8).

Reprint: Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie. Edited by Gustav Fülleborn. Stück XI and XII, Jena, 1799, pp. 132-96.

Eigene Betrachtungen über die allgemeinsten Grundsätze der Sittenlehre. Breslau, 1798.

Briefe an Christian Weisse und einige andere Freunde. Theil 1.2. Breslau, 1803.

Popularphilosophische Schriften über literarische, aesthetische und gesellschaftliche Gegenstände. 2 vols. Edited by Kurt Wölfel. Stuttgart, 1974.

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe in 40 Bänden. 40 vols. Edited by Eduard von der Hellen. Stuttgart, 1902-1912.

Hamann, Johann Georg. Schriften. 8 vols. Edited by Friedrich Roth and Gustav Adolph Wiener. Berlin and Leipzig, 1821-1843.

Johann Georg Hamann's, der Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften. 6 vols. Edited by C.H. Gildemeister. Gotha, 1857-1873.

Sämtliche Werke. 6 vols. Edited by Josef Nadler. Vienna, 1949-1957.

Briefwechsel. 8 vols. Edited by Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel. Wiesbaden, 1955ff.

Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, A Translation and Commentary. Translated and commentated by James O'Flaherty. Baltimore. 1967.

Socratische Denkwürdigkeiten/Aesthetica in nuce. Edited by Sven Aage Jørgensen. Stuttgart, 1968.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Theorie Werkausgabe. 20 vols. Frankfurt/Main, 1969.

Herder, Johann Gottfried. Verstand und Erfahrung. Vernunft und Sprache. Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1799.

Sämtliche Werke. 33 vols. Edited by Bernhard Suphan. Hildesheim, 1967 (reprographic reprint of the edition Berlin, 1877-1913).

Essay on the Origin of Language. Translated by J.H. Moran and Alexander Gode. In On the Origin of Language: Rousseau and Herder. Translated by J.H. Moran and Alexander Gode. New York, 1966.

Hissmann, Michael. Anleitung zur Kenntnis der auserlesenen Literatur in allen Teilen der Philosophie. Göttingen and Lemgo, 1778.

Hoffmann, Adolf Friedrich. Vernunft-Lehre, darinnen die Kennzeichen des Wahren und Falschem aus den Gesetzen des Verstandes hergeleitet werden. Leipzig, 1737.

Humboldt, Wilhelm von. Gesammelte Schriften. 15 vols. Edited by Albert Leitzmann. Berlin, 1903-1918.

Hume, David. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford, 1970.

Gespräche über die natürliche Religion von David Hume. Nach der zweiten Englischen Ausgabe. Nebst einem Gespräch über den Atheismus von Ernst Platner. Leipzig, 1781.  
Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1782, number 18 (February 11), pp. 143-4.

Irwing, Karl Franz von. Erfahrungen und Untersuchungen über den Menschen. Berlin, 1772 (2d. and enlarged edition in 4 vols. Berlin, 1777-1785).

Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich. Werke. 6 vols. Edited by Friedrich Roth and Friedrich Köppen. Leipzig, 1812-1825.

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis Briefe an Friedrich Bouterwek. Edited by W. Meyer, Göttingen, 1868.

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis auserlesener Briefwechsel. Edited by Friedrich Roth. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1825-7.

Jacobi, Johann Friedrich. Nähere Entdeckung eines neuen Lehrgebäudes der Religion nebst einer Prüfung desselben. Zell, 1773.  
Reviews: Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, XXV, i (1775), pp. 75-96.

Jakob, Heinrich. Prüfung der Mendelssohnschen Morgenstunden oder aller spekulativen Beweise für das Dasein Gottes. Leipzig, 1786.

Kant, Immanuel. Kant's gesammelte Schriften. Published by the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vols. 1-28f. Berlin, 1902f.

Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Logik. Vol. I: Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie. Edited by Gerhard Lehmann. Berlin, 1961.

Werke. 6 vols. Edited by Wilhelm Weischedel. Darmstadt, 1966.

Selected Pre-Critical Writings and Correspondence with Beck. Translated and introduced by G.B. Kerferd and D.E. Walford. Manchester and New York, 1968.

Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New York and Toronto, 1965.

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Edited by Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis and New York, 1950.

Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis, New York and Kansas City, 1959.

Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis and New York, 1956.

Critique of Judgement. Translated by James Creed Meredith. Oxford, 1952.

Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-1799. Edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig. Chicago, 1967.

Krug, Wilhelm Traugott. Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften nebst ihrer Literatur und Geschichte. 6 vols. 2d. ed. Leipzig, 1832-1838.

Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. Samtliche Schriften. 23 vols. 3d. ed. Lachmann and Muncker. Stuttgart, Leipzig and Berlin, 1886-1924.

Lichtenberg, Johann Georg. Schriften und Briefe. 4 vols. and 2 vols. of commentary. Edited by Wolfgang Promies. München, 1973f.

Lossius, Johann Christian. Physische Ursachen des Wahren. Gotha, 1774.  
Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1775.  
number 62 (May 25), pp. 525-6.

Unterricht der gesunden Vernunft. 2 vols. Gotha, 1776-1777.  
Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1777,  
number 54 (August 7), p. 751.

Meiners, Christoph. Revision der Philosophie. Göttingen, 1772.

Gundriss der Seelenlehre. Lemgo, 1786.

ed. Philosophische Bibliothek. 4 vols. Göttingen, 1788-1791.

Mellin, Georg Samuel Albert. Enzyklopädische Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie. 11 vols. Züllichan and Leipzig, 1797-1804.

Mendelssohn, Moses. Gesammelte Schriften. 7 vols. Edited by G.B. Mendelssohn. Leipzig, 1843-1845.

Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe. 20 vols. Edited I. Illbogen, J. Guttman, E. Mittwoch. Continued by Alexander Altmann in co-operation with H. Bar-Dayana, E.J. Engel, L. Strauss and W. Weinberg. Berlin, 1929f. (Now by Frommann and Holzboog, Stuttgart).

Schriften zur Philosophie, Aesthetik und Apologetik. 2 vols. Edited by Moritz Brasch. Hildesheim, 1968.

Neuerschlossene Briefe an Friedrich Nicolai. Edited by Alexander Altmann and Werner Vogel. Stuttgart, 1973.

Newton, Sir Isaac. Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and his System of the World. Translated by Andrew Motte, edited by Florian Cajori. 2 vols. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1974.

Oetinger, Friedrich Christoph. Die Wahrheit des sensus communis oder des allgemeinen Sinnes in den nach dem Grundtext erklärten Sprüchen des Prediger Salomo. 1753.

Inquisitio in sensum communem et rationem. Tübingen, 1753.  
(Reprint edited by Hans-Georg Gadamer. Stuttgart, 1964).

- Oswald, James. An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion. 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1766, 1772.  
 Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1769, number 28 (March 6), pp. 265-275; 1773, number 35 (March 22), pp. 289-99, number 44 (April 12), pp. 370-1.  
Bibliothèque des sciences et des beaux arts, April, Mai, June 1772, pp. 465-69.
- Appellation an den gemeinen Menschenverstand zum Vortheil der Religion. 2 vols. Translation by F.E. Wilmsen. Leipzig, 1774.  
 Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1774, number 97 (August 13), pp. 834-8; 1775, number 8 (January 19), pp. 60-1.  
Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, XXVIII, i (1776), pp. 157-9.
- Platner, Ernst. Philosophische Aphorismen. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1776, 1782.
- Philosophische Aphorismen. Vol. I. 2d. ed. Leipzig, 1784.
- Philosophische Aphorismen. Vol. I. 3d. completely revised edition. Leipzig, 1793.
- Philosophische Aphorismen. Vol. II. 2d. ed. Leipzig, 1800.
- Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1777, number 20 (February 15), pp. 153ff.
- Gesprache über die natürliche Religion von David Hume. Nach der zweiten Ausgabe. Nebst einem Gespräch über den Atheismus von Ernst Platner. Leipzig, 1781.
- Priestley, Joseph. An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, Dr. Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common Sense. London, 1775.  
 Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1775, number 92 (August 17), pp. 777-83.
- Reid, Thomas. An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Edinburgh, 1764.  
 Reviews: Bibliothèque des sciences et des beaux arts, XXXVIII (July, August, September, 1767), pp. 1-26.  
Journal Encyclopédique, December 1764, pp. 29-41.
- Recherches sur l'entendement humain d'après les principes du sens commun. Amsterdam, 1768.  
 Reviews: Journal Encyclopédique, November 1768, pp. 19-37; December 1768, pp. 29-37.

Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Geist, nach den Grundsätzen des gemeinen Menschenverstandes. Leipzig, 1782.  
Reviews: Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, LII (1783), p. 417.

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Edinburgh, 1785.  
Reviews: Journal Encyclopédique, 1786, Part II, pp. 3-7.  
Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, April 1786, pp. 181-3.  
Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1787, number 63 (April 21), pp. 625-32.  
Philosophische Bibliothek, I (1788), pp. 43-62.

"Versuch über den Geschmack" (German translation of Chapter VIII of Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man), Neue Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste, XXXI (1786), pp. 183-96.

Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Edinburgh, 1788.  
Reviews: Philosophische Bibliothek, II (1789), pp. 83-118.  
Journal Encyclopédique, 1791, Part I, pp. 3-18.

Philosophical Works. 2 vols. Edited by W. Hamilton, with an Introduction by Harry M. Bracken. Hildesheim, 1967.

An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Edited by Timothy Duggan. Chicago and London, 1970.

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Edited by Baruch Brody. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1969.

Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Edited by Baruch Brody. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England, 1969.

Reinhold, Karl Leonhard. Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens. Prag and Jena, 1789.

Resewitz, Friedrich Gabriel. Erziehung des Bürgers zum Gebrauch des gesunden Verstandes. 1773.  
Reviews: Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, XXII, 1 (1774), pp. 325ff.

Riedel, Friedrich Justus. Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften. Ein Auszug aus den Werken verschiedener Schriftsteller. June, 1767.

Briefe über das Publikum. Jena, 1768.

Rink, Friedrich Theodor. Ansichten aus Kant's Leben. Königsberg, 1805.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. 2 vols.  
Berlin and Wien, 1924.

Schulze, Gottlieb Ernst. Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie. 2 vols.  
Hamburg, 1801.

Schulze, Johann. Prüfung der Kantischen Critik der reinen Vernunft.  
2 vols. Königsberg, 1789, 1792.

Reviews:

Philosophische Bibliothek, IV (1791), pp. 20ff.

Storchenau, G. von. Grundsätze der Logik. Augsburg, 1774.

Reviews: Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, XXV, ii (1775), pp. 505-8.

Suabedissen, David Theodor. Resultate der philosophischen Forschungen  
über die Natur der menschlichen Erkenntnis von Plato bis Kant.  
Warburg, 1805.

Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb. Geschichte der Philosophie. 11 vols.  
Leipzig, 1798-1819.

Tetens, Johann Nicolaus. Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie.  
Bützow and Wismar, 1775.

Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre  
Entwicklung. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1776-1777.

Über die allgemine speculativische Philosophie/Philosophische  
Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung.  
Vol. I. Edited by Wilhelm Uebele. Neudrucke seltnener philo-  
sophischer Werke. Hrsg. von der Kantgesellschaft. Vol. IV.  
Berlin, 1913.

Tiedemann, Dietrich. Untersuchungen über den Menschen. 3 vols. Leipzig,  
1777-1778.

Reviews: Erfurtische gelehrte Zeitungen, Thursday, January 22,  
pp. 57-62.

Handbuch der Psychologie. Edited and supplied with a biograph-  
ical and bibliographical account by Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig,  
1804.

Tittel, Gottlob August. Erläuterungen der theoretischen und praktischen  
Philosophie nach Feders Ordnung. 6 vols. Frankfurt/Main,  
1783-1794.



Thomasius, Christian. Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre. Halle, 1691.  
(Reprint edited by W. Schneiders. Hildesheim, 1968).

Ausübung der Vernunftlehre. Halle, 1691. (Reprint edited  
by W. Schneiders. Hildesheim, 1968).

Ulrich, Johann August Heinrich. Erster Umriss einer Einleitung zu den  
philosophischen Wissenschaften. 2 vols. Jena, 1772, 1776.  
Reviews: Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, 1772,  
number 125 (October 17), p. 1070.

Vico, Giambattista B. On the Study Methods of our Time. Translated by  
Elio Gianturico. Indianapolis, New York and Kansas City, 1965.

Wolff, Christian. Gesammelte Werke. ed. J. Ecole, J.E. Hofmann,  
M. Thomann and W.H. Arndt. I. Abteilung: Deutsche Schriften.  
1. Band: Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen  
Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der  
Wahrheit. Edited by H.W. Arndt. Hildesheim, 1965.

Gesammelte Werke. II. Abteilung: Lateinische Schriften. 8.  
Band: Philosophia prima sive ontologia. Edited by Jean Ecole.  
Hildesheim, 1962.

Gesammelte Werke. II. Abteilung: Lateinische Schriften. 12.  
Band: Philosophia moralis sive ethica. Hildesheim and New  
York, 1970.

## B. SECONDARY SOURCES

- Alexander, W.M. Johann Georg Hamann, Philosophy and Faith. The Hague, 1966.
- Altmann, Alexander. Moses Mendelssohns Frühschriften zur Metaphysik. Tübingen, 1969.
- Moses Mendelssohn; A Bibliographical Study. Alabama, 1973.
- Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind. 2 vols. Edited by Mary McCarthy. London and New York, 1977.
- Aster, Ernst von. Geschichte der neueren Erkenntnistheorie. Berlin and Leipzig, 1921.
- Barnouw, Jeffrey. "The Philosophical Achievement and Historical Significance of Johann Nicolaus Tetens". Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture. Vol 9. Edited by Roseann Runte. Madison, 1979.
- Bäumler, Alfred. Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft. Darmstadt, 1967 (reprographic reprint of 1st edition, Halle, 1923).
- Baum, Gunter. Vernunft und Erkenntnis. Die Philosophie F.H. Jacobis. Bonn, 1969.
- "K.L. Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie und die Idee des transzendentalen Idealismus". Kant-Studien 64 (1973), pp. 213-30.
- Barker, S.F. and Beauchamp, T. ed. Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations. Philosophical Monographs. Philadelphia, 1976.
- Beanblossom, Ronald E. "Introduction". Thomas Reid's Inquiry and Essays. Indianapolis, 1975.
- Beck, Lewis White. Early German Philosophy. Kant and his Predecessors. Cambridge, 1969.
- Essays on Kant and Hume. New Haven and London, 1978.
- Bernstein, Richard J. "Why Hegel Now?" The Review of Metaphysics 31 (1977), pp. 217-74.
- Blassneck, M. Frankreich als Vermittler englisch-deutscher Einfluss im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Bochum-Langendreer, 1934.
- Bloch, Ernst. Christian Thomasius, ein deutscher Gelehrter ohne Misere. Frankfurt/Main, 1967.

Bollnow, F.O. Die Lebensphilosophie F.H. Jacobis. Stuttgart, 1933 (2d unchanged edition with a new Foreword, 1966).

Boutroux, Emil. "De l'influence de la philosophie ecossaise sur la philosophie francaise". Transactions of the Franco-Scottish Society. Edinburgh, pp. 16-36 (reprinted in Emil Boutroux, Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie moderne. Paris, 1846-7).

Bracken, Harry M. The Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism, 1710-1733. Revised edition. The Hague, 1965.

"Thomas Reid: A Philosopher of Un-Common Sense". Introduction to Thomas Reid, Philosophical Works. With Notes and supplementary dissertations by Sir William Hamilton. 2 vols. Hildesheim, 1967.

Berkeley. Toronto, 1974.

Brentano, Franz. Versuch über die Erkenntnis. Edited by A. Kastil, F. Mayer Hildebrand. Hamburg, 1970.

"Was an Reid zu loben". Grazer philosophische Studien 1 (1975), pp. 1-17.

Brody, Baruch. "Introduction". Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Cambridge, 1969.

"Reid and Hamilton on Perception". The Monist 55 (1971), pp. 423-41.

"Hume, Reid and Kant on Causality". Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations (ed. Barker and Beauchamp), pp. 8-13.

Cassirer, Ernst. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Princeton, N.J. 1951.

Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit. Vol. II. Berlin, 1907.

Clark, Robert T. Herder, His Life and Thought. Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1955.

Collingwood, R.G. The Idea of History. Oxford, 1946.

Cummins, Phillip D. "Reid's Realism". Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (1974), pp. 317-41.

Daniels, Norman. "On Having Concepts 'By our Constitution'" Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations. (ed. Barker and Beauchamp), pp. 35-43.

Dessoir, Max. Geschichte der neueren Psychologie. 2d. ed. Berlin, 1902.

"Des Johann Nicolaus Tetens Stellung in der Geschichte der Philosophie". Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16 (1892), pp. 355-68.

Düsing, Klaus. "Rezension von G. Baum's Vernunft und Erkenntnis". Philosophische Rundschau 18 (1971), pp. 105-16.

Duggan, Timothy. "Thomas Reid's Theory of Sensation". Philosophical Review 69 (1960), pp. 90-100.

"Introduction". Thomas Reid. An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Edited by Timothy Duggan. Chicago and London, 1970.

Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Paul Edwards (1967), s.v.

"Tetens, Johann Nicolaus". By Giorgio Tonelli.

"Beattie, James". By Elmer Sprague.

Erämtsae, E. Englische Lehnprägungen in der deutschen Empfindsamkeit des 18. Jahrhunderts. Helsinki, 1955.

Adam Smith als Mittler english-deutscher Spracheinflüsse. Helsinki, 1961.

Erdmann, Benno. Martin Knutzen und seine Zeit. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wolfischen Schule und insbesondere der Entwicklungsgeschichte Kants. Leipzig, 1876.

"Kant und Hume um 1762". Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 1 (1877-1888), pp. 62-77, 216-30.

Festner. Crusius als Metaphysiker. Halle, 1892.

Feyerabend, Paul. "How to be a Good Empiricist -- A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological". The Philosophy of Science. Edited by P.H. Nidditch. Oxford, 1968.

Against Method. London, 1975.

Finger, Otto. Von der Materialität der Seele, Beitrag zur Geschichte des Materialismus im Deutschland der 2. Hälfte des XVIII. Jahrhunderts. Berlin (Ost), 1961.

Flajole, Edward S. "Lessings Retrieval of Lost Truths". Proceedings of the Modern Language Association 74 (1959), pp. 52-66.

Forster, Robert and Forster, Elborg, ed. European Society in the Eighteenth Century. New York, Evanston and London, 1969.

Fullenwider, Henry W. Friedrich Christoph Oetingers Wirkung auf Literatur und Philosophie seiner Zeitgenossen. Göppingen, 1975.

Funke, Gerhard. "Der Weg zur ontologischen Kantinterpretation". Kant-Studien 62 (1971), pp. 364-8.

- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Oetinger als Philosoph". Kleine Schriften. Vol. III: Idee und Sprache. Tübingen, 1972.
- Wahrheit und Methode. 4th ed. Tübingen, 1975.
- Ganz, P.F. Der Einfluss des Englischen auf den deutschen Wortschatz. Berlin, 1957.
- Gay, Peter. The Enlightenment. 2 vols. London, 1967, 1971.
- George, Rolf. "Kant's Theory of Perception". Proceedings of the Ottawa Congress on Kant in the Anglo-American and Continental Traditions Held October 10-14, 1974. Edited by Pierre Laberge, Francois Duchesneau and Brian E. Morrissey. Ottawa, 1976.
- Golz, A. T. Wizenmann, der Freund F.H. Jacobis in Mitteilungen aus seinem Briefwechsel und handschriftlichen Nachlass, wie nach Zeugnissen von Zeitgenossen. Gotha, 1859.
- Gram, Moltke S., ed. Kant: Disputed Questions. Chicago, 1967.
- Grassi, Ernesto. "Vorrang des Gemeinsinns und der Logik der Phantasie". Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 30 (1976), pp. 491-509.
- Grave, Selwyn A. Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. Oxford, 1960.
- "The 'Theory of Ideas'". Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations (ed. Barker and Beauchamp), pp. 55-61.
- Grenzmann, Wilhelm. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. Leipzig, 1939.
- Groos, Karl. "Hat Kant Hume's Treatise gelesen?" Kant-Studien 5 (1901) pp. 177-81.
- Habermas, Jürgen. Erkenntnis und Interesse. Frankfurt/Main, 1973.
- Hammacher, Klaus. Die Philosophie Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis. München, 1969.
- "Rezension von G. Baum's Vernunft und Erkenntnis". Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 24 (1970), 625-33.
- Hanson, Norwood Russell. Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge, 1965.
- Harris, H.S. Hegel's Development toward the Sunlight, 1770-1801. Oxford, 1772.
- Hartmann, Eduard von. Geschichte der Metaphysik. 2 vols. 1899-1900. (reprographic reprint, Darmstadt, 1969).
- Hassan, I.H. "The Problem of Influence in Literary History: Notes toward a Definition". American Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 14 (1955), pp. 66-76.

Hauck, Wilhelm-Albert. Das Geheimnis des Lebens. Naturanschauung und Gottesauffassung Friedrich Christoph Oetinger. Heidelberg, 1947.

Haym, Rudolf. Hegel und seine Zeit. Berlin, 1857.

Herder nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken. 2 vols. Berlin, 1877-1885.

Heidegger, Martin. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. 4th and enlarged edition. Frankfurt/Main, 1973.

Heidemann, Ingeborg. "Metaphysikgeschichte und Kantinterpretation". Kant-Studien 67 (1976), pp. 291-312.

Heimsoeth, Heinz. Metaphysik und Kritik bei Chr. A. Crusius. Ein Beitrag zur ontologischen Vorgeschichte der Kritik der reinen Vernunft im 18. Jahrhundert. Berlin, 1926.

Metaphysik der Neuzeit. Darmstadt, 1967 (unchanged reprint of the edition München and Berlin, 1934).

Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Vol. I. Köln, 1956 (2d. ed. Bonn, 1971).

Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants. Vol. II. Bonn, 1970.

Transzendente Dialektik. 4 vols. Berlin. 1966-1971.

Heinsius, Wilhelm. Allgemeines Bücherlexikon oder vollständiges Verzeichnis der von 1700-1810 erschienenen Bücher. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1812f.

Heinrich, Dieter. "Hutcheson und Kant". Kant-Studien 49 (1957-1958), pp. 49-69.

"Über Kants früheste Ethik". Kant-Studien 54 (1963), pp. 404-31.

Henry J. "Le traditionalisme et l'ontologisme a Universite de Louvain 1835-1865". Annales de l'institut superieur de philosophie 5 (1924).

Herpel, Otto. Friedrich Christoph Oetinger. Die heilige Philosophie. München, 1923.

Herzog, Johannes. Friedrich Christoph Oetinger. Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild. Stuttgart, 1902.

Hettner, H. Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1928.

Hinske, Norbert. "Kant's Begriff der Antinomie und die Etappen seiner Ausarbeitung". Kant-Studien 55 (1966), pp. 485-96.

- Höhn, G. "Die sensualistischen Missverständnisse der Jacobischen Kant-Kritik, zu G. Baum's Vernunft und Erkenntnis". Kant-Studien 62 (1971), pp. 113-20.
- Höllerer, W. "Methoden und Probleme der vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaft". Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschriften N.F. 2 (1952), pp. 116-31.
- Holzhey, Helmut. Kant's Erfahrungsbegriff. Basel and Stuttgart, 1970.
- Immendorfer. Johann Georg Hamann und seine Bücherei. Königsberg and Berlin, 1938.
- Immerwahr, John. "The Development of Reid's Realism". The Monist 61 (1978), pp. 245-56.
- Janitsch, Julius. Kants Urteile über Berkeley. Strassburg, 1879.
- Jørgensen, Sven Aage. "Zu Hamanns Stil". Germanisch-Romanische Monatshefte N.F. 16 (1966), Heft 4.
- Jones, O. McKendree. Empiricism and Intuitionism in Reid's Common Sense Philosophy. Princeton, N.J., 1927.
- Johnston, G.A. Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. Chicago, 1915.
- Justin, Gale D. "Re-relating Kant and Berkeley". Kant-Studien 68 (1977), pp. 77-9.
- Kayser, Christian Gottlob. Vollständiges Bücherlexicon, enthaltend alle von 1750 bis zum Ende des Jahres 1831 in Deutschland und angrenzenden Ländern gedruckte Bücher. 6 vols. Leipzig, 1834ff.
- Keyserling, Meyer. Moses Mendelssohn. Sein Leben und seine Werke. Nebst einem Anhang ungedruckter Briefe von und an Moses Mendelssohn. Leipzig, 1862 (2d. ed. 1888).
- King, E.H. "James Beattie's Essay on Truth (1770). An Eighteenth Century 'Bestseller'" The Dalhousie Review (1971-1972), pp. 390-403.
- Kloth, Karen and Fabian, Bernhard. "James Beattie: Contributions Towards a Bibliography". The Bibliothek 5 (1970), pp. 232-45.
- Knoll, Renate. Johann Georg Hamann und Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. Heidelberg, 1963.
- Lauth, Reinhard. "Rezension von G. Baum's Vernunft und Erkenntnis". Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 54 (1972), pp. 97-103.

- Lehmann, Gerhard. "Kritizismus und kritisches Motiv in der Entwicklung der Kantischen Philosophie". Kant-Studien 49 (1957-1958), pp. 25-54.
- Lehrer, Keith. "Scottish Influences on Contemporary American Philosophy". The Philosophical Journal 5 (1968), pp. 34-42.
- Löwisch, Dieter Jürgen. "Kants Kritik des reinen Vernunft und Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion". Kant-Studien 56 (1966), pp. 170-207.
- Lorsch, J. Die Lehre vom Gefühl bei Tetens. Giessen, 1906.
- Lubbers, Klaus. "Aufgaben und Möglichkeiten der Rezeptionsforschung". Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschriften N.F. 14 (1964), pp. 292-302.
- McCosh, James. The Scottish Philosophy. London, 1875.
- Martin, Gottfried. Gesammelte Abhandlungen. Vol. I. Köln, 1961.
- Martin, T. The Instructed Vision: Scottish Common Sense Philosophy and the Origin of American Fiction. Bloomington, 1961.
- Mautner, Franz H. Lichtenberg, Geschichte seines Geistes. Berlin, 1969.
- Merlan, Philip. "From Hume to Hamann". The Personalist 32 (1951), pp. 11-18).  
     "Hamann et les Dialogues de Hume". Revue de Metaphysique 59 (1954), pp. 285-9.  
     "Kant, Hamann-Jacobi and Schelling on Hume". Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 22 (1967), pp. 343-51.
- Metzke, Erwin. J.G. Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts (Eine Preisarbeit). Halle, 1934.
- Miller, George. "Kant and Berkeley: The Alternative Theories". Kant-Studien 64 (1973), pp. 315-35.
- Mossner, E.C. "Beattie's 'The Castle of Scepticism'; An unpublished Allegory against Hume, Voltaire and Hobbes". University of Texas Studies in English 27 (1948), pp. 108-45.
- Mossner, E.C. and Todd, William, ed. Hume and the Enlightenment. Edinburgh and Austin, 1974.
- Neumann, W. Die Bedeutung Humes für die Aesthetik und sein Einfluss auf die deutschen Asthetiker. Halle, 1894.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Portable Nietzsche. Translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann. New York, 1954.
- Nivelle, Armand. Kunst- und Dichtungstheorien zwischen Aufklärung und Klassik. Berlin, 1960.



Norton, David Fate. From Moral Sense to Common Sense. An Essay on the Development of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy, 1700-1765. University Microfilms. Ann Arbor, 1966.

"Reid's Abstract of the Inquiry into the Human Mind". Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations (ed. Barker and Beauchamp), pp. 125-32.

"Hume and his Scottish Critics". In McGill Hume Studies. Edited by David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi and Wade L. Robison. (Vol. I of Studies in Hume and Scottish Philosophy. Edited by David Fate Norton.) San Diego, 1979.

O'Flaherty, James C. Unity and Language: A Study in the Philosophy of Johann Georg Hamann. Chapel Hill, 1952.

Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, A Translation and Commentary. Baltimore, 1967.

Oppel, Horst. Englisch-deutsche Literaturbeziehungen. 2 vols. Berlin, 1971.

Pascal, Roy. "Herder and the Scottish Historical School". Publications of the English Goethe Society 14 (1939), pp. 23-42.

Peach, Bernhard. "Common Sense and Practical Reason in Reid and Kant". "Sophia" 24 (1956), pp. 66-71.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Pierce. Vols. I-VI. Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, Mass., 1931-1935. Vols. VII-VIII. Edited by Arthur Burks. Cambridge, Mass., 1958.

Peterson, R. Scottish Common Sense in America 1768-1850, an Evaluation of its Influence. University of Michigan (Dissertation), 1972.

Pinkuss, Fritz. Moses Mendelssohns Verhältnis zur englischen Philosophie. Würzburg, 1929.

"Moses Mendelssohns Verhältnis zur englischen Philosophie". Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres Gesellschaft 42 (1929). pp. 449-90.

Piper, W.B. "Kant's Contact with British Empiricism". Eighteenth Century Studies 12 (1978-1979), pp. 174-89.

Price, Mary Bell and Price, Lawrence Marsden. "The Publication of English Humaniora in Germany in the Eighteenth Century". University of California Publications in Modern Philology XLIV (1955).

Price, Lawrence Marsden. The Reception of English Literature in Germany. Berkeley, 1932.

Pringle Pattison (Seth), A. Scottish Philosophy: A Comparison of Scottish and German Answers. Edinburgh, 1885.

- Randall, Helen W. The Critical Theory of Lord Kames. Smith College Studies in Modern Languages. Northampton, Mass., 1944.
- Raphael, D.D. The Moral Sense. Oxford, 1947.
- Remak, H.H.H., ed. Comparative Literature: Method and Perspective. Carbondale, 1961.
- Rescher, Nicholas. "The 'Special Constitution' of Man's Mind; The Ultimately Factual Basis of the Necessity and Universality of A Priori Synthetic Truths in Kant's Critical Philosophy". Akten des IV. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (1974), Part II.1, pp. 318-37.
- Rollin, Bernard H. "Thomas Reid and the Semiotics of Perception". The Monist 61 (1978), pp. 257-70.
- Rome, Sidney C. "The Scottish Refutation of Berkeley's Immaterialism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (1942-1943), pp. 313-25.
- Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth, 1963.
- "Ordinary Language". In Philosophy and Ordinary Language. Edited by Charles E. Caton. Chicago and London, 1970.
- Schepers, Heinrich. Andreas Rüdigers Methodologie und ihre Voraussetzungen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Schulphilosophie im XVIII. Jahrhundert. Köln, 1959.
- Schlegelndahl, Walter. Johann Nicolaus Tetens Erkenntnistheorie in Beziehung auf Kant. Leipzig, 1888.
- Schmucker, Josef. "Zur entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung der Inauguraldissertation". Kant-Studien 65 (1975), pp. 261\*-282\*.
- Schneider, Robert. Schelling und Hegels schwäbische Geistesansichten. Würzburg-Aumühle, 1938.
- Schoffler, Herbert. Deutsches Geistesleben zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung. Frankfurt, 1956.
- Schouls, Peter A. "The Cartesian Method of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (19/5), pp. 579-601.
- Schulz, W.A. "Oettinger contra Leibniz". Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 2 (1957), pp. 607-17.
- Sciaccia, M.F. "Reid e Gallupi". In his Studi sulla filosofia moderna. Milano, 1964.
- Seeböhm, Thomas M. "Der systematische Ort der Herderschen Metakritik". Kant-Studien 63 (1972), pp. 58-73.

- Segerstedt, Torgny T. The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish Philosophy. Lund, 1935.
- Sidgwick, Henry. "The Philosophy of Common Sense". Mind 14 (new series), 1895, pp. 145-58.
- Silver, Bruce. "A Note on Berkeley's New Theory of Vision and Thomas Reid's Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities". Southern Journal of Philosophy 12 (1974), pp. 253-63.
- Smith, Norman Kemp. A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. New York, 1962 (reprint of 2d. ed. of 1923).
- The Philosophy of David Hume. London, 1941.
- Sommer, Robert. Grundzüge einer Geschichte der Psychologie und Ästhetik von Wolff-Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller. Leipzig, 1892.
- Stäbler, Eugen. Berkeley's Auffassung und Wirkung in der deutschen Philosophie bis Hegel. Tübingen, 1935.
- Störing, G. Die Erkenntnistheorie von Tetens. Leipzig, 1901.
- Strawson, P.F. Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London, 1964.
- Stroud, Barry. Hume. London and Boston, 1977.
- Süss, Theobald. "Der Nihilismus bei F.H. Jacobi". In Der Nihilismus als Phänomen der Geistesgeschichte in der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion unseres Jahrhunderts. Edited by Dieter Arendt. Darmstadt, 1974.
- Swain, Charles. "Hamann and the Philosophy of David Hume". Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 (1967), pp. 343-51.
- Taylor, Charles. "The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology". In Hegel; A Collection of Critical Essays. Edited by Alasdair MacIntyre. Garden City and New York, 1972.
- Hegel. Cambridge, London, New York and Melbourne, 1975.
- Taylor, Richard. "Review of S.A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense". Philosophical Review, July 1961.
- Terras, Rita. Wilhelm Heinses Ästhetik. München, 1972.
- Turbayne, Colin M. "Kant's Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism". Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1955), pp. 225-44.
- Uebele, W. "Herder and Tetens". Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 18 (1905), pp. 216-49.

"Johann Nicolaus Tetens zum 100 jährigen Todestag".  
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik. 1908,  
pp. 137-51.

Johann Nicolaus Tetens. Kant-Studien Ergänzungsheft. Vol. 24:  
Berlin, 1911.

Unger, Rudolf. Hamann's Sprachtheorie im Zusammenhang seines Denkens.  
München, 1905.

Hamann und die Aufklärung. Studien zur Vorgeschichte des  
romantischen Geistes im 18. Jahrhundert. 2 vols. Halle, 1925.

Vaihinger, H. Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 2 vols.  
Stuttgart, 1881.

Zu Kant's Widerlegung des Idealismus. Strassburger Abhand-  
lungen zur Philosophie: 1884.

Vernier, Paul. "Reid on Foundations of Knowledge". In Thomas Reid:  
Critical Interpretations (ed. Barker and Beauchamp), pp. 14-24.

Verra, Valerio. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, 1743-1819. Torino,  
1967.

Vleeshauwer, H.J. The Development of Kantian Thought. London, 1962.

Vorländer, Karl. Immanuel Kants Leben. Leipzig, 1911.

Walsh, W.H. Philosophy of History. Revised edition. New York and  
Evanston, 1967.

"Philosophy and Psychology in Kant's Critique". Kant-Studien  
57 (1966), pp. 186-98.

"Kant and Metaphysics". Kant-Studien 67 (1976), pp. 372-84.

Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics. Chicago, 1976.

Walz, J.A. "English Influences on the German Vocabulary of the 18th  
Century". Monatshefte (Madison) 35 (1943), pp. 156-64.

Walzel, Oskar F. "Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben des 18.  
Jahrhunderts". Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschriften 1 (1909),  
pp. 416-37.

Weber, Heinrich. Hamann und Kant. München, 1904.

Weiser, Christian F. Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben.  
Leipzig and Berlin, 1916.

- Weisstein, U. Einführung in die vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft. Stuttgart, 1968.
- Wellek, Rene. Concepts of Criticism. New Haven and London, 1963.  
Discriminations, Further Concepts of Criticism. New Haven and London, 1970.
- Werkmeister, W.H. "Notes to an Interpretation of Berkeley". In New Studies in Berkeley's Philosophy. Edited by Warren E. Steinkraus. New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Toronto and London, 1966.
- Wessell, Leonhard P. G.E. Lessing's Theology; A Reinterpretation. The Hague, 1977.
- Winch, P.G. "The Notion of 'suggestion' in Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception". Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1953), pp. 327-41.
- Windelband, Wilhelm. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Vol. II. Leipzig, 1909.
- Windelband, Wilhelm and Heimsoeth, Heinz. Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. 14th ed. Tübingen, 1950.
- Wize, Filip. Friedrich Riedel und seine Ästhetik. Leipzig, 1902.
- Wölfel, Kurt. "Nachwort". In Christian Garve, Popularphilosophische Schriften über literarische ästhetische und gesellschaftliche Gegenstände. 2 vols. Edited by Kurt Wölfel. Stuttgart, 1974.
- Wohlgemuth, Josef. Henry Homes Ästhetik und ihr Einfluss auf deutsche Ästhetiker. Berlin, 1893.
- Wolf, F.O. "General Introduction: Scottish Philosophy and the Rise of Capitalist Society -- Some Remarks on the Relevance of a Study of Beattie and on the Methodology of the History of Philosophy". James Beattie, The Philosophical Works. Vol. I. Edited by F.O. Wolf. Stuttgart and Bad Constanz, 1973.
- Wolff, Robert Paul. "Kant's Debt to Hume via Beattie". Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960), pp. 117-23.
- Wreschner, Arthur. Ernst Platners und Kants Erkenntnistheorie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Tetens und Aenesidemus. Leipzig, 1882.
- Wundt, Max. Die Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung. Tübingen, 1945.
- Zart, G. Einfluss der englischen Philosophie seit Bacon auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts. Berlin, 1881.
- Zinn, Elisabeth. Die Theologie des Friedrich Christoph Oetinger. Gütersloh, 1932.