RESPONDING TO MEMBERSHIP IN A DISADVANTAGED GROUP: FROM ACCEPTANCE TO COLLECTIVE PROTEST

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ABSTRACT

The present thesis describes an experimental paradigm used to determine when disadvantaged group members will accept their situation, take individual or collective action, and when that action will follow or violate existing norms. Subjects were asked to respond to information indicating that they had failed in their attempts to gain access to a high status group. "Collective nonnormative" action was endorsed only by subjects who were told that the high status group was completely closed to members of their group. In contrast, subjects perceiving the high status group to be open endorsed "acceptance" and "individual normative" actions. Even when access to the high status group was almost closed, subjects continued to prefer individual action. Subjects who perceived themselves as close to gaining entry into the high status group were more likely to endorse "individual nonnormative" strategies while those who were distant from entry were more likely to accept their position. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for the disruption of societal functioning.

RESUME

La présente thèse décrit un paradigme expérimental utilisé pour déterminer, quand les membres d'un groupe désavantagé accepteront leur situation, quand ils prendront une action individuelle ou collective, et quand cette action suivra ou transgressera des normes existantes. Les sujets étaient mis en situation d'échec devant une tentative d'accession à un groupe au statut plus élevé, et leur réaction devant l'échec était évaluée. Les résultats montrent qu'une action "collective non-normative" était endossée seulement par les sujets qui avaient été avertis que le groupe au statut plus élevé était complètement fermé aux membres de leur groupe. Au contraire, lorsque les sujets étaient avertis que le groupe au statut plus élevé était ouvert aux membres de leur groupe, ils endossaient une action "d'acceptation" ou une action "individuelle normative": Lorsque l'accès au groupe au statut plus élevé était presque fermé, les sujets persistaient dans une action individuelle. D'autre part, les sujets se percevant comme étant proches d'entrer dans le groupe au statut plus élevé avaient plus tendance à endosser des stratégies "individuelles non-normatives" que ceux qui se percevaient comme étant éloignés d'entrer dans ce groupe. Ces sujets avaient plutôt tendance à accepter leur situation. Les résultats de cette recherche sont discutés en terme de leur implication dans la perturbation du functionnement sociétaire.

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The unequal distribution of resources among members of a collectivity is a pervasive phenomenon that arises at virtually every level of social organization; from nations, to large businesses, to the family unit. The actions of individuals faced with these inequalities can range from apparent passive acceptance, to individual attempts to gain a larger share of the resources, to episodes of collective violence. Understanding and predicting the reaction of group members when they are in a relatively disadvantaged position is a fundamental issue.

In order to address this important element of intergroup relations it is important to first delineate the scope or range of behavioural responding that is available to the disadvantaged group member. Secondly, an understanding of the existing theoretical perspectives in intergroup relations is needed in order to formulate empirical hypotheses. Finally, an experimental paradigm must be developed in order to test these hypothesized determinants of the responses of disadvantaged group members.

Responses to Perceived Inequality

There is an infinite number of different specific behaviours that might be exhibited by members of a disadvantaged group. How to conceptualize these is a major challenge. In an attempt to meet this challenge the present paper will propose that the available responses be organized

into five distinct categories on the basis of three important "decisions" made by members of a disadvantaged group. The first decision is whether to take any form of action at all. Often when faced with inequality disadvantaged group members do not act, appearing to accept their disadvantaged position (Martin, 1987; Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble & Zeller, 1987). Once the decision to act has been taken, the question is what form should that action take; the disadvantaged group member must choose between an individual or collective response. Third, the choice must be made between action, be it individual or collective, that conforms to the norms of the existing social system ("normative"), or that is outside the confines of the existing social rules and structure ("nonnormative").

Through these three decisions the disadvantaged group member selects among five broad categories of response: 1) no action to alter his/her disadvantaged position; 2) attempts at individual upward mobility through normative channels made available by the system; 3) individual action outside the norms of the system, with the intention of elevating himself/herself to a more advantaged position; 4) instigation of collective action within the prescribed norms of the existing structure; or 5) instigation of collective action outside the normative structure, with the intention of altering the system to improve the position of his/her group.

These five forms of responding represent distinct

categories, however, the category into which some specific actions fall may require some clarification. In terms of personal and collective action, this distinction is not made simply on the basis of the number of people involved. For example, when a prisoner goes on a hunger strike to protest the treatment of all prisoners, the action is taken by one individual but this action should not be construed as an individual response. The prisoner's actions are motivated by an interest in the improvement of the collective condition of his/her group. The individual is acting as a representative of his/her group not solely on his/her own behalf. Similarly, when an individual member of a terrorist organization hijacks an airplane and demands changes in the conditions of his/her group, we must interpret this as a collective action. Alternatively, if the hijacker's intent is to demand a large ransom for personal gain, this would be classified as an individual action. In both examples the actions of the hijacker may result in actual improvement of his/her personal condition. However, in the first instance it is the indirect result of improvement of the collective condition of the group and in the second he/she is the only beneficiary of the improvements resulting from the action. Thus, the individual/collective distinction has to do with whether actions are directed at the improvement of the personal or the collective condition and not the number of individuals taking part.

The normative/nonnormative distinction also needs some clarification. Normative action refers to actions that conform to the existing norms of the given society. By definition, a norm involves behaviours that are accepted and, in fact, positively valued in the given social milieu. Therefore, a normative action is one that is acceptable and valued within the context in which it occurs. By this definition a behaviour that is normative today in North America may not be perceived as normative in another time or in another cultural milieu. For example, a strike by labourers represented an unacceptable response to job dissatisfaction in North America in past centuries and remains unacceptable in many Japanese corporations. However, strikes are both legal and acceptable as a means of expressing dissatisfaction in North America today. In one time period and in one cultural setting this action by a disadvantaged group is nonnormative and in another it is considered normative.

In order to make clear the distinctions between these five categories of behaviour and to illustrate their social relevance, a real-world example of each category will be explored. One of the most intriguing behavioural choices, and often the most intuitively difficult to understand, is inaction. Yet, examples of disadvantaged group members who do not take action abound. Until recently the vast majority of women apparently accepted their lesser role in the

marriage relationship and in society in general. Another even more dramatic example of passive acceptance is found in accounts of slaves who seem to perceive their position as just and right and who revere and cater willingly to their masters (Van der Berghe, 1967).

"Individual normative" action plays an important role in the context of modern industrialized societies. This response is exemplified by the new immigrant who holds two or three jobs in an attempt to improve his family's economic and social status. Similarly, this form of behaviour is romanticized by the "ghetto kid" who trains diligently to "make it" as a professional athlete as a way of improving his personal status and position. "Individual nonnormative" behaviour may not be as obvious but is as prevalent. The simple act of cheating on one's income tax return, stealing from the company at which one works, or even a verbal or physical attack on one's superior represent actions in this category.

Examples of nonnormative collective action are the most conspicuous of the responses to inequality. Riots, illegal strikes, acts of terrorism and collective violence receive much publicity and come readily to mind. However, this type of action need not be prohibited by law or be violent in nature. It need only violate social standards of acceptable behaviour. For example, acts of civil disobedience or the previously described hunger-strike also fit the requirements

of "collective nonnormative" action. Normative collective action, although not usually as conspicuous, is also a widely used form of group action. Lobby groups, unions and consumer action committees are all examples of groups that work within the system to improve the collective position of their group members.

Upon examination of these five categories of responding, the profoundly different societal implications of each become quite clear. The type of response chosen will have a dramatic effect on future intergroup relations and the likelihood of changes in the relative position of the advantaged and disadvantaged groups. In addition, these five types of responses are vastly different in their likelihood of producing broad changes in the social system itself.

Should members of the disadvantaged group choose inaction, there are likely to be few if any changes. Regardless of how open to social mobility the existing system is, if those who are disadvantaged passively accept their position there will be no change in the relative status of the groups or the social structure at large.

"Individual normative" action may in an open or partially open system lead to personal upward mobility. However, this type of action involves no effort at altering the intergroup situation and is unlikely to lead to societal change. In fact, this type of action serves to support the legitimacy of the existing order and the perception of open

opportunity for social mobility. "Individual-nonnormative" action, because it is not motivated by an interest in improving the status of the group, is unlikely to have an effect on intergroup relations. In some cases it may prove to be somewhat disruptive for the system. However, due to its small scale and the "built in" mechanisms of most systems for dealing with individuals who violate acceptable standards of behaviour, this type of action is not likely to have any major effect on the larger social system.

Collective action is the form of behaviour that is most likely to result in serious changes to the intergroup situation. Depending on the openness of the system, "collective normative" action may lead to the improvement in the relative status of the disadvantaged group involved. However, because it also reflects acceptance of the existing social rules, this form of response is unlikely to lead to sweeping changes in the broad social structure. Clearly the action most likely to disrupt and alter the existing social order is one that is collective and nonnormative. The success of this type of action in producing alterations in the intergroup situation depends on a variety of situational variables, however, this type of action is most difficult for the existing social system to ignore or respond to.

In order to systematically investigate the responses of disadvantaged group members, the infinite number of different actions available to the individual must be classified into a

set of manageable categories. This paper has proposed five broad categories of responding, including "acceptance", "individual normative", "individual nonnormative", "collective normative" and "collective nonnormative". The utility and importance of the distinctions made by these five categories is made clear by the vastly differing impact of each on the intergroup situation and on the social structure in general. With the available responses clearly classified in this manner, it is possible to address the question of what variables determine interest in these different forms of responding.

Theoretical Approaches to Intergroup Relations

To date the theoretical and empirical literature in intergroup relations has failed to generate precise predictions as to the conditions likely to give rise to these different forms of behaviour. This paucity is the result of several limitations in current theory and research. In part this problem is the result of the neglect of the broader topic of intergroup relations by social psychologists. Despite its seemingly central role for social psychology as a discipline, the psychology of intergroup relations remains understudied. Taylor and Moghaddam (1987) in their recent review of theories of intergroup relations underscore this neglect: "Exploring the titles of articles in key social psychological journals leads to the same conclusion:

intergroup relations is not a central topic." (p. 3). However, even within the existing literature there are several important deficits that have left the question of behavioural responses to inequality unanswered. In this thesis four prominent theories of intergroup relations will be reviewed; Equity, Relative Deprivation, Social Identity and Resource Mobilization, and their limitations discussed. Two less prominent theories, Elite and the Five Stage Model, begin to deal with some of these limitations and are offered as the basis for firm hypotheses about the actions of disadvantaged group members.

Equity Theory

Equity theory is the most prominent of the social justice theories. "Essentially Equity theory deals with two questions; (1) What do people think is fair and equitable? and (2) How do people respond when they perceive they are receiving far more or far less from their relationship than they deserve?" (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978, p. VII) The second of these questions has direct relevance to the interests of the present research. Equity theory suggests that individuals note the ratio of "outcomes" to "inputs" of others and then compare this ratio to their own. If these two ratios appear equal, the relationship will be judged as fair. If the two ratios are not perceived as equal then inequity exists and the relationship will be perceived as unjust. These perceptions of injustice lead to feelings of

psychological tension for both parties. In order to reduce this tension, equity must be restored. The restoration of equity involves changes in the inputs or outcomes of one or both of the parties in the relationship. Two strategies for altering inputs and outcomes are available; actual restoration such that physical changes are made in the inputs or outcomes, or psychological restoration such that the perception of the inputs or outcomes are altered so as to exaggerate or reduce their relative importance.

Psychological restoration provides an explanation for situations in which disadvantaged groups refrain from action and appear to accept their position. For the disadvantaged group the actual restoration of equity is naturally preferable. However, if they are powerless to change the inputs and outcomes in the relationship, feelings of inequity must be reduced by psychological restoration. This results in the members of the disadvantaged group devaluating their own inputs and thus "legitimizing" their lesser share of the outcomes. Alternatively, they might exaggerate the inputs of the advantaged group members thus "legitimizing" the greater outcomes received by the advantaged group (see Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987).

Another explanation for inaction arises from research based on Equity theory. This explanation holds that most individuals are likely to limit their social comparisons to members of their own group, those that are making equivalent

contributions (ie. inputs), and thus they avoid comparisons with more advantaged groups (Cook & Messick, 1983). In so doing individuals should feel fairly treated as long as other members of their own group are as poorly off as they.

These efforts have provided some insight into the first of the three decisions facing members of a disadvantaged group; that of action or inaction. Disadvantaged group members are often able to ignore the inequity of their relationship with a more advantaged group by avoiding comparisons across groups. Also they may be forced by their powerlessness to restore equity by psychologically devaluing their own contributions. If either of these processes occur the group members are unlikely to act out against their disadvantaged position.

At this point, however, the limitations of Equity theory become apparent. First, the fact that action by disadvantaged groups does occur in real-world conflicts indicates that, at some point, cross-group comparisons must be made. The theory in its present form is unclear as to when and why these cross-group comparisons would arise. Given the existence of comparisons with the advantaged group, the theory provides only "powerlessness" as the necessary criterion for the implementation of psychological restoration. This broad idea needs to be more clearly described if one is to predict when a given group is, in fact, powerless and thus unlikely to take action. Finally,

given some level of power, Equity theory allows for no prediction as to the form that action will take. It does not identify any specific inputs or outcomes (or combination thereof) that can be used in the prediction of actual behaviour. This results in the typical study stimulated by Equity theory concerning itself only with feelings, such as resentment, dissatisfaction and perceptions of injustice, that result from an inequitable relationship. In fact, an even broader criticism of Equity theory is its inability to specify the range of possibilities that can be perceived as potential inputs and outcomes in the first place. This results in a theory which is not falsifiable. There is always the possibility that an unmeasured input or outcome can play a role in the determination of the responses of the parties involved. Therefore, one can always claim that any deviations from predicted behaviour are simply the result of an unforeseen and unmeasured input or outcome (see Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987).

The lack of predictions about the form action will take is compounded by the reductionist orientation of Equity theory. Consistent with the dominant theoretical orientation in the psychology of intergroup relations, Equity theory extrapolates to the intergroup context theoretical ideas that were generated to explain interactions at the interpersonal level. The result has been a primary concern for individual action, with "collective action" virtually ignored as a

response alternative. The obvious importance of this response type makes clear the necessity of theoretical outlooks that incorporate collective response alternatives. Moreover, because of the reductionist ancestry of this theory, there has also been a tendency to limit attention to small, closed groups. In so doing, researchers have often neglected the individual "exit" option, available in many larger open social groups. In this case, the individual member attempts to leave his/her position in a disadvantaged group in favour of joining the ranks of a more advantaged group. This "social mobility" option represents an "individual normative" action which has important theoretical implications, as it is a common response in many social contexts (Hirschman, 1970; Taylor et al., 1987).

The failure to specify specific inputs and outcomes that can be associated with different types of behaviour, and the reductionist nature of the theory, seriously limits Equity theory in terms of its capacity to offer precise hypothesis about the likelihood of individual verses collective action. Nor is this theory able to provide insight into the endorsement of normative verses nonnormative action.

Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative Deprivation (RD) theory recognizes that there is no direct relationship between a person's objective situation and their subjective interpretation of it,

Research has confirmed what casual observation has noted for some time; that deprivation per se is not sufficient to cause resentment. Satisfaction is affected by subjective rather than objective standards of prosperity. In fact, it has been found that those who feel most deprived are generally not those who are objectively the most destitute (Crosby, 1976; Davis, 1959: Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Starr & Williams, 1949).

Runciman (1966) distinguished two types of deprivation: personal or "egoistical" and collective or "fraternal". When an individual feels that his/her own rewards are unfair when compared to other individuals in a similar situation the result is egoistical relative deprivation. Fraternal deprivation, however, occurs when a member of a group is discontent with the relative position of his/her group. For both of these forms of relative deprivation a key determinant of the level of dissatisfaction felt by the individual is who the person decides to make comparisons with. In the collective (fraternal) deprivation context, if the disadvantaged group member chooses to make comparisons with an equally disadvantaged group, this comparison is unlikely to result in feelings of deprivation. If, however, a more advantaged group is chosen for comparison, then dissatisfaction and feelings of injustice are the likely result.

This orientation which emphasizes the importance of

psychological factors as mediators between objective deprivation and action has, in fact, resulted in several interesting insights into the psychological effects of membership in a disadvantaged group (Crosby, 1976; Dion, 1987; Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume & Martin, 1983; Folger, Rosenfield & Robinson, 1983; Gurr, 1970; Mark, 1985; Martin, 1987; Olson & Ross, 1984). However, the emphasis on the role of the psychological interpretation of the objective situation has lead research efforts in this area to focus primarily on feelings of dissatisfaction, resentment, injustice and outrage that result when individuals make comparisons with more advantaged others. In fact, as pointed out by Mark (1985) the term "relative deprivation" is often used as essentially equivalent to an emotional reaction of anger. This line of inquiry has provided only a minimum of information useful in the prediction of behaviour per se. What insight it has provided involves primarily the first of the three decisions facing members of a disadvantaged group; that of "acceptance" or action. Relative Deprivation provides insights into the conditions under which objective deprivation will or will not lead to feelings of dissatisfaction and anger. This theory can explain situations where large objective inequalites do not result in dissatisfaction and thus provides a viable explanation for inaction in the face of high levels of objective deprivation.

Just as there is no direct relationship between level of dissatisfaction and the actual equality of distribution, neither is there a direct relationship between feelings of dissatisfaction and the behavioural responses of disadvantaged group members. Even though it may be reasonable to predict no action when feelings of dissatisfaction and deprivation are absent it does not necessarily follow that the presence of these feelings will inevitably lead to action. Martin (1987) discusses a variety of situations in which "inequalities may cause feelings of injustice, but these feelings may have little effect on behaviour, causing a behavioural, if not emotional, tolerance of injustice" (p. 35). If this is the case, and there can be distinguished situations where feelings of deprivation and injustice do not result in action, then little can be extrapolated from research on emotional reactions to relative deprivation to questions of behavioural responding.

As well, the existence of dissatisfaction, or even the intensity of these feelings, does not determine the form action will take. Knowledge of the psychological reactions of individuals is of little predictive value in determining whether action taken will be individual or collective, normative or nonnormative (Tajfel, 1982). In this way, the research concerning itself solely with the emotional outcomes of relative deprivation has very limited value in determining when action will occur, or if it does what form it will take.

A limited number of RD researchers have attempted to study behavioural responses directly and to their credit they have offered important insights. However, in designing these studies most researchers have focussed on only one of the many possible forms of action. Some have exclusively examined "collective nonnormative" action (Guimond & Dubé, 1983; Martin & Murray, 1984). Others have concerned themselves only with "individual normative" actions such as "achievement striving" (Cook, Crosby & Hemingan, 1977; Wilensky, 1963). Still others have considered "collective normative" action (Morrison & Steeves, 1967; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972). By limiting their measures to a single type of behavioural response, researchers often fail to realize that the given situation may not lead to a preference for "no action" but, in fact, to one of the unmeasured behaviours. In addition, in experimental research involving the introduction of a single response option researchers may have inadvertently pressured their subjects to "choose" a behaviour that might not have been preferred had all the response options been available. It is quite reasonable to assume that very different conclusions might have been drawn had all five behavioural response types been considered.

As with Equity theory, RD theory too is rooted in a theory of interpersonal relations. The distinction between personal and collective deprivation is an important step towards reducing the highly individualistic nature of earlier

versions of this theory, however, the individualist beginnings have resulted in continued difficulties. Most of these problems center around misunderstandings of the egoistical/fraternal distinction. Many researchers have failed to include the more recently developed collective deprivation component and have, thus, found little relationship between relative deprivation and collective action (see Dubé & Guimond, 1983 for a more complete discussion). Also, there has been difficulty in determining appropriate measures of these two forms of deprivation. Varying operationalizations of the two concepts has resulted in widely varying predictions of the consequences of the two types of deprivation.

A final limitation with RD theory is aimed directly at one of the fundamental components of relative deprivation. Primarily the question is how the individual selects the target for comparison. As the target of comparison is one of the key determinants of feelings of deprivation, it is important to have the ability to predict this target. Preliminary research in the intergroup context has shown that the selection of a comparison group is a highly complex process and may vary dependent upon the psychological reason for the comparison (Taylor, Moghaddam & Bellerose, 1986). Without reasonable prediction of which group will be chosen for comparison it is impossible to predict psychological or behavioural responses utilizing a relative deprivation model.

Several researchers (Crosby, 1976; Dubé & Guimond, 1983; Martin, 1987) have pressed for continued support of RD theory as a viable theoretical basis for studying the behavioural responses of disadvantaged groups. A portion of their recent work has strengthened the legitimacy of the distinction between egoistical and fraternal deprivation. When properly defined and measured, these two forms of relative deprivation may play distinct roles in determining the type of action taken by the members of disadvantaged groups. However, even with more stringent control of the individual/collective distinction Martin (1987) is forced to admit that the link to behaviour remains a troublespot for RD theory.

In conclusion, Relative Deprivation theory is seriously limited in its predictive capacity related to the behavioural responses of disadvantaged groups. As with Equity theory it has evolved out of an inter-personal theory and suffers from many of the oversights and confusion that result from this reductionist theoretical orientation. In addition, much of the research stimulated by RD theory has concerned itself solely with emotional responses to relative deprivation and has only minimal relevance to behavioural responding. Perhaps most serious, is the problem of predicting the target of comparison. These important limitations have resulted in RD theory providing little basis from which to draw firm hypotheses about when action will be the result of deprivation and when this action will be individual versus

collective and normative versus nonnormative.

Resource Mobilization Theories

The difficulties of the social psychological theories in providing predictions of the behavioural responses to inequality and deprivation has prompted some sociologists to call for the abandonment of psychological theories altogether (McCarthy & Zald, 1979; McPhail, 1971). Instead these critics of the psychological theories advocate a shift in attention towards structural and organizational variables. They cite a number of studies motivated primarily by Relative Deprivation theory that fail to provide connections between psychological factors and outbursts of collective action. The RD studies cited, however, have some important shortcomings that must be addressed. Many are plagued with difficulties in the control and measurement of important variables. For example, several fail to provide adequate measures of the mediating psychological processes of feelings of deprivation and dissatisfaction (see Bernstein & Crosby, 1980; Martin & Murray, 1984) and thus, the existence of actual inequality is presumed to result in feelings of deprivation and dissatisfaction. With the importance of the subjective evaluation of the individual so well established, this represents an important oversight. It is not surprising that studies which are, in fact, testing the role of absolute deprivation as a cause of action have produced few systematic findings. In this case the critics of the psychological

theories are using research which fails to measure psychological variables to attack the value of these same psychological variables.

In addition, much of the research used as evidence by the critics of psychological theory relies on archival and survey data. When archival data is used the lack of accurate measures of psychological variables is understandable. As Martin (1987) aptly points out "it is difficult to obtain reliable measures of the participants' feelings just before the storming of the Bastille" (p. 10). The use of historical accounts of collective action as research data inevitably limit the variables one can test or control, and leave any conclusions open to criticism on the grounds of biases on the part of those recounting the events. Again it appears that research that fails to adequately measure psychological variables is being used to attack the value of these same psychological variables.

Surveys given after the fact to participants in collective action also raise important questions. Retrospective surveys rely on the subjects' recollection and retrospective interpretations of their feelings, intentions and behaviours. Research evidence quite clearly shows that people often assume their past attitudes and feelings were consistent with their present ones even when, in fact, their attitudes and feelings have undergone substantial change (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals & Reckman, 1973; Wixon & Laird,

1976). Given the amount of attitude change that occurs over time, retrospective measures may dramatically differ from measures taken before or during the action.

The results of these poorly designed and conducted RD studies have, not too surprisingly, lead to the conclusion that psychological variables have little predictive power concerning the behavioural responses to deprivation. It is on these grounds that McPhail (1971) and McCarthy and Zald (1979) claim that the psychological variables play no part in the prediction of action by disadvantaged groups. They propose that there is always sufficient discontent in society to support a collective social movement, if the social structure is conducive to social action, and the collectivity is effectively organized and has at its disposal adequate power and resources. These Resource Mobilization theorists provide a list of structural variables that determine the likelihood of the occurrence of social action. Variables such as proximity of potential supporters, the existence of other successful social movements to act as role models, and a well organized structure within the movement are listed as the essential predictors of collective action.

There is some support (Snyder & Tilly, 1972; McCall, 1970) for this view that structural variables and resources may play a role in increasing the likelihood of nonnormative action. However, it would also appear somewhat premature to dispatch psychological factors as unimportant in determining

the actions of groups faced with inequality. As stated, there are serious problems with the research used to deny the importance of psychological variables and much of the existing psychological work in intergroup relations has not dealt directly with collective behaviour. This thesis represents an initial attempt to redress the lack of attention given to psychological research in the area of collective action.

Social Identity Theory

An important step towards a stronger psychology of intergroup relations has been the development of several psychological theories of intergroup relations that are more "group oriented"; distinguishing themselves from the more prevalent reductionist perspective. Tajfel and Turner (1979), inspired by their findings in social categorization, have developed one such theory. Social Identity theory holds that group members make social comparisons between their own group and other groups in order to determine if their group has a distinct and positive social identity. It is the desire to achieve or maintain group distinctiveness along positively valued dimensions that motivates group members to take social action.

This theory makes more explicit the various individual and collective responses (both behavioural and emotional) at the disposal of disadvantaged group members who find their

group faced with a negative social identity. When faced with a negative social identity the disadvantaged group member will seek change. The form that this change takes will depend upon the existing intergroup structure. If the existing system is viewed as unjust and unfair, its legitimacy is in question. If changes in the system are perceived as even vaguely possible, the stability of the system is also in question. When the legitimacy and stability of the social system is questioned the door is open for members of the disadvantaged group to imagine a situation in which their social identity might be improved. These perceptions of an alternative social structure are referred to as cognitive alternatives and their presence is the key to determining the response of the group.

The presence of cognitive alternatives makes available four types of collective action. The first strategy involves the redefinition of a previously negative characteristic so that it is now positively evaluated. An example of this is the "Black is beautiful" slogan of the American Black civil rights movement. The second response involves the creation or adoption of new dimensions of social comparison which allow for a more positive image of the disadvantaged group. The third possible response is for disadvantaged group members to attempt to have their group absorbed into the advantaged group. In this way they are able to gain access to the advantages previously denied them. Finally, the

perception of cognitive alternatives allows for the taking of direct collective action against the advantaged group and the existing system.

If, however, the stability and legitimacy of the social system remains unquestioned and thus the perception of cognitive alternatives is not evoked, the disadvantaged group member can only undertake individual responses. The first involves the disadvantaged group member satisfying the need for positive social identity by restricting himself/herself to individual social comparisons within his/her own group. In this case no action is taken to alter the existing situation and the intergroup inequalities are simply ignored. The second option is one of individual social mobility in which the individual member of the disadvantaged group attempts to leave his/her group in favour of entering the advantaged group.

This theory is, however, incomplete in its predictive capacity. Beyond identifying instability and illegitimacy of the system as the precursors to the perception of cognitive alternatives, and the presence of perceived cognitive alternatives as the determinant of two possible categories of responses, Social Identity theory provides no precise conditions that will determine which of the alternative responses will ultimately be preferred (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). In addition, the theory fails to provide indications as to what will determine the stability and legitimacy of any

given social system and what variables might make disadvantaged group members perceive this illegitimacy and instability. It thus remains difficult to predict when the response of the disadvantaged group members will be individual or collective, emotional or behavioural or perhaps some combination of these.

Two Theoretical Alternatives

The difficulty with the theories reviewed thus far is that, for all their insights, they have little substantive predictive power in terms of the behavioural responses of disadvantaged groups to perceived inequality. Two lesser known theories, however, do provide a basis from which to make specific hypotheses. These theories; one that has had a long history but has received little attention in the psychological literature and the other that is quite recent, provide some direct predictions as to the circumstances that will lead to different types of action by members of a disadvantaged group. They also allow for some predictions as to which individuals within the disadvantaged group are likely to remain inactive, engage in individual action, and instigate collective action.

The Five Stage Model of Intergroup Relations

Taylor and McKirnan (1984) propose a five stage model of intergroup relations. This model attempts to delineate the conditions which will determine the behavioural responses of

disadvantaged group members. At the first stage of intergroup relations group stratification is rigid and based on ascribed characteristics such as sex or race. During the second of the five stages of intergroup relations there exists a social situation in which membership in the advantaged or disadvantaged group is ostensibly due to performance, based on one's individual effort and ability. In this situation groups are perceived to be open and individual upward mobility possible for any with adequate ability. As long as this perception remains intact both advantaged and disadvantaged group members will attribute their position to their individual characteristics and, therefore, will limit their comparisons to ingroup interpersonal comparisons. If, however, the attempts of individual members of the disadvantaged group to move up (Stage Three) are repeatedly blocked, these people will come to perceive that membership in the advantaged group is not based on personal ability but on ascribed characteristics such as race, sex, or being born into a particular socio-economic class. This new perception of the advantaged group as closed results in strong feelings of injustice. The perception of the system as unjust represents an important stage in this model, as the emergence of these feelings prompt those individuals who have been denied entrance to the advantaged group to make cross-group comparisons. These comparisons lead to increased dissatisfaction and their

disadvantaged position is no longer perceived as acceptable or tolerable. It is at this point (Stage Four) that attempts at collective action will be initiated in an effort to create a more open system.

The key assumption made by this theory is that attempts at individual upward mobility (an "individual normative" response) are always the first strategy by which members of the disadvantaged group cope with the inequality they face. This form of behaviour will be maintained as long as the advantaged group continues to be regarded as open. It is only when these individual attempts are blocked and the advantaged group is perceived as closed to the disadvantaged group member that collective action will be initiated.

This model also makes clear predictions as to which individuals within the disadvantaged group will instigate collective action. Because the division of the two groups is initially perceived as legitimately based on ability, only intragroup comparisons are viewed as appropriate. This social comparison process, encouraged by the dominant ideology, leads the most talented members of the disadvantaged group to perceive themselves as closer than their fellow disadvantaged group members to the required criterion necessary for membership in the advantaged group. This perception encourages them to attempt mobility into the advantaged group. When rejected in their attempts at individual mobility these individuals, who have perceived

themselves as closest to entry into the advantaged group, will initiate collective action.

Elite Theory

The causes of individual and collective action proposed by the Five Stage Model are consistent with those espoused by Elite theory. Elite theory holds that all societies are made up of elites and non-elites and it is the advantaged elite which governs. Essential to all societies is some level of openness in the system so as to provide adequate "circulation of the elite" (Dye & Zeigler, 1970). This circulation process allows for the most able of the non-elites to gain entry into the ruling class and for unproductive members of the elite to be dropped from their advantaged position. If this circulation does not occur, individuals who are talented enough to be effective members of the elite but who have been thwarted in attempts to enter the elite will form counter-elites. It is these counter-elites which will instigate and lead collective action with the intention of challenging the existing structure and the elite group (see Taylor & Moghaddam 1987).

In the terms of intergroup relations used in this paper; Elite theory holds that those members of the disadvantaged group who will lead collective action against the advantaged group are the individuals who have the qualities necessary to become a member of the advantaged group. These are individuals who, in an open system (one with adequate

circulation of elite), would have been allowed access to the advantaged group through individual upward mobility. However, because the system is closed to them (inadequate circulation of elite) their bids for individual mobility are blocked. If their efforts to produce social change through collective action are successful, the members of the counter-elite (those who lead the collective action) will establish themselves as the new governing elite and the process will continue.

The Present Study

The third and final requirement of a study of the behavioural responses of disadvantaged group members is the development of an appropriate experimental paradigm. Work by Taylor et al. (1987) offers the groundwork for just such a paradigm. The present project will build upon this initial framework. The more complete and sophisticated paradigm presented here will allow the present research project to test three basic hypotheses arising out of the Five Stage Model and Elite theory. In addition, several of the present hypotheses extend beyond these two theoretical perspectives in an attempt to incorporate a broader range of behavioural response strategies than those considered by the Five Stage Model and Elite theory.

The first of the three basic hypotheses arising from the Five Stage Model and Elite theory involves the importance of

the perceived openness of the advantaged group. Both theories hold that individual attempts at social mobility will be attempted first by members of the disadvantaged group and that this behavioural strategy will be maintained as long as entry into the advantaged group appears to be dependent on individual performance alone. However, when the disadvantaged group members perceive the system as closed individual social mobility will be abandoned in favour of collective action.

Hypothesis I: a) when entrance into an advantaged group is perceived to be completely open, individual action will ensue and b) when entrance into an advantaged group is perceived to be completely closed, collective action will result.

In addition to the completely open and closed condition there is a need to investigate intergroup situations in which entrance into the advantaged group is only partially open. In these conditions upward mobility is no longer dependent exclusively on performance, however, neither is the advantaged group entirely closed. These conditions lead to interesting questions concerning the point at which restrictions on entrance into the advantaged group will begin to effect the responding of disadvantaged group members. Although both theories proclaim the importance of group openness as a determinant of action by disadvantaged group members, neither specify exactly how restrictive a system must

be before it will be perceived by the disadvantaged group as closed and therefore unjust.

Elite theory avoids this question entirely by the use of aristocratic and "divine right" regimes as examples of closed systems. In these cases no upward mobility is possible. Many social systems, however, are not as absolute in their discrimination. There exist many situations in which the unjust restriction of disadvantaged group members, though not complete, is easily recognized.

Taylor and McKirnan (1984) do make reference to systems in which "a few" disadvantaged group members do succeed in gaining access to the advantaged group. It is their prediction that these individuals will serve to strengthen the belief in the existing social system by reaffirming the availability of individual social mobility within the system and by emphasizing the role of personal ability and effort in their success. This would lead to the prediction that even the slightest semblance of openness to the advantaged group should be enough to maintain responding similar to that found in a completely open system. Our second hypothesis will then be based on the predictions of the Five Stage Model.

Hypothesis II: Even when a mere token percentage of the disadvantaged group is allowed access to the advantaged group individual action will ensue and little interest will be shown in collective action.

The third and final hypothesis arising out of Elite theory and the Five Stage Model involves predictions about which individuals within the disadvantaged group will be the instigators of collective action. Both theories hypothesize that it will be those members of the disadvantaged group who are closest to gaining entrance into the advantaged group who will initiate collective action. These "most talented" members of the disadvantaged group are more likely to have come "face to face" with the system's injustices and thus perceive the advantaged group as closed to them. It is this altered perception of the system that inspires them to enlist the support of other disadvantaged group members and instigate collective action. Consistent with these predictions, it is also expected that those who are distant from gaining entrance (especially those faced with what appears to be an open system) will be less likely to blame the system for their failure and therefore, they will be more likely to accept their disadvantaged position.

Hypothesis III: a) individuals who believe themselves to be close to entrance into the advantaged group will be inclined to take collective action when the system is closed to them; and b) individuals who believe themselves to be distant from the required level of performance necessary for entrance will be more likely to accept their

disadvantaged position.

The theoretical foundations on which to base predictions about the normative/nonnormative response decision are not as clearly defined. One limitation to both the Five Stage Model and Elite theory is that they fail to recognize this important distinction. Both theoretical perspectives seem to consider only normative action when discussing individual strategies of response and nonnormative action when describing collective responding. The exclusion of "individual nonnormative" and "collective normative" actions compromise the completeness of predictions based on these theories.

The primary theme concerning this normative/nonnormative distinction presented in other theories (ie. Crosby, 1976; Mark & Folger, 1984; McCarthy & Zald, 1979) seems to support the hypothesis that normative behaviour is contingent merely on the availability of a functional channel for normative responding. Our fourth hypothesis is derived from these broad claims.

Hypothesis IV: If there exists a normative means for action this line of action will be preferred. However, if normative means are unavailable, or ineffective, nonnormative action will result.

It must be recognized, however, that any predictions on the normative/nonnormative dimension are seriously limited by the failure of the existing research to include all five forms of

potential behaviour.

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were 120 males and females drawn from a variety of sources. About two thirds (n=80) were undergraduate students at McGill University from the faculties of Management, Physical Education and Psychology. The remaining participants were students at a local community college and university students employed at a community recreation facility. None of the participants were familiar with psychological experiments and all indicated that they had never participated in a social psychological study before.

Procedure and Materials

The laboratory procedures were designed so as to represent the basic elements of the North American "meritocracy". Subjects were lead to believe that they were to begin the experiment as members of a low status group and advancement to a higher status group would be based on personal performance. All subjects participated in small groups of five to nine but were required to work independently and were not permitted interaction with others in the room.

Initial Instructions to Subjects

Initial instructions were provided through a tape-recorded message. Subjects were told that the experiment was

intended to test their ability to make effective decisions about people. In order to increase the subject's motivation to perform well on the task this skill was characterized as an important social skill and one essential to those wishing to "move up the social hierarchy" and attain a position of responsibility or leadership. It was explained that as in "the real world" they were to begin at the bottom as a member of the "unsophisticated decision-making group" and their performance on an initial decision-making task would determine if they were to advance to the "sophisticated decision-making group". In order to further encourage the subject's interest in advancement and to make it apparent that they were, in fact, members of a disadvantaged group the benefits of membership in the sophisticated group were clearly delineated. They were told that if accepted into the sophisticated group they would associate with high status others, who had already been recognized as superior decision makers. In addition, they were informed that consistent with most "real-world" organizations, it was the members of the superior high status group who set the decision-making task, evaluated the performance of members of the unsophisticated group, and ultimately determined who would be allowed into their high status group. It was explained that a panel of three sophisticated group members would act as judges in the evaluation of their work. Finally, again consistent with the "real world" there were monetary advantages. The subjects

were informed that sophisticated group members were to participate in a $100.00 lottery, whereas the unsophisticated group members would participate only in a $10.00 lottery. In reality all subjects participated in a $100.00 lottery. Clearly subjects were motivated to attain acceptance into the sophisticated group as subjects worked hard on the task and showed substantial interest in their results.

Independent Measures

Following the tape-recorded instructions participants were given 15 minutes to read the evidence from a criminal case and to answer three questions ostensibly designed to tap their decision-making skill. Their answers were then collected and passed to an assistant who was to take them to the the panel of sophisticated group members to be evaluated. A 10 to 12 minute delay then followed during which time the three judges were supposedly marking the participant's work. In this delay period the experimenter distributed a blank "sample mark sheet" and described in detail the process used by the judges to arrive at their mark. It was also explained that the sophisticated group had collectively set a mark of 8.5/10 or 85% as the minimum score required for acceptance into their group. In order to fill the remaining waiting time, the experimenter then distributed "two cases to be used in the second portion of the study". Participants were informed that they "need not write anything on these but simply to familiarize themselves with the cases while waiting

for their marks". In reality these cases served only to reinforce the notion that they would be participating in a second portion of the study as a member of one of the two groups.

Following the prescribed delay completed mark sheets were returned by an assistant and distributed by the experimenter to the participants. On all mark sheets the final decision stated that the participant "must remain in the unsophisticated group". Information provided on these mark sheets was used to produce the two experimental manipulations. The openness of the advantaged group was manipulated by altering the information provided in the comments written by the judges. How close the subject perceived him/herself to be to gaining entrance into the advantaged group was altered through the actual mark received on their work. As the subjects participated in small groups and the experimental manipulations were in the form of written feedback, in any given session it was possible to randomly assign subjects to the eight different experimental conditions. In addition, the experimenter was blind to the experimental condition of each subject, as this was determined by the assistant who returned the mark sheet. These two manipulations are explained in greater detail.

Group Openness. This independent variable involved four conditions. In the "open" condition rejection from the sophisticated group was based solely on performance (i.e.

failure to reach the required criterion). Therefore, participants in this condition were given some general comments about their work but their total mark did not reach the required 8.5 out of 10.

In the conditions that were less than open an additional restrictive criterion was placed upon entrance into the sophisticated group. In order to allow random assignment of subjects to conditions and to avoid the possible confounding effects of introducing a criterion that might hold some social significance or past experience with discrimination, the new additional criterion could not involve a specific characteristic of the subject. It also must be appropriately perceived as unrelated to "merit" per se. For this purpose we chose simply to introduce a quota system. By having the sophisticated group arbitrarily impose a quota on the entry into their group, the meritocracy is compromised, performance is no longer the sole determinant of success. In this way the system is no longer completely open. The quota system also allows for easy manipulation of the degree of openness. By reducing the size of the quota, the openness of the advantaged group is decreased. In the extreme case, for example, a quota of 0% results in the advantaged group being completely closed. In the present experiment four levels of group openness were introduced.

1) The "open" condition: In this condition entry into the advantaged group is dependent solely on performance.

Subjects believe that all those who achieve the required score are accepted into the advantaged group.

2) The "30% quota" condition: In this condition subjects received additional information on their mark sheet that indicated that "the sophisticated group had decided to ignore the previously presented cut off of 8.5 out of 10 and felt it necessary to impose a 30% quota on entrance into the sophisticated decision-making group".

3) The "2% quota" condition: In this condition subjects received information identical to that of the "30% quota" condition except that the comment indicated that a 2% quota has been imposed rather than the 30% quota.

4) The "completely closed" condition: In this condition subjects were told that the sophisticated group had decided not to accept any new members regardless of their performance on the task.

Closeness to Entry. The two levels of this independent variable were determined by the manipulation of the total mark given to the subject. Subjects in the "far" condition, always received a mark of 6.0, indicating that they were substantially below the required 8.5 cutoff. Subjects in the "close" condition, received one of two marks. "Close" subjects in the "open" condition of the "group openness" variable received a mark of 8.2, just slightly below the 8.5 cutoff. "Close" subjects in the other three "group openness" conditions (ie 30% quota, 2% quota, and closed) receive a

mark of 8.8. This mark exceeds the designated 8.5 cutoff and had the system been completely open, this mark would have resulted in acceptance into the sophisticated group.

Dependent Measures

Subjects were given a few minutes to digest their negative feedback. They were then asked to consider five behavioural options that they might wish to undertake in response to the decision of the sophisticated group. 1) They could accept the decision of the sophisticated group and agree to remain a member of the unsophisticated group for the remainder of the experiment. 2) They could request an individual retest. As a request for a retest is presented as an option that has been acceptable to the sophisticated group in the past, a subject supporting this option is indicating a desire to continue their attempts to gain entrance into the advantaged group through an "individual normative" action. 3) They could make an individual protest against the decision of the sophisticated group. In this case they endorse a behaviour explicitly unacceptable to the advantaged group. In doing so they are willing to go outside the rules of the system in an attempt to gain personal access to the higher status group. 4) They could support a collective retest option. This strategy involves the subject attempting to solicit the support of the other members of the unsophisticated group in order to persuade the judges

(members of the sophisticated group) to allow a retest for all members of the unsophisticated group. Here the subject perceives the joint effort of the members of the disadvantaged group as advantageous in improving the likelihood of success. As the request for a retest is described as a response that is acceptable to the sophisticated group, this response, though collective, is normative in nature. 5) Finally, the subject can attempt to instigate collective protest. Here the subject attempts to solicit the support of the other members of the unsophisticated group with the intention of forcing the sophisticated group to reverse their decision and thus allow all members of the unsophisticated group access to the sophisticated group. The selection of this alternative calls for action that is both collective and inconsistent with the rules of the existing system.

Ratings of Behavioural Intentions. The five behavioural response options were presented to the subject together in the form of five statements each followed by a rating scale. The respondent was asked to first read all five options, and then to rate his/her interest in each of the five alternative responses. Each ratings was done on an eleven point Likert scales, bounded by "not at all" (0) and "very much" (10).

Single Behavioural Response Selection. Before rating the responses, subjects were asked to consider which option they would most like to undertake. They were told that they

would be expected to carry out the option they rated highest (i.e. nearest to 10 on the Likert scale). After rating all five alternatives the respondent was provided with a "message form" that had space in which to indicate one's decision to accept the decision of the sophisticated group or to request a personal or group retest. If the subject wished to make a personal or collective protest they were instructed to write a paragraph indicating their position and describing the changes they wanted made. Subjects were told that messages of "acceptance," personal retest and personal protest would be taken to members of the sophisticated group, while messages intended to instigate collective action would be circulated to other unsophisticated group members.

Perceptions and Emotional Responses. Following the collection of the message forms the experimenter distributed a short questionnaire that queried respondents as to their feelings about the decision of the sophisticated group and the system in general. Again all responses were given in the form of ratings on an eleven point Likert scale. These nine questions can be divided into three broad categories. The first category includes two questions that asked the subjects to rate their satisfaction with the system that gave all the decision making power and greater monetary rewards to the sophisticated group. The second broad category included four questions that asked the subjects to rate their satisfaction with and the justness of their treatment at the hands of the

sophisticated group members. Two questions were directed at their personal treatment and two at their perception of collective treatment of the unsophisticated group as a whole. The third and final category contained three questions concerning the subjects' emotional reaction to the results they had received. Feelings of frustration, resentment and hope for future success were measured.

The purpose of including this second group of measures was twofold. First, it was important that it not simply be assumed that the manipulations implemented in the present experiment would produce the appropriate feelings and perceptions. If the manipulations failed to produce the appropriate emotional responses the present study would have been reduced to the measurement of responses to actual injustice. As described in the discussions of Equity theory, Relative Deprivation theory and the Five Stage Model, it is the perception of injustice and deprivation that determines the response of disadvantaged group members, not the actual conditions. Therefore, it was important to ensure that the manipulations were effective in producing the required perceptions. Secondly, by measuring a variety of feelings, emotions and perceptions in addition to the behavioural responses, it might be possible to investigate the relationships between these two types of reactions to the intergroup situations created in this study.

Following completion of this second set of questions,

subjects were informed that the study was completed and were thoroughly debriefed as to the true purpose of the study and the procedures. All subjects were assured that there was no relationship between their actual work and the feedback they received. In addition, they were informed that all participants were entered in the $100.00 lottery.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results are presented in three sections corresponding to the three primary dependent measures used in this study. The first section focuses on the subject's ratings on the five behavioural intentions scales. This data is analyzed using an analysis of variance to investigate the role of the two experimental manipulations in determining the subjects interest in the five behavioural response options. In so doing the three hypotheses concerning interest in individual and collective action are tested. As well some light is shed on the important normative/nonnormative distinction raised in hypothesis four. The second section involves the frequency data provided by the single behavioural response undertaken by each subject on the "message form". These results are used primarily to highlight and support the results of the rating scales data, provided in section one. Section three concerns the nine measures of feelings, emotions and perceptions. These analyses are used to ensure the effectiveness of the manipulations in producing feelings of injustice and

dissatisfaction, as well as to investigate the relationships between these perceptions and emotions and the behavioural responses.

Ratings of Behavioural Intentions

The first analysis involved the subject's ratings of interest in each of the five behavioural intentions as the dependent measure. This analysis involved a 2 x 4 x 5 analysis of variance (ANOVA). The three factors included were: a) closeness to entry (close, far); b) group openness (open, 30% quota, 2% quota, closed) and; c) the repeated factor, behavioural intention (acceptance, individual normative action, individual nonnormative action, collective normative action, collective nonnormative action).

A statistically significant main effect for "behavioural intention" [$F(4,504)=16.10$, $p<.05$] was embedded in two significant two-way interactions. The first was the interaction between "behavioural intention" and "group openness" [$F(12,504)=2.67$, $p<.01$]. The group means and pattern of responding for the two factors involved in this interaction are presented in Figure 1. The second significant two-way interaction was between "behavioural intention" and "closeness to entry" [$F(4,504)=3.19$, $p<.05$]. The group means and pattern of responding for the two factors involved in this second interaction are presented in Figure 2. These interaction effects will be discussed in turn as they relate

to the four major hypotheses raised in the present study.

Hypothesis One

Hypothesis one focuses on groups that are completely open or closed. Therefore, the partially open conditions (30% and 2% quota conditions) will be ignored at this stage. The pattern of ratings for subjects in the "open" and "completely closed" conditions (see Figure 1) provides some support for this first hypothesis. As predicted, when entrance into the advantaged group is completely open "individual normative" action is the most preferred response (M=7.18) and "collective nonnormative" action receives little support (M=3.79). When opportunity for upward mobility is completely closed there is a reduction in interest in "individual normative" action (M=5.43) and increased support for the "collective nonnormative" strategy (M=6.49). However, support for the first hypothesis is qualified by the failure of both the theories, on which it is based, to recognize the "individual nonnormative" and "collective normative" response options./ When faced with the complete closure of the advantaged group subjects show somewhat greater support (though not statistically significant difference) for "individual nonnormative" action (M=6.07) than those in the "open" condition (M=4.76). As well, the closure of the advantaged group results in little change in interest in collective action which is normative in nature (M=4.79, for the "open" condition and M=5.40, for the



Figure 1: Mean rating of endorsement of the five behavioural responses by subjects at four levels of group openness

"closed" condition). It appears that as long as discussions of individual action are restricted to normative forms and collective action to nonnormative forms, as is the case in both the Five Stage Model and Elite theory, then there is support for the claim that if the intergroup system is perceived as open individual action will be preferred and when the advantaged group appears closed collective action will be undertaken. However, because individual responding can involve nonnormative action and collective responding includes normative action, these two theories have proven inadequate in producing a complete picture of the response patterns of disadvantaged group members. The present findings would indicate that when the system is closed there is no decrease (and perhaps even a slight increase) in the endorsement of "individual nonnormative" action and little or no change in interest in "collective normative" behaviours.

Hypothesis Two

The basic prediction of hypothesis two, concerning the selection of individual and collective action in partially open intergroup settings, is supported by the results of the "30% quota" and "2% quota" conditions (see Figure 1). This data appears consistent with the assertion of the Five Stage Model that even a small number of successful attempts at individual upward mobility will serve to maintain interest in individual action, and prevent strong endorsement of collective action. However, the pattern of responses

indicated in Figure 1 would tend to question the premise on which this assertion is based. As entrance into the advantaged group becomes increasingly restricted, support for "acceptance" and "individual normative" action decrease systematically and interest shifts to nonnormative forms of individual action. Therefore, although individual rather than collective actions remain the response types of choice, the increased interest in nonnormative forms of individual action tends to indicate that a small number of successes will not serve to strengthen disadvantaged group member's belief in the existing system. Increasing closure of the advantaged group leads to action that violates the norms of that system; actions directed at changing the system. So, although the Five Stage Model lead us to the appropriate prediction that individual action will be preferred over collective action in partially open situations, the failure to recognize nonnormative forms of individual action leads to an erroneous interpretation of this preference.

The continued interest of subjects in individual actions in the partially open condition seems to reflect a dominant concern for personal self-interest on the part of these subjects. If the individual member of the disadvantaged group is primarily concerned with personal advancement, then it is quite reasonable that as long as there remains even the slightest possibility for personal advancement (as is the case in the 2% quota condition), the inclusion of other group

members is not appealing. If one is motivated by selfish concern for one's own position, then gaining personal access to a group restricted to only a very small percentage of the most capable individuals should be far more appealing than gaining the same objective status along with a larger number of one's peers. Thus, even when arbitrary changes in the rules are introduced and the individual is rejected, as long as personal advancement remains a possibility, individual responding will remain the preferred form of action. Consistent with this interpretation, the turn to collective action in the "completely closed" condition is not explained by a sudden shift to a more collective consciousness. This change in strategy reflects the realization that only through the inclusion of one's peers can the individual have a chance to improve his/her personal position. Consequently, it is selfish concern for personal position which leads even to collective responding.

Interest in "collective normative" action, surprisingly, seems to show little relationship to the openness of the advantaged group. A moderate and stable level of interest in this type of behaviour is found at all levels of "group openness" ($\underline{M}$=4.79, $\underline{M}$=4.63, $\underline{M}$=5.05, $\underline{M}$=5.40, for the "open", "30% quota", "2% quota" and "closed" conditions respectively). Therefore, the preference for collective action in the "completely closed" condition is the result of increased interest in nonnormative forms of collective

action. As discussed at the outset of this paper, this form of action is likely to result in the greatest change in both the intergroup situation and the system itself. It is, therefore, of special interest.

Simple effects analysis of the effect of "group openness" on the endorsement of "collective nonnormative" action resulted in a significant main effect of "group openness" [$F(3,133)=4.57$, $p<.01$]. Subsequent post hoc, pairwise comparisons indicated that this effect was the result of a significant difference ($\alpha=.05$) between the "completely closed" condition ($M=6.49$) and all three other conditions ($M=3.79$, $M=3.81$, and $M=4.67$, for the "open", "30% quota" and "2% quota" conditions respectively). Quite clearly it is only when opportunity to gain access to the advantaged group is completely closed that a real interest in "nonnormative collective" action is shown. At that point collective protest becomes the most preferred response. These findings indicate that the action of the disadvantaged group most likely to result in serious disruption of the status quo may be reserved solely for situations where opportunity for personal advancement is completely removed. In the present study, even the strict and arbitrary restriction of advancement evident in the "2% quota" condition does not result in a significant increase in interest in collective protest over that expressed by subjects in the "open" or "30% quota" conditions.

These results provided by subjects in these partially open conditions have direct implications for the study of discrimination and primarily the area of "tokenism". In the partially open conditions (especially the 2% quota condition) a system is instituted that allows for minimal integration of disadvantaged group members into advantaged positions, while systematically keeping the remainder of that group in a disadvantaged position. This, by definition, is tokenism. The present results show that although the complete rejection of disadvantaged group members leads to substantial interest in "nonnormative collective" action, the practice of tokenism leads to little of this most disruptive forms of action. Instead the result is endorsement of individual action strategies. It seems then that the likelihood of change in intergroup relations or in the system itself is greatly decreased by the implementation of a policy of tokenism.

Hypothesis Three

The second statistically significant two-way interaction, between "behavioural intention" and "closeness to entry", is relevant to the third major hypothesis forwarded in the present study. As shown in Figure 2, subjects who were told that they were very close to gaining entry to the advantaged group showed greater interest in "individual nonnormative" action ($\underline{M}$=6.47), than did those distant from entry ($\underline{M}$=5.11). On the other hand, those who received a low mark, and thus



Figure 2: Mean rating of endorsement of each of five behavioural responses by subjects close to and far from entry into the advantaged group

were lead to believe they were quite distant from entrance, showed a greater propensity to endorse "acceptance" (M=3.84) and "collective normative" action (M=5.45) than those who believed themselves to be close to entrance (M=2.91 for "acceptance" and M=4.48 for "collective normative"). Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons indicated that these differences between the mean ratings of subjects in the "close" and "far" conditions reached statistical significance for the "acceptance" and "individual nonnormative" responses (α=.05). This pattern of findings is quite consistent with aggregate measures of the effects of "closeness to entry" provided by Taylor et al. (1987).

These findings taken independently do not provide all the conditions described in our third hypothesis. The prediction that those individuals who are closest to entry into the advantaged group are the ones most likely to endorse collective action strategies, is relevant only to individuals faced with an unjust or closed system. In this case some of the subjects in the "close to entrance" condition find themselves in what appears to be an open system and others in partially open systems. However, the differences seen in Figure 2 and the lack of any three-way (behavioural intention by group openness by closeness to entry) interaction effect casts some doubt on the assertion that it will be primarily those individuals that are close to entrance and faced with a closed system that will prefer collective action. The

absence of a three-way interaction effect indicates that although for each type of response the relationship between the ratings of subjects in the "close" and "far" conditions is different, this relationship is not effected by the openness of the group. From this we can assume that the small difference in endorsement of "collective nonnormative" action, evident between those close to and far from entrance (M=4.99 and M=4.56 respectively), is reasonably consistent across levels of "group openness". Equivalently, the somewhat greater endorsement of "collective normative" action by those who are distant from entrance (M=5.45) than those that are close to entrance (M=4.48), is also unrelated to the openness of the advantaged group. It appears then that at any level of "group openness" there will be little difference between the endorsement of "collective nonnormative" action by individuals who are close to entry into the advantaged group and by those who are far from gaining entry to the advantaged group. If there are any differences in the likelihood of endorsing a collective style of responding, the present findings would indicate that normative forms of collective action are more likely to be undertaken by those who are far from the criterion required for entrance into the advantaged group.

It would appear that it is the preference for "individual nonnormative" action that distinguishes those that are close to entry from those who are distant. To

understand this finding it is important to recall that in the present manipulation three quarters of the subjects in the "close to entry" conditions (those in the last three conditions of "group openness") received a mark which by the initial rules should have qualified them for a place in the advantaged group. These subjects have a personal experience with the unjust and arbitrary nature of the system and it appears to be this personal experience that leads to a preference for nonnormative action. Although subjects in the "far" condition are given the same information about the changing of the criterion for entrance into the advantaged group, this change does not have the same personal impact. These subjects would have failed by either the new or the old criterion. The arbitrary rule change did not effect them personally, therefore these subjects are less inclined towards action outside the rules defined by the existing system.

The higher level of "acceptance" by those distant from entrance into the advantaged group is consistent with the second portion of hypothesis three. Again, due to the lack of a three-way interaction effect, we are unable to claim that this higher propensity for "acceptance" is greatest in the "open" condition of the "group openness" variable. However, this consistently greater endorsement of the "acceptance" option is consistent with interpretation that individuals who perceive themselves as far from the

performance level required for entry into the sophisticated group are more likely to show an attitude of defeat. Subjects who are faced with a poor evaluation and a system that appears open may be forced to accept their own inadequacy and thus their disadvantaged position. Those distant from entry and facing a closed or partially closed system may feel robbed of control over their situation by the injustice of the system and, because of their poor performance, they may feel incapable of acting to change the situation.

The greater support for "collective normative" action by those in the "far" condition, though not reaching statistically significant levels, is worthy of note because of its consistency with the dominance of personal self-interest shown in the responses of subjects through the present study. The subjects in this "far" condition have earned a poor mark on the task. Should a retest be granted to only a few individuals in the disadvantaged group, those who have done very poorly are unlikely to be selected. If however, the entire group is provided a retest they are assured of a second opportunity. Those in the "close to entry" condition have received a very high grade and may feel less of a need to include other members of their group to ensure themselves of second opportunities to to gain access to the advantaged group. Interest in the "collective normative" strategy, therefore, seems also to depend, not on

interest in improvement of the collective condition, but on increasing the likelihood of personal advancement.

Hypothesis Four

No support at all is shown for the fourth hypothesis presented at the outset of this research. The previous discussion has clearly shown the great importance of the normative/nonnormative distinction in the actions of disadvantaged group members. Based on the limited discussion of this division in the existing literature, hypothesis four predicted that given the availability of a functional channel for normative action, normative actions will be preferred. This does not appear to be the case. All subjects, in all conditions, were presented with a normative form of both individual and collective action as a possible response, and yet many chose to ignore these options in favour of nonnormative strategies. The present data indicates that the endorsement of normative or nonnormative action by disadvantaged group members is effected by both the intergroup situation (the perceived openness of the advantaged group) and how distant the individual perceives him/herself to be from the advantaged group entrance criteria. The present findings suggest that this distinction plays a substantially more complex role in the responses of disadvantaged group members, than is represented in most theoretical discussions.

Single Behavioural Response Selected

Following the rating of the five behavioural responses subjects carried out the behaviour they were most interested in. The single behavioural response actually undertaken by each subject represents the second dependent measure. This measure provided frequency data which can be used to supplement the continuous data provided by the rating scales.

Table 1 provides a 4 X 5 frequency table containing the number of subjects in each of the four conditions of "group openness" who engaged in each of the five behavioural responses. A chi-square test of independence indicated a statistically significant relationship between the level of openness of the advantaged group and the type of action chosen ($\chi^2=29.93$, $p<.01$). The pattern of responding responsible for this significant relationship is perhaps more evident in the graphic representation of this data provided in Figure 3. A comparison of this figure to the pattern of responding for the rating scale data provided in Figure 1 indicates substantial similarity between the results of these two dependent measures. In part, this similarity in pattern serves to show that the more statistically versatile rating scale technique is an appropriate method by which to determine the likelihood of a particular response actually occurring. In addition, the single response measure serves to highlight the major findings for each of the experimental conditions.

Table 1

The Number of Subjects Selecting Each of the Five Behavioural Responses at Four Conditions of Group Openness.

Behavioural Response	Level of Group Openness: Open	30% Quota	2% Quota	Closed	TOTAL
Acceptance	9	7	4	5	25
Individual Normative	14	12	9	7	42
Individual Nonnormative	6	7	14	7	34
Collective Normative	4	6	6	3	19
Collective Nonnormative	2	1	2	12	17
TOTAL	35	33	35	34	137

Hypothesis One

The actions taken by those faced with an advantaged group which is either open or completely closed are consistent with our first hypothesis. Again, this support is qualified by the neglect of "individual nonnormative" and "collective normative" actions. The majority of subjects faced with rejection in an open system engaged in "individual normative" action (N=14) or simply accepted their position in



Figure 3: Frequency of selection of each of five behavioural responses by subjects in four levels of group openness

the disadvantaged group (N=9). Only a single subject in this "open" condition attempted to instigate "collective nonnormative" action. Subjects facing a completely closed advantaged group, on the other hand, were more likely to take "collective nonnormative" action (N=12) than any other response (see Figure 3). Also similar to the results of the rating scale data, we find little difference between these two groups in terms of the number of subjects taking "individual nonnormative" (N=6, for "open" and N=7, for "closed" condition) and "collective normative" actions (N=4, for "open" and N=3, for "closed" condition).

Hypothesis Two

The findings of this dependent measure are also consistent with the broad prediction of the second hypothesis, the preference for individualistic action in the "2% quota" and 30% quota" conditions is clearly evident in this frequency data (see Table 1 and Figure 3). The shift from normative to nonnormative forms of individual action as the restrictions increase from 30% to 2%, described in the rating scale data, is even more clearly evident in the frequency data presented in Figure 3. "Individual normative" action is undertaken most frequently by subjects faced with a 30% quota restriction on entry into the advantaged group (N=12), while "individual nonnormative" action is undertaken most often by those facing a 2% quota (N=14).

Conclusions concerning interest in "collective nonnormative" action drawn from the rating scale data are dramatically supported in the actual behaviours undertaken by the subjects. Very few subject in the "open" (N=2), "30% quota" (N=1) or "2% quota" (N=2) conditions take this form of action. However, in the "completely closed" condition this becomes the behaviour of choice (N=12). Quite clearly involvement in collective action which deviates from the norms of the system is almost completely reserved for conditions where access to the advantaged group is completely unavailable. This measure provides perhaps even more compelling evidence of the apparent success of tokenism in preventing interest in the most disruptive of behaviours available to the disadvantaged group; "collective nonnormative" action.

Hypothesis Three

Table 2 presents the number of subjects in each of the two levels of "closeness to entry" who selected each of the five available responses. A chi-square test on this 2 X 5 frequency table indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between the subjects perceived closeness to entry into the advantaged group and the behavioural response he/she selected (χ^2=13.74, p<.01).

Table 2

The Number of Subjects Selecting each of the Five Behavioural Responses when Close To and Far From Entrance into the Advantaged Group

Behavioural Response	Closeness to Entrance		TOTAL
	Close	Far	
Acceptance	7	18	25
Individual Normative	22	20	42
Individual Nonnormative	25	9	34
Collective Normative	7	12	19
Collective Nonnormative	9	8	17
TOTAL	68	69	137

An examination of the table shows that the results of this dependent measure strongly support the evidence provided by the rating scale data. "Individual nonnormative" action is undertaken by almost three times as many subjects who are lead to believe that they are close to the entrance criterion (N=25) than by those who believe themselves to be far from gaining entry (N=9). The opposite is true of "acceptance" and "collective normative" action, where those in the "far"

condition are more likely than those in the "close" condition to undertake these forms of response. Again, we find little to distinguish these two conditions in terms of the number of subjects interested in "collective nonnormative" and "individual normative" actions.

Hypothesis Four

As was true for the rating scale data, no support was found for hypothesis four. Endorsement of nonnormative verses normative action was tied to a variety of intergroup and individual variables, and not simply the availability of a normative response option.

Some Extensions provided by this Single Response Measure

Although not directly relevant to the four primary hypotheses of the present paper, this frequency data provides some additional information that qualifies the findings associated with the rating scales of behavioural intention. The rating scale data shows "acceptance" to be the least preferred option in almost every condition. However, the single response frequency data provided in Table 2 shows that in the "far" condition only "individual normative" action is chosen by a greater number of subjects than the "acceptance" option. Also the overall totals indicate that acceptance of one's disadvantaged situation was selected by a greater number of subjects than either of the collective actions. What this indicates is that even though these subjects

actually accept their disadvantaged situation, they are doing so with relatively less interest (as measured on the rating scale). In other words, these subjects are accepting their disadvantaged position begrudgingly. This conclusion is confirmed by comparing the mean rating for "acceptance" by those who chose the "acceptance" response to the mean rating for the chosen action of all other subjects. Subjects who accept their situation do so with a mean rating of 7.3 for "acceptance". The mean rating for all other actions for those undertaking that action is over 8.8. A list of means for all groups is provided in Table 3.

Table 3

Mean Rating of Endorsement for Each of the Five Behavioural Responses by Subjects who Selected to Undertake Each of these Responses.

Single Selected Behavioural Response	Mean Rating of Endorsement (on 10 point Likert scale)
Acceptance	7.28
Individual Normative	8.85
Individual Nonnormative	9.15
Collective Normative	8.89
Collective Nonnormative	9.06

The frequency data provided by allowing subjects to actually carry out one of the five behavioural response options serves to clarify the important findings arising out of the rating scale data. In addition, it serves to provide some important qualifications. This dependent measure, although more limited in terms of statistical analysis, is relevant to extrapolations of these findings to real-world groups. In most naturalistic settings interest is in the actual behaviour undertaken by group members, not their hypothetical endorsement of possible options.

Perceptions and Emotional Responses to Perceived Inequality

As indicated previously, nine questions were used to measure the perceptions and emotional responses of each subject. The two primary purposes of these nine perception and emotional response measures were: 1) to ensure that the experimental manipulations resulted in the appropriate emotional reactions; and 2) to investigate possible relationships between these perceptions and emotions and the endorsement of the five categories of behavioural response.

The analysis of these measures involved the performance of a series of nine 2 X 4 ANOVA's, involving the two levels of "closeness to entry" and "group openness". Despite the importance of these two factors in determining the action of disadvantaged group members, they had little systematic effect on these measures of perceptions and emotional

response. The nine ANOVA's produced only one significant effect. A statistically significant main effect of "closeness to entry" [$F(1,125)=6.89$, $p<.01$] showed that subjects in the "far" condition indicated greater satisfaction with their personal treatment than subjects in the "close" condition. Table 4 provides the mean ratings, on the eleven point Likert scale, for subjects in each of the experimental conditions on each of the nine measures. Low scores indicate that the subject feels lesser levels of the emotion described in each question.

It is clear from these means that, whether close to or far from entry and at all levels of group openness, subjects felt little satisfied with and saw little justice in the personal and collective treatment. As well, they indicated moderate to high levels of emotional reaction to the feedback they received. From this evidence we can confidently hold that the manipulations presented in the present study did serve to produce the appropriate feelings and perceptions. Consequently, the responses measured are the result of perceived injustice and deprivation not simply the actual conditions.

Consistent with the second purpose of these measures of perceptions and feelings, some interesting relationships between these measures and the subjects ratings of behavioural intention were uncovered. Previous research has indicated that collective action should be predicted by

Table 4

Mean Rating on the Nine Perceptions and Emotional Response Measures for Subjects in All Experimental Conditions.

Perceptions and Emotional Responses	Group Openness							
	30% Open	2% Quota	Quota	Closed	30% Open	2% Quota	Quota	Closed
	Close to Entry				Far from Entry			
Justice of Personal Treatment	3.41	3.00	1.50	1.67	3.06	3.63	4.06	3.63
Satisfaction with Personal Treatment	3.35	2.35	2.25	1.61	3.00	2.31	2.69	2.88
Justice of Collective Treatment	3.41	3.29	3.81	2.78	3.81	2.75	3.56	3.13
Satisfaction with Collective Treatment	2.41	3.47	3.38	2.17	3.35	2.44	2.94	2.88
Satisfaction with Monetary Distribution	1.59	3.18	3.63	2.39	3.29	2.75	3.38	1.88
Satisfaction with Power Distribution	4.00	4.41	4.00	3.72	2.94	2.31	4.25	4.25
Hope for Future Personal Success	6.82	5.12	5.94	4.72	5.19	6.56	5.69	5.88
Resentment	4.41	4.94	5.00	5.05	4.75	6.86	4.75	5.44
Frustration	4.24	4.53	5.06	4.06	6.00	7.25	5.31	5.50

feelings of collective mistreatment and dissatisfaction with the collective condition (i.e. Guimond & Dubé, 1983). Individual action should be the result of personal grievance and feelings of personal injustice. Many of the findings that have been presented in the present study, however, have led to the interpretation that personal self-interest is the dominant motivator for all types of behaviours. In order to investigate the relationships between feelings and perceptions and the subjects behavioural intentions both sets of ratings for the entire sample were entered into a factor analysis.

Four factors were extracted resulting in a model that accounted for 66.5% of the variance in the data set. A varimax orthogonal rotation was performed on these four factors resulting in the pattern of factor loadings presented in Table 5.

Factor One might be labelled "interest in nonnormative action, motivated by personal self-interest". This first factor shows large loadings from both behavioural responses and feelings of satisfaction and justice. Satisfaction with and perceived justice of one's personal treatment, as well as interest in an "acceptance" response load positiyely on this factor. Both "individual nonnormative" and "collective nonnormative" action load negatively.

Factor Two might be viewed as "the subject's philosophical support of the system". This second factor

Table 5

Factor Pattern Matrix for Analysis including Ratings of Endorsement of the Five Behavioural Responses and the Nine Perceptions and Emotional Response Measures.

Variables	Factors 1	2	3	4
Acceptance	.8063	.0925	-.0755	-.0514
Individual Nonnormative Action	-.7578	.0501	.3035	.1800
Collective Nonnormative Action	-.5466	-.1861	.4213	.1948
Justice of Personal Treatment	.7524	.2492	.0898	-.2026
Satisfaction with Personal Treatment	.6097	.4998	.1468	-.1426
Justice of Collective Treatment	.2758	.7256	.1180	-.1991
Satisfaction with Collective Treatment	.2064	.8426	-.0799	-.0200
Satisfaction with Monetary Distribution	-.2668	.7728	-.0918	.0505
Satisfaction with Power Distribution	.3337	.6303	.0247	-.1076
Hope for Future Personal Success	-.0045	.0631	.7705	-.0523
Individual Normative Action	.0172	.0520	.7340	.2154
Collective Normative Action	-.2256	-.1178	.7189	.2056
Resentment	-.1972	-.1645	.1418	.8644
Frustration	-.1891	-.0260	.2056	.8584

includes only four emotional variables. Satisfaction with, and perceived justice of collective treatment, and satisfaction with the distribution of power and rewards all show large positive loadings on this factor.

Factor three could be labelled "belief in the system". This third factor includes the two forms of normative action (individual and collective) and the emotional variable of hope for future success. All three load positively on this third factor.

Factor Four could be referred to as "negative feelings". This fourth factor holds the remaining two emotional responses of resentment and frustration.

The pattern of results seems to describe a relationship between behavioural responding, emotional reactions and perceptions which is inconsistent with the findings of previous research. Researchers who held that involvement in collective action should be predicted by feelings of collective injustice and deprivation (Guimond & Dubé, 1983) would have to predict that collective actions (either normative or nonnormative or both) should load with feelings of collective injustice and dissatisfaction with the collective condition. Factor three indicates that "collective normative" action is associated with the same feelings as "individual normative" action: that being the hope that future personal success is possible within the existing system. The subjects belief that they will succeed

in gaining access to the advantaged group in the future is associated with their endorsement of both normative strategies. "Collective nonnormative" action appears to be related to the same perceptions as "individual nonnormative" action and "acceptance". It appears that endorsement of all three of these types of action is related to perceptions of personal treatment. The perceptions of collective treatment are not associated with any forms of action; but instead load with other feelings of satisfaction with the overall system. It appears that perceptions of collective treatment are primarily a component of the subject's philosophical support of the system, but is not necessarily related to action per se. These findings are consistent with earlier discussion of the dominant role of personal self-interest in determining the actions of the individual disadvantaged group members.

It is also interesting to note that the emotional responses of frustration and resentment form their own factor. This lends support to the conclusion that interest in a particular form of action is not simply the result of increasing negative feelings. It would be unwise then to assume that support for collective over individual action or the selection of nonnormative over normative action is simply the product of greater anger, frustration or resentment.

This analysis of the relationship between these perceptions and feelings, and the behavioural responses was not the primary focus of the present study. Thus the

conclusions drawn from the evidence provided here, are not stated with overwhelming conviction. The present findings should represent the basis for alternative hypotheses to those forwarded by other work on the relationship between overt behaviour and underlying feelings and perceptions. Quite clearly, the role of these perceptions and feelings in determining actual behaviour should be more completely investigated before firm conclusions can be drawn.

CONCLUSIONS

The present research represents an attempt to specify the conditions that determine the actions taken by members of disadvantaged groups. Three significant departures from traditional lines of research where taken and all are shown to have important ramifications. The emphasis on behavioural responses found in this study distinguishes it from much of the previous work. Past research tends to emphasize feelings, perceptions and emotions associated with a disadvantaged position and discriminatory treatment. In addition, the inclusion of the two collective behaviour options represents an important improvement over the highly individualistic studies of the past. Finally, this research has demonstrated the substantial importance of the normative/nonnormative distinction for action at both the individual and collective levels.

The Five Stage Model and Elite theory provided the theoretical basis for the three primary hypotheses forwarded

in the present study. First, both of these theories make reference to the important role of perceived openness of the advantaged group in determining the actions of disadvantaged group members. This importance was clearly demonstrated by the present results. When the advantaged group is perceived to be open to upward mobility, "individual normative" strategies are the form of action most preferred by disadvantaged group members. In this "open" condition there is very little interest in "collective nonnormative" action. When access to the advantaged group appears to be closed to disadvantaged group members we see the emergence of a strong interest in "collective nonnormative" action. However, the failure of the two relevant theories to recognize "individual nonnormative" and "collective normative" actions is shown, by the present findings, to be a significant oversight. The level of endorsement of these forms of responding for subjects in the "open" and "closed" conditions follow a pattern inconsistent with the theoretical prediction.

The results of the partially open conditions also provide some insights into the possible deficiencies of the Five Stage Model and Elite theory. Elite theory pays little attention to this type of intergroup situation and the present findings show this to be a significant oversight. The second major hypothesis forwarded in the present study arose out of a prediction of the Five Stage Model, that successful attempts at individual upward mobility by a few

members of the disadvantaged group will lead to a strengthening of a belief and faith in the system. This in turn would lead to increased support for individual action strategies. Continued support for individual action was evident in these partially closed conditions, however, the preference for "nonnormative individual" action in these conditions casts serious doubt on the premise that belief and faith in the system are strengthened in these partially open conditions. Interest in normative forms of individual action only continues when the restrictions are liberal enough not to destroy the perception of openness (our 30% quota condition). When the restriction becomes too conservative (our 2% quota condition) interest turns to nonnormative forms of individual action.

These findings can be interpreted as demonstrative of a dominant concern for personal self-interest on the part of disadvantaged group members. As long as there exists even the slightest possibility of personal advancement, then the inclusion of one's group, in the form of collective action, is not appealing. In the situation where the advantaged group is almost closed, individual mobility is even more appealing in that one's status is likely to be enhanced even more by admittance into a highly restricted group. The move to high endorsement of collective action in the "completely closed" condition is also consistent with this interpretation. In a completely closed intergroup situation

personal advancement can be gained only with the support of one's comrades. This primary concern for one's own self-interest is a recurrent theme in the interpretation of the present findings and appears to provide a compelling interpretation of many of the actions of disadvantaged group members.

The findings on partially open groups also provide some very disturbing insights into the responses of disadvantaged groups to a policy of tokenism. By definition, the "2% quota" condition represents the implementation of a policy of tokenism. In this "tokenism" condition, disadvantaged group members neglect "collective nonnormative" action; the type of action most likely to lead to alterations in the intergroup situation. They endorse, instead, individual strategies. The present findings would support the assertion that by systematically allowing a very small number of disadvantaged group members entrance into their group, the advantaged group can virtually prevent the occurrence of "collective nonnormative" action. Although not the primary focus of this study, these insights have important ramifications and point clearly to a need for additional investigation along these lines.

Only partial support emerged for hypothesis three, concerning the individuals within the disadvantaged most likely to instigate collective action and those most likely to accept their position. It was found that those who feel

themselves to be distant from the required performance level necessary to be a member of the advantaged group are more likely to accept their disadvantaged position. However, support was not found for the prediction that disadvantaged group members who are closest to gaining entrance into the advantaged group will be more likely to instigate collective action when faced with a closed group. These subjects showed little difference from those far from entry in their endorsement of a "collective nonnormative" behaviour and even a tendency towards less interest in "collective normative" action. The present data suggests that in general it is a greater interest in "individual nonnormative" action, not collective action, that distinguishes the individuals who are close to entrance from those more distant from the entry requirements of the advantaged group.

One of the important contributions of the study is its demonstration of the great import of the distinction between normative and nonnormative action. The present findings clearly indicate that the inclusion of this distinction is essential to any theoretical work attempting to describe the responses of disadvantaged groups. To date most theoretical discussions of this distinction have supported the view that given the availability of a functional channel for normative action, normative actions will be preferred. In the present experiment, all subjects, in all conditions, were presented with a normative form of both individual and collective

action as a possible response, yet many chose to ignore these options in favour of nonnormative strategies. It is quite clear that the decision to endorse normative or nonnormative action is effected by both the experimental manipulations presented in the present study, as well as, the perceptions and emotional reactions of the individual.

Finally, the present study provided results concerning the link between perceptions and emotions experienced by disadvantaged group members and the actions they take. The present results are somewhat at odds with earlier discussions of this relationship. Nonnormative action, both collective and individual, was related to satisfaction with personal treatment and perceptions of personal injustice. These same perceptions concerning one's group did not have a strong relationship with action of any form. Normative actions, again both collective and individual, were related primarily to one's faith in future personal success within the system. Consistent with the earlier discussion of the dominant role of self-interest in determining the behaviour of disadvantaged group members, it would appear that action, be it individual or collective, is primarily motivated by personal interests.

The Five Stage Model and Elite theory proved useful in the development of testable hypotheses about the behaviour of disadvantaged group members and several tenets of these two theories were given empirical support. However, it was also

clearly indicated that research programs such as the one presented here will be instrumental in the development of a more complete knowledge of the determinants of disadvantaged group actions. Both the categorization of possible responses developed for the present research and the experimental paradigm utilized here have proven to be promising tools in this investigation. Research of this type should play an important role in the development of a more definitive understanding of the relations between disadvantaged and advantaged groups.

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