

**POLITICAL LINKAGE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
EDUCATION, WESTERN EDUCATED ELITES, AND THE  
FALL OF HAILE SELASSIE'S FEUDAL REGIME**

by

**Paulos Milkias**

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
and Research in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy**

**An Inter-disciplinary Dissertation  
in the Fields of Political Science  
and Comparative Education**

**Department of Administration and  
Policy Studies,  
McGill University,  
Montreal, Canada.**

**August 1982.**

To my late uncle,

Tarfa Amaya,

who helped me

get a

Western education

## ABSTRACT

Traditionally, education and politics in Ethiopia were highly influenced by church-educated scholars known as the Debteras. But when, in order to fulfil the need of a modernizing autocracy Emperors Menelik and Haile Selassie introduced Western education into the country, a new breed of educated youth were born. Western education also brought about a very intense Anglo-American cultural penetration. The first group of Western-educated intelligentsia integrated themselves into the feudal system and embraced Western values. The Haile Selassie regime, the United States and the first generation of Western-educated elites, as a result, became interdependent. But because the government was not keeping pace with the developmental aspirations of the educated youth, a newer generation of intelligentsia, who were mostly students and teachers, became alienated. Ultimately they ignited the fuse of the revolutionary ferment in the country and all the military had to do in 1974 was to deliver a coup de grâce to Haile Selassie's feudal regime.

Name: Paulos Milkias.

Title of Thesis: Political Linkage: The Relationship Between Education, Western Educated Elites, and the Fall of Haile Selassie's Feudal Regime.

Department: Administration and Policy Studies.

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy.

## RESUME

Dans le passé, la vie politique et l'éducation étaient profondément influencées par les lettrés de l'église Copte éthiopienne, à savoir, les Debteras. Avec l'arrivée au pouvoir de l'Empereur Ménélik, et surtout de l'Empereur Haile Selassie, leur influence diminua, car les exigences d'une aristocratie moderniste ouvrirent la porte à l'enseignement occidental, créant ainsi, une nouvelle élite. En même temps, cet enseignement occidental favorisa une forte présence de la culture anglo-saxonne chez l'élite. Cette élite occidentalisée s'intégra au système féodal en même temps qu'elle adopta certaines valeurs occidentales. Par conséquent, le régime impérial d'Haile Selassie, les Etats Unis et la nouvelle élite sont devenu interdépendant. Mais, du fait que le régime échoua à remplir les aspirations suscitées par l'enseignement occidental, la deuxième génération, composée des étudiants et enseignants, s'est aliénée. Celle-ci a finalement mis le feu au poudre en intensifiant ses activités et revendications révolutionnaires. En 1974 les militaires n'ont fait que donner le coup de grâce au régime féodal d'Haile Selassie.

Nom: Paulos Milkias.

Titre de la Thèse: Les Rapports Politiques Entre l'Education, l'Elite Occidentalisée et la Chute d'Haile Selassie.

Département: Administration et Etudes Politiques.

Degré: Docteur en Philosophie.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT. . . . .	<u>Page</u> ii
RESUME . . . . .	iii
LIST OF MAPS . . . . .	viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . .	ix
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . .	x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . .	xiii
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
The Problem . . . . .	1
Method of Data Collection and Delimitations of the Problem . . . . .	3
Significance of the Study and Review of the Literature. . . . .	9
Hypothetical Assumptions. . . . .	26
<u>Chapter</u> I ETHIOPIA: BACKGROUND . . . . .	34
Physical Features . . . . .	34
History, Myth and Reality . . . . .	40
Soci-Economic Structure . . . . .	57
Education, Educated Elites, and the Exercise of Political Power in Traditional Ethiopia. . . . .	68

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
II	FOUNDATIONS OF WESTERN EDUCATION AND THE FASCIST INTER-REGNUM . . . . .	89
	Menelik, Tafari, and "Zamanawi Sélétané" (Westernization) . . . . .	89
	Western Educated Elites vs. Modernizing Feudalism . . . . .	113
	Colonial Scramble and Mussolini's Occupation . . . . .	122
	Italian Fascism and Fascist Educational Policies in Ethiopia . . . . .	135
III	EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND UNDER- DEVELOPMENT FROM 1941 TO 1960 AND THE FIRST OPEN CHALLENGE TO THE <u>ANCIEN REGIME</u> . . . . .	150
	The State of the Country in 1941 and the Struggle for Educational Reconstruction . . .	150
	Problems of Planning, Financing, and Educational Administration . . . . .	178
	Challenge for Power: Modern Educated Elites and the 1960 Abortive <u>Coup d'Etat</u> . . . . .	200
IV	THE TREND OF EDUCATION UNTIL 1974, THE BIRTH OF A UNIVERSITY AND THE EVOLUTION AND CHARACTER OF FOREIGN CULTURAL PENETRATION. . . . .	233
	Long Range Accomplishments in the Establishment, Expansion and Improve- ment of Primary, Secondary and University Education. . . . .	233
	Long Range Problems: A Critique of the Ethiopian School System under Haile Selassie . . . . .	253
	Cultural Penetration. . . . .	289

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
V	FISSURES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, THE HYPHENATED INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE EMERGENCE OF STUDENT POWER . . . . .	321
	Aftermath of Penetration: A Crack in the System and the Fragmented Elites . . . . .	321
	Student Radicalism and Student Power. . . . .	338
VI	THE DELUGE: FAILURE OF A 'PANACEA' FOR EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS, THE FALL OF THE EMPEROR, AND AN END TO ETHIOPIAN FEUDAL MONARCHY . . . . .	365
	"The Education Sector Review" as Panacea . . . . .	365
	General Conditions of Education and Final Challenge by Teachers and Students . . . . .	387
	Popular Uprising and a Military <u>Coup de</u> <u>Grâce</u> . . . . .	439
	CONCLUSION . . . . .	490
	POSTSCRIPT . . . . .	502
	<u>APPENDICES</u>	
I	Proclamation on the Establishment of the Ministry of Religion and Education: Menelik, Emperor . . . . .	512
II	Ras Tafari's (Haile Selassie's) Letter Addressed to President Harding of the United States . . . . .	514
III	Haile Selassie's Inauguration Address at the Convocation of Haile Selassie University (now renamed Addis Ababa University) on December 18, 1961. . . . .	516

APPENDICES (Cont'd)

Page

IV "The National Democratic Revolution" Program  
of the World Wide Federation of Ethiopian  
Students . . . . . 517

V Proclamation on the Dethronement of  
Emperor Haile Selassie. . . . . 538

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 542

## LIST OF MAPS

<u>Map</u>		<u>Page</u>
1	Africa and the Middle East Between the Years 1000 B.C. and 200 B.C. . . . .	35
2	Physical Features of Ethiopia . . . . .	37
3	Axum and the Near East Sixth Century A.D. . .	45
4	The Agricultural Sector in Ethiopia . . . . .	60
5	Types and Locations of Manufacturing and Industry in 1974 . . . . .	65
6	European Scramble for Colonial Empire—The Subdivision of Africa by 1930 . . . . .	124
7	Geographic Locations of Major Ethnic and Linguistic Groups of Ethiopia . . . . .	254
8	The Oromos in Ethiopia and Kenya . . . . .	256

# LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
1	Income per Capita in Ethiopia in 1969 — Urban and Rural . . . . .	63
2	Sectoral Employment, Output, and Output per Worker, 1967 . . . . .	66
3	Number of Schools of Different Types in Ethiopia in 1960 . . . . .	159
4	Students Returned: Breakdown by Country, March, 1960 . . . . .	163
5	Students Abroad: Breakdown by Country March, 1960 . . . . .	164
6	A Five-year Study of Government Schools and Colleges in the 12 Provinces and Addis Ababa. . .	169
7	The Budgetary Process in Ethiopia from 1954-1957. . . . .	196
8	Teaching Staff of the University College of Addis Ababa, 1950-1960 . . . . .	242
9	Enrolment in Full-time Institutions of Higher Education in Ethiopia, 1950-1961 . . . . .	245
10	Urban (U), Rural (R) and Total (T) Population by Age and Sex 1974 . . . . .	264
11	Ethiopia's Proposed Plan for the Development of Education. . . . .	271
12	Able-bodied, Economically Active, and Hired Population (1970). . . . .	280
13	Provinces: Area and Population (1974) . . . . .	283
14	Education and Related Projects of the Ethiopian Government . . . . .	313
15	Alternative Strategy I: School Operating Characteristics . . . . .	369

<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
16	Alternative Strategy I: Basic Statistics for Government Primary Schools . . . . .	370
17	Alternative Strategy II: Teacher Needs, Number of Graduates and Enrolment . . . . .	372
18	Expenditures, Enrolment and Participation Rates . . . . .	373
19	Alternative Strategy III: School Operating Characteristics . . . . .	375
20	Alternative Strategy III: Basic Statistics for Government First Level Schools. . . . .	376
21	Alternative Strategy II: Basic Statistics for Government Primary Schools . . . . .	380
22	Alternative Strategy II: Basic Statistics for Government Second Level Schools . . . . .	381
23	Alternative Strategy III: Expenditures, Enrolment and Participation Rates. . . . .	384
24	Income per Capita (P.C.): Estimate for 1969 and Projection for 1990 (in constant 1969 Ethiopian dollars) . . . . .	385
25	Peasant Association Leadership in Tigré . . . . .	388
26	Percentage of Literate People (1974) . . . . .	389

## LIST OF FIGURES

<u>Figure</u>		<u>Page</u>
1	Traditional Power Relationship . . . . .	86
2	Number of Secondary School Students per 1,000 Secondary School Age Population 1951-71. . .	273
3	Third Level Graduates by Field of Study . . . .	275
4	Modern Power Relationship . . . . .	324
5	Political Linkage: The Relationship Between Modern Education and the Fall of Haile Selassie's Feudal Regime . . . . .	335
6	Projected Enrolment of Children Born in 1970-71 under Alternative Strategy III . . . .	377
7	Development of Education in Ethiopia . . . . .	391
8	Number of Primary School Students per 1,000 Inhabitants . . . . .	392
9	Number of Students in Secondary Schools per 10,000 Inhabitants . . . . .	393
10	Number of Vocational Secondary School Students per 100,000 Inhabitants . . . . .	394
11	Number of Students in Secondary Teacher- Training Schools per 100,000 Inhabitants . . .	396
12	Number of University Students per 500,000 Inhabitants . . . . .	397
13	University Students Enrolled per 10,000 University Age Population in Ethiopia . . . .	398
14	Students as Percentage of Total Population (1950-1974). . . . .	399
15	University Students as a Percentage of Population Aged 20-24 (1960-1974). . . . .	400



<u>Figure</u>		<u>Page</u>
16	Educational Expenditure as Percentage of Gross National Product . . . . .	402
17	Budget on Selected Items as Proportion of Total National Expenditure (1964-1973) in Ethiopia . .	403
18	Per Capita Expenditure for University Students in Ethiopia (1963-1973) . . . . .	404
19	Passes and Failures in the Ethiopian Secondary School Leaving Certificate Examinations (1951-70) . . . . .	405
20	Percentage of Failures in the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate Examinations (1951-1970). .	406
21	Passes and Failures in Eighth Grade National Examinations (1951-1970) . . . . .	407
22	Post-1974 Power Structure . . . . .	508

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Since a great many individuals and organizations have contributed to the research and successful completion of this dissertation, it would be hard for me to mention them all. However, I should single out some for my very special indebtedness.

My first thanks go to my thesis committee representing diverse disciplines who put such great confidence in me and helped me to complete this dissertation. The Chairman of the committee, Professor Margaret Gillett, introduced me into the field of education when, in her capacity as an executive member of the Canadian Society for the Study of Education, she invited me to present a paper on Ethiopia to the meeting of the Learned Societies of Canada. Since my background specialization was political science, my first research into Ethiopian education and politics provided me with an opportunity to later develop an interdisciplinary approach in the writing of this dissertation.

Professor Gillett's genuine interest in my work and my country, her help in providing me with school and university curricula and other materials from the 1950s and early 60s, her useful suggestions for the logical structuring of the dissertation, and her unerring eye for style has helped me a great deal. I have, of course, benefited greatly from her well-known scholarly background and talent in the area of the history of education. Sam Noumoff of the Political Science Department was not only a professor and a very helpful adviser, but also a friend who assisted me in making some very difficult decisions.

His confidence in me and his positive approach to all scholarly endeavours has always been a source of profound inspiration. This has sometimes forced me to do twice as much work as I otherwise would have done. Professor Peter Gutkind from the Department of Anthropology has helped me with his recognized skill and knowledge and I have greatly benefited from his immense scholarship in the area of African Political Economy. Professor Donald Von Eschen, Chairman of the Department of Sociology, deserves special thanks for his advice and interest in my work, and particularly for his genuine desire to see me complete the dissertation in the shortest time possible. Just like Sam Noumoff, Professor Von Eschen was always a source of inspiration. Professor Ratna Ghosh, Director of Graduate Studies and a member of the dissertation Committee, has provided me with invaluable support. Like Professor Gillett, she was also instrumental in introducing me into the field of education—particularly into the discipline of comparative education. In general, it is indeed difficult for me to express in simple words how much I owe to my dissertation Committee. I need hardly add, however, that the final responsibility for any errors or views expressed are mine and mine alone.

I thank all those whom I have interviewed through the years and the scores of Canadian expatriates who took the trouble of answering my survey questionnaire, and in the process provided me with some very useful information and scholarly insight. My indebtedness to those whom I have widely quoted has been acknowledged in the footnotes and elsewhere.

I am indebted to many scholarly colleagues who gave me constructive criticisms during the presentation of papers which form the core of this dissertation; to the members of the Canadian Society for the Study of Education (Learned Societies' Meeting, 1979) and members of the Canadian Political Science Association (Learned Societies' Meeting, 1980). I also express special thanks to the anonymous readers of my articles which have either been already published or are in the process of publication. Although their names are unknown to me, they have contributed a great deal in helping me correct some misconceptions as a result of which possible scholarly errors have been avoided in the writing of the dissertation. I would particularly mention readers for the Canadian Political Science Review, World Development, the London Times Educational Supplement and Harvard Educational Review for very useful advice.

My great indebtedness goes to the Canada Council for providing me with a Doctoral Fellowship which helped me through the preliminary stages of my graduate studies and research and thus, lay the groundwork for the completion of this dissertation. Special thanks also go to Marianopolis College for helping and encouraging me in all my scholarly pursuits and to my students whose provocative and challenging intellectual atmosphere helped me to be more and more interested in the topics of education, problems of economic and political development and the anatomy of a revolution.

My best friend and Ethiopian compatriot, Dr. Maimire Mennasemay, deserves very special thanks for providing me not only with some useful suggestions in constructing the theoretical framework on which I have been working for the last several years, but also for his constant friendship and advice, specially during some difficult moments. My indebtedness to him is so great that I cannot find words to express them. Had I not been under an emotional stress from the untimely death of my uncle Balambaras Tarfa Amaya, to whom I have to pay a very special tribute in this work, Mennasemay would have been the person to whom the dissertation would have been dedicated.

Dr. Zeleke Bekele, former President of the Gondar Public Health College, and Dr. Aklilu Habte, former President of Haile Selassie University (later Ethiopian Minister of Youth and Culture), had given me some invaluable documents for which I am profoundly grateful.

I have benefited greatly from the skill and useful advice of my friend Lise Winer, who went through the trouble of deciphering my handwriting and typing the first draft of the dissertation. Her "eagle-eyed" observation of errors in structure and style have helped me tremendously. I really express heartfelt thanks to Lise. Special thanks also go to my friend Sharon Gubbay, who proofread the first three chapters and gave me some useful suggestions. Mrs. Margaret Blevins, who typed the final draft of the dissertation, also deserves very special thanks. She has meticulously checked and rechecked all footnotes and references while typing the manuscript. The uniform

orderliness of the documentation and organization is due in large measure to her patience and care.

In conclusion, while much of whatever virtue may be found in this dissertation has been made possible through the invaluable help of individuals and organizations mentioned above, all its faults remain my own.

## INTRODUCTION

### The Problem

Ethiopia—the country to be treated in this dissertation—has a special place in the history of the world: it is one of the four oldest nation states and one of the three countries with the longest uninterrupted independence in the entire planet.<sup>1</sup> Its continuous historical antecedents are much longer and much older than the annals of all African countries except Egypt and are indeed more ancient than those of most nations anywhere on this globe. The relationship between education and the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 which forms the core of this research has to be juxtaposed against this unique historical background.

It has been generally recognized for the last several decades that Ethiopia's ancient polity had been straining under the load of a rigid feudal order trying to adjust itself to the modern world. But the fall of the ancien régime in 1974 and its political aftermath has been highly misunderstood in scholarly literature that has proliferated within the last few years. Too often, the entire event has been depicted as just another African military coup d'état.<sup>2</sup> Some have tried to show

<sup>1</sup>Czeslaw Jésmán, The Ethiopian Paradox (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1963), pp. 1-5.

<sup>2</sup>The only difference most writers observed was that while other Third World coup d'états were not only swift and dramatic but were led by known military officers, the Ethiopian one was "creeping"—led by faceless lower level military officers and N.C.O.s. Thomson

it as part of a struggle for power by the different ethnic groups, especially the Oromos and the Tigrés against the Amharas.<sup>3</sup> Others have tried to represent it as a nationalist revolution—similar to that of Algeria or Angola—which was pushed to the brink by the Eritrean revolt.<sup>4</sup>

What has been overlooked in all these analyses is that the 1974 Ethiopian revolution was unique to the African continent both in depth

---

is one of the authors who considers the 1974 upheaval as a coup d'état. See Blair Thomson, Ethiopia: The Country That Cut Off Its Head (London: Robson Books, 1975). Thomson even goes to the extent of hinting, although in a form of denial, that he himself might have overthrown Haile Selassie! See, for example, his chapter entitled "The Emperor and I," *ibid.*, pp. 95-99. These kinds of simplistic ideas, of course, originate from the well-known paternalistic attitude of the West. It is based on the assumption that Ethiopians or any Third World people for that matter—could not undertake such an important task as overthrowing a well-entrenched monarch so ingeniously (the "creeping coup" approach was a new phenomenon in political science)—thus they must have taken advice and direction from the West. The reader should clearly see in Chapters V and VI of this dissertation the myth about this "advice and direction."

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, P.T.W. Baxter, "Ethiopia's Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo," African Affairs: Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 77, No. 308 (July, 1978); and Richard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1980).

<sup>4</sup>This assumption is based on the wrong premise that the Amharas are imperialists in the same category as the French or the Portuguese. It does not take into consideration the fact that the Amhara nation is not developed enough to export finance capital like France or Portugal. It also neglects to recognize the fact that the Ethiopian ruling classes come from all major ethnic groups although they have adopted the Amharic language as their medium of communication. For an analysis that emphasizes the movement of nationalities, particularly the Eritrean one, see Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980).



and magnitude. It was a social upheaval of dramatic proportions which was a result of a historical process that had been unfolding over several decades. The upheaval was directly tied to education, modern educated elites and the contradictions inherent in a traditional polity that was attempting to survive with all its intrinsic characters even when modernization had introduced entirely new and different vistas to the country's body-politic. This dissertation attempts to prove that Haile Selassie was not overthrown by the military; that the 1974 revolution was not merely an ethnic revolt although ethnic revolts did indeed contribute to its outcome. Our analysis is based on the premise that Haile Selassie was overthrown by the students and the teachers who were the products of the modern school system. Hence, we focus on education and political processes in Ethiopia from 1905 to 1974.

The empirical research involved will be conducted by linking education in Ethiopia with the educated elites' status and their own perception of the system at work. It will also deal with the reciprocal and contradictory relationships which existed between the feudal regime, the metropolitan powers, and the modern educated elites since Western education was introduced into the country in 1905.<sup>5</sup>

#### Method of Data Collection and Delimitations of the Problem

Our analysis, which follows a political-historical approach in investigating the relationship between education, educated elites and

<sup>5</sup>The dialectical development involved has already been analyzed in detail by the author. See Paulos Milkias, "Traditional Institutions and Traditional Elites: The Role of Education in the Ethiopian Body Politic," African Studies Review, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (December, 1976), pp. 79-83. See also Paulos Milkias, "The Political Spectrum of Western Education in Ethiopia," Journal of African Studies, Vol. IX, No. 1 (Spring, 1982), pp. 22-29.

revolution in modern Ethiopia, uses a wide range of data. The secondary sources cover a wide span of vital scholarly books and articles stretching through several hundred years. We are confident that no major work on the subject is neglected or left out. Our primary sources are even more far-reaching and varied. They include:

a) Ethiopian, British and American government documents covering the period both before and after the 1936-41 Fascist occupation—that is, from 1905 to 1974. Most of these documents were classified and were only recently released by the Ethiopian Government, the British Foreign Office, and the United States' Department of State;

b) Italian Fascist Documents and educational texts;

c) World Bank documents;

d) The UNESCO educational records on Ethiopia covering the period from 1950 to 1974. The time limit of 1950 was not chosen at random. There was no United Nations' record on Ethiopian education prior to that period. Also, for comparison, we use selected UNESCO records on education in Africa, the Third World, technologically advanced countries and the whole world;

e) Other International Organization documents;

f) Personal communications and interviews. Some of these which include interviews with high Ethiopian Government officials such as ministers and diplomatic personnel, members of the Ethiopian royal family, even the author's discussions with Emperor Haile Selassie himself, had been compiled before the start of the dissertation for other

works but are adopted for our thesis because of their relevance;

g) A large number of clandestine and non-clandestine political tracts originating with the military, the students, the teachers, the University professors, the workers and other mass movements of the 1973-74 Ethiopian revolution.

h) In addition, the following questionnaire seeking first hand information from Canadian and other expatriates who were involved in the Ethiopian school system since 1941 were also constructed and employed:

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

May I quote you?

Yes

No

☐
☐

(If you do not wish to be quoted your answers will be strictly confidential.)

Period of stay in Ethiopia. 19\_\_\_\_ to 19\_\_\_\_.

If you have been in Ethiopia at different intervals please indicate.

19\_\_\_\_ to 19\_\_\_\_

19\_\_\_\_ to 19\_\_\_\_

19\_\_\_\_ to 19\_\_\_\_

1. What is (or was) the name of the institution you are (or were) associated with?

2. In what capacity are you (were you) associated with Ethiopian education?

3. Please describe briefly your experience as an Educator in Ethiopia.  
How would you evaluate that experience?
4. It is a known fact that Canadians, especially French Canadian Jesuits, have been involved in Ethiopian education after the war. What do you think are some of the contributions they have made?
5. Did they have problems in implementing their programs? If yes, what were the problems they had to face? Were these problems solved? If not, what do you think is the reason?
6. Can you mention some contributions you have made for the development of education in Ethiopia?  
Can you identify other individuals who made contributions?  
What contributions do you consider most important?
7. If you were connected with the founding of one of the schools or colleges in Ethiopia, or taught there at an early formative period, or were involved in an administrative position at any time, what were some of the problems you, your colleagues or the institution in question had to face? Were the problems solved? If not, what do you think were the reasons?
8. In your view, what were and are the major problems of Ethiopian education in general? Is it possible that these problems could have been avoided? If so, how?

9. Do you think that the quality of Ethiopian education improved or deteriorated after mass American involvement (running of Haile Selassie University, involvement of large numbers of Peace Corps volunteers in elementary and high schools)?

a) improved ☐      b) deteriorated ☐      c) don't know ☐

Please explain.

10. What suggestions would you make for Ethiopian education, present and future?
11. If you have additional comments, please state them below.

For the questionnaire interviews, one hundred and forty-six people whose names and addresses were provided through Canadian and Ethiopian Government help, the Montreal office of the Society of Jesus and Centre d'Etudes et de Cooperation Internationale, were contacted. However, in an attempt to correspond with all of them, the writer discovered that more than twenty had either died (relatives reporting) or had changed addresses (letters of communication returned). Many of the remaining 126 did respond but declined to comment for personal reasons. But several (whom we quote widely in the dissertation) did provide enlightening and very useful personal information and comment. We believe that these personal responses and reflections by expatriates, some of whom were highly placed in Ethiopian education during the time of Haile Selassie, will provide our analysis a new and very important dimension.

There are some delimitations in conducting the research. Our analysis covers only the relationship between Western education, Western educated elites and political processes in Ethiopia from 1905 to 1974 and attempts to link them with the fall of Haile Selassie's "modernizing" autocracy. Although this author hopes that the outcome of the study may be replicated for regimes and societies with similar economic and political conditions, until such studies are conducted and similar patterns discerned, the assumed universal conclusions should be considered only tentative. For the sake of better focus, and in-depth analysis, the study has excluded the following:

1. Traditional Ethiopian Orthodox schools after 1905.
2. Koranic schools.
3. Catholic and Protestant mission schools.
4. Foreign private schools.
5. Eritrea, which needs a separate treatment due to its unique historical and political character.

The questionnaire used in the dissertation is aimed only at providing additional information for the research. Although the analysis is to a large extent quantitative and attempts to be as rigorous as possible, it does not use a method which requires statistical techniques such as sampling and scaling. To make the writing of the research more practical and manageable, the questionnaire interviews concentrate on Canadian expatriates. With a few exceptions, Ethiopian, British or Indian educators are not included in the sample. Nevertheless, we have no reason to doubt that the views of the Canadian expatriates are not only

objective but highly representative.

### Significance of the Study and Review of the Literature

At this stage, it may be important to point out the rationale of the research. It is known that the modernization of any traditional underdeveloped nation necessarily requires the introduction of modern education which is based on science and technology. This is what gave rise to a concerted move by international agencies to introduce massive aid money in development schemes which usually linked education with political and economic development. However, the campaigns, which aimed at producing more skilled manpower, have not succeeded in transforming Third World countries in the direction of the equitable distribution of resources. Even where industrial development had taken place and had created employment for a section of the urban population, labour in the market continued to increase at a faster rate than available jobs. The inevitable consequence is that the unemployed intellectuals, liberated from the constraints of past tradition, have rebelled against their Western educators and their own indigenous rulers who are, in most cases, autocratic, depending militarily, economically and politically on the metropolitan Western nations. In spite of this, however, many Western scholars blame the systematic instability and underdevelopment problems of the Third World countries as emanating from the inherent backward nature of those societies themselves, not from their dependence on the metropolitan centres. This has been argued in many elite and modernizationist theories (e.g., Pareto, Rostow, Smelser and Lipset).<sup>6</sup> A challenging

<sup>6</sup>Vildredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of the Elites; An Application of Theoretical Sociology (Totwa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1968); Walt Whitman Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Neil Smelser and Seymour Lipset, Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966).

view which blames the underdevelopment and the unstable nature of the Third World countries on the metropolitan nations has recently emerged. This model is commonly referred to as "Dependency Theory" (e.g., Baran, Dos Santos, Frank, Amin, and Wallerstein).<sup>7</sup> In both cases, however, there is as yet no in-depth analysis of the problem of underdevelopment and subsequent social upheavals in traditional modernizing autocracies such as Ethiopia and Iran, both of which fell in the decade of the 1970s. The writer believes that this dissertation will provide a significant contribution to regional political history and an understanding of the anatomy of Third World revolutions.

In our review of the literature, we have to focus first on attempts to analyse and categorize revolutions of the last 300 years. These may be studied under three major subdivisions.<sup>8</sup> In the early part of this century, Ellwood, Sorokin, Edwards, Lederer, Pettee and

<sup>7</sup>Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975); Theodorio Dos Santos, "The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America," in Henry Bernstein, ed., Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 57-80; André Gundar Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, 2 vols. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Origins of the Modern World System (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

<sup>8</sup>Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," World Politics, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (Jan. 1966), pp. 159-76; Isaac Krammick, "Reflections on Revolution—Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship," History and Theory, Vol. XI, No. 1 (1972), pp. 26-63; Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 1 (March 1973), pp. 23-52; Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," World Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (April 1980), pp. 425-53.



Brinton left their imprint. But since their preoccupation was with the identification of the main stages of revolutionary processes and a description of socio-demographic changes that took place after the change, their studies had numerous shortcomings. Ellwood, for example, tried to explain revolutions by what he called a breakdown in "social habits"; LeBon, through "mob psychology," and Sorokin through the effect of "repression of basic instinctual needs."<sup>9</sup>

Since then, a second generation of scholars has arisen. This group, which has provided a serious critique of the first generation of Western studies of revolution, has attempted to advance new insights to develop theories that would explain why and when revolutionary upheavals arise. Davies, Gurr, Feierabend, Schwartz, Geschwender thus suggested that revolution originates from the condition of the state of mind of the masses.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup>Charles Ellwood, "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XI, No. 1 (July 1905), pp. 49-59; Gustave LeBon, The Psychology of Revolutions (New York: Ernest Benn, 1913); Pitrim Sorokin, The Sociology of Revolution (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1925); Lyford Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); Emil Lederer, "On Revolutions," Social Research, Vol. III, No. 1 (February 1936), pp. 1-18; George S. Pettee, The Process of Revolution (New York: Harper, 1938); Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1938).

<sup>10</sup>James Davies, "Toward A Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (Feb. 1962), pp. 5-19; Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972); Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend and Betty Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns," in Hugh D. Graham and Ted Gurr, eds., Violence in America (New York: Signet, 1969); David Schwartz, "Political Alienation: The Psychology of Revolutions' First Stage," in Feierabend, Feierabend and Gurr, Anger, Violence and Politics, pp. 58-66; James Geschwender, "Explorations in the Theory of Social Movements and Revolution," Social Forces, Vol. XLVII (December, 1968), pp. 127-35.

The critical moment is, according to their analytical framework, when the cognitive state of the masses reaches "frustration" or "deprivation" compared with some preconceived goals. For Feierabend, "frustration" and/or "deprivation" originates during the process of urbanization and modernization; for Davies and Geschwender from short term socio-economic problems; and for Gurr from denial of access to some groups, specific political and economic benefits. Smelser, Johnson, Tiryakian, Hart, Jessop and Hagopian, on the other hand, believe that revolution arises when a state of disequilibrium arises between the social system and its sub-systems such as the economic, political, social and cultural status of the country.<sup>11</sup> Another group (Amman, Huntington, Stinchcombe and Tilly) traces the origin of revolutions to conflicts between competing interest groups.<sup>12</sup> Revolution arises, according to them, when there is lack of symmetry between institutions and mass mobility, and when normal political processes ultimately cease to function. The malfunction

<sup>11</sup>Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1963); Charles Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); Edward Tiryakian, "A Model of Social Change in Its Lead Indicators," in Samuel Z. Klausner, ed., The Study of Total Societies (New York: Anchor Books, 1967); Mark Hart, The Dynamics of Revolution (Stockholm: Totobekman, 1971); Bob Jessop, Social Order, Reform and Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Mark Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974).

<sup>12</sup>Peter Amman, "Revolution: A Redefinition," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 1 (March 1962), pp. 36-53; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Arthur Stinchcombe, "Stratification Among Organizations and the Sociology of Revolution," in James March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 169-80; Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. III (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 483-555; Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

occurs when there is high intensity of conflict between the competing interest groups, when resolution and mediations fail, and when the political system is consequently ripped apart in a violent manner. There should be two necessary conditions for this to happen. First, the differences between the interest groups in question must be irreconcilable within the existing system. And second, two or more of the competing interest groups must have sufficient resources, organizationally, financially and politically, to wield substantial control over the country's military and political machine. All second generation theorists, mentioned above, agree that once a revolutionary situation becomes ripe, any incidental reversal that societies could normally absorb, war, wrong and foolish steps taken by those in a ruling position, a mutiny or a riot or even crop failure and incidental famine, may trigger the final act of the revolution.

The problem with the second generation of revolutionary theorists is that they all believe that a country faces a revolution due to a variety of social changes: economic, demographic, military, cultural, technological, or organizational. But as Eisenstadt's study has shown, the great empires of the past, such as that of Rome, Byzantium and the Moguls had also experienced these changes, and yet the empires did not end up with a revolution but a gradual decline and decay.<sup>13</sup> One may, therefore, rightly ask, why these changes led to revolution in the

---

<sup>13</sup>S.N. Eisenstadt, "Sociological Theory and an Analysis of the Dynamics of Civilizations and of Revolutions," Daedalus, Vol. 106, No. 1 (Fall, 1977), pp. 59-78.

case of say, France, Russia or China and yet ended in gradual decay in the case of Rome, Byzantium or the Moguls in India. The problem with these theories is also the assumption that any society undergoing rapid change moves towards an inevitable violent revolution. But as Eckstein notes, the West has been subjected to rapid social change since the 1750s and with European contact the rest of the world since the 1850s.<sup>14</sup> One may, therefore, ask why violent revolutions have actually been rare? Why was it that revolution did not take place, for instance, in Britain, subjected to rapid social change since 1700, and Japan since 1875?

A third group of non-Marxist revolutionary theorists has also sprung up almost simultaneously with the second generation. The new group, unlike the first or the second generation theorists, consider four variables to be crucial for an understanding of the anatomy of a revolution. First, they feel that the above-mentioned theorists have neglected to analyze the structure and priorities of the status quo state as a distinct variable. For example, Eckstein posits that only a particular kind of state that he dubs "feudal-imperial" may inevitably face a revolution.<sup>15</sup> This kind of state is prone to revolution, according to him, because it extracts resources from the society, permeates and mobilizes it for the benefit of a specific elite which monopolizes the political, cultural and religious institutions. Skocpol, who tried to understand in her own words "the logic of social

<sup>14</sup>Harry Eckstein, "The Etiology of Internal War," History and Theory, Vol. IV, No. 2 (1965), pp. 133-65.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 86.

revolutionary causes and outcomes from France in the 1790s to Ethiopia in the 70s," points out that revolutions are enhanced in societies where the goals of a state, for example, industrialization or modernization, come into conflict with elite class privileges and resource capabilities.<sup>16</sup> Trimberger concurs with this stand.<sup>17</sup> Skocpol also suggests that revolutions take place in "agrarian-bureaucratic" societies, where a centralized machine, and powerful landlords reap the benefit of a predominantly agrarian economy.

Another variable the third generation theorists consider important in deciphering the causes of a revolution is the effect linkage with international political and economic forces has on revolution. Neumann, Moore, Wolfe, Kelly, Miller, Rosenau, and Paige thus posit that revolutions are triggered by foreign military conflicts, or by the intrusion of international capitalist markets on domestic agriculture and trade.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup>Theda Skocpol "Explaining Revolutions: In Quest of a Social Structural Approach," in Lewis Coser and Otto N. Larson, eds., The Uses of Controversy in Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 155-75; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

<sup>17</sup>Kay Ellen Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).

<sup>18</sup>Sigmund Neumann, "The International Civil War," World Politics, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (April, 1949), pp. 333-50; Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Eric Wolfe, "Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century," in Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World (New York: Free Press, 1971); George A. Kelly and Linda B. Miller, Internal War and International Systems: Perspectives on Method, in George A. Kelly and Clifford Brown, Struggles in the State: Sources and Patterns of World Revolution (New York: Wiley, 1970), pp. 223-60; James Rosenau, "International War and International Systems," in Kelly and Brown, Struggles in the State, pp. 196-222; Jeffrey M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World (New York: Free Press, 1975).

Political linkage as a theoretical framework of political analysis has increased in importance since the decade of the 60s. But the study has been almost wholly confined to an explanation of the impact of external variables on domestic politics or of internal politics on foreign policy. Rosenau's Linkage Politics is the keynote of this move.<sup>19</sup> He distinguished between nine types of linkage, six aspects of international political behaviour, and twenty-four features of domestic political processes. This is all the more important because there is no lack of linkages between domestic conflict and domestic variables; indeed, almost all explanations of political instability employ this approach.

Armed forces' coherence is a third important variable cited. Chorley and Russel, for example, suggest that revolution is not possible where the armed forces are loyal, intact and effectively used by the state.<sup>20</sup> However, in our view, this does not explain how, for example, the Shah of Iran or Somoza of Nicaragua fell despite unquestionable loyalty from the formidable modern armies they had created during the course of their autocratic rule.

The structure of rural societies or landlord-peasant relationships is a fourth important variable considered essential by the new theorists of revolution. This arises from their observation of the role

<sup>19</sup>James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergencies of National and International Systems (New York: Free Press, 1969).

<sup>20</sup>Katherine Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1943); David Russel, Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Forces: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries With Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

of the peasants especially in the Bolshevik, the Chinese and the Vietnamese revolutions. Moore, Wolfe, Landberger, Migdal, Paige, Prosterman and Linz have attempted to analyse the role of the structure of agrarian communities in a national revolution.<sup>21</sup>

Skocpol goes to the extent of downgrading the effect of urban revolts on social revolution whether in initiating or determining its outcome.<sup>22</sup> Urban revolts, according to her, took place only in unsuccessful revolutions, for which she cites the Paris Commune and the German and Austrian revolutions of 1848. She also adds that the outcome of a major social revolution transformed rural life by removing the powers and privileges of the landlords over the peasants in the countryside without any apparent change in the social organization of the cities. The crucial thing in a revolution, according to her, is a peasant revolt coming simultaneously with a breakdown in the power structure of a country's central government.

Finally, third generation theorists of revolution consider elites' relationships and elite behaviour as an important variable in

<sup>21</sup>Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Wolfe, "Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century," in Miller and Aya, eds., National Liberation; H.H. Landsberger, ed., Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973); Joel Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Paige, Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World; Roy Prosterman, "IRI: A Simplified Predictive Index of Rural Instability," Comparative Politics, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (April, 1976); Juan Linz, "Patterns of Land Tenure, Division of Labour and Voting Behavior in Europe," Comparative Politics, Vol. III, No. 3 (April, 1976).

<sup>22</sup>Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions: In Quest of Social Structural Approach," in Coser and Larson, eds., The Uses of Controversy in Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1976).

precipitating not only a revolution, but also the type of revolutionary outcome. Skocpol, Eisenstadt and Trimberger have carried out a wide range of studies to explain this phenomenon. Eisenstadt, for example, suggests that new elites with a close tie to old elites create "pluralist" or "open" regimes whereas isolated or clandestine elites create what he calls "coercive" or "closed" regimes when their revolution becomes successful.<sup>23</sup> Skocpol also suggests that "marginal" or isolated elites are likely to adopt radical revolutionary policies while traditional landed elites tend to do just the opposite.<sup>24</sup>

Three major hypotheses have been advanced by scholars in the study of major world revolutions. These are: 1) the "increasing expectations" hypothesis, 2) the "relative gap" hypothesis, and 3) the "climb and fall" hypothesis, all related in that, according to their major premise, rebellion starts when there is a significant discrepancy between actual and anticipated circumstances or the perception that there is an intolerable gap between a state of affairs believed possible and desirable and a state of affairs actually existing.

The "Increasing Expectations" hypothesis goes as far back as 1856, the time of de Tocqueville, who wrote:

Revolutions are not always brought about by a gradual decline from bad to worse. Nations that have endured patiently and almost unconsciously

---

<sup>23</sup>Eisenstadt, "Sociological Theory and An Analysis of the Dynamics of Civilizations and of Revolutions."

<sup>24</sup>Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions: In Quest of Social Structural Approach."



the most overwhelming oppression often burst into rebellion against the yoke the moment it begins to grow lighter. The regime which is destroyed by a revolution is almost always an improvement on its immediate predecessor. . . . Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable once the idea of escape from them is suggested.<sup>25</sup>

Edwards and Crane Brinton also concur with de Tocqueville's suggestion.<sup>26</sup> Their studies of the French, the Bolshevik and the American revolutions had indicated upheavals taking place when people experienced a period of improvement in their socio-economic conditions, were expecting more but further improvements came too slowly. Their main suggestion is that blockage in group mobility will enhance the movement towards social upheaval.

The "Relative Gap" hypothesis is traced to Karl Marx's study of the condition of the proletariat and his anticipation of a future revolution which he predicted would be caused by an inevitable class conflict. Marx wrote in "Wage, Labour and Capital":

A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. The rapid growth of productive capital brings about an equally rapid growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, social enjoyments. Thus, although the enjoyments of the workers have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of develop-

---

<sup>25</sup>Alexi de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and The French Revolution (New York: Harper and Bros., 1856), p. 214.

<sup>26</sup>Lyford Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution; Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution.

ment of society in general. Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.<sup>27</sup>

Edward and Brinton, although arguing from a different perspective than Marx's conceptions, also agree that it is not the actual deprivation of socio-economic status as such that matters in elite agitation but rather their perception of a relative gap where one group is unjustly deprived relative to another group at a specific space in time.<sup>28</sup>

The "Climb and Fall" hypothesis is advanced by James C.

Davies as follows:

Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs—which continue to rise—and, during the latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality. The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, not blocked, can and must continue in the future.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Wage, Labour and Capital," Selected Works, Vol. I (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), p. 94.

<sup>28</sup> Edwards, The Natural History of Revolutions; Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution.

<sup>29</sup> James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (February 1962), p. 6.

Crane Brinton's study in the Anatomy of Revolution had identified some "tentative" uniformities in major world revolutions including the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. These uniformities were:

- a) that the societies were somewhat advancing compared with the past,
- b) they had clearly identifiable class antagonisms, c) the government of the status quo were inept and inefficient, d) the ruling elites had lost confidence in themselves, e) the government was experiencing financial failures, f) the educated elites had deserted the system, and g) there was inept use of force to contain the growing rebellion.<sup>30</sup> We consider it important to point out here that all these variables were present in Ethiopia in 1974; the country was thus ripe for revolution.

Since our study involves not only an explanation of why, when and how revolutions start and the role of educated elites in the revolutionary process, but also the relationship between education and political movements, we believe that a careful investigation and survey of the available literature which covers education and a country's domestic political processes would be useful. Indeed, by tradition, Western scholars have attempted to create a dichotomy between education and politics by advancing the view that the political system is a separate entity from the educational system and that, therefore, both practically and analytically, schools should be considered non-ideological and non-political. However, this view and its totally misleading premise had been challenged by a new generation of scholars who have come to

<sup>30</sup>Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution.

appreciate the close and intrinsic relationship that has always existed between schooling and political processes. A concerted move towards explaining the phenomenon started in the 1920s and went through the 30s and beyond: in studies of political education and training (Merriam and Pierce);<sup>31</sup> in the examination of acquired personality, politics and "national character" (Inkles and Levinson);<sup>32</sup> in political behaviour, development and "socialization" (Hyman and Easton).<sup>33</sup>

"Political socialization," which is nothing but a euphemism for "political indoctrination," has recently attracted a great deal of scholarly interest, specially in the political science discipline. Its analysis is rooted in communications theory (Lasswell):<sup>34</sup> a) who b) learns what c) from whom d) under what circumstances e) with what effects? Class and sex stereo-typing is, according to Hyman and Easton, reinforced by political learning. For example, because of

---

<sup>31</sup>C. Marriam, Civic Education in the United States, Report of the Commission on the Social Studies, American Historical Association, Part 6 (New York: Scribner, 1934); B. Pierce, Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth, Report on the Commission on the Social Studies, American Historical Association, Part 3 (New York: Scribner, 1933).

<sup>32</sup>A. Inkles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The study of modal personality and sociocultural systems," Vol. 2 in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 977-1020.

<sup>33</sup>H. Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959; D. Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1962), pp. 202-16.

<sup>34</sup>H. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958).

political socialization, most political participants are male. The upper classes are more active in politics than the workers. Schools, according to this view, therefore perpetuate social and political stratification and are, by design, the main pillars of the system within which they function.

Whereas all the above studies are Western-liberal in orientation, the question of alienation in school and society is the major variable in radical political analysis. The latter assumes that under a non-socialist organizational structure, man is separated from his activity, the products he makes and his fellow human beings. Potential human powers under feudalism or capitalism are made use of without being replenished and the schools neglect this potential and consider the student a mere commodity. Education, in this sense, becomes deified and is considered like a fetish. As time goes by, this would ultimately result in the total dehumanization of man.

Proponents of deschooling (Illich, Reimer, Postman and Wein-gartner, and Lister)<sup>35</sup> have tried to explain the root causes of these dehumanizing conditions in their studies. Ivan Illich, the main theoretician in that field, posits that man's apparent dehumanization is a result of the institutional frameworks spawned by a mass production and mass consumption society. The institutions, he argues, develop into a pervasive and powerful force. In the process they become "anti educational" and

---

<sup>35</sup>E. Reimer, School Is Dead (New York: Penguin, 1971); N. Postman and C. Weinberger, Teaching As A Subversive Activity (New York: Penguin, 1971); I. Lister, ed., Deschooling: A Reader (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Ivan Illich, After Deschooling What? (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Penguin, 1973).

"anti-social." Illich further argues that, in spite of the claim that Western schools are non-political and non-ideological, one of their primary aims is socializing the child to accept the existing basic tenets of the status quo political system. Western schooling, according to him, therefore has the subtle motive of "internalization" or the hidden mechanism for persuading children to accept prevalent political realities so that when they start work, they would be kept "democratically in place." The socialization process takes many shapes. First, children are initiated into the belief that everything is measured, which means that all kinds of values (e.g., happiness in democratic or dictatorial societies) can be measured and ranked like an ordinary commodity. Second, children are schooled into disciplined consumption patterns and, thus, start to entertain the myth of unending consumption. Third, and perhaps most importantly, schools legitimize the "divine origin" of economic, social and political stratification that exists much more vigorously and effectively than the Christian churches have been able to do in the last couple of millenia.

The works of Paulo Friere mainly concentrate on literacy studies for adults but his major concern, just like the deschoolers, is alienation and the pervasive, sterile education environment which arises due to lack of relevant and fulfilling political content in schooling.<sup>36</sup> Alienation

<sup>36</sup>Paulo Friere, Education for Critical Consciousness (New York: Seabury Press, 1973); Paulo Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herdes and Herdes, 1970); Friere has criticized many of his previous assumptions after the partial failure of his method; see Friere's recent book on Guinea Bissau, Lettres à la Guinée-Bissau sur l'alphabétisation: Une expérience en cours de réalisation (Paris: F. Maspero, 1978).

is born of the mentality of "consumerism"<sup>37</sup> which is built into the school system—a system that follows the example of "banking." Knowledge, in the traditional method, is consumed, not made and remade. Illiterates are treated like objects, oppressed and dehumanized. His study attempts to introduce a new teaching and learning system which creates "conscientization." The method, according to him, would liberate the learner. The major flaw in Friere is, however, the implied assumption that a new type of educational approach can redress society's ills regardless of the political system within which it functions. Whereas "conscientization" is his short term aim, Friere is also curiously silent on the long range goals of his method. In other words, "conscientization," instead of being a means to revolutionary change to combat alienation, becomes an end in itself.

To conclude, careful investigation of the literature on education and politics shows that neither the political socialization scholars, nor the deschoolers and the Friereans, have addressed themselves to the

---

<sup>37</sup>This is a revisionist view and does not follow Marx's original explanation of the concept of alienation in political economy analysis. Marx had described his concept of "alienated labour" which specifically dealt with the worker as follows: "According to the laws of political economy, the alienation of the worker in his object is expressed as follows: the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume, the more values he creates, the more valueless and worthless he becomes, the more formed the product, the more deformed the worker, the more civilized the product, the more barbaric the worker, the more powerful the work, the more powerless becomes the worker, the more cultured the work, the more philistine the worker becomes and more of a slave to nature." See Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, trans. M. Milligan (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959), p. 21.

explanation of the relationship between education and revolution in which we are interested. Our analysis will, therefore, attempt to explore the role of education as an important variable in the socio-political transformations of Ethiopia which culminated in the far-reaching revolutionary upheaval of 1974, and thus aspires to fill a major gap in the available literature.

### Hypothetical Assumptions

This research is conducted with some basic hypothetical assumptions in mind. In the study of revolutions which forms the crux of the problem in our analysis, elites' perception of their status are crucial for an understanding of the root causes of social upheavals. All the scholarly works we have investigated seem to agree that when rewards such as substantial earnings, property, fame, popularity, authority, power (none of them mutually exclusive), are forthcoming, educated elites could be, by and large, coopted. These are, however, individual rewards. There are other collective rewards which although not personal are nevertheless very crucial in our view. Elites' perception of their country and the condition of their own people in comparison with others with similar resources and status in the international community, we believe, are among these neglected variables. If they perceive the performance of the status quo regime as not contributing to the general well-being and socio-political development of their country and of their people compared with others with similar opportunities and resource capabilities, we posit that the elites' personal alienation from the



established order would reach a crucial threshold and, thus, lead to an eventual revolution.

We would like to stress our agreement with the already prevalent scholarly view that perceptions may be more important than realities. But if realities and perceptions correspond, the rationale and the success of an impending revolution becomes greater. For example, if Ethiopian educated elites perceived their government as slow moving in educational development process as compared with their African neighbours, their alienation would be crucial, regardless of whether the perception corresponded to reality or not. But if perceptions and realities corresponded, the chances for a revolutionary upheaval would be further enhanced. This would be so because while in the first instance the government may successfully defend itself with its records and stem the tide, in the second instance it could not possibly do so. Indeed, it would be an easy prey for attack since it could be politically disarmed. Even support from indispensable and friendly governments would tend to wane.

In both cases, that is, in cases of added or reduced material and psychological benefits which are personal and collective rewards which emanate from the perception of one's own country in comparison with others, there are increasing expectations. But with increasing expectations, there may come a stage when both the individual and collective rewards become scarce. The educated elites then start to be fragmented. The established ones who have substantially

benefited from the individual rewards would be either quiescent or openly attach themselves to the old order. But the new elites who have not benefited from these rewards and have therefore not been coopted would be alienated from the established order. They would then start championing the causes of the masses by attacking the system's apparent socio-economic weaknesses. Since economic development cannot take place in the absence of educational expansion, the regime's commitment or non-commitment in that sphere becomes detrimental to its very survival. But in both cases it faces a paradox. Too much educational expansion, which entails larger and larger numbers of educated personnel, makes material rewards by which the elites are coopted dangerously thin (unless there is a regulated system of egalitarian distribution of scarce resources), thus increasing the chances of rebellion. Too little educational expansion also alienates the educated elites who have accepted the West's normative values and standards and thus opens the regime to severe criticism which is even more detrimental. Haile Selassie's feudalism, we posit, opted for and suffered more from the second than from the first. But since educational expansion in Ethiopia in the decades of the 50s, 60s, and 70s favoured higher education in liberal arts and social sciences, despite the fact that there were severe shortages of skilled manpower in technical areas, there was also a certain amount of the first element. Lopsided elite production without concomitant rewards and even jobs had significantly increased the ranks of the educated rebels, especially in the late 60s and early 70s, thus enhancing opposition to Haile Selassie's feudalism.

We also believe that the role of education and the educated students and teachers in precipitating a revolution in underdeveloped societies needs close scrutiny, since in this particular aspect the literature is, by and large, lacking. Indeed, in societies where serious socio-economic problems exist, even though the illiterate rural masses are quiescent, however miserable their condition, education acts as a stimulus for political upheavals, because the teachers and students always have increasing expectations that could not ultimately be fulfilled through a gradualist approach. The role of students and teachers in the Russian, Chinese and other major revolutions was quite significant. That at a particular revolutionary period these societies had high proportions of alienated intellectuals and students was, therefore, not coincidental.

We also assume that the role of the military in Third World countries with a revolutionary momentum have seldom been any different from the traditional bureaucratic elites who are status quo oriented and are strongly attached to the state machinery. At the most, their role in revolutionary situations had been either passive or playing "a waiting game." Their decisive involvement usually appears when the ruled rise en masse, join ranks with the small but highly committed civilian intelligentsia who are the vanguards of the revolution and defy the established order; and the rulers exhibit a tendency of crumbling under the new revolutionary onslaught. What makes them effective at that stage is that if there is not a well-established and well-organized party,

as in the Soviet Union prior to 1917 and China in the late 40s, the military establishment being the only group with the most important physical powers in the entire society, could succeed to crush the revolution, subvert or coopt it, or as in the Ethiopian case, jump on the bandwagon and adopt the radical programs championed by the civilian revolutionaries. They would then ultimately entrench themselves by neutralizing the revolutionary intelligentsia who had started to roll the ball of the revolution in the first place.

Whereas the hypothetical assumptions above run through the whole of this dissertation, a resumé of what we want to analyze and prove in the Ethiopian case and the major framework of our hypotheses is given below.

Our preliminary analysis starts with traditional education in Ethiopia which is simply a continuum into the modern era. We assume that for over a millenium, Ethiopia, which had its own indigenous writing system and literature, had spawned homegrown traditional elites known as the Debteras (or church scholars) who played a pivotal role in the exercise of political power. But with modern education came modern educated elites. When Western education was introduced into Ethiopia at the beginning of this century, it was to fulfil the need of a modernizing autocracy aspiring to enter the Technological Age. At first, language schools were opened to enable the feudal government to carry on a dialogue with foreign powers. Then, Mussolini invaded the country. During the five years of occupation (1936-41), the Fascists attempted to

employ education as a tool by which a sense of racial inferiority would be inculcated in the Ethiopian people. Ironically, however, Western education got its lettre de noblesse during the period of occupation. Ethiopians in all walks of life were, by then, convinced that a country which less than two generations ago had vanquished a mighty European army could not have been so speedily defeated had it not been for lack of modern education and know-how. Thus, the nation embarked on a full-fledged acceptance of Western education. But through Western education also came a very intense Anglo-American cultural penetration. The first group of Western-educated intelligentsia integrated themselves into the feudal system, embraced western values and the American way of life. Haile Selassie hoped that the American free enterprise system would absorb those his bureaucracy could not. The missionary zeal that guided America's global policy of "containment" also created a situation whereby the U.S., in order to influence Ethiopian politics and particularly its youth, invested heavily in the educational sector. Thus, the feudal regime, the U.S., and the first generation of Western educated elites became necessarily interdependent. But with positions at higher levels filled up, technological progress moving at a snail's pace, Ethiopia trailing almost all African countries in its educational progress, the priorities of the government being distorted, and the failure rate in the school system dramatically rising, the new generation of intelligentsia that the liberal arts-oriented educational system produced became alienated.

The alienation was reinforced by the fact that a conflict was developing between the newer generation of intelligentsia, Haile Selassie's

feudal monarchy and the United States of America. From the outset, there was a seed of contradiction in this alliance and the ideological bond that tied them. American education which moulded the new Ethiopian intelligentsia is rooted in the liberal-utilitarian tradition which promotes the values of metropolitan market economies. Autonomy and individual freedom—which forms the core of this liberal-utilitarian ideology—was accepted at face value by the new intelligentsia. However, these ideological values could not be implemented in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia which was a dependent, modernizing autocracy tied to a metropolitan nation (i. e., the United States of America). The contradictions involved are clear—dependency and autocracy are dialectically opposed to autonomy and individual freedom. In other words, the liberal education disseminated through the Ethiopian school system and the political ideals connected with it were negated by a dependent authoritarian system and the prevalent political realities in Ethiopia. There was also a further paradox. Since Haile Selassie's authoritarian system was guided by metropolitan capitalism, the alienated elites later came to reject the latter ideology. Furthermore, due to the fact that liberal education, which was the product of capitalism, could neither explain nor accommodate this apparent rejection, a segment of the Ethiopian intelligentsia, in their attempt to seek resolution to their paradox, turned to the socialist prism. They then employed socialist ideological and revolutionary weapons in their anti-feudal and anti-Haile Selassie political strategies. Ultimately, with their colleagues still within the

educational system (and those working at the lower echelons of the bureaucracy) these new breed of Western educated intelligentsia, who were mostly students and teachers, ignited the sparks of the revolutionary ferment in the country, and all the military had to do in 1974 was deliver a coup de grâce to Haile Selassie's feudal regime.

To conclude, this research, which was undertaken because of personal, intellectual and academic interest, is interdisciplinary in nature. It draws on the author's background strength in political science (undergraduate Honours and M. A.) and his own personal involvement in education as school teacher and college and university lecturer. He also has a long-standing interest in the discipline of comparative education in which he has a well-established publication record. It is his ardent hope that the detailed analyses contained in the ensuing chapters and the vast amount of empirical data at his disposal will shed light on these crucial assumptions and make a significant contribution to knowledge. He even entertains the aspiration that the thrust of the analysis may go beyond the limited scope of explaining the root causes of the Ethiopian revolution, and have a wider application; it may help in understanding the critical realms of education, revolution and political processes in the Third World.

## CHAPTER I

### ETHIOPIA: BACKGROUND

#### Physical Features

The name "Ethiopia," which means "Land of the Burnt Faces," is Greek in origin. It is associated with the Hellenic legend which recounted the story of Phoebus's golden chariot; when it passed too near the tropics, it burnt the inhabitants' skin so deeply that they remained permanently tanned.<sup>1</sup> For the ancient Greeks, all peoples south of Egypt were Ethiopians by virtue of their dark colour (see Map 1). Mediaeval European writers used the name indiscriminately to include sub-Saharan Africa, Nubia, India, and southern Arabia. After the Portuguese contact with Africa in the fifteenth century, however, European records consistently used the name "Abyssinia" to refer to Ethiopia as we know it today. Abyssinia as a designation derives from Habashat, a tribe of immigrants who crossed the strait of Bab el Mendeb and founded the Axumite Empire, which flourished between the second century B.C. and the seventh century A.D.<sup>2</sup> For the Ethiopians, there is always a subtle distinction: while the people are known as Habasha, the country—transcending all tribal boundaries—is called Ethiopia.


---

<sup>1</sup>Robert L. Hess, Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. xvii.

<sup>2</sup>Theodore Bent, The Sacred City of the Ethiopians (London: Longmans and Green, 1893), pp. 1-296.



Map 1  
Africa and the Middle East Between  
the Years 1000 B.C. and 200 B.C.



Modern-day Ethiopia,<sup>3</sup> located on the eastern Horn of Africa, encompasses an area of over 457,000 square miles, and is as large as Germany and France combined.<sup>4</sup> The country is roughly divided into three geographic regions (see Map 2). The Western Plateau comprises 40% of the territory, and covers the traditional Abyssinia known to Europeans, thus including Tigré, Gondar, Shoa and Gojam—a stronghold of the Agaws, the Tigrés, and the Amharas until the Oromo conquest of the sixteenth century.<sup>5</sup> These Abyssinian ambas (tablelands) form natural barriers and sharp escarpments which, in places, drop suddenly to the valley below so that they are almost impenetrable by a foreign enemy. The ambas and mountain fortifications have also been places of political exile for Ethiopian princes—especially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—as recounted by James Bruce in his travel books; they were an inspiration for stories such as Samuel Johnson's Rasselas.<sup>6</sup> Some of the ambas are frequently dissected by a series of valleys, such that one of the soldiers who came to Abyssinia with the Napier expedition against Tewodros remarked in 1868, "They tell us this is a tableland. If it is, they have turned the table

<sup>3</sup>Donald Levine, Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-ethnic Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 26-39.

<sup>4</sup>G. C. Last, "Introductory Notes on the Geography of Ethiopia," Ethiopia Observer, VI (1962), 82-134.

<sup>5</sup>Jean Dorresse, Ethiopia, trans. by Elsa Coult (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1959), pp. 13-198.

<sup>6</sup>Samuel Johnson, Rasselas, the Prince of Abyssinia (London, 1759). See also Barbara Toy, In Search of Sheba (London: Butler and Tanner, 1861), pp. 220-36.



upside down and we are scrambling up and down the legs."<sup>7</sup>

Coupled with its advantage as a natural barrier against a common enemy, the Western Plateau, with the rest of Ethiopia, is said to be one of the most fertile areas of the world if proper farming methods are employed. In fact, agricultural experts have dubbed it the "future granary" of the Middle East, since it could easily feed the entire Arab world and at the same time support over 130 million people in Ethiopia itself.<sup>8</sup>

The Eastern Plateau, which is mostly inhabited by Moslems, stretches from the Oromo lands of Bale and Arusi to Cape Guardafui in Somalia.<sup>9</sup> Several valleys protected by mountain barriers exist in this region, but in number, as well as in magnitude, they are no rival to those in the Western Plateau.

In terms of elevation and climate, the Ethiopian highlands are divided into three sectors. The Dega, which is 8,000 feet or more above sea level, is generally chilly the whole year round, and has some snow on mountain tops during the monsoon season. The Woina Dega is 5,000 to 8,000 feet about sea level. The mean temperature here is between 60° and 68°F<sup>10</sup> and it is almost impossible for a visitor there

<sup>7</sup>Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 7-11.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 321-26; World Bank, World Development Report 1980 (London: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 142.

<sup>9</sup>Spencer Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965), p. 104.

<sup>10</sup>Hideo Suzuki, "Some Aspects of Ethiopian Climates," Ethiopian Geographical Journal, V (December, 1967), 19-22.

to believe that Ethiopia is only 200 degrees north of the equator. Most Ethiopians live and work in this Woina Dega sector. The third sector of the highlands is the Quolla. This region, which is less than 5,000 feet above sea level, is similar to and as hot as areas located in the rest of Africa's tropical zone. The major part of the Quolla region lies sandwiched between the Western and Eastern Plateaus, as these two regions are bisected by the well-known Rift Valley. This is a continuation of a huge fault in the earth's crust which stretches from Syria through Jordan and Israel, and runs across the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea down through Tanzania almost to the confluence of the Zambezi River.<sup>11</sup> The Ethiopian Rift Valley is studded with lakes, and is well-known for its beautiful panoramic scenery. The average temperature here is generally very high, and one area, the Danakil depression at 300 feet below sea level, and another region, Massawa on the coast of the Red Sea, are credited with producing some of the hottest recorded temperatures ever—at times "an infernal 140° Fahrenheit."<sup>12</sup>

We have started our discussion of education and politics in Ethiopia with geography because we believe that the topography of Ethiopia has shaped the character of the country's demographic distribution, educational status, socio-economic position, and political structure. We should note that the deep escarpments of Ethiopia have

<sup>11</sup>G.C. Last, "Some Notes on the Scenery of the Ethiopian Rift Valley," Ethiopia Observer V (1961), 194-202.

<sup>12</sup>Hess, Ethiopia: . . ., pp. 5-6.

both protected the people from foreign invaders as well as isolating them from the outside world, thus inspiring Gibbon to remark in 1788,

Encompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the Aethiopians slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world, by whom they were forgotten. They were awakened by the Portuguese who . . . appeared . . . as if they had descended through the air from a distant planet.<sup>13</sup>

The topography of the country, marked by huge gorges, torrential rivers, and numerous mountain chains, has not only prevented the amalgamation of the people into one single unit, thus encouraging the co-existence of over 70 local linguistic groups—some limited to only a few square miles in area<sup>14</sup>—but has also made it difficult to distribute the available educational resources in an efficient and equitable way. The fierce independence of the Ethiopians, the very strong sense of regionalism in the absence of outside intervention, and the suspicions of the people toward foreign ideas and ideologies—all undoubtedly influenced by the topography of the country—have strengthened the hand of the reactionary forces and have thus hampered the pace of modern economic and political development even after some significant, albeit modest, steps were taken.

### History, Myth and Reality

Like its geography, the history of the Ethiopian people is varied. For the most part, ancient historians bestowed accolades on ancient Ethiopia, a country which in their conception included Nubia, Napata, Meroe and Axum. Homer referred to "The blameless Ethiopians."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup>Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London: John Murray, 1846), Vol. IV, p. 393.

<sup>14</sup>Edward Ullendorff, The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 30-44.

<sup>15</sup>The famous Greek poet said, "Zeus went to the blameless Aethiopians at the ocean yesterday to feast and the rest of the gods went with him," The Iliad I, 423-25.

Mohammed's biographer Ibn Hisham described Abyssinia as "the land of the righteous."<sup>16</sup> Diodorus Siculus, the Greek historian of 100 A.D., recounted that visitors were "awed by the piety of the Ethiopian people."<sup>17</sup>

This ancient country was also renowned for its extensive power and unique splendour. During the third century A.D., for example, Mani ranked Axum as being third among the greatest powers in the world.<sup>18</sup> Emperor Justinian's ambassador to Axum described the Ethiopian monarch of the day as being attended by retinues carrying gilded spears and shields, and riding in a four-wheeled chariot drawn by four elephants.<sup>19</sup> The trust of the Byzantine emperors in the Ethiopian kingdom was so great that when the Persians were just about to invade the Empire, one threatened emperor sent the major portion of his royal treasures to Axum for safekeeping.<sup>20</sup>

With the advent of Moslem invasions, however, Ethiopia's image started to take on a mystical note. Many Christian rulers in Europe and elsewhere surmised that since Ethiopia controlled the headwaters of the Nile, it could bring about drought and famine in Moslem Egypt

---

<sup>16</sup>Levine, Greater Ethiopia, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup>Diodorus Siculus, Fragments of Books XXXIII to XL, translated by Francis R. Walton, Diodorus of Sicily, 12 vols. (London: Heinemann 1967), Vols. I-I, Vol. II-III.

<sup>18</sup>Mani: Cologne Mani Codex, Peri Tès Crennè Tou Sòmatos Autou (Cologne: Inv. Nr. 4780).

<sup>19</sup>Procopius of Caesarea, Opera Omnia, Recognovit Jacobus Haury, Vol. III (Leipzig: Teubner Library of Greek and Roman Writers, 1949), 70-97, passim.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

simply by withholding the Nile. Others thought that Ethiopian kings could speed the river up and thus flood the delta.<sup>21</sup>

But the most legendary of Ethiopia's images is that of the period of the Christian crusades.<sup>22</sup> European interest in Ethiopia was triggered when a letter purportedly written by Prester John (Tsadeku Yohannes), known in Ethiopia by his crown name Dawit, reached major western leaders, among whom were the Byzantine emperor Comenius I and Frederick Barbarossa. Almost immediately, European writers started to depict Prester John as a great monarch who resided in a grand palace, carried an emerald sceptre, was attended by hundreds of princes, and had an archbishop as a butler and a king as a chief cook.

Others gave their imaginations free rein.<sup>23</sup> Prester John, they wrote, had a magic mirror through which he could glance at every corner of his vast empire; his robes, washed only in fire, were woven by salamanders. Luduvico Ariosto, the famous early Renaissance poet, was inspired by these fantasies to describe the land of Preteianni (Prester John) as a place where one could find golden-chained drawbridges with solid crystal columns; musk, balsam, and

---

<sup>21</sup>Tadesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 256-57.

<sup>22</sup>C.F. Beckingham, The Achievements of Prester John (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1966).

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.



amber in every corner; a palace whose walls and ceilings were studded with pearls and whose rooms differed from each other in that the floors of some were made of rubies while others were covered with topazes and sapphires.<sup>24</sup>

The church-educated Ethiopian debteras who occasionally traveled to Jerusalem, Syria, and Cyprus, instead of denying the stories, kept silent or deliberately added some amusing anecdotes that developed into more myths. This was because one of the greatest powers the debteras held in Ethiopian society lay in their perpetration of mystical stories and intuitive explanations of supernatural events. The rulers' tradition of not allowing a foreign ambassador to return home once he had set foot on Ethiopian soil was another reason why the image of the country as described above persisted in Europe even long after the turbulent period of the crusades had passed.

As far as scientifically verifiable records go, modern Ethiopian history has been traced back to 700 B.C.,<sup>25</sup> when immigrants from south Arabia crossed the strait of Bab el Mandeb (Gate of Tears) and settled in the highlands of present-day Eritrea and Tigré.<sup>26</sup> The early inscriptions left by these immigrants can still be seen in Quiha, Yeha, and Koloe. They were written in the Sabea script originating in one

---

<sup>24</sup>Conti Rossini, "Legende Geographica Giudaiche," Bulletino della Regio Societa Geographica Italiana (1925), 10-40.

<sup>25</sup>Bent, Sacred City, pp. 152-309; William Leo Hansbury, Pillars in Ethiopian History (The William Leo Hansbury African History Notebook), Vol. 1, ed. Joseph E. Harris (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974).

<sup>26</sup>Ullendorff, The Ethiopians: . . ., pp. 46-47.

of the regions in south Arabia known as the Hagere Saba (the Kingdom of Saba). Through intermarriage with the indigenous Hamites, the immigrants soon established themselves in areas surrounding the famous city of Axum in Tigré province, and in later years moved south into the hinterlands of the Western Plateau. As intermarriage with the Agaw and other indigenous tribes increased, the southern Agazian (Ge'ez-speaking) people developed a more Hamitic culture that we now know as Amhara or Amara.

The conversion of Emperor Ezana of Axum to the Christian faith in 330 A.D. marks a very important period in Ethiopian history. From that date on, the country was destined to play some very decisive roles in the regional affairs of the littoral states of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.<sup>27</sup> One major event during the early Christian period occurred in 523 A.D. Upon the personal request of the Byzantine emperor Justin I, Emperor Kaleb of Axum dispatched a successful military expedition across the sea against a Jewish colony in southern Arabia. And just around the time of Mohammed's birth, Emperor Kaleb's viceroy Abraha was attempting to expand the Axumite empire as far north as Mecca<sup>28</sup> (see Map 3).


Ironically, however, at about the same time, the Jewish faith penetrated Ethiopia through the Falashas—immigrant Hebrew settlers who intermingled with Agaw Kushites, and who, under the leadership of Queen Yodit (Judith), succeeded in destroying the Christian dynasty

<sup>27</sup>Tadesse Tamrat, Church and State, pp. 21-25.

<sup>28</sup>Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, pp. 53-54.

Map 3

Axum and the Near East Sixth Century A.D.



in Axum in the seventh century A.D.<sup>29</sup> Even though the Falashas were at the time a very formidable force, they were unable to keep their empire together. Chaos followed as several Christian kings who pledged allegiance to Axum went behind their mountain fortifications.

A most important development during this short interlude was the birth and rapid expansion of Islam. Despite the fact that Armah, Emperor of Axum, had given refuge to the first generation of Mohâmed's followers,<sup>30</sup> (an event known as the first hajira in the Moslem faith), the fast-moving jihad (holy war) isolated the country from the outside world. All lowland areas, including the sea coasts of Ethiopia, were seized during the initial campaigns, and people inhabiting these regions were all converted to Islam.

The fall of Axum to the Agaw Falashas of Jewish faith was immediately followed by the rise of an Agaw Christian royal line in the central highlands. This dynasty, known in Ethiopian history as the House of Zagwé, built some of Ethiopia's most splendid rock-hewn churches in the mountain regions of Roha at Lalibela<sup>31</sup> and ruled Ethiopia for almost 300 years. Zagwé's control over the country came to an end in 1270. Political manoeuvres between the Agaw, who

<sup>29</sup>Greenfield, A New Political History, pp. 31-33.

<sup>30</sup>Czeslaw J sman, The Ethiopian Paradox (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1963), p. 25.

<sup>31</sup>D.R. Buxton, "Ethiopian Rockhewn Churches," Antiquity (1946), and Travels in Ethiopia (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1949); L. Finlay, The Monolithic Churches at Lalibela in Ethiopia (Cairo: 1944).

claimed descent from Moses, who according to the Bible was married to an Ethiopian while in Egypt, and the kings of Shoa, who traced their line directly to Abemelek—son of a king—or Menelik I, the legendary son of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, forced the Zagwés to relinquish the throne in favour of the new Solomonian dynasty which the church supported.

What followed was a period of literary and religious revival. Royal chronicles were written and ecclesiastical literature was vastly expanded.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, Ethiopian isolation did not end except for occasional visits by Portuguese and European ambassadors in the fifteenth century. These emissaries were forced to spend the rest of their lives in Ethiopia, lest they betray the kingdom by divulging its secrets and inviting what the people always dreaded: hostile foreign forces.

During the early expansion of Islam which engulfed the Middle East and parts of Europe, stories about Prester John continued to keep western interest in the country alive,<sup>33</sup> and Ethiopia was thought to be the last outpost of Christianity in the Near East. However, when, following the Turkish occupation of Arabia, the Adal Moslems were armed with cannons and muskets, and under the leadership of Imam Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim al Gazi (known in Ethiopia as Gragh, "the left-handed"), penetrated the Christian highlands, nine-tenths of the Ethiopian population were converted to Islam.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup>Tadesse Tamrat, Church and State, pp. 64-74.

<sup>33</sup>C. F. Beckingham and G. W. B. Huntingford, The Prester John of the Indies, Vols. I and III (London: Hakluyt Society, 1954).

<sup>34</sup>Gedle-Gelawdewos, trans. by W. E. Conselman (Paris: Bouillon, 1895), p. 123.

The event described above would probably have been the end of Ethiopia's Christian kingdom had it not been for the swift intervention of the Portuguese, who, upon appeal from Emperor Lebna Dengel, sent an expeditionary force in 1541. The Portuguese army, under the leadership of Christopher Da Gama (son of Vasco Da Gama) provided crucial aid to the fledgling troops of Emperor Galawdewos (who succeeded Lebna Dengel), though Da Gama himself and half of his 400 fighters were killed in battle during the preliminary engagements. In 1543, however, the Ethiopian army, carrying firearms supplied by the Portuguese and bolstered by the remaining two hundred men of Da Gama's forces, succeeded in stemming the tide of the jihad.<sup>35</sup> Many of the Portuguese who fought side by side with Abyssinian soldiers and ensured the continued independence of Ethiopia's Christian kingdom remained behind, and when a new capital was founded in central Amhara, they helped build the historic castles of Gondar. But later, their attempt to introduce Catholicism into Ethiopia in place of the Coptic Monophysite faith ran into stiff resistance and led to a bloody civil war. Upon the success of the Monophysite faction, all Portuguese nationals and all Jesuit missionaries who held influence over the Gondarine monarchs were legally made personae non grata and had to leave the country in 1633.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup>R. Pankhurst, "Firearms in Ethiopian History," Ethiopia Observer, vol. 6, no. 2 (1962).

<sup>36</sup>A. Castanhoso, The Portuguese Expedition to Abyssinia, trans. R.S. Whitney (London: Hakluyt Society, 1902).

The defeat of Grang and his Moslem army was, of course, one of the most important events in Ethiopian history. Nevertheless, as soon as the Adals and their Somali allies retreated to the lowlands, a new wave of Oromo invasion ensued. The new invaders, the Oromo Kushites, were pagan nomads roaming the quolla grasslands of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya in their endless search for grazing land. The Oromos were known as fierce fighters, and with a series of lightning raids, they soon engulfed the highlands of Abyssinia, thus forcing the Christian Amharas and Tigrés to retreat to the most inaccessible ambas such as Limalimo and Ambaalagie in Tigré, the Simien mountains in Begemder, Menz in Shoa and Choké, and the Balaya mountain ranges in Gojam. But the new invaders, who had a gada system of government run by democratically-elected political leaders of specified age groups, were divided into seven major clans<sup>37</sup> who fought amongst each other as much as they fought against the kingdoms of Gondar, Shoa, and Tigré. In actual fact, with the sole exception of the Wollo clan, who acceded to the throne in later years, the Oromos were never able to hold centralized political influence over the Abyssinian empire. Through royal marriages, religious conversions, and clever use of divide et impera among the Oromo clans, the Amharas and Tigrés finally succeeded in restoring control over the Christian empire. Most of the Oromos, who had gradually become agriculturalists, were

<sup>37</sup>Paulos Milkias, Yegeda Hegena Yeoromo Hezb Astedader Serat (Addis Ababa: Ethio-American Mapping and Geography Institute, 1960), pp. 1- 5; Asmorom Legesse, Gada: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1973), pp. 1-271.

by the late 1800's reduced to virtual serfdom. Wollo's chiefs, the only Oromos with court influence, were eventually assimilated into a newly emerging Amharized ruling class. They lived as absentee landlords at the Gondar Palace and engaged in palace intrigues as king-makers during the period known as Zemene Mesafint (the Era of the Princes), 1769-1855.<sup>38</sup>

Zemene Mesafint ended with the accession to the throne of Kassa of Quarra, better known to historians by his crown name Tewodros, who vowed to unite the fragmented Ethiopian empire.<sup>39</sup> Tewodros, upon ascending to the throne, immediately set about modernizing Ethiopia and subduing the Ottoman Turks, who were occupying the Ethiopian coast, and crushing the Oromo tribes, who had already established themselves on the Abyssinian highlands. But when the king's letter to Queen Victoria explaining the difficulties he faced with the Turks remained unanswered for two years, the emperor took it as an insult and detained all Europeans including the British Consul Duncan Cameron. Failing to achieve the release of their diplomatic envoy and other nationals through normal channels, the British dispatched an expedition in 1868 under the leadership of Sir Robert Napier. Aided by Tigrean

<sup>38</sup>The Royal Chronicle of Abyssinia, 1769-1840, trans. W. Weld Blundel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922); Mordechai Abir, The Era of the Princes: The Challenge of Islam and the Reunification of the Christian Empire, 1769-1855 (New York: Frederik A. Praeger, 1968).

<sup>39</sup>Debtera Zeneb, YéTewodros Tarik, E. Litmann, ed. (Princeton: 1902); Alaka Wolde Mariam, Yédagmawí Tewodros Neguse-Negest Ze-Etiopia Band Abnet Yemigegn Tarik (original 1881) (Paris: Librairie Orientale et Américaine, 1904).



leaders who were rivals to the imperial throne, Napier and his followers succeeded in traversing the highlands and were victorious against Tewodros at the Battle of Makdala. Tewodros, rather than being taken prisoner by the British, committed suicide with a pistol previously given to him by Queen Victoria.<sup>40</sup> After securing the release of the prisoners, the British expeditionary force left the country immediately.

The successor to the throne after the events of 1868 was Emperor Yohannes IV of Tigré, who had aided Napier in defeating Tewodros. The new Tigrean emperor had in his turn to fight against the Egyptians, the Turkish Dervishes, and the Italians who were vying to take over his Christian empire.<sup>41</sup> His troops first defeated the Italians at the Battle of Dogali, but his other major victory against the Dervishes was marred by his own death on the battlefield of Mattama in 1889.<sup>42</sup>

Emperor Menelik II of Shoa soon acceded to the throne. Purchasing a significant quantity of firearms from Italy, he started to engage in the consolidation and expansion of his empire to the south. In this ambitious venture, the kingdoms of the Oromos, the Wollamos, the

---

<sup>40</sup>Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (London: Heinemann, and Addis Ababa University Press, 1978), pp. 172-200.

<sup>41</sup>E. Ullendorff and Abraham Demoz, "Two Letters from the Emperor Yohannes of Ethiopia to Queen Victoria and Lord Granville," The Journal of the British Society for Oriental and African Studies, vol. 32, no. 1 (1969).

<sup>42</sup>Zewde Gebre Selassie, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 225-49.

Kaffas, the Janjeros, and the Adérés fell one by one, and the size of the Abyssinian empire almost doubled within a single generation.<sup>43</sup> Once well established at home, on May 2, 1889, the Shoan Emperor signed the treaty of Wuchalé with Italy, recognizing Italian control of Eritrea and Somaliland. But the wording of the treaty originally drafted by the Italians themselves had stipulated in the Amharic version that Ethiopia might avail herself of the good offices of Italy in diplomatic relations with European powers, while the Italian version, unknown to Menelik, and inadvertently signed and carrying his royal seal, stipulated that Ethiopia must consult Italy before establishing any relationship with other European nations.<sup>44</sup> The Italians immediately made their version known to their European allies and claimed protectorate over Ethiopia.<sup>45</sup> Menelik, upon being informed of the discrepancy in translation, declared the treaty null and void. But European powers, with the sole exceptions of France and Russia, recognized Ethiopia's protectorate status. Britain actually went to the extent of signing a protocol with Italy recognizing that claim in return for restraint from interfering with the normal flow of the Nile, which gets more than 80 percent of its water from

<sup>43</sup>Tsehafe Téezaz Gebre Selassie, Tarik Zemen Ze Dagmawi Menelik Neguse Negest Ze-Etiopia (Amharic, 1901), eds. Like Likawunt, Haile Meskel Gebre Medhen, Degazmatch Kebede Tesemma, Blata Mersée Wolde Kirkos, and Kentiba Zewde Gebre Selassie, (Addis Ababa: Artistic Press, 1966), pp. 100-276; R.H. Kofi Darkwah, Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire, 1813-1889 (London: Heinemann, 1975), pp. 57-110.

<sup>44</sup>Sven Rubenson, "The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichalé Treaty," Journal of African History, vol. 11 (1964).

<sup>45</sup>Sven Rubenson, Wichalé XVII, The Attempt to Establish a Protectorate over Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: 1964).

the Abyssinian highlands.<sup>46</sup>

The recognition of the European powers, especially Britain, emboldened Italy to push its military expansion south to subdue Menelik. But to the surprise of the Italians and the Europeans who considered Menelik's feudal army a paper tiger, the Italian army suffered a crushing defeat at the battle of Adwa in 1896.<sup>47</sup> To obtain the release of over 10,000 prisoners taken at Adwa and to rescue their east African colonies from the onslaught of Menelik, the Italians hastily signed a new treaty annulling the Wuchalé one and recognizing Ethiopia's undisputed independence.<sup>48</sup>

After Menelik's death in 1913, his grandson Lij Eyasu ascended to the throne. But the fact that Eyasu's father was an Amharized Oromo king of Wollo (known as Abeto Mohamed Ali, later forcibly converted by Yohannes IV to Christianity) worked against him. Furthermore, Eyasu's flirtation with the Turks aggravated his unpopularity among the Shoan aristocracy and played into the hands of his enemies. Thus, the Shoan ruling class, led by Déjazmatch Tafari Makonnen (later Emperor Haile Selassie), mustering the support of the Ethiopian

---

<sup>46</sup>W. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New York: 1951); Thomas Gilmour, Abyssinia, the Ethiopian Railway and the Powers (London: 1906); Engeda-Work, Ethiopia: A Pawn in European Diplomacy (New York: 1935).

<sup>47</sup>Roberto Battaglia, La Prima guerra d'Africa (Turin: Einandi, 1958), pp. 733-68; Augustus Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (London: Methuen, 1901), pp. 196-225.

<sup>48</sup>Harold Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 111-213.

church and receiving the tacit encouragement of the western embassies, staged a successful coup d'état in 1916. However, since Tafari Makonnen was not the rightful heir to the Solomonian throne, the eldest daughter of Menelik Woizero Zawditu was proclaimed Empress of Ethiopia and Tafari Makonnen became Ras and Regent to exercise full political powers as well as being named heir to the throne of Menelik upon Zawditu's death.<sup>49</sup> From this time on, Ras Tafari had to maintain influence over the destiny of this ancient land. His coronation in 1930 as Emperor of Ethiopia was almost an anti-climax, for he was known in Ethiopia as well as abroad for his early Westernization efforts and the dramatic events that took place during his ~~regency~~, as well as for those which occurred during his long imperial reign.<sup>50</sup>

Tafari's early efforts to modernize feudal Ethiopia was, however, cut short when in 1936, fired by the ambitions of imperial glory and desirous of avenging Italy's major defeats at Dogali and Adwa,<sup>51</sup> the Fascist army of Benito Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, employing modern tanks, airplanes, and mustard gas against a feudal army equipped only with old forearms, clubs, and spears.<sup>52</sup> Haile Selassie consequently

<sup>49</sup> Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja (Amharic, 1936) (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1972), pp. 30-38.

<sup>50</sup> Highlights of important events during his regency can be seen in his own autobiography, see *ibid.*, pp. 1-252.

<sup>51</sup> Emilio de Bono, Anno XIII, The Conquest of an Empire (London: Crescent, 1937); Pietro Badoglio, The War In Abyssinia (London: Methuen, 1937).

<sup>52</sup> Marcel Junod, Warriors Without Weapons (Oxford: Alden Press, 1951), pp. 22-75.

travelled to Geneva and appealed to the League of Nations for help but to no avail. He then took exile in Britain. However, five years after the invasion, the alliance between Mussolini and Hitler, and the bold encroachment by Italy on British Somaliland soon encouraged the British to aid Haile Selassie and the Ethiopian patriots who continued their fight against the Fascists while the Negus was in exile in Britain.<sup>53</sup> By April 1941, Italian troops had been defeated by the combined force of British and Ethiopian troops, Haile Selassie had returned to his throne and the country's sovereignty was once again restored.<sup>54</sup>

The trauma of Fascist cruelties during the occupation of 1936-41 united the country more than ever. Thus, for the following two decades, Haile Selassie, who enjoyed unfaltering loyalty from the people, continued his previously interrupted "modernization of autocracy."<sup>55</sup> In 1960,

<sup>53</sup>Tadesse Mecha, Tekur Anbassa (Amharic Asmara: 1950); Teke Tsadik Mekuria, Yé-Etiopia Tarik-Kastse Tewodros Eske Kedamawi Haile Selassie (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1946); Richard Greenfield, "Remembering the Struggle," Makerere Journal, Vol. 9 (1964).

<sup>54</sup>Government of Great Britain, Ministry of Information, The Abyssinian Campaigns (London: 1942).

<sup>55</sup>Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (London: Faber and Faber, 1947). Haile Selassie's "Modernization of Autocracy" has been analyzed in detail in Hess's scholarly treatise, Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy. Concerning the autocratic nature of Tafari's regency one cannot resort to any other euphemism which implies political enlightenment without falling into the trap of scholarly distortion. For this fact one has only to turn to Tafari himself. His seal of Regency had the title "Tafari Makonnen Yé Etiopia Mengist Algawérashenna Bala Mulu Siltan Enderassie" (Tafari Makonnen, Heir to the Ethiopian Throne and Regent with Absolute Political Powers). He also proudly describes his unlimited authority in his autobiography. See Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heyweténna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 124-28.

however, while the Emperor was on a state visit to Brazil, a coup d'état was staged by western-educated youths who had infiltrated the leadership of the Imperial Bodyguard and the Police. For three days, civil war raged in the capital. Then the opposition forces collapsed and the attempted coup was crushed by loyalists in the army, the air force, and the paramilitary police.<sup>56</sup>

The abortive 1960 coup is significant in modern Ethiopian history in that Haile Selassie's efforts to follow the example of Japan and introduce modern development through the vehicle of western education was now for the first time creating a challenge for the monarchy itself.<sup>57</sup> The revolution of rising expectations and the educated Ethiopians' feeling of shame at their country's backwardness slowly galvanized a feeling of solidarity in the minds of the new intelligentsia, particularly the students, to press for a revolutionary solution to Ethiopia's development problem.

The political ferment that was growing throughout the Ethiopian school system was thus signalling the end of Haile Selassie and his regime. From 1960 to 1974, political satires read in the form of poetry to the general public, and violent confrontations with the police to demand land reform and humane treatment for the poor were among

<sup>56</sup>Sir Harry Luke, "Witness of Ethiopia Palace Revolt," The Times, Dec. 30, 1960; D. Goodspeed, The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'Etat (London: 1962); Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History, pp. 337-463.

<sup>57</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution (London: Review of African Political Economy, 1975), pp. 94-98; Colin Legum, Africa: The Year of the Students (London: Rex Collings, 1972), pp. 15-17.

the major events that the autocratic regime could not dismiss lightly. On the night of December 28, 1969, a prominent student leader was mysteriously assassinated and in the melée that followed, a massacre took place. But the students continued their vigil. In solidarity with their teachers, they vehemently opposed the implementation of the 1972 "Education Sector Review," which in their view was a mechanism by which a caste of half-educated labourers would be churned out of the school system only to return to the rural areas and thus give breathing space to the snail-paced modernization of autocracy Haile Selassie championed during the early periods of his rule. But by then, the situation was out of hand. Coupled with grievances in the labour force, the bureaucracy and the army, the ongoing student agitation soon precipitated the fall of Haile Selassie, and an end to the Solomonian dynasty and Ethiopian feudalism in 1974.<sup>58</sup>

#### Socio-Economic Structure

In the preceding pages we have briefly described over two thousand years of Ethiopian history until the fall of the Solomonian dynasty in 1974, following a series of student demonstrations in the 1960's and 70's. However, we believe that a proper grasp of the underpinnings of this major event will not be possible without a clear understanding of

---

<sup>58</sup>Blair Thomson, Ethiopia: The Country That Cut Off Its Head (London: Robson Books, 1975); John Markakis and Nega Ayale, Class and Revolution in Ethiopia (London: Review of African Political Economy, 1978); Marina and David Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (London: Holmes and Meier, 1978); Raul Valdez Vivo, Ethiopia: The Unknown Revolution (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Ciudad de la Habana, Novotny Press Agency Publishing House, 1979).

the mode of production in pre-revolutionary Ethiopia.

For over a millenium, Ethiopian feudalism was a highly segmented political structure in which the major classes were landlords<sup>a</sup> (big and small) and tenant serfs, the latter constituting more than 90% of the population. The nature of the relationship between the two classes was one of bondage in which the ruling classes owned the land and the other instruments of production while the ruled class, the peasants, provided their services, in return for which they received the bare necessities of life. The landlord class consisted of the Negusawi Beteseb (members of the royal family), the Mekwanent (aristocrats, mostly big absentee landlords), Balabats (local landlords), and Chekashums (appointed local chiefs). A member of this landlord class was generally known—and took pride in being known—as Tchewa (noble), Yesew Lij (literally, "the son of man," implying that those from the peasant class were sub-human), and Balabat ("one born of a father" the assumption again being that peasants and labourers had no known origin and were therefore second-class citizens). This was true in the traditional north as well as the less traditional south, and the practice cut right across ethnic lines. For example, the Quemant's political and spiritual leader, the Wember (chairman), was considered the supreme worldly guardian of the behaviour of the tribe, and exacted from each peasant three days of free labour a year, while the ruler of the Janjeros in the South not only exacted as much labour as he wished but was handed by a chosen one of his subjects who was forbidden to use that hand



again for any other purpose (it was carefully wrapped in a sheet of cloth after each royal meal). An infraction, even an accidental one, led to the severing of the offending hand, while a serious and deliberate breach brought about the peasant's execution.<sup>59</sup>

Prior to the 1973-74 popular upheaval that brought down the Haile Selassie regime, 53% of the rural peasantry were landless serfs who could be evicted at will by their landlords. This was particularly true in the south, where tenancy had reduced the mass of the peasants to abject poverty and total servitude. The following figures show the land tenure system in eight of Ethiopia's 14 provinces:<sup>60</sup>

<u>Percentage of Tenants in Southern Ethiopia</u>			
Wollo	41%	Wollega	54%
Gamugofa	48%	Kaffa	62%
Arsi	52%	Shoa	67%
Harargé	54%	Illubabor	75%


Most of the peasants in the above-mentioned provinces farmed just enough to pay rent on land they tilled (in some regions, up to 75% of their produce); the rest of their labour was aimed simply at maintaining their daily existence. Subsistence agriculture was in fact the most dominant sector in feudal Ethiopia (see Map 4). The general practice in such a feudal system was not new. The landlord appropriated the peasants' surplus through rent, taxation, and the exaction of services.

<sup>59</sup>See Gebre Selassie, Tarik Zemen Ze-Dagmawi Menelik for details of feudalistic practice and malpractice in traditional Ethiopia.

<sup>60</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Provisional Military Administrative Council, Measures for Rural Transformation (Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1977), pp. 5-8.

Map 4

## The Agricultural Sector in Ethiopia



The landlord's arbitrary powers over the peasant (e.g., eviction) were sanctioned by law and age-old feudal custom. Thus, the peasant had neither the initiative to innovate nor the aspiration to increase production, for the more he produced, the more he paid to the landlord.

This is why Ethiopian feudalism remained for generations not only as an extremely exploitative system, but also an unproductive one.

In the two decades prior to 1974, with the introduction of the green revolution and modern farming methods which had become highly profitable, a second sector based on agriculture had emerged. This modern sector produced primarily cash crops such as soybeans. Since the system was, by and large, mechanized, it required few hands. However, peasants working on such agricultural projects formed a small but fast-growing rural proletariat. Their earned wages were generally high compared with those of the millions of serfs in the subsistence sector. However, those peasants who could not find employment were evicted. This led to a mass influx into the big towns, especially to the city of Addis Ababa, of large numbers of displaced rural people. Traditional craftsmen such as the Shemanés (weavers), Ketkatchs (smiths), Fakis (leather tanners) could survive just below the poverty level, but their efforts to beat the vicious circle of poverty was usually futile, as they had to compete with modern manufactured products from such countries as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong. A few became zabagnas (personal guards), porters, maids and servants. The rest resorted to petty thievery, burglary, and pauperism. The women

usually ended up in bordellos. In general, these evicted peasants formed Ethiopia's lumpen proletariat who were eventually to participate in the "White and Red" terror campaigns of 1977.

The urban sector, especially the city of Addis Ababa, where almost all the absentee landlords and the ruling families lived, was continuing to develop at the expense of the rural sector, burdened with tenancy. In terms of basic services, the city's share was unbelievably disproportionate: Addis Ababa had 2.4% of the country's population, but enjoyed the services of 61% of all the nurses, over 50% of the doctors,<sup>61</sup> more than 40% of the country's industrial establishments<sup>62</sup> and 20% of all the teachers in the entire nation.<sup>63</sup> When we look at income per capita, the rural peasantry earned less than US \$55 per annum, of which only one third was monetary, while by contrast, the urban population's income was US \$340 per capita, of which 95% was monetary (Table 1). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the urban figure does not represent the median income of a city dweller, as it is inflated by the disproportionate amount of earnings that accrued to the top crust of the feudal order and the small but very significant petite bourgeoisie and comprador class.

---

<sup>61</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts, 1967-1968, p. 184.

<sup>62</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office and Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism, Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industry 1964/5-1966/7 (Addis Ababa: June 1969), p. 2.

<sup>63</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "School Census for Ethiopia," part 2, (Addis Ababa, 1967), p. 1.

TABLE 1

## Income per Capita in Ethiopia in 1969

	<u>1969</u>
All population:	
Total income P.C.	Eth. \$161
Monetary income P.C.	91
Urban population:	
Total income P.C.	680
Monetary income P.C.	649
Rural population:	
Total income P.C.	109
Monetary income P.C.	35

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts (Addis Ababa, 1969-70).

The birth of the latter class was a result of the new modern sector (which dates, with a few exceptions, no further back than the Italo/Ethiopian war of 1935-36). After the 1941 liberation, mining, building, manufacturing, construction, quarrying, and many other types of industries were created (see Map 5). Although the emergence of this sector was significant, it nevertheless accounted for roughly less than 17% of the gross domestic product (Table 2) and employed no more than a million people. The mode of production in this sector was capitalist in character. The worker and the owner of the means of production were related by the payment of wages for specific tasks performed. While these wage earners formed the small but very dynamic industrial proletariat, ownership of industries was 60% private (almost 75% of which was foreign controlled).<sup>64</sup>

Under Haile Selassie's centralized authority there was a small but very important stratum of petite bourgeoisie—an amalgam of lawyers, medical personnel, teachers and shopkeepers, almost all of whom were western educated. This class constituted a large sector of the urban population and owned property—and therefore the means of production—but to a much lesser degree than the landowning families constituting the bourgeoisie. One significant difference between these two classes was that while the former, who had western education, worked for a living, the latter simply idled. In the 1974 revolution, which followed continued student agitation, the petite bourgeoisie's

---

<sup>64</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office and Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industry, pp. 4-14.

## Types and Locations of Manufacturing and Industry in 1974




TABLE 2

## Sectoral Employment, Output, and Output per Worker, 1967

(in constant factor cost of 1969)

	Employment		Output		Output per Worker in Eth. \$
	Number of Workers in Thousands	Percent of Total Work Force	Amount in Millions of Eth. \$	Percent of Total Output	
<u>Agriculture (total)</u>	<u>6,191.7</u>	<u>86.1</u>	<u>1,993.1</u>	<u>56.0</u>	<u>322</u>
Commercial	500.0	7.0	551.8	15.5	1,104
Subsistence	5,691.7	79.1	1,441.3	40.5	253
<u>Industry (total)</u>	<u>497.2</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>595.5</u>	<u>16.7</u>	<u>1,198</u>
Mining and quarrying	6.3	0.1	10.2	0.3	1,619
Manufacturing, handicrafts	392.0	5.5	304.3	8.5	776
Building and construction	96.0	1.3	249.4	7.0	2,598
Electricity and water	2.9	+	31.6	0.9	10,906
<u>Transport and Communication (total)</u>	<u>29.9</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>149.1</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4,986</u>
<u>Wholesale and Retail Trade (total)</u>	<u>89.9</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>261.3</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>2,906</u>
Total	7,190.6	100.0	3,558.9	100.0	495

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Appendix II-A-1.



loyalty was essentially ambivalent towards the forces of the unfolding change. They first supported the overthrow of the less educated and traditionalist bourgeoisie and the nationalization of big agricultural and industrial holdings, but later joined the new opposition groups when the revolutionary momentum required, to their disquietude, a major sacrifice in the areas of nationalization of urban land, increased workload, moderation in consumption, and austerity. It was at this time that most of the educated members of this class went into voluntary exile so that international organizations like the U.N. and the World Bank now seem to have a disproportionate number of Ethiopians working for them. On the other hand, some western-educated petit bourgeois simply changed loyalties from Haile Selassie to the Derg and held positions of major political power in the country.

The growth of the modern sector and a change in the global situation also helped the emergence of a new class—the comprador bourgeoisie, a class depending on and benefiting from metropolitan - dependency relationships. The comprador bourgeoisie could not, by itself, form a strong and independent entrepreneur class to challenge the powers of the old feudal aristocracy. This was so because modern metropolitan-dependency relationships are so well integrated that they do not allow any room for localized independent commercial activity. Members of the comprador bourgeoisie were therefore forced to join the landed aristocracy by heavily investing in the modern component of the agricultural sector or by going into other business areas such as residential housing, highrise apartments, and real estate

speculation. Ironically, while this was the only class that played no direct role in the overthrow of the feudal regime, it also happens to be the only one that still remains intact and has not been adversely affected by the revolution of 1974.<sup>65</sup>

Education, Educated Elites, and the Exercise of Political Power in Traditional Ethiopia

The concept of education as a vehicle for the development of human potentialities is generally recognized, but its role as a transformer of political systems needs to be explored.<sup>66</sup> In the historical and socio-economic introduction above, we have hinted that modern education and modern educated elites have contributed to the fall of Haile Selassie. Here we argue that the phenomenon is not unique, that during the past millenium, education in Ethiopia has always played a role in the overthrow of emperors and dynasties.

Traditionally, education was dispensed by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church,<sup>67</sup> which introduced the young Ethiopian<sup>68</sup> to the Ge'ez and

<sup>65</sup>A few who were engaged in the agricultural sector did lose their mechanized farms, but most of them were children of absentee landlords who evicted peasants on their lands, obtained soft loans from the government, and reaped exorbitant profits made possible by the green revolution of the 60's and 70's. The best example is the case of Ras Berou's children, the biggest landowners among the aristocracy, who after being educated in Canada went home, started to make millions of dollars a year, and died fighting the nationalization of private farms in 1974.

<sup>66</sup>For more details, see Paulos Milkias, "Traditional Institutions and Traditional Elites: The Role of Education in the Ethiopian Body-Politic," African Studies Review, vol. 19, no. 3 (December, 1976), pp. 79-93.

<sup>67</sup>This study does not cover the traditional Koranic education, since its influence on Ethiopian political life has been minimal.

<sup>68</sup>Traditional education was seldom dispensed to young women. Girls from the nobility were sometimes tutored at home by debteras, just enough to read the Dawit, but this was more for prestige purposes than for anything else.

Ethiopian alphabets,<sup>69</sup> and to reading the Old and New Testaments in Ge'ez.<sup>70</sup> A distinction was made between reading and writing. The youngster was taught how to read the sacred texts, but no emphasis was put on teaching him how to write. This produced two kinds of "educated" people: those who could read, and those who could both read and write. Salt, upon his visit to Tigré, had, for example, observed that he met only a few persons "who could read the Bible," and that "not one in twenty could understand the characters they read."<sup>71</sup>

The first group could read both Ge'ez and Amharic, but could not translate one into the other, i. e., they could read Ge'ez but could not comprehend it, although they might vaguely sense the meaning in the same way a French-speaking person might try to understand Latin.

These people were destined mainly to become members of the Ethiopian

<sup>69</sup>The basic Ge'ez alphabet has 26 main characters with 7 variations, while the modern Ethiopian alphabet has 33 characters with 7 variations of each. The former has 182 phonetic symbols, but the Ethiopian (called thus because it is used in Amharic, Tigray, and other national languages), has 231 characters, mainly because of some additional letters of Cushitic root that do not exist in the Ge'ez language. Accretions such as the equivalents of the English p and v are very recent in origin and are the result of European linguistic influence.

<sup>70</sup>Although referred to in the past, it is not in the sense of a "tradition" that has disappeared. Traditional schooling is still quite important in the Amhara and Tigré provinces. The traditional school is usually situated in a churchyard, under a tree, or in the home of a debtera or "church scholar."

<sup>71</sup>Earl G. Annesley and Henry Salt, Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, The Red Sea, Abyssinia, and Egypt, Vol. 2 (London: Miller, 1809), pp. 487-88.

Orthodox Church. They became priests and deacons, and held lower-echelon jobs in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

Those who pursued their education further in the centres of learning in the great churches and monasteries, on the other hand, became the debteras, the traditional intellectual elite. Because their education was based on liturgical texts, they were the undisputed pillars of the Church. In addition to being religious singers, dancers, and choristers, they were the invaluable sources and interpreters of ecclesiastical knowledge and doctrine.

However, as the "intellectual elite" of a traditional society imbued with orthodox beliefs, the debteras' main influence lay outside the Church.<sup>72</sup> They were indispensable in the courts of the feudal kings, nobles and barons.<sup>73</sup> Before elaborating this power connection, let us examine the mode of traditional education in Ethiopia.

The curriculum for traditional education can be generalized as follows.<sup>74</sup> The primary level had five stages. The first stage con-

<sup>72</sup>Alaka Wolde Mariam, Yedagmawi Tewodros Tarik, p. 27.

<sup>73</sup>The use of titles in the Ethiopian court has always been confusing. Military titles, in order of importance, were: 1) Ras-Bitwaded (Field Marshall); 2) Ras (Chief of Staff); 3) Dejazmatch (General); 4) Ligaba (the Emperor's Liaison Officer); 5) Fitawrari (Commander of the Army and Minister of War). Civilian titles were: 1) Bitwaded (usually a prime minister); 2) Afe-Negus (Minister of Justice); 3) Tsehafé-Te'ezaz (Minister of Pen); 4) Azazh (Minister of the Palace); 5) Berjond (Minister of Finance), etc. The nobility usually held the military titles, while prominent church-educated scribes or debteras serving in the feudal courts held the latter.

<sup>74</sup>Richard Pankhurst, "Foundations of Education, Printing, Newspapers, Book Production, Libraries, and Literacy in Ethiopia," Ethiopia Observer vol. 6, no. 3 (1962), pp. 240-90; Ephraim Isaac, "Social Structure of the Ethiopian Church," Ethiopia Observer, vol. 14, no. 4 (1971), pp. 242-47.

cerned the mastery of Fidel, the Ethiopian alphabet with 231 characters, while the second stage consisted of reading Fidele-Hawaria ("the apostle's syllabary"), studying by rote the first chapter of the first epistle general of St. John in Ge'ez. Writing and numerical studies began here, but these were rather optional and the teachers seldom attempted to teach them of their own volition.

The third stage was memorizing Gebata-Hawaria (some sections of the New Testament and the Apostles' Creed) which were read aloud by the pupils in unison, the emphasis being on pronunciation and intonation. Tselote-Hawaria (religious prayers) would also be studied by heart at this stage. Writing and numerical studies could continue but this depended on the inclination of the instructor and the desire of the pupil. Religious songs were taught at this point so that the pupils could start to serve as choristers.

The fourth stage, known as Dawit (the Psalms of David), consisted of reading the psalms, the instructor paying particular attention to the pupils' Ge'ez pronunciation. The lesson was divided into 15 sections, each named after a Negus (King), the name of the Negus being the first word or phrase of each section.<sup>75</sup> Being allowed to proceed from one Negus to the next was considered an important promise. Under no conditions would an instructor let a student start a new Negus until he had a total mastery of the one preceding.<sup>76</sup> When he finished the

<sup>75</sup>The first lesson starts: "Fekaré Ze-Tsadikan Weze-Hatan" and the name of the first Negus (chapter) is thus Fekaré.

<sup>76</sup>Mastery here means reading the text fluently with the correct pronunciation and the right intonation, and does not imply understanding the meaning of the text as such.

fifteenth Negus, he was considered a primary graduate; the parents rejoiced and gave gifts both to the teacher and the pupil.

It is important to note at this juncture that the symbolic name Negus was simply the means of socialization towards political authority. Political socialization also took other forms. All pupils were obliged, for example, to stand at attention before dismissal hours and pay homage to the monarch, the Abuna and the debtera. In addition, the names of the monarch and the Abuna were repeatedly mentioned in church services together with that of the deity and debteras' Kinés to which these young people were continuously exposed were mainly devoted to the praise and glorification of the Emperor and his feudal retinue.

The next and last stage in the curriculum of elementary traditional schooling, which was usually accompanied by a church career as a deacon, was a transition period to a higher educational level to become a debtera, or to a full-time church career as a priest.<sup>77</sup> This involved committing all of the Psalms of David to memory with proper pronunciation and intonation. Prayers such as the Wudassé-Amlak (Praises to God), Arganon (Praises to the Virgin Mary), arranged for each day of the week, Songs of Solomon, Songs of the Prophets, elementary Kedassé

---

<sup>77</sup> There was a third possibility. The pupil might stop his schooling once he had acquired the skill of reading, and in some cases also writing, and go into the life prescribed for him by the feudal tradition. This was especially the case with the children of the nobility or the chewas (meaning both "illiterate" and "of a respected birth"), who had no intention of seeing their offspring as priests or debteras.

rudiments of general liturgy), and Sa'atat (hours of night services) would all be committed to memory.

Despite all the time and labour involved, the average student at this level left school, as O'Hanlon observed, "having learnt to read Ethiopic, though not to understand it, and also to read his own language of Amharic and to write a little."<sup>78</sup> This was the case in remote areas where specialized schools were lacking, or where the student's interest was either to serve the church as a simple priest or to terminate schooling and become an educated layman.

The more ambitious students, however, strove for a still higher level of education that would qualify them as a Liq or debtera.<sup>79</sup> These students usually went to the ancient institutions of higher learning located in the Amhara and Tigré provinces. Education at this level had three main branches. First was Zema Bet (School of Music), second was Kiné Bet (School of Poetry), and third was Metsahaf Bet (School of Texts, or Books).

Zema Bet had three branches of its own. The first dealt with the study of the Degua<sup>80</sup> (Musical Compositions of the Ethiopian Church

<sup>78</sup>W.D. O'Hanlon, Features of the Abyssinian Church (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1946), pp. 13-14; Sylvia Pankhurst, Ethiopia: A Cultural History (Woodford Green: Lalibela House, 1955), pp. 274-77; M. Griaule, "Les Saints Patrons en Abyssinie," Orientalia, Vol. III (Paris: 1934), pp. 106-07.

<sup>79</sup>Liq literally means "one who excels in knowledge," its English equivalent being "scholar." Debteras or Likaunt (plural of Liq) who did not hold political positions (e.g., Tsehafé-Te'ezaz, "Minister of Pen") carried titles such as Alaka. Most Alakas were in charge of the different monasteries throughout the empire.

<sup>80</sup>Tsome-Degua and Me'eraf (lenten and general hymns, respectively), are also included here.

written by an Ethiopian scholar named Yared in the sixth century A.D.).<sup>81</sup> The second dealt with Zemaré (Eucharist Songs) and Mewaset (Songs for commemorations and funerals), and the third concentrated on Kedassé (general liturgy). Each of these could be learned at the same institution or at specialized localities. The monastery of Bethlehem in Begemder specialized in Degua while Zurumba, in the same province, was famous for Zemaré and Mewaset. Serekula in Wadla (Wallo) and Debre-Abai in Tigré were also noted for Kedassé. The school of Aquaquam (styles of singing) synthesized the three branches of music mentioned above by training the student in the appropriate movement and steps (religious dances) that accompanied the songs. Mastery of each of these branches of knowledge normally took at least two years of intensive study.

Kiné Bet concentrated on Sewasew (Ge'ez grammar) and the teaching of 12 different types of composition, all committed to memory and taking as long as 13 years—nine for Sewasew and four for Derset (composition).<sup>82</sup>

<sup>81</sup>One local source, Tarique-Negest (History of the Kings), however, traces the authorship of the Degua to Geza and Raguel, who lived during the reign of Emperor Galaudewos (1540-1554). Ephraim Isaac explains that the Degua "notations (called seraye) consist of Ge'ez syllabic characters and numbers of curving and waving signs, lines and points. They are small symbols, generally placed above the words to be sung and sometimes written in red, indicating the melody and rhythm of the music. In effect, they are abbreviations that are indicated by written signs. The models may be Ge'ez (*forte*), E'zel (*legato cantabile* and *piano*), Ararai (*plaintive con moto*). The tempo may be Mergd (*largo*), Neus Mergd (*andante*), Abiye Tsefat (*allegro*), and Tsefat (*presto*). Anyone who has received church musical education is expected to know how to sing correctly using the traditional notation." Ephraim Isaac, "Social Structure" p.244.<sup>82</sup>"Wax and Gold," a theme that Donald Levine chose for the title of his book, is but one of 12 composition forms. Levine explains "Wax and Gold" Kiné as "consisting of an explicit comparison in which the subjects being compared—the 'wax and gold' are presented in apposition, while their predicates are rendered jointly by a single verb which carries a 'wax and gold' meaning." For an excellent description of a



The syllabus of the Kiné Bet is succinctly described by Donald Levine as follows:

[Kiné] is taught by running the student step by step through the gammit [sic] of figures and stanza forms. Instruction by example begins in the dark before sunrise. The teacher extemporizes on a given theme in each of the stanza forms. His productions are memorized and discussed. In the daytime, each student goes off by himself to a secluded place and composes one stanza. When finished—it may take him all day to perfect a couplet—he recites it to the master who makes appropriate critical comments.<sup>83</sup>

The most prestigious Kiné schools, which were located in the monasteries of Woshara, Wadela, and Gonj in Gojam Province, also taught philosophy. The main text was Metsahafe-Falasfa Tabiban (Book of Wise Philosophers), with passages from Plato, Aristotle, Diogenes, Cicero and other Western classical authors. Another important text was the seventeenth-century Ethiopian scholar Zara Ya'acob's philosophical critiques of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

The third main branch of traditional education, the Metsahaf Bet, had a syllabus with three branches. First was an in-depth study of Kedusan Metsaheft (the sacred books of the Old and New Testaments).<sup>84</sup>

typical Kiné school, see Haddis Alemayehu, Feker Eske Mekaber (Amharic) (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1965), pp. 71-82. See also Donald Levine, Wax and Gold (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 5; Blattein Getta Herui, Meshafe Kiné (Amharic) (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1925); Alaka Yekuno-Amlak Gebré Selassie, "Yekedmo Kinéwoch," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, vol. IV, no. 1 (1966).

<sup>83</sup> Levine, Wax and Gold, p. 8.

<sup>84</sup> The Ethiopian Bible is composed of 81 books, some of which are not recognized by the Catholic and Protestant Churches.

These were studied with the different interpretations nominally recognized by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church—nominally because the "same" interpretation differed from institution to institution and even from liq to liq. Second was the study of Awaledt (literature of "imagination," or "fiction"), and third was mastery of the Gedle (or books on monastic life). In addition, Tarike-Negest (monarchic history), Kibre-Negest (Glory of the Kings), Fetha-Negest (laws of the Kings, the basic code of laws of Ethiopia from the thirteenth century until less than two decades ago), and world history were taught at the Metsahaf Bet. The texts for world history included Zena-Ayehud (Josppon's History of the Jews), and Lessane-Tarik (historical tales), Yohannes Madabba's writings on history of the world up to Islamic expansion into Egypt. Such schools, whose courses normally took a decade to complete, were widespread in the Amhara and Tigré provinces of Ethiopia.

The above course syllabi are only a few of many.<sup>85</sup> Add to these, inter alia, astronomy, astrology, the preparation of medicinal herbs, and "magical prayers" and "formulae," which many an ambitious debtera studied on an extracurricular level, and it is not hard to realize that few young Ethiopian men could afford to leave their parents, who might be priests or laymen but who were almost invariably subsistence farmers, to the drudgery of primitive agriculture and embark on the spending of more than a quarter of a century in pursuing traditional higher education. Conversely, it was not surprising that

<sup>85</sup>C. A. Dillman, Lexicon Linguae Aethiopicae cum Indice Latino (Lipsâae: T.O. Weigel, 1865), pp. v-xv.

those few who did were in great demand both in the church hierarchy and the feudal courts. Although these educated young people always felt close to the church, they made their careers mainly as scribes: copying texts from the sacred books, writing letters and petitions for a fee, running ecclesiastical affairs, or serving as chroniclers in the courts of kings and nobles, who were, for the most part, illiterate.

Functional illiteracy among the ruling classes<sup>86</sup> was neither exceptional nor reprehensible. Traditionally, reading and writing were looked down upon. The Amhara proverb, "the worst of beasts is the scorpion, the worst of men is the debtera," attests to this. Portal noted, for example, that Ras Alula of Eritrea could neither read nor write,<sup>87</sup> and Vanderheyem reported that the Showan nobles were mostly illiterate and employed church-educated scribes to look after their correspondence.<sup>88</sup> Major Austin commented,

One could not help being struck with the comparatively few officers of rank we met who were capable of either reading or writing their own language. This work was always done by special clerks who were retained for this work alone and had necessarily to be the confidants [*sic*] of their masters.<sup>89</sup>

E. A. Pease commented likewise that many Rases could neither read

---

<sup>86</sup> Balambaras Mahteme Selassie Gebre Meskel, Zekre Neger (Amharic, Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1948), p. 612; Bairu Tafla, "The Education of the Ethiopian Meknannent in the Nineteenth Century," Ethiopian Journal of Education, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1973), 18-27.

<sup>87</sup> G. H. Portal, My Mission to Abyssinia (London, 1892), p. 237.

<sup>88</sup> J. G. Vanderheyem, Une Expédition avec le Négous Ménélik vingt mois en Abyssinie (Paris: Hachette, 1896), pp. 120-21.

<sup>89</sup> Major Austin, Foreign Office Document, 403/299 (London: Government of Great Britain, July 7, 1900).

nor write.<sup>90</sup>

Illiteracy was not confined to the ranks of the feudal nobility, as many Ethiopian emperors also fared no better.<sup>91</sup> In the mid-1800's, for example, Flad reports that despite his vast collections of Ethiopian manuscripts in his private library at Makdala, even the Emperor Tewodros himself was not able to write.<sup>92</sup> On occasion, it was his custom, Flad notes, to dictate as many as three letters at once to different scribes.<sup>93</sup> Count Fleichen also reports:

It is only the upper classes in Abyssinia, besides the priests, who can read Ethiopic and very few of them can write it. It is said that the Negus himself [Emperor Menelik] is unable to write, and this is more likely as he always has a secretary at hand to do his writing for him.<sup>94</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> A. E. Pease, Travel and Sport in Africa, Vol. 3 (London: A. L. Humphreys, 1902).

<sup>91</sup> The illiteracy of most of the emperors was only to the extent that they could not write. As pointed out above, even students who could read the sacred books could not, in most cases, understand the meanings of the texts they were reading. Also, as no emphasis was put on writing, a person who finished the first level of Dawit would not be able to write without some extra efforts on his part. Since there was a stigma attached to writing, and since the debteras were handy whenever required, the princes seldom made these extra efforts.

<sup>92</sup> J. M. Flad, The Falashas of Abyssinia (London, 1869), p. 87. However, the fact that he finished the first stage of traditional education, Dawit, shows that Tewodros was capable of reading. See Wolde Mariam, Yedagnaw, p. 1.

<sup>93</sup> For details about the illiteracy of the nobility and additional sources, see Pankhurst, "Foundations of Education . . . Ethiopia," pp. 247-90.

<sup>94</sup> Count Fleichen, With the Mission to Menelik (London: Edward Arnold, 1898), p. 233. Concerning Menelik's inability to write, however, Fleichen's observation seems suspect, since according to Menelik's royal chronicler, this creative emperor even attempted to invent a new type of alphabet; see Gebre Selassie, Tarik Zemen Ze Dagnawi Menelik, p. 94.

This does not in any way imply that because they were illiterate, the kings, princes, and noblemen were fundamentally ignorant or naïve. On the contrary, they were men who excelled in political intrigues and manoeuvres. It does indicate, however, that education was not a prerequisite for political power, at least not in the direct exercise of it.

The traditional educated elite in Ethiopia were mainly the scribes of the politically powerful. Indeed, their nearness to the apex of secular power and their capacity to read and write brought upon them a certain stigma: that of being tenguai, a word which literally means "one who points out," or "spy," but which also implies the practices of a wizard, magician, or sorcerer.<sup>95</sup> Moreover, the subtle and learned conversationalism of the debtera created an awe in the eyes of many laymen. Ethiopian peasants believed that the motion of the celestial bodies, natural calamities, disease, and death could be caused by the "incantations" of the debtera. People flock to them even today to purchase amulets (the fees varying according to the effects required) that the buyers assume will ward off the "evil eye," win the favour of a higher official, or simply serve as a "love potion."<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup> Dejazmatch Kebbede Tesemma, Yétarik Mastawesha (Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1969), p. 18; S. Gobat, Journey of Three Years' Residence in Abyssinia 1851 (New York: Negro University Press, 1969), p. 153.

<sup>96</sup> It is also due to these traditional beliefs that rumours abounded after the execution of the Ethiopian Minister of Defence, Ras Abebe Aregai, during the abortive 1960 coup, that bullets coming from the rebels' machine-guns simply ricocheted off his body because he had a debtera-prepared amulet to ward off bullets, and that in the end they were able to kill him only with bayonets.

Levine comments on this:

The association of impious properties with the main representative of traditional religious learning may be seen as an expression of the Abyssinians' ambivalence toward knowledge as such. The whole tenor of Ethiopian Orthodox religion runs counter to rationalization and inquiry.<sup>97</sup> It stresses mystery and discourages curiosity with tales like that of the man who tried to probe the mystery of the Trinity and was swallowed up by the earth—a tale commonly told to students who are learning to read.<sup>97</sup>

While correctly describing the situation, Levine misinterprets it as one in which there is no rationalization, inquiry, or curiosity. On the contrary, the powers of the debtera are based on these constant rationalizations (or explanations) of unnatural, incoherent, or unwelcome events and situations. Debteras do inquire into human and natural phenomena, but only according to the rules and laws of their knowledge. There is, in fact, as an Ethiopian proverb runs, "no limit to the curiosity of the debtera." Indeed, it was for this very purpose that he associated himself with esoteric knowledge in the first place. Interestingly enough, one thing that seemed to have fascinated Gobat in his association with the Ethiopian debteras in the nineteenth century was their constant insatiable quest for knowledge.<sup>98</sup>

As to creativity, one must first see the amount of subtlety and originality required in composing a Kiné or a Derset to realize how far off the mark Levine's interpretation is. By a major twist of logic,

---

<sup>97</sup> Levine, Wax and Gold, p. 197.

<sup>98</sup> Gobat, Journey of Three Years' Residence in Abyssinia (1851), pp. 154-204.

even Levine admits this fact.<sup>99</sup> Nor is the "ambivalence" that exists, as pointed out by Levine, due to the debtera's ambivalent stand with respect to knowledge. Rather, it is an ambivalence which reflects and assesses the sacrifices required to be so knowledgeable.

Otherwise, that knowledge itself is highly valued by Ethiopians in all walks of life is an undisputed fact. Indeed, the origin of the preposterous beliefs in the debtēras' magical powers partly emanated from their mastery of vast amounts of knowledge as compared to the common Ethiopian who can hardly read and write. Even the unsuspecting European scholar who first comes into contact with a humble debtera cannot help being amazed at the magnitude of his knowledge. This is what led the British explorer, Salt, to equate debtera with doctor. Salt wrote:

Dofter, or Doughter [sic] in the Abyssinian seems to be the same word as our doctor, signifying a person who has dedicated his time to learned pursuits. . . . I am not aware by what means the word can have crept into the language.<sup>100</sup>

Bent likewise commented:

The class called defteras [sic] . . . are the scribes, advocates and doctors . . . and are certainly the most instructed and intelligent people we came across.<sup>101</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Levine remarks elsewhere in Wax and Gold, pp. 270-71, "in the case of gené . . . the Amhara poet must . . . be original. In the production of versé, individuality is explicitly emphasized. Poets who use verses composed by others—this is primarily true of students of gené—are insulted with the term leba (thief). Similarly, a poet should not repeat himself. If he repeats the same word in a piece of verse, he is derided as an ant. Once he has composed a certain verse, he is supposed to discard it and compose something new the next time."

<sup>100</sup> Henry Salt, Voyage en Abyssinie, entrepris par ordre du gouvernement britannique, exécuté dans les années 1809 et 1810, Vol. 2, trans. P.F. Henry (Paris: Magimel, 1816), p. 84.

<sup>101</sup> T. Bent, The Sacred City of the Ethiopians (London: 1893), p. 161.

The Italian missionary, M. de Jacobis, remarked that the Ethiopian debtera had "more real knowledge than the most learned professors in our European schools."<sup>102</sup>

The mysterious aura surrounding knowledge in traditional Ethiopia was not to discourage inquiry by the learned, in spite of the story told to school beginners; rather, it was to discourage those who did not become debteras and those who ventured into learning reading and writing without the guiding hand of the debtera. The debteras went to great extents to ensure their monopoly of knowledge. Alaka Wolde Mariam, for example, recounts how, when the Abuna, for whom he was a scribe, asked him to write a secret political letter to Tewodros' young rival Menelik (probably hinting that if Menelik got him out of jail, he would excommunicate Tewodros and anoint him emperor), he found himself in a dilemma. If he had refused to write the letter, he might have fallen out of favour with an Abuna he "considered like a father." If he had written the letter and it had been intercepted before it reached Shoa, Tewodros would definitely have executed him. Therefore, Wolde Mariam claims that he used his "special knowledge" and demonstrated to the Abuna how he could send a paper that would become a letter on arrival in Shoa. The Abuna "admired my knowledge," the debtera related, but declined the offer, obviously thinking that it was

<sup>102</sup> Baroness M.E. Herbert, Abyssinia and its People (London: 1867), pp. 81-82. See also Acheber Gabré Hiôt, La Verité sur l'Ethiopie révéllée après le couronnement de roi des rois (Lausanne: Editions Frendweiler-Spiro, 1931), pp. 57-60; and A. Cipolla, Nell impero di Menelik (Milano: Societa Editria "La Grande atturalita," (1911), pp. 80-82.



the work of a demon. True to the traditional code of ethics of his profession, the Aleka not only failed to divulge the secret to the Abuna he considered "like a father," but also left his readers in suspense as to what that special "knowledge" was.<sup>103</sup>

Contents of amulets were also dotted with different colours, meaningless symbols, that each debtera invented himself most of the time, and strange words and enigmatic phrases. An example is the amulet worn by Emperor Tewodros when he committed suicide in Makdala after losing a war to the British expedition of General Napier.<sup>104</sup> Among other things, it contained the following words: "(Tse) Telshu Anahor Tsimur (or Dimur) Mehtsun Ilshai Pion." The reason for using these words, which have no specific meanings, is that when read, they sound like what the common man assumed to be an ancient occult language, reinforcing the popular belief that the knowledge of the debtera comes from a store of arcane learning accumulated through numerous millenia, to which only a debtera has the key.

The relations between the people and the debteras were quite complex. In terms of material existence, the latter were better off than the masses of the people, even if the degree was slight. Some might succeed in gaining the favours of a nobleman and obtain a tikle (a piece

<sup>103</sup>The author, who has only a few years of traditional schooling, knows, however, that the ink the Aleka claims to have "prepared with special knowledge" was simply lemon juice; the blank-looking paper would indeed become a letter the moment it was exposed to heat!

<sup>104</sup>Richard Pankhurst, "The Emperor Theodore's Amulet," Ethiopia Observer, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1962), p. 29.

of land to rent or cultivate).<sup>105</sup> Indeed, to get a tikle was the primary aspiration of these educated people, for it gave them both a modicum of security and a symbolic distinction from the common people, most of whom were tenant farmers.<sup>106</sup> The tikle, with its pecuniary and symbolic values, was one of the ways—perhaps the most important—by which the educated were made to depend, both for their living and their status, on those who held political power.

The educated served the powerful in more ways than one. They interpreted the actions of their patrons in terms of secular (in traditional context, this means relating actions to custom or history) and religious ideas. It was, indeed, in this capacity that every nobleman, prince, or king had his court of educated people who, as interpreters of his actions and policies, were the expounders to the people—on the symbolic level—of the legitimacy of the existing powers.<sup>107</sup>

The emperors of feudal Ethiopia used to recruit from learned ecclesiasts to fill the bench of their courts. These were the Akabé-

<sup>105</sup> A tikle is usually one gasha of land, which varied from 40 to 80 hectares.

<sup>106</sup> While the majority of farmers in the southern provinces were landless peasants who could generally be evicted at will, even in the north a large number of people worked on lands leased from the church (e.g., Samon land, see John Markakis and Nega Ayele, Class and Revolution in Ethiopia, Review of African Political Economy (1978), pp. 21-26.

<sup>107</sup> Sometimes, rival princes waged violent wars to capture the Abuna (head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church) in order to secure the throne for themselves. It is from this point of view that one can see the importance of Haile Selassie's efforts to centralize the Ethiopian Church and have it depend on him as one single unit. By doing this, he, in a way, deprived his political opponents of the agents of symbolic representation of legitimacy.

Sa'at (the spiritual guardians of the canonical rules), whose functions in modern times had evolved into that of the Like-Mekwas or the emperor's aide-de-camp;<sup>108</sup> the Like-Debtera (Chief literati); Like-Memheran (Chief Scholar); Nebure-Id (the spiritual and temporal ruler of Axum, his title being equivalent to Ras); Like-Kahenat (Chief arbitor of ecclesiastical disputes and a liaison between the monarch and the church).<sup>109</sup> The above officers were in fact the power connections of the Orthodox Church. As the institution of education, the church supplied the secular power with its pen, ideas, ideologies, and the interpreters and justifiers of its legitimacy. To this extent, the linkage of the educated was two-sided. On the one hand, they hinged on the ecclesiastical hierarchy as a conduit to the secular powers, and, on the other, they aspired to win the favours of the secular powers who were the sources of their income (Figure 1).


This interdependency was not, by any means, a fragile one. Both the secular and spiritual powers needed the educated: the former for administrative and ideological reasons; the latter for the very existence of the church as a religious and educational institution.

In spite of the fact that the triple relationship may appear, and is to a certain extent, asymmetrical in favour of the powerful, these

<sup>108</sup>Levine fails to point out the change in the connotation of the Akabe-Sa'at which today simply means "rules and procedures of the Imperial Court"; see Levine, War and Gold, pp. 167-68.

<sup>109</sup>Balambaras Mahteme Selassie Gebre-Meskel, Zekre Neger, pp. 653-54; James Bruce, Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile, Vol. 1 (Edinburgh: G. G. J. Robinson and J. Robinson, 1790), pp. 533-34.

Figure 1  
Traditional Power Relationship



educated people who were firmly attached to the church had an important ideological role to play. That this educated class remained a formidable force in the Ethiopian body-politic for over a millenium is manifested by the roles it played in the doings and undoings of monarchs and dynasties.<sup>110</sup>

On occasion, the tremendous political power the church wielded in Ethiopia enabled it to contribute to the demise of a hostile emperor. In 1603, Emperor Ze-Dengel converted to Catholicism against the advice of his church counsellors.<sup>111</sup> In retaliation, the archbishop,

<sup>110</sup>One such outstanding case in traditional Ethiopian history is the role played by a member of this class in the overthrow of the Zagwé dynasty in the thirteenth century. This concerned Abuna Tekle Haymanot, Echegé (Head of the monastery of Debre Libanos), who negotiated the transfer of the crown to the Solomonian dynasty by telling the Zagwé monarch, Neakuto-Leab, that according to a revelation he had received from God, if he did not step down from the throne in favour of the Solomonic dynasty he would go to hell upon his death. Neakuto-Leab, being a very religious man, subsequently vacated the throne for Yekuno-Amlak. In gratitude, the Solomonian dynasty decreed that "one third of the Kingdom should be appropriated and ceded absolutely to the Abuna himself for the maintenance of his own state and for the support of the clergy, convents and churches in the Kingdom." (All lands, including those of the church, were nationalized by the Derg, the executive committee of the ruling military regime, in February 1975. See Addis Zemen (Amharic) (Yekatit 25, 1967 [March 4, 1975, Gregorian calendar]). The church, in turn, paid its debt to Tekle Haymanot by making him a saint. While there is no doubt that Yekuno Amlak was the founder of the Solomonian dynasty and the succession was possibly not effected without bloodshed (see, e.g., Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, pp. 65-68), some traditional sources replace the name Tekle Haymanot with Iyesus Moa, and Neakuto Leab with Yitbarek (see Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia, pp. 66-68). It should also be recalled that, as recently as the last century, the conquest of Shoa by Emperor Yohannes IV of Tigré was averted by a similar strategem. See Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History, p. 90.

<sup>111</sup>Pedro Paez, Historia da Ethiopia, Vol. 3 (Oporto: Livraria Civilizaçao, 1945-46).

who had his own team of deberta advisers, excommunicated him. Subsequently, he lost not only his throne, but also his life. The downfall of Emperor Suseneyos in 1632 and the defeat of Tewodros by the British in 1868 were both strongly influenced by the opposition of the church. Whereas Suseneyos had offended by flirting with Catholicism, Tewodros was reportedly abandoned because of his well-known contempt for the church intelligentsia and his policy of nationalization of church land.<sup>112</sup> As we shall argue later, even the Showan coup d'état that brought Haile Selassie to power in 1916 was mainly the work of the church intelligentsia. Thus, a better understanding of the relationship among the traditional authorities—the monarchy, the nobility, and the church, on the one hand, and the masses of people on the other, with the clerical intelligentsia acting as the ideological synthesizers and power brokers—offers us an illuminating background to explore the not-so-new political roles the modern educated class has played in contemporary Ethiopia since it engineered the overthrow of Haile Selassie and his feudal regime in 1974.

---

<sup>112</sup> Alaka Wolde Mariam, Yédagmawi Tewodros Tarik, pp. 40-45.

## CHAPTER II

### FOUNDATIONS OF WESTERN EDUCATION AND THE FASCIST INTER-REGNUM

#### Menelik, Tafari, and "Zamanawi Seletané" (Westernization)

During the Ethiopian millenium of isolation, the only groups able to have contact with the West were Ethiopian debteras or their students who converted to Catholicism or Protestantism after arriving in Jerusalem for religious worship and travelled to Europe for further studies. Those who went to Rome read philosophy and theology at "Collegio Urbano di Propaganda." They were then dispatched to Ethiopia with other missionaries from the Vatican to propagate their new religious faith. But more often than not, they were unsuccessful in disseminating Catholicism to the fanatic Ethiopian Orthodox Amharas and Tigrés and the schools attached to these missions also had very minimal impact. To augment their activities, therefore, the Capuchin missionaries from Rome ransomed children from the oppressed nationalities of Ethiopia who were being sold as slaves in the market places of Massawa and Cairo. After liberating these children, they changed their names to European ones (such as Albert, François, Charles, Henry), educated them in Europe, and dispatched them to the areas of Ethiopia where they spoke one of the several score local languages.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Aleme Eshete, "Békédmo Zéménat Ke 1889 Amété Meherét Béfeet Wuch Agér Yétémarru Etiopiawuyanoch [sic] Tarik," Ethiopian Journal of Education, vol. 1, no. 1 (1967), pp. 115-148.

However, the few returnees who operated the scattered European missions of Ethiopia did not leave any significant imprint.

Feudal Ethiopia had its own established official religion and the kings and princes were highly suspicious of European influence that might be a harbinger of direct colonialism. Indeed, while in most colonial countries the aims of Western education were geared towards fulfilling the metropolitan powers' calls and demands, in Ethiopia, they were dictated by the needs and aspirations of a feudal elite that wished to gain the benefits of modern technology without losing its monopoly on political power.

Historically, the first modern schools opened by Emperor Menelik were mainly of the "foreign language" type. After Menelik's victory against the Italians at Adwa in 1896 which not only rescued Ethiopia from the European scramble for Africa but also led to an unswerving recognition of its sovereignty by the great powers,<sup>2</sup> Menelik judged that his country could not open her doors to the Western nations without at the same time acquiring the means and the power to communicate with them.

Nevertheless, the short-term goals of these early western-type schools were very modest. They were to supplement, rather than to supplant, traditional Church education because Ethiopian feudalism could not cut its umbilical cord to traditionalism so drastically, since such action might have entailed dire consequences for its firm grip

<sup>2</sup>Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence (London: Heinemann and Addis Ababa University Press, 1978), pp. 384-410.



on the newly restructured nation-state. And even if it had wanted to take such a drastic step, it would have aroused the wrath of the Church, which still controlled the power of legitimation.<sup>3</sup> But the need for modernization, if Ethiopia was to survive in the twentieth century, was unequivocally clear to Menelik from the lessons of Adwa and the vicious politicking of the colonial scrambles preceding it.

In order to carry out his modernization efforts, therefore, Menelik decided to establish a permanent capital.<sup>4</sup> It should be remembered that since the end of the Gondarine era and the warlord years of Zemene Mesafint Ethiopian emperors had never had a fixed metropolis. Menelik himself had moved his ketema (city) four times, starting from Ankober until he settled on Finfiné (later renamed Addis Ababa, or "New Flower") in 1889.<sup>5</sup> In doing this, he was repeating what

<sup>3</sup>Paulos Milkias, "Traditional Institutions and Traditional Elites: The Role of Education in the Ethiopian Body Politic," African Studies Review, vol. 19, no. 3 (1976), pp. 79-93.

<sup>4</sup>Tsehafe Téezaz Gebre Selassie, Tarik Zemen Zedagmawi Menelik Neguse Negest Ze-Etiopia, edited by Like Likawunt Haile Meskel Gebre Medhen et al. (Addis Ababa: Artistic Press, 1966 [1901]), pp. 138-140.

<sup>5</sup>Emperor Haile Selassie seemed to be sensitive about attributing anything modern and important to Menelik whom he considered to be his rival in introducing Westernization into the country. In 1960, for example, when this writer was a researcher at the Ethio-American Mapping and Geography Institute, there developed a heated argument between him and the Emperor. Upon hearing the name of Menelik being mentioned as the founder of Addis Ababa, the Emperor sternly asked the researcher where he got the information from. When the researcher showed him books written by European travellers and diplomats who came to Ethiopia immediately before and after the founding of the city, he challenged the authenticity of the sources and remarked that it was his great-grandfather Negus Sahle Selassie who had founded it, not Menelik. When the researcher showed him the first Amharic dictionary written by one of the most respected Debtera scholars Alaka Kesaté Berhan who had recorded

another Orthodox Christian westernizer, Peter the Great of Russia, had done several centuries earlier. Menelik's capital was, however, much more modest than the Russian emperor's St. Petersburg. The British envoys who went to Addis Ababa to sign a treaty a year after the Adwa victory saw it as "nothing more than a military camp surrounded by hovels, an imagined rather than a real city whose principal site was the den where the imperial lions were kept."<sup>6</sup>

But for Menelik, this camp was to be built up rapidly and developed into a focus of westernization and a show piece for his new empire. He had few of the trappings European monarchs exhibited in their capitals. He imported a car for himself, although there were no paved roads. He installed electricity in his tin-roofed gibbi (palace) perched on a hill. He established in Addis Ababa a weekly news-magazine called Iemero ("Mind," with the connotation of the Greek logos) which was handwritten by debtera calligraphers since there were no printing presses as yet.

that the city was founded by Menelik, Haile Selassie angrily replied that the Alaka was also misled. When the researcher claimed that the Emperor's government recognized Menelik's founding of Addis Ababa and showed him an official stamp put out to commemorate the Seventieth Year of the city's founding, he looked in disbelief at his Minister of Posts and Telegraph. When the Minister Ato Amanuel Abraham showed his agreement with the researcher, the Emperor remarked to both: "Addis Ababa was founded by Our Great Grandfather Abeto Sahle Selassie long before the last century. Menelik only made the city known to the West through his limited modernization efforts. If modernizing the city can be considered its founding then We founded Addis Ababa." The Minister of Pen, Tsehafe Te'ezaz Tafari Work later came and whispered into the ears of this writer: "Do not forget his majesty's orders."

<sup>6</sup>James Dugan and Lawrence Lafore, Days of Emperor and Clown (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1973), p. 28.

Menelik was always inspired by the wonders of western technology although some might have misinterpreted his interest as the childish amusement of a primitive African chieftain. Thus, when in 1897 British diplomats brought Menelik ceremonial presents thought befitting a monarch—silver candelabra and rifles—he remarked, "Other nations have treated me like a baby and given me musical boxes, magic lanterns and mechanical toys."<sup>7</sup> It should be pointed out that while most Ethiopian emperors, locked in voluntary exile on the plateau, had no one to compete with, Menelik had the European powers surrounding his sprawling empire for inspirations of grandeur. After all, the Shoan Negus, like the French, the English, and the Italians, was an expansionist who built up his Shoan territorial possessions with apparent ruthlessness. He took advice from foreigners, mostly French and Russian, on the consolidation and modernization of his new empire, but he was "a shrewd judge of their vanities, since he rewarded some quite cheaply with high sounding orders and titles."<sup>8</sup> In his ambitious race to compete with his imperial colleagues, Menelik brought into the country the conveniences of the telephone and telegraph, he introduced the first railway system, and created ministries on the European model.

But the crowning achievement of Menelik was the decision to introduce western education into the country. Modern education,

---

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 124-25.

in his judgement, was essential in order to establish peace in his realm, to develop it and to enhance its greatness "in the face of the European powers."<sup>9</sup> His first attempt was to send students abroad. In 1894, three Ethiopian youngsters were sent to Switzerland. Among them was Afework Gebré Yésus, who studied literature and painting and ended up as a radical anti-feudalist when his goals and aspirations were frustrated by the arch-reactionary Ethiopian feudal order. Two others went to Russia to study medicine, literature, and military science. They returned and opened the first modern medical facility in the country—the Menelik II Hospital.

Another of the Emperor's actions in westernizing education was his tolerance of the educational endeavours of foreign mission schools, which some Ethiopian children including Haile Selassie had attended at the turn of the century before transferring to the newly opened Menelik Lyceum in Addis Ababa.<sup>10</sup> These mission schools were indeed necessary links between traditionalism and Westernization in modern Ethiopian history. However, whereas the Capuchin Mission opened by Karl Isenberg and Johann Krupp in the Oromo section of Shoa in the 1830s was holding its own,<sup>11</sup> J.M. Flad's schools at Aora and Makdala in the Province of Gondar had very little success.<sup>12</sup> The

<sup>9</sup>Richard Pankhurst, "Introduction," in Alaka Imbacom Kalewold, Traditional Ethiopian Church Education (New York: Columbia University, Teachers' College Press, 1970), p. xiii.

<sup>10</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1972), pp. 1-5.

<sup>11</sup>Karl W. Isenberg and Johann L. Krupp, Journals (London, 1843), p. 25.

<sup>12</sup>J.M. Flad, The Falashas of Abyssinia (London, 1869), pp. 152-260.

emphasis of the missionaries therefore changed to expansion to the pagan and mainly Moslem areas of the Empire. More schools were consequently opened in many peripheral areas of the Empire.<sup>13</sup> In 1905, there were approximately 100 students (88 boys and 12 girls), with 144 additional pupils peripherally connected with mission schools throughout the Ethiopian empire. The most important of them all was, however, the more secular school opened in Addis Ababa by Félix de Nole in 1907 to cater to the French community which was expanding rapidly after the building of the railway line from Djibouti to Akaki, near Addis Ababa.

The first western-type school opened in 1905 under the direct orders of Menelik was located in his gibbi (imperial palace).<sup>14</sup> The same year, he passed the following imperial decree:

The Lion of the Tribe of Judah has prevailed,  
Menelik II, Elect of God, King of Kings of  
Ethiopia. . . . All citizens are hereby ordered  
to teach their children reading and writing,  
and the acquisition of higher knowledge. Failing  
to do that, you will pay a fine of fifty thalers.  
. . . . If your children aged seven to 21 do not  
acquire technical knowledge . . . in the new  
schools we have opened and later in life fail to  
support themselves, you will be fined as a  
criminal who has handicapped another person.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup>Richard Pankhurst, "Foundations of Education, Printing, Newspapers, Book Production, Libraries, and Literacy in Ethiopia," Ethiopia Observer, VI, 3 (1962), pp. 254-55.

<sup>14</sup>Balambaras Mahteme Selassie Wolde Meskel, Zekre Nèger (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1948), pp. 599-600.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

To emphasize his determination to introduce education for the modernization of his empire, he added:

In other countries . . . people learn . . . [and] make new things. Therefore, from now on after reaching the age of six, boys and girls must be sent to school. As for parents who would not send their children to school, when the former die, their wealth, instead of reverting to their children, will be transferred to the Government. My Government will prepare the schools and the teachers.<sup>16</sup>

In order not to arouse the suspicions of the Church, which had controlled education for several centuries, Menelik consulted Abuna Matheos, the Patriarch. Upon the latter's recommendation, ten Egyptian Copts were hired to teach in the new school (i.e., the Menelik II Lyceum), which was established in 1908.<sup>17</sup>

It is important to point out at this juncture that the legitimizing power held by the Church—a power skilfully manipulated by the church-educated—did not diminish as long as the Church had the monopoly on education. Contrary to popular belief, however, the influence of the Church on the Ethiopian people was not so much due to the religious fervour of the populace, but to the monopoly the church enjoyed over education. The Church was not only the main agent of political socialization, but also the only custodian of the instruments of legitimation. The Church was not unaware of this. Menelik had previously been forced by the ecclesiastical authorities

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Richard Pankhurst, "Foundations of Education . . .," pp. 258-59.

to make concessions when he hired ten Egyptian Monophysites and put the administration of all his new educational establishments under the full administrative control of Professor Hanna Saleh Bey, a trusted Orthodox Copt. When, however, he tried to appoint a secular Minister of Education for the first time in Ethiopian history, Abuna Matheos successfully vetoed his actions by contending that education was entirely under the prerogatives of the Church and therefore within his own jurisdiction. In one of his decrees, Emperor Menelik had therefore to put the administration of all schools under the jurisdiction of the Abuna, except in European-oriented schools where the "Minister of Health" was to act as an adjunct.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, in order not to make the opposition of the ecclesiastical authorities a stumbling block for the modernization efforts, Menelik passed the following edict:

The Abuna shall be responsible for all matters pertaining to religion. He is its supreme authority. . . . The Ministry of Religion . . . which is a liaison between the government and the Abuna and looks after the interests of the church and the clergy. . . [shall also] administer the schools.<sup>19</sup>

This undoubtedly assured the continued monopoly of education by the Church, but it is said that in practice Menelik continued to receive progress reports on the new schools without the Church acting as an intermediary.

In Ethiopia, tradition and practice denigrated manual labour, and the development of craft as a profession had always been highly

<sup>18</sup>See Appendix I.

<sup>19</sup>*ibid.*

despised. Anybody who worked as a blacksmith, a leather tanner, or a weaver belonged to the lowest caste. For the general population, marriage as well as cultural contact with such workers was taboo.<sup>20</sup> But one of Menelik's greatest fascinations with westernization was connected with modern inventions and technical products which were shown to him by European travellers and diplomats. In his judgement, if the dignity of labour was not respected, the new schools could not contribute to Ethiopia's technological progress. To discourage the practice of castes, therefore, he issued the following edict:

The Lion of the Tribe of Judah has prevailed, Menelik II, Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia. You who insult the labourer should stop your action. It involves me in person. Remember that . . . a farming labourer is better than an imperial crown. We are created equal. We are all one by nature. If everyone stops work could there be a government? Could there be a country? In Europe, if a person invents and manufactures cannons, guns and railways, he is called an engineer, and is rewarded for it, not insulted . . . but you, by insulting a labourer are destroying my empire. . . . An insult to a worker is an insult to me. From this day on, anybody who calls another person a name because he engages in crafts and labour will be sentenced to one year's imprisonment.<sup>21</sup>

Menelik's new schools, which had free tuition and boarding soon expanded into Ankober, Harar and Dessie. The curriculum in-

---

<sup>20</sup>Donald Levine, Wax and Gold (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 70-71; Edward Ullendorff, The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 103.

<sup>21</sup>Balambaras Mahteme Selassie Wolde Meskel, Zekre Neger, pp. 421-22.



cluded basic mathematics, science, and physical training, but the major emphasis was put on relevant foreign languages. If Menelik's first schools were "language" schools, it was to fulfil the need of direct dialogue with foreign powers. It should not be forgotten that the question of the interpretation of the Treaty of Wuchalé was the apparent starting point of the dispute between the two nations.<sup>22</sup> It is not a coincidence, therefore, that of six teachers assigned to the first European model school (Ecole Impériale Menelik II) three were language instructors, two of whom taught English and French. Menelik's decree in fact explicitly stated that French, English, Italian, and Arabic should be taught at the school.<sup>23</sup> This was to fulfil his desire for direct communication with France, Britain, the United States, Italy, and Egypt (the latter for religious reasons, since Ethiopian Abunas were all Arabic-speaking Copts from Alexandria).

Despite the 1908 proclamation attempting to elevate the dignity of labour, which his European advisers must have emphasized as a prerequisite for economic and technological progress, Menelik's major drive was rather aimed at the production of elites. Young trainees from Western schools, he thought, would help run his burgeoning empire without the menace of outsiders. As explained previously, the first school that he introduced was located within his gibbi and catered

<sup>22</sup>The Italian version was at variance with the Amharic one, the former implying that Ethiopia was its protectorate. For details see Chapter I, pp. 51-53.

<sup>23</sup>Balambaras Mahteme Selassie Gebre Meskel, Zekre Neger, pp. 599-608.

exclusively to the children of the nobility. But this attempt did not succeed because neither the feudal lords nor their children changed their central concept about education in general; they maintained the view that education was always the preserve of the lower classes.<sup>24</sup> The church also systematically tried to discourage the children of the chewas (nobles) from going to western schools under the pretext that it was foreign, that it was taught by Catholics, and that it was therefore a betrayal of the traditions of the motherland. With more places open and unfilled, therefore, the children of the working classes started to enter the school system in large numbers.

Menelik died in 1913, following a debilitating illness, and was succeeded by his carefree grandson, Lij Eyasu, who immediately started to defy the church by appointing Melake Tsehay Esdros as the first Minister of Education.<sup>25</sup> Eyasu was already under heavy suspicion by the church, since his father was an Oromo Moslem from Wollo forcibly converted to Christianity. In a successful court intrigue conducted in collusion with the Shoan nobility, the church acted swiftly. The young emperor was excommunicated in 1916, and lost his throne after only three years of reign.<sup>26</sup>

What followed was a diarchy with Woizero Zawditu, the eldest daughter of Menelik as Empress and head of state, and Tafari as

<sup>24</sup>G. F. Rey, In the Country of the Blue Nile (London: Camelot Press, 1927), pp. 208-09.

<sup>25</sup>Paulos Milkias, "Traditional Institutions . . .," pp. 86-87.

<sup>26</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywatenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 24-38.

Regent and head of government. Zawditu, knowing full well the strong political muscle of the church, immediately passed the following edict:

All Ethiopians who have children and are not sending them to school will be fined fifty thalers each and this fine will be transferred to the church. . . . Officials who do not carry out the order will be demoted. . . . Parents who do not teach their children new skills in the institutions already available will pay fines as criminals. . . . The limit of school age is between seven and twenty-one years. You will not be fined if your children are outside this age limit.<sup>27</sup>

But since Zawditu had no political clout, being only a figure-head, responsibility for education and the task of modernizing Ethiopia's age-old feudalism therefore quickly shifted to young Tafari. However, the church's opposition to modernization still continued, and the warlords refused to patronize education as they felt it would ultimately bring about their own demise.<sup>28</sup> Gradually, due to inertia, the Menelik II Lyceum was converted into a Monophysite religious training institution, as it had slowly come under the administrative direction of Orthodox priests.<sup>29</sup> The number of teachers at the Lyceum had fallen drastically, and its academic standards had deteriorated. Furthermore, all the

---

<sup>27</sup>Balambaras Mahteme Selassie Wolde Meskel, Zekre Neger, pp. 601-02.

<sup>28</sup>The preoccupation with Menelik's long illness, the ever-present court intrigues between the Emperor's consort, Empress Taitu, the Regent Ras Tasemma Nadew, Eyasu's father Negus Mikael of Wollo, the Council of Ministers, the Shoan aristocratic clique led by Tafari and the church, all combined to paralyze the modernization activities initiated by Menelik.

<sup>29</sup>Leonard Mosley, Haile Selassie, the Conquering Lion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 122.

western-type schools Menelik had opened in Harar, Dessie, and Ankober simply vanished during the interregnum.

The new regent, Tafari, in order to revive Menelik's drive for the modernization of Ethiopian feudalism, ordered the construction of a new and more modern school named Tafari Makonnen Lyceum, in 1922. The school was well equipped and had well ventilated classrooms. Educational materials—technical and scientific books, teaching aids and equipment—were purchased from Europe while the Regent was on a state visit to several western European countries in 1924. There was a laboratory, a big dining hall, a fairly large library, spacious gardens, and recreational centres. With its new curriculum, Tafari Makonnen Lyceum made a new beginning. Courses were offered by qualified teachers in what were considered important subjects in the Ethiopia of the 1920s: French, Arabic, chemistry, geography, mathematics, history, sports, and Amharic.

While some pupils at Tafari Makonnen Lyceum were day students, most were boarders. This school and other institutions of learning opened soon afterwards were French-oriented due to the fact that the Ethiopian ruling classes, in line with their royal counterparts in Europe, had come to accept French as a diplomatic language. France had also enjoyed a very friendly relationship with the Shoa court since the time of Menelik, and Tafari's background as a French-educated ruling prince encouraged the choice of that language over that of the British. The school principals were all French nationals.

Annual examinations were conducted at the French legation to ensure the students' command of the language. Those who passed were awarded France's Certificate of Competence in Primary Studies.<sup>30</sup> Whereas in 1924, 50 students were registered at the school, the number had risen to 200 by 1929.<sup>31</sup>

To build and equip the Tafari Makonnen school 130,000 Maria Theresa thalers were raised from voluntary donations. Then, a year later, the Regent ordered the raising of a 6% educational tax on all imported and exported goods.<sup>32</sup> The new tax money amounted to 240,000 thalers, which was almost triple the educational expenses required. Additional voluntary donations were also made year to year.<sup>33</sup> Income from government and private donations amounted to 125,000 thalers from 1925-27, and balance after expenditure amounted to 33,000 thalers.<sup>34</sup> In 1928, there was another 33,000 thaler surplus,<sup>35</sup> and throughout the following decade, what was not utilized at Tafari Makonnen Lyceum was transferred to open additional schools throughout the empire.

---

<sup>30</sup>J. I. Eadie, An Amharic Reader (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924), pp. 1-10.

<sup>31</sup>Richard Pankhurst, "Foundations of Education . . . , " p. 260.

<sup>32</sup>Rey, In the Country of the Blue Nile, p. 195.

<sup>33</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Berhanenna Selam (Amharic), (Sené 30, Addis Ababa, 1919 [1926]), pp. 1-5.

<sup>34</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Berhanenna Selam (Amharic), (Hamlé 5, 1920 [1928]), pp. 1-8.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*

Due to the fact that Western education assured school graduates a reliable career in the new feudal bureaucracy, the argument of the feudal modernizers soon started to win more and more supporters. The Protestant and Catholic mission schools in Ethiopia which had previously languished due to the strong antagonism of the church and the opposition of a xenophobic traditional society suspicious of outsiders and their religious influence, now expanded even more than the government-run schools. In 1921, the Brothers of St. Gabriel, sponsored by Ethiopian, Armenian, Lebanese, French, and Greek communities, opened L'Ecole Française, from which 1,400 students were to graduate by 1924. The United Presbyterian Church, under the leadership of Dr. Lambe, also opened a school in Dembidollo, Wollega, in 1922. The Seventh-Day Adventist Mission opened two other schools—one in Addis Ababa and another in Addis Alem in 1923. The Swedish Evangelical Mission established more than eight schools in northern Ethiopia in 1924. One religious organization, the Bibeltrogn Vanner Mission, also opened three schools in Southern Ethiopia during the same year.<sup>36</sup>

It is important to point out that during all these activities, Tafari was careful not to repeat the mistakes of his rival and cousin Lij Eyasu. He avoided the appointment of the Minister of Education until he had slowly eroded the traditional power of the clerics.<sup>37</sup> But for

<sup>36</sup>Richard Pankhurst, "Foundations of Education . . .," pp. 61-279.

<sup>37</sup>Paulos Milkias, "Traditional Institutions . . .," p. 86.

the traditionalists and the church, expanding the scope of modernization and opening up more and more schools was itself a grave sin. Previously, when Menelik had started his modernization drive, the church had had no strong grounds on which to accuse him of being a traitor to the Orthodox faith, since the Emperor was a well known patron of the church.<sup>38</sup> Menelik had enjoyed the trust of the Abuna starting from the period when he was 12 years old and a prisoner of Tewodros at Makdala.<sup>39</sup> Menelik was also too powerful to be directly challenged after creating his big empire and his successful bid against the intrigues of the Egyptian Khedive and the European colonialists. But Tafari had only the record of inheriting a throne for which he had no direct claim—a throne that he could not have won without the direct help of the church.<sup>40</sup> If Eyasu, the legitimate successor to the throne, could be overthrown, the debteras calculated, there was no reason why Tafari could not.

The opening of an independent western school was therefore confronted by severe opposition from the clerics who were by then in full control of the Menelik II Lyceum run by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.<sup>41</sup> The traditional intelligentsia again started clamouring to

<sup>38</sup>Balambaras Mahteme Selassie Wolde Meskel, Zekre Neger, p. 526.

<sup>39</sup>Alaka Wolde Mariam, Yedagmawi Tewodros Neguse Negest Ze Etiopia Band Abnet Yemigegn Tarik (Paris: Librairie Orientale et Américaine, 1904), pp. 40-42.

<sup>40</sup>Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History, pp. 131-184.

<sup>41</sup>Mosley, Haile Selassie: The Conquering Lion, pp. 43-123.

use the church and the Monophysite Orthodox faith as a tool for bringing about a change in government. To carry out their scheme, they went to the Empress Zawditu and accused the Regent of attempting to introduce Catholicism into the country<sup>42</sup> and thus setting a stage similar to that of the bloody civil war that followed the conversion of the Gondarine Emperors to Catholicism in the seventeenth century.<sup>43</sup> The fact that Tafari was a student of the Catholic missionary Monsignor Jarousseau (known in Ethiopia as Aba Salama)<sup>44</sup> and that the teachers running the new Tafari Makonnen school were French—and therefore Catholic—gave credence to their accusations.

The Regent had, however, taken his own precautions. Although most of the staff, including the principal, were French, he had appointed the distinguished western-educated Ethiopian, Dr. Workeneh Eshete, chief administrator of the school, and an orthodox debtera as moral and religious instructor. Thus, Tafari's hold over the country became beyond question following an abortive coup d'état by organized citizens who were opposed to his government and the makeup of his newly appointed Cabinet.<sup>45</sup> After gaining control and central power, he had also succeeded in having many traditional warlords neutralized.

---

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Pedro Paez, Historia da Ethiopia (Oporto: Livraria Civilizacao, 1945-46), vol. 3.

<sup>44</sup> Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 1-5.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 39-40.



The church intelligentsia were thus forced to retreat after receiving assurances that the character of the school would continue to be feudal and Ethiopian and that Ethiopian debteras would have control over the spiritual guidance of the pupils at Tafari Makonnen.

With this respite, Tafari's public relations efforts to underscore Ethiopia's need for modern schools grew in vigour. In order to counter the church's opposition, which had now shifted into the Amhara and Tigré strongholds in the hinterland, supporters of Tafari's modernization wrote and disseminated newspaper articles<sup>46</sup> that demanded universal and compulsory school attendance, the expansion of modern education at home to reduce the need to send students abroad, an inclusion in the curriculum of Ethiopian geography and the Amharic language, and even a bold appeal to appoint a Minister of Education<sup>47</sup> to undercut the church's traditional hold on education.

At the same time as Haile Selassie's publicity efforts in support of modernization were being vigorously conducted, his campaign on the political front escalated. He had outmanoeuvred traditionalist and powerful regional governors such as the Adwa hero Dejatch Balcha, who was forcibly retired to a monastery as a monk.<sup>48</sup> He had put the

<sup>46</sup>The Regent's introduction of the printing press into the country had greatly facilitated the publications of books, pamphlets and newspapers for this purpose.

<sup>47</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Berhanenna Selam (Amharic), (Miazia 18, 1920, [1927], Megabit 22, 1919 [1926], Tir 21, 1917 [1926]).

<sup>48</sup>Balcha came out of the monastery of Debre Libanos where Haile Selassie had banished him as a monk when he heard that the Italians were again attempting to take over Ethiopia. He volunteered to fight but Haile Selassie dismissed him. But this heroic military commander of Adwa continued to fight as a single soldier and died with his carbine in his hands when Haile Selassie went into exile. See Tsehai Berhane Selassie, "The Life and Career of Dejazmatch Balcha Aba Nafso," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (July, 1971), p. 30.

warlords' armed retainers under his own centralized command, had set up a well-equipped and well-trained Imperial Bodyguard, had started vigorous commercial relations with the capitalist west. Tafari had also won diplomatic recognition abroad by successfully making Ethiopia a respectable member of the League of Nations.<sup>49</sup> He had laid the basic infrastructure for a modern bureaucracy.<sup>50</sup> And by 1929, he was even ready to confront the powerful Ethiopian church itself. He defied the conservative clergy for the first time and secured the independence of the Ethiopian church from Alexandria. He then invested four handpicked Ethiopian bishops, breaking a tradition of 1600 years.<sup>51</sup>

The campaign for the expansion of western education continued despite some setbacks. One obstacle was that while Tafari's aim was to westernize the ruling classes in order to modernize the country without changing the class structure, the Ethiopian Meknament's (aristocracy's) contempt for technical and modern activities persisted. However, the greatest obstacle was the incompatibility between modern education and the feudal order itself. The Rases and the Dejazmatchs

<sup>49</sup>Ethiopian Government Delegation, "Request for Admission to the League of Nations," Geneva, League of Nations, VII (1923[4]), pp. 1-2; League of Nations, "Admission of Abyssinia to the League of Nations," Report Presented by the Sixth Committee to the Assembly, Geneva, League of Nations VII (1923[8]).

<sup>50</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution (London: Review of African Political Economy, 1975), pp. 61-68.

<sup>51</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 138-41.

never needed education since a debtera was always at hand to carry out their orders. The feudal rulers who were reaping as much as 75% of a peasant's produce from the millions of acres of land they owned, especially in the south, had so much accumulated wealth that education, whether traditional or modern, was in their estimation superfluous. Indeed, Tafari must have been aware of one possible development: a clash might occur when those with modern knowledge, usually recruited from the lower classes in the absence of ruling class children, found that the offices that they were supposed to fill were already occupied by those who had no education, but had wealth and traditional political power.<sup>52</sup> This anticipated struggle between the haves and the have-nots, between the forces of change and the forces of reaction, did occur, as we shall see later, although not until several decades later.

Tafari's power was buttressed as more modern institutions were opened in the closing years of the 1920's. There were already two major western-type schools in the city of Addis Ababa, and more than a dozen additional ones in the provinces. The Regent was even thinking of opening up a new university, although that ambition would not be realized until 30 years later.<sup>53</sup> But opposition to Tafari did not stop. In the gibbi there was always a political axe to grind, and

---

<sup>52</sup> A very perceptive author had predicted these consequences as far back as 1927. See Rey, In the Country of the Blue Nile, pp. 208-10.

<sup>53</sup> Balambaras Mahteme Selassie Wolde Meskel, Zekre Neger, p. 602.

it again started to become clouded with the customary Abyssinian political intrigue. Factions supporting the Empress claimed that Tafari had usurped her imperial power.<sup>54</sup> The Empress' estranged husband, Ras Gugsä Wollé, a powerful warlord in the Amhara stronghold of Begemder, immediately started a propaganda campaign, repeating the same arguments Tafari had used successfully against the deposed Emperor Eyasu. The Regent, this campaign went, has been converted to Catholicism; he is opening Catholic schools in the empire; if the Orthodox Monophysite faith is to be protected, every patriotic noble in Menelik's realm must rise up against his treachery.<sup>55</sup>

In the spring of 1930, with the hope of gaining support among other traditional warlords and their armies, especially the non-committed Mahal Safari (Menelik's standing army of approximately 50,000 which guarded the capital and the gibbi), Gugsä moved his 35,000 armed retainers towards Shoa, vowing to crush the modernizing "Catholic." But Tafari had already started to reap the fruits of his modernization efforts. He met Gugsä with his own counter-propaganda, by distributing thousands of leaflets carrying the insignia of the Abuna, depicting Tafari as the "True Son of the Church" and excommunicating Gugsä.<sup>56</sup> The leaflets were distributed over the difficult terrain

---

<sup>54</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 43-45.

<sup>55</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, pp. 65-66; also a private interview with Alaka Jembere Melaku, September 3, 1966.

<sup>56</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 129-34.

occupied by Gugsä's fanatically Orthodox soldiers with the help of the only airplane the Regent had introduced into the country.<sup>57</sup> The Begemder Amhara army, which had come with a crusading religious zealotry, became confused and demoralized. Thus, when Haile Selassie's loyalists attacked on the 31st of March, 1930, there was only feeble resistance. Gugsä was killed on the battlefield. Two days later, in the typical manner of court intrigues, Tafari announced the death of Empress Zawditu—a death mysterious to this day—in her gibbi. He then proclaimed himself Emperor, with the crown name Haile Selassie and the titles "Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia."<sup>58</sup>

After silencing the opposition in the gibbi and enfeebling the church, Haile Selassie's position was unquestionably enhanced. To leave no doubt about this, he proclaimed in the 1931 constitution:

The Emperor shall lay down the organization and the regulations of all administrative departments. It is his right to appoint and dismiss the officers of the army as well as civil officials and to decide as to their respective charges and salaries. . . .

[The Emperor has] the right to confer the title of Prince and other honorific titles, to establish personal estates . . . to pardon, to commute penalties and to reinstate . . . to negotiate and to sign all kinds of treaties . . . to declare war . . . to determine the armed forces necessary both in times of peace and war. . . . All Ethiopian lands, all its people and all the laws belong to the Emperor.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>57</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, pp. 65-66.

<sup>58</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 133-34.

<sup>59</sup>Government of Ethiopia, The Constitution of Ethiopia Promulgated by Emperor Haile Selassie (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1931), articles 1-55.

Indeed, the Constitution was very clear here; Haile Selassie was saying, like Louis XIV before him, "l'état c'est moi."

Education for the modernization of feudal autocracy continued to advance between and after the factional struggles described above. In Harar, the old Menelik school was revitalized; it was joined together with another Haile Selassie had established in 1930 and was renamed after his father, Ras Makonnen. Other schools were also opened in provincial towns: the Tafari Makonnen Elementary School in Goré and the Woizero Sihen School in Dessie, both opened in 1928; Asbé Tafari School in Harar, Haile Selassie Elementary School in Jimma and the Selalé School, both built in 1932. All of the above schools used French as the medium of instruction. The Tafari Makonnen School in Jimma and the Haile Selassie I Elementary School in Nakamté, built in 1929, the Gojam Elementary School in Debre Marcos, and the Makalé and Adwa Schools, which opened at the same time, all used English as the medium of instruction.<sup>60</sup>

On the eve of the occupation in 1935, there were 21 government schools with a total enrolment of 4,200.<sup>61</sup> Despite vehement conservative opposition to sending students abroad, Haile Selassie sent many promising young men who had already mastered elementary

---

<sup>60</sup>Adrian Zervos, L'Empire d'Ethiopie: Le Miroir de l'Ethiopie moderne 1906-1935 (Alexandria: Imprimerie de l'Ecole professionnelle des Frères, 1936), pp. 229-30; R. Pankhurst, "Foundations of Education . . .," pp. 244-90; E. S. Pankhurst, Ethiopia: A Cultural History (Essex: Lalibela House, 1955), pp. 535-39.

<sup>61</sup>Zervos, L'Empire d'Ethiopie . . ., pp. 229-30.

schooling in Ethiopia to the Middle East. After attending colleges in Assiut, Cairo, and Beirut, the students later transferred to Europe and North America. By 1935, over 140 Ethiopian students were attending universities in the United States, Britain, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and Italy.<sup>62</sup> Because of the fact that the two most important lyceums—Menelik II and Tafari Makonnen—gave precedence to the French language, most of the students were sent to France and studied, inter alia, economics, law, and political science. The latter group, among whom was the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Aklilu Habte Wold, was to become a very strong ministerial clique in the decades after the war. Many of them were executed in the 1974 revolution. But just as Haile Selassie's aim to expand modern education and create a new elite that would help him control the Empire without dependence on the traditional warlords was being realized, an internal contradiction which had been brewing since the time of Menelik emerged clearly.

#### Western-Educated Elites vs. Modernizing Feudalism

In the internal struggles raging between reactionary feudalists (the hereditary feudal lords of Shoa, Gojam, Begemder, Tigré and Wollo) and the westernizing feudalists (Menelik and Haile Selassie), a new generation of western-educated elite was born. This new group

<sup>62</sup>Balambaras Mahteme Selassie Wolde Meskel, Zekre Neger, pp. 602-07; Kenneth King (ed.), Ras Makonnen: Pan Africanism from Within (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 109-10.

was anti-feudal and progressive in political orientation.<sup>63</sup> On the overall question of development, members of this progressive group sided with the westernizing feudalists, but they found the modernizing process Menelik instituted and Haile Selassie continued to be slow-paced and inadequate. For them it was simply window dressing rather than a process of fundamental and real change. Their own frustrations arose from their experiences within the established system, which had convinced them that unless a more drastic transformation vis-à-vis feudalism took place, the Ethiopian people would continue to languish in oppression and ignorance, and that the country, unable to catch up with the advanced capitalist world, would become a pawn of European colonialism. Thus, while they provided a critical support to the westernizing feudalists, they were at the same time vehemently opposed to them for not disturbing the structural foundations of feudalism.

The first open challenge had already started to emerge by 1908, even before Haile Selassie had come onto the political scene, when one of the few foreign-educated Ethiopians, Professor Afework Gebré Yésus published in Italy an Amharic-French phrase book and guide in which he described the plight of the Ethiopian peasants. As soon as they produce anything, Afework explained, the fruits of the peasants' labour are usurped by the neftegnas (feudal soldiers). The best animals they carefully raise for market go to fatten the absentee

---

<sup>63</sup>The terms "anti-feudal" and "progressive" are used very broadly and are relevant only to the period under discussion. They have no Marxist connotation since these early élites were merely reformists.



landlords. The balabats and chekashums confiscate the horses and mules the tenant farmers keep to barter for oxen or pedigree cows:

From the moment when they discover that no rest is possible, since on returning home, weary from toiling in the fields, they come upon their abode which has already been taken over by the soldier-oppressors, who behave as masters; from then on, what use can they see in earning a living? . . . the rulers of the country eat, drink, sleep and grow fat like Easter sheep at the expense of the oppressed masses, [and are] continually and pitilessly robbed by them.<sup>64</sup>

He then added that stupidity and ignorance ruled in Ethiopia and that feudalism and the feudal establishment itself should be immediately stamped out, since "as long as the feudal system exists in the Empire of Ethiopia, neither equality nor liberty will be established."<sup>65</sup>

Another anti-feudalist, Negadras Gebre Hiywot Baykedagn, had remarked in the 1910's during the reign of Emperor Iyasu, of Ethiopia's rulers:

Up to now, they regard the land they are appointed to govern as their own, bought by their own money. They do whatever they like with the taxes collected . . . when, oh people of Ethiopia, when would you wake up from your sleep? When will you open your eyes and see what is being done in the world.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>64</sup>Afework Gebré Yésus, Guide de Voyageur en Abyssinie (Rome, 1908), pp. 1-20.

<sup>65</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>66</sup>Gebré Hiywot Baykedagn, Dagmawi Menelikenna Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: 1914), pp. 1-12.

During the two decades that followed the death of Menelik in 1910, as the number of the modern-educated Ethiopians grew, the ranks of the anti-feudalists also continued to increase. This opposition group eventually formed an organization known as "La Jeunesse d'Ethiopie."<sup>67</sup> The ideas and ideals of "La Jeunesse d'Ethiopie" was derived from post-1848 Japan—the Meiji modernization drive.<sup>68</sup> Members of the movement had all acquired their training in Europe and were well educated. They could compare their country with the advanced nations more accurately than either Menelik or Haile Selassie. All were fired by patriotism and wanted to introduce rapid development.

"La Jeunesse d'Ethiopie" were also inspired by the movement of the Young Turks, who wanted to bring about rapid change in their traditional Ottoman empire. Their political philosophy was based on the assumption that revolution could be introduced from above. The goal was to stamp out Ethiopian feudalism and create a new Japan in Africa by using state power as an instrument of change. Their conception of change thus far transcended that of Menelik and Haile Selassie, who were trying to modernize feudalism. But unlike the new elites of the 1960's and 70's, they did not advocate or work towards generating a violent revolutionary upheaval.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>67</sup>Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History, pp. 315-16.

<sup>68</sup>This group is dubbed "Japanizers" by Addis Hiwet in his Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, pp. 68-77.

<sup>69</sup>See Chapters V and VI below.

The anti-feudalist movement gained momentum when the Western-educated intelligentsia replaced the traditional deberas and worked for the monarchs as astergwamis (translators),<sup>70</sup> liyyu tsehafis (private secretaries), negadrasses (customs officers), ambassadors and upper and middle level bureaucrats in the newly created ministries. The forums used for advocating radical change were sometimes foreign publications, but most often they utilized the independent columns of the weekly newspaper Berhanenna Selam (Light and Peace). Although they sometimes resorted to the traditional Ethiopian Semenna Work (Wax and Gold), a method of commentary about things and events with words that have double meanings,<sup>71</sup> the anti-feudalists often wrote with vivid examples, calling a spade a spade.

A member of "La Jeunesse d'Ethiopie," Asbé Hailu, for example, described in detail the hardships of the Ethiopian peasant who had slowly been reduced to the status of a slave, serving an unsalaried feudal soldier. The latter, he pointed out, was given the right to use the gebar (peasant farmer) as his own chattel. Asbé then traced the backwardness of Ethiopia to its feudal system and the oppressive rule of the aristocrats. He explained that they never

<sup>70</sup> Aleme Eshete, "Békédmo Zéménat Ke 1889 Amété Meheret Béfeet Wuch Agér Yétémaru Etioplawuyanoch [sic] Tarik," pp. 115-48.

<sup>71</sup> Levine, Wax and Gold, pp. 4-10.

attempted to develop the land they owned, that they evaded taxes and mercilessly exploited the peasants. According to Asbé Ethiopian feudalism was most abhorrent, it dishonoured the nation, and should therefore be totally abolished.<sup>72</sup>

Some progressives of the 1920's suggested that even if feudalism could not be routed so quickly, one should introduce faster modernization programs than those Menelik and Haile Selassie had put in motion. They advocated an extensive land reform measure, the abolition of the Afersata (a practice that entailed punitive measures against a community for the criminal offence of one of its members), removing the arbitrary powers of the mesafint (aristocrats), the establishment of schools in every wereda (twenty times more than

<sup>72</sup>His description of the life of an Ethiopian gebar during the 1920's is graphic and poignant as well as being based on the feudal practices of the day: "The toiling peasant works," Asbé explained, "on a patch of land and every year has to surrender one third of his produce to the melkegna [absentee landlord], or shaleka [an unsalaried feudal soldier with the rank of major]. The peasant renders services such as fixing fences to the Meslené [district governor]. He has to travel to Addis Ababa five times a year in order to pay tribute. He has to surrender 15 gunna [about 220 pounds] of flour to the absentee landlord. He provides a tenth of his produce and a significant amount of honey to the mengist [state]. As soon as the peasant delivers the tribute, the landlord orders him to go to another estate he owns, and bring him a load of grain. . . . There, the Meslené orders the peasant to renovate the melkegna's country house. By the time he returns to the capital . . . the provisions he brought from home are exhausted. . . . He then travels and begs for leftover food and in the process, contracts a disease. Like a sick old dog, resting his head on a heap of cow dung, this peasant passes away below the melkegna's fence. Zebegnás [household guards] throw the body on a mat and bury him in some shallow grave. . . . Neighbours are informed that the dead ' . . . is not yesew lij [human born] but only a gebar. . . ." See Asbé Hailu, Berhanenna Selam (Amharic), vol. 3, no. 29 (July 1927), pp. 1-7.

Haile Selassie had opened by 1927), the rapid expansion of all means of transportation, the fast introduction of a money economy and banking, and so on. One progressivist pointed out that if the government was not ready to go faster and generate development with the few facilities it had introduced, such as railways and banks, those institutions were there as nothing but "the grave diggers of the Ethiopian people."<sup>73</sup>

To call attention to the anachronistic nature of feudalism in the twentieth century, the progressivists wrote about the dehumanizing and oppressive aspects of European feudalism during the medieval period. Professor Afework Gebré Yésus, in order to illustrate the condition of Ethiopian feudalism in the 1920's, thus resorted to a vivid description of Europe during the Middle Ages. Even though he did not mention Ethiopia in the article, his message was very clear. During the mediaeval period in Europe, estates were subdivided among the great warlords, the barons and the viscounts. Ethiopia was, similarly, subdivided among the mesafint (feudal lords) such as Ras Kassa and Ras Berou, and the many balabats (local landlords) and chekashums (appointed rural officers). Mediaeval European warlords, just like their Ethiopian counterparts, ruled over their peasant folk with ruthless despotism. They both used brutal armed retainers to subdue the rural population. Law and order was always their banner.

---

<sup>73</sup>Blatta Déréssa Amanté, Berhanenna Selam, vol. 3, no. 8 (1927), p. 2; Gebré-hiywot Baykedagn, Mengistenna Yé-Hizb Astedader, 2nd edition (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1953).

They were parasitic, and never engaged in production per se. They always lived in incredible luxury, adding to the ever-present burden of the peasantry. Exploitation by the warlords and their neftegnas (armed retainers) was an everyday practice. In Europe, the agency of the new nation state removed the arbitrary forces of the feudal lords, then instituted uniform laws, introduced commerce, developed agriculture, and reduced the burden of the peasantry. Such a change could not be realized in Ethiopia, because for that to happen, the people should first be freed from their shackles and acquire equality and justice.<sup>74</sup>

More examples could be given, but when Wolde Giyorgis Wolde Yohannes made the following statement, he was definitely speaking for the whole anti-feudal progressive movement of the pre-war era that the western school system had produced:

At last we have reached the point when we have officials who have the ability to govern the country in the European method, instead of oligarchies. I am convinced that we shall now develop more rapidly, but, we must be left alone, for all our efforts would be wasted if we fell back on the old ways, even if it were in defence of our very life and independence. On that day our evolution would stop, and a bloody war would take place. And the men who take it upon themselves to make a European country out of this backward African Empire, will be the first martyrs in the war, for the Conservatives rule the country, and Conservative here means backward and pitiless. We of the younger generation are the

---

<sup>74</sup>Afework Gebré Yésus, Berhanenna Selam (Amharic), vol. 5, no. 20 (July 1929), pp. 1-6.

friends of progress and humanism, while they are its enemies! And we do not want to work in vain.<sup>75</sup>

The first significant division between the traditional warlords and the more progressive reformers within the framework of the state machinery itself started with the opening debates of the 1931 Constitution, when before its promulgation Haile Selassie submitted it to the feudal lords and the ministers and mekuanent (appointed high officials) in his government. The mesafint were hereditary feudal lords of Shoa, Gojam, Begemder, Wollo, and Tigré. The ministers and mekuannent, who were products of the westernization drive of Menelik and Haile Selassie, were led by Bejrond Tekle Hawariat, an enlightened Ethiopian who spent 17 years in Russia and became a colonel in the Czarist army. The colonel later returned home to provide service to both Menelik and Haile Selassie, but his frustration with the corruption, inefficiency, and injustices of Ethiopian feudalism forced him to go back to Europe, this time to France, to study agriculture. He then returned, to become President of Haile Selassie's parliament in 1931. The conflict between the two groups concerned the institutionalization or deinstitutionalization of hereditary peerage as known in the British tradition. The mesafint (the feudal lords except Ras Emeru) advocated hereditary titles and fiefdoms. The anti-feudalists, led by Tekle Hawariat, argued against this. Then Haile Selassie intervened with a compromise whereby the Emperor would,

<sup>75</sup>Ladislav Farago, Abyssinia on the Eve (London: Putnam, 1935), pp. 70-71.

if he saw fit, provide the mesafint and other civil servants with titles and lands, but the final authority should always stay with the centralized state power.<sup>76</sup>

By 1935-36, the progressive demands of the anti-feudalists had so far advanced that there was almost no correspondence with Haile Selassie's gradualist approach to modernization. The change the anti-feudalists envisaged required not only transforming feudalism totally, but also changing the basic strategy for national security. Their fear was that Ethiopia had always survived like Sparta, by creating a garrison state devoid of innovations in weaponry and tactics; but just as Sparta was destroyed by Thebes which introduced new weapons and new styles of warfare,<sup>77</sup> Ethiopia might also be destroyed by Italy which had ready access to modern armaments and had openly declared its intentions to colonize Ethiopia. This difference in the adoption of correct strategies for national security, as we shall see later, led to an incident in which members of the new educated class almost physically attacked the Emperor when he refused to heed their advice.

#### Colonial Scramble and Mussolini's Occupation

The gulf between the modernizing feudalists and the anti-feudal progressivists of Ethiopia was developing parallel to the European powers' quest for the annexation of Ethiopia. After controlling the

<sup>76</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 147-53.

<sup>77</sup>Margaret Gillett, A History of Education: Thought and Practice (Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1966), pp. 22-25.




Indian subcontinent, Britain was interested in the strategic areas south of Gibraltar down through Egypt, covering the Red Sea and Indian Ocean littoral states. Its colonization of Egypt in 1882, and later Sudan, also created an immediate interest in the confluence of the Nile, from which 80% of the water on which these two territories are dependent originates.<sup>78</sup> Britain also had the ambition to build a railway line connecting its colonies, stretching from Cape to Cairo, but the Bahr el Ghazal swamps in the Sudan were less well-disposed for this project than areas adjacent to the Ethiopian highlands in the south-western region. The French also had a grand design to expand from west of the Atlantic through south and north of the Sahara into the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Its strategically-located port of Djibouti connecting the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean was to be the limit for this east-west expansion. Italy had also long complained that it did not have "enough share" in Africa, and since Ethiopia was the only open frontier, Italy had an insatiable desire to annex it (see Map 6). As we can see, therefore, there was a seed of conflict of interest in controlling Ethiopia, and the feudal leaders of the country, who were aware of this fact, successfully turned it to their advantage. None of the three colonial powers would want the other to annex Ethiopia to its own exclusion, and all the feudal leaders had to do was to pit one against the other.

---

<sup>78</sup>John Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1979), pp. 1-249.

Map 6

European Scramble for Colonial Empire—The  
Subdivision of Africa after 1900



Islands and enclaves

- ♦ Portuguese
- \* Spanish
- ▲ British
- ▽ French

Since the Italians had attempted to take over Ethiopia but suffered a crushing defeat at Adwa in 1896, the three European powers wanted to secure influence over Ethiopia by peaceful means—at least during the initial stages. Britain signed a treaty with Menelik in 1889 and 1902 by which it obtained a commitment from the Emperor that the confluence of the Nile would not be diverted, and a dam might be built by Britain on Lake Tana to control its seasonal flow. In return, Britain was to pay Ethiopia £10,000 per annum.<sup>79</sup> In 1906, however, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy signed a treaty recognizing Ethiopia as being within the sphere of influence of Italy but with the stipulation that Britain's interests in the Lake Tana and western Ethiopia region and France's interest in its railway line from Djibouti to Addis Ababa would not be violated.<sup>80</sup>

Fearful that European powers might annex and divide up the country, Ethiopia's feudal leaders, led by Haile Selassie, applied for membership in the League of Nations. Britain and Italy vehemently opposed Ethiopia's entry into the League, but France, who wanted security for her railway line from Djibouti to Addis Ababa, supported Ethiopia. After a long argument, Ethiopia was accorded membership in 1921.<sup>81</sup> But without consulting Ethiopia, Italy and Britain, who

<sup>79</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, p. 101.

<sup>80</sup>Emile Burns, Ethiopia and Italy (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 41.

<sup>81</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 55-56.

were suspicious of French ambivalence, signed a separate treaty in 1925 by which British influence over the Lake Tana region and Italian influence from northern Eritrea down through central Ethiopia to the lower Red Sea area were recognized.<sup>82</sup>

Ethiopia's leaders, who were worried about the ever-present threat to the territorial integrity of the country, had long looked towards another western power for protection. That power, the United States, was more than ready to get involved in the struggle on the Horn. As early as 1903 Robert Skinner, the American Consul General in Paris, had been dispatched to the court of Menelik of Ethiopia as the leader of a 26-man delegation from the United States, and had sent the following report to the Secretary of State:

Waiving all regard for the probably important future of Ethiopia as a consuming nation . . . to reach these customers of ours, our merchandise had to cross either British, French, or Italian soil. Then came the partition of Africa by the European powers into spheres of influence, the creation of customs houses and all these administrative measures whereby trade was made to follow the flag. . . . Then our British friends, whose shibboleth is free trade, had in fact extended special privileges to their own manufacturers in many of their colonies, creating conditions which made American transaction difficult of accomplishment. . . . It seems a perfectly obvious business proposition that the U. S. government should look into this field, where we had an actual interest of no mean importance, and defend it by the simple process of procuring a treaty which should guarantee to our people equal treatment in respect to trade.<sup>83</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., pp. 101-18.

<sup>83</sup>Robert Skinner, Abyssinia of Today (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1966), pp. 91-92.

Skinner's recommendation was accepted by the State Department, and a treaty was signed the same year. In 1914, John W. Woods, who was sent to Addis Ababa to renew the treaty, wrote back to the Secretary of State, "European powers interested in Ethiopia sought to exclude American commerce by every means in their power, not hesitating to intrigue against the signing of another treaty."<sup>84</sup> And in 1922, the American Consul in Aden, elaborating on French, Italian, and British designs on Ethiopia, added, "America has every reason to be very greatly interested in the disposition made of such valuable territory."<sup>85</sup> Suggestions given by American diplomats were that Ethiopian relations with the United States should follow the "Philippines and Cuban" examples.<sup>86</sup>

If American interest in Ethiopia was great, Ethiopian rulers' interest in cultivating friendship with the United States was even more compelling, since that country had no history of direct colonialism on the continent. Skinner, who was warmly received at the court of Menelik in 1903, had, for example, concluded that the Emperor considered "American friendship had no dangers and would be a source of moral strength to the nation."<sup>87</sup> In 1923, Ras Tafari (later Haile

<sup>84</sup>Government of the United States, National Archives of the United States, M-412, p. 10.

<sup>85</sup>Government of the United States, Department of State, American Consul in Aden, Arabia, Letter to the Secretary of State of the United States, Aden, February 6, 1922.

<sup>86</sup>Government of the United States, Department of State, American Consul in Aden, Arabia, Letter to the Secretary of State of the United States, Aden, April 20, 1919.

<sup>87</sup>Skinner, Abyssinia of Today, p. 82.

Selassie) told the American Consul in Egypt that "he favored America to the European powers because it has no territorial ambitions in Africa."<sup>88</sup> Tafari had also asked the American Consul in Aden if President Woodrow Wilson "would be willing to assist Ethiopia in so arranging its affairs that the country might be free from the menace of intervention by the three European powers."<sup>89</sup> The Regent's trust in America was so deep that he wrote a letter to President Harding in 1923 (Appendix II) asking him to find "a leading bank or a responsible company of the United States" to which he could entrust his money "now invested in Europe."<sup>90</sup> Tafari continued his attempt to cultivate ties with the United States. In a letter written on May 22, 1926, he pleaded desperately with President Coolidge to open a legation in Addis Ababa.<sup>91</sup> In 1928, after a legation had been established, Addison Sutherland, the chief American representative, wrote to the Secretary of State in Washington, "Notwithstanding my efforts tactfully to evade the issue, [Ras Tafari] has come to the point where he insists that I help to obtain certain advisors [sic] from the

<sup>88</sup>Government of the United States, Department of State, Consul Coert du Bois, Port Said, Egypt, "Notes on the Situation in Abyssinia," March 14, 1923.

<sup>89</sup>Government of the United States, American Consul in Aden, Arabia, Letter to the Secretary of State of the United States, Aden, Arabia, April 20, 1919.

<sup>90</sup>Ras Tafari Makonnen, Heir to the Throne of Ethiopia, A Letter Written to President Harding of the United States, Addis Ababa, Yekatit 3, 1915 [February 1923]. (See Appendix II.)

<sup>91</sup>Government of the United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S.A., vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927), p. 587.

United States."<sup>92</sup> In the meantime, the Regent started sending students to the United States.<sup>93</sup>

It should be pointed out at this juncture that the choice of the Ethiopian ruling classes was between European colonialism, which meant direct political and administrative control, and American metropolitan/dependency relationship, which did not involve direct rule, but worked on the basis of harmonizing the interests of the metropolitan nation and the indigenous ruling group. In the first, the leaders of the client nations are eliminated, displaced or reduced to a very subordinate level, and the benefits from the resources of the country are channelled to the needs of the colonial power, while in the latter, the indigenous leadership, their political power and economic benefits would be enhanced as long as there was an identity of interest. In the first, the interests are irreconcilable. In the second, they are independent and mutually supportive. This explains the great enthusiasm of Tafari for the United States.

In the late twenties, when British insistence on building a dam on Lake Tana was considered a Trojan Horse by the Ethiopians, Regent Tafari hastily gave the concession to an American engineering consortium, J. G. White of Wall Street, and a contract to this effect

---

<sup>92</sup> Government of the United States, Department of State, Legation of the United States of America in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Letter to the Secretary of State of the United States, December 8, 1928.

<sup>93</sup> Government of the United States, Department of State, National Archives of the United States, M-412 (Government of the United States, U.S. Legation in Addis Ababa, 1928, pp. 1-6.

was signed in 1927.<sup>94</sup> To facilitate the deal, the United States government sent a high level delegation to Addis Ababa. But the project was set aside when Britain's Labour Government secretly protested about American involvement.<sup>95</sup>

While Haile Selassie was trying to play one power off against another in order to keep his throne, on December 5, 1934 the Walwal incident in which a minor military clash took place between Ethiopian border guards and Fascist soldiers who penetrated Ethiopian territory provided Mussolini with a pretext to invade Ethiopia. Thus on October 2, 1935, the expansionist Il Duce, who believed that he had an historical call from destiny and Providence to rebuild the Roman Empire, addressed an estimated twenty million Italians gathered around loudspeakers throughout the Fascist domain he controlled:

Blackshirts of the Revolution! Men and women of all Italy! Italians throughout the world, across the mountains and across the seas! Listen!

A solemn hour is about to strike in the history of the Fatherland.... Twenty million Italians at this moment are gathered in the squares throughout the whole of Italy. It is the most gigantic demonstration in the history of mankind. Twenty million persons: a single heart, a single will, a single decision. This manifestation is to demonstrate that the identity between Italy and Fascism is perfect, absolute and unchangeable....

For many months the wheel of destiny, under the impulse of our calm determination, has been moving towards its goal. In these last hours the rhythm has become swifter and cannot now be arrested. Not only is an army marching towards

---

<sup>94</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, p. 118.

<sup>95</sup>James W. Ford and Harry Gannes, War In Africa (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1935), p. 9.



its objectives, but forty million Italians are marching in unison with this army, all united because there is an attempt to commit against them the blackest of all injustices, to rob them of a place in the sun. . . .

When it came to sitting around the table of the mean peace, to us were left only the crumbs from the sumptuous colonial booty—of others. For twenty years we have been patient while around us tightened ever more rigidly the ring which sought to suffocate our overflowing vitality. With Ethiopia, we have been patient for forty years. Now, enough!<sup>96</sup>

The following day, defying the League of Nations' sanctions against a military solution to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, Mussolini ordered his troops to cross the Mereb river bordering Eritrea. Within a few months, half a million well-armed and well-trained Italian soldiers pushed their way into the country's hinterland. Ethiopian "warriors without weapons"<sup>97</sup> could not repel the invader, although they put up stiff resistance against all odds and fell wave after wave before the flanks of the advancing Italian tanks and airforce planes that rained yperite gas (mustard gas) over their heads. As Haile Selassie explained to the League of Nations, the latter weapon proved to be not only deadly, but decisive in the unequal war. The Negus reported to the members:

When Ethiopian troops had encircled Mäqälle, . . . a mechanism spraying yperite liquid was installed in the aircraft, and it was arranged that a fine rain bringing death should descend over vast tracts of country. At one time, nine, fifteen, or eighteen Italian aeroplanes were

---

<sup>96</sup>Benito Mussolini, La Fondazione Dell'Impero (Roma, 1936), pp. 10-20.

<sup>97</sup>See Marcel Junod, Warriors Without Weapons (Oxford: Alden Press, 1951).

going to and fro bringing down an unceasing rain of yperite. From the end of Ter 1928 (= late January 1936) onwards this death-dealing rain descended uninterruptedly upon our soldiers, upon women, children, cattle, streams, stagnant waters as well as pastures. The Italian army commander made the aeroplanes repeat this work of theirs, in order to extinguish completely all living creatures and to turn into poison the waters and the grazing grounds. He made this the principal means of warfare.

This work of cruelty, carried out with some finesse, annihilated people in places far removed from the battlefield and made their country into a desert. The plan was to spread terror and death over the greater part of Ethiopia.

This most deplorable scheme was eventually accomplished. Man and beast perished completely. The deadly downpour that descended from the aircraft made anyone who touched it fly with torment. Those who drank the water upon which this poisonous rain had settled or ate the food which the poison had touched died in dreadful agony.<sup>98</sup>

Seven months after the initial engagement on the northern and eastern fronts, mercilessly employing weapons that were prohibited by the Geneva Convention, the Fascist army succeeded in entering Addis Ababa. Mussolini then triumphantly announced:<sup>99</sup>

<sup>98</sup>Haile Selassie I, King of Kings, Speech to the General Assembly of the League of Nations, June 29, 1935, Saint Catherine Press, 1936, 012301, eee 56, pp. 1-14.

<sup>99</sup>For the Italian version of reasons for invasion, see Baron P. Aliosi, Head of the Italian Delegation, Speech to the General Assembly of the League of Nations, Mimeograph, October 9, 1935, pp. 1-5. For diplomatic and legal details about the war, see League of Nations Union, "The Tragedy of Abyssinia," London, 1936, 20020.bb.13; the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, "Abyssinia and Italy," London: Information Department Papers, 1935, No. 16, AC. 2273d; Sir Samuel Hoare, M. Laval and Cordell Hull, "Address delivered before the League of Nations Assembly, Geneva: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11-13 September, 1936; H.S. Jevons, Italian Military Secrets: Three Years Preparation for the Abyssinian War (London: H.S. Jevons, 1937); H. Mathews, Eyewitness in Abyssinia, With Marshal Badoglio's Forces to Addis Ababa

Today, May 9, [1936] of the fourteenth year of the Fascist era, the fate of Ethiopia is sealed. At last Italy has her empire. Italians, here is the law that closes one period of our history and opens another: 1) the territories and the peoples that belonged to the Ethiopian empire are placed under the full and complete sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy; 2) the title of Emperor of Ethiopia is assumed by the King of Italy for himself and for his successors. Legionaries! raise high your insignia, your weapons, and your hearts to salute, after fifteen centuries, the reappearance of the empire on the fated hills of Rome. 100

Prior to Italy's successful military advance, there was sharp division among Ethiopian leaders as to how the invasion could be repelled. As we noted before, the educated progressivists who were fully aware of the extent of Fascist military preparedness for the conquest of Ethiopia, and the futility of waging conventional war with outdated weapons, had strongly urged Haile Selassie to revert to non-conventional guerrilla attacks from Ethiopia's natural mountain fortifications in the north and the south-west of the country. After the debacle at Maichew in 1936, Takele Wolde Hawariat, among others, urged (New York: Secker and Warburg, 1937); P. Badoglio, La Guerra d'Etiopia (Milano, 1936); E. de Bono, La Preparazione e le Prime Operazioni: La Conquisia dell'Impero (Castaldi, 1937), W. P. 5272/1; Arbitration Commission on the Wal Wal Dispute, "Proceedings and Other Documents of the Commission," Geneva, 1938, pp. 1-17; Government of Ethiopia, "Memorandum on Dispute Between Ethiopia and Italy," Geneva, May 22, 1935, Fol. U.N.E. 85; Victor Emmanuel III, King, "The Italo-Ethiopian Dispute . . . memorandum of the Italian Government," Roma, 1935, doc. 20020.g.IV, pp. 1-23; League of Nations, "Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy: Report by the Committee of Five to the Council," Geneva: Sept. 2, 1935, Fol. A.C. 2299/37/4.

<sup>100</sup> Benito Mussolini, Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, eds. Eduardo and Dmitro Sumel (Fierenze: La Ferrice, 1959), Vol. III, p. 269.

Haile Selassie to move to the fortress city of Goré, from where guerrilla bands could be easily organized to rout the enemy. He explained—surprisingly enough, quite accurately—that the rains would immobilize not only the Italian army but also its air force, and that future world conflict compounded with Italian internal problems would ultimately ensure Fascist defeat.<sup>101</sup>

The Emperor and his feudal followers failed to heed this advice. When, after the last defence was broken at Lake Ashangé (1936), the Emperor opted for going into exile rather than leading the war of resistance, another western-educated leader, Dejazmatch Fikre Mariam (who was to make a daring attempt to reconquer Addis Ababa in 1938 and die in the engagement) told his patriotic colleagues: "If the Emperor of Ethiopia should flee, our honour demands that we ambush the train [he boards] and that he die at our own hands."<sup>102</sup> Haile Selassie and his family, fully aware of the consequences, were said to have boarded the train leaving for Djibouti with extreme secrecy.<sup>103</sup> Some of the Western-educated patriots, upon being informed

<sup>101</sup>Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History, pp. 219-23.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid.

<sup>103</sup>On May 1st, 1936, for example, when the American Ambassador to Ethiopia asked him about rumours of his planned departure before the fall of Addis Ababa, the Emperor called it "entirely baseless," and added that he "would remain and go on fighting as long as one Ethiopian soldier was left to help him." However, the Negus had left the country just less than twenty-four hours after the conversation. See "United States Diplomatic Papers," 1936, p. 64. Haile Selassie left Djibouti for Geneva where he made one last futile bid to the League of Nations for aid and retired to Bath, England where he stayed until 1941.

of the Emperor's departure, rushed on foot to the Akaki station (about ten miles from Addis Ababa) in order to intercept the royal entourage. But it was too late. Indeed, the events described above show that when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, the gulf between the modern, educated youth and the Emperor was already so deep that if there had not been the Fascist conquest, the revolutionary overthrow of Haile Selassie would probably have occurred earlier than 1974.

### Italian Fascism and Fascist Educational Policies in Ethiopia

The decision of Haile Selassie to go into exile instead of leading the resistance movement, of course, did not mean that the Ethiopian people acquiesced to the invasion. The Italians had, nevertheless, successfully established themselves in the major cities and towns, whereupon they started to implement their colonial policies. In spite of the fact that one of the pretexts for the colonization of Ethiopia was dubbed "a civilizing mission" by Mussolini's propaganda machine, the takeover of Ethiopia by the Fascist army brought to a virtual standstill Haile Selassie's attempt to create a modernizing autocracy. As soon as Haile Selassie went into exile, the western-educated youth in Ethiopia became the vanguard of the war of liberation. The resistance movement against both the invasion and the occupation united not only the Western and the traditionally educated, but also the illiterate masses from the different tribal groups, despite Italy's overt policy of pursuing the age-old imperialist technique of divide et impera. Thus, as soon as the last defence was broken, and Addis

Ababa was occupied, the western-educated youth, most of whom had initially been conscripted into the Imperial Bodyguard, regrouped themselves into guerrilla units and founded a political party, the first of its kind in Ethiopian history, known as the Tekur Anbassa (Black Lion).<sup>104</sup> It was members of this organization who, in collaboration with their cohorts, the traditionally educated, disseminated information and propaganda among the confused populace whose Negus (King) for the first time in their history had gone into exile, surrendering to an enemy and leaving them to a foreign occupying force.

Of course, the Fascists' answer to this was quick and merciless. When a grenade attack was made by two western-educated Ethiopians, Abraha Deboch and Moges Asgedom (ironically, of Eritrean extraction) on Marshal Graziani, the military governor of occupied Ethiopia and other high-ranking Fascist officials in Addis Ababa in 1937, the die was cast. Italian "Black Shirts" were let loose to hunt Ethiopians who were in any way associated with modern schools, or those traditionally educated whom they suspected had collaborated with them. In that rampage, in which up to 10,000 people were massacred, almost all the modern-educated Ethiopians were eliminated.<sup>105</sup> The Italians were said to have been particularly ruthless towards those educated in Britain and the United States, probably due to cultural and religious bias.<sup>106</sup> Leonard Mosley observed, "in one

<sup>104</sup>Taddésé Macha, Tekur Anbassa (Asmara, 1950).

<sup>105</sup>Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History, p. 240.

<sup>106</sup>Richard Pankhurst, "Foundations of Education. . .," p. 274.

month, the cream of Ethiopia's educated youth was destroyed."<sup>107</sup>

Under Fascism, the aim of education in Ethiopia which had been formerly dictated by domestic exigencies, was now geared instead towards the fulfilment of the needs of a metropolitan power. Mussolini was clear about the educational policy he envisaged for his new colony. In his official Fascist publication, Etiopia, he urged the preservation of Italian superiority over the "non-white natives." Giuseppe Fabri, the editor of this periodical, elaborated on Mussolini's point by drawing a parallel between Italy's future educational policy in Ethiopia and Agricola's education of the British "natives" which he considered a betrayal of the Roman Empire. Fabri added:

We abhor the invasion of the colonial office by officials who employ natives, because that constitutes a formidable danger. The mentality of the natives is spoilt; they believe themselves equal to us when they see themselves invested with functions we are accustomed to fulfill. Moreover, the native mass tends always to admire this kind of aristocracy of their race; to foment this evil germ is to destroy our Empire.

The Office and the administration should seem mysterious to the native, a place where white people stay as at the altar; documents locked in the cupboard should have the odour of sacred papers which natives must not touch. It is when natives are put in contact with such instruments of civilization that they cease to be sensible of the difference between themselves and us. . . .<sup>108</sup>

Mussolini's aim was thus to employ education as a tool by which a sense of racial inferiority would be inculcated in the Ethiopian people.

<sup>107</sup>Mosley, Haile Selassie: The Conquering Lion, p. 229.

<sup>108</sup>Centre d'Etudes de Droit et de Politique Colonial Fascist, L'Institut Nationale pour les Relations Culturelles avec l'Etranger, "La Civilisation Fasciste en Afrique Orientale Italienne," (Rome, 1963), p. 32; Sylvia Pankhurst, The Ethiopian People (London: Lalibela House, 1946), p. 693.

This he intended to do not simply by denying equal educational opportunities to the "natives," which he did, but also by tailoring the education there was to the bare needs of colonial administration.

The major emphasis in the few native schools the Italians instituted was very clear. They had to cultivate obedience to authority and respect for discipline. There was total indoctrination and mental conditioning to make the pupils accept inferiority to their Italian masters. The practice of racial segregation was one which Il Duce and his followers kept at the heart of their colonial policy in occupied Ethiopia. The inculcation of inferior/superior race consciousness was thus an essential ingredient in insuring the absolute superiority of the Italian whites. The belief was that, as Mussolini's chosen governor in Addis Ababa, Marshal Badoglio, pointed out, the sooner Il Duce's policies of racial discrimination in Ethiopian schools and society at large was realized, the more the prestige of Italy's new conquest would be recognized.<sup>109</sup>

The Italian governor in Harar, General Guglielmo Nasi, added that it was a grave political mistake to provide widescale schooling to native children and even to teach them the Italian language. The reason he gave was that once educated, they would not only flock to the towns and demand employment in governmental institutions, and compete with Italian nationals in technical trades that should be reserved for the

---

<sup>109</sup> E. S. Pankhurst, Ethiopia: A Cultural History, p. 692.



Europeans alone, but would also form a conscious class of educated natives who might be tempted to rebel against Il Duce's empire. Nasi's advice was, therefore, to reserve whatever modest education they could offer only for children of the chiefs and aristocrats who cooperated with them so that they would serve the Fascist government in necessary positions such as interpreters.<sup>110</sup>

In the few schools opened for Ethiopians, the aim of the Fascists, according to De Marco, was that "the natives, twenty years [later], would be what the Italian educational institutions had made them."<sup>111</sup> The policy already set stated:

When the natives in an Italian colony show themselves to be utterly submissive and obedient to the Italian Government and renounce all forms of political autonomy, they are left free to maintain . . . their usages and customs, their own language and their own mentality.<sup>112</sup>

In order to make those who went to school docile and obedient subjects of Fascism, the texts used for teaching Italian history carefully avoided any period with revolutionary and social upheavals. Thus, the political history of Italy covering the decades immediately before and after 1848, and the political goals and ideals that brought these changes about, were omitted. Passages on Italian unification did not even

---

<sup>110</sup> Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice, Documents on Italian War Crimes, vol. 1 (1949), pp. 30-31.

<sup>111</sup> R. R. De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 19.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

mention Pellico Mazzini, Mameli, Manin, Charles Albert, Speri, Garibaldi, and Cavour. They simply said that on the 14th of March, 1861, "Victor Emmanuel II of Savoy and Sardinia was proclaimed King of a united Italy."<sup>113</sup> This was in accordance with the orders given to the textbook preparation unit which explicitly stated that the indigenous children "must know nothing about conspiracy and revolution."<sup>114</sup>

In view of this policy of historical distortion, it is interesting to look at how the Fascists presented the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36 to Ethiopian children. Concealing the fact that Italian troops passed several miles across the border before the Walwal incident took place, the texts stated that Ethiopia persistently menaced the Italian colonies of Somaliland and Eritrea. Not mentioning anything about Axum, Lalibela, and Gondar, Ethiopia was dismissed as a "barbarian" nation with inferior civilization, where the government could not exercise even a semblance of political control. Not mentioning Ethiopia's appeal to the League of Nations to settle the dispute peacefully, and its fateful voluntary delay in mobilization for almost a year, hoping to show good-will and peaceful intentions to the international community, the text on the war stated that taking into consideration Ethiopia's "aggressive attitude, Italy, in order to defend its prestige and the safety of its colonies, was

---

<sup>113</sup> Government of Italy, Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Libro Sussidiorio per la Terza Classe Elementare (Scuole Elementari per Indigeni), sesta edizione (Rome, 1937), pp. 28-29.

<sup>114</sup> De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives, p. 34.

forced to have recourse to arms."<sup>115</sup>

One major aim the Fascists repeatedly gave to the world and their own people when they occupied Ethiopia was their "civilizing mission" in Africa, or, as they commonly referred to it, "the civilizing of the native." Marshal Badoglio, who was first assigned to the occupation of Ethiopia, had said that the purpose of the occupation was to "construct school buildings" to educate "the natives and their sons" and to "seek to carry prosperity everywhere."<sup>116</sup> Graziani, Mussolini's viceroy in occupied Ethiopia, who was responsible for the Addis Ababa massacre, said that Italy intended to lead Ethiopia "to greatness, prosperity, happiness, and civilization."<sup>117</sup> A Fascist education official also explained that the aim of schools in the occupied colonial empire was to stabilize the natives and "make them understand, admire, and love the civilizing mission of Italy."<sup>118</sup>

Since the word was so loosely used by the Italians, it is appropriate at this juncture to ask what they meant by "civilization." For this, we need only turn to Mussolini for explanation. Addressing mothers and widows of Italian soldiers who died fighting in Ethiopia

<sup>115</sup>Government of Italy, Ministèro dell'Africa Italiano, Libro Sussidiarii per la Terza Classe Elementare, pp. 28-29.

<sup>116</sup>Marshal Badoglio, I Diritti della Scuola, Dec. 10, 1935, no. 8, p. 118.

<sup>117</sup>Marshall Graziani, I Diritti della Scuola, June 20, 1936, no. 25, p. 389.

<sup>118</sup>De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives, p. 18.

in 1935-36, Il Duce asked a rhetorical question about what crime Italy was committing in attempting to invade Ethiopia, and answered: "None, unless it is a crime to carry civilization to backward countries to construct roads and schools."<sup>119</sup> And the civilization that he had in mind was explained in a statement he had made earlier:

Civilization, in fact, is that which Italy is creating on the fourth bank of our sea—Western civilization in general; Fascist civilization in particular.<sup>120</sup>

And as De Marco points out, "Fascist civilization did not contemplate political autonomy for the subject peoples. Complete political domination was the sine qua non of Fascist rule."<sup>121</sup>

In the cultural sphere of education, there were clearly discriminatory policies in goal and application. One of the architects of Fascist education for the colonies, Professor Malvezzi de Medici, stated Fascist goals as follows:

Although the assimilation of Italian culture on the part of the natives is certainly beneficial, it can only take place gradually, while absolute cultural equality with the Italians would breed in them aspirations and pretensions compatible neither with their true situation nor with the actual conditions of the colonies. In accordance with such concepts, the Italian Government proposes to extend to the most advanced natives the opportunity to acquire an education developed in terms of their own traditional culture, which,

---

<sup>119</sup>Benito Mussolini, I Dritti della Scuola (Roma: Dec. 10, 1935), no. 8, p. 118.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid.

<sup>121</sup>De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives, p. 20.

while it remains distinct from instruction of the European type, at the same time permits them to know and appreciate the superior character of our methods and culture (emphasis added).<sup>122</sup>

Teachers recruited to teach Ethiopian children in remote areas were referred to as "apostles of civilization."<sup>123</sup> Their qualification was the ability to impart the Fascist "high mission." They should know the language of the children, which might be used when necessary for "penetrating the minds of the colonial subjects and inculcating in them a love for their new fatherland" (emphasis added).<sup>124</sup> Membership in the Fascist party should be achieved before a teaching position was granted. In addition, a very good knowledge of "fascist interpretation of education and fascist culture" was imperative.<sup>125</sup> The Fascist teacher's duty extended well beyond his daily teaching in class. He was a "sentinel" for the Italian state. He had to say little, and observe much that had to be seen. The teacher's "power of sensibility and intelligence" were no more only for self-realization. He was not supposed to look after his own particular needs; he should be selfless and always ready to serve Italy and Italian Fascism.<sup>126</sup> The new

---

<sup>122</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>123</sup>Mario Tortonese, Le Istituzioni Scolastiche in Libia (Rome, 1937), pp. 10-14.

<sup>124</sup>De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives, p. 84.

<sup>125</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>126</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

Fascist Empire, according to Mussolini, was "an Empire of civilization and humaneness for all the populations of Ethiopia, in the traditions of Ancient Rome, which, after conquering, associated the vanquished peoples with her destiny."<sup>127</sup> Classrooms were emblazoned with propaganda posters written in large block letters: for example, "Italy does not conquer colonies to exploit them or to oppress them but to give them the benefit of civilization."<sup>128</sup> Ciarlantini, a distinguished editor and an important member of one of the Italian legions in the Italo-Ethiopian War, described the Fascist principle for colonial education as follows:

... to make every school, of whatever type, an instrument by which to mold, in certain categories of natives, an 'arch-Italian' conscience which would make out of every native a propagandist of Italian civilization and of the Italian right to command and expand (emphasis added).<sup>129</sup>

Nowhere can we find a more excellent idea of the kind of education and political indoctrination that the Fascists unleashed after entering Addis Ababa than in the textbooks they distributed in the Ethiopian school system. The textbooks were said to be "adapted to the capacity of the natives" and had to inculcate in the child a "patriotic devotion and love for Italy and her leaders."<sup>130</sup> Most of the books had previously been

---

<sup>127</sup>Mario Missiroli, What Italy Owes to Mussolini (Rome, 1938), p. 190.

<sup>128</sup>De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives, p. 36.

<sup>129</sup>C. Ciarlantini, I Dritti della Scuola, no. 19, Feb. 20, 1936, p. 202.

<sup>130</sup>De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives, p. 36.

prepared for Libya and other Italian colonies in East Africa, but the material and the aims were the same. For the Fascists, the intention was to make Italy look like an ideal colonial metropolis. One passage read:

Italy is my second Fatherland. . . . I know that the clear sky, the fertile soil, make of Italy one of the most beautiful countries of the world. Italy is a land of strong and good workmen, of artists and of heroes.

I am happy to be subject to the Italian Government and I love Italy with the affection of a son.<sup>131</sup>

On the importance of the metropolis, the textbook had to be a medium in which the idea that Italy was "great, powerful and feared"<sup>132</sup> had to be religiously accepted. The symbolism of the Italian flag was used to indoctrinate indigenous children towards this end. One passage, for example, read:

All beautiful things, all great things, all good things, have a sign which distinguishes them.

The spring has flowers. . . . Italy has the tricolor flag, green, white, and red.

Oh children [of Ethiopia] love the three colors of the Italian flag, which is your flag; salute it, raising your right hand toward it, and promise to serve it with fidelity and honor.<sup>133</sup>

Ethiopian and other indigenous children also read primers with the following passage:

---

<sup>131</sup>Government of Italy, Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Il Libro della Seconda Classe, p. 89.

<sup>132</sup>De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives, p. 34.

<sup>133</sup>Government of Italy, Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Il Libro della Seconda Classe, p. 30.

I love Italy greatly. Long live Italy! Let us salute the beautiful Italian flag which is also our flag! . . . Italy governs her colonies wisely. Help me, of God, to become a good Italian! God assists Italy now and always! Italy is one of the greatest nations of Europe; it is rich and powerful. Rome, in ancient times, ruled the world. . . . God grant that I love Italy, my second fatherland, in increasing measure (flag salute).<sup>134</sup>

Although the Fascists were telling the Ethiopian children to become good Italians and that Italy was their "second fatherland," their racial policies allowed gradual assimilation for Libyan children only,<sup>135</sup> and not for Ethiopians and other north-east African peoples. The Libyans, after fulfilling specific requirements, inter alia, three years of "Italianizing" elementary education, could become metropolitan citizens, but the East Africans, including Ethiopians, could not, because they had "a less advanced civilization."<sup>135</sup> The explanation should really read, "because they are black."

Teaching Fascist symbolism was another aspect the texts emphasized. One passage ran:

On little streamers and on banners you have seen the Fascio littorio [lictors' bundle]. It is a bundle formed by a group of rods and an axe bound together by a ribbon of leather. The united rods signify harmony; the axe indicates force.

Il Duce has chosen the Fascio littorio as the sign of Fascism in order to remind Italians

<sup>134</sup> Government of Italy, Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Sillabario e Piccole Letture (Scuole Primarie per Indigenie), (new edition compiled by Fulvio Contini) (Rome, 1937), pp. 26-163; De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives, pp. 10-120.

<sup>135</sup> Umberto Borsi, "Cittadinanza e Sudditanza Coloniale nell'Ordinamento Odierno," Centro di Studi Coloniali, Atti del Terzo Congresso (Rome, 1937), pp. 65-687.



that they must be conformable, love the Fatherland and defend it, in case of danger, with all of their power.

You, also, oh children [of Ethiopia] should be proud to belong to the great Italian nation and to work under the banner of the Fascio littorio.<sup>136</sup>

Another section reads: "Oh, [children of Ethiopia], you must feel proud to belong to the great Italian nation and to work under the insignia of fascio littorio."<sup>137</sup>

On indoctrinating children to love Italian leaders, the texts referred to the Italian King Victor Emmanuel as a monarch who was wise and good, and add: "He has fought and won the Great War and has deserved the title of Victorious."<sup>138</sup> But most of the praise was showered on Mussolini himself. One selection had an interesting title: "Benito Mussolini, Scholar!" The following are from the school primers:

Long live the Duce of Italy, Benito Mussolini . . .  
[he has made] of Italy one of the most powerful  
states of Europe.<sup>139</sup>

One selection, entitled "Il Duce," says:

Benito Mussolini, the Head of the Government  
and Leader of Italy, works without rest not

---

<sup>136</sup>Government of Italy, Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Sillabario e Piccole Letture, p. 158.

<sup>137</sup>Richard Pankhurst, "The Textbooks of Italian Colonial Africa," Ethiopia Observer, vol. 2, no. 4 (1967), pp. 330-32.

<sup>138</sup>Government of Italy, Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Libro della Seconda Classe, p. 53.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid., pp. 53-56; Government of Italy, Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Libro Sussidario per la Terza Classe Elementare, p. 31.

only for the greatness of his Country, but also for the good of Italian Africa (emphasis added).<sup>140</sup>

Another selection runs:

[Benito Mussolini's] words are just, his hands are strong, and his heart is large. The Duce founded the Empire of Ethiopia (emphasis added).<sup>141</sup>

In terms of the "civilizing mission" campaign, the Fascists had a dismal record in the number of students they enrolled in Ethiopian schools. By the close of 1937, there were only 1460 pupils in the school system, compared with 4000 before the occupation.<sup>142</sup>

Outside the propaganda and indoctrination aims of Fascist schools, the Duke of Aosta, Governor of Italian East Africa, was explicit as to what type of basic education was provided to Ethiopian children. He had given directives earlier that "native" schools should be concerned with farming the soil and acquiring non-specialized work skills where due to race prestige or other reasons, "Italian labour is not admissible."<sup>143</sup> In short, the "civilizing mission" boiled down to one thing: the Fascists wanted the Ethiopians as "hewers of wood and drawers of water."

---

<sup>140</sup>Government of Italy, Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Sillabario e Piccole Letture, pp. 156-57.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid.

<sup>142</sup>Interview with Ato Bekele Jijo, archivist in the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Addis Ababa, September 8, 1966.

<sup>143</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice, Documents on Italian War Crimes, vol. 1 (1949), p. 30.

In this chapter, we have seen that whereas Menelik and Haile Selassie introduced Western education into their fledgling Empire to modernize feudalism without instituting fundamental changes into the country's body-politic, modern education brought about an unprecedented opposition to the feudal structure which the Ethiopian Emperors aimed to preserve. The contradictions between the modernizing feudalists and the Western-educated progressivists was growing so rapidly that by the time the Fascists invaded Ethiopia in 1936, the radicals were on the verge of overthrowing the traditional rulers. The five years of occupation brought about an almost total elimination of these modern, educated youths who were vying for change. The Italian invaders, despite their declared aim of "a civilizing mission," were more interested in indoctrinating Ethiopian children to be loyal to both Fascism and Italy than in expanding modern education which they feared would breed a conscious group of intellectuals who might challenge their colonial domination. Indeed, the damage done during the five years of occupation to Ethiopia's initial attempts to expand Western schools was so monumental that, as we shall see in the next chapter, the problems of reconstruction were to prove insurmountable for many years after liberation.

### CHAPTER III

#### EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

#### FROM 1941 TO 1960 AND THE FIRST OPEN

#### CHALLENGE TO THE ANCIEN REGIME

##### The State of the Country in 1941 and the Struggle for Educational Reconstruction

When, in 1941, Ethiopia was liberated by the combined forces of Ethiopian patriots, who had been waging war for six years, and the British and Commonwealth army and Haile Selassie returned to Addis Ababa, the state of the country was very dismal.<sup>1</sup> There was dislocation in the communications network. No trade and commerce existed to ensure the distribution of critical resources. The administrative machinery was at a standstill. The retreating Fascist army had left over 40,000 Italian civilians and thousands of prisoners of war behind who needed food, shelter, and medical care. There was a widespread shortage of traditional staples and clothing throughout the Empire.

During the occupation, a large number of children who were either orphans or separated from their parents roamed the streets of the capital or other large towns, without shelter and without aim. Most of the boys who spent their nights huddled on city corners were known as berendda-adaris ("veranda dwellers"). They had been "forcibly

---

<sup>1</sup>Ethiopian Government, Department of Press and Information, La Civilisation de l'Italie fasciste en Ethiopie (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1945), 2 vols, pp. 1-40; "Italy's War Crimes in Ethiopia," Evidence for the War Crimes Commission, New Times and Ethiopia News (Woodford Green: 1945), pp. 1-24.

removed from their villages and carried off in Italian army lorries to work on the roads or to serve the Italians in the towns.<sup>2</sup> Parents, having been robbed of their homes and property, were themselves impoverished and therefore unable to care for their children. The teenagers teeming in the streets of Addis Ababa, Gondar, Harar, Jimma, Dire Dawa and other towns had already become victims of diseases such as tuberculosis, tropical ulcers, trachoma, hookworm, syphilis and gonorrhea.

Furthermore, as a young Ethiopian eye-witness describes:

Patriots happy at the termination of the fighting returned but did not know where to settle, and thousands of wounded citizens, men, women and children, needing hospitalization waited for someone to look after them. The country's economic condition and the morale of the people were at the lowest.<sup>3</sup>

As if the havoc the Italians had created was not enough, the British who came in as allies had made sure that Ethiopia would not benefit and emerge as a regional power after taking over Italian arms and moveable property. It should be remembered that the United Kingdom still had colonial territories almost surrounding Ethiopia and was wary of the potential consequences should Ethiopia emerge as a viable north-east African nation. Thus, whereas the retreating Fascist army was forced to leave behind 40,000 registered trucks that could transport food, clothing, medical supplies, and other essen-

<sup>2</sup>S. Pankhurst, Ethiopia: A Cultural History (Essex: Lalibela House, 1955), pp. 577-579.

<sup>3</sup>Girma Amare, "Government Education in Ethiopia," Ethiopia Observer, I (1962), p. 336.

tial commodities within the Empire, the British had either removed or destroyed 34,000 of them, leaving only 15 percent of the transport vehicles and heavy machinery which the war-ravaged nation badly needed.<sup>4</sup>

In fact, at the time when the Fascist army was totally defeated, British war officials had open colonial designs on Ethiopia. This was despite Churchill's assurances to the contrary. The suspicions of the Ethiopians became greater when, without consulting Haile Selassie, the British set up an "Occupied Enemy Territory Administration." It was at this time that the bulk of the people, the feudal rulers, and especially the patriots, became indignant at what they considered a stab in the back by their new ally.<sup>5</sup> Britain backed down from this course because there was opposition from within the anti-Fascist alliance. The United Kingdom was also in the middle of a publicity campaign against the Axis powers, its major weapon being territorial integrity, equality, and freedom. As an American envoy reported to the State Department, "In opposition to the War Office, the Foreign Office felt that the emphasis should be laid on independence rather than control and argued that it would set a bad political precedent to deny independence to the first country to be freed from the Axis."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Memoranda Presented by the Imperial Ethiopian Government to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, September, 1945" (Addis Ababa, 1955), pp. 20-22.

<sup>5</sup>Kebbede Tesemma, Dejazmatch Yetarik Mastawesha (Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1969), pp. 433-453.

<sup>6</sup>Government of the United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S.A., IV (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 106.

Another reason why Britain abandoned direct colonialism was that the Ethiopian patriots were more armed than ever before, and the officials correctly calculated that as freedom fighters they would not be satisfied with exchanging masters. Concerning this point, an American diplomat sent the following report to the State Department:

The Abyssinians have large stores of arms and ammunition as they have not only the supplies given the patriot troops by the British, but also the enormous stores captured from Italian sources. To disarm the country would, of course, be a difficult undertaking, for the Abyssinian would part with all his possessions rather than give up his gun. . . . The British cannot afford to spare the troops necessary for this job.<sup>7</sup>

This was at a time when the theatre of the great war was expanding and Britain's flanks in its colonies in the far-flung corners of the world were already too wide. After securing Ogaden, therefore, Britain abandoned its plan, recognized Ethiopia's sovereignty, and concentrated on extending its cultural influence through the country's school system.

The British first opened a military drill school for Ethiopian boys where regular instruction in the three R's was given and advanced reading materials produced in Britain were supplied. Then, after 1942, when a formal withdrawal was signed<sup>8</sup> and complete control of the

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>8</sup>British Government, "Agreement and Military Convention between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia," 1941-42, B.P.P., IX, pp. 1-16; 1944-45, B.P.P., X, pp. 1-12; British Government and Ethiopian Government, "Agreement between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia," Addis Ababa, December 19, 1944, 1945, pp. 1-12; "Agreement between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia for the Regulation of Mutual Relations," (with annexure, schedule, and exchange of letters), Addis Ababa, Dec. 19, 1944, 1949, pp. 1-27; "Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ethiopia relating to Certain Matters Connected with the Withdrawal of British Military Administration from the Territories designated as the Reserved Area and the Ogaden," London, November 29, 1954, 1955, pp. 1-5.

country's administrative machinery reverted to the hands of the remaining Ethiopian feudal lords, Haile Selassie, who returned in the wake of the British forces, gave free reign to the United Kingdom to expand its cultural influence within the Empire. This trend, as we shall see later, was to continue for some time.

On the Ethiopian side, however, the task of educational development and reconstruction was indeed difficult and enormous. As the government pointed out, in 1941, Ethiopia was "a country ravaged by six years of war ... during which ... three-quarters of its educated citizens were killed in battle or wantonly murdered."<sup>9</sup> While before the war there had been 230 school instructors, all but thirty of whom were foreigners, over 50 per cent of the Ethiopian educators were killed, and many of the foreigners forcibly deported. During the final stages of the liberation, the remaining ranks of the Ethiopian teachers were either fighting pockets of Italian troops or were still in exile.

As Sylvia Pankhurst reports:

[When] the liberating Ethiopian, British, and other forces entered Ethiopia, they found schools operated and entirely taught by children. The teachers had been killed or imprisoned or were away fighting in the bush. The children had [therefore] already restarted the schools.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup>Government of Ethiopia, "Memoranda," pp. 21-23.

<sup>10</sup>Traditional Ethiopian schools usually had one teacher, the advanced students instructing the beginners. What Pankhurst saw was perhaps these advanced students running beginner classes in the absence of regular teachers. For the quotation above see Sylvia Pankhurst, "Education in Ethiopia II: Secondary Education," Ethiopia Observer, XI (April, 1958), p. 162.



A few months later, makeshift shelters were turned into schools, but the major problem was lack of qualified teaching personnel. The task of Makonnen Desta, an outstanding Harvard graduate, who was appointed the Ethiopian Minister of Education in 1941, was thus a very difficult one. The educational network created before the occupation was completely shattered. Marshal Badoglio, upon marching into Addis Ababa, had ordered all Ethiopian educational establishments closed. The Tafari Makonnen School was occupied by Alpine troops who destroyed the equipment Haile Selassie had acquired from Europe. The dormitory was converted to a medical store for the Fascist army and the main building became one of their many military barracks. Likewise, the Itigué Mennen School became a Fascist hospital.<sup>11</sup>

In 1941, educational supplies, teaching aids, maps, and textbooks were virtually nonexistent; Amharic, French and English instructional materials had been destroyed by the Italians, and replaced with Fascist propaganda texts for which there was no further use. The only materials which were of any utility were the backs of Fascist office forms and customs declarations, which were ingeniously turned by the pupils into indispensable exercise books.<sup>12</sup> Many of the students

<sup>11</sup>More facts about this Fascist legacy can be seen in Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice, "Documents on Italian War Crimes," submitted to the United Nations by the Imperial Ethiopian Government, Addis Ababa, 1967, folio S.V. 422.

<sup>12</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education in Ethiopia: A Survey Issued by the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts" (Addis Ababa, 1961), pp. 9-12.

who hoped to make up for lost time by registering in these makeshift primary schools were already in their twenties.

In the capital city, orphaned children and those whose parents could not provide for them flocked to the Ministry of Education and begged to get into the boarding schools which Haile Selassie began to establish in Addis Ababa. As Sylvia Pankhurst, one of the few foreigners who visited Ethiopia soon after liberation, reports: "When the government schools reopened, children stood by the roadside to greet the Emperor with appealing cries of 'School! School!'; they even attempted to stop his car to make their plea."<sup>13</sup> Mr. Hussey, an educator from England who worked as an adviser to the Ethiopian Minister of Education had also reported that "children often cast themselves down in the road before his car crying 'School! School!'"<sup>14</sup> When the Interior Ministry opened a correction centre for some youths whose lack of proper family environment had led to anti-social behaviour, those who failed to gain admittance to the formal institutions swarmed to the centre and begged for admittance.<sup>15</sup>

Amidst all this healthy clamour among the youths who wanted to gain knowledge, the few schools opened were handicapped by lack of equipment and educational texts; these could not be imported from abroad due to the war. The teachers the Ministry of Education employed

---

<sup>13</sup>S. Pankhurst, "Education in Ethiopia: Secondary Education," pp. 162-63.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Private interview with Mr. Mebratu Yohannes, a former Director of the Tebay Marremia (Correction Centre), September 5, 1967.

were also of very low standard. In an attempt to reconstruct a new educational network and accommodate the large number of youths clamouring for education, it became necessary for the government to hire even teachers who had no more knowledge than the ability to read and write in Amharic...

During the first few years after liberation, elementary schools, with only three or four grades, had spontaneously mushroomed in many districts. A distinguished Canadian educator and former Leader of the Social Credit Party, Dr. Robert N. Thompson, who was the Ethiopian Director General of Education in the 1940's and early 1950's, in a reply to our survey concerning the conditions during that period, commented as follows:

No Ethiopians had been allowed to attend any schools during the Fascist years, so we started from 'scratch.' We developed a crash program and we had the great problem of supplying facilities and teachers to meet the very high demand for education from the populace. A very large problem was one of dollars . . . we operated on a limited 'cash and carry' budget. The resources of the country were meagre compared to later years.<sup>16</sup>

Thus a start was made and more formal schools were later established. But the most important development was the opening of the Haile Selassie First Secondary School in Addis Ababa. The campus was located on the site of a Fascist agricultural station on the outskirts of the city. It had large dormitories, two well-equipped laboratories, and a library with some 4,000 selected texts.<sup>17</sup> Since there

<sup>16</sup>Response to survey questionnaire, November 5, 1981.

<sup>17</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Yearbook 1942-43 [1949-51] (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1952), pp. 99-110.

were no qualified Ethiopian teachers, almost all the instructors were foreign citizens.

In 1946, another secondary school, named for Orde Wingate, the commander of Haile Selassie's army when it entered the country through Gojam, was opened at Gulalé in an abandoned Fascist radio station. This school was wholly staffed and financed by the British government and later in the 1950's prepared students for the London G. C. E.<sup>18</sup>

Other schools were also re-established during the same period. The Tafari Makonnen school, which was reopened under the direction of the French Canadian Jesuits, the Itegué Mennen School for girls, the Menelik II School, and the Medhana Alem School in Harar had elementary and secondary level curricula. All of these above institutions prepared students for School Leaving Certificate examinations given by British Universities and the University College of Addis Ababa. The Lycée Gabre Mariam, the only school that exclusively used French as a language of instruction, trained students for the French baccalaureate. Growth in education continued both at the elementary and secondary levels until by 1960 there was a total of 1,087 schools in the Empire, with 180,163 students registered in them (see Table 3).<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup>The author went to this school and is writing from personal experience.

<sup>19</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Bureau of Educational Research and Statistics, Government, Mission, Private, Community, and Church Schools (Addis Ababa, 1960), p. 1.

**TABLE 3**  
**Number of Schools of Different Types in Ethiopia in 1960**

	<u>School Type</u>					<u>Total</u>
	<u>Govt.</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Private</u>	<u>Church</u>	<u>Community</u>	
Empire total	635	180	129	55	88	1087
Primary grades only (1-8)	583	168	121	54	88	1014
Primary and secondary grades	24	7	6	1	-	38
Secondary grades only	5	4	1	-	-	10
Special schools	18	1	1	-	-	20
Institutions of higher learning	5	-	-	-	-	5

Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education (Geneva, 1962) and UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook (Geneva, 1963-1964).

Considering the fact that there were virtually no formal learning institutions of any kind in 1941, and that the resources available were meagre, it could be said that development in Ethiopian education during this period was significant.

During the same period, tertiary education was also expanded. The monetary drain arising from sending students abroad—the government shared this expense with foreign donors—and the fear that education abroad might erode the loyalty of the youth of the future, prompted the regime to open the University College of Addis Ababa in 1950. The College, like Tafari Makonnen run by French Canadian Jesuits, was to be an embryo of the future Haile Selassie University. The Emperor himself had decreed, when he laid the foundation stone of the College on March 20, 1950, that it was simply a penultimate stage to a modern university comprising all appropriate faculties and awarding all levels of degrees.<sup>20</sup> In 1952, Lucien Matte, the French Canadian President of the College was in fact referring to it as a two-year preparatory school before advancing to Haile Selassie University, although the University was not established until 1961.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup>S. Pankhurst, "Education in Ethiopia: Secondary Education," p. 195.

<sup>21</sup>Lucien Matte, "Haile Selassie University Committee Report," (Addis Ababa, 1952), p. 15. In a survey conducted by the author in 1981, all the responding Canadians who taught in Ethiopia between 1941-1974 mentioned Dr. Matte as the most outstanding and selfless foreign contributor to Ethiopian higher education.

The College was finally accorded an imperial charter guaranteeing full academic freedom on July 28, 1954,<sup>22</sup> thereby offering degrees in arts and sciences. The academic freedom that Haile Selassie granted in the Negarit Gazetta was, as we shall see later, one of the instruments of protest against the Emperor's regime in the late 1950's and the 1960's.

At the inauguration of the University College, 150 students were registered.<sup>23</sup> Science laboratories were comparable to other foreign institutions of the same type, and the College library was modestly stocked with 7,000 books mostly purchased abroad. The books were selected carefully: Marxist-oriented or radical books and academic journals were censored. Even agnostic or atheistic authors such as Bertrand Russell were banned from the campus. However, the students had their own outside networks, and continued to read such prohibited materials.<sup>24</sup> Ultimately, the movement that led to the fall of Haile Selassie was to emanate from here in the 1960's.

Other institutions of higher learning that were soon opened were: the Engineering College (1952), the Gondar Public Health College (1954), the Ethio-Swedish Institute of Building Technology (1955) and the Theological College (1959). All these institutions, including the

<sup>22</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Pen, Negarit Gazeta (Addis Ababa, July 28, 1954).

<sup>23</sup>Edouard Trudeau, "Higher Education in Ethiopia" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1964), pp. 29-51.

<sup>24</sup>An interview with Sebhat Gebre Igziabher, a 1958 graduate of the College, indicates the extent of this censorship: Sebhat was warned by the College authorities that he would be expelled if he continued to read profane authors. Interview conducted February 15, 1967.

University College, were later incorporated into the Haile Selassie University. By 1960, there were 935 students enrolled at the tertiary level, of which females comprised 56.<sup>25</sup>

Education abroad had also continued. By 1960, for example, there were 686 students who had returned from foreign countries: 250 from the United States and Canada; 124 from Britain; and 118 from other western bloc countries (see Table 4 ).<sup>26</sup>

At the same time, 813 students were still outside Ethiopia; 198 of them in the United States and Canada. There were no students from eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. among the returnees, nor were Ethiopian graduates sent there by the government prior to 1958, indicating Haile Selassie's fear of importing political radicalism that might endanger his imperial throne. But by 1960, there were 14 students in the eastern bloc countries: nine in Yugoslavia and five in Czechoslovakia,<sup>27</sup> all studying science (see Table 5 ).<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "School Census for Ethiopia," (Addis Ababa, 1967).

<sup>26</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Government, Mission . . . Schools, p. 14.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>28</sup>There is a popular misconception that it was the students who attended schools in the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc countries who led the fight to overthrow Haile Selassie. For example, Amédée Dupas, a French Canadian and former teacher at Tafari Makonnen and Harar Normal School, in a survey conducted by the author in 1981, commented: "[what] brought the actual situation [the revolution] was that the Negus sent too willfully the pupils to study in Russia. Because, it was by them the University was stopped every year and they brought about the subjugation of the country." However, a careful study shows that there was not a single graduate from the socialist countries who influenced student agitations of the 50's, 60's, and 70's; among those in power after 1974, none had training there prior to Haile Selassie's overthrow. Almost all of the revolutionaries and Dergists were either products of the local schools and colleges, or studied in the U.S., Britain, France, Canada, and other western bloc countries.



**TABLE 4**  
**Students Returned: Breakdown by Country**  
**March, 1960**

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of Students</u>
United Kingdom	124
U.S.A. and Canada	250
Lebanon	117
Germany	74
United Arab Republic	28
India	29
France	7
Australia	5
Greece	12
Sweden	10
Uganda	8
Ghana	1
Italy	8
Sudan	8
Norway	1
Costa Rica	1
Belgium	1
Kenya	1
Nigeria	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>686</b>

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts,  
Government, Mission . . . Schools, p. 14.

TABLE 5  
Students Abroad: Breakdown by Country  
March, 1960

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. of Students</u>
U.S.A. and Canada	198
United Arab Republic	117
Germany	108
Italy	98
United Kingdom	37
Lebanon	80
France	37
Israel	31
India	31
Greece	12
Yugoslavia	9
Sweden	12
Austria	5
Czechoslovakia	5
Japan	6
Denmark	4
Sudan	2
Finland	2
Netherlands	1
Norway	1
Jordan	1
Tanganyika	1
Ghana	1
Haiti	1
Australia	1
Mexico	6
Portugal	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>813</b>

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Government, Mission . . . Schools, p. 15.

Most Ethiopian students of the 1940's and 50's attended the schools and colleges mentioned above, which were concentrated in urban areas. For those who lived in the countryside, however, the situation was very different. In 1941, the transportation system was disrupted by the war. The Italians had destroyed all the main bridges while retreating. Ethiopia being covered with precipitous mountains and swift streams during the rainy season—children could not travel to the larger towns, far from their villages where schools were non-existent. But even in later years, when a few peasants were lucky enough to live near a town with a school of some kind, those from remote ambas where swift torrents destroyed makeshift bridges and dangerously overflowed their banks during the rainy season could not attend school during certain months. The fact that these children also had to walk at least two hours to reach the nearest school exacerbated the problem.<sup>29</sup>

In addition, immediately after liberation, the economic means of the parents being very meagre, peasant families called their children home from school so that they could assist overworked mothers and fathers who had to provide grain, cash and labour to the greedy landlords, who wanted to collect rent for the previous five years.<sup>30</sup> Some

<sup>29</sup>The author writes from personal experience. In an answer to a 1981 survey, Mr. A. Savagnac, of Quebec, points out that this problem was still acute when he taught French in Makale in 1967; some students walked more than 70 km each day to come to school.

<sup>30</sup>This was despite Haile Selassie's Awaj (proclamation) in 1941 that all Ethiopians had been given a reprieve from taxes covering the Fascist occupation. The peasants were of course paying taxes to either the Fascist occupiers or to the patriots who were in virtual control of most of the countryside between 1936 and 1941.

children also took up menial jobs to earn money and thus help the wounded, the disabled, and the aged members of their families. But even long after the trauma of the war had slowly subsided, and other infrastructures were constructed, there were almost no schools in the countryside.

In the expansion of educational opportunities in Ethiopia, the fact that the countryside was badly neglected and the urban areas had an unfair share of educational resources and opportunities is disappointingly clear; that the same education in Ethiopia was supported by rural revenues paid by peasants who rarely got an education gave the practice a particular irony. Records show that it was in 1947 that a land tax for education was passed by the Emperor.<sup>31</sup> Schools in Addis Ababa and all institutions of higher learning were not directly funded from land tax, but the huge amounts of money the government treasury allocated to these institutions could have been shared with provisional school commissions if a fair system had been put in motion. Concerning this urban/rural dichotomy, the Ethiopian educator, Mulugeta Wodajo, comments:

The education tax is levied only on rural land, while most of the elementary schools are located in cities and towns. Thus farmers pay for the education of the children of city-dwellers. This is clearly an untenable situation. . . . The tax will either have to be discontinued and the government's contribution increased proportionately, or the tax will have to be increased substantially and city dwellers required to contribute directly to the education of their children.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Pen, "Proclamation No. 94 of 1947," Negarit Gazeta, VII (Addis Ababa, 1954), pp. 15-16.

<sup>32</sup>Mulugeta Wodajo, "The State of Educational Finance in Ethiopia," The Ethiopian Journal of Education, I (June; 1967), p. 23.

The discrepancy between Addis Ababa and the rural areas was from the beginning a phenomenon that developed with the fact that the first western schools started in Addis Ababa catered to the children of the balabats (nobles).<sup>33</sup> In 1949, there were fifteen million inhabitants in the Empire of Ethiopia (not including Eritrea, which was not federated yet); among this population that of Addis Ababa comprised only 300,000.<sup>34</sup> Yet, most educational development took place in the capital. It was here that old buildings were renovated and new ones created to accommodate large numbers of children. The educators in the city were more qualified than those who went to the provincial towns. Throughout the decade of the forties, the only schools that were equipped with modern laboratories and had stocks of relevant books and teaching aids were found in Addis Ababa. In fact, the bulk of the educational expenditures was spent in Addis Ababa to purchase necessary equipment and to staff schools with qualified foreign instructors.

During the school year 1947-48, for example, only \$2,056,237 was spent on all the 12 provinces of Ethiopia where 98 per cent of the Ethiopian population lived, while in contrast about \$5,000,000 was spent in Addis Ababa alone on a population which constituted only 2 percent

<sup>33</sup>Since both Menelik and Haile Selassie believed in educating high level elites to run their empire and a broad-based education was not their priority, they found it economically sound to concentrate these schools in the urban areas, specially the city of Addis Adaba. Expatriate teachers (with the exception of a few Indian educators, Protestant and Catholic missionaries and some peace corps volunteers) were also unwilling to go to the countryside where modern amenities of life were not available.

<sup>34</sup>United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (New York: United Nations Publications, 1949/50).

of the national total. Capital equipment for Addis Ababa schools alone cost \$248,264, as against \$68,418 for all the provinces. Food for Addis Ababa student boarders cost \$691,060, as against \$108,130 for the 12 provinces. School construction projects in the capital cost \$1,187,688, whereas only \$675,401 was spent in the rest of the Empire.<sup>35</sup>

By 1952 there was only one secondary school in the provinces—the agricultural school in Jimma. All colleges were concentrated in Addis Ababa, except the Public Health College in Gondar and the Agricultural College in Haramaya, Harar. Even by the end of 1960, the 2 percent of the Ethiopian population living in Addis Ababa had 27 high schools and four colleges; the corresponding figure for the 98 percent of the Ethiopian population who lived in the countryside was 24 secondary schools and two colleges (see Table 6). Careful observation also reveals that the percentage of school teacher increase from 1955-1960 also favoured Addis Ababa as opposed to the provinces. The data also shows that the number of teachers from 1955-59 increased more in Addis Ababa than the provinces. This was particularly dramatic in 1958-59, when the number of teachers in Addis Ababa rose by 15 percent whereas in the provinces it decreased by 7 percent.

Once western education was firmly established in Ethiopia, a fight over the control of education which also meant control over national elites ensued. Although before the war, Haile Selassie had

<sup>35</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Yearbook, 1949-1951 (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1952), pp. 5-70, passim.

TABLE 6

A Five-year Study of Government Schools and Colleges  
in the 12 Provinces and Addis Ababa

Location	Academic Secondary 9 - 12	Special Secondary I - IV	Colleges 13 - 16	Total
<u>12 Provinces</u>				
1955-1956	1	2	2	418
1956-1957	2	3	3	431
1957-1958	7	8	2	459
1958-1959	13	8	2	438
1959-1960	14	10	2	435
<u>Addis Ababa</u>				
1955-1956	8	5	3	35
1956-1957	8	7	3	38
1957-1958	8	12	3	42
1958-1959	10	14	3	46
1959-1960	11	16	3	48

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Government, Mission . . . Schools, p. 3.

successfully stifled the Church's attempts to frustrate the secularization of education, the Fascist interregnum and the confusion that was created by his new alliance with the Tsere Mariam (Protestant) Britishers had emboldened some clerics to vie once again for the control of education. However, the collaboration of some bishops with the Fascists during the occupation of 1936-41, which damaged their prestige, the denial to the church of its traditional land-tax exemption and secular jurisdiction in 1942, the channelling of church revenues for administrative purposes, clearly strengthened Haile Selassie's hands.<sup>36</sup>

Two years after the Post of the Minister of Education was established, Haile Selassie passed Order No. 1 of 1943, which stated that the Minister had the powers to administer and develop education, to make bylaws for the proper execution of its duties, to determine curricula for schools, to oversee and control private education, including Church education, to issue proper certificates to students upon completion of their studies and satisfactory passing of examinations.<sup>37</sup> Order No. 3 of 1947 made Haile Selassie's aims even more explicit. It stated:

The direction, administration, supervision and guidance of all functions and controls of Our Imperial Government relating to education, fine arts, and religious and cultured instruction

---

<sup>36</sup>Despite the 1942 decree, Haile Selassie, as a concession, had in practice allowed the Church the conscription of labour, the collection of rents, and even the levying of fines, a feudal practice that continued until his overthrow in 1974.

<sup>37</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Pen, "Order No. 1 of 1943," Negarit Gazeta, II (Addis Ababa, 1950)



within our Empire shall come under Our exclusive control (emphasis added).<sup>38</sup>

However, the Church did not give up. In 1949, it precipitated a crisis by declaring its independence from the education land tax, citing its tax exempt status held since the fourteenth century, and arguing that it had always run its own schools and should continue to do so. Haile Selassie, knowing that a direct confrontation with the Church at the last stage of its political demise would serve no purpose, thereupon started to take more caution with all matters impinging upon ecclesiastical affairs. He allowed the Church to keep its annual half a million Ethiopian dollar education tax, and turned over 177 traditional schools administered by the Ministry of Education which offered additional subjects.<sup>39</sup> The retrogression of these schools into traditionalism and anti-secularism was of course a great blow to the growth of modern education in Ethiopia and created chaos for all Ethiopian and foreign educational planners.

But Haile Selassie was only buying time. After making sure that liberal clerics had replaced conservative debteras in key ecclesiastical positions in the Church hierarchy, he moved again. The revised Constitution of 1955 explicitly stated that the Emperor as well as being the head of state was also "Defender of the Faith" and "Head of the

---

<sup>38</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Pen, Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation No. 94 of 1947, " p. 1.

<sup>39</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Long Term Planning Committee, "A Ten Year Plan for the Controlled Expansion of Ethiopian Education" (Addis Ababa, 1955), pp. 60-65.

Ethiopian Orthodox Church."<sup>40</sup> It also provided that

The organization and secular administration of the established church shall be governed by law. The Archbishop and Bishops shall be elected by the Ecclesiastical Electoral College consisting of representatives of the clergy and the laity of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Their spiritual consecration shall be performed according to the Canon Law subject to the approval of the Emperor of their election and appointment. The Emperor has the right to promulgate the decrees, edicts and public regulations of the church except those concerning monastic life and other spiritual administrations.<sup>41</sup>

In traditional Ethiopian history, the aristocracy formed one sector of the triad of political power, but this group posed minimal opposition to Haile Selassie's autocracy and modernization efforts after liberation. This may, therefore, raise the question of whether the exposure of the aristocracy to the European environment during the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia in any way contributed to the emergence of a new outlook, and therefore the birth of a new political order during the post-war period.

One can certainly say that, with the sole exception of Ras Emeru, who even before the war was relatively progressive among

<sup>40</sup>Government of Ethiopia, The Revised Constitution (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1955).

<sup>41</sup>Order No. 48 of 1967 also states: "The powers necessary to the secular administration of the church shall be vested in the Ecclesiastical Council thereof which shall be comprised of the following members: (a) the Patriarch of Ethiopia or in his absence, his Enderasye who shall be Chairman of the Council; (b) All the bishops and Episcopos of Ethiopia; and (c) Eight (8) other persons who shall be appointed by Us upon the recommendation of the Patriarch" (Church Administration Order, 1976, Article 2[1]).

the reactionary feudal princes,<sup>42</sup> members of the ruling classes who were either in voluntary exile or under Fascist detention<sup>43</sup> did not significantly alter their overall social and political perception. However, their life-style had undergone significant metamorphosis. Surely, the syncretic life-style that the upper aristocracy developed after their five years of contact with the European environment may be read hermeneutically to show how and what they perceived or misperceived of "modernization" and hence, what social-political views that specific cognitive process had produced. Within the framework of this study, however, the most important consequence of that perception was the recognition by the aristocracy that western education would be more profitable to their children than the traditional kind, an attitude that was no doubt reinforced by the Chewas' prevalent bias against all things debtera.

The successful transfer of education of the children of the ruling classes as well as of the working classes from the Church to the few western-type schools thus became a watershed in modern Ethiopian history, for it produced a new aristocratic elite whose perception of politics was more secular. The socialization process of this new generation pictured the Church essentially as an anachronistic religious

<sup>42</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywéténna Yé Etiopia Erméja (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1972), pp. 48-149.

<sup>43</sup>Some aristocrats who remained behind, such as Ras Desta Damtew and Déjazmatch Aberra Kassa were killed by the Italians, the former on the battlefield, the latter upon surrendering to the Fascists who falsely promised them amnesty. Many others, specially those who previously had rivalries with Haile Selassie (e. g., Ras Hailu of Gujam) cooperated with the enemy and held high level positions until 1941.

institution with a mere ceremonial function. The image of the new political order was drawn in terms of a new ideology: Zamanawi-seletané (modernization), which meant modern institutions, modern schooling, and modern thinking.<sup>44</sup>

In the secularization process of the post-1941 era, we should note that Haile Selassie had to start everything anew. Ironically, however, western education got its lettre de noblesse during the period of occupation. It is important to understand that traditional resistance to modern education emanated from an underlying assumption that non-Ethiopian values would lead to the production of outward-looking youth influenced by western secular and religious ideas who would therefore be non-patriotic. But since those early western-type schools attempted only to fulfil the domestic needs of the nation, the political socialization emanating from them did not tie the elite culturally to the Metropolitan countries from where the education was initially imported. The courageous struggle of the new educated class against the Fascist invaders thus bore witness to the people that to have a western education was not to betray the motherland. Moreover, initially, there was a false assumption among the general populace that Ethiopia, which two generations before had vanquished one of Europe's mightiest armies

<sup>44</sup>Due to this change of focus, Ethiopian literature within the last two decades has, by and large, concentrated on themes such as the problems of generation gap, rural superstition, undue privilege accorded to the traditional sources of power, and the anachronistic nature of Ethiopian Orthodox beliefs. See, for example, Mengistu Lemma, The Marriage of Unequals (London: Macmillan and Co., 1970), and Dagniachew Worku, The Thirteenth Sun (London: Heinemann Books Ltd., 1973).

would repeat its admirable performance if any foreign enemy attacked. However, the speedy defeat of the country's feudal army during the 1935-36 campaign—a defeat made possible by the enemy's use of tanks, aircraft, poison gas and other destructive weapons—brought home to every sector of the population and to every politically important group who initially had misgivings about the new education that Ethiopia had no choice but to acquire the knowledge and know-how which made such might possible, if she wanted to survive in the modern world.

Yet, the implementation of the new education was not without its difficulties. An attempt was made to restore the new educational system that existed before the Fascist invasion. Even though the invasion and the destruction that ensued seemed to offer a clear slate on which to construct a modern network of educational institutions, the remaining ranks of the feudal lords, some of whom had a claim to patriotic resistance, the Church hierarchy and the debteras who also had their own martyrs of the war, did not look favourably upon a development which might leave them out in the political cold. Nor were their fears and suspicions assuaged by the visible roles they played in the Emperor's contacts with foreign things and powers.

As a result, six different types of schools operated simultaneously. These were government schools financed and administered by the Ministry of Education, traditional schools established and run by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, private schools operated by individuals (mostly members of foreign communities), mission schools run by Protestant and Catholic religious societies, Koranic schools financed and run by Moslem

Communities, and on-the-job training schools attached to government departments other than the Ministry of Education.

Of the entire primary level enrolment, fully 75 percent of the students attended government schools. Moreover, the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts was empowered, at least in theory, to exercise supervision and control over the administration, curricula and organization of non-governmental schools. When we recall the resistance which was put up by the Church and its supporters to stop the creation of a Ministry of Education under the reigns of Menelik, Iyassu and Zawditu,<sup>45</sup> the successful reincarnation of this ministry in the post-liberation period is a sign of the declining influence of the Church and the burgeoning status of modern educational institutions in Ethiopia.

At the onset of the post-liberation era, parallel with the establishment of a modern administrative machine, Haile Selassie obviously sought to train young Ethiopians to fill the nation's new bureaucratic structure.<sup>46</sup> To realize this aim, there was an unavoidable demand for people who could teach reading and writing, as a consequence of

<sup>45</sup>Paulos Milkias, "Traditional Institutions and Traditional Elites: The Role of Education in the Ethiopian Body-Politic," African Studies Review, vol. 19, no. 3 (December, 1976), pp. 79-92.

<sup>46</sup>As Maaza Bekele points out, the aims of education during the early post-liberation period were to prepare in the fastest possible time "young men and women who could man a modern administrative system"; they were to man the industries, the professions, transport, and commercial establishments, police and armed forces organizations. See Maaza Bekele, "Higher Education in Ethiopia" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1966), pp. 85-87. Even as late as the 1950's, the major aim of the government was the production of competent bureaucrats, technical and professional personnel to run Haile Selassie's newly created state machine (see Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Long Term Planning Committee, "A Ten Year Plan . . .," p. 62).

which, new fields were opened up for the Church-educated elite. The opening of the Theological College in later years also served as a bridge between traditionalism and modernization in the ecclesiastical sector. These developments undoubtedly contributed to the diminishing resistance of the debteras to the modernization of Ethiopian education.

For the Haile Selassie regime, however, the choice was far from simple. There was a legitimate fear that through their dependency, either past or present, on particular feudal lords to whom they owed a tikle (land grant) or other favours, the debteras might invite factionalism to the centralized autocracy of the post-liberation period. Also, in addition to being non-conversant in foreign languages, the traditionally educated elite were steeped in the ways of conventional Ethiopian administrative practices, where men counted more than bureaucratic procedures. Thus, there was some kind of apprehensiveness that they could be the retrogressive agents of the new society—that through inertia they might "retraditionalize" Haile Selassie's westernized institutions while they were still in their cradle.

In order to counterbalance this, therefore, the Negus geared all government schools towards educating en masse young Ethiopians who would staff a modern administrative structure. Due to the exigencies of the time, grade by grade promotion was unknown. In some schools, students' names were not even recorded, and classes were in general extremely overcrowded. Those who advanced to high schools completed only a few years of education at the primary level and soon joined Haile Selassie's burgeoning administrative machinery. In this sense,

we should note that Ethiopian education during the early post-independence period was responding to the domestic exigencies of a modernising autocracy, which was simply mass production of educated elites to staff the newly created bureaucratic apparatus.

#### Problems of Planning, Financing, and Educational Administration

Although the Haile Selassie regime justifiably boasted about the significant strides it had made in educational development in stamping out the disastrous legacy of the Fascist era, the problems created during the same period were also enormous. A few might have been unavoidable due to the pioneering aspect of Ethiopian education, but most arose out of apparent contradictions in planning, budgeting, bureaucratic inefficiency, and official neglect.

Schooling in Ethiopia, it should be noted, led a dependent existence right from the day of independence from Fascism, since to a great extent it hinged on western and international development aid funds. During the 1940's and 50's, the ratio of foreign assistance as a percentage of national expenditure was dangerously skyrocketing. For example, whereas in 1954 bilateral and international aid, a large part of which was from the United States, comprised 12 percent, it had soared to 52 percent by 1955. During the fiscal year 1954, total foreign aid to the Ministry of Education was \$2,617,600, but by 1956 it had jumped to \$13,261,842. The trend continued. In 1957, the amount was \$2,533,425, and in 1958, it climbed further to \$14,392,340. As if that was not problem



enough, the budgetary figures for 1954-55 show that expatriate salaries took up 41 percent of the 53.7 million dollars of aid money.<sup>47</sup> As can be surmised, from this point on, a major cut in foreign aid could have at any time crippled and dislocated the nation's educational development.

The huge loans taken from organizations such as the International Development Association were actually not to solve but to further distort the distribution of educational resources of the country. Mulugeta Wodajo had the following to say concerning this development:

The loan will not in any way answer all of the Ministry's financial troubles. By equipping the laboratories and libraries of the provincial 'secondary schools,' many of which now exist in name only, the loan will do what the Government and the Ministry should have done at the time those schools were opened.

Since the blueprint for the expansion of secondary education through the loan was based on the existing distorted distribution of elementary schools, the loan will inevitably contribute to the further distortion in the geographical distribution of the schools.<sup>48</sup>

That foreign aid should only supplement and not replace the national effort should have been realized from the start, but this major point was totally overlooked. Dependency thus continued to spiral year after year. Due to the fact that initially there were not enough western-trained personnel to fill teaching jobs, and that teaching as a profession was itself not made attractive to Ethiopian youth, the number of foreign

<sup>47</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education in Ethiopia: A Survey Issued by the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts" (Addis Ababa: 1961), pp. 1-23; Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Educational and Financial Statistics, (Addis Ababa, 1955-1956), passim.

<sup>48</sup>Mulugeta Wodajo, "The Effect of Educational Finance in Ethiopia," p. 25.

educators continued to grow, effectively preventing the desired Ethiopianization of the country's school system. An in-depth report on the American Point IV program pointed out that in 1952, 20 percent of the nation's educational budget went into paying the salaries and maintenance of foreign teachers, who were also, in most cases, recipients of free accommodations.<sup>49</sup> The Ethiopian government was aware of the seriousness of this problem as early as 1955, since the Long Term Planning Committee of the Ministry of Education had by then reported that:

... with very few exceptions, all secondary school teachers other than the teachers of the Amharic language are foreigners. Dependence upon foreign teachers... should be corrected as rapidly as qualified Ethiopian teachers become available.<sup>50</sup>

The Committee's recommendation and its explicit admission concerning the "heavier drain on the budget of the Ministry of Education"<sup>51</sup> nevertheless went unheeded.<sup>52</sup>

The fact that foreign advisers coming from several countries with divergent social and political values were in virtual control of the

<sup>49</sup>Government of the United States, U.S. Operation Mission to Ethiopia, Progress Report: Point IV Report to Ethiopia on Ten Years of Joint Technical and Economic Cooperation between the United States and the Imperial Ethiopian Government (Addis Ababa: Communications Media Centre, 1961), pp. 5-8.

<sup>50</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Long Term Planning Committee, "A Ten Year Plan . . . , " pp. 33-52.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup>In our survey, Professor Gilles Pion, a former Dean at Haile Selassie University also stressed "lack of sufficient Ethiopian staff members" as the major problem the young university had to face in its formative period.

major planning activities of the Ministry of Education was also another problem. In 1953, for example, the Long Term Planning Committee of the Ministry of Education was set up under the strong influence of these advisers. But as the implementation started to come into focus, it was discovered that the initial analysis had not taken the Ethiopian realities into consideration. The country's educational problem had been looked at from an ivory tower perspective, and vital reforms that had been envisioned could not be put into motion due to the alien character of the recommendations. The Committee assumed, for example, that Ethiopian administration would automatically respond to change as if the country had the character of a developed nation and as if the people who had been xenophobic about other cultures for so long would not resist new ideas. The Committee also curiously assumed that the rural population would passively accept the prevalent manner of distributing scarce educational resources which favoured the urban regions. Even the publications of the Ministry itself later criticized this Committee for being too unrealistic. It mentioned the Committee's faulty sociological assumptions which were simply mechanical and ignored vital variables such as the existing administrative infrastructure, and crucial social and human factors which could have shown that "change occurs only when people have been educationally prepared."<sup>53</sup> The publication commented:

---

<sup>53</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Teacher Education Division, "The Development of Pre-Service Teacher Education 1937-1963 E.C. [1944-1970]" (Addis Ababa, 1945), pp. 23-25.

... [people] will be receptive to new ideas only when they understand the reasons for them and where they lead to. They will be fully cooperative only when they themselves have had some say in decision-making concerning the sort of education their children will receive. The parent in the countryside also wants the same educational opportunities as those provided in the cities.<sup>54</sup>

It was due to the haphazard nature of implementing plans which were worked out in a socio-cultural and economic vacuum that the structure of Ethiopian education lost the necessary harmony. For example, there was no correspondence between growth in lower and upper grades of the Ethiopian school system. Although it was generally recognized that higher education itself was far from fulfilling the basic requirements of the nation, many foreign advisers who influenced the long range planning of the Ministry of Education had failed to perceive the growing discrepancy between the first and second levels. As Maaza Bekele pointed out in 1958:

Higher institutions have been allowed to expand rapidly without corresponding expansion of the basic lower levels. There are more chairs in the higher institutions than there are students to sit on them. . . . Financially . . . more provision for secondary and higher institutions has meant less provision for Middle and Primary schools. . . . [Budgetary allocation] has been disproportionate and the educational pyramid has been turned upside-down not only in terms of effort, but in terms of finance. Elementary Education needs to be advanced on a country-wide basis to cater for the masses of people.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Maaza Bekele, "Some Thoughts on the Future," Ethiopia Observer, II (1958), p. 139.

Education in Ethiopia in the 1940's and 50's also suffered without doubt because of the reception of "too much advice from too many sources."<sup>56</sup> The pet theories of many a foreign adviser, though meant for the good of the country, had in the end created apparent chaos and confusion among well-meaning educators. Gillés Pion, who was a teacher at Tafari Makonnen School from 1950 to 1952, for example, commented about the curriculum which was "transformed by the education advisors [sic]" [original emphasis] about which the teachers "did not have much to say."<sup>57</sup>

A typical foreign adviser in the Ministry of Education was, for the most part, apologetic, and painted an unrealistic picture of development in Ethiopian education. Not surprisingly, the kind of story he told was precisely the kind that the Emperor, who was by the mid-40's his own Minister of Education, liked to hear. Haile Selassie even invited such advisers into his palace and generously decorated them. This further encouraged others to engage in more and more flattery, by glossing over some of the problematic realities. Dr. Caleb Gattegno, UNESCO adviser to the Ethiopian Government, was one such example. In treating the "Ethiopian Educational problem," already getting out of hand, his comments were as follows:

People consider that the situation in Ethiopia is that of an under-developed country; in fact,

---

<sup>56</sup>Gene S. Jacobson, "The Organization and Administration of the Public Schools in Ethiopia," The Ethiopian Journal of Education, I (June, 1967), p. 14.

<sup>57</sup>In answer to a survey conducted by the author, Nov. 4, 1981.

the problems are those of a too fast developing country. Too fast for anyone to know what to do at any moment; what to put into plans, so that they are not obsolete before they come into existence; what to conceive as answers to so many challenges. It is possible that most people meet the situation with only experience of countries with much slower paces for development and attempt to suggest solutions that are adequate for those. What is needed hence is, an attitude that is dynamic from the start, that creates models into which the variable-time is intrinsically embedded, so that there is no need to alter plans continually because they are out of date. But to think in that way is not easy, for most minds have been educated in a different atmosphere, and know not how to formulate solutions that are evolutionary schemes.<sup>58</sup>

The Ministry's Planning Committee, of course, believed in this type of self-glorification showered on the foreign advisers and their achievements in the 1950's. The Committee assumed that education in Ethiopia was expanding too fast. Accordingly, it suggested that no new primary schools be established and no schools with fewer than four grades be authorized to add more grades. It also advised that the average pupil with irregular school attendance be dropped.<sup>59</sup> Ironically, this was the time when Ethiopia was still far behind all other African countries in education at the primary level, and its illiteracy rate was the highest in the world. Dependency on foreign advisers who churned out "pet projects" had thus imposed on the Ethiopian educational scene "unrealistic," contradictory, and "costly" schemes which were

<sup>58</sup>Caleb Gattegno, "Ethiopia's Educational Problems," Ethiopia Observer, II (March, 1958), p. 140.

<sup>59</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Long Term Planning Committee, "A Ten Year Plan . . .," pp. 74-76.

to be ultimately abandoned.<sup>60</sup>

That the prime impetus for the expansion of education in Ethiopia was the fulfilment of the country's manpower needs is clear, but as Teshome Wagaw points out, the curriculum of the 1940's and 50's "was not well-thought out, nor was it tailored to the fundamental wishes of the people or the characteristics of Ethiopian children."<sup>61</sup>

This was because the curriculum was worked out under a strong foreign influence. Each expatriate came with the philosophy of his native country and implemented it without much regard for the unique characteristics of Ethiopia. Since no native pedagogue with the experience of the foreign educators existed to challenge their direction, the Ministry gave the latter free reign to shape the future course of the country's education.<sup>62</sup>

The syllabi of the early decades, until 1958, were so lacking in perspective, relevance, and focus that they may be remembered more for what they did not include than for what they did. The geography syllabus, prepared in the main by foreign advisers, dealt with almost all other countries of the world except Ethiopia. The same problem existed in the history syllabus. In the first year, the secondary school

---

<sup>60</sup>Jacobson, "The Organization and Administration of Public Schools in Ethiopia," p. 17.

<sup>61</sup>T. Wagaw, Education in Ethiopia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979), p. 69.

<sup>62</sup>See Margaret Gillett, "Symposium on Africa: Western Academic Role Concepts in Ethiopian University," Comparative Education Review, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1963), pp. 149-151.

curriculum covered in detail Egypt, Rome, the rise of Christianity, the Byzantine Empire, early Islamic expansion, the rise and fall of the Franks, feudalism in western Europe, the Ottoman conquests, mediaeval concepts of the world, early European travellers and their search for trade routes, Marco Polo in China, the Portuguese search for Prester John and their African journeys and colonizations. The second year concentrated on European history, 1500-1750. It dealt with Europe's contact with India, China, and Japan. It treated the Renaissance, European exploration, commerce, nationalism, autocracy, maritime expansion, and colonial conquests. It singled out the Holy Roman Empire, Spanish and Dutch colonial expansion, English and French history from 1500-1750, Russia, and Prussia. The third and fourth years concentrated on a chosen area of European history. There was clearly no mention of Ethiopia here, except in a passing reference to the Portuguese search for Prester John.

The secondary school syllabus adopted in 1958, despite pointing out its aims as "to inform the pupil of the past development of his own surrounding countries as well as the world at large" made no fundamental changes other than introducing America and Africa.<sup>63</sup> In the latter section, there was a mention of the Axumite and Gondarine eras together with the West African Empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai, but no particular treatment of Ethiopian history—past or present.

---

<sup>63</sup> Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Secondary School Curriculum 1951 EC [ 1958 ]" (2nd edition) (Addis Ababa, 1958), pp. 110-23.



The University College syllabus, drawn up by the French Canadian Jesuits in 1950, fared no better.<sup>64</sup> While each department and discipline had a range of subjects important to the field, philosophy, theodicy, and ethics were made compulsory for all students by the special order of the College council. Cosmology, epistemology, and metaphysics were similarly common to all disciplines—even to those on which they had no particular bearing. The history syllabus started with the ancient history of the Middle East—Egypt, Sumeria, the Hyksos, Syria, Palestine, and the Assyrian Empire. This was followed by the history of Greece from 3000 to 30 B.C. Then came the Roman Empire, Byzantium, the Crusades, and Europe in the Dark Ages. The final year concentrated on the modern history of Europe from 1830-1939. Nowhere was Ethiopia treated in the University College history syllabus. There was also so much emphasis on religion that it was sometimes hard to distinguish between philosophy and theodicy. What follows is a 1957 sample of a second term examination in philosophy at the University College of Addis Ababa:

1. Assuming that human evolution became historically certain, would this fact compel you to a readjustment of your ideas about the nature of man?
2. In the first three proofs of God's existence, it is stated that an 'infinite regress' is impossible: What do we mean by that expression?
3. Develop, at your choice, one proof of God's existence, with all the examples and explanations you deem necessary.

---

<sup>64</sup> University College of Addis Ababa, University College Calendar (Addis Ababa, 1957), pp. 1-20.

4. God is the Self-Subsisting Being: What does this statement imply?
- h 5. Does 'eternal' mean simply 'lasting for an infinite time' or does this word call for a radically different idea?<sup>65</sup>

That religion was highly emphasized at the College can be easily attributed to the influence of the French Canadian Jesuits who controlled the College, but the Haile Selassie Regime, we should note, was also seriously concerned with the phenomenon of the new generation of educated youth who, due to alienation from the archaic monophysite church, were becoming more and more atheistic. The intelligentsia emerging during the 1950's were clearly opting out of the traditional power structure, and Haile Selassie feared that they might be slowly moving along the road to embracing the contemporary ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, as long as deliberate conversion to Catholicism was not made, the Jesuits had the blessing of the emperor in devising their own theologically-oriented curricula.

To Ethiopian peasant children, modern education provided a ticket out of poverty, but the more they left the drudgery of rural life behind and flocked to schools in larger and larger numbers, the less the educational accommodations became available. In fact, as the number of students rose geometrically, the number of schools, which were growing arithmetically, could not keep up.

In the 1940's and 50's, the government pumped huge amounts of money into major projects, such as defence. It had also opened up

<sup>65</sup> University College of Addis Ababa, Second Term Examination: Philosophy (Addis Ababa, 1958).

many new schools. However, the former was given priority over the latter and less money was available for educational expansion. Nevertheless, the students continued to pour into the newly established schools in the capital city and the larger provincial towns. As early as 1944, Sylvia Pankhurst had observed:

In our visit to Ethiopia . . . our motor journeys through the country extended eastward through Dire Dawa and Harar, northward to Dessie, Makalle and Adigrat. We found the schools everywhere crowded with eager children, and everywhere many boys and girls for whom no room could be found were pleading for admission.<sup>66</sup>

Since the Ministry of Education allocated very little money for these schools, they were all poorly equipped and poorly staffed. Instead of supplying equipment such as maps and geography books, the Ministry actually instructed teachers in provincial schools to "rely to a great extent on their own knowledge of Ethiopia"; lack of maps was to be remedied by "drawing a map on the board for each lesson," and a lack of a globe by substituting a ball.<sup>67</sup> Amharic and English textbooks were "practically non-existent" and school "furniture had to be retrieved or improvised."<sup>68</sup> Even as late as 1951-52, in terms of library stocks "as many as ten books would be among the best in the smaller provincial schools."<sup>69</sup>

---

<sup>66</sup>Sylvia Pankhurst, "History of Ethiopian Schools," Ethiopia Observer, II (March, 1958), p. 132.

<sup>67</sup>Ayalew Gebré Selassie, "Three Years' Experience in Education," Ethiopia Observer, VIII (1964).

<sup>68</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education in Ethiopia: A Survey Issued by the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts" (Addis Ababa, 1961), p. 9.

<sup>69</sup>Government of the United States, U.S. Operation Mission to Ethiopia, "Progress Report: Point IV Report to Ethiopia . . .," pp. 5 - 8.

While some of these early problems could be attributed to the condition of a country ravaged by war, most resulted from a lack of government priorities in these areas, inadequate long-range planning, rigid bureaucracy, and gross administrative inefficiency. This problem became more and more obvious as the initial expansion showed signs of strain, and the systems started to back up, thus prematurely entering a plateau growth rate.

Whereas in 1948, per capita expenditure per pupil was \$145, it had declined to \$86 by 1957.<sup>70</sup> The obvious consequences were many. Essential teaching aids could not be purchased by provincial schools because of a lack of appropriate budgetary allocation. As a government report indicated, during the school years 1948-56, no libraries or laboratories existed in Ethiopian schools except those in Addis Ababa and Asmara. The report also went on to point out that:

The few textbooks that somehow manage to trickle down through the maze of bureaucratic red tape extending from Headquarters via the Provincial Education Offices to the District Education offices and finally to the school directors are more often than not securely locked in storage rooms.<sup>71</sup>

The dilapidated state of a typical school building in Ethiopia was so serious that the report had made an even grimmer comment:

Of the physical plant itself, the less said the better. A few solid buildings were built by

---

<sup>70</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report on the Current Operation of the Education System in Ethiopia" (Addis Ababa, 1969), pp. 20-36.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

the Ministry a few years ago; but these are now falling apart for lack of money for maintenance and minor repair work. In recent years, money for building and capital expenditure has not been available and communities have been left to put up elementary school buildings themselves. The lack of funds for constructing secondary schools has forced some of the newer secondary schools to offer classes in improvised quarters, or even in rented buildings scattered all over the town, as in Decamere. So we are not speaking here of the absence of special rooms like laboratories, assembly halls, geography rooms, etc., but of bare necessities such as classrooms with large windows, decent desks, and ample blackboard space.<sup>72</sup>

These problems were not corrected even in later years, and were disastrous for Ethiopian education. One would have expected the expenditure to continue to increase, even if modestly, as enrolment climbed, but it in fact decreased during some fiscal years. The educational expenditure per student during the year 1951 was thus Eth. \$28; but in 1952 it was Eth. \$26.<sup>73</sup> The Ministry had blamed this retrogression on the Church's refusal to pay educational land tax, but that amounted to no more than half a million dollars, covering the period from 1949 through 1951, and was even less between 1951 and 1952.<sup>74</sup> However, even if we make that allowance, there was a very significant decrease in 1952 over the previous year.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Bureau of Educational Research and Statistics, Government, Mission, . . . Schools, p. 17.

<sup>74</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Long Term Planning Committee, "A Ten Year Plan . . .," pp. 60-65.

<sup>75</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Bureau of Educational Research and Statistics, Government, Mission, . . . Schools, p. 17.

A comparison of enrolment increase in elementary and secondary schools and the Central Government Treasury's approved budget from 1954 to 1957 clearly indicates that the problem was not simply one of uncontrolled growth in the school system versus lack of budgetary resources, but rather one of healthy growth in enrolment versus lack of corresponding interest on the part of the government to continue to fund further educational efforts. Thus, while enrolment at the elementary and secondary schools increased by 13 percent from 1954 to 1955, and by 11 percent from 1956 to 1957, the corresponding Government Treasury allocation of budgetary resources from 1954 to 1956 decreased from the previous year's expenditure by 7 percent, and showed an increase of only 7 percent from 1956 to 1957.<sup>76</sup>

During the two decades after liberation, overcrowding of classrooms was a chronic problem, especially in the primary grades. For example, while in 1956-57, growth in classroom units was 12 percent, the corresponding increase in the student population was 24 percent. The growth rate in the number of schools was even more dismal—only 6 percent, lagging far behind student enrolment. In 1960, grades one and two had, as a result, a class average of 63 and 43 respectively,<sup>77</sup> only a slight improvement over what the report of the Ministry of Education had shown for 1951-52: "[B]eginning classes often numbering

<sup>76</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts (Addis Ababa, 1954-58).

<sup>77</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Bureau of Educational Research and Statistics, Government, Mission, ... Schools, p. 17.

as many as one hundred children [were] carried on with a third or half of them crowded into the classroom and the others sitting outside the building in the sun."<sup>78</sup>

Lack of budgetary allocation for teaching equipment, and excessive overcrowding of classrooms was followed by student wastage. For example, in 1952, 50 percent of the first grade students dropped out before the end of the second school year, and by grade five, 90 percent of them had left entirely.<sup>79</sup>

Failures in the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate Examination were similarly continuously increasing. From 1951 to 1960, for example, failures consistently outstripped the corresponding numbers of passes. This is despite the fact that the number of students enrolled as a percentage of primary school-age children showed no significant increase. The student wastage at all levels is no doubt related to the increasing amount of failure among those in the elementary and high schools of Ethiopia: the result of the government's decision to halt growth. For example, while the number of passes in the eighth grade examination increased at least from 1951 to 1958, the proportionate number of failures during the same period went up even more markedly until 1960.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup>Government of the United States, U.S. Operations Mission in Ethiopia, Progress Report: Point IV, pp. 4-9.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup>See Figure 21, p. 407.

The Haile Selassie regime, despite repeated words of commitment, did not spend as much as it should have on education. The national educational expenditure was miniscule compared with the needs of the country; the percentage of the total national budget expended on education stagnated at 10 to 12 percent from 1950-57 while school enrolment almost doubled during the same period, growing from 156,860 in 1950 to 297,741 seven years later.<sup>81</sup>

Due to the manner in which Haile Selassie's rigid bureaucracy functioned, the Ministry of Education's financial requests were almost always subjected to huge cuts, sometimes up to 40%. But even after allocation had been made, the ever slow and reactionary Ethiopian administrative structure imposed other impediments. Every year, it forfeited about \$2 million due to the fact that the money was not transferred during the appropriate fiscal years. This was because legally, funds transferred to its account by the central and provincial treasuries after the end of the fiscal year, could not be used. The bejronds (treasurers) were in fact rewarded, through promotions and other benefits, for inventing ingenious delaying tactics and "saving" the government as much money as possible. As Mulugeta Wodajo points out, some bejronds were "known to delay salary payments to teachers, even when they [had] the money in their safes until the teachers [threatened] to go on strike."<sup>82</sup> From 1954 to 1957, the bejronds

<sup>81</sup>Mulugeta Wodajo, "The State of Educational Finance in Ethiopia," p. 21.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 22.



used delaying tactics on the budget of the Ministry of Education and "saved" the government about nine million dollars (see Table 7 ).<sup>83</sup>

As the quality of Ethiopian teachers remained very low, the attrition rate among those who were formally accredited added another dimension to the plethora of problems the Ethiopian school system faced in the 1940's and 50's. In 1954, Ministry of Education statistics show that 53 percent of the Ethiopian instructors were unclassified in the sense that four out of ten had not gone beyond the 4th grade. Some knew no more than reading and writing the national script, and thus mainly engaged in teaching Amharic for beginners. Some were actually nonliterate, and taught only arts and crafts. Only 3 percent had an 8th grade education, and two percent the minimal elementary teacher qualifications of having finished 8th grade plus one year of pedagogical training.<sup>84</sup>

The biggest problem was, however, the case of those teachers who had the necessary training but were leaving the profession faster than the Ministry could train new ones to replace them. From 1952 to 1960, 23 percent of the successful graduates from a one-year teacher training course, 28 percent from the four-year teacher training institutes, and 42 percent from the community teacher training schools left their careers to join other government and private agencies. In 1957, only 38 percent of the qualified teachers from the training institutions re-

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>84</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Long Term Planning Committee, "A Ten Year Plan . . . , " pp. 79-83.

**TABLE 7**

**The Budgetary Process in Ethiopia from 1954-1957**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Budget Request</b>	<b>Budget Approved</b>	<b>Request Denied</b>	<b>Actual Expenditures</b>	<b>Money Saved by Delaying Tactics</b>
1954	27,733,140	16,244,056	11,489,084	13,410,509	2,833,547
1955	21,729,606	16,137,049	5,592,557	13,812,128	2,324,921
1956	23,613,514	19,471,695	4,141,819	17,299,637	2,172,058
1957	31,932,335	20,850,395	11,081,946	19,224,715	1,625,680

Source: Mulugeta Wodajo, "Educational Finance," p. 21.

mained in the profession, and by 1960, the situation had worsened, as most teachers, due to lack of incentives, were abandoning teaching altogether.<sup>85</sup>

Too much centralization had also created a major problem for Ethiopian education. Decisions concerning not only educational planning and finance but even minor duties were controlled by a rigid bureaucracy from Addis Ababa. Almost all Canadian educators with years of experience when interviewed by the author, specifically pointed out this problem as a major obstacle for them while they were engaged in education in Ethiopia.<sup>86</sup>

There was so much centralization that the regional offices were virtually without any power to carry out even minor administrative tasks. Since the Provincial Governor had no control over other organs save those of the Ministry of the Interior, the Treasury, and, to a lesser extent, the administration of justice, there was no central provincial planning that took into consideration local conditions and needs. According to Andargatchew Tesfaye, "educational priorities were determined at the top [i.e., in Addis Ababa] without the knowledge, not only of the people who are to carry out the program but also of the people who are supposed to benefit from it."<sup>87</sup>

<sup>85</sup>Aklilu Habte, "Brain Drain in the Elementary School: Why Teachers Leave the Profession," The Ethiopian Journal of Education, I (June, 1967), p. 28.

<sup>86</sup>Over 90 percent of the respondents to our questionnaire concerning problems in Ethiopian education during their teaching and administrative years in Ethiopia mentioned rigid bureaucracy as the major problem.

<sup>87</sup>Andargatchew Tesfaye, "The Training and Development of Manpower for the Social Services in Ethiopia," The Ethiopian Journal of Education, VI (June, 1973), p. 56.

Because of a lack of coordination and a great deal of bureaucratic red tape, even where Provincial Education Officers received directives to carry out reforms and bring about changes, they spent "a good deal of valuable time in the bejron's office literally begging the official to provide them with funds which have been allocated for the schools and which are theirs to spend."<sup>88</sup>

It is not hard to see, therefore, the resultant demoralization of the teachers, who could not carry out their major duties. The Ethiopian teachers who were hampered by a lack of promised funds had the major bureaucracy in Addis Ababa as simply another obstacle to their professional commitment to education. They called the Ministry of Education itself "the epitome of the Zemene Mesafint Administration"<sup>89</sup> in Ethiopian history—a house full of lords, each one circulating memos to contradict and weaken the stand of the others."<sup>90</sup>

The officials in the Ministry who hindered the growth of the country's educational effort were not fired from their duties, since many of them had got into their positions via the back door, and had officials in high places protecting them. This was what used to baffle foreign educators and advisers. Gene S. Jacobson, for example, was

<sup>88</sup>Mulugeta Wodajo, "The State of Educational Finance in Ethiopia," p. 22.

<sup>89</sup>Zemene Mesafint (Era of the Princes) was a period in Ethiopian history when regional feudal lords were too strong for the central government at Gondar and carried out their own private policies without reference to the Pretender to the throne of the Solomonian dynasty. For details, see Mordechai Abir, The Era of the Princes: The Challenge of Islam and the Reunification of the Christian Empire (New York: Frederik A. Praeger, 1769-1855).

<sup>90</sup>Aklilu Habte, "Brain Drain in the Elementary School," p. 35.

forced to remark:

In the Ethiopian organization for the administration of education, elimination of a person because of incompetency is almost unheard-of practice. Interestingly enough, the Ethiopians abhor, regret, and even condemn incompetency, but at the same time seem not to have the technique of dismissing from the ranks those people who are not capable of carrying out their roles in a satisfactory manner. . . . Once an incompetent person is identified, the practice is generally to transfer him to another position in hopes that the change will perform some sort of miracle.<sup>91</sup>

What Jacobson refers to above is the Haile Selassie practice of shum-shir (promote-demote) whereby officials were shifted from one place to another so that they would not be too strong in one position and thereby threaten central government powers. Educators, just like other public employees, were moved around, sometimes following bureaucratic infractions, sometimes at random, and thus never got the opportunity to stay in one position long enough to implement useful programs. As the Ministry of Education's report itself indicates, for a long time there was no stability in Ethiopian educational structure and the "constant changeover of school directors as well as senior ministry officials at Headquarters" had hindered the proper implementation of planned courses of action. The report notes that this was true "even at the very top where the Ministry had had eight leaders in eleven years."<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup>Jacobson, "The Organization and Administration of Public Schools in Ethiopia," p. 15.

<sup>92</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report on the Current Operation . . .," pp. 20-26.

The disastrous consequences arising from this scheme, both in terms of money and human resources, definitely outweighed the Haile Selassie regime's temporary check on the Ethiopian bureaucracy to ensure its loyalty, but the practice went unabated, together with the deliberate neglect of their professional and financial needs, until the modern educated elites struck back and precipitated the political crisis of 1960, and finally succeeded in triggering Haile Selassie's fall in 1974.

#### Challenge for Power: Modern Educated Elites and the 1960 Abortive Coup d'Etat

It is important to note at this point that in introducing western education into Ethiopia, both Menelik and Haile Selassie considered military training as important as the production of educated civilian elites who would staff their modernizing of the feudal state. The inertia that led to this policy of introducing a European-type military training was dictated by a history filled with disastrous civil wars waged by feudal princes whose base of existence was highly dependent on their own military prowess. Ethiopia had also been subjected to numerous invasion attempts by the Persians, the Turks, and the European colonial powers—most notably Italy—which made it imperative that the country should always be ready to raise an army of warriors to guard its territorial integrity and political independence.

Traditionally, to serve in the Ethiopian feudal army was not only a matter of honour; it was also a matter of prestige and social

status. If the modern educated fonctionnaires' aim was this, however, Haile Selassie's was not. For the Negus, it meant raising a new class of military officers with modern training who would be dependent on him for their wages, the traditional role of the feudal princes and barons who kept their own armies already being curtailed.

In the early part of Haile Selassie's reign, the new recruits did fulfil their main objective, i.e., unquestioned dedication to the Emperor and his regime. But in time, they proved to be a Trojan horse, and an eventual threat to the feudal order they were meant to protect.

After effectively curbing the powers of the Church and the feudal princes and raising a modern army directly responsible to him, Haile Selassie immediately instituted a governmental machinery consisting of an amalgam of trusted nobles, created out of resistance fighters who showed unflagging allegiance to the crown, and fellow exiles who were allowed to amass huge fortunes, mostly through graft and nepotism. The Emperor had also carefully groomed a select group of loyal western-educated elite to man his burgeoning bureaucracy.

The raising of a trusted class of western-educated intelligentsia to staff a feudal machinery was a long-standing Haile Selassie policy. Indeed, all educated Ethiopians remember the oft-repeated statements of the Emperor to students: "You are our children, you should serve us with dedication."<sup>93</sup>

<sup>93</sup>The author, who was delegated by the University students to see Haile Selassie concerning other student leaders who had been expelled from the University College of Addis Ababa in 1962 remembers the Emperor remarking, "It is good that you came to Us because after all you are our children. The palace is also yours. Do not engage in conspiracies. If you just give Us a telephone call at the palace, which is your own home, and suggest the administrative changes you deem necessary We will give due consideration to your proposals."

Whereas 50 of the 200 Ethiopians who were educated abroad survived the Fascist war, at the close of the 1950's, 30 were at a ministerial or ambassadorial level. Eventually, however, they were absorbed into the feudal aristocracy regardless of their class of origin. On the subject of elite production after the war, an Ethiopian educator, Tadesse Terefe provides the following picture:

[In 1941] the demand was for qualified personnel to work as administrators in various government offices. Almost all of those who went abroad came back qualified to occupy the important positions they now hold in government. They are working side by side with those who had received their training before the liberation.

In 1950, there were some 200 Ethiopian students abroad—Europe 90, United States 60, Canada 20, India and the Middle East 30. Of those who have returned home, 11 are cabinet ministers, and 25 are directors-general in various departments of the government: 65 others are holding leading positions in the fields of Economics, Law, Engineering, Medicine and Education. . . . It can be deduced that Education prior to 1950 has produced much of the leadership personnel needed after the restoration. As such, the system was effective in that it fulfilled its objectives.<sup>94</sup> (emphasis added.)

In the 1940's and early 50's, the children of the nobility were the only ones who had access to the best schools in Europe (mainly in Britain) and North America. It should be pointed out that despite his routinely repeated statement, "it is not important to be born of noble or humble parents,"<sup>95</sup> Haile Selassie had actually prided himself on

<sup>94</sup>Tadesse Terefe, "Progress, Problems and Prospects in Ethiopian Education," Ethiopia Observer, VIII (1964), pp. 6-18.

<sup>95</sup>The author remembers the Emperor, while at the General Wingate Secondary School, repeatedly remarking to a physically handicapped student: "To be born of poor parents or to be physically handicapped does not determine whether a person fails or succeeds in life. What determines a person's future is his intellectual development and progress."



giving special educational privileges to the children of the nobility. Many first went to a school that catered exclusively to them—the Balabat School (School of the Nobility).

But there were also a large number of non-balabat children who through sheer hard work and determination got the attention of the Emperor and thus gained access to modern educational opportunities in Haile Selassie's newly created public schools. Among the non-balabats, there were very few from the downtrodden peasant class which comprised over 80 percent of the Ethiopian population. Most of the aspiring youth who had the opportunity to eventually break the class barrier through education were for the most part children of the petite bourgeoisie: lower echelon government employees, the clergy, small shopkeepers, or chekashums (rich peasants), who lived mostly in the larger villages and towns, and in the capital city of Addis Ababa.

Traditionally, the parents of this new breed stayed outside the political arenas of the State; that was considered the private domain of the nobility. But if Haile Selassie brought this new group into the political sphere, it was not solely for the purpose of social justice. It was also a method—ingenious on the surface—of preventing a new generation of educated nobles from challenging his well entrenched power.

That the nobility was alarmed by these turns of events was not surprising. As Greenfield explains:

The most conservative of the Rases and of the nobility soon began to ask Haile Selassie whether he was sure the education of 'young nobodies'

was a good thing—would they not turn against him in time? . . . One dignitary is reported to have remarked . . . 'What do you want with schools, Janhoy [Your Majesty], I did not go to school but in spite of that I have become a Minister.'<sup>96</sup>

Ras Mengesha Seyoum, while on a visit to North America about two decades ago, bluntly told Ethiopian students attending universities in Canada that they came from the "wrong class" and in order not to be misunderstood, he added: "Do not forget that whereas we are born to rule, you are born to be ruled."<sup>97</sup> His father, Leul Ras Seyoum, the Prince of Tigré, when asked by peasants when His Lordship would build schools for their children, also went on record as replying, "I have educated two of my sons for you; rejoice!"<sup>98</sup>

The young nobles also detested mingling with what they termed Yassir Deha Lijoch (children born of ten generations of poor). One such student went to the extent of bringing a retinue of servants with him to the General Wingate Secondary School and pitching a tent on the football field. Others, such as Prince Sahle Selassie and Dejazmatch Fike Selassie Habte Mariam, used to sit in class surrounded by heavily armed guards.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>96</sup>R. Greenfield, A New Political History (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 317-18.

<sup>97</sup>An interview with Dr. Yoseph Tesfaye (a former graduate student at McGill University), March 30, 1982.

<sup>98</sup>This comment by the Prince was one of the most well-known eye-witness stories students from Mekele told the author in 1960.

<sup>99</sup>An interview with Dr. Zeleke Bekele Nov. 9, 1979. Dr. Zeleke had witnessed the manner in which classes were conducted at Balabat and Haile Selassie Secondary Schools during the 1940s when he was a student.

Scholarships for the children of the nobility were in practice non-competitive. One of Ras Kassa's grandsons, still living in North America, when interviewed by the author and asked how he obtained his scholarship to Canada about 20 years ago, replied: "I inherited the scholarship when my older sister abandoned it and got married."<sup>100</sup>

During the decades of the 40's and 50's, the only significant groups to have the ability to generate opposition, however covertly, were members of the newly created bureaucratic machine which had absorbed the many graduates of the modern schools recruited mainly from the balabat and petite bourgeoisie social strata. The entrance of the nouveaux riches (children of low level bureaucrats, small shopowners, and so on) into the bureaucratic structure was crucial, in that it introduced not only more liberal elements but also signalled a potential political opposition which had been hitherto nonexistent. But many of them ended up as adirbays (careerists), co-opted through bureaucratic and political appointments by filling Haile Selassie's ministerial, vice-ministerial, and departmental headships.

However, for as many who were co-opted into the feudal power structure and watched for the Emperor the educated balabats who despised them, there were as many who totally refused to be part of the nouveaux riches. The latter group were effectively kept out of power, but they gave their sympathy to any educated group in a position of power, whether those already co-opted who might have second

<sup>100</sup>A private interview with Lij Tedla Berhane Meskel, July 10, 1978 (Lij is a title reserved for the children of the aristocracy).

thoughts, or the educated nobility who showed the courage to openly or clandestinely defy the feudal regime.

The challenge happened to be mostly from the second group: those who had both the legitimacy in the traditional Ethiopian feudal structure, as well as the benefits of modern education. As one of these silent rebels remarked, the Emperor could not for long count on their education as if it was "a plaything he can turn on and off as he pleases."<sup>101</sup> It was the activities of these educated rebels of balabat origin, encouraged and fuelled by the passive defiance of their colleagues, that almost succeeded in overthrowing Haile Selassie in 1960.

Despite numerous local revolts in Tigré, Gojam, Wollega, Sidamo and other provinces, the 1940's and 50's were years of consolidation of autocratic powers for Haile Selassie. The euphoria of independence from Fascism had given him a breathing space at the top. The powerful lords were already crushed. The Church and its ideological guides, the debteras, were successfully subdued. The freedom fighters who fell in line were rewarded with high government positions and big land appropriations. The challengers among the patriots, such as the great national hero Belay Zéléké, were publicly hanged. Others, like Bitwoded Negash, were incarcerated in remote political prisons.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>101</sup>Greenfield, A New Political History, p. 355.

<sup>102</sup>Belay Zéléké and Bitwoded Negash were the 1936-41 freedom fighters from Gofam Province who commanded an army of over one hundred thousand each. As resistance fighters against the Fascist occupiers, they kept that province virtually untouched by the Italians. Immediately after his return, however, Haile Selassie decorated them, dissolved their wartime army and kept them in Addis Ababa under the watchful eyes of his security men. Belay was later accused of conspiracy against the Emperor and was hanged at Jan Hoymeda in 1946. Fifty other alleged collaborators were also hanged. Bitwoded Negash, who was accused in another plot, was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1953. He was serving his term at a prison in Jimma until the 1970's.

Once his feudal opposition was effectively removed, the Negus also wanted to put a brake on the progress he had previously launched, since he feared that he might be washed away by a resultant deluge. He vehemently opposed the slightest call for economic and political reform. Security in his empire was so tight that there was a permanent curfew throughout the 40's and 50's.<sup>103</sup> All forms of socio-cultural groupings were banned. Despite the 1955 Constitution, which granted the right of civil liberties, in practice there was no freedom of speech or press. As Ernest Luther, an American economic adviser to Haile Selassie in the 1950's observed:

No Ethiopian in his right mind would dare to mount a soapbox in the middle of the piazza in Addis Ababa and call for the resignation of a public official on any grounds. No Ethiopian, however educated, would dare to write a letter to a newspaper criticising a government official, or even government policy, and no newspaper would print such a letter if it received one.<sup>104</sup>

Since Ethiopia was a non-party state, any attempt to organize a professional or cultural association with socio-political tinges brought about swift police repression. But in time, the educated youth with progressive aims who wanted to bring about a fundamental change had to start somewhere. By forming an alumni association of the Haile Selassie Secondary School, which many early University graduates and

<sup>103</sup>The author, although still under legal age in 1958, was jailed overnight for walking from his uncle's home to the General Wingate School at midnight, and was released the following day after paying a fine of \$15 in the district court of Addis Ababa.

<sup>104</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution (London: Review of Africal Political Economy, 1975), p. 88.

returnees had attended, the progressive elements hoped by the mid-1950's to create the first political party in the history of the nation.

The movement gained instant fame, but its popularity among the educated did not go unnoticed. It immediately created a commotion among the die-hards in court circles who feared that it was the first anti-feudal alliance in the country, and that it would ultimately challenge their traditional authority. However, the isolation of the educated from the masses of the people, in whose eyes they were simply strangers from the bahr mado (across the seas) with a penchant for ferenji (European) customs and lifestyle, presented them with organizational problems. Due to lack of experience, organizational discipline was not sufficient. Furthermore, they all knew that they were being carefully watched by Haile Selassie's security officers and by the personal spies of conservative ministers like Makonnen Habte Wold. Since the aim was to scare members who might still be aspiring to high government positions, the technique seemed to be effective. Attendance soon started to drop off sharply.

The major obstacle was, however, the growing division among the educated. This was encouraged by the regime and skilfully manipulated by Haile Selassie's security men. The division was based on the country of education. Graduates from national colleges were dubbed "locals," which slowly gained a pejorative connotation, as they had no foreign experience. Those who had studied in Britain were children of the high aristocracy who were more successful in copying the English haut monde manners of dress and lifestyle than in attaining British

university degrees, which required a considerable amount of hard work. They were thus referred to as Yengliz Woodk (British Failures).<sup>105</sup> Those who had gone to the United States had been too successful, coming back with several degrees.<sup>106</sup> This was thought to reflect the low standard of education there. They were thus known to the "locals" and those educated in Britain as Yamerica Fabrica (American Mass Production).

The division between the two groups of returnees was so serious that each tried to outdo the other in mimicking the lifestyle of the crème de la crème élite in his country of education. Those from Britain mostly put on hats and heavy ties, carried umbrellas even when there was no rain, and spoke in an attempted Oxonian accent. The American-educated wore light summer jackets of greater length and tried to speak like one fresh from Dixie.

The "locals" despised both groups due to their lack of background. They knew that the older generation had been propelled into universities abroad in some cases after only four or five years of education, and thus lacked a solid educational background and a good command

<sup>105</sup>Although this was a blanket term for those educated in Britain, it definitely did not include successful aristocratic youths such as Michael Emeru, Endalkachew Makonnen, and Zawde Gebré Selassie, who easily earned their degrees at Oxford, and others from the petite bourgeoisie class, such as Bereketgab Habte Selassie, who attended Hull and London and earned his law degree with distinction.

<sup>106</sup>Canadian graduates were "neutral" and were not categorized as British or American. A large number of those who came to Canada went to McGill University to study Medicine and Civil Law. In fact, the new Cabinet which was formed immediately after Haile Selassie's overthrow in 1974 had more graduates from McGill than from any other foreign University.

of the English language. The "locals" who had fulfilled the necessary eight years of elementary school, four years of secondary school, and four years of college education, thus showed off by writing in-depth articles in national magazines and journals. Even those with only a high school education had such intellectual attainment that foreign specialists were sometimes appalled at the gap between them and the bahr mados (foreign educated). Donald Levine, for example, recounts encountering some "extremely cultivated self-educated men, and others whose intense intellectual curiosity would put the average returnee to shame."<sup>107</sup>

In the final analysis, however, divisions among the educated elite served the Emperor's purpose. The Haile Selassie Secondary School Alumni Association, which was led by Germamé Neway—later the organizer of the 1960 coup d'état—was thus to die a "natural" death.

Early plots of the 1940's and 50's were of a conspiratorial nature. They aimed at overthrowing the Emperor, executing or removing the highest officials and replacing them themselves. In short, they aimed at staging palace coups. But while these plots showed that Haile Selassie could not afford to feel absolutely confident in his seemingly unchallenged grip on the country, they simply increased and further reinforced the feudal regime's methods and instruments of repression.

At the time that many college graduates of the 1950's thought in terms of fundamental reforms that would transform the country and

<sup>107</sup> Donald Levine, Wax and Gold (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 208.



hasten the rate of economic and political development of the country, segments of the imperial bodyguard, the army, and the police, who were serving Haile Selassie faithfully, were also witnessing the magnitude of corruption at the apex of political power. They were reading from foreign publications (which were mostly smuggled into the country) the political events in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. They were following radical developments in the rest of the world, and as a result, they sought alliance with the progressive intellectuals. As Addis Hiwet points out:

These army and police officers, who in the active defence of the autocratic state won the confidence of Haile Selassie, proved to be no automatons. As they were drawn into the closer circles of Haile Selassie's regime, they became increasingly coup conscious.<sup>108</sup>

By 1960, discussion groups about serious internal problems of the country had arisen among the cadets and teachers of the Harar Military Academy. Many senior military and police officers, like General Mengistu Neway and Colonel Workneh Gebeyehu, profoundly affected by their experiences abroad, were only waiting until enough opposition materialized to help them stage a coup.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>108</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: Autocracy to Revolution, p. 90.

<sup>109</sup>Even General Merid Mengesha, who was to be instrumental in crushing the 1960 coup, had some regrets later. When the author was working in the Ministry of Defence as a consultant in 1966, the General was then the Minister of Defence; he called the author to his office and remarked, "I crushed the coup because I knew it would lead to further bloodshed. They could not have won even if they controlled Addis Ababa because the Emperor could still convince the peasants to follow him and even the private soldiers could have turned against them. But when most of the exploiters were executed, we thought it was the end of nepotism and corruption. But we were wrong. Now even the Prime Minister [Aklilu Habte Wold] is enriching himself by acquiring huge land grants from the Emperor. Lots of young educated people hate me for my action in 1960. Some even call me on the telephone and insult me. I have now changed my telephone to a private number. What I want you young educated people to understand is that I also feel

As for the students in the 40's and early 50's, they were docile, apologetic, and seriously believed that no leader could equal the Emperor Haile Selassie. The general objective of the educational system was to socialize the students to accept the authority of the monarch and the central government. In order that this point not be missed by anyone, the curricula of both the elementary and secondary schools pointed out as their first aim:

... to foster in children the traditional values of loyalty, unity and devotion to Emperor and country which have sustained the nation for thousands of years.<sup>110</sup>

The political socialization of the public school system, geared towards this objective, seemed to be working very well. It inculcated in the impressionable minds of the Ethiopian children the idea that the selfless

---

that a radical change is necessary." He had made similar remarks to other educated colleagues who were not radical, such as Abate Mengiste who was an Assistant Minister in the Ministry of National Defence. He had put up a strong fight in the cabinet to get the salary of University graduates raised proportionate to the inflation rate. His contact with the author and other educated radicals was clearly to gain support from the progressive youths who had already dubbed him a reactionary. He was organizing a clandestine group to overthrow the regime and the Habte Wold family. But Haile Selassie's security men must have been on his track. In late August, 1966 it was suddenly announced on the national radio that Prime Minister Aklilu Habte Wold had gone to Paris for medical checkups and that the Emperor had appointed General Merid as Acting Prime Minister in addition to allowing him to keep the Portfolio of Defence. A few days later, on the Ethiopian New Year's Eve, the general was found mysteriously dead in his home.

<sup>110</sup> Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Elementary [and] Community School Curriculum" (Addis Ababa, 1958), p. v; and Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Secondary School Curriculum 1951 EC [ 1958 ]," p. vii.

Emperor had given them education; that he alone restored Ethiopia's independence. Stories were told by grade school teachers that the Emperor had spent the five years of exile praying by standing on one foot, that his father—who died even before Emperor Menelik—was still alive and appeared only to holy men. School songs implied that the Emperor was destined to live forever. The extent of belief in this had gone to such an extent that one who generously wished Haile Selassie ten thousand years of life was struck by another zealot who retorted, "How dare you limit the life of Janhoy [His Majesty]!"

An extract from the essay of a Tafari Makonnen School student shows how far the political socialization to inculcate loyalty to the Negus had gone. In describing Haile Selassie, the student wrote:

... that elegance and dignified manner peculiar to him. . . . You melt like ice in the hot rays of a summer sun before those piercing eyes. His lips affirm the constancy in him. Wherever he goes in his Ethiopia, people wheel around to bow low and he never passes without greeting back. He never leaves a petition unrewarded. Even thieves respect him for his justice. He works for his devoted subjects more than eighteen hours a day. When we solemnly swear upon his name the oath we take will never be broken. . . .

If you ask a traditional Ethiopian with guns pointing at his skull, 'Who is your master?' he will answer, 'I have no master, except God and His Majesty. . . .'

In front of the representatives of the League of Nations, when his country was in the cruel hands of fascism, before the jeering Italians, he was acknowledged fearless and dauntless. He never gave up hope [even] when the League of Nations refused [to help]. . . . 111

<sup>111</sup>Sylvia Pankhurst, "Tafari Makonnen School," Ethiopia Observer, II (March 1958), pp. 178-79.

The University College of Addis Ababa, which opened its doors in 1950, was populated by students with this background. They were literally "shackled by their national tradition of blind obedience, to parents . . . to the monarch, and thus to authority in general."<sup>112</sup> The French Canadian Jesuits who ran both the Tafari Makonnen School and the University College of Addis Ababa were known for their strict discipline, in which they took a special pride. Mr. Vincent Monty, a former headmaster of Tafari Makonnen (1950-1952), in a questionnaire concerning the contributions of the French Canadian Jesuits, wrote of a "high level of responsibility" and "discipline" as some of the major ones. He mentions "the practice of the Ministry of Education of sending unruly manual workers of other schools to Tafari Makonnen . . . which had the reputation of maintaining order and discipline." Mr. Monty also mentions in this reply to our survey how "after several incidents of violence in the schools of Addis Ababa, the need was felt for a program of moral education." When the Ministry of Education demanded this, he "set up a committee to elaborate such a program," and had it "duly written and presented to the Ministry."<sup>113</sup>

That the Jesuits were sought after in Ethiopian education for their unbending discipline, which Haile Selassie badly needed, is very

---

<sup>112</sup>Greenfield, A New Political History, p. 367.

<sup>113</sup>An answer to a survey conducted by the author, October 16, 1981. In the same survey, Professor Gilles Pion also pointed to his development of a "code of conduct that was respectful of human and moral values without being oppressive" as one of his crowning achievements.

clear from these candid remarks made by a reputable Jesuit educator and scholar. It is not surprising, therefore, that as Greenfield writes:

At the University College, the student news-sheet News and Views was more or less directly controlled by the Dean of Arts in the national pattern. . . . Debates as such were not customary, but oratorical contests were held at which speeches, checked by college lecturers, were made. When the contests were public, copies of the speeches were also previously submitted to the government security department.<sup>114</sup>

It is not surprising also that when Haile Selassie gave 200 scholarships to African students in 1959,<sup>115</sup> they came with a prospect of excitement, ready to enjoy freedom in the only African country that had had an uninterrupted independence of over two thousand years; but

<sup>114</sup>Greenfield, A New Political History, p. 366.

<sup>115</sup>The scholarship scheme was a belated aim by Haile Selassie to win a leadership role in Africa. It followed the Accra Conference of 1958 in which more outspoken leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Gamal Abdel Nasser were emerging as champions of African and Arab nationalisms respectively. Haile Selassie, who previously had not made an overt effort to advocate the decolonization of Africa (for fear that the neighbouring colonial powers, Britain and France, would retaliate by trying to annex Ethiopia), entered the leadership competition once the wind of change started to blow in Africa. When later a serious rift developed between the more radical Casablanca group led by Nkrumah and Nasser and the more conservative Monrovia group led by Sir Abubakar Tafews Balewa of Nigeria, Haile Selassie found his greatest opportunity to act. Through a series of subtle diplomatic moves, he succeeded in bringing the opposing camps together at the Addis Ababa Conference of 1963. This meeting resulted in the creation of the Organization of African Unity of which the Negus was later widely recognized as the founding father.

they stood aghast at what they saw. The Ethiopian students were soon to learn their lesson.<sup>116</sup> They admired the free spirit of the scholarship students and their dedication to stamping out colonialism from African soil. The newcomers introduced their hosts to the active anti-colonial struggle raging all over Africa. Ethiopian students' heroes were therefore no more the Haile Selassies and the Abebe Aregays; they were the Nkrumahs and the Nassers. Upon their encounter with their colleagues from the newly emerging countries on the continent, the young scholars were soon filled with horror to discover that African views of Ethiopia in the closing years of the 1950's had turned from one of admiring the age old Abyssinian independence and the victory of Adwa to one of embarrassment to the cause of African revolution.<sup>117</sup>

The students at the University College therefore not only closely associated with the newcomers, but enthusiastically elected many into their first freely elected executive and the new group soon started to demand more protection of academic freedom, and the right to run independent student associations. A former administrator of the University College, Frère Guy Morency, in a survey conducted by the author, refers specifically to this period of raised consciousness

<sup>116</sup>The author is writing from recollection of the experiences of his senior colleagues, who told him how much the scholarship students had affected their political views. One of these colleagues, Gebeyehu Firisa, who was later jailed and expelled from the university, was particularly influenced by progressive students from Ghana.

<sup>117</sup>R. Cox, Pan Africanism in Practice (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 10-82.

as follows:

I recall the atmosphere at U.C.A.A. after the arrival of Africans from other countries on the Continent. Things had changed. Some guest students had learnt a lesson hitherto unknown to our students and the interest started to shift from studies to new ideas.<sup>118</sup>

The new ideas Mr. Morency refers to were threefold: free organization of student affairs, discussions and debates concerning national issues, and sympathy for and involvement in the currents of the wind of change blowing throughout Africa. What startled the Jesuits and the government alike was, however, the speed at which these "new ideas" were exploding out of the University College campus into the outside arenas. Just a few days before the 1960 attempted coup, the University College students, in order to expand their ideas, had resolved to establish a national Union of Ethiopian students, and political discussion groups and debating clubs had started mushrooming up all over the campus.

The government, which had given the scholarships to the African students, was of course stunned by this unexpected turn of events. In panic, the University authorities attempted to arrange scholarships for "guest agitators" to go to European and American universities<sup>119</sup> so that they would not "contaminate" the Ethiopian students and stir up

---

<sup>118</sup>An answer to a questionnaire survey by the author, October 18, 1981.

<sup>119</sup>The author knew some of these radical African students. Those who accepted the opportunity to go to the United States were fully aware of why the College was anxious to arrange the scholarships for them.

the country's calm. But that was to no avail. The students, both foreign and Ethiopian, continued to campaign for a more radical change to transform feudal Ethiopia even after many of the so-called "agitators" were systematically dispersed.

At the time this radicalization process was taking place among the new bureaucracy, the educated officer corps, and the college students, a coup d'état was being secretly hatched by progressive educated élites, mainly of Shoan ruling class extraction. The movement started in what was known as the "Emeru Club," a social gathering at the residence of Leul-Ras Emeru, the Emperor's cousin, known as "the Red Ras." Prince Emeru had been educated in French, like Haile Selassie, and had been the Emperor's life-long friend.<sup>120</sup> But he was a progressive aristocrat even during the pre-war years.<sup>121</sup> He was held captive by the Fascists, who jailed him in Tuscany from 1937-41. This brought him in direct contact with Italian socialist and communist leaders who had profound influence over his later political views,<sup>122</sup> as a result of which he gave away all his feudal property to the serfs farming his land.

The "Emeru Club" started in 1954, without any political fanfare, but the movement's leader, Germané Neway, a progressive American-

<sup>120</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja, pp. 1-23.

<sup>121</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 148.

<sup>122</sup>An interview with Woizero Eleni Emeru, daughter of the late Ras Emeru, and with Dr. Zéléké Békélé, son-in-law of the Prince. (Woizero is a title of the female members of the Ethiopian aristocracy.) This interview was conducted in Toronto on Aug. 9, 1979.



educated moja (of ~~an~~ aristocratic Shoan class) who was considered rather eccentric by his colleagues,<sup>123</sup> took charge and started to steer it towards a clearly-defined political goal.

Germamé Neway, later to lead the 1960 coup d'état, was at first an admirer of the United States and the American Revolution. He marvelled at the United States' "prodigious achievements," which eclipsed those of the "traditionally arrogant European states." According to him, "History-making incidents in [Africa were] . . . more or less the modern counterparts of the agitation preceding the Boston Tea Party."<sup>124</sup>

Germamé Neway was also a Pan-Africanist, a disciple of Norman Leys, George Padmore, and W. E. B. DeBois. Like them, he was influenced by the political ideals of Marxism-Leninism, but only within the framework of the Pan-Africanist struggle. He read widely in the fields of socialism and contemporary international affairs. Although the Ethiopian aristocracy considered him a communist because of his preoccupation with the plight of the poor, his humble dress, his habit of distributing portions of his salary to the downtrodden zebagnas (guards) in government departments, and his peculiar penchant for wearing a red necktie, Germamé Neway's political line was more in line with Fabian socialism. His favourite theoretician was neither Marx nor Lenin, but Harold Laski.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>123</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, p. 90.

<sup>124</sup>Quoted in Greenfield, A New Political History, p. 344.

<sup>125</sup>An interview with Mr. Alemayehu Seifu, a cousin and close confidant of Germamé Neway, Aug. 5, 1979.

Like the progressive elites of the prewar years, Germamé Neway used the Ethiopian "Wax and Gold" satirical approach to criticize Ethiopian feudalism. His ideas were expressed in his 1954 M.A. thesis written in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University.<sup>126</sup> The choice of studying the Kenyan land tenure system was not coincidental. It was a deliberate attempt to draw a parallel between the white settlers of that country and the feudal leaders of Ethiopia. To make his point clear, he repeatedly referred to the white settlers of Kenya as "feudalistic" and a "landed aristocracy." He accused them of "despotic rule," and of denying "rights" to the "overwhelming majority."<sup>127</sup> His preoccupation with the Ethiopian problem was sometimes so deep that he seemed to consider the Kenyan one not the main issue. He wrote in one case, "Feudal lords increase their wealth by robbing more of what is already produced, thereby causing the general population to grow poorer and poorer" and then added "and the European settlers of Kenya are no exception to this rule."<sup>128</sup> On education in Africa, and obviously with the 98 percent illiteracy rate of Ethiopia in mind, he wrote, "a people kept in the shadow of ignorance, superstition, etc. is easier to rule; they can be terrorized, cajoled, divided and soon with less effort brought into submission."<sup>129</sup>

---

<sup>126</sup>Germamé Neway, "The Impact of the White Settlement Policy in Kenya" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1954), pp. 1-114, passim.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid.

When the Haile Selassie government suddenly summoned Germamé Neway from Columbia University and gave him an administrative position in the Ministry of the Interior (a Ministry which also looked after national security), it was with the intent of watching his activities, and, if possible, to co-opt him like the adibays (careerists). The Ministry of the Interior was notorious for being the most bureaucratic organ of the Ethiopian government, fully controlled by the traditionalists for whom ishi négé (equivalent to the Spanish *mañana*), graft, nepotism and red tape were natural phenomena.<sup>130</sup>

Haile Selassie also hoped to break what he considered a "hot headed radical," but the attempt came to naught. Even the rigid Ethiopian bureaucracy could not break Germamé Neway. He introduced innovations into his office, worked very hard, and gained great reputation as a selfless and dedicated young man.<sup>131</sup> It was then that Haile Selassie posted him to Sidamo province as governor of this remote area. The action was clearly meant to put Germamé in exile. But this move, like the first, backfired. As Addis Hiwet observes,

... through his honesty and innovative spirit [Germamé] won the confidence of the local communities. . . . His short period of provincial administration . . . brought him into more direct confrontations with the bureaucracy in Addis Ababa; indeed, from his provincial governorship, he found out at first hand how the autocratic state stifled, frustrated and blocked reforms. He then saw the depth and extent of the anachronism of Haile Selassie's feudal autocracy.<sup>132</sup>

<sup>130</sup>The author, who worked for the Ministry of the Interior as photogrammetrist and cartographer from 1958 to 1961, remembers this from personal experience.

<sup>131</sup>An interview with Mr. Alemayehu Seifu, August 10, 1980.

<sup>132</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, p. 90.

Germamé Neway was indeed not to be subdued. On his own initiative, he courageously carried out land reform in the sub-province of Wollamo. But his action brought on him the wrath of the Emperor, who angrily called him to the palace and asked why he interfered with the feudal land tenure system. Germamé replied, "Because Your Majesty has appointed me as governor to look after the life of the inhabitants and I found out that they had nothing to eat, since they had no land to farm."<sup>133</sup> Haile Selassie ordered the reinstitution of feudal land ownership in Wollamo, and immediately resorted to his subtle political weapon of shum shir. He transferred Germamé to the fort of Jijigga, to be a governor of the Somali nomads, in an area where there was no feudal land system to reform. Haile Selassie also simultaneously took a side-sweep against the new élites, whereby he effectively removed almost all the leaders of the radical intelligentsia from positions of power and dispersed them throughout the country and far away Ethiopian embassies.

But by this time, Germamé's frustration had already turned him to his trusted friends and his brother, Brigadier-General Mengistu Neway, Commander of the Imperial Bodyguard—an élite, well-trained troop with combat experience in international conflicts such as Korea. Through Germamé's influence and leadership, a conspiratorial group comprised of the commander of the police force, General Tsige Dibu, and the chief of Haile Selassie's security department, Colonel Workneh

---

<sup>133</sup> An interview with Mr. Alemayehu Seifu, August 10, 1980.

Gebeyehu, was quickly forged.<sup>134</sup> Haile Selassie was preparing to make a series of state visits abroad, and since taking further time might nip their movement in the bud—there were already rumours that a clandestine revolutionary development was taking place among members of the armed forces—Germamé suggested to the newly formed Council of the Revolution that they machine gun all the dignitaries when they assembled at the airport to see the Emperor off. But fearing the international repercussions of such a drastic act, the other members of the revolutionary command, including Germamé's brother General Mengistu, cautioned against such a plan. Workneh argued that the new government's prestige would be greatly enhanced if it made arrests and staged swift but fair military-style trials and executed those who put their own interest before that of their country.

In the meantime, Haile Selassie called Colonel Workneh and General Mengistu to his office and gave them thousands of dollars each. He then told them, "I leave the country in your hands," and flew off in his private jet to make his state visits.<sup>135</sup>

While the Emperor was away in Brazil, the revolutionary command group rounded up a number of dignitaries, including the Crown Prince and all members of the Royal family and held them captives at

<sup>134</sup>Some reports have suggested that Tsige and Workneh joined the movement at the last minute, but in an interview with Lieutenant Digaf Tedla, one of the officers tried for the coup, the author learned that although they were not among the coup planners, they were routinely informed of the developments. Interview January 10, 1981.

<sup>135</sup>An interview with General Fire Senbet (former member of Emperor Haile Selassie's private entourage), August 20, 1967.

the Guenete Leul Palace. The rebels also occupied all strategic positions in the capital. The state bank, the Finance Ministry, and telecommunications and radio stations were soon effectively controlled. Armoured cars guarded all important crossroads. The first stage of the coup seemed to go off without a hitch. The capital city was secured without a shot. Most leading feudal reactionaries were detained.

However, a few potential counterrevolutionaries, such as Ras Asraté Kassa, Major-General Merid Mengesha (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces), Major-General Kebede Gebré (Commander of the Ground Forces), and Brigadier-General Assefa Ayene (Commander of the Imperial Airforce) somehow slipped the net. This latter group immediately formed a counterrevolutionary force and declared their loyalty to the Emperor.

To complicate matters, the United States, which had an important military base in Asmara and was training the Ethiopian army and air force, fearing Germamé's left-wing views, threw its full weight behind the counterrevolutionaries. They threatened the air force officers who refused to "shed Ethiopian blood": if they did not act quickly, the Americans would fly in their own jet squadrons from Aden and strike the rebel strongholds. The Ethiopian officers, fearing that even more damage might be done, took off and attacked the Bodyguard's headquarters and maintenance garages. Brigadier-General Chester de Garve, Commander of the American Military Mission in Ethiopia, also joined the loyalists, and provided them with invaluable advice

for an effective counterattack.<sup>136</sup>

Germamé had urged his brother to have the élite Imperial Guard, which was clearly the strongest military establishment in the capital, strike at the counterrevolutionaries and their small contingent in the city before reinforcements came from outside. Mengistu, however, refused, hoping that those who were holding out might be persuaded to change their minds and join them, thereby enabling the coup to be executed without bloodshed. This was later to prove the group's most crucial mistake, but in the meantime, Germamé composed a proclamation and forced the Crown Prince, at gunpoint, to record it. The proclamation read:

Ethiopia has a renowned history of 3,000 years, but during this period, the tools of the farmer, the business of the small trader, and most other aspects of Ethiopian life have remained stagnant. Continued ignorance and a low standard of living has gripped the Ethiopian people. Progress has so far been stifled because of self-serving officials who, instead of working for the common interests of the people, chose to indulge in nepotism and greed. Despite a mountain of promises, the Ethiopian people, who have been patiently waiting for the day when they would be freed from the shackles of illiteracy, ignorance and poverty, have gained nothing. There is no other nation on earth that has manifested such patience. The fast stride of progress forged by the newly emerging nations of Africa has made the Ethiopian people realize that their country is to remain behind in education, economic development and standard of living. Stagnation has been the rule in Ethiopia in the last few years. Dissatisfaction and discontent have been shown not only by the farmers, traders, and professionals, but also by members

---

<sup>136</sup> An interview with Senior Technician Wangielu Elias (member of the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force), August 22, 1967.

of the armed forces and the police; by young educated Ethiopians, and, in short, by the entire Ethiopian population.

Attempts have been made to frustrate such movements. But just as the bee whose hive has been disturbed becomes violent, the people have now risen. It has so far not been possible to hold back the growing awareness of the Ethiopian people. As a result of this awareness, this movement was born and has succeeded in establishing a government dedicated solely to the welfare and security of the entire Ethiopian people. It is, thus, my great pleasure to announce the success of the movement to the people of Ethiopia.

All those selfish officials who fought merely to further their own individual interests and to gain personal power and glory, who were obstacles to the country's progress, who, like cancer, impeded the nation's development, have now been removed. And I have, as of today, consented to serve you and Ethiopia with a salary determined by the constitution.

From this moment on, all decisions and appointments declared by my new Ethiopian government, which is supported by the armed forces, the police, the younger educated Ethiopians and by the entire people will have legal effect.

People of Ethiopia! Let your unity be stronger than iron! In the eyes of the whole world, today we begin a new era for Ethiopia!<sup>137</sup>

Paraphrasing the proclamation, the rebel government informed foreign embassies of the rationale for the coup. The main reasons given, inter alia, were the following:

The fantastic progress achieved by the new independent African states has placed Ethiopia in an embarrassing situation. The new government will have as its aim to restore Ethiopia to her ancestral place in the world. . . . Many

---

<sup>137</sup>The declaration, read in Amharic over the national radio, is in the possession of the author. The above is a free translation, by the author, from the original Amharic broadcast.



young Ethiopians are seen loitering in the streets. As these young people should be in school, the new government aims to educate them and to find employment for those who are now unemployed. . . . One of the problems of Ethiopia's advancement is a lack of technical know-how. The new government will establish technical schools in the country to deal with this problem.<sup>138</sup>

The Crown Prince's "proclamation" was broadcast repeatedly over the national radio, interspersed with martial music. The people seemed to be confused. Was the Emperor dead? Who was behind the coup? Were there any opponents at large? Very few people knew. And the fact that the announcement made no mention of the Emperor added to the confusion.

Realizing their lack of rapport with the residents of Addis Ababa, the rebels soon appealed to the students of the University College, who were clearly jubilant about the anticipated change, to demonstrate and win the people over. General Mengistu invited the student leaders of the college to meet with him.<sup>139</sup> He showed them scraps of dry, coarse bread that the average Ethiopian peasant ate, and told them how the Council of the Revolution "served the dignitaries with [it], the previous night, which, of course, they could not eat." He said the idea was to draw their attention to the plight of the poor. He reminded them that the rebels' action was not personally motivated but was rather

---

<sup>138</sup>A copy of the document distributed to foreign embassies is in the possession of the author.

<sup>139</sup>A 1967 interview with Tameru Fayissa, one of the 1960 executive leaders of the University College Students Society.

for the good of the masses who lived in misery. He then remarked, "Remember that as the commander of the Imperial Guard, I have all the privilege one may wish to have: a mansion, a limousine, expensive furniture, servants, maids, etc. My actions are solely for the interest of our people."

Mengistu then confided to them that there was already strong opposition from a group of counterrevolutionaries and that the rebels were no more sure of success. Before their departure, the general added prophetically, "Even if we fail with this coup, we have done our part. We have started a fire which will henceforth burn by itself."

On Thursday, December 15, 1960, college students—including the author—from Addis Ababa started an open demonstration supporting the change and marched towards the railway station area where the counterrevolutionaries were entrenched. The jubilation seen in the eyes of the young demonstrators surprised and frightened those who were still loyal to the Negus. Pamphlets were distributed to the populace urging them to support the new change. An Amharic song composed by the students of the University College of Addis Ababa was sung repeatedly during the march. Freely translated, it ran:

Wake up my countrymen!  
 Your history beckons you.  
 Throw slavery's yoke away and here taste freedom's dew!  
 Take courage! Have heart!  
 For you have the ability.  
 Wake up, my people!  
 Wake up for the sake of dignity!

Flyers distributed on the way told of the great shame Ethiopia had to live with. They told of how Ethiopia's development was creeping

behind every newly independent country despite her 3,000 years of uninterrupted independence. They attacked the ancien régime as backward and corrupt, and attacked the concentration of power in the hands of one man, i.e., Haile Selassie.<sup>140</sup> They recounted the facts that freedom of speech and press were gagged. Placards carried by the students proclaimed, "Our goal in Equality, Brotherhood and Freedom."

Once the procession reached its destination, some overzealous student leaders (particularly the secretary-general, Shibiru Seifu) almost triggered a massacre by attempting to disobey orders not to pass the cordon created by a platoon of soldiers who gave the demonstrators ten minutes to disperse, before they opened fire. When the ten-minute deadline seemed to have approached, a clicking of rifle bolts followed and the soldiers trained their machine guns on the students. At that point, a College lecturer, Mesfin Wolde Mariam, hurled back those at the forefront and convinced the students to march back. The students of course knew that they were on the brink. But they were fully prepared to die for what they called "our principle."<sup>141</sup>

The initial delay in ordering an attack served the cause of the counterrevolutionaries, who deliberately sent out feelers and misleading cues that they might join the rebels; in the meantime, however, they continued to fly in reinforcements, since the air force was now clearly

---

<sup>140</sup>The author was one of the distributors of the pamphlets. This particular copy is still in his possession.

<sup>141</sup>The national radio, still occupied by the rebels, deliberately gave out a false report that the students had all been massacred.

on their side. Just moments after the student demonstration ended, the army, the air force, and the police commandos who had declared their loyalty to Haile Selassie, struck. They opened fire with heavy guns and a bloody war ensued in the capital, claiming thousands of casualties.<sup>142</sup>

The Bodyguard was effectively subdued within 48 hours. The rebels, in the meantime, gunned down all their hostages except the Crown Prince, Haile Selassie's immediate family, and Ras Emeru, whom they had appointed Prime Minister prior to their defeat. A few ministers also miraculously survived the repeated volleys of machine gun fire.

Ultimately, most of the rebels were in turn wiped out in mopping up operations conducted by the loyalist security forces. General Tsige Dibu died fighting in the initial attack on the palace. Germamé and Workneh fought separate engagements on the outskirts of the city, and committed suicide when their ammunition ran out. Then, on the orders of the Emperor, their bodies were strung up at Menelik Square for 24 hours, to give a warning to any person who might think of rebellion again. Mengistu, who was captured with severe head wounds, survived, but was later hanged, still defiantly refusing to repent his actions.

Haile Selassie, although victorious, was disturbed that this had happened at all. When he asked what Workneh, his most trusted security chief, was doing all this time, and was informed that the colonel was one of the conspirators, the Emperor uttered in disbelief, "Workinehim?"

<sup>142</sup>The government report deliberately understated the number of casualties (at less than a thousand) to show the world that there was no big struggle against Haile Selassie. However, the author personally witnessed numerous bodies in the back alleys of Addis Ababa, not to mention those immediately removed by military and Red Cross personnel.

(the Ethiopian equivalent of Et tu, Brute?). He summoned the Crown Prince, and with a typical Ethiopian father's rage at a son who is disloyal asked him why in the world he had read that proclamation. When Asfa Wossen pointed out that Germamé had impelled him to read it at gunpoint, the Emperor contemptuously dismissed him with the remark, "I would have been prouder to come to your funeral."<sup>143</sup> Asked by a journalist what changes he was going to introduce after the lessons of December 1960, the "Lion of Judah" shot back, "None!" Reflecting on why those who benefited from his western education ultimately rebelled against him, Haile Selassie remarked, "Trees that are planted do not always bear the desired fruit."<sup>144</sup>

The above remark points to the predicament of the feudal Negus. Modern education during the second decade of the post-war period had indeed been a surprise for Haile Selassie and, reaping the fruits of an armed revolt from those few educated youths he had hoped to co-opt was the least he had bargained for. The feudal monarch's aim in re-opening modern schools immediately after his return from exile was to redress the damage done by the Fascists and to implement an educational reconstruction program which would help create new civilian and military élites who would staff his freshly re-established feudal state. Problems relating to planning, financing and educational administration had emerged

---

<sup>143</sup>An interview with one of Haile Selassie's grandsons, residing in North America and unidentified by request.

<sup>144</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Information, The Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa: December 9, 1960), p.2

in the 1940's and were growing during the following decade, but his greatest challenge came from the few products of the post-war schools. The new intelligentsia were ashamed of seeing their country trailing almost all the emerging African countries in development and technological progress. Many held the view that feudalism and all feudal institutions were anachronistic for a dynamic society that the modern technological era necessarily demands. Hence, they staged the 1960 Palace coup d'état and openly challenged Haile Selassie's political power. An assessment of the planning and execution of the insurrection itself is, however, a different matter. Addis Hiwet rightly dismisses it as "a lesson on how not to make a coup."<sup>145</sup> But it is important to note that prior to this event, Germamé, who was the architect of this palace revolt, had made a point in the conclusion of his thesis, a point written in capital letters for everyone to notice: "ONE PHASE OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE ENDS WHERE THE VICTORY OF THEIR JUST CAUSE BEGINS!"<sup>146</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, p. 92.

<sup>146</sup>Germamé Neway, "The Impact of the White Settlement Policy in Kenya," p. 101.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE TREND OF EDUCATION UNTIL 1974, THE BIRTH OF A UNIVERSITY AND THE EVOLUTION AND CHARACTER OF FOREIGN CULTURAL PENETRATION

#### Long Range Accomplishments in the Establishment, Expansion and Improvement of Primary, Secondary and University Education

In considering the long-range viewpoint of the direction education and politics had taken until Haile Selassie was finally overthrown in 1974, it must be noted that the abortive 1960 coup would be remembered in the annals of history more for its being a catalyst for the subsequent developments of political consciousness among the new generation of educated youth than for its qualitative content. That the extent of political socialization emanating from the school system and from the government-controlled press and radio had created a significant number of western-educated youth who were staunchly loyal to the emperor is undeniable. The traditional Ethiopian belief, however erroneous, that Haile Selassie loved every Ethiopian as his own child, that he educated them with his own personal money, and the like, was continuously impressed on them by their parents, their teachers, their peer groups and the clergy, starting in 1916 when Haile Selassie overthrew Iyasu. The fact that the 1960 coup succeeded in casting a shadow of doubt on such assumptions is indeed not an insignificant contribution.

The contribution in question here is, however, not the counter propaganda that the rebels made, for they made none. It should be noted that they even refrained from mentioning the name of the emperor in their radio broadcast for fear that they might arouse the wrath of the emperor's traditional supporters and strengthen the hand of the Loyalist army and air force troops. The contribution is rather to be found in the rebels' armed defiance of the well-entrenched Ethiopian feudal system for the first time in the country's history.

Despite the fact that Haile Selassie had stressed that the coup itself would not in any way change his political course, he was undoubtedly disturbed by the magnitude of the support it engendered, especially among the newly educated youth. It should be remembered that the coup was staged in the middle of the first Five Year Plan, which was launched in September 1958 and ended in 1963, its goal being mainly to encourage the growth of the industrial sector. On that score, there was substantial success. The national income was increased by 11 percent and per capita earnings grew at about 1.7 percent per annum starting from a very low base of E \$89 in 1957 and reaching E \$97 in 1961.<sup>1</sup>

In the field of education, from the year 1957 to 1961, the number of students enrolled in all types of schools increased by approximately 11 percent per annum; the number of high schools had more than trebled, 403 young people had graduated from the various local colleges, and about 883 were still enrolled in institutions abroad. A

<sup>1</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1963), p. 78.



significant number of returnees—1100 graduates from abroad—had also occupied important technical and bureaucratic positions in the government.

The growth in non-government, mostly Christian missionary, schools had contributed to this achievement considerably since roughly one third of the enrolments from 1957 to 1961 were in that sector.<sup>2</sup> As we shall see later, there were also many shortcomings and chronic problems during this period.

The Second Five-Year Plan, 1963 through 1968, came after the political shock of 1960 and thus aimed primarily at creating improvements in the administrative machinery of the state. This was designed to stem another possible challenge from the politically radical youth who were considering Haile Selassie's feudal regime something of an anachronism in the modern era. After the coup, government planning units were immediately established within each ministry and agencies of the Crown, thus reducing the usual duplication of economic and administrative efforts. Some of the planned goals were achieved, but not to the extent that the government had desired.

The Third Five-Year Plan, 1969-1974, was even more ambitious than the Second. Since it came at a time when student agitation had created a much more widespread mass consciousness, it was perceived by government stalwarts as very serious. Whether the goals of the Plan were genuinely inspired by its professed aims or not, the

<sup>2</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Planning Board, Second Five-Year Development Plan (Addis Ababa, 1959), VII, p. 159.

Third Plan called for a substantial improvement of the standard of living of the people, a more equitable distribution of income, the raising of production per capita, rural development and increasing agricultural production and income.<sup>3</sup>

In the field of education, both the Second and the Third Five-Year Plans set forth a quick and efficient training of technical personnel, and reduction in time spans of school curricula and educational programs in order to achieve the fastest possible production of skilled manpower. The burden for the financing of these projects was mostly to fall on local communities, which were at the same time expected to provide the necessary labour. There was also a plan to distribute scarce educational resources among the populace much more equitably.<sup>4</sup>

While most of these long-range goals continued to elude the regime until it was overthrown in 1974, there were some concrete gains. Compared with the early 1940's, the educational system was at least fulfilling the feudal government's trained middle and high level manpower requirements. Thus, while in 1944 there was only one secondary school in the Ethiopian empire, thirty years later, there was at least one senior secondary school in each of the fourteen provinces.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report of the Education Sector Review" (Addis Ababa, 1972), pp. 11-13.

<sup>4</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Planning Board, Second Five-Year Development Plan (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1962), pp. 261-64.

<sup>5</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report of the Education Sector Review," p. 1.

Foreign assistance, especially from countries that provided it without strings attached, had helped education to spread to areas that the regime had neglected for political and other reasons. The International Development Agency of the Swedish government, which provided volunteers to help in the construction of primary schools, is a good example. From 1965 to 1968, through this aid, 109 elementary schools were constructed, mostly in the remoter regions of Ethiopia. The agency's local organ, known as the Elementary School Building Unit, was attached to the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts and was under obligation by agreement to build and furnish elementary schools in the rural districts of Ethiopia, the expenses to be equally shared by Sweden and the local communities themselves. Sweden also paid the cost of its own consultants and experts in addition to providing free education to Ethiopians who would carry on the plan in later years. The Swedish project, which coincided with the Third Five-Year Plan, was to spend E\$64 million. Although it did not reach its target, mainly due to failure on the part of the Ethiopian government to provide the necessary cooperation, by 1973, it had 3,644 classrooms built and furnished with basic school equipment. It is worthy of note that because of Sweden's insistence, 85 percent of these schools were built in remote regions in all the Ethiopian provinces, and that 38 percent were constructed in localities where hitherto there had been no schools of any kind.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report of the Education Team on Elementary School Building Programme" (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1973), pp. 50-66.

In simple numerical terms, enrolment had also substantially increased, although financial commitments did not keep up with growth. For example, in 1950, total government school enrolment was less than 10 percent of the 1970 total. Over the previous decade and a half, although at a rate below the target, government primary schools expanded at an average annual rate of about 11 percent. Secondary and university level education showed an even more significant growth—19 to 20 percent annually.<sup>7</sup>

There was also some progress on the qualitative side. Primary school instructors who taught mathematics, history, science, geography, and other subjects were, during the early reconstruction period, almost all expatriates. So were most school directors. By 1974, however, more than 99 percent of elementary school teachers and school directors were Ethiopian. Their level of training had also significantly improved. Primary school teachers with less than secondary school qualifications constituted only 4 percent of the entire teaching staff, and from 1968 to 1971, the proportion of senior secondary level Ethiopian teaching personnel rose from 29 to 44 percent.<sup>8</sup>

Owing to the fact that some educational centres which were limited to the sixth grade level had started offering full elementary level classes, and thanks to the Swedish elementary school building program, the chronic problem of pupil retention which had continued

---

<sup>7</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report of the Education Sector Review," pp. 11-17.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-2.

to plague the Ethiopian school system had shown signs of diminishing. Retention rates improved from 37 percent in 1969 to 53 percent in 1972.<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps one of the most positive developments during the latter years of the Haile Selassie regime was the introduction of new teaching techniques which successfully employed the tools of modern technology to disseminate educational opportunities to a wider audience. In 1968, an instructional media centre was established in Addis Ababa to produce and transmit radio and television programs of an educational nature. The following year, the centre beamed lessons to fifty-six elementary schools in the vicinity of the capital. Later the same year, 262 radio sets were distributed to senior secondary schools and the broadcasts expanded to teaching advanced lessons that might lead to the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate Examination. One hundred and fifty-one hours of Amharic, English, geography, history and science lessons were thus broadcast. By 1971, some 126 primary, 59 secondary, and 10 adult education schools were involved in this pioneering project. The media centre also prepared a 50-hour supply of tapes and, after distributing 175 television sets donated by Britain and Japan to senior secondary schools and literacy centres around Addis Ababa, provided audio-visual lessons in several subjects.<sup>10</sup> As Ethiopian education had long suffered from overcrowding and lack of teaching personnel

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Annual Report 1970-71 (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1973), pp. 13-15.

and instructional materials, the introduction of mass media technology was a positive move.

The formal establishment of the first university in Addis Ababa in 1961 was perhaps what Haile Selassie rightfully considered the epitome of his drive for the modernization of the age-old Ethiopian feudal autocracy.<sup>11</sup> The idea of establishing the first modern university in Ethiopia was such an important national priority that all civil servants had to pay a full month's wages as an obligatory contribution over a period of two decades. By 1961, E \$4 million had been collected from Ethiopian government employees.<sup>12</sup>

It should be remembered that when the University College of Addis Ababa was established in 1950, there were only three secondary schools in the country preparing students for entrance to a tertiary institution. The College itself was quite humble. As one of the founding French Canadian Jesuits describes:

Classes began at University College of Addis Ababa on December 11, 1950. It was a humble beginning. There was a staff of nine teachers, the principal included. There were twenty-one students, all men, who had completed high school. The students, all boarders, and some of the staff members were living together on campus, in the building that used to be the Commercial School and was still partly occupied by students of this School. Dormitories, dining

---

<sup>11</sup>Haile Selassie University, "Program of the Convocation Celebrating the Founding of Haile Selassie I University" (Addis Ababa, 1961), pp. 1-3.

<sup>12</sup>Ato Yilma Deressa, Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Haile Selassie University, a speech at the convocation of Haile Selassie University (Addis Ababa, 1961), pp. 1-5.

hall, library, classrooms and laboratories were accommodated in this one building. It was simple and poor, but sufficient.<sup>13</sup>

But by 1959-60, the University had more than half a dozen "attractive, relatively new buildings."<sup>14</sup> There were 381 men and 45 women boarders pursuing their studies full time and 600 more attending classes in the Extension Department. The full-time teaching faculty and administrative personnel had now risen to 63, with 13 Ethiopians among them (see Table 8). The University had a library stocked with some 26,000 volumes. The laboratories, although not up to the standard of liberal arts colleges of other countries, were reasonably sufficient. "The museum though small [was] exceptionally good."<sup>15</sup>

When a final decision was taken to lay the foundation of the first national university in 1961, higher education in Ethiopia was comprised of the following institutions:

1. The University College of Addis Ababa;
2. The Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts (Haramaya, Harar);
3. Engineering College (Addis Ababa);
4. Ethio-Swedish Institute of Building Technology (Addis Ababa);
5. Public Health College (Gondar);

---

<sup>13</sup>Edouard Trudeau, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1964).

<sup>14</sup>University of Utah, "Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia, 1959-60" (Addis Ababa, 1960), p. 12.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

TABLE 8

## Teaching Staff of the University College of Addis Ababa, 1950-1960

Year	Faculty of Arts						Fac. of Science				School of Law				Faculty Totals						Total Staff		Grand Total Staff Teaching
	F-Time		P-Time		Invited		F-Time		P-Time		P-Time		Invited		Arts		Sci.		Law				
	N. E.	*Eth.	*N. E.	Eth.	N. E.	Eth.	N. E.	Eth.	N. E.	Eth.	N. E.	Eth.	N. E.	Eth.	N. E.	E.	N. E.	E.	N. E.	E.	N. E.	Eth.	
1950-51	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	4	-	4
1951-52	9	-	-	-	3	-	5	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	12	-	5	-	2	-	19	-	19
1952-53	9	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	9	-	5	-	2	-	16	-	16
1953-54	10	-	20	1	2	-	7	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	32	1	7	-	3	-	42	1	43
1954-55	14	-	25	6	2	-	8	1	-	-	2	-	2	-	41	6	8	1	4	-	53	7	60
1955-56	14	-	25	6	3	-	7	1	-	-	2	1	1	-	42	6	7	1	3	1	53	8	61
1956-57	16	-	25	6	1	1	15	1	2	-	2	1	-	-	42	7	17	1	2	1	61	9	70
1957-58	20	1	12	8	4	-	15	2	4	2	2	1	2	-	36	9	19	4	4	1	59	14	73
1958-59	22	1	15	7	1	-	12	2	3	2	2	2	1	-	38	8	15	4	3	2	56	14	70
1959-60	22	4	15	3	2	-	10	3	1	3	-	-	-	-	39	7	11	6	-	-	50	13	63

Source: University of Utah, Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia, p. 37.

\*Eth. = Ethiopians

\*\*N. E. = Non-Ethiopians



6. Theological College (Addis Ababa);

7. Teacher Training Institutes and Programs:

- a. Halle Selassie I School - three programs (Addis Ababa)
- b. Empress Menon School (Addis Ababa)
- c. Teacher Training Institute (Harar)
- d. Teacher Training Institute (Debre Berhan)
- e. Teacher Training Institute (Asmara)
- f. Teacher Training Institute (Majété)

8. National Defence Academies:

- a. The Military Academy (Harar)
- b. The Naval Academy (Massawa)
- c. The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force Training Centre (Bishoftu).<sup>16</sup>

While all of the above institutions contributed different categories of graduates, only the first five prepared students for College level diplomas and degrees. The University College, the oldest and most well-organized institution, was variously referred to as the "mother" institution,<sup>17</sup> "the core,"<sup>18</sup> or the "nucleus for the new University."<sup>19</sup> The Engineering College began offering degrees in the specific fields of civil, mechanical and electrical engineering in 1959, and had a total of 103 full-time students during the academic year 1959-60. The Agricultural College at Haramaya, financed by the United States government through the University of Oklahoma, offered B.Sc.

---

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Aklilu Habte, Mengesha Gebre Hiwet and Monika Kehoe, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 1 (January, 1963), 1.

<sup>18</sup> University of Utah, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," p. 13.

<sup>19</sup> Gilles Pion, former Dean of the University College of Addis Ababa, in a response to our survey, November 4, 1981.

degrees in animal and plant science as well as general agriculture.

During the academic year 1960-61, there were 190 full-time students enrolled.<sup>20</sup> The Institute of Building Technology, funded and staffed by a Swedish government grant, had 91 students registered in 1960-61, and trained graduates in designing, constructing and building projects.<sup>21</sup> The Public Health College at Gondar, mainly financed by the World Health Organization and the United States government, produced three types of graduate. It trained health officers in outlying health stations and in a hospital with pre-clinical and clinical laboratories. It also produced community nurses and sanitarians. The former pursued a three-year program concentrating on preventive medicine and public health, while the latter took a two-year course specializing in human sanitation. The community nurse and sanitarian training programs were not of college standards, but they did produce the personnel necessary to aid the health officers in running the rural clinics, where more qualified nurses would not go. In 1960, when it started to offer B.Sc. degrees, there were 56 full-time students registered at the College.<sup>22</sup> The Theological College opened in 1960 with 13 students and brought the number of independent colleges forming the national university to six.

As shown in Table 9 , enrolment in all colleges had increased steadily through the years, but the institutions worked under capacity at

<sup>20</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "School Census for Ethiopia, 1961-62" (Addis Ababa, 1962). pp. 1-40.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

TABLE 9

## Enrolment in Full-time Institutions of Higher Education in Ethiopia 1950-1961

Year	University	College					Sex		Grand Total
		Engineering	Agricultural	Public Health	Building	Theological	M	F	
1950-51	71						71	0	71
1951-52	75						75	1	76
1952-53	94						94	1	95
1953-54	130	12	12				152	2	154
1954-55	131	25	22	21			351	2	353
1955-56	193	45	43	55	21		700	10	710
1956-57	230	63	86	71	30		464	10	474
1957-58	270	95	107	68	53		564	27	591
1958-59	353	110	160	77	70		720	44	770
1959-60	428	103	160	58	92		790*	49	839
1960-61	405	128	190	56	91	13	843	40	883

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, School Census for Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 1962).

a cost of E \$6 million.<sup>23</sup> Some departments were overstaffed; they had three, five, or eight students in classes which were also offered at other locations. The cost of sending students abroad and the possible consequences to the regime of a future work force staffed with "contaminated" youth returning with alien ideas made it imperative that Haile Selassie soon establish a national university.

Although the Negus first discussed the possibility of opening a university under the leadership of Lucien Matte, the Canadian Jesuit president of the University College, he later changed his mind and approached the American government. The Board of Education made a formal request that the United States carry out a survey of higher education in Ethiopia and help finance a new university. The American government was quick to agree, since it was wary of radical student agitation—anti-feudal and anti-American in tone—that was growing at the University College of Addis Ababa. The United States must have hoped through this act to put a lid on a boiling cauldron that it feared might bring about dire consequences to their client regime and to their strategic position on the Horn.<sup>24</sup>

Through an American institution (the University of Utah), the "Operation Mission on Education in Ethiopia," which was financed by the United States International Cooperation Administration (I.C.A.), was assigned in 1959 to conduct a preliminary survey for the establish-

---

<sup>23</sup>Trudeau, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," p. 111.

<sup>24</sup>George D. Archer and Paulos Milkias, "The Second Scramble for Africa," Horn of Africa Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July-September 1979), pp. 55-66.

ment of Haile Selassie I University. The objectives of the survey were to:

1. Determine the present status of higher education in the Empire and the situation with respect to secondary education.
2. Determine the needs to be met through a program of higher education.
3. Define a step-by-step development program of higher education.
4. Define an organizational structure for higher education development.
5. Suggest plans for financing programs.
6. Identify first steps to be taken.
7. Prepare a report of the survey, preliminary and final.<sup>25</sup>

The Utah Team, as it came to be known, started to carry out its duties under the chairmanship of Dr. Harold W. Bentley. As a pilot project, it spent several months in the country, examining the existing physical facilities, observing a sample of class and laboratory performances, and conducting several hundred interviews. It then made the following major recommendations.

A UNIVERSITY. That to coordinate more effectively present units of higher education and Teacher Education in Ethiopia (education beyond the secondary schools) and to plan efficiently for future developments, His Imperial Majesty decree the founding of a university, the Haile Selassie I University, a modern university with strong centralized control which would be envisioned, recognized, and supported by all agencies as the national university of Ethiopia.

---

<sup>25</sup>University of Utah, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," p. 13

and which would also be considered important regionally; that the University College be considered a desirable foundation on which to build the University, thus along with other advantages, reducing costs in money and delay in time. . . .

A CHARTER. That this University be granted a charter, which would take precedence over existing or previously granted charters to institutions of higher learning in Ethiopia, bestowing full power and authority to coordinate, operate, or to contract operation of, and to supervise all units and forms of higher education and Teacher Education in Ethiopia; to establish new and additional units on the Main Campus, in downtown Addis Ababa, or elsewhere in the Empire; that this charter guarantee those conditions requisite to high standards of academic excellence recognized by leading universities throughout the world, such as freedom from political, economic, racial, religious or other pressures or conditions inimical to the integrity and academic prestige of a university. . . .

THE BUDGET. That all budgets and funds which regularly and normally go to the various units of higher education, including budgets for Teacher Education and Training, together with all other funds that may logically and rightfully be secured, be included in the budget of the proposed University. . . .

OFFICERS. That as a step towards coordination of higher education His Imperial Majesty appoint a Board of Trustees and certain other university officers, and that not later than the academic year 1961-62, the proposed Board and officers assume responsibility for budgetary control, personnel appointments, and the administration of scholarships in existing units of higher education in the Empire. . . .

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. That much more emphasis be put on the English language as Ethiopia's adopted language of learning; that higher standards for facility in English—reading, comprehending, speaking—be set for admission to the University and that students deficient by these standards be required to devote sufficient time and practice during the first and second years to remove the deficiency; that the Uni-

versity make very special efforts to furnish tutors and modern language learning equipment to accelerate the removal of English language deficiencies. . . .

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE. That the United States Government, through its appropriate agencies, such as the International Cooperation Administration and the United States Information Administration, give financial and other aid commensurate with the importance of Ethiopian world affairs and the unique opportunity this high educational endeavor provides. That, furthermore, the United States Government encourage other agencies such as Foundations, Associations, and Corporations and other Nations to proffer aid to this Ethiopian educational project. . . .

That a committee of interested and competent persons, representing Ethiopia and the United States, be appointed to study and implement these recommendations or as many of them as are considered feasible. . . .<sup>26</sup>

The Utah Team further suggested that a main campus with sufficient land contiguous with or adjacent to the University College of Addis Ababa be provided for administration, classroom, laboratory, library and other requisite functions. As to the specific model institution to be set up, the Team recommended an "American type of university with strong central authority as regards policy-making, budget control and appointment of personnel, the type exemplified in the United States universities whether land grant or not."<sup>27</sup> It further suggested that private universities be established and urged the authorities concerned to provide the necessary encouragement to that end. It also provided controversial advice—that the blanket scholarship cur-

---

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 25-49.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 21-22.

rently given to all Ethiopian students registered at the different colleges be discontinued and that, instead, students pay their fees, funds being provided only to needy students on a loan basis to be returned during "income producing years."<sup>28</sup>

The main assumptions the Utah Team took for granted in making its recommendations were the following.

1. That for some time to come the United States will, as a national policy, continue a foreign aid program and that Ethiopia will be included in this program.
2. That Ethiopia is strategically situated and uniquely constituted to develop and advance in a leadership role in her part of the world.
3. That much greater impact would result, at relatively little more cost, in sponsoring a reasonably impressive program or project rather than one which might invite unfavorable comparisons with projects aided by other countries.
4. That a university bearing the name Haile Selassie I University is certain to be established during the life of the present monarch with aid from some source outside Ethiopia.
5. That should Ethiopians and Americans decide to collaborate in establishing and implementing such a university they could and would do so with that mutual confidence and consideration which result in genuine and lasting friendships.
6. That with outside aid given to higher education the Ethiopians could and would devote more effort to the improvement of primary and secondary education which in turn would enhance the success of the university.

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 37.



7. That private United States agencies—Foundations, Associations, Corporations—might welcome a competent institution, such as a university, through which to clear or operate projects and subsidies and that, as a result, the total American contribution to education in Ethiopia and Africa could be outstanding without great expense to any one agency. . . .<sup>29</sup>

The Emperor immediately announced that he would transfer one of his palaces, the Guénété-Leul, to the new university<sup>30</sup> of which he was the first chancellor. On February 28, 1961, he granted the university a royal charter.<sup>31</sup> A Board of Governors, headed by Ato Yilma Deressa, Minister of Finance, was appointed by the Emperor, and an agreement between the Ethiopian and the United States governments was signed by which the latter was to provide monetary assistance to pay salaries of administrative officials to be recruited from the

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>30</sup>A rumour spread in the 1960s that the Emperor actually sold the palace and did not donate it to the University. Careful investigation on the part of this author, however, has so far found no substance to this story. What is clear is that there is a linkage between the events of the 1960 coup d'état, and the Emperor's donation of the Palace. All the ministers and feudal dignitaries who were captives of the rebels were machine-gunned in the "Arengwadé Salon" (Green Salon) section of the Guénété-Leul. The Empress, according to General Fire Senbet, the Emperor's private guard, had refused to go back to a place where "all that blood was spilt." She complained of "nightmares." After the coup, therefore, the Jubilee Palace became the permanent residence of Haile Selassie and the Empress Mennen. Since the College students vehemently supported the rebellion, the Emperor was also aiming to win the students' loyalty. There was therefore real and symbolic connection between the 1960 abortive coup d'état and the foundation of the University on the site where the Emperor was crowned in 1930. (The private interview with General Fire Senbet was conducted in Addis Ababa on 15 August, 1967.)

<sup>31</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Pen, Negarit Gazeta, Notice No. 284, 1961.

United States and to reimburse the expenses of capital investments for new building structures, laboratory and other equipment and the maintenance of service personnel. Dr. Harold Bentley, who had headed the Utah Team, was appointed Academic Vice-President, and Acting President of the new university.

On December 18, 1961, at a formal convocation of the newly established university, Haile Selassie passed on the stern message that "the spread of knowledge is the bastion of liberty"<sup>32</sup>—a liberty that was ironically to be crucial for the survival of his own regime during the following decade.

Third level education continued to grow, until by 1974, total enrolment at Haile Selassie University and other post-secondary institutions stood at 6,474, of which females comprised 9 percent (580). The number of instructors at the secondary level had also risen to 434. Secondary school enrolment was 191,703, of which 27 percent were female. At the primary level, there were 959,272 students, of whom 32 percent were female.<sup>33</sup> Considering the fact that Ethiopia had not had a universal public education system for over two millennia, and had restarted modern education from scratch in 1941, in simple numeric terms, the strides that had been made were of considerable significance. Furthermore, the products of post-war Ethiopian educa-

---

<sup>32</sup>Haile Selassie, "Message from the Emperor," Convocation of Haile Selassie I University (Addis Ababa, 1961), p. 1.

<sup>33</sup>UNESCO, United Nations Statistical Yearbook (Paris: UNESCO, 1978), pp. 326-27.

tion had contributed a large percentage of the nation's leadership and and technocratic personnel in government, private industry, national defence and culture, and in that sense alone, seemed to have partly fulfilled Haile Selassie's foremost goal of introducing western education into the country for the specific purpose of modernizing his feudal autocracy.

Nevertheless, the choice of national and educational priorities, the manner in which education was dispensed, the introduction into the country's educational system of cultural penetration and the place of the educated in the new socio-economic milieu were all ridden with insurmountable problems. These were ultimately to negate what the Negus considered important gains, and were eventually to bring about his downfall in 1974.


#### Long Range Problems: A Critique of the Ethiopian School System under Haile Selassie

One primary aim of the Haile Selassie regime was the creation of And-Hezb (national integration) through the ultimate Amharization of the Ethiopian population, divided into some seventy distinctive linguistic groups with over 200 dialects (see Map 7). Amharic, it should be noted, is a first language for only about 20 percent of the population. By contrast, Oromic is the mother tongue of no less than 50 percent of the population<sup>34</sup> and is spoken in at least twelve of the fourteen provinces

---

<sup>34</sup>Donald N. Levine's estimate of the Oromo population in 1974 was 15 million, more than 50 percent of the national population. Other figures put it much higher, at 18 million. See Donald N. Levine, Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 38; and P.T.W. Baxter, "Ethiopia's Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo," African Affairs (The Royal African Society), LXXVII (July, 1978), p. 255.

Map 7  
 Geographic Locations of Major Ethnic and  
 Linguistic Groups of Ethiopia



of Ethiopia<sup>35</sup> (see Map 8). Tigringa, another major Ethiopian language, is spoken by a majority in Tigré and Eritrea.<sup>36</sup>

The Amharization of the Ethiopian school system was formally proclaimed after the Final Report of the Long-Term Planning Committee of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts recommended such action to the Board of Education in June, 1955.<sup>37</sup> A report reflecting national policy, which was later adopted, had pointed out in 1971 that although one should not suppress local vernaculars for initial exposure to education, "the promotion of Amharic at the various levels . . . is an important task that is fundamental to national integration."<sup>38</sup> When government officials talked of Ethiopianization of the Ethiopian school system, they meant, in fact, Amharization. The major objective was:

To Ethiopianize the content of education; to promote the national language, Amharic, as the medium of instruction.<sup>39</sup>

Non-Amharic languages were not to be used in the schools except when it became absolutely necessary. The policy was very clear. "The language of instruction in both first and second level schools would be

<sup>35</sup>Oromic is the language of the Oromos of Ethiopia, also known as the "Gallas." The latter name is, however, resented by the Oromos since it has negative connotations to some Ethiopian tribal chauvinists. The Oromos do not know the origin of the word "Galla" and are baffled when you address them as such. They have always referred to themselves as "Oromos." They also call their language "Afan Oromo" [the Oromo tongue].

<sup>36</sup>Berekete Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), pp. 86-96.


<sup>37</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Long Term Planning Committee, "A Ten Year Plan for the Controlled Expansion of Ethiopian Education" (Addis Ababa, 1955), pp. 92-93.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 111-13.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 113.

Map 8

## The Oromos in Ethiopia and Kenya



Amharic, with vernaculars used as necessary in the early grades to teach Amharic."<sup>40</sup>

Since the end of the Ethio-Italian war, Amharic, supplemented by English in the higher grades, has been the language of instruction in Ethiopian schools. The problem of learning English for those pupils whose mother tongue is Amharic is hard enough, but it becomes acute in the case of the non-Amharic speaking child who has to master both in addition to his native tongue.

Dr. Lilian O'Connor has put the picture as follows:

The language problem in which we are interested arises out of the fact that 1) the native mother tongues are numerous; 2) one of those mother tongues has been chosen as a national language; 3) the language of the school system is not always the language of the student's home and 4) an outside or a foreign language is needed for international communication.<sup>41</sup>

This would of course create serious problems on a national scale. For example, an Ethiopian educator, Girma Amare explains the problem of an Ethiopian child taught in English at an early age as follows:

The early employment of English as a medium of instruction puts the Ethiopian at a real disadvantage . . . . [It] expresses a totally different culture . . . [and] remains a purely classroom language. As soon as the child leaves his classroom, he uses his own mother tongue. Thus, the environment is not conducive to learning English at all. Faced with such disadvantages,

---

<sup>40</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report of the Education Sector Review," pp. 111-12.

<sup>41</sup>Lilian O'Connor, "Some Aspects of the Language Problem," Ethiopia Observer, II (March, 1958), p. 143.

the Ethiopian child finds English very difficult to learn and express himself in. In most cases, he fails to grasp a problem in Arithmetic or an explanation in History or Geography not because of difficulties that the subjects present but because of the language employed in explaining these subjects. The eager child, however, anxious to pass his examinations discovered that the only way out was to memorize what he was taught and not try to understand. Many however gave up altogether and dropped out on their way.<sup>42</sup>

Substitute Amharic for English and one can see the problem of an Oromo or a Tigré or a Guragé child attending primary school in Ethiopia. The failure rate and lack of interest among the non-Amhara children had as a result made the country's education lopsided, in favour of Amharic-speaking Shoans, Gojamés, and Gondarés.

Supporters of Amharization, primarily Amhara scholars, gave many reasons for this policy. They pointed out that the language was already widely spoken in Ethiopia and its importance would continue; that Amharic had been an official language of the country since 1270 and that an Ethiopian wishing to obtain a position in government offices should have good command of the language; that Amharic was the only language in Ethiopia that had its own script; that Amharic had been enriched by other Ethiopian languages during the Amhara conquest of other tribes and had as a result a richer vocabulary and was more flexible in expression.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>42</sup>Girma Amare, "Government Education in Ethiopia," Ethiopia Observer, VI (1963), pp. 340-42.

<sup>43</sup>Teshome G. Wagaw, Education in Ethiopia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979), pp. 121-25.



Foreign observers who know the ethnic makeup of Ethiopia and realize that Amharic is a minority language cannot help being puzzled about how the policy was initially decided upon and implemented, no matter what the rationale. Antoine Nteziryayo, for example, asks:

(1) How was the language issue settled without arousing antagonistic feelings among non-Amharic speakers? Or, (2) Was the influence of the Amharic culture in the country as a whole so pervasive that minority cultures did not have a say in the matter? (3) What were the reactions of non-Amharic-speaking parents whose children were required to learn a second foreign language in addition to English? (4) What concrete changes were effected in the curriculum to accommodate non-Amharic-speaking children?<sup>44</sup>

Indeed, no one asked other cultural groups what their choices would be, as it would have been unrealistic to even think of such a move; in Haile Selassie's court, a non-Amhara citizen was not allowed to speak directly with a judge in his mother tongue, even when the latter himself did not know the official language. By law, there had to be a simabalaw (interpreter) in between, despite the fact that neither would understand the Amharic translation; they continued to listen to each other, which was illegal, but could not be avoided.

An answer to Nteziryayo's second question, therefore, is a definite yes: the influence of the Amharic culture in the country as a whole supported and promoted by an autocratic state had become so

---

<sup>44</sup> Antoine Nteziryayo, "Review of Education in Ethiopia by Teshome G. Wagaw, " Comparative Education Review , Vol. XXV, No. 3 (1981), pp. 464-65.

pervasive that the other groups, even the majority Oromos, did not have a say in the matter.

What many outside observers have not been aware of is the fact that during the time of Haile Selassie no magazines, newspapers, or books were published except in Amharic or a few major European languages such as English and French. Oromic books written by such scholars as Anisimos Nesib (Aba Gémechis) were confiscated and burnt by the government security department. Oromo place names were systematically changed; thus, Finfiné, Bishoftu, Adama, and Ambo become Addis Ababa, Debré Zeit, Nazreth, and Hagere Hiywet, respectively.

The government deliberately refrained from encouraging the adoption of family names, which would have made legal claims and proceedings much easier. It was waiting until the Amharization process had run its full course. Since being called Galla, Somali, Guragé, Kaffa, Falasha, or any other non-Amharic nationality was slowly becoming derogatory, people were en masse changing their names to Amharic ones. The newborn, no matter which ethnic background they came from, were almost invariably given Amharic names. Since every person was known by his given name and his father's first name, many people who also spoke the official language in addition to their local vernacular started passing for Amharas. If this trend had continued it would have meant that in just a few generations the Amharic language and culture would have prevailed, and the 80 percent of the population consisting of non-Amharic tribes would have been victims of cultural genocide,

remembered only as curios of anthropological history.

The validity and justification of the arguments given for adopting Amharic as the only official language of instruction in the schools, as well as its status as the lingua franca of the nation, is indeed very questionable. That Amharic has been a court language in Ethiopia since the thirteenth century is not borne out by the facts. For example, Emperor Iyasu II, who reigned from 1730 to 1755, made Oromic the official language of Ethiopia. His son, Emperor Iyoas, who reigned from 1755 to 1769, not only continued the official language as Oromic, but spoke no other language himself.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, most other indigenous languages of Ethiopia had borrowed words from each other—including Amharic—and are as a result just as rich and flexible as Amharic.

That if the trends for the future development of Ethiopian education had to aspire to be democratic and the participation of all Ethiopians in the educational experience was to be achieved, the suppression of mother tongues and the imposition of a minority language would be considered inimical, is hard to dispute. The problem of the language of instruction, which must have been tackled and solved in a way which did not weaken national identity and destroy cultural

---

<sup>45</sup>Levine, Greater Ethiopia, pp. 83-84. For a scholarly analysis of the structure of Ethiopian languages, see Wolf Leslaw, The Scientific Investigation of the Ethiopian Languages (an inaugural Lecture delivered at the University College of Addis Ababa, February 12, 1954) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956); for Oromic see A.W. Hodson and E.H. Walker, Elementary and Practical Grammar of the Galla or Oromo Languages (London: S.P.C.K., 1922); for Tigray, see Wolf Leslaw, Documents Tigrigna-Ethiopiens Septentrional, Grammaire et Textes (Paris: Société de Linguistiques de Paris, 1941).

diversity, was indeed deliberately neglected by the feudal regime, whose major aim was to Amharize all Ethiopia forcibly and systematically.<sup>46</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the strongest opponents of Haile Selassie during the last days of his regime were the educated Oromos who comprised the largest ethnic block in the country. The new regime, the Derg, in order to win broad support, had to encourage local vernaculars, broadcast news in the major languages, Amharic, Tigray, Oromic, etc., and allow the publication of periodicals in languages other than Amharic—a practice considered heretical and non-Ethiopian during the feudal regime.

Another major problem in the long-range educational development during the Haile Selassie regime was that education for girls lagged far behind that of boys. Female enrolment was dismally low. Ministry of Education records show that from 1956 to 1980 the enrolment of female students at all levels of government, mission, private,

<sup>46</sup>The policy was becoming so successful, at least on the surface, that the educated Ethiopians rarely involved themselves in questioning its implications openly. However, this had its own backlash for the feudal regime. The intelligentsia were for the first time united against it. And, frightened by these unexpected turns of events, the régime attempted to rekindle tribalism. It used the government-controlled mass media to encourage what it called community self-help projects based on ethnic groups. The Macha Tulama (Oromo Association), the Tigré, Guragé, and Walmo Associations were thus formed in 1966. A large number of educated civilians and generals joined these tribal movements and later found themselves jailed or incarcerated. The fate of people like Generals Tadesse Berou and Dawit of the Macha Tulama, who ended up getting sentences of life imprisonment, and Dr. Mengesha Gebre Hiwet of the Tigré Association, who fell out of favour with the Emperor and lost his Assistant Minister's position, were results of the machinations of the Shoa-Amhara faction, led by Aklilu Habte Wold, who was Prime Minister and who greatly influenced the aging Emperor's policies during his final years.

community and church schools in the Empire of Ethiopia was only 51,439, while in contrast, male enrolment was 173,495.<sup>47</sup>

This neglect, without doubt, reflects the status of women who formed more than half the population of Ethiopia (see Table 10).

Traditionally, Ethiopian women were trained to acquire:

... polished manners, politeness, obedience, and reverence for age. Bowing low when greeting elders or strangers and receiving articles in both hands were part of the training. Marriages were arranged by parents and it was considered immodest for a girl to flirt.<sup>48</sup>

That the Ethiopian school system always tried to fit the girls into this traditional straitjacket can be seen from the fact that even at the University College of Addis Ababa, in order to earn their degrees, all women students had to take three hours of training a week in "clothing and dress-making for the family, nutrition, planning the meal, marketing, cooking, and serving meals."<sup>49</sup> They also studied home nursing, child care, entertaining and interior decoration. Education for girls was therefore not for their own individual benefit. Nor was it for national growth in a country where women outnumbered men. It was rather for the personal benefit of their future husbands.

<sup>47</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Bureau of Educational Research and Statistics, Government, Mission, Private, Community and Church Schools (Addis Ababa, 1960), p. 6.

<sup>48</sup>This practice with certain variations is, unfortunately, widespread and is not unique to Ethiopia. For the quotation above, see Teshome G. Wagaw, Education in Ethiopia, pp. 67-69.

<sup>49</sup>Sylvia Pankhurst, "The University College of Addis Ababa," Ethiopia Observer, XI (May, 1958), p. 206.

TABLE 10

Urban (U), Rural (R) and Total (T) Population by Age and Sex 1974

Age Groups		thous.	‰*	thous.	‰*	thous.	‰*	Ratio of males (M) to females (F)		
								M per 100 F	M	F
Under 10	U	420	29.3	461	30.3	881	29.7	91	47.7	52.3
	R	3,944	31.5	3,756	31.1	7,700	31.3	105	51.2	48.8
	T	4,364	31.2	4,217	31.0	8,581	31.1	103	50.9	49.1
Under 15	U	592	41.4	637	41.5	1,229	41.4	92	48.2	51.8
	R	5,484	43.8	5,217	43.2	10,701	43.5	105	51.2	48.8
	T	6,076	43.5	5,854	43.0	11,930	43.3	104	50.9	49.1
15-29	U	366	25.5	370	24.1	736	24.8	99	50.3	49.7
	R	3,405	27.2	3,225	26.7	6,630	27.0	106	51.4	48.6
	T	3,771	27.0	3,595	26.4	7,366	26.7	103	51.2	48.8
30-59	U	415	28.9	465	30.3	880	29.6	90	47.2	52.8
	R	3,130	25.0	3,031	25.1	6,161	25.1	103	50.8	49.2
	T	3,545	25.4	3,496	25.7	7,041	25.5	101	50.3	49.7
Over 59	U	62	4.3	63	4.1	125	4.2	98	49.6	50.4
	R	501	4.0	604	5.0	1,105	4.4	83	45.3	54.7
	T	563	4.0	667	4.9	1,230	4.5	84	45.8	54.2
All ages	U	1,435	100.0	1,535	100.0	2,970	100.0	93	48.3	51.7
	R	12,520	100.0	12,077	100.0	24,597	100.0	104	50.9	49.1
	T	13,955	100.0	13,612	100.0	27,567	100.0	102	50.6	49.4

\*Share in male, female or total population, respectively.

\*\*Share in age group.

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts (Addis Ababa: 1975).

The typical red tape and rigidity which characterized the day to day performance of Ethiopian government mandarins was another major problem of the Ethiopian school system. One Jesuit educator pointed out, for example, the difficulties he faced as director of a high school in Ethiopia, one being "recuperating documents once they had been laid to rest in the archives of the Ministry of Education." He adds:

This always took too much time, time that was taken away from work to be done at the school. Money . . . was always a problem . . . money for repairs and needed improvements. As a rule, I found that dealing with any and all the ministries and with the State Bank took too much time. . . . Mail service with reference to parcel post was very poor. As we had a mail box at the post office, we received our letters without problems. But parcels were an entirely different matter.<sup>50</sup>

This rigid bureaucracy extended even to the university itself, where most clerical work was handled by Ethiopian personnel. Professor Paul Mohr, who was a member of the English Department at Haile Selassie University thus points out that he

. . . soon learned that the H.S.I.U. administration up at Sidist Kilo was cooperative and friendly at the personal level but hierarchical, remote and bureaucratic at the official level. Decisions came very slowly if at all and a sense of humor could work wonders. Otherwise, I ignored the existence of administrators wherever possible and kept the 'science' going.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup>Vincent Monty, in response to our questionnaire, October 16, 1981.

<sup>51</sup>Paul Mohr, in response to our questionnaire, November 10, 1981.

Another major problem in Ethiopian education during the time of Haile Selassie was that no matter what level of achievement it had reached, Ethiopia did not move at the same pace as the rest of the newly-emerging African nations. We have already pointed out how the Haile Selassie regime took pride in the progress modern education had made in Ethiopia since 1941, and that numerically speaking, that was justified. Nevertheless, it is a different picture altogether if comparisons are made with other African countries which had outstripped Ethiopia in the development of education since their independence from the European colonial powers.

The 1960s, it should be remembered, were the years of pan-Africanism; Ethiopia could no longer afford to isolate itself from this emerging movement. Yet the decade was also a decade of soul searching for the regime and for all educated Ethiopians. As Teshome Wagaw points out:

We began to interact directly with other sovereign African states and to compare educational notes with them. The comparison was to bring traumatic shocks. . . . If freedom and independence were to be measured in terms of secular educational achievements, Ethiopia did not like what she learned. She was at the bottom of the hierarchy.<sup>52</sup>

During the academic year 1961-62, for example, Ethiopia had one of the three lowest enrolment percentages of school age population in all of Africa. While enrolment per school age population was 6.6 percent for Ethiopia, it was 41.9 percent for Uganda, 42 percent for

<sup>52</sup>Teshome G. Wagaw, Education in Ethiopia, pp. 147-52.



Nigeria, 46.5 percent for Ghana, 61 percent for Kenya, 63 percent for Tunisia and 66 percent for Egypt.<sup>53</sup>

As Haddis Alemayehu, the Ethiopian Vice-Minister of Education, went on record as saying, the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts had to admit:

In terms of the number of students currently enrolled in her schools and of the national investment in education, Ethiopia has fallen seriously behind most other African countries.<sup>54</sup>

The Ministry of Education's report also pointed out that although some improvements were made, the goals of the first five-year plan were unfulfilled since only 4.3 percent of the secondary age and 10 percent of the primary school age children attended school in 1960. The high attrition rate, inadequate training of teachers and the low level of female enrolment were also noted as very serious compared with other African nations.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup>United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations Publications, 1961-1966), passim.

<sup>54</sup>Haddis Alemayehu, interview in Addis Zemen, 10 Ginbot 1956 [May 1961], pp. 1-3.

<sup>55</sup>But Haile Selassie, refusing to accept this situation, quoted an Ethiopian saying, "One should live within the means available at home, instead of trying to imitate neighbours." In a speech during a high school graduation ceremony in 1961 at which the author was present, the Vice-Minister of Education, Haddis Alemayehu, in one of the most courageous actions made by an Ethiopian government official, openly criticized Haile Selassie by replying that the era of the old saying was passé, and that Ethiopia should and could not help comparing herself with her fast-developing neighbours. (Haddis Alemayehu, interview in Addis Zemen, 10 Ginbot [May 1961].) The Negus's answer was the immediate removal of the Vice-Minister from his position. This was, of course, typical of the Emperor. Haile Selassie was sensitive to criticism and well-meaning Ethiopian officials always found themselves as ambassadors—considered in the national tradition to be a form of exile. After losing his position, Haddis Alemayehu had to spend most of his years as an Ethiopian ambassador abroad.

The UNESCO Conference of 1961 at which all independent African States participated had set the following objectives for the continent:

... to provide a forum for African States to decide on their priority educational needs, to promote economic and social development in Africa and, in the light of these, to establish first tentative short-term and long-term plans.<sup>56</sup>

These plans were to be conducted as follows:

1. Short-term plan targets (1961-66)
  - a) An annual 5 percent increase of enrolment at the primary level which would mean an increase in enrolment from the then existing mean of 40 percent to 51 percent by the end of the plan.
  - b) An increase in enrolment in second level education from 3 percent to 9 percent. During the short-term period, this was to receive highest attention.
2. Long-term plan targets (1961-81)
  - a) Universal, free, and compulsory primary education.
  - b) Education at the second level for 30 percent of those who completed primary school.
  - c) Higher education, mostly in Africa, for 20 percent of those who completed secondary school.
  - d) Constant improvement of the quality of African schools and universities.<sup>57</sup>

Although this was clearly an ambitious project, at the time it was thought to be feasible. But the manner in which experts and educational administrators in the country received the recommendation and offered to solve the problem within the target date was grossly erroneous, if not down-

<sup>56</sup>Haile Selassie, "Inaugural Address," UNESCO-ECA Final Report (UNESCO E.D/181, 1961), pp. 1-21.

<sup>57</sup>UNESCO-ECA, Final Report (UNESCO E.D/181, 1961).

right irresponsible. The officials did not admit the apparent inadequacies of the Ethiopian school system whereby they could have suggested workable alternatives to solve the problem in question. They did not have clearly defined and meaningful guidelines for the school system to follow.<sup>58</sup> Instead, they created a false picture of the country's educational standing and its future course under the feudal regime. While this was a routine practice (as we have explained above in connection with Ethiopia's rigid bureaucracy), in this particular case Ethiopian

---

<sup>58</sup>There were, of course, exceptions. The ideas, ideals and long-range objectives envisaged by some foreign educators were frequently not different from those of the Ethiopian radicals who later overthrew Haile Selassie. In a response to our survey, for example, Vincent Monty, a former school administrator in Ethiopia, suggested the following as the goals that he thought Ethiopian education should have followed: "1. A national education, that would give to all Ethiopians a common ideal, a common national pride, a common loyalty to their nation and country. This would tend to eliminate the rivalries between ethnic groups, the misunderstandings between different religious denominations, the animosity between different social levels. With common ideas and ideals drawn from education, there would be some hope for true unity in Ethiopia. 2. An international education, by which I mean an education that would help Ethiopian students to look beyond the horizons of their own country, to see the world as a whole and to perceive the place and role of their country in the world of nations, to thus overcome a certain isolationism and become interested in the whole family of man, seeking to live in harmony with all peoples, whatever their race, color, religion, nationality or social standing. 3. A moral education, both individually and socially. a) Individually, an education that would inculcate the basic moral principles and practices by which men should live. b) Socially, an education that would train each individual to look beyond himself or herself, to realize that we all have social duties, that we cannot be content with enjoying whatever we have (education, wealth at any degree, power and influence, etc.) without sharing with others who are less privileged. I was struck, in Ethiopia, by the enormous gap between the very rich and the extremely poor. I should favor an education that would train the students, both theoretically and practically, to work for the improvement of the masses " (emphasis added). Vincent Monty, response to our survey questionnaire, October 16, 1981.

government forecasts were inflated out of proportion to reality to satisfy African and international audiences. Since one main goal of the plan was to enrol 100 percent of the primary school-age children by 1980, Ethiopia's 20-year "Proposed Plan for the Development of Education in Ethiopia" was broken down into 5-year periods, on the assumption that 4 to 6 percent of the national income would be allocated annually for education, the rest financed with foreign aid, thus permitting the attainment of full primary school enrolment by 1982-83. Although we shall not make a detailed assessment of this deceptive projection, since we have pointed out above that Ethiopia consistently spent less than 3 percent of its gross domestic product between 1960 and 1970 on education, for general interest we should like to draw attention to Table 11, which shows the incredibly optimistic picture created by Ethiopian officials and foreign experts. In 1965-66, for example, they forecast enrolment figures at 724,955 for primary schools, 73,840 for secondary schools, and 6,731 for the university level. The actual figures were soon found to be 378,750, 55,588, and 2,256, respectively.<sup>59</sup>

According to the official plan, the number of primary school students in 1967-68 and 1972-73 would be 1 and 2.2 million, respectively. The actual figures, however, were 452,457 and 792,000, respectively. For secondary school enrolment, forecasts were 109,100 and 329,600 for 1967-68 and 1972-73, but the actual figures were 71,467 and 118,230,

---

<sup>59</sup>United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (New York: 1968-1970), passim.

TABLE 11

## Ethiopia's Proposed Plan for the Development of Education

	1962/63	1967/68	1972/73	1977/78	1982/83
Population in millions	20.5	22.0	23.6	25.3	27.0
Per Capita income in Eth. \$	100.0	120.0	140.0	160.0	180.0
Public Expenditure on Education per inhabitant in Eth. \$	1.5	4.5	8.0	8.0	11.0
<b>PRIMARY EDUCATION</b>					
Enrolment grades 1-6 (in millions)	0.3	1.0	2.2	3.3	4.4
School age population (in millions)	3.3	3.6	3.8	4.1	4.4
% enrolled	9.9	30.4	58.2	79.2	100.0
<b>SECONDARY EDUCATION</b>					
Enrolment (in thousands)	34.7	109.1	329.6	504.4	690.0
School age population (in millions)	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.1	3.3
% enrolled	1.4	4.0	11.2	16.9	20.0
Academic Enrolment as % of total	65.0	48.0	43.0	38.0	35.0
<b>HIGHER EDUCATION</b>					
Enrolment (in thousands)	2.6	10.1	21.4	40.6	54.0
School age population (in millions)	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.7
% enrolled	0.1	0.4	1.0	1.6	2.0

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, A Proposed Plan for the Development of Education in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: 1961), p. 11.

respectively. University student enrolment was projected at 10, 100 for 1967-68 and 21, 400 for 1972-73;<sup>60</sup> actual enrolments were 6, 001 and 9, 142, respectively.<sup>61</sup> The discrepancies here are overwhelmingly clear.

Another long-range problem of the Ethiopian school system which was seriously handicapping the nation's progress towards economic development was the fact that vocational training was largely neglected. In 1960, for example, while there was a total of 813 students studying abroad, 289 of them were pursuing degrees in humanities, social sciences and fine arts, while only 110 studied in vocational fields.<sup>62</sup> As Edouard Trudeau pointed out in 1964, technical education was a "poor, undeveloped sector in the educational system, with less than a thousand students and about 10% of the overall secondary school enrollment . . . the situation was not encouraging."<sup>63</sup>

Our analysis of data covering twenty years actually shows not only an appalling gap between enrolments in arts and vocational studies but that the gap was continuously widening. Thus, as shown in Figure 2 , while the increase in the number of students per 1000 secondary school

---


<sup>60</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, A Proposed Plan for the Development of Education in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Press, 1961), p. 11.

<sup>61</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Annual Report (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1969), passim; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1974-1977 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1978), passim.

<sup>62</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Bureau of Educational Research and Statistics, Government, Mission . . . Schools, p. 16.

<sup>63</sup>Trudeau, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," p. 18.

Figure 2  
 Number of Secondary School Students per 1,000 Secondary  
 School Age Population 1951-71



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962 (Geneva: United Nations Office), *passim*; and UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1977 (Geneva: United Nations Office, 1978), *passim*.

age population enrolled in liberal arts sharply climbed from 2 to 43, the corresponding number of vocational trainees kept to a low level plateau of 1-2 percent between the years 1951 and 1971.<sup>64</sup>

Another long-range problem of the Ethiopian school system was lack of perspective in selecting priorities. To take just one case in its modernizing process, agriculture was perhaps the most important single activity that Ethiopia should have tried to expand and develop. It is well known that the country depended on agricultural products for roughly 90% of its foreign earnings.<sup>65</sup> Potentially, the Ethiopian plateau is said to be so rich that it could be the granary of the Middle East. Yet without qualified experts, the age-old primitive nature of Ethiopian agriculture could not be transformed. One would normally have expected the government to give the highest priority to the training of large numbers of students in the fields of modern agricultural methods. But instead, the feudal regime gave precedence to training liberal arts students in order to produce mandarins and lawyers to man its burgeoning bureaucratic structure.<sup>66</sup> Thus, as shown in Figure 3, while


<sup>64</sup>This problem is widespread around the world. In Quebec, Canada, for example, the same trend was seen following the educational reforms of the 1960s when Jean Lesage's Liberal Party launched what was known as "La Révolution Tranquille." It is not a coincidence, therefore, that the banner of radicalism in both Ethiopia and Quebec in the 1960s and 70s was carried by the masses of social science students whose socio-economic and political status seemed uncertain, despite the technological expansion that was taking place.

<sup>65</sup>Irvin Kaplan, et al., Area Handbook for Ethiopia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. viii.

<sup>66</sup>During a span of ten years, 1963-1973, agriculture constituted only 4.2 percent of the state's ordinary and capital expenditure. See Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts (May 2, 1974), p. 16.



Figure 3  
Third Level Graduates by Field of Study



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962,  
and Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1977.

liberal arts graduates increased from 27% in 1960 to 73% in 1973, the corresponding percentage for those in the field of agriculture decreased from 28% in 1960 to 7% in 1973.

It is due to this fact that agriculture, which grew at the low rate of 2.2 percent per year from 1963 to 1969, declined from 67 to 57 percent of the total gross national product, and that agricultural and urban incomes were to remain grossly in favour of the latter. In addition, during the same period,

Monetary GDP per capita grew more . . . than twice as fast, rising from \$67 in 1963 to \$91 in 1969. . . . Income per capita for the rural population in 1969 was estimated at \$109, of which only one-third was monetary, while the urban population had a per capita income of \$680, of which 95 percent was monetary.<sup>67</sup>

Another major problem in the Ethiopian school system concerned the disproportionate nature of educational expansion throughout the country. The neglect of agricultural education and the relative decline of rural income coincided with the fact that the city of Addis Ababa and certain regions of the country were developing at the expense of other regions. For example, the condition of this urban/rural dichotomy was described in 1972:

Schools are concentrated primarily in the more densely populated regions, and as a result school participation rates vary significantly among the provinces. In Addis Ababa it was estimated that 35 percent of the primary school-age group, 7-12, attended school in 1970/71 whereas the figure in Harar was

---

<sup>67</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report of the Education Sector Review," pp. 11-14.

less than 6 percent. Four provinces had about 60 percent of total enrollment but only about 35 percent of primary school-age children. At the awraja level, disparities are even more pronounced, ranging from the participation rate of 39 percent for Gondar down to almost zero in some awrajas such as Kebri Dahr in Harar which has only one school with 384 pupils and Elkere in Bale which has one school with 54 pupils.

Distribution of secondary school enrollment is even more unequitable. In 1970/71, 58 percent of total enrollment in senior secondary schools was concentrated in the provinces of Addis Ababa, Shewa, and Eritrea which had only about 27 percent of the secondary school-age population. At the other end of the scale, five provinces had only one senior secondary school each, with enrollments in each averaging only a little more than 800.<sup>68</sup>

This problem has been repeatedly pointed out by those who knew the conditions of Ethiopian education. William M. Germain, a Jesuit priest who taught in Ethiopia from 1950 to 1953 and is presently teaching in India, commented:

Ethiopia is an agricultural country and hopefully always will be, like Denmark and Holland, so that more [educated] people may live and work in rural areas. Look at what has been done for Siberia by sending so many exiles there! Why does it have to be by force, why not make isolated places better—good boarding schools can integrate the country. . . . Too much emphasis put on Addis [Ababa]. . . . The tendency . . . always 'to show off' . . . the gate of the University was a clear example, built before anything else! Bhutan is doing well in having the College in Eastern Bhutan,

---

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., pp. 11-18.

not at the capital. Nepal has followed the pattern of Ethiopia, everything centralized in Kattamandu.<sup>69</sup>

The "showing off" that Germain observed in 1950-53 continued unabated, and by 1974 there were two distinct sectors in Ethiopia. One, usually recognized by the outside world, had a façade of social and economic transformation. In this sector, the progress of change was striking to the casual observer. Travel was carried out in jets, manned entirely by Ethiopian crews, that landed at a well-equipped and well-run modern airport, similar to those found in the developed world. Limousines sped along wide tree-lined boulevards to the centre of a bustling city. Along the streets were huge supermarkets lavishly stocked with all the engaging gadgetry of modern consumer products. There was a university, and several light industries producing many types of contemporary commodities for the burgeoning urban elite. Everywhere, the economic landscape seemed impressive. Government statistics showed an oil refinery, and a series of dams, ports, hydroelectric projects, roads, bridges, schools and clinics. Nevertheless, this was a false image, and led to a clearly misleading perception of the country at large.

---

<sup>69</sup> The "gate of the university" that Germain mentions was built in the early 1950s. It remained there until the 1970s, even though there was no university building inside. It was, in fact, a grazing ground for the city's goats and donkeys, until a hospital was built on the site in the mid-1960s. The quotation above is from an answer Germain provided us in a questionnaire conducted October 17, 1981.

There was still the market area to the west of Addis Ababa, teeming with thousands of squatters in shanty towns who had left the countryside out of extreme degradation and misery.<sup>70</sup> This was a problem that arose with the introduction of a capitalist mode of production into the modern agricultural sector controlled by the aristocracy and the new comprador bourgeoisie. The peasants, who formerly farmed the land, were not wanted; others who could not compete moved to the capital city. This problem has plagued all African countries that have been tied to the world capitalist economy. As Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein point out:

[It] has become evident that the continued expansion of the so called 'modern sector' to the detriment of the needs of the vast majority of Africans has led them to escape from rural poverty only to join the ranks of the unemployed in the towns and cities.<sup>71</sup>

In the Chilalo district of Arusi, for example, with the advent of mechanized agriculture, owned either by traditional landlords or the rising urban bourgeoisie, 20 percent of the tenant farmers were forcibly evicted from the land on which their forefathers had lived for hundreds of years. Not only because of a lack of education and modern skills, but also because no jobs were available, many of these people had no employment opportunities (see Table 12). They were thus reduced to petty thievery,

<sup>70</sup> A. Mistahl, Ethiopia: Political Contradiction in Agricultural Development (Uppsala: Political Science Association in Uppsala, 1974), pp. 10-56.

<sup>71</sup> Peter C.W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (London: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 12.

TABLE 12

Able-bodied, Economically Active, and Hired Population (1970)

	Total	Able-Bodied*	Economically Active**	Hired	Economically Active Percentage of total	of Able-bodied	Hired Percentage of Economically Active
Rural	22, 544, 000	14, 073, 000	8, 727, 000	250, 000	38.7	62.0	2.9
Urban	2, 016, 000	1, 144, 000	629, 000	369, 000	31.2	55.0	58.7
Total	24, 560, 000	15, 217, 000	9, 356, 000	619, 000	38.1	61.5	6.6

\* For rural areas 10-59 years of age; for urban areas 15-59 years of age.

\*\* Rural Economically Active included "helping family members."

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts (Addis Ababa: 1971), passim.

vandalism, prostitution and pauperism.

And some 15 miles outside the city, there was in fact an entirely different world. This second sector was the real Ethiopia. Here, no change had taken place for thousands of years. The mode of production of this sector was extremely primitive. Peasants tilled the soil with gruelling old-fashioned tools and techniques. Instead of limousines, one saw mules, camels and donkeys. Disparities between official optimism about the nation's economic development and the realities of the country were indeed staggering.

Although the only hope that the population of the neglected areas had for improving their lot lay in the expansion of educational opportunities, their aspirations could not be realized. As discussed above, the geographical distribution of schools in Ethiopia was incredibly disproportionate. It not only favoured the urban areas over the rural ones, but was very concentrated in a few regions. In 1968, for example, enrolment figures for Asmara and Addis Ababa included 58 percent of the school-age population, while the corresponding figure for the rural regions of Lasta, Wadla Dalanta, and Merha Bété was only 1 percent. Whereas Shoa, Addis Ababa, Hamasien and Asmara had schools within walking distance of most students, 31 sub-provinces had one school per 1,600 square kilometres or even more.<sup>72</sup> In spite of the fact that

<sup>72</sup>The problem becomes even more acute when one considers the fact that there are few roads in the rural regions; most of the areas are criss-crossed with rivers without bridges, sharp escarpments, chains of mountains, and gorges that dwarf the Grand Canyon. Maaza Bekele, "Some Thoughts on the Future," Ethiopia Observer, II (19 March, 1958), p. 135; Sylvia Pankhurst, "Education in Ethiopia: Secondary Education," Ethiopia Observer, II (1958), p. 162. For figures, see Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Annual Report 1969 pp. 8-9.

92 percent of school-age children lived in the rural areas, as against 8 percent in urban areas, 60 percent of the school-age children in urban areas were provided with schooling, whereas only 3.7 percent of those in rural areas had that opportunity. There was significant variation even within the rural regions. Whereas sub-provincial enrolment in Tigré Province, for example, was less than 2 percent, Eritrea, Wollega, Illubalor and Kaffa had the highest enrolment percentages. Many schools in the rural areas also had an incomplete grade structure. In 1967-68, for example, 437 out of 1,016 government primary schools, almost all in rural areas, had fewer than six grades in their school systems.<sup>73</sup>

A study conducted to investigate the problems of admission to the national university, covering the period between 1963 and 1969 gave the following picture. Students from the provinces of Shoa (including Addis Ababa), Eritrea and Hararge (the home province of the Emperor) supplied 88 percent of the university freshmen, although the three provinces constituted only 37 percent of the Ethiopian population. The provinces of Gemu Gofa, Illubalour, Wollega, and Sidamo on the other hand supplied .05 percent, .3 percent, .5 percent, and .7 percent, respectively. (For the size of the provinces and their total population, see Table 13.) These latter schools, it was found, were overcrowded, and had inferior teaching personnel and equipment.<sup>74</sup> At the senior high school level, Addis Ababa, Shoa, and Eritrea had 61 percent enrolment.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Haile Wolde Michael, "The Problems of Admissions to the University through School Leaving Certificate Examinations" (May, 1969), pp. 1-12.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 34.



TABLE 13

## Provinces: Area and Population (1974)

Provinces and Their Administrative Centres*	Area thous. sq km	Population, thous.			Density per sq km
		Rural	Urban**	Total	
Arussi (Asella)	23.5	927	43 (4.4)	970	41.3
Bale (Goba)	124.6	760	21 (2.7)	781	6.3
Eritrea (Asmara)	117.6	1,680	481 (22.3)	2,161	18.4
Gemu Gofa (Arba Minch)	39.5	870	21 (2.3)	891	22.6
Gojam (Debre Markos)	61.6	1,742	72 (4.0)	1,814	30.0
Gondar*** (Gondar)	74.2	1,736	92 (4.7)	1,828	24.7
Hararghe (Harar)	259.7	2,588	194 (7.0)	2,782	10.7
Illubabor (Mettu)	47.4	665	28 (4.0)	693	14.6
Kefa (Jimma)	54.6	1,361	90 (6.2)	1,451	26.6
Shoa (Addis Ababa)	85.2	4,187	1,483 (26.1)	5,670	66.5
Sidamo (Awasa)	117.3	2,355	144 (5.8)	2,499	21.3
Tigray (Mekele)	65.9	1,770	140 (7.3)	1,910	29.0
Wollega (Nekemte)	71.2	1,745	53 (3.0)	1,798	25.2
Wollo (Dessie)	79.4	2,217	108 (4.6)	2,325	30.0
All provinces	1,221.9	24,597	2,970 (10.8)	27,567	22.6

\* Since 1976 officially called administrative regions.

\*\* In parentheses: percentage of urban population to total.

\*\*\* Old name Beghemder; renamed in April 1976.

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts (Addis Ababa: 1975).

In terms of literacy, no more than 7 percent of the rural population was literate; the corresponding figure for the urban population was over 50 percent. The trend of disparity was increasing rather than decreasing. For example, literacy for rural men between the ages of 20-44 was 10 to 12 percent, while that for the 10-19 year age group declined to a mere 7 percent.<sup>76</sup> In terms of regional variation, literacy rates were 56 percent in Addis Ababa, 27 in Eritrea, 4.3 in Gamu Gofa, 3.5 in Harar, 3 in Wollo, and lower than 3 percent in Tigré, Gojam, Arussi and Sidamo.

Rural schools, where they existed, were also plagued by "lack of library, the inability of students to [obtain] books, the general paucity of resources."<sup>77</sup> And as Professor Pion put it, "more and more students [were] swallowed by a system which [lacked] the basic facilities: classrooms, teachers, textbooks, etc."<sup>78</sup>

In general terms, the problems facing the Ethiopian school system up to the time of the Emperor's overthrow were so many that it is difficult to imagine how the regime could have continued to ignore them. A good example is a report submitted to the Council of Ministers in 1966. Officials submitting the report (comprised of Ethiopians and foreigners) pointed out:

<sup>76</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report on the Current Operation of the Educational System of Ethiopia" (Addis Ababa, 1969), pp. 1-30.

<sup>77</sup>Professor Thomas R. Knipp, who taught in Ethiopia from 1956-61 and 1968-70, in response to our survey, November 17, 1981.

<sup>78</sup>Gilles Pion, in response to our questionnaire, November 4, 1981.

Any educational system is made up of five component units: (a) students, (b) teachers, (c) facilities, (d) curriculum (syllabuses), and (e) administrators (finance is omitted since all of the five component units involve finance for their implementation) whose duty is to create a climate which is the most conducive to learning. A vigorous and flourishing education system is one where these component units are healthy and where there is an effective and lively communication among them. If any one of these five integral parts is diseased, the other four are bound to be affected. . . .

In the case of Ethiopia, our study has revealed that not one, but all five, of the integral units mentioned above are inadequately developed. The result is that Ethiopian education is today facing a serious dislocation. It is known that many students are restless and undisciplined, and those who do take their studies seriously are handicapped by obstacles: in the provinces, students have to leave their homes and parents in pursuit of education and live in crowded and unhygienic conditions where there are not even the minimum facilities (such as electricity and a table and chair, not to mention privacy) that are indispensable for effective study.<sup>79</sup>

An Ethiopian educator, Dr. Aklilu Habte, had also enumerated the following major problems which faced the Ethiopian school system in 1967:

Ethiopia's educational system, undersized as it is, is harassed by a number of unresolved difficulties. Among the more important of these may be noted: the absence of carefully worked-out educational policies; the lack of dynamic and

---

<sup>79</sup>But no corrective actions were taken, and in 1969 the editors of the Ethiopian Journal of Education pointed out that the Report was "no less accurate now than when it first appeared almost three years ago." See Ethiopian Journal of Education, III (June, 1969), p. 52. For the quotation above see, Committee on the Operation of the Education System, The Current State of Affairs: A Short Review (Addis Ababa, November 1968), pp. 1-30.

professionally competent leadership; the unfair incidence and insufficient yield of the education tax; the patchwork character of the school curricula; the inadequate supply of suitable textbooks—even when suitable textbooks exist; the language situation, which bristles with difficulties, political and linguistic as well as pedagogic; the hasty and uncritical acceptance of recommendations from foreign advisers—or their equally hasty and uncritical rejection; the appalling shortage of qualified teachers.<sup>80</sup>

The chronic problems enumerated above could not be solved for many years because rivalries and disagreements were rampant among the Ethiopian officials and foreign experts. In structuring the curriculum, for example, which could have alleviated a few of the quantitative and qualitative shortcomings in the Ethiopian school system, agreements could not be reached. Different groups were formed around different ideas and each considered its alternative better. The problem of curriculum was, of course, difficult to solve during the time of Haile Selassie because the substantial alienation of the content of education dispensed in Ethiopian schools was reinforced by the institutional isolation of the educational system from the needs of the people. The contradictions between the needs of the Ethiopian people—socio-economic development—and that of the feudal government—the modernization of autocracy—had always been irreconcilable. This inconsistency was clearly manifest in the structural configuration of the primary and high school system which was, to say the least, chaotic and irrationally

---

<sup>80</sup>Aklilu Habte, "Brain Drain in the Elementary School: Why Teachers Leave the Profession," The Ethiopian Journal of Education, vol. 1, no. 4 (1967), p. 27.

organized.

The unresolved argument that raged among experts up to the time Haile Selassie was overthrown in 1974 was between those who contended that six years of education was sufficient for entrance into a 4-year secondary school, and those who suggested that 8-year primary schooling was the bare minimum for first level education. The latter also recommended that a 1-4 year basic and 5-8 year middle school educational system be part of the curriculum. The Ministry of Education had, however, adopted a 6-year elementary, 2-year junior, and 4-year senior secondary educational system. Then a group of experts suggested that the last stage be reduced by one year. But another proposal also soon gained currency. This proposal advocated six years of elementary and three years of junior secondary education for half of the students. It also suggested a reduction of the 6-year secondary level education.

The exponents of the 6-2-3 system contended that by reducing by one year, the government would save money, while the advocates of the 6-2-4 system pointed out that one could not reduce secondary level education from six years to less without affecting the standard and quality of education that would prepare a student for college. Both groups considered the 2-year junior secondary school as a transition period during which vocational training and regular academic work would be pursued.

The exponents of the 6-3 and 6-2-3 systems presented diverse arguments for their proposals. The first argument was that the Haile

Selassie regime could not afford to educate all secondary school-age pupils for six years. They suggested instead providing half of them with only three years of secondary education, which would prepare them to fulfil the manpower requirements of the Second Five-Year Plan. The second argument was that a 6-year secondary was too long a period during which time manpower wastage could accrue due to drop-outs. They suggested instead that secondary schools concentrated in Addis Ababa and a few provincial capitals be decentralized and extended to other regions by adding ninth grades to schools which already had eighth grades. Finally, it was argued that diversification of programs in such junior secondary schools would be possible as local needs dictated and that junior college graduates could be assigned to fill their teaching positions.

In spite of the diversity in these arguments, the adherents of the three different systems described above all shared the beliefs that: vocational training should be an integral part of secondary education; that for basic education, 6-year elementary courses are sufficient; and that Amharic, which despite being the mother tongue of less than one-third of the population was already the lingua franca of the nation, should be the language of instruction at the elementary level.<sup>81</sup>

The surprising thing about the debates that raged around the four pedagogical alternatives described above was, however, the fact

---

<sup>81</sup>Tadesse Tereffe, "Progress, Problems, and Prospects in Ethiopian Education," Ethiopia Observer, VIII (1964), pp. 6-13; Assefa Bekele, "The Educational Framework of Economic Development in Ethiopia," Ethiopia Observer, XI (1967), pp. 50-51.

that the exponents of the different approaches did not judge it important to evaluate Ethiopia's education desideratum in terms of the objective and subjective conditions existing at the time and the socio-economic needs of the people in the years to follow. Nor did they recognize the worthiness of investigating what had caused the alienation of students from the mainstream of the established elite. The majority of arguments implicitly or explicitly revolved around the idea of "quality of education" in the abstract, as if this "quality" could be specified independently of the material conditions that were structured to siphon the wealth created by the labour of the uneducated peasants and underpaid workers into the money banks of the feudal lords, the Church and the Emperor. It might be worth remembering that while this debate was going on, famine had already killed hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians; the alienated students and teachers were taking the plight of their countrymen into the political arena; and Haile Selassie was making a last-ditch attempt to keep the lid on Ethiopia's seething political cauldron.

#### Cultural Penetration and the Hyphenated Intelligentsia

We have already described Britain's interest in making Ethiopia its protectorate, and its later decision to abandon the plan mainly because of fear of being bogged down in a long, drawn-out war with the Ethiopian patriots at a time when Hitler's ambitions in Europe and Britain's course towards a major clash with Germany seemed inevitable.<sup>82</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup>See Chapter III, above, pp. 151-53.

But even though the United Kingdom desisted from a prolonged occupation of Ethiopia, it secured the province of Ogaden for itself and turned its efforts instead into setting in motion a process of cultural penetration through the country's school system.

From 1941-45 the only foreigner in the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts was a Britisher who rendered crucial advice to the Minister or Director General concerning short-range and long-range educational policies of the country and the organizational setup of the main institutions of learning.<sup>83</sup> In 1944, Britain granted the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts £200,000 for the purchase of texts which were mostly readers published by the Grant Educational Company of London and Scotland. Major texts used by Ethiopian schools were Kings, Queens, Knights and Heroes, Mighty Men and Mighty Deeds, and Makers of our Modern World. The only teacher-training school in the country was run by the British Council,<sup>84</sup> which had also started evening classes in Addis Ababa and some major provinces. The principals of all the main schools in Addis Ababa were British and the first secondary school in the country, the Haile Selassie First Secondary School, was fully controlled by teachers and administrators from the United Kingdom. From 1941 to 1948, almost all graduates from the secondary level were sent to British universities. Consulates were opened by the

<sup>83</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Yearbook 1942-43 [1949-51, G.C.] (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1952), pp. 125-30.

<sup>84</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Education in Ethiopia: A Survey, issued by the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts (Addis Ababa, 1961), pp. 7-9.



British in all regions of the Empire, and through the establishment of libraries, and the distribution of educational tracts and pamphlets and audio-visual aids they started the crusade of popularizing English.

Just as all textbooks were imported from Britain, the school system was also geared towards the British system. Secondary school students prepared for the General Certificate of Education examination given by British universities. Even when the teachers were not British, they were from the British Commonwealth—from countries such as Canada, Australia and India—countries that were essentially steeped in the British pedagogical tradition.

This influence was, however, short-lived. From 1945 onwards, a watershed which marked the decline of Great Britain, the rise of the two modern superpowers and the ensuing cold war also saw American weight being felt in Ethiopia. Haile Selassie, who before the war had been desperately interested in shifting his ties to the United States, now found the latter to be more enthusiastic than ever because of the growing struggle between the communist and western blocs and America's increased interest in denying the strategic Red Sea and Gulf regions to Soviet expansion.<sup>85</sup> It was at this time that, as Margery Perham reported following the mass exodus of British advisory personnel, "Americans were made advisers in foreign affairs, education, finance and communication; others went to the government of the state bank and directorship of medical services."<sup>86</sup>

---

<sup>85</sup>Archer and Milkias, "The Second Scramble for Africa," pp. 55-58.

<sup>86</sup>Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), p. 95.

Haile Selassie's shift to the United States was because of the fact that, unlike the United Kingdom, the United States had no directly occupied colonial territory on the continent. The British were, of course, unhappy about the loss of privileges which they had secured under the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944, and as a result cut off all financial aid to the country. Sylvia Pankhurst, a British citizen, who was a staunch champion of Ethiopian causes as much as she was the leader of the suffragette movement in England, recounts how British officials told her in 1944 that "Ethiopia could not accomplish in education, or any other field, what Britain could and would achieve for the Ethiopian people."<sup>87</sup> This statement shows the depth of British interest in controlling Ethiopia's future destiny.

When the Americans came in, they came in with more zeal. They spent substantially larger amounts of money, not only in the field of education, but in all vital areas.<sup>88</sup> During the fiscal year 1944-45, for example, under the lend-lease agreement, the United States provided Ethiopia with E \$5 million, and in 1946, E \$1 million, thus enabling the Haile Selassie government to purchase war surplus.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup>Sylvia Pankhurst and Richard Pankhurst, Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Last Phase of the Reunion Struggle 1941-1952 (Essex: Lalibela House, 1953), pp. 98-100.

<sup>88</sup>Governments of Ethiopia and the United States, "Amity and Economic Relations-Treaty with Exchange of Notes between the United States of America and Ethiopia (1946-1953)," signed at Addis Ababa, September 7, 1951 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954).

<sup>89</sup>Ernest W. Luther, Ethiopia Today (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 60-69.

With the new relationship that was developing between the United States and the Haile Selassie government, private and semi-private American corporations and organizations also took interest in the country. Thus, the Export-Import Bank of Washington loaned to the Ethiopian government E \$3 million for the purchase of industrial machinery, trucks and automobiles, gold mining equipment, materials for currency notes and coins, and educational supplies.<sup>90</sup> The National City Bank of the United States also provided a credit of E \$900,000 and in 1948-49, the World Bank (mostly controlled by the United States) advanced a credit of E \$8 million. A private American loan through Trans-World Airlines also provided E \$324,000 for the purchase of aircraft and maintenance equipment for the Ethiopian Airlines.<sup>91</sup>

In 1955, the American Point IV Advisory Group, which had been officially attached to the Ethiopian Ministry of Education and Fine Arts since 1953, established a teacher training faculty for the University College of Addis Ababa. The faculty was aimed at producing American-style secondary school teachers for all Ethiopian schools.<sup>92</sup> It also set up a Ten-Year Plan for expanding education through an organ called the "Long-Range Planning Committee," whose purpose was described as making a comprehensive survey of the Ethiopian school system, work

<sup>90</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Economic Handbook of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Press, 1951), pp. 210-13.

<sup>91</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup>Sylvia Pankhurst, "University College of Addis Ababa," pp. 195-223.

schedules and academic standards, and recommending needed reorganization. The Committee was officially authorized to collect written and oral reports from Ethiopian school administrators, directors and teachers, and analyze them in the light of American and other countries' experiences.<sup>93</sup>

In addition, starting in the early 1950s, funds had been made available for the adoption of American-type curricula in all schools. The Ministry of Education and Fine Arts was flooded with American educational tracts. As one Ethiopian educator observed:

... [American] pamphlets and reading materials which would attract the attention of small children written for various grades and age levels were sent not only to Addis Ababa schools but also to those in the provinces. . . . Now, as the advisorship to the ministry passed to the Americans, the attention shifted from Great Britain to the States. Textbooks, audio-visual aids and other school equipment were ordered from America. Students were sent to American colleges and Universities for further studies.<sup>94</sup>

At the insistence of American experts, even the primary school leaving examination was changed from "essay" type to "objective" type, despite strong resistance from "non-American" educators in Ethiopia who considered this a deterioration rather than an improvement of the British method of examination.

As Sylvia Pankhurst describes, the "non-American" educators, mostly British expatriates, provides the following argument against

<sup>93</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "A Ten-Year Plan for the Controlled Expansion of Ethiopian Education," pp. 10-13.

<sup>94</sup>Girma Amare, "Government Education in Ethiopia," p. 339.

# American-style "objective" tests:

... these examination papers call for no self-expression by the pupils ... the standard of education has fallen since their introduction; pupils tend to abandon the effort to learn to write good English and to formulate their ideas in a creditable manner. Even their handwriting and spelling tend ... to deteriorate. Pupils ask their teachers, 'What is the use of writing essays?' 'These will not help me with the examination.' 'Why are you correcting my English?' boys will ask. 'I shall not be obliged to write it in the examination. In the history paper I have to know the names of many kings and the country where they reigned, so that when I am asked whether Amenhotep, Nebuchadnezzar or Solomon reigned in Egypt I shall be able to blacken the right circle. I have no time to be bothering about excellent handwriting or excellent grammar.' Others complain that the examinations are far too easy and that boys and girls pass without due preparation into the secondary schools where much is required of them and where the leaving certificate examination is framed on very different principles by the University College of Addis Ababa.<sup>95</sup>

The situation at the post-secondary level was not much different. In 1953, Haile Selassie, aware of the pitfalls of depending on only one major power for guiding the education of the country's youth, instructed Dr. Lucien Matte, the President of the University College of Addis Ababa, to seek an affiliation of the University College with the University of London. Matte sent the following letter to Britain's Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies:

We are anxious ... to associate the College with the English University system for purposes of

---

<sup>95</sup>Sylvia Pankhurst, "Elementary School Curriculum," Ethiopia Observer, II (March, 1958), pp. 145-47.

examinations, adjustment of syllabuses, recognition of degrees, etc. . . . We should like to know first of all if a 'special relationship' with the University of London, as outlined in the Asquith Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies could be applied to our College, i.e., whether we could initiate the syllabuses for the proposals of acceptance for London as equivalent with the appropriate syllabuses of the London University. If the above would be technically impossible, we should like to know the procedure for taking external examinations.

We realize that the intermediate and final examination for B.A. or B.Sc. will have to adhere as closely as possible to the London University standards in either case.

We realize furthermore that the fact that Addis Ababa is outside the British territory may bring forth additional difficulties. English, however, has been declared as the second official language of the Empire and it would be in the interest of all concerned to anchor firmly the nascent higher education of Ethiopia to an English University rather than to contemplate other possibilities in this respect. . . . <sup>96</sup>

But a team of university teaching experts from Britain reported that affiliation would be possible only after:

. . . the strengthening of the teaching of English, the raising of the standards of admission, the teaching of a more eclectic system of philosophy, the establishment of a system of external examiners for closer control of the final examinations by the British universities, the establishment of a committee in England that would maintain contact between British universities and the Ethiopian system of higher education. <sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup>Trudeau, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," pp. 35-36.

<sup>97</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 38.

This was understood to be a "polite no" from Britain, and the plan was therefore abandoned. It is clear, however, that the disenchantment of the United Kingdom arose not only from its disapproval of the Jesuit orientation of the College, but also from the Americanization of the Ethiopian educational institutions. Indeed, behind the battle for standards was hidden a long-standing conflict of interest.

In our discussion of the strong cultural influences that came to Ethiopia first from Britain and then from the United States, it is impossible to avoid wondering where the Jesuits fitted in. The French Canadian Jesuits, we should note, were the pioneers in modern education in Ethiopia both at the secondary and tertiary levels, since they controlled not only the Tafari Makonnen School and the University College of Addis Ababa, but had also taken over major schools, including Haile Selassie I Secondary School, Menelik II School, Itegue Mennen Girls' School, and the only vocational secondary institution in the country—the Technical School of Addis Ababa, in 1945.

The Jesuits were interested in opening higher education in Ethiopia for a long time, but according to Edouard Trudeau, Haile Selassie took the initiative for the first time in 1945 and "summoned" them to open Ethiopia's first College.<sup>98</sup> The Emperor's choice of the Jesuits to run higher education in Ethiopia was, as two Canadians who were formerly professors at the University College of Addis Ababa put it, because "they [advocated] a conservative education that pleased the

<sup>98</sup>Professor Edouard Trudeau, in response to our questionnaire, Oct. 8, 1981.

imperial government,"<sup>99</sup> and because "the Jesuits had been brought up and trained in an authoritarian society, and naturally enough carried their instilled ideas to U.C.A.A. . . . [which trained graduates for] an authoritarian Emperor!"<sup>100</sup>

In terms of overall policies, the Jesuits had very little leeway. As a former member of the Society of Jesus, high school instructor for many years, and later Dean of Haile Selassie University, Gilles Pion explained:

The Jesuits had been called by the Emperor. They were not free to change or experiment with the educational system. In fact, the structure of the system and even the educational approach were directly influenced by the 'advisors' [sic] at the Ministry level and the dominating political influence of one of the Big Powers: England at first, the United States afterwards. The Jesuits could move freely inside the system, if I may say so; they could not change it nor influence it very much at the Secondary level.<sup>101</sup>

One thing that was obvious to both Ethiopians (including this author) who studied under the Jesuits, and non-Jesuit Canadians and other foreigners who were involved in Ethiopian education was that except for some attempts to inculcate Catholic-oriented philosophy.

<sup>99</sup>Professor Thomas A. Knipp, in response to our questionnaire, November 17, 1981.

<sup>100</sup>Professor Paul Mohr, in response to our questionnaire, November 10, 1981.

<sup>101</sup>Gilles Pion, in response to our questionnaire, November 4, 1981.



(which led to a student disturbance at Tafari Makonnen in 1950),<sup>102</sup> the French Canadian Jesuits had not and did not in any way strive to change the cultural setup of the country. Almost all our respondents, Jesuits and non-Jesuits alike, have clearly attested to this fact. Father William Manley Germain explained how, during his stay in Ethiopia between 1950 and 1953, he went to the extent of attempting to "be" an Ethiopian, and a student reproached him. As he recounts, he learned one lesson from the boy, who asked him, "Sir, are you trying to be an Ethiopian?", to which he replied, "Yes, I admire your culture." The boy said, "Sir, we have 12 million Ethiopians. We don't need more; we need a Canadian who likes Ethiopians." Father Germain comments, "I learned from that and have lived by it. I taught my first genius in Ethiopia—a thrill for me which I still savour!"<sup>103</sup> He also adds that the Jesuits "helped set a standard in primary and secondary education—they helped begin higher education. They respected the customs . . . of the people."<sup>104</sup>

---

<sup>102</sup>This particular disturbance, in which one Jesuit member was accused of trying to convert Ethiopian Orthodox children to Catholicism, was one of the early student rebellions. In a response to our survey questionnaire, answered on January 3, 1982, Dr. Georges Savard, a member of the French Canadian Jesuit team and former professor of sociology at the University College of Addis Ababa, wrote: "The Society of Jesus . . . members, assigned to Ethiopia, beginning in 1945, had to refrain from proselytizing in any shape or form. A few of them found it difficult to accept this restriction; they either returned to Canada or were allowed to exercise their ministry outside of Ethiopia."

<sup>103</sup>Father William Manley Germain, in response to our survey questionnaire, October 17, 1981.

<sup>104</sup>*Ibid.*

Amédée Dupas, a Canadian expatriate, points out that the French Canadian Jesuits, in an attempt to raise "the standard of culture and art in the country . . . stored and completed the registration of all the folklore, songs, dances, instruments for the twelve provinces of Ethiopia."<sup>105</sup> Another Canadian expatriate, who belonged to Dr. Matte's team as a young teacher in the 1950s, remembers some fundamental questions that kept cropping up in his mind when he first arrived in Ethiopia. He kept wondering:

How to teach students that the Earth was not flat without them throwing out also all the good values their rural society had imbued them with. Was I helping to destroy traditional Ethiopia the way the European had destroyed the American Indian, by destroying his self-respect.<sup>106</sup>

With the advent of large-scale American involvement, first at the University College, where they slowly replaced the Jesuits, and then at Haile Selassie University, the few French Canadian educators who remained in some key positions clearly saw a clash of cultures and educational approaches. Former Dean of Students Gilles Pion, for example, recounts:

As an administrator (member of the University Council, etc.) I saw how each administrator, while working for the interest of the University and the University students, would be greatly 'influenced' by the importance to project the 'right' image of his own country or was it of his own government's policies? There were clashes that were very seldom dramatic. But they were

---

<sup>105</sup>Mr. Amédée Dupas, in response to our questionnaire, October 1981.

<sup>106</sup>*Ibid.*

usually deep-rooted in different educational philosophies, different approaches. I retain from that experience that it is not easy to be a newborn university in a developing country. The margin of freedom is thin: the majority of the staff is foreign and so is the money.<sup>107</sup>

Reflecting on problems of Ethiopian education when the Americans were heavily involved, Pion adds that the following were some of the major questions Ethiopians should have asked themselves:

How to do fast without producing cheap human product?  
 What to do with the too many school leavers?  
 How to integrate the graduates into a perhaps sound but slow evolving economy?  
 How to define the Ethiopian mentality and culture: essentially Amhara or Galla or Tigré or Sidamo. Can it be a mixture?  
 Where to get the money from for such a formidable task?  
How to avoid the political implications of receiving aid from any of the Big Powers?<sup>108</sup>  
 (emphasis added)

When Haile Selassie made the final and perhaps fateful decision to turn over tertiary level education in Ethiopia to the United States, the transfer started with a feud between the former Dean of the University College, Edouard Trudeau, and the Ethiopian Minister of Education, Endalkatchew Makonnen (later to be Prime Minister). Haile Selassie had always given privileges to the leading Jesuits, especially Dr. Lucien Matte, to discuss any financial and policy matters with him, bypassing the cumbersome Ethiopian Court protocol. This had

<sup>107</sup>Professor Gilles Pion, in response to our questionnaire, November 4, 1981.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid.

not endeared them to Haile Selassie's ministers, especially the young aristocratic newcomer, Endalkatchew Makonnen, who wanted to fire Trudeau, Dr. Matte's chosen successor, in order to reassert his own power. Concerning the incident, Professor Pion recounts:

At the University College level, my recollection is that the major problem has always been the financing of the institution. There also seems to have been a kind of a 'feud' between Lij Endergathew [sic] Makonnen, when he was Minister of Education, and Dr. Matte. I really do not know the nature of the misunderstanding between these two persons. I do remember that on one occasion at least, Dr. Matte threatened to withdraw all the Jesuits at once if Lij Endergathew [sic] would carry on a decision affecting a Jesuit member of the staff.<sup>109</sup>

When Haile Selassie started to listen more to his new minister than to the Jesuits, and went along with Endalkatchew Makonnen's advice to entrust the establishment of Haile Selassie University to the Americans, the energetic Dr. Matte, whose health was already failing, retired to Canada permanently.<sup>110</sup> His duties were temporarily entrusted to his Jesuit colleague, Edouard Trudeau. Then there was a short hiatus when the administration of the University College was transferred to a non-Jesuit Canadian, John Macfarlane, who was appointed Acting Principal. This period was strictly transitional and no major reorganizational activities took place between Macfarlane and the Minister of Education and Fine Arts. But Endalkatchew and American

---

<sup>109</sup>Gilles Pion, in response to our questionnaire, November 4, 1981.

<sup>110</sup>A personal interview with Mr. Grum Tesfayé, December 2, 1981.

diplomatic personnel continued to work towards the establishment of the new University which was to be mainly staffed and financed by the Government of the United States.

The Jesuits, as pioneers, were bitter that the university they were slowly evolving had been snatched from their hands at a time when their long-range dream to establish the first university in the country was about to be fulfilled. They also were familiar with the American approach to education in foreign lands, and knew that this decision would have a detrimental effect on the future of Haile Selassie's regime. As one of their members, Amédée Dupas, recounts,

When an American University offered 25 million dollars and a teaching staff as against our offer, more modest in money but more ~~des~~interested culturally, the Negus Hallyey Sallassie chose the first. On the long run the effect was that of the Americans in different countries, of involvement in politics. Which, to my knowledge, had a not too good effect on the country.<sup>111</sup>  
(spelling and grammar in the original)

If there was bitterness on the part of the French Canadians towards Haile Selassie for making this fateful decision, it is understandable. Many French Canadians loved Ethiopia; some spent thirty years of their lives there. The tenor of their response to our survey questionnaire attests to this feeling. When we asked Father Amédée Dupas what suggestions he would make for Ethiopian education, obviously reflecting on past American approaches, he gave us the following response:

---

<sup>111</sup>Father Amédée Dupas, in response to our questionnaire, October 1981.

It must adapt to the modern world and progress as long as it is for the benefit of the Ethiopian population. Therefore, it must retain and respect the different cultures of its main components. Ethiopia must remain Ethiopian, African, first. Let not Ethiopia be contaminated, polluted, with ways that profit first the outsider. Only Ethiopians can decide what is best for themselves. Peace and prosperity will then follow. Long live Ethiopia!<sup>112</sup>

The American takeover of tertiary education in Ethiopia started with what is known as the Utah Report, mentioned above. This report, which preceded American involvement in administering the University College of Addis Ababa and the establishment of Haile Selassie University in 1961, was considered so important, and politically so sensitive, that it was carefully guarded as "top secret." The Emperor's commitments and written memorandum related to the report were "placed in the appropriate files of the State Department."<sup>113</sup> According to Edouard Trudeau, who was then Dean of the University College, even the President of the University College of Addis Ababa, who had done so much groundwork for the opening of the new university, was not cleared for the information. Trudeau recounts:

The report of the Utah Survey Team was presented to His Imperial Majesty, to the Imperial Ethiopian Government and to the International Cooperation Administration around the middle of 1960. For certain internal reasons, which the officials of I.C.A. did not publicly reveal, this report was not widely circulated. It was difficult to obtain a copy. The President of University College of Addis

---

<sup>112</sup>Ibid.

<sup>113</sup>University of Utah, "Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia," p. 23.

Ababa, who had with his staff so closely collaborated with and helped the team, never received a copy of the report from the I.C.A. Its circulation was limited to officials of both governments.<sup>114</sup>

The fears of both the Americans and the feudal regime was understandable. The recommendations clearly intended to stream higher education for the children of the "haves" when it suggested the abolition of the boarding system.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, the revelation of such intent, when students were already being politicized, would have ignited a political inferno against both the Americans and the feudal regime.

The Utah Report also recommended an "American style land grant university," which was unpopular with Ethiopian educators. Aklilu Habte, Mengesha Gebre Hiwet, and Monika Kehoe later made the following comments concerning that decision:

The chairman of the Utah team, stated on several occasions, that, although the international quality of the existing colleges should be retained, the American land-grant university might serve as a model for Ethiopia's newest institution of higher learning. Much as some of the Americans on the staff may appreciate this plan, all Ethiopian educators are not equally sure that such a prospect presents the most suitable pattern for higher education in their country. There are still many questions to be answered. In a nation where so much mass education is yet to be accomplished, how is the University going to produce the leadership necessary to complete the job? What curriculum will be required? What cross-

---

<sup>114</sup>Trudeau, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," p. 104.

<sup>115</sup>University of Utah, "Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia," p. 37.

cultural difficulties will arise? What approach will be effective in adapting American or European pedagogical procedure and practice to the Ethiopian academic scene so that a genuinely creative synthesis may result?

While plans for educational advance in Africa are being made, it must not be forgotten that the new Haile Selassie I University belongs to Ethiopia and that Ethiopians have, after all, made the greatest sacrifice towards its inception and subsequent development . . . every Ethiopian government employee, from the ministers down to the lowliest wage earner, has contributed a share of his monthly salary to establish this University. Although the goals sought cannot be basically different from those of the best universities abroad, the entire undertaking must be an embodiment of the highest ideals and tradition of Ethiopian society. Haile Selassie I University should function, if possible, in an atmosphere [in] which men and women may study, among other things, all aspects of Afro-Ethiopic culture, where they may trace its development and mould its future, swiftly recognizing and adapting those features of Asiatic, European or American achievement which best suit its purposes and best meet its needs.<sup>116</sup>

While the American decision to become heavily involved in the establishment of the Haile Selassie University was aimed first at shaping an American-oriented future Ethiopian elite who would take a leading role in the country, the other aim was to establish an African centre for disseminating American culture and political ideology. Its function was to fulfil what the American University of Cairo was already doing in the North African and Maghreb countries and the American University of Beirut in the Middle East. In a sense, the

---

<sup>116</sup>Aklilu Habte, Mengesha Gebre Hiwet and Monika Kehoe, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," 3-7.



aim went even beyond that. The Haile Selassie University was to be a counterpart to Lumumba University in Moscow, an institution which placed particular emphasis on ideological training for African students. The only difference was that the American-oriented university was not going to be in Washington, D.C. It was going to be in Addis Ababa, the headquarters for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and a city chosen by all independent African nations as the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity. In other words, the university the Americans were planning to invest in heavily<sup>117</sup> was going to be established in the continent's diplomatic metropolis.

In terms of curriculum, the emphasis was to be put on business and commerce, which are at the heart of American capitalism. The Haile Selassie University was not only to formulate new "adequate business education curriculum," but was also to augment "business course offerings in the College of Arts and Sciences."<sup>118</sup> This was in addition to what was already being provided in the College of Business Administration, financed and run by expatriates from the United States. The separation between business and public affairs disciplines was also to be abolished, and a new college called the "College of Business and Public Administration" was to be established. The aim of this College

<sup>117</sup>As Margaret Gillett, the former Registrar, points out, despite American money, personnel and ideas, people from many nationalities were also involved in the formation of Haile Selassie University. See Margaret Gillett, "Symposium on Africa: Western Academic Role Concepts in Ethiopian University," Comparative Education Review, VII (1963), 149-51.

<sup>118</sup>University of Utah, "Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia," pp. 27-28. See also Grant H. Calder, "Business and Public Administration in Ethiopian Higher Education," in *ibid.*, Section III, pp. 1-9.

was to produce "top executives of business and government organizations in Ethiopia." To indicate the importance of this institution, the Utah Report stressed, "it is recommended that . . . programs in the Department of Commerce be strengthened at once"<sup>119</sup> (original emphasis).

The College of Business and Public Administration, which was to be richly accommodated, was not only to train American-oriented business and public officials for Ethiopia but also for the rest of Africa and the Middle East. The recommendation went:

A building to house the College of Business and Public Administration should be constructed not later than 1965. Provision is made for this building in the general construction plans of this survey, and it is shown on the proposed model for Haile Selassie I University. The plans call for 25,000 square feet of floor space at a cost of U.S. \$400,000. The building would have conference and seminar rooms, a small auditorium, classrooms equipped for film projection, a machine accounting laboratory, and other features to facilitate the use of most modern teaching techniques. This building would become the center for instruction, training, and research in business and public administration for Africa and the Near East.<sup>120</sup>

American involvement in building the new Haile Selassie University was not a simple undertaking. As one American educational expert, Gwendolyn Groomer, pointed out:

American AID assistance is being given for design and construction of buildings, purchase

---

<sup>119</sup>William J. Burke, "The Arts and Sciences in Ethiopian Higher Education," in University of Utah, "Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia," Section II, p. 17.

<sup>120</sup>G. Calder, "Business and Public Administration . . .," in *ibid.*, p. 9.

of instructional materials and equipment, financing of salaries for senior administrative and teaching staff . . . and training of Ethiopian faculty. Individual direct-hire contracts and a contract with the University of Utah are providing teaching and administrative staff.<sup>121</sup>

The reasons that the United States had to invest so much money in Ethiopian higher education were given as, among others:

That for some time to come the United States will, as a national policy, continue a foreign aid program and that Ethiopia will be included in this program.

That Ethiopia is strategically situated and uniquely constituted to develop and advance in a leadership role in her part of the world.

That should Ethiopians and Americans decide to collaborate in establishing and implementing such a university they could and would do so with that mutual confidence and consideration which result in genuine and lasting friendships.

That private United States agencies—Foundations, Associations, Corporations—might welcome a competent institution, such as a university, through which to clear or operate projects and subsidies and that, as a result, the total American contribution to education in Ethiopia and Africa could be outstanding without great expense to any one agency.<sup>122</sup> (emphasis added)

In terms of finance, as well as administrative powers, the Haile Selassie University was to be an American university except perhaps in name. It is true that following its establishment Britain and Germany had also worked out arrangements with the Ethiopian Government to manage the University's new medical faculty and the Engineering

---

<sup>121</sup>Gwendolyn Groomer, Inventory of American Aid to Education in Africa, A Report for the African Liaison Committee of the American Council of Education (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Education, 1962), pp. 100-112.

<sup>122</sup>University of Utah, "Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia," p. 22.

College, respectively, and many non-Americans were still in administrative and teaching positions,<sup>123</sup> but in the main, the institution remained under strong American influence. A large number of the teaching staff were supplied by USAID, and the university itself was run by a group of American Mormons. The Mormons had, for a long time, been a strong force in the Faculty of Education.<sup>124</sup>

The duty of American lecturers in the University was described by Ambassador Korry of the United States as being not only "to assist in the education of the youth of Ethiopia in certain academic fields," but "to interpret the history, culture and customs of the United States to the people of Ethiopia."<sup>125</sup>

The Agricultural College, a main organ of the new university, was affiliated with the University of Oklahoma, which signed a contract with the U.S. Department of State to run it. The President of this College was appointed by the director of the "Imperial Ethiopian Agricultural College Fund," headed by an American official who was an appointee of the U.S. government. The American director had, by agreement, the following powers:

---

<sup>123</sup>Margaret Gillett, "Symposium on Africa: Western Academic Role Concepts in Ethiopian University," pp. 149-51.

<sup>124</sup>The choice of the Mormons, who did not permit blacks into their church, to teach in a black country was of course, not unnoticed by the students.

<sup>125</sup>Government of the United States, U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, Commission for Educational Exchange between Ethiopia and the United States (Addis Ababa, 1963), p. 3.

... [to] determine the general policies and administrative procedures and the direction of activities and operations of the Fund, the incurrence of obligations, the purchase, inventory, control and disposition of property of the Fund; the appointment and discharge of officers and other personnel of the Fund and the terms and conditions of their employment; and other administrative matters of the Fund.<sup>126</sup>

The President of the College, also an American, was appointed by the Director of the Fund. He held the following powers:

... [to] plan, direct and be responsible for all operations and activities of the College, including the admission of students, establishment of curricula, conduct of examinations for the measurement of attainments in learning and conferring of suitable certificates, honors, and discharge of personnel of the College and the terms and conditions of their employment, and all other administrative matters.<sup>127</sup>

The power of the United States Government over the Agricultural College was therefore practically total. It even superseded the power of the University's Board of Governors and the newly created Faculty Council.

In addition, USAID, together with the World Health Organization, financed the Public Health College. The Business College and the Law School were entirely run by the U.S. Government.<sup>128</sup> Moreover, while

---

<sup>126</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Report of the Technical Education Committee (Addis Ababa, 1951), Article IV, Section 2, pp. 25-27.

<sup>127</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>128</sup>Due to the fact that modern Ethiopian administration of Justice in the area of torts was based on French Civil Law, there were some Canadian educators, mostly from McGill University who taught at the new law school. However, starting from J. Paul, who was the first Dean, until the fall of Haile Selassie in 1974, the administrative decision makers of the school were solely Americans.

roughly a quarter of the University's annual budget was derived from foreign aid, more than two-thirds of that came from the United States.

American involvement in Ethiopian education, which started in 1945 with the appointment of two Americans in the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts—Dr. Hambrook and Dr. Ruckonick as superintendents of schools—and later continued with the opening of Haile Selassie University, thus paved a way for the "Americanization" of the Ethiopian school system. As Table 14 shows most Ethiopian educational projects were soon to be dominated by USAID (the successor to the Point IV Program).

Parallel to this heavy involvement in the sphere of education, the metropolitan-dependency relationship was advancing so quickly that at the close of the 1960s more than two-thirds of the coffee, which accounted for 60% of Ethiopia's export earnings, was exported to the United States. Most of Ethiopia's imports which were non-durable items were imported from the United States. By 1966, of its repayable debt of a quarter of a billion dollars, Ethiopia owed 72 percent to the United States and the World Bank (mainly controlled by the U.S.).<sup>129</sup>

In the military field, the United States gave Ethiopia more than 50 percent of its total military aid to Africa.<sup>130</sup> The "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement," signed in 1953 between Ethiopia

---

<sup>129</sup>The Middle East and North Africa (London: Europa Publications, 1969-70), pp. 201-62.

<sup>130</sup>Government of the United States, "U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia," Part VIII (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1970), pp. 1880-1914.

TABLE 14

## Education and Related Projects of the Ethiopian Government

<u>Type of Project</u>	<u>Total Cost U. S.</u>	<u>U. S. Aid Contribution by %</u>	<u>Year</u>
1. Education Administration and Program Development	565,000	85	1959-70
2. Haile Selassie I University	4,206,000	29	1960-70
3. Agricultural Education, Research and Extension	10,677,000	87	1952-70
4. Public Health College and Training Center, Gondar	983,000	89	1954-70
5. Public Health Advisory Services	801,000	88	1955-70
6. Nurses Training and Advisory Services, Eritrea	380,000	92	1954-69
7. Public Safety	1,065,000	100	1961-66
8. Agricultural Productivity and Evaluation	1,874,000	100	1957-62
9. National Airlines Training	1,285,000	94	1957-63
10. Higher Education Survey	96,000	89	1959-60
11. Education Cooperative Service	4,269,000	46	1954-61
12. Education General Support	388,000	94	1958-62
13. Women's Education	133,000	91	1957-61
14. Teacher Education and School Demonstration	1,594,000	26	1953-62
15. Radio Broadcasting Station	1,103,000	100	1957-62
16. Communications Media Cooperative Service	82,000	50	1958-61
17. Mapping and Geography Cooperative Service	413,000	43	1955-61
18. Communications Media Center	434,000	84	1958-62
19. Mapping and Geography Institute	319,000	73	1955-62
20. Technical Support	3,813,000	100	1952-70

Source: Government of the United States, "U. S. Foreign Operations in Africa," Senate Report (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 713-735.

and the United States, whereby the latter acquired military and communications bases in Asmara, gave the United States the right "to install, store and employ within the installations such weapons, devices, substances or ammunition as are deemed necessary by the U.S. Government."<sup>131</sup> And, in times of crisis, the United States had "the right to use Ethiopian land, airspace, waterways and port facilities whenever it deems necessary"; it also permitted the United States to utilize Ethiopian airfields if a rescue operation was in progress.<sup>132</sup>

Parallel to this enormous economic and military weight, the aim of education in Ethiopia continued to shift from domestic to external influences. Thus, we see in retrospect that for almost three decades, an intense cultural penetration was conducted, first by Britain and then by the United States. Teachers' guides, invariably written by British or American advisers, contained cultural models culled from the Anglo-American experience which could not by any stretch of imagination be compared to the Ethiopian educational scene. As these guides were in English, primary school teachers were required to be bilingual so that they could force upon Ethiopian pupils in Amharic ideas distilled and packaged by "Americanizers" or "Anglo-Centric" advisers.

We have already mentioned that the curriculum of the forties and fifties dealt with experiences—cultural and historical—completely

<sup>131</sup>Governments of Ethiopia and the United States, Utilization of Defense Installations Within the Empire of Ethiopia—Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia (signed at Washington, May 22, 1953) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 1-12; Governments of Ethiopia and the United States, "Mutual Defense Assistance Program" (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 26, 1956).

<sup>132</sup>Ibid.



alien to Ethiopians. The same was true of the texts the Ethiopian youth were exposed to up to the day of Haile Selassie's overthrow. Thus, Ethiopian children learned about the Boston Tea Party, Buffalo Bill, Davey Crockett, Washington and the cherry tree, bears, snowstorms, ice cream, Hallowe'en, etc., in a country where none of these had any significance. Books dealt with weights and measures that had no relevance to the country. Officially, Ethiopia used the metric system and the Ethiopian dollar was based on the decimal system. Nevertheless, since teaching materials supplied by Britain in the 1940s still survived as late as the 1960s, upper grade mathematics texts required a knowledge of the British Isles and the English system of weights and measures. In order to make any arithmetical calculations, the students (including this author) had to learn by rote that 21 shillings equal 1 guinea, 1 chain equals 66 feet, and 1 stone equals 14 pounds; the distances calculated dealt with place names in Norfolk or Sussex, and cities such as London and Birmingham.

The main texts in social studies were The March of Time, Book I, which began with the story of Queen Boadicea of England, Little Stories of a Big Country (i.e., the United States), and Little Stories of Well-Known Americans. One basic text for the eighth grade, a huge volume entitled The Old World—Past and Present, subtitled the section on Africa as "The Dark Continent," and mentioned Ethiopia—as "Abyssinia"—in only one paragraph, referring to it as an "Italian Colony." This book was still in use, unrevised, in the late 1960s. The syllabus on which

these books were based were so irrelevant that they rarely dealt with the history of the continent of Africa let alone that of the Ethiopian nation which forms its constituent part. Here is a description of the history syllabus by an Ethiopian educator:

In grade 7 the first term is devoted entirely to England and British expansion in Canada and India. The second term is devoted to America and France and biographical information about individuals who made contributions to their countries . . . the third term at least sees fit to mention Africa, but only in so far as it relates to David Livingstone and A.M. Stanley. The American text used as basis for history in grade 8 includes a unit on ancient Egypt but there is no further mention of Africa in the syllabus.<sup>133</sup>

In fact, outline materials for the second term started with the introduction: "Our civilization begins with the Teutons and fighting tribes from the North" (emphasis added).

The science syllabus, which was also irrelevant to the country's needs, was loaded with misplaced priorities and contradictory goals in its focus. In a country like Ethiopia, where average life expectancy was 35 years,<sup>134</sup> and infant mortality more than 50 percent, where the climatic, geographic, and physical conditions are vastly different from those in the United States, American-made science textbooks were used.

---

<sup>133</sup> Ayalew Gebre Selassie, "Three Years Experience in Education," Ethiopia Observer, VIII (1964), 19-37.

<sup>134</sup> M. Tayback and J. S. Prince, "Infant Mortality and Fertility in Five Towns of Ethiopia," Ethiopian Medical Journal, IV (1965), 11-17; Government of the United States, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Syncrisis: The Dynamics of Health, VIII Ethiopia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 1-109.

These books covered everything except questions that were fundamental to Ethiopians: questions dealing with conservation, health, nutrition, hygiene and sanitation. By contrast, pages were devoted to explaining the nature of the solar system, the Bunsen burner, blow pipes, etc., and, of course, their renowned discoverers.

By 1974, prior to Haile Selassie's overthrow, most British teaching materials had already been abandoned as being out of date, but the Americanization process had continued unabated, especially at the post-elementary level. Primary, high school and university students in Addis Ababa and Asmara were encouraged by their teachers to go to USIS libraries, stocked with some 8,500 American books, mostly of a social, economic, political and cultural nature. USIS libraries were assigned to secondary schools in provincial capitals such as Gondar and Makalé. One library, the "Abraham Lincoln Reading Room" in the town of Harar, was attached to the largest teacher-training school in the country, where it was expected to have a profound effect. Publications such as True Tales of Great Americans and Cultural Bulletin were distributed to all secondary schools, the national University, and all Ethiopian cultural and educational leaders.<sup>135</sup> And, as a former Canadian expatriate remembers, the American teachers in Ethiopian schools continued to teach Ethiopian children "exactly as they would have taught at home. Which wasn't right."<sup>136</sup>

<sup>135</sup>Government of the United States, U.S. Senate Report, pp. 705-09.

<sup>136</sup>Father Paul Mohr, in response to our questionnaire, November 10, 1981.

U. S. influence was not limited to the Ethiopian school system. American values and the American way of life were widely disseminated through the government-controlled mass media. Television programs were mostly westerns such as "Bonanza" and "Gunsmoke". American-style music bands were spontaneously springing up all over the major cities. Many vocalists sang American country songs. In fact, in the city of Addis Ababa, it was not uncommon to encounter Ethiopian adolescents dressed like American cowboys who proudly called themselves "the Texans." Names of nightclubs frequented by educated Ethiopian youth included Hollywood, Arizona, Texas and Apollo 13. Even children's names were becoming Kennedy, Armstrong, and so on.

The detailed analysis we have provided above suggests that if the abortive 1960 coup d'état had produced a reverberating chord at the very centre of the millenium-old Ethiopian feudalism, Ethiopia's first contact with the newly emerging African nations also had a traumatic effect on the thinking of the country's educated youth. The regime officially attempted to downplay the root causes of the 1960 rebellion. Rather, it called attention to the positive strides it had made in the field of education since the end of the Italo-Ethiopian war. That, however modest, some concrete gains were made in this area was, of course, undeniable. Primary and secondary schools had expanded. The first University in the country's history had been established. Haile Selassie's goal of producing modern educated elites to staff his modernizing feudal state was, by and large, fulfilled. But a large segment of the new elites who were themselves products of the same post war educational network

thought otherwise. They pointed out with apparent shock that the status of their country which boasted of the longest uninterrupted independence in Africa was becoming an embarrassment to them. Ethiopia, they argued, was trailing almost every independent nation on the continent in its rate of economic and educational advancement. What King David said in the Book of Psalms three thousand years ago—"Ethiopia stretches her hands unto Heaven," one of them is said to have reminded Haile Selassie, "had almost become an aphorism and a fetish. She had done that for too long. She should now turn her hands towards the earth. She should start moving and working fast to catch up with the rest of the world."<sup>137</sup>

The concern of the youth was by no means unjustified. In addition to the lag, singled out by them, throughout Ethiopia's decade of development after the war, serious and long-range problems were plaguing the country's school system. The attempted Amharization of the Ethiopian people by suppressing all other local languages in favour of Amharic as a means of pedagogical instruction had alienated eighty percent of the Ethiopian population for whom Amharic was not the mother tongue. Education of girls was not given the priority it deserved in a country where females constituted more than half of the potential work force. Vocational as well as agricultural training were largely neglected in the race to produce more and more bureaucratic mandarins for the feudal state machine. The distribution of educational resources

---

<sup>137</sup>The young official was said to have been immediately demoted from a high bureaucratic position. Recounted to the author by a former Minister of Haile Selassie who had demanded anonymity.

was highly slanted in favour of Addis Ababa and other urban areas. The bureaucratic red tape in the Ministry of Education consistently frustrated every attempt by concerned Ethiopian and foreign officials to redress the growing ills in the Ethiopian school system. Disagreements concerning the structural configuration of the country's educational framework had been raging for more than two decades but were never resolved. And most importantly, Haile Selassie's decision to give free reign first to Britain and then to the United States to run the Ethiopian school system had unleashed a process of intense cultural penetration. This last development, as we shall see, was one of the major factors that both helped create and splinter political alignments in the country and sounded a death-knell for Haile Selassie and the Ethiopian feudal system in 1974.

## CHAPTER V

### FISSURES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, THE HYPHENATED INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE EMERGENCE OF STUDENT POWER

#### Aftermath of Penetration: A Crack in the System and the Fragmented Elites

The intense American cultural penetration channelled through the Ethiopian school system and the mass media, which we have already documented in detail above, is open to a variety of interpretations. But one fact must, in a way, direct these interpretations: the involvement was accepted, promoted and defended by the Ethiopian regime, indicating a clear identity of interest.

In essence, Haile Selassie's aim was not, as many observers have alleged, directed mainly to the development of education for the purpose of a radical transformation of the country, but rather for the fulfilment of the need to have a bureaucracy free from the umbrella of the Church and the feudal lords, and thus the creation of an elite which owed an unswerving loyalty directly to him. The American cultural transplant denied the new elite a root of identity and influence such as the debteras had previously enjoyed among the masses. Haile Selassie also needed educated Ethiopians whose visions of change matched his. Concerning this vision, there is no mistaking his stand. He had remarked earlier in his reign:

You must remember that Ethiopia is like  
a Sleeping Beauty, that time has stood still

here for 2000 years. Therefore, not to overwhelm her with changes, we should be very careful now that she is beginning to awaken from her sleep.<sup>1</sup>

The United States State Department had observed long before the war Haile Selassie's ideological stand, as the following clipping sent by an American diplomat from Addis Ababa to the Secretary of State shows. The clipping was from an official government newspaper, Berhanenna Selam, the date May 30, 1929, the subject "Bolshevism":

Everyone knows that Russia was a prosperous country. . . . But in 1906 [sic] a number of vagrants, crooks, adventurers, thieves and vagabonds joined forces and by fomenting strikes completely overran the Government. This was followed by persecution of high dignitaries, nobles . . . state buildings were ransacked and destroyed. Persons of high rank and esteem, the rich and the elite of the population were compelled to stoop to the meanest labour such as breaking stone and carrying loads commonly done by people of the lowest class. . . . Those who caused this great catastrophe are known as Bolsheviks.<sup>2</sup>

As an avid anti-communist and believer in tempered, gradual changes "granted" by him,<sup>3</sup> it is not in any way surprising that American political and educational philosophy appealed to the deepest fears of Haile Selassie—a fear born of possible popular revolt against his

---

<sup>1</sup>Henry de Monfried, Vers les Terres hostiles de l'Ethiopie (Paris: Bernard Franet, 1933), pp. 229-30.

<sup>2</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Information, Berhanenna Selam (May 30, 1929).

<sup>3</sup>Haile Selassie, King of Kings, Heywaténna Yé Etiopia Ermeja (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1972), p. 47.



regime. On the other hand, the strategic position of Ethiopia, and the missionary zeal that guided America's global policy of "containment" combined to create a situation where the United States invested heavily in the ideological sector (i.e., education) of its "anti-communist" campaign.

The American pedagogy did produce, as Haile Selassie had hoped, a different breed of educated people. Whereas the traditional educated class was strongly attached to the people (see Figure 1 ), their values and customs, a large sector of the new elite tended to isolate itself from the mainstream and express its faith in the American way of life and ideology. It became the cerebral link in the metropolitan-client relationship that was taking shape through the material weight that American economic and military aid had created in the Ethiopian social fabric. But as long as the new elite had unrestricted access to money and eventually to power, the imperatives of interest dictated that all three partners—Haile Selassie, the western-educated elite, and the United States—should construct a viable bond of interdependence and patronage (see Figure 4 ).

The Illinois State Register seems to have understood this relationship when it pointed out:


One of the most important showdowns between East and West is in the making of Ethiopia. . . . Upon its outcome may depend whether the United States loses Africa. The U.S. must stand behind those who have supported it in the past—in this case Emperor Haile Selassie.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Illinois State Register, January 12, 1964, pp. 1-8.

Figure 4

## Modern Power Relationship



The Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the United States had stated similarly: "We have always considered that the general importance to us of the Emperor, of the key position of Ethiopia, the need to keep it friendly in the total African context were justifications for our programs in Ethiopia."<sup>5</sup>

The Ethiopian Ministry of Information also speaks of the metropolitan power's role in a laudatory tone:

The Business College is one the departments completely American in style. It is run by Harvard-Columbia-Cornell professor . . . whose aim is to provide a full rich knowledge, understanding and skill in the functional areas of business and to teach planning . . . communicating and training others. . . . He has discovered that the new generation of Ethiopians does not despise business and most of his students have indicated that they would rather control their own business than work for the Government.<sup>6</sup> (emphasis added)

The above statement is instructive in discerning a fundamental point. Certainly, the jubilation of the regime at the "discovery" that the elite had accepted the "free enterprise system" at a time when almost every high post in the bureaucracy had been filled and might find itself with "unemployed intellectuals" who might preach subversion is understandable, because during the last three decades after the war,

<sup>5</sup>Government of the United States, U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia, Part VIII (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1970), p. 1891.

<sup>6</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Information, Ethiopia, the Official Handbook (Nairobi, Kenya: University Press of Africa, 1969), pp. 110-14.

the government had been forced to create positions to satisfy these newly trained youth. In fact, at times, some aspiring educated officials carefully prepared organizational charts with several impressive but overlapping and unnecessary posts at the apex of the bureaucratic pyramid, and, after a formal approval by the government, filled the positions themselves. This explains the unusually high number of Directors-General and Assistant Ministers in Ethiopia. Also, for the Haile Selassie regime, another cause for jubilation was the hope that the elite would be willing to be satisfied by the economic advantage that the free enterprise system could grant them in an economy whose modern sector was totally dominated by non-Ethiopian interests.<sup>7</sup>

Looking at the other side of the coin, the American educators were similarly determined to see their "discovery" flower without any contamination from those who were not business-minded. In 1961, they encouraged and temporarily succeeded in splintering the Ethiopian student movement by offering funds to the leaders of the students of the Business College to form their own union, which they told them should be, unlike the one from the University College, "anti-Communist."<sup>8</sup> The student organization at this time was, however, no more than a protest movement against Haile Selassie's feudal regime. A more leftist orientation emerged later, after the creation of the University

<sup>7</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office and Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity Industry 1965-66, 1966-67 (Addis Ababa, 1969), p. 14.

<sup>8</sup>For details of this controversy, see the entire 1964-65 volume of the University student paper, News and Views.

Students' Union of Addis Ababa in 1965, and the publication of the students' magazine, Struggle.<sup>9</sup> It might be of interest to note that the radicalization of the student movement was partly a response to the apparent division of their organization, which the American teachers were said to have espoused. The Business College also offered scholarships to compliant student leaders, some of whose academic qualifications were publicly known to be questionable, and sent them to the United States to study "advanced business management." When a referendum decided, however, that all University students in Addis Ababa wanted a single Union, the scheme failed.

The identification of the United States with the feudal regime and the consequent involvement in student affairs of American teachers therefore not only radicalized the students, but also made them reflect upon and assess the magnitude of American interest in influencing the course of Ethiopian politics and their far-reaching cultural penetration since 1945. The popularity with which Robert Kennedy was received on the campus of the university in 1961 shows that at that time, although there were some radicals, they were only a minority. The students did not start to equate anti-Americanism with anti-feudalism until their experience with American lecturers and Peace Corps volunteers during the subsequent months and years. An article which appeared in

---

<sup>9</sup>This was the first radical publication of the university students [this author was one of the founders]. The first issue was so popular with the intelligentsia outside the university campus that the second issue, which was supposed to come out in 1966, was immediately banned by the government.

the student weekly News and Views, entitled "I Shall Look After My Enemies, God Protect Me from My Friends," points towards this break.<sup>10</sup> From then on, even successful campaigns for students offices involved a strong national stand against Americanism. One such campaign speech in 1965 which was delivered by one of the early student radicals thus received tumultuous applause. The student's speech went as follows:

Tell the Americans that this is not Korea!  
Tell them that this is not the Dominican  
Republic or Laos or Vietnam whom they have  
succeeded in dividing! Tell them that we have  
a long history behind us, that America is too  
young to outsmart us! Tell them that the Presi-  
dent of the United States cannot determine who  
should rule this country in the same manner  
as he is determining who should rule the  
Dominican Republic. Tell them that ours is a  
land that successfully protected its independence  
against all foreign intruders, that it is a proud  
country on a proud continent. Tell them that  
we are the fighting Horn of a continent whose  
written and unwritten histories date back much  
further than the first Caucasian apeman, who  
once had the pyramids built, sent Hannibal  
across the Alps to conquer Rome, fought with  
Caesar's battalions, ruled over Spain, and  
dominated the Pyrenees.<sup>11</sup>

In retrospect, this signalled a ferment of dissent and bitterness that was to become commonplace among the students in the ensuing years. But what was more important, the campus politics described above transcended in its consequences the perimeters of the university. They were,

---

<sup>10</sup>University College Students Union, News and Views (Addis Ababa, March 10, 1962), p. 5.

<sup>11</sup>A tape recording of this speech is in this author's possession.

in a way, the first crack in the armour of the tri-partite alliance of the monarchy, the western-educated class and the United States, and a challenge to the ideological quietism practised by the already integrated intelligentsia.

At this juncture, it may be of interest to dissect the nature of the new intelligentsia that had already joined Haile Selassie's work force. What were they like? Were they of one type? What were their sociopolitical positions concerning their place in the American-supported regime which was attempting to modernize feudalism?<sup>12</sup>

The first observation about the Ethiopian intelligentsia of the 1960s and 70s should start with one experience common to most of them. The average young bureaucrat had completed his studies abroad, most probably in the United States, and because of his foreign experience, he had learned some lessons. His perspectives, narrowly defined by Ethiopian tradition, had now been greatly enlarged. He felt proud of and used the new status qualifications he had acquired—qualifications which differentiated him from the traditional Ethiopian official: residence abroad and/or university degree. He had developed a taste for a high standard of living. He engaged in profit-making ventures to increase his wealth. He built lavish villas in the European

<sup>12</sup>The discussion which follows is a personal analysis by this author. Donald Levine, in Wax and Gold (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 191-217, had attempted his own characterization of this group. Although we found it useful, it was not wholly satisfactory. We are thus taking a fresh look at the Ethiopian intelligentsia of this period. Our comments are mostly based on personal observations and experiences in interacting with members of this elite during the 1960s.

or American styles, and either lived in them himself or rented them out to accumulate even more wealth. He obtained satisfaction from buying every new thing—cars, stereos—and then soon exchanging them for others. He always tried to emulate the mass-consumption societies of North America and Europe. This type of elite member was known in educated Ethiopian circles as an adirbay (careerist).

The typical adirbay was one affected by the political socialization of the schools to which he had willingly submitted. He knew how to adjust himself to Haile Selassie's feudal institutions and bureaucratic structure. He was willing to be commanded to fulfil what was expected of him, to fit into the social machine without friction. He experienced his ingenuity and critical thinking within very narrow limits, and took special care not to appear to initiate any reform which might raise suspicions about his loyalty to Haile Selassie and his regime. Whatever he did in his occupational endeavours was broadly prescribed by the feudal stalwarts at the top. He always attempted to appear not only skilled in his modern trade, but also as a highly disciplined bureaucrat. He had just enough initiative to carry out assignments but not so much as to question the assignment given. He was fiercely competitive within his own peer group. However, he showed absolute submissiveness by becoming the traditional dej tegni (position hunter) in the imperial court. So long as he had enough recognition and respect from his subordinates, as well as his peers, he would be naked of integrity and personal dignity in front of his superiors.



The educated adirbay had passionate respect for rules of all sorts. He openly exhibited an insatiable desire for social status and material achievement. The opportunities for using the system to achieve his goals rarely escaped his hunter's eye, for he had developed an uncanny ability to recognize all the nuances of the feudal order. In politics, he did not have a wide range to choose from, since his platform was determined for him by "His Imperial Majesty." Just like his Jesuit teachers before him, he "waved no flag"; he simply "tried to follow the leader."<sup>13</sup>

Some of the adirbays climbed the social ladder by marrying the children of the nobility, thus becoming property owners in their own right. To encourage this development, the Emperor distributed to the educated youth large land holdings at government expense. He freely dispensed municipal property to loyal educated bureaucrats and generously allowed them to take out large loans from the state treasury to be paid over a long period; in fact, those exhibiting "good behaviour" eventually received letters from the Ministry of Pen stating that "His Majesty has granted that you not pay back your loan."<sup>14</sup>

At every stage of the bureaucratic hierarchy, the Negus allowed the adirbays to help themselves to the spoils of office. Some even held

<sup>13</sup>Father Guy Morency, in response to our questionnaire, October 18, 1981, used this terminology to describe the Canadian Jesuits teaching in Ethiopia.

<sup>14</sup>This was the method especially used to co-opt the high officer corps. Since officers above the rank of colonel had so much to lose, they obviously did not play any significant role in the revolution of 1974. In fact, they were classified as oppressors, and many were executed along with the feudal rulers.

the view that public office was merely a private possession, or a reward from the Negus for loyalty and service to the monarch, not a national obligation or duty. Their position was, thus, unabashedly employed in scheming money out of the public treasury or in practising blatant nepotism.

Haile Selassie's aim here was fairly clear. He was creating a nouveau riche intelligentsia who would be grateful to him for their social and economic success. He hoped that the new group would ultimately form a bulwark against the educated balabats who might present a political challenge to his autocratic regime. The Negus always encouraged rivalry between the nobility and the new breed of western-educated officials in order to implement his policy of divide et impera.

There was also another group among the intelligentsia—the "quiescent rebel." This person was one who, upon return from abroad, was faced by a shock to rediscover the plight of the average taxpayer, the common Ethiopian on the street—who lived in abject poverty, ignorance, and ill-health—a plight combined to create not only sadness but also deep remorse. The "quiescent rebel" also found it hard on his conscience to participate in the country's semi-institutionalized nepotism. For him, opting out of the system in terms of personal benefits was a matter of principle. He would not share the spoils of office. However, he felt absolutely helpless in trying to openly oppose the system, or in attempting to encourage personal or professional honesty in public service as long as Haile Selassie's overpowering influence over the

populace was unchallenged. Despite the fact that he had the personal decency and professional integrity to decry graft and corruption, the silent rebel had no courage to challenge the system he vehemently detested.

For distraction, the silent rebel routinely followed developments abroad. He talked of civil rights problems in Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas. He continually debated the question of how to stem the institutionalization of racism in South Africa and Rhodesia. He lived in a hotel or a rented apartment. He was not married, had no children, and saved no money. His evenings were mostly spent in reading novels, watching Hollywood movies, playing cards, drinking, smoking and dancing at the big hotels, or sometimes, discreetly, in Dejatch Wube Bereha (Addis Ababa's red-light district). In short, this individual was silenced by total defeatism, and did not act, but waited for others to do something to win his instant support.


A third group of the modern intelligentsia was constituted of diehard revolutionaries. They had both the integrity and the courage to criticize, to challenge, and to fight against a system of corruption, oppression and injustice, by making tremendous sacrifices. It was this group that was to attempt to stamp out the vestiges of feudalism and had in the process been killed, jailed or exiled. Since the strategies and fundamental beliefs of the last group were identical to those of the students of the University College of Addis Ababa, they were ardent sympathisers and sometimes behind-the-scene advisers to the radical Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s and 1970s.

Student radicalism at the university, which had the open support of the student body and the tacit encouragement of the revolutionary group in the bureaucracy, thus signalled the coming of a new era. A new chapter opened in the history of the educated youth—a chapter which made possible the mobilization of the students and the formation of a political front in a struggle against the feudal-client government of Haile Selassie, which by its intensity imposed itself as a trigger of the political consciousness of some of the important sectors of the power structure, especially the army, the air force and the police.

Ultimately, a fissure had to develop in the tripartite alliance of Haile Selassie, the United States, and the intelligentsia. The problem emanated from the contradictory nature of attempting to implement western education in a dependent modernizing autocracy. The basic assumptions and ideals of American—or any western-type—education are rooted in the Liberal-Utilitarian tradition which promotes the values of metropolitan market economies. These values—autonomy and individual freedom—were introduced into Ethiopia—a dependent modernizing autocracy tied to a metropolitan nation (see Figure 5 ). Dependency and autocracy by their very nature are, however, opposed to autonomy and individual freedom. The consequence is that the political ideals of liberal education are negated by the political realities of a dependent authoritarian system. Since such a system is guided by metropolitan capitalism, there is a paradox: liberal education in dependent authoritarian systems of the Third World leads to a rejection of capitalism.

Figure 5

**Political Linkage: Modern Education and the  
Fall of Haile Selassie's Feudal Regime\***



\* A detailed treatise on the subject, which was developed by the author, was first presented to the Canadian Political Science Association. See Paulos Milkias, "Political Linkage: The Relationship Between Modern Education and the Fall of Haile Selassie's Feudal Regime," a Paper Presented to the Canadian Political Science Association at the Annual Meeting of the Learned Societies of Canada, held at the University of Quebec in Montreal, June 3, 1980.

Furthermore, as liberal education, which is a product of capitalism, can neither explain nor accommodate this rejection, Third World revolutionaries, who are almost invariably the products of western liberal schools, seek a resolution to this paradox through a different lens, i.e., socialism.

Our survey of Canadian expatriates who were involved in Ethiopian education for over thirty years shows that there was a direct correlation between American involvement in Ethiopian education and the consequent politicization of the campuses which led to the dramatic events of the 1960s and finally brought down the Haile Selassie regime in 1974. Dr. Robert Thompson, a close confidant of Haile Selassie, comments, for example:

The Americans came in with money and many inexperienced, ill trained, culturally uninformed personnel. They were not concerned with what had been done or why it had been done or what the circumstances [were]. Worse than that, they did not care to find these answers. It is said that 'Fools go where angels fear to tread' and they marched forward . . . to do it their way—and it did not work. It was heartbreaking for all of us.<sup>15</sup>

Another Canadian expatriate, William Prouty, formerly a lecturer at Haile Selassie University and now professor at the University of New Brunswick, also agrees with our conclusion. To the question on our survey questionnaire which asked: "Do you think that the quality of Ethiopian education improved or deteriorated after mass American involvement (running of Haile Selassie University, involvement

<sup>15</sup>Dr. Robert Thompson, in a response to our questionnaire, November 5, 1981.

of large numbers of Peace Corps volunteers in elementary and high school)?, Professor Prouty indicated "deteriorated," and gave the following as the reasons:

When I went to Ethiopia, I found that the 'system' worked smoothly and the students had a highly developed set of academic and intellectual standards. There seemed every possibility that Ethiopians would gradually create for themselves a large and competent class of teachers, administrators, and governors. I detected no attempt on the part of teachers to exert undue influence in areas that were none of their business.

With the coming of the Americans, academic standards were set aside as irrelevant, badly educated and badly motivated people exerted a tremendous influence over the running of the university. Foolish and socially destructive decisions were made (such as the creation of an American oriented law school) that inevitably destroyed the system already (but precariously) in place.

The most distasteful aspect of the American invasion was, however, the false and misinformed interest taken in Ethiopia and Ethiopians. Hypocrisy and ignorance in combination are difficult to tolerate.

For what it is worth, I have (or had) information that led me to believe that Dr. Myers (the American Vice-President) was directly responsible for the student riots that signalled the collapse of the status quo.<sup>16</sup>

For a proper understanding of the development Professor Prouty has mentioned above, it is imperative to trace the growth of Ethiopian student radicalism. What follows is a documentation which is mostly

---

<sup>16</sup>Professor William Prouty, in response to our questionnaire, December 5, 1981. Professor Margaret Gillett, who was the Registrar of Haile Selassie University during that period disagrees with Professor Prouty's assessment of Dr. Myers. She has commented to this author: "Edward Myers was hardly ignorant. He was an associate of Toynbee's." This comment was made in March, 1982.

remembered by the author from his own experiences as a former member of this movement.

### Student Radicalism and Student Power

As the response of the expatriates quoted in the previous section shows, it was American involvement in Ethiopian education and the consequent clashes against interference and cultural penetration which partly ignited the student rebellions of the 1960s. "The Ethiopian Student Movement," as it came to be known, then became the vanguard of the revolutionary process that ultimately precipitated the downfall of feudalism in the country. This was because in Ethiopia, where political parties or other legal political organizations were unknown, one very significant force was the student movement. By 1960, the Ethiopian students, who were largely drawn from the privileged classes of the country, had come to believe, as many of their progressive predecessors had, that the feudal system in Ethiopia was anachronistic and had to go.

Beginning in 1960, when university students demonstrated in support of the abortive coup d'état, the belief in the magic that Haile Selassie held over all Ethiopians, including the students, had been shaken. Students, like some of their fellow intellectuals off the campus, continued to clamour for freedom of speech, press and assembly. They believed that it was their right and in the interest of the Ethiopian masses to carry on a frank discussion of their nation's problems.



The feudal regime's response was fifty lashes for persons convicted of

... insults, abuses, defamations or slanders of the Emperor ... the publication of inaccurate or distorted information in any form concerning judicial proceedings ... the defence of a crime, spreading false rumours ... false charges ... inciting or provoking others to disobey orders issued by the lawful authorities . . .<sup>17</sup>

and so on.

A poetry contest which the University College students had started to use as a forum for dissent and criticism of the regime, and also of political education of the masses was held in the presence of scores of thousands of people on the college premises in 1962. Employing kiné (poetry) to express one's inner convictions had remained, as mentioned above, a political tradition of the country, where the right of political dissent had always been unknown. Yohannes Admasu, a forceful modern Amharic poet<sup>18</sup> wrote an Amharic poem in a modernized version of semenna work (wax and gold).<sup>19</sup> The "wax" was a journey of a frustrated youth to the land of "the dead" to ask questions he could not deal with in the land of "the living." The "gold" was an open question by the same frustrated youth as to why the Church,

---

<sup>17</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Pen, Negarit Gazeta, December 15, 1960.

<sup>18</sup>He died during the zemecha (educational campaign) of 1974 under circumstances unknown to this author.

<sup>19</sup>Levine, Wax and Gold, pp. 5-8.

an ally of the feudal regime, kept the Ethiopian people in bondage of ignorance, and why the regime exercised a reign of terror. The "dead" also referred to the ignorance of the people and their lack of power to criticize a regime that kept them in such bondage. Some of the lines run as follows:

Are there priests, deacons and clergymen in  
the country of the dead,  
Who answer only that kind which knows not  
what it talks of?  
What of their number? Overwhelming great?  
And do they sing the same rhyme year after year?  
Do they ever harp on prayer and fasting?  
Two things whose significance they understand  
not one jot?  
Do they teach the observance of a thousand  
and one holidays? . . .

If your people observe these for their souls'  
salvation,  
How can they live from day to day?  
And what of those who do not conform and  
holiday?  
Are they excommunicate—ostracized from  
society? . . .

What do your priests teach of hell and heaven?  
Is hell said full of worms and no sleep there?  
And fires that burn without end?  
Are your priests fanatics? . . .

Do they answer Yes! No! Black! White!—  
no grey?  
And the educated there, are there any?  
Is theirs too a life of fear and conflict? . . .<sup>20</sup>

The response of the regime to this reading was the expulsion of the poet and the College student leaders, and, following the advice

---

<sup>20</sup>The author has a tape recording of the poem read to the public by Yohannes Admasu. For a free English translation see Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 38.

of the Utah Team, abolishing the boarding system which they thought kept the students together and facilitated their political education and organization.<sup>21</sup>

But the students had politically matured, and were fighting on all fronts. They were far from defeated. However, the regime always exploited the fact that the students, as boarders, were receiving a free education and were thus privileged or even spoiled compared with the Ethiopian masses; and indeed, seldom did their status and activities make them popular among those who toiled to earn their daily bread. It was then that the College students started to become involved in community development projects which brought them into direct contact with the masses. The purposes of these projects, as proclaimed by the students themselves, were in the main to teach the people and to learn from them. It was the beginning of the "conscientization" process that was to eventually have such a detrimental effect on the feudal regime. Officially, the Community Service clubs which were created in the early 1960s were designed:

- to bridge the gap between the more or less unrealistic, ideal and intellectual world of the university and the community or the society across the street;
- to offer the students the opportunity to observe the life of their own people in its full reality and to understand better the realities of the world for which they

---

<sup>21</sup>The regime soon found this decision counter-productive, as the students, who were scattered all over the city, soon started transmitting progressive ideas to the masses amongst whom they found themselves. This was much more dangerous to the regime in the long run. The boarding system was thus slowly restored, beginning in 1968.

were being trained as potential leaders: a world with little or no education, a life without social or personal security, a life of poverty, disease and illiteracy; —to give the college students, an elite or less than 1000 students in a population of 20 million, a social conscientiousness, that should eventually develop in them a sense of SERVICE.<sup>22</sup>

Many of the community organization projects on which the students worked were: conducting literacy campaigns among service employees (such as cleaners, servants and gardeners); a literacy campaign at Prince Makonnen School in the Addis Ketema district, where most of the city's poor lived; opening and running a primary school in the Beggars' Rehabilitation Centre of Addis Ababa; the establishment of a mobile school (with the help of UNESCO) for shepherds and parents in rural areas. All these activities were voluntary, and in most cases the students themselves contributed money from their stipends to buy teaching equipment and rent facilities.<sup>23</sup>

Many educators at the University College, including the French Canadian Jesuits, were already aware of the purpose and the future implications of these community service projects. Thus, Edouard Trudeau observed in 1964:

True leadership would not normally come from those students interested only in their own intellectual pursuits or in their own future security; a good job, a car, a home and a

---

<sup>22</sup>Edouard Trudeau, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," Ed. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1964, p. 87.

<sup>23</sup>The author, who was a member of the University College Literacy Campaign team, writes from personal experience.

family. The common good of the society could not remain a neglected value in the education of the Ethiopian college student....

Are the students of yesterday the nation's builders of today? Are they devoted to their work as civil servants? Are they elements of change for a better life in their community? Are the teachers, administrators, economists, agricultural technicians, engineers and doctors that came from this 1950-60 generation real assets to their country, new pioneers in a newly-developing country? Or are they a new 'bourgeoisie,' a needy establishment? Have the speeches and articles and strong debates of yesterday on 'serving the nation' been transferred into action? Does Ethiopia have a new 'autocracy' or a real meritocracy of service? The years 1960-1975 will give the answers and will provide the best evaluation of the type of citizens the institutions of higher education in Ethiopia have produced.<sup>24</sup> (emphasis added)

This statement was, as we shall see, prophetic.

In 1961, at the annual meeting of the National Union of the Ethiopian Student Union, at which the author represented the University College of Addis Ababa, the participants discussed and endorsed a national service plan by which all university students, before graduation, would go to the countryside and teach the peasants to read and write. The project, which was to last for one year, was unanimously endorsed. From the discussion that took place at the caucus meeting, it was clear that the major purpose was the "conscientization and politicization" of the peasantry.

It was at this point that the regime started to be truly wary. The popularity of the students' literacy campaign in the Addis Ketema

<sup>24</sup>Trudeau, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," pp. 87-88.

area was countered by the creation of a National Literacy Campaign, with Haile Selassie as the honorary chairman and the Crown Prince, Asfa Wossen, as the honorary vice-chairman. A University Service Program was also hastily put in motion. Suggestions brought before the rubber-stamp parliament by the regime and hastily approved had nonetheless stipulated that students instruct children in regular elementary and high schools in order to earn degrees. Teaching the peasants, which the students had planned to do, was thus out of the question. The scheme was indeed clear. It pulled the rug out from under the students and at the same time curbed their activities. It was also designed to solve the regime's shortage of teachers and, most importantly, to create a wedge between the students and the peasant masses.<sup>25</sup>

However, the students were not unprepared. First they fought in the feudal court itself over the constitutionality of parliament determining a degree requirement, but found that the supreme court judges who had decided in their favour were dismissed from their offices. Then, since the National Literacy Campaign and the University Service ran simultaneously, the students, although constrained by the government's tactics, attempted to fulfil their initial objectives in many of the areas they went to teach in by opening adult literacy campaign

---

<sup>25</sup>Although the Haile Selassie government used the name "University Service," in a rather broad manner, the focus in other countries who had adopted the program was different. A "University Service" program, it should be pointed out, was thought to enhance the process of economic development and was as a result popular in many parts of the world, especially socialist countries.

centres and teaching the peasants in their spare time.<sup>26</sup> The "conscientization" the government had wanted to prevent thus went more or less according to plan, though not in the manner and on the scale the students had originally intended.

Looking back at the achievements of the students during this period, the former Dean of Haile Selassie University and Director of the Ethiopian University Service, Gilles Pion made the following comment:

History may or may not one day evaluate the role of EUS in these pre-revolutionary days, in initiating the politico-national awareness of the University students in contact with the hard realities lived by the grass-root communities.<sup>27</sup>

But there was also another front, riskier and bloody but clearly more dynamic. The student struggle, which was low-key in the early 1960s, picked up momentum in 1965 when for the first time they challenged the feudal regime in a demonstration by demanding the abolition of serfdom. Placards demanded "Land to the Tiller," and leaflets distributed attacked the concentration of rural land in the hands of a few aristocratic families. What followed was a serious confrontation; the regime clamped down on this movement with a series of arrests and expulsions of student activists.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup>The author, who was in the first University Service group, together with three other colleagues, waged an adult literacy campaign in Yilmana Dinsa district of Finote Selam, Gojam and taught about 200 peasants the rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic, and politicizing them in the process.

<sup>27</sup>Gilles Pion, in response to our questionnaire, November 4, 1981.

<sup>28</sup>World Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students, Challenge, XIII (August, 1973), pp. 1-20.

Since 1963, when the Organization of African Unity established its headquarters in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian regime had attempted to hide the poverty its own people suffered from the eyes of the numerous diplomats who flocked to the capital. In the process, thousands of unemployed citizens who roamed the city streets vending or begging were rounded up and put in a concentration camp opened at Shola, a district on the outskirts of the city. In 1966 militant student leaders who were informed of the terrible conditions in the camp by two American exchange students and who took photographs of the camp, opened an exhibit on the campus for the student body. Pictures exhibited showed people in their seventies and infants only a few months old huddled together. Lepers, blind people, and the merely sick and under-nourished crowded together in the same unsanitary room. There were also

... dead bodies unburied and littered all over the place; mothers emaciated in agonizing childbirth and others unable to survive it; the living unfed and unclad.<sup>29</sup>

The regime was caught red-handed. The student reaction was angry and swift. They quickly mobilized and marched with enlargements of the photographs from the exhibits, thus starting the largest student demonstration to date.

They first marched towards the Cabinet Office, where the then Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Aklilu Habte Wold, awaited them with all

---

<sup>29</sup>Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution (London: Review of African Political Economy, 1975), p. 96.



his ministers. The students demanded the government immediately give proper medical treatment to these victims, job security for the people, and trial and punishment for officials who were responsible for creating the Shola camp. But Aklilu Habte Wold replied in the usual bureaucratic manner, "We shall form a committee and study the case." When one of the student leaders told the Prime Minister, "We are speaking of people dying right now," the Prime Minister ordered, "Return to your classes!" The students started to march towards the Parliament building, and when armed police convoys sealed the area, they advanced in a different direction towards the City Hall. But here a confrontation with police occurred, and large numbers of students (including the author) and many riot police were injured.

The public, for the first time, started to give open support to the students, and fought against the police. The regime was disturbed; fearing that wider conflict might ensue, it had the Shola camp dismantled overnight. The dead were buried, the sick taken to hospital, the destitute given clothing and food; the jobless who showed a desire to return to their villages were given money and transportation back.

This was the first taste of victory for the student movement and their newly created citywide union, the University Students' Union of Addis Ababa, which carried out the mobilization and politicization of the public. It was this union which organized this particular demonstration, with the cooperation of unions representing the individual city colleges and all university students.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup>The author was one of the founders and executive leaders of the University Students' Union of Addis Ababa, and was also one of the organizers of this demonstration.

The University Students' Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA) also established the first left-wing student magazine, Struggle, which won such instant popularity that the second issue of May 1966 was confiscated by police on the orders of the government. The regime's and the American lecturers' attempts to strengthen splinter unions failed, and the USUAA prevailed when, by a majority of a half vote (freshmen had only a half vote), a referendum determined that all university student associations in the capital would henceforth fall under the banner of the USUAA, starting in 1967.

On March 3, 1968, what had started as a campus benefit show in which some American and Ethiopian upper class ladies were involved ended up as a bloody riot. During the show, miniskirts, considered by many radical Ethiopian youths as an epitome of American decadence, were displayed. At first the students merely wished to obstruct the performance, but in the melée that followed, aristocratic women present, the invited wives of foreign ambassadors, and the models themselves were dragged out from their cars, beaten and pelted with rotten eggs. When, as a consequence, the government announced that the university was closed, clashes raged in the streets of the capital; many university students and several riot police were injured. High school students immediately went on strike to support their university colleagues, and when the students and government police clashed again, even small children from primary schools joined the fight "carrying additional supplies of stone for their elders to use against the police."<sup>31</sup> More students and riot police were injured and

<sup>31</sup>"Rioting By Students," Africa Diary (May 19-25, 1968), p. 1.

about a hundred student leaders were consequently arrested. The western press covered this event widely, with some amusement, but it never understood nor cared to analyze the cause. For the western press, it was Ethiopian student "conservatism." For the students, however, it was a war against "cultural penetration."

In April 1968, there were additional violent clashes between students and riot police when the former demonstrated upon learning that the government was planning to expel those who had taken part in previous demonstrations, and had decided to ban their unions. Starting from early March until April 5, 1968, when the university was not in operation, at least 500 students were arrested.<sup>32</sup> Clashes continued and all secondary schools were closed. This was the year that the radical movement slowly expanded into the provinces. During this period, widespread unrest was reported, including criticism of a new educational fee that was introduced, and the conduct of the educational system as a whole. Students by then had expanded their demands and had started to ask that a minimum wage for workers be legislated, and that the money spent on lavish embassies abroad be cut back.<sup>33</sup> The effect of this mobilization, which for the first time included high schools, was such that it led to the resignation of Akale Work Habte Wold, the then Minister of Education and Fine Arts, and the closing of many Ethiopian embassies abroad, including the one in Canada.

---

<sup>32</sup>Kessings Contemporary Archives, XVIII (London: 1971-72).

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

During 1969, students turned their energies to the political education of the masses and thus participated in some unprecedented political actions. They demonstrated, and clashed with Haile Selassie's para-military forces. Some disgruntled students hijacked an Ethiopian Airlines jet as a protest against what they considered to be severe repression in the country. In an air battle that ensued in the Boeing 707 aircraft, virtually all the hijackers were killed and several foreign passengers were injured.<sup>34</sup>

The following year, the regime singled out and made a systematic attack on the government-controlled radio and television stations one specific demand the students had previously made, that nationalities that felt oppressed and asked for self-determination, including secession, be given the right to do so. The regime depicted the students as spoiled, and traitors to the unity of their country—the cause for which their forefathers shed their blood over thousands of years of Ethiopian history. As soon as the patriotic Ethiopian populace had been aroused against the students, on the night of December 28, 1969, Tilahun Gizaw, President of the USUAA, was shot and killed by unknown gunmen in a passing car. The next day, 10,000 enraged students, in the largest demonstration ever, congregated on the campus of the university, broke into the hospital where the body of Tilahun Gizaw was being kept, and took it by force. When they were mounting vigil over the body of their fallen comrade, police attempted to eject the

---

<sup>34</sup>ibid.

mourners and opened fire, killing over twenty students.<sup>35</sup>

This disturbance ignited a series of violent student demonstrations against Ethiopian embassies abroad—from Moscow to Washington. In Moscow, militant Ethiopian students swarmed into their embassy, where they wrecked furniture and smashed pictures of Emperor Haile Selassie. They ripped up all the documents they could find. They shouted, "Haile Selassie is a fascist!" On leaving, they left the embassy fence plastered with posters that attacked the Emperor and what they called his greatest support—"American imperialism." This scene was repeated wherever there were Ethiopian students abroad—Washington, Stockholm, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, etc.<sup>36</sup>

Killings and police repression throughout 1969 and 1970 did not subdue the students. In 1971-72, students came back with new force, more militancy, and in larger numbers. This time, the initiative was taken by high school students who had modified their tactics. They demonstrated in support of Congo veterans whose wages had allegedly been embezzled by the former Minister of Defence, Ras Ababe Aregay, and in support of oppressed vocational people and tradesmen throughout Ethiopia. They also made four demands, none of them directly related to student affairs but all deriving from serious problems affecting the

<sup>35</sup>An interview with Dr. Eshetu Chole (lecturer at Haile Selassie University during the period), Montreal, September 7, 1972. Dr. Eshetu, who was one of the radical Professors at the University during the final days of Haile Selassie was one of the key figures who spearheaded the progressive moves made by the Ethiopian educators in 1974. At the time of writing, he had been in the Derg's jail for eight years.

<sup>36</sup>Africa Diary, X (Jan. 22-28, 1970), p. 2.

daily lives of the public. They asked for: 1) reduced bus rates, as these had recently been increased by 20 percent; 2) a reduction in living expenses, since the price of butter, for example, had gone up as much as 100 percent and potatoes were "totally prohibitive"; 3) land to be given to the "tillers of the soil"; 4) an end to the incarceration of unemployed people in what was called the "poor house" but was actually a revival of the Shola concentration camp, which had ostensibly been dismantled in 1966.<sup>37</sup>

The students then effectively forced the closing down of most of the government schools in Addis Ababa and many small towns as far away as Nazareth, and organized street and market demonstrations, which became popular and were joined by the public, who were severely hit by the high cost of living.

Again changing tactics, the students this time avoided direct confrontations with the riot police. Their attacks were concentrated on Ambassa buses (most of the shares of this company were owned by the estates of the Emperor) and on the high-status Mercedes-Benz automobiles, a symbol of the aristocracy and the new bourgeoisie of the capital.<sup>38</sup> All in all, seventy-six buses and scores of Mercedes on the streets, in garages, and in showrooms were severely damaged. As a symbolic target of the aristocracy, students also attacked the

---

<sup>37</sup>World Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students, Challenge, XIII (August 1973), pp. 1-13.

<sup>38</sup>In Kenya, the new bourgeoisie class had already been dubbed "Wa-Benzi," or "Mercedes-Benzers."

home of Ras Mesfin, one of the biggest landowners in the country.

Students continued to modify their tactics. One guerrilla-style approach they introduced during this period became particularly popular with the public, so much so that the regime became very seriously concerned. The students made a series of sorties into the marketplace and asked a trader how much he charged for goods such as butter or potatoes. Since the students always moved in intimidatingly large numbers and spoke in an intimidating manner, the trader was forced to quote a figure which was significantly below the going price for that particular week. The students then invited the public to buy at the price quoted. If a merchant hiked up his prices after the students had departed, they returned and poured paraffin over the produce.

These shifts in tactics had a double purpose. The first was to depict the government as fighting for its own survival, not for the public welfare. The second aspect was to win the public over to the students' side. The scheme worked. Even law-enforcement men started to sympathize with them. For the first time since student militancy began, the police, themselves victims of spiralling prices, refused government orders to intervene. Almost everywhere, the students were carrying out their guerrilla sorties; policemen stood by passively, remarking: "This is not politics." And soon, the price of some essential foodstuffs went down by 50 percent, and remained lower even long after the demonstrations had ended.

Frightened by these turns of events, especially by the support the students were winning among the police, the government called in

the army to do their job. But it was again surprised by the sympathy of the soldiers for the actions of the students. In the city of Nazareth, some soldiers who were found collaborating with the students in their sorties were arrested.<sup>39</sup> The government then had no other alternative and belatedly enacted price controls, which it had refused to do previously.

From 1972 until the fall of Haile Selassie in 1974, student agitation had escalated into popular turbulence since other sectors, such as the teachers' union, the taxi drivers, the soldiers, and the confederation of Ethiopian labour unions had joined in. In that sense, after a series of violent separate struggles, the Ethiopian student movement joined its forces with other mass movements, and thus ultimately succeeded in its objective: the overthrow of Haile Selassie and feudalism.

It is of interest to examine the reactions of the non-American expatriates administering higher education in Ethiopia during the tumultuous years before the fall of the Negus. Edouard Trudeau describes his initial reactions when, for the first time, the students started to shake off the Jesuits' excessive paternalism, showed their independence, and started to become directly involved in the political arena:

A 'wind of change,' similar to the one felt in the international and national politics of African countries, swept the students' campus. Internally, this brought some temporary clashes and misunderstandings. Students became very sensitive to staff interference and even staff

---

<sup>39</sup>Interview with Dr. Eshetu Chole, Montreal, September 7, 1973.



cooperation with students in the students' affairs. Advisers, even coaches for sports, were put aside by many clubs and committees and replaced by self-management. The Dean could no longer appoint coaches for students' teams, or select advisers for clubs and committees. Students would call for and select their own coach, if they wished to! For some time the college teams fell apart, the dramatic club lost its reputation, the glee club its audience. It was a necessary crisis, that of the phase of adolescence in student government. The staff understood this attitude and worked with the students, at their request, in a less paternalistic spirit.<sup>40</sup>

If student independence and agitation was limited to the realm of extra-curricular activities within the University College itself, the problem would have been very simple—the "staff's" understanding of "adolescent crisis" would have solved the problem. But the students' involvement was much more serious; it was politically motivated. It attacked Haile Selassie and the entire feudal system of government at every level. On that score, the expatriates' position was marked by a dilemma. Trudeau comments:

Students are interested in politics. Debating societies discuss the political problems of today in Ethiopia freely. This creates some delicate situations for college authorities. What could or should the Dean of Students have done when students strongly attacked national policies on the college campus, either in their student newspaper, or on the rostrum—while debating among each other? In the classroom, there was no problem; this was not a public platform. But in a semi-public debate, in an inter-collegiate public competition, the problem reared its head. When students asked for more freedom

---

<sup>40</sup>Trudeau, "Higher Education in Ethiopia," pp. 86-88.

of speech in the country, for more freedom of the press, for more freedom of organization, should the college authorities have taken action? These were regular issues at the college in Addis Ababa. Students, in a few instances, decided to march to the Palace and present their petition directly to the Emperor or His representative. Should the University authorities have taken sides in the internal politics of the country? Should they have let students assume their own political responsibilities and with them the consequences citizens must face when moving into the political realm? College students in North American countries live a very secure and peaceful life in comparison with the life of African and Asiatic students. And, quite often, students have to commit themselves and take responsible action which would affect their whole future.<sup>41</sup>

There was no question about the fact that the non-American expatriates understood the students' resolve and their "coming of age." Gilles Pion, commenting on problems the university had faced during the early formative period, had thus remarked in a questionnaire interview conducted by the author:

The main problem, as I saw it, was the growing political awareness of the University students and their growing capacity for critical analysis. This should normally not be construed as a problem but as a sign of maturation on the part of the students. It so happens that the political circumstances were such in Ethiopia at that moment that this newly acquired political awareness created a state of unpredictable and frequent 'student unrest' and instability at the University. This went along for at least twelve years. . . . I was Dean of Students when the first President of the Student Union . . . Gebeyehu Frissa . . . was arrested and barred from further attending the University

---

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

that was to open the following September. When I left Ethiopia, in 1968, students were being killed in clashes with the police and the Army. It did continue well after I left, evidently.<sup>42</sup>

The same could not be said, however, for the regime; its estimation of the extent and nature of student involvement in political affairs was pathetically poor. Its replies were inherently paternalistic and arrogant. The regime took solace in the fact that the masses of the Ethiopian peasantry still believed in the Negus and "the country." The students' agitation, the regime was assured, could not master mass support. Thus, its punitive actions were similar to those meted out by every Ethiopian parent to a "spoiled" son. "Give him a punishment that fits the crime and he will correct his undesirable behavior" was the prevalent attitude.

Gilles Pion, who was Dean of the University College during the hottest period of student political unrest of the mid-1960s and was liaison to the Emperor and his ministers, describes the government's reactions as follows:

The problem, at that time, was aggravated by the awkward reaction of the members of the Board of the University, most of them Ministers. I remember having discussed with Lij Yilma Deressa [who was then both Minister of Finance and Chairman of the University's Board of Governors], at the occasion of a meeting of the Board with the Emperor, at which I was invited as Dean of Students, the possible causes of the so-called student unrest. His reaction was pathetic. It was clear from the Emperor's own reaction that day that the Board did not

---

<sup>42</sup>Gilles Pion, in response to our questionnaire, November 4, 1981.

understand at all that the students were more than 'nasty big boys': they were deadly serious.

This combination of socio-political awareness on the part of the students and a kind of paternalistic blindness on the part of the Government made the problem insolvable in as much as the students' motivation would not be rightly understood by the University authorities.<sup>43</sup>

But when the feudal government belatedly discovered the magnitude of the Ethiopian student movement, it panicked, and started not only to use punitive measures but also to employ scare tactics. Following a demonstration against the abolition of the boarding system, the Emperor addressed the students in the palace and tried to explain why boarding schools had to be abolished. Haile Selassie explained how, during the beginning of his reign, in order to attract more and more students and provide modern education to his people he provided boarding facilities, but that by the mid-1960s, there were "too many students." He tried to argue that in order to distribute scarce educational resources to more and more youngsters in the country, he had to reduce their share. He then pointed to his ministers, including the Prime Minister, Aklilu Habte Wold, and told the students that these were the first beneficiaries of his early effort.

The Prime Minister admitted to his humble origin. He told the students how "His Majesty" took him "out of poverty" where he used to eat only quolo (roasted whole grains) and wear dabalo (tattered clothes). He added: "Now as you see, I have received modern education and I am the Prime Minister of Ethiopia."

<sup>43</sup>ibid.

Yilma Deressa, in his capacity as Chairman of the University's Board of Governors, then tried to draw a parallel between New York University, where there were no boarding facilities, and Haile Selassie University. An argument soon developed between the students on the one hand, and the Emperor and the ministers on the other. The Vice-President of the University College Students' Union, Iyesus Work Zafu, pointed out that it was true that there was no boarding at New York University, which he himself had visited the previous year, but that it was wrong to compare the United States, where the average income per capita was U.S. \$5,000, with Ethiopia, where the per capita income was less than U.S. \$60. At this point, the Emperor angrily reprimanded the students for thinking that Ethiopia could not be compared with the United States. He said, "Are you not ashamed to compare your country with such nations as Ghana, Nigeria, and Egypt?" Still raging with anger at the comparison, the Emperor returned to his chilot (Imperial court) with a stern command to the students: "Go now! Nothing will change!" The Imperial Bodyguard, which had already surrounded the demonstrators with machine-guns and drawn bayonets, then physically attacked the students and led them out of the palace.<sup>44</sup>

The Emperor's comments were, of course, for public consumption, since they were publicly broadcast on Radio Ethiopia the same evening. He definitely did not imagine that he could convince the students that Ethiopia could not be compared with the three African

---

<sup>44</sup>The author was one of the students present during this demonstration, and writes from personal experience.

countries he mentioned, since they all had per capita incomes of over U.S. \$250, and even less that Ethiopia was economically on equal standards with the United States, the richest capitalist nation in the world!

During the convocation ceremony of 1962, when the student leader Iyesus Work Zafu went to receive his degree—having passed with distinction, he had been chosen to receive the Board of Governors' Award as the best graduating student—he was turned away. He was told by the President of the University, Lij Kassa Wolde Mariam, that the Board of Governors had determined that he was to be denied his degree because of his insolence in replying to the Emperor during the previous demonstration. But the graduating students all collaborated, and refused to receive their own degrees which the Emperor held in his hands unless their colleague also received his. This led to an embarrassing moment when students' names were called, the Emperor waiting on the throne and holding the diplomas, and all the graduates declined to accept. The day was saved when a promise was given to the then Dean of Students, Dr. Aklilu Habte, who was trusted by the students, that on the Emperor's orders, Iyesus Work Zafu would receive his degree.<sup>45</sup> This was just one of the tactical measures the government adopted to discourage students from challenging the feudal regime.

---

<sup>45</sup>Aklilu later made sure, on threat of his resignation, that the degree was given to this student.

The government also resorted to blackmail and scare tactics. Friends of student leaders were warned that their colleagues would be killed. Haile Selassie's grandson, Iskender Desta, who was the head of the anti-espionage division in the Emperor's cabinet, once summoned the president and vice-president of the University College Students' Society (including this author) and reminded them of Spain, where masses of students had been massacred by the government. He reminded the student leaders that their fate would be the same if they did not restrain the agitation on the campus.

Domestic and American undercover agents went digging into students' records for the purpose of sabotage and blackmail. As Gilles Pion remembers, it was not easy to be an expatriate and a Dean of Students during those years. He commented:

As Dean of Students, I certainly live the most challenging years of my career in Ethiopia. It has always been my belief that a Dean of Students should be a 'national.' The position was a sensitive one in the years the University students were starting to be politically aware and active. I had telephone calls from what was called the C.I.D. [Criminal Investigation Department] asking me to give information or to hand in the files of a certain number of students, specially the student leaders. I even had the visit of 'foreign citizens' asking me to give them information. Although I never gave out any file or information, at times I would find—coming to the office in the morning—that the filing cabinet had been opened during the night.<sup>46</sup>

The public media were also extensively used to counter the students' protest. Although the government had admitted the existence

<sup>46</sup>Gilles Pion, in response to our survey questionnaire, November 4, 1981.

of the Shola camp, which it eventually dismantled in 1966, in the public press, the story was different. It denied the allegations that caused the demonstration against the camp. In the official English-language daily, the Ethiopian Herald, an editorial entitled "Demonstration of Ignorance" appeared, countering the students' charges.<sup>47</sup>

The passage of stern laws was also carried out as a precautionary measure the government resorted to. After the student militancy of the late 1960s escalated, the regime, which was faced with an ever-growing student agitation, set new and draconian restrictions on all types of demonstrations. Freedom of association and assembly were legally denied, except under certain controlled conditions. For a public demonstration to take place, any group involved "must submit" an application to the Ministry of the Interior (which controlled national security). It had to define the causes of the demonstrations. It had to provide the number of participants. It had to supply in advance the names of the "ring leaders" with all necessary details including their photographs. The law, which was passed on April 7, 1969, was designed to clamp down on student radicals once and for all. It categorized student agitation as political subversion, and distinguished between two classes of people who could be arrested and kept without trial on suspicion of being subversive. Those falling into the first category were to be subject to the payment of a heavy sum of caution

---

<sup>47</sup>The Ethiopian Herald, April 20, 1966. The editor-in-chief, Tegegn Yetesha Work, was one of the sixty-two officials executed in 1974, particularly for having written this editorial.



money as a guarantee of good behaviour for a period of six months. Those falling into the second category were to receive automatic prison sentences ranging from three to six months. This law also abolished all organizations that the government suspected of encouraging subversive activities or public gatherings considered "prejudicial to public safety."<sup>48</sup>

As Colin Legum points out, after the violent demonstration of 1969, which ignored the regime's tightening of freedom of assembly:

The Cabinet itself ordered the closing down of the schools. Finally, the decision was taken to arrest the demonstrators. Between 2,500 - 4,500 high school children were reported to have been detained under a tough regimen in four detention camps—sleeping on the rough floor, allowed no blankets nor food to be brought by their parents, and having to work on the land. At the same time, the radio gave unusual prominence to the action of General Mobutu in conscripting his students to the army.<sup>49</sup>

The Emperor personally gave a national address in which he announced that in order to open the University, which was closed following the assassination of the student president Tilahun Gizaw and the subsequent massacre on the campus, the University would have to be policed by government security forces, students suspected of intimidating their colleagues into joining demonstrations would have to be suspended

---

<sup>48</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Pen, "Public Safety and Welfare Order, 1964," Negarit Gazeta, April 7, 1969.

<sup>49</sup>Colin Legum, Africa: The Year of the Students (London: Rex Collings, 1972), p. 17.

or detained, that all student publications and student unions would be legally banned, and that student's records would be enlarged to include "non-academic information."<sup>50</sup>

It should be clear to the reader by now that the strong bond that was created between the feudal regime, the United States of America and a large segment of the first generation of post-war educated Ethiopian youth, was decisively broken when student radicalism was born in the mid 1960s and grew in intensity, as American cultural penetration went deeper and deeper into the country's social fabric. The regime's answer to this was, as could be predicted, the introduction of severe measures, including prison terms, expulsion from schools, blacklisting to prevent recruitment of offenders by both government and the private sector. All these measures were not, however, able to contain the growth and agitation of the Ethiopian student movement. As we shall see in the next chapter, the students' last two moves—first to publicize the "hidden famine" of Wollo, and second, together with their teachers, to precipitate a series of strikes—were the most crucial, as they triggered the fall of the feudal regime in December, 1974.

---

<sup>50</sup>Ethiopian Herald, January 28, 1970, pp. 1-3.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE DELUGE: FAILURE OF A 'PANACEA' FOR EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS, THE FALL OF THE EMPEROR, AND AN END TO ETHIOPIAN FEUDAL MONARCHY

#### "The Education Sector Review" as Panacea

When demands by students and parents, and critical debates among Ethiopian educators concerning the serious problems of the Ethiopian school system started to rage with greater intensity, the government established the "National Commission for Education," which laid the groundwork for the Education Sector "Review," launched in 1971. The "Review" was the brainchild of the International Development Association (IDA), a branch of the World Bank. The task involved a comprehensive investigation into all aspects of Ethiopian education, including the following responsibilities:

1. to analyse the education and training system of Ethiopia, and its capability for promoting economic, social, and cultural development;
2. to suggest, wherever necessary, ways to improve and expand the education and training system in order that it might achieve aims relevant both to the society and the overall development of the country;
3. to suggest ways in which education could best be utilized to promote national integration; and
4. to identify priority studies and investments in education and training.<sup>1</sup>

Although, due to its basic contradictory character in the light of the existing economic system, the "Review" proved to be too unrealistic,

---

<sup>1</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report of the Education Sector Review," (Addis Ababa, August, 1972), p. 1-3.

and was obviously short-lived, it nonetheless had significant social and political ramifications. The "Review's" inception was radical for a feudal society. It contained some vehement criticisms of the status quo, and carefully avoided the traditionally accepted exaggeration and flattery that most advisory commissions showered on the regime. It had stern comments in the introduction of the analysis. First, it pointed out that there were no clear-cut objectives concerning Ethiopian culture and language, because

... the educational experience of Ethiopian youth is inadequately related to Ethiopian realities and milieu. . . . The school system is consequently producing youth that is unaware of, unappreciative of and alienated from its own cultural heritage and roots.<sup>2</sup>

The "Review" Committee found the Ethiopian educational system to be "elitist, formalistic and rigid."<sup>3</sup> It did not respond, the Committee stated, to the needs of the majority of the Ethiopian population. Agriculture was completely neglected by the system, and thus the Ethiopian educational system ignored 80 percent of the country's labour force.

The structure of the school system was, according to the "Review," wasteful, thus contributing to and increasing losses of skilled manpower. There was an overemphasis on rigidly set examinations, and too much stress on the language aptitude of the students.

Huge discrepancies were observed between basic infrastructures and scarce educational resources. Educational opportunities

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. I-6.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. I-5.

always favoured some provinces at the expense of others. According to the "Review,"

... three of the nation's 15 provinces [accounted for] 61 per cent of primary school enrollment and over 41 per cent of the total elementary school budget [was] allocated to the three, i.e. the city of Addis Ababa, Eritrea, and Shoa.<sup>4</sup>

Educational administration was highly centralized and did not leave any room for local initiative. The creative endeavours of the different communities were not harnessed.

Curriculum design . . . decisions on personnel matters, purchase and distribution of supplies, budget preparation and allocation [were] all rigidly centralized in the Head Office of the Ministry of Education.<sup>5</sup>

Taking into consideration these shortcomings, the "Review" Committee closed its critical comments with the following remark:

The conclusions drawn by the Sector Review participants from the foregoing concerns are that education must aid in the transformation of the Ethiopian society by playing a vital role in the lives of all citizens. To do this, the present educational system must be restructured and changed. Education must be conceived in its broadest connotation to include all non-formal and formal learning experience. It must take advantage of new technology and of social and religious institutions so that education can be delivered to the Ethiopian population as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

The Committee then made a broad range of proposals concerning future Ethiopian educational objectives. Three strategies

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. I-5 - I-6.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. I-6.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

were juxtaposed and studied. Strategy I (see Tables 15 and 16), which suggested that the existing 6-2-4 structure be retained, generally recommended that the goal of universal education be achieved as rapidly as possible, that vocational education be substantially increased, that for economic reasons, schools be run with two shifts a day, and teachers be required to instruct during both shifts. School hours would be relatively shortened, but the school year would be extended from 180 to 220 days per year.

Strategy II suggested a 4-4-4 structure, with a fundamental overhaul of the curriculum at both the first and second levels. The language of instruction at these levels was to be Amharic, with local other languages employed only in the lower grades for the sole purpose of introducing non-Amharic-speaking students to the lingua franca of the nation. Strategy II's most important recommendation concerned the 4-year "Minimum Formation Education" (MFE) at the primary level. Its specific character was to be as follows:

The . . . program would consist of 'minimum formation education' (MFE) which would be made available to all children throughout the Empire as soon as permitted by availability of resources. Under MFE, emphasis would be placed on meaningful activity and experience, rather than on number of years of attendance in school. It is anticipated that for most pupils four years in MFE would be needed to gain necessary skills.<sup>7</sup>

The general format of the MFE would be similar to what Strategy I had suggested, i.e., two shifts per day, extending the 180-

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. V-5.

TABLE 15

**Alternative Strategy I**  
**School Operating Characteristics**

	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Junior Secondary</u>	<u>Senior Secondary</u>
Grades	1-6	7-8	9-12
Typical Pupil Age Range	7-12	13-14	15-18
School Days per Year	220	180	180
Shifts per Day (1)	2	1	1
Pupils per Class	50	40	35
Distribution of Certified Teachers			
8-1	85%		
12-1	15%	100%	
12-2			70%
12-4			30%
Approximate Percentage of Instruction by:			
Certified Teachers	100%	100%	100%
Community Assistants	-	-	-

(1) Indicates number of shifts worked by teachers.  
Many secondary schools will have a second shift  
staffed by a second set of teachers.

---

Source: Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Appendix V-B, p. 1.

TABLE 16

## Alternative Strategy I

## Basic Statistics for Government Primary Schools

	Year, (GC)						
	1970/1971	1974/1975	1979/1980	1984/1985	1989/1990	1994/1995	1999/2000
<b>Operating Statistics</b>							
Number of Schools	1,190	2,370	2,464	3,041	4,087	5,717	8,134
Number of classrooms	8,401	15,481	16,037	19,345	25,863	35,445	48,136
Enrolment (thousands)	471.1	867.5	1,603.7	1,934.5	2,568.5	3,490.3	4,340.0
Participation rate (percent)	11.7	19.3	31.4	33.0	38.5	46.5	51.9
Number of teachers - total	8,992	16,682(a)	24,056	29,018	38,495	53,168	72,204
Teachers - 12-1	N.A.	2,502	3,608	4,353	5,774	7,975	10,831
Teachers - 8-1	N.A.	14,180	20,448	24,665	32,721	45,193	61,373
<b>Financial Statistics (b)</b>							
Recurrent expenses (millions)	\$33.5 (c)	\$66.6	\$88.2	\$124.0	\$187.1	\$289.0	\$454.4
Average expenses per student	\$71.20 (c)	\$77.00	\$55.00(d)	\$84.40	\$72.90	\$82.80	\$104.70

(a) Assumes one teacher per 52 students

(b) Expressed in 1969 constant dollars

(c) Expressed in 1970/71 dollars rather than in 1969 dollars

(d) The drop in unit cost between 1974/75 and 1979/80 is a result of implementing the recommendations of this report in particular. The shift system and the employment of fewer high-salaried teachers

N.A. Not applicable

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Appendix V-A, p. 13.



day school year to 220 days, with teachers giving instruction during a portion of both shifts.

Another unconventional recommendation of Strategy II concerned the future of graduates from MFE who, on completion of minimum formation education were "to enter the work force and participate in non-formal education programs with a minority entering second level schools."<sup>8</sup> One other new proposal, later to be a serious issue, was the training and employment of teachers. The 'Review' Committee wanted to radically reduce the number of 12+1 teachers and produce instead 8+1 teachers. Another suggestion was that:

In addition to certified 8+1 and 12+1 teachers, instructional staff would include 'community assistants' who would teach practical studies. For planning purposes it was assumed that each pupil would receive one hour of instruction each day by a community assistant, or about 200 hours per year.<sup>9</sup>

The types of teacher and number of students to be enrolled until the year 2000 are shown in Table 17.

Non-formal education and vocational training (practice) were also emphasized. The basic formation of Strategy II, which includes expenditure, enrolment and predicted participation rates, is shown in Table 18.

Strategy III suggested a two-pronged attack whereby parallel structures would run simultaneously. One would be a 4-2-4 system, incorporating the MFE with an additional 2-year secondary education

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. V-6.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

**TABLE 17**  
**Alternative Strategy II**  
**Teacher Needs, Number of Graduates and Enrolment**

Teacher Qualification	Statistic	Year (GC)						
		1970/71	1974/75	1979/80	1984/85	1989/90	1994/95	1999/2000
8-1	Total needs (a)	8,992	13,076	13,489	16,300	21,496	30,101	41,129
	Graduates per year	N.A.	1,100	1,100	1,700	2,450	3,600	4,400
	Enrolment	2,030(b)	1,225	1,225	1,900	2,750	3,900	4,900
12-1	Total needs (c)	1,585	4,265	4,556	5,731	7,866	10,268	12,965
	Graduates per year	866	850	400	650	850	1,050	1,250
	Enrolment	700	725	450	725	950	1,175	1,400
12-2	Total needs	690	784	870	988	1,124	1,277	1,453
	Graduates per year	175	175	85	75	80	95	110
	Enrolment	400	400	150	170	185	220	250
12-4	Total needs	552	611	696	791	899	1,022	1,182
	Graduates per year	70	95	50	60	70	75	75
	Enrolment	370	475	250	300	350	375	375

(a) This line refers to total needs for 8-1 teachers, under the hypothetical assumption that Alternative II were implemented fully and immediately. In fact due to phasing, many of these teachers will have more than the minimum of 8-1 preparation in the earlier years. In 1970/71 for instance only 1,830 teachers were in the 8-1 or equivalent, and lower, salary brackets. Cost projections take account of this fact.

(b) Refers to 10-2 teachers

(c) Includes primary school directors

N.A. Not available or not applicable

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Appendix V-A, p. 26.

TABLE 18

## Expenditures, Enrolment and Participation Rates

	Year (GC)						
	1970/ 1971	1974/ 1975	1978/ 1980	1984/ 1985	1989/ 1990	1994/ 1995	1999/ 2000
<b>Total Expenditures</b> (in millions of \$)	86.3	135.5	190.3	283.0	387.3	503.9	835.
Primary, traditional (1-6)	33.5	46.6	-	-	-	-	-
Minimum formation (1-4)	-	-	52.2	78.0	107.7	192.2	356.
Secondary (7-12) (a)	18.2	22.2	32.3	41.3	55.1	69.1	87.
Basic formation (I-III)	-	20.0	26.6	31.7	41.3	77.3	-
Secondary formation (III-V)	-	-	2.5	2.8	17.9	36.9	43.
Teacher Training Institutes	2.4	1.7	1.7	2.6	4.1	5.2	6.
Higher education	19.0	23.2	32.7	47.1	67.4	96.7	138.
Mass Media	0.2	0.9	3.0	3.8	4.9	6.3	8.
Non-formal education	0.5	5.3	13.5	19.7	28.7	44.9	70.
Administration	4.7	6.8	9.5	13.2	19.4	28.2	43.
Non-government schools	0.8	3.0	6.3	9.5	11.5	14.5	18.
Non-recurrent and other expenses	6.4	6.8	9.8	13.2	29.3	42.9	63.
<b>Enrolment (in thousands)</b>							
First Level - total	656	1,352	2,168	2,548	3,213	4,126	5,16
Government Minimum formation	471	606	1,086	1,331	1,746	2,777	4,03
Government Basic formation	-	476	647	662	759	445	-
Non-government	184	270	435	555	708	904	1,15
Second Level - total	135	156	250	282	591	910	97
Government - Secondary (b)	115	127	144	164	188	214	24
Government secondary formation	-	-	60	59	328	601	61
Non-government	20	29	46	59	75	96	12
Third Level - total	6	8	10	13	17	22	2
Non-formal - total	N.A.	138	580	672	930	1,298	1,90
<b>Participation Rates (in percent)</b>							
Age 7-8 - non-government	7.4	9.8	13.9	15.5	17.3	19.6	22.
Age 9-12 - MFE and non-government	21.1	24.9	38.6	41.5	47.7	72.0	83.
Age 13-14 - Basic Formation	-	38.9	43.2	39.0	39.0	20.0	-
Age 13-18 - Second level	4.1	4.3	6.0	5.9	10.8	14.8	13.
Age 19-24 - Third level	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.
Age 11-18 - non-formal	N.A.	1.0	3.4	3.5	4.3	5.2	5.
Age 19-34 - non-formal	N.A.	1.5	5.4	5.7	6.9	8.5	9.

(a) Includes junior and senior secondary, and second level vocational-technical schools

(b) Includes junior and senior secondary, vocation-technical and teacher-training institutes

N.A. Not available or not applicable

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Appendix V-C, p. 2.

program for a few selected students. The other had a 2-3 structure known as "Basic Formation." The goal of Basic Formation was the attainment of universal education in a much shorter time span than would have been possible under the existing system. This was to be phased out by the year 2000, when it had fulfilled its goals.

Another new element in Strategy III was that the entry age of the children who would be enrolled in the Basic Formation Program would be nine years of age, so that when they graduated and joined the work force, they would be older than they would have been if they were to have gone through the system recommended by Strategy II, where the starting age was to be seven years. Strategy III's school operating characteristics and the recommended feature of government first level schools can be seen in Tables 19 and 20. Projected enrolment of children born in 1970-71 is summarized in Figure 6.

After lengthy debate and discussion, the Committee finally accepted a modified version of Strategy II with some of Strategy III. As endorsed by the Committee participants, Ethiopia's future educational structure was to be as follows.

At the primary level, 7- to 10-year old children would attend school for four years, with the option that the time might be reduced in some exceptional cases. The academic year would have 210 teaching days and two semesters. The course work would include reading and writing, basic arithmetic, community studies,<sup>10</sup> and handicrafts, with

<sup>10</sup>This type of study would vary from community to community. A child in Kaffa, for example, might be required to study elementary methods of coffee cultivation, while a child in the Ogaden might study animal husbandry.

**TABLE 19**  
**Alternative Strategy III**  
**School Operating Characteristics**

	<u>Minimum Formation</u>	<u>Junior Secondary</u>	<u>Senior Secondary</u>	<u>Basic Formation</u>	<u>Secondary Formation</u>
Grades	1-4	7-8	9-12	I-II	III-V
Typical pupil age range	9-12	13-14	15-18	13-14	15-18
School days per year	220	180	180	220	220
Shifts per day (1)	2	1	1	1	1
Pupils per Class	50	40	35	40	40
Distribution of Certified Teachers					
8-1	85%	37%		85%	85%
12-1	15%	63%		15%	15%
P2-2			55%		
12-4			45%		
Approximate Percentage of Instruction by:					
Certified Teachers	70%	80%	90%	70%	70%
Community Assistants	30%	20%	10%	30%	30%

(1) Indicates number of shifts worked by teachers. Many secondary schools will have a second shift staffed by a second set of teachers.

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts,  
 "Education Sector Review," Appendix V-D, p. 1.

**TABLE 20**  
**Alternative strategy III**  
**Basic Statistics for Government First Level Schools**

Program	Year (GC)						
	1970/ 1971	1974/ 1975	1979/ 1980	1984/ 1985	1989/ 1990	1994/ 1995	1999 2000
<b>Minimum Education Formation</b>							
Number of Schools	1,190	1,600	1,600	2,012	2,704	4,341	4,851
Number of classrooms	8,401	10,803	10,850	13,307	17,460	28,448	42,808
Enrolment (thousands)	471.1	605.8	1,086.0	1,330.7	1,746.0	2,777.0	4,034.0
Participation rate (percent)	11.7	13.5	33.1	35.3	40.7	57.3	74.8
Teachers - total (a)	8,992	11,550	10,860	13,300	17,460	28,448	42,808
Teachers - 12-1	N.A.	1,748	1,830	1,995	2,819	4,267	6,421
Teachers - 8-1	N.A.	9,902	9,230	11,305	14,641	24,179	36,387
Recurrent expenses (millions)	\$33.5	\$46.6	\$52.4	\$78.0	\$107.7	\$192.2	\$356.5
Average expense per student	71.2	77.0	48.2	58.6	61.7	69.2	88.4
<b>Basic Formation</b>							
Enrolment (thousands)	-	476.2	847.2	861.7	758.6	445.0	-
Participation rate (age 13 to 14)	-	36.9	43.2	39.0	39.0	20.0	-
Teachers - total (a)	-	5,952	8,090	8,271	9,492	5,582	-
Teachers - 12-1	-	893	1,214	1,241	1,422	834	-
Teachers - 8-1	-	5,059	6,876	7,030	8,060	4,728	-
Recurrent expenses (millions)	-	\$20.0	\$26.6	\$31.7	\$41.3	\$27.3	-
Average expense per student	-	42.0	41.1	47.9	54.5	61.4	-
<b>Secondary Formation</b>							
Enrolment (thousands)	-	-	60.8	58.5	328.4	600.9	612.8
Participation rate (age 16 to 18)	-	-	3.1	2.7	12.4	19.9	17.2
Teachers - total (a)	-	-	760	731	4,105	7,511	7,960
Teachers - 12-1	-	-	114	110	616	1,127	1,149
Teachers - 8-1	-	-	646	621	3,489	6,384	6,511
Recurrent expenses (millions)	-	-	\$2.5	\$2.8	\$17.9	\$36.9	\$43.2
Average expense per student	-	-	41.1	47.9	54.5	61.4	70.5


(a) Community assistants are provided in addition to teachers

N.A. Not available or not applicable

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Appendix V-A, p. 29.

Figure 6

Projected Enrolment of Children Born in  
1970-71 under Alternative Strategy III



Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts,  
"Education Sector Review," Exhibit V-D-1.

main emphasis on vocation, especially pertaining to agriculture. Eighty-five percent of the teachers at this level would average 15 years of age and have acquired eighth grade education followed by a year's teacher training course. Fifteen percent would, however, be 19 years old or older, and would be twelfth grade graduates with one year of teacher training. In addition to these two categories of teacher, every year, people in the community who had traditional manual skills such as weaving, pottery, carpentry and masonry would instruct the children in their own fields for an average of 200 hours.

Only 10 percent of the children who went to primary schools would be allowed to proceed to the next stage—the middle school level. In 1978, for example, when 1,490,000 students were expected to enroll at government primary schools and 435,000 in private schools, with a yearly total of 1,925,000 children, only 192,500 were expected to be allowed to proceed to middle schools after completing their four years of training. The remaining 1,732,500 children were to pursue their vocational studies in their own communities for eight more months, after which period the communities themselves would provide them employment. The assumption in the study was that the communities in question would not only be required to provide employment to these children, but would also be expected to supply teaching materials, to provide all necessary classrooms, and to pay teachers' salaries.

The middle level school (5th-8th grade), which also would take four years to complete, would be attended by children between



the ages of eleven and fourteen. The courses provided would be languages, composition, elementary maths and simple practical vocations. The academic year would cover 180 teaching days divided into two semesters. Forty percent of the teachers would have eighth grade schooling with an additional one year teacher training course, while 60 percent would have acquired 12th grade schooling and one year of teacher training. They would also receive 200 hours of vocational training that experts in the community would provide during each academic year.

Only 2.6 percent of the pupils in the middle school would be able to proceed to the third level, i.e., to secondary school. For example, if 192,500 pupils are projected to enrol at the middle school level, only 5,005 would be allowed to proceed to a secondary school. The remaining 187,495 pupils would proceed to the different stations set up for vocational studies, such as the Wallamo Agricultural Association, the Y.M.C.A., and other Community Development Centres. The centres would be expected to provide the boys with training in the fields of farming methods, and for girls, home economics, sanitation, handicrafts, etc. Government primary and secondary school statistical projections and structure as recommended and later accepted are summarized in Tables 21 and 22.

Secondary level students would be between the ages of 15 and 18, and their curricula would be similar to the existing ones.<sup>11</sup> The main purpose of the secondary school was preparing students for higher

<sup>11</sup>The secondary school curriculum was aimed at providing a student with an education that would enable him to acquire the Ethiopian School Leaving Certificate—equivalent to the London G.C.E. (O Level). A pass in mathematics, English, Amharic, General Science, Geography or History is a requisite for acquiring the Certificate. Generally, there is no vocational training at this level. Parallel schools such as the technical and commercial schools did not normally prepare their students for the secondary school leaving certificate.

**TABLE 21**  
**Alternative Strategy II**  
**Basic Statistics for Government Primary Schools**

Statistic	Year (GC)						
	1970/1971	1974/1975	1979/1980	1984/1985	1989/1990	1994/1995	1999/2000
Number of Schools	1,190	2,216	2,273	2,802	3,852	4,540	5,071
Number of Classrooms	8,401	14,557 (a)	14,899	18,073	24,037	33,986	46,784
Enrolment (thousands)	471.1	816.0	1,489.9	1,806.9	2,380	3,240	4,180
Participation rate (percent)	11.7	26.4	41.4	44.8	51.9	62.7	72.4
Teachers - total	8,992	14,557 (b)	14,899	18,073	24,037	33,986	46,784
Teachers - 12-1	N.A.	2,184	2,235	2,711	3,606	5,098	7,015
Teachers - 8-1	N.A.	12,373	12,664	15,363	20,431	28,883	39,749
Recurrent expenses (millions)	\$33.5	\$62.0	\$71.1	\$97.1	\$146.9	\$229.4	\$336.2
Average expense per student	\$71.20	\$77.00	\$47.70	\$54.60	\$61.60	\$70.70	\$87.60

(a) Assumes one classroom per 56 students

(b) Assumes one teacher per 52 students

N.A. Not available or not applicable

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Appendix V-A, p. 20.

TABLE 22

## Alternative Strategy II

## Basic Statistics for Government Second Level Schools

Item	Year (GC)						
	1970/1971	1974/1975	1979/1980	1984/1985	1989/1990	1994/1995	1999/2000
<b>Middle Schools</b>							
Number of schools	233	245	89	78	89	101	115
Number of classrooms	1,020	1,152	1,375	1,564	1,775	2,021	2,229
Enrolment (thousands)	63.4	70.3	110.0	125.1	142.0	161.7	183.9
Teachers - total (a)	1,585	1,758	2,063	2,346	2,663	3,033	3,449
Teachers - 12-1	1,585	1,055	2,063	2,346	2,663	3,033	3,449
Teachers - 8-1	N.A.	7,703	825	938	1,065	1,213	1,380
<b>Senior Secondary Schools</b>							
Number of Schools	52	56	78	87	98	112	127
Number of classrooms	1,250	1,333	1,523	1,730	1,968	2,235	2,543
Enrolment (thousands)	48.3	53.5	60.9	69.2	78.7	89.4	101.7
Teachers - total (a)	1,242	1,375	1,566	1,779	2,023	2,299	2,615
Teachers - 12-4	552	611	696	791	899	1,022	1,162
Teachers - 12-2	690	764	870	988	1,124	1,277	1,453
<b>Recurrent Expenses (thousands)</b>							
Middle School	N.A.	\$ 9,450	\$13,420	\$18,560	\$24,560	\$30,800	\$39,160
Senior Secondary School	N.A.	\$11,676	\$17,334	\$22,086	\$30,022	\$37,666	\$47,683
	\$15,351	\$21,236	\$30,754	\$40,586	\$54,582	\$68,446	\$86,843

(a) Community assistants are provided in addition to these teachers

N.A. Not available or not applicable

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Appendix V-A, p. 22.

studies. The number of students proceeding to a university would be limited by the amount of the nation's economic growth and its degree of manpower requirements. Thus, 5 percent economic growth would allow only 5 percent university entrance. For example, assuming that there was a steady 5 percent economic growth rate, of the projected 5,005 secondary school pupils, only 250 would be accommodated in the universities. The remaining 4,755 would be expected to proceed to higher vocational training schools specializing in health, technical, agricultural and industrial studies.

Educational costs at the university level would be covered by the students themselves. Needy students would be provided with a government loan that would be payable in monthly installments after graduation and acquisition of a job.

In addition to the above points, the "Education Sector Review" Committee also recommended that:

- 1) 'To increase the level of public educational opportunities' a high proportion of the Ministry of Education's annual budget should be provided as aid to private schools.<sup>12</sup>

By the year 1999-2000, 28 percent of the elementary school budget and 41 percent of the secondary level expenditure would be allocated for private institutions. In contrast to this large budget allocation, the enrolment in public elementary schools was to be only one-fifth of the national total. This would, of course, favour children

<sup>12</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report of the Education Sector Review," p. V-2. Private schools providing education at primary, middle, secondary and higher levels were all to benefit from this generous offer.

coming from the upper classes who would pay their own way and have a better opportunity to pursue their education at higher levels (see Table 23 ).

Since 88 percent of the Ministry of Education's budget was expended on salaries, it had not been possible to extend equal educational opportunities to all Ethiopians. The study therefore also recommended that starting in 1982, 8+1 teachers be increased in number so that a large number of the instructors graduating from teacher training schools could be paid lower rates, on a base of E\$76.50, compared with E\$112.50 for more highly trained teachers.<sup>13</sup>

One important factor implicitly accepted by the 'Review' Committee participants was that income per capita between urban dwellers and the rural population would show some improvements but not substantial ones. In the years 1968-69, for example, per capita income for the rural population was E\$109 of which only one-third was monetary, while the corresponding figure for urban dwellers was E\$680, of which 95 percent was monetary. Improvements envisaged within the framework of the 'Review' Committee's recommendations were that "rural incomes would increase . . . to E\$135 in 1990, as against E\$713 for the urban population."<sup>14</sup> That despite some improvements in rural income, the level of the increment over the years does not keep pace with the growth income for urban dwellers can be seen in Table 24.

<sup>13</sup> Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report of the Education Sector Review," pp. V-5 - V-25.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., Appendix II-A-4, p. 10.

TABLE 23

## Alternative Strategy III

## Expenditures, Enrolment and Participation Rates

	Year (GC)						
	1970/ 1971	1974/ 1975	1979/ 1980	1984/ 1985	1989/ 1990	1994/ 1995	1999/ 2000
<b>Total Expenditures</b> (in millions of \$)	86.3	136.5	190.3	263.0	387.3	563.9	835.0
Primary (1-8) (a)	33.5	51.7	-	-	-	-	-
Minimum Formation (1-4)	-	10.3	71.1	97.1	146.9	229.4	388.2
Middle school (5-8)	-	9.5	13.4	18.6	24.8	30.8	39.2
Senior Secondary (9-12) (b)	18.8 (e)	15.9	22.3	28.4	37.9	47.6	60.1
Teacher Training Institutes	2.4	1.4	1.3	2.2	3.4	5.1	6.9
Higher education	19.0	23.2	32.7	47.1	67.4	98.7	138.7
Mass Media	0.2	0.9	3.0	3.8	4.9	6.3	8.1
Non-formal education	0.5	7.0	21.1	29.1	42.1	62.4	90.9
Administration	4.7	6.8	9.5	13.2	19.4	28.2	43.0
Non-government school subsidies	0.8	3.0	6.3	9.8	11.5	14.5	18.0
Non-recurrent expenses	6.4	6.8	9.6	13.2	29.3	42.9	63.9
<b>Enrolment</b> (in thousands)							
First Level - total	656	1,086	1,925	2,362	3,088	4,144	5,333
Government	471	818	1,490	1,807	2,380	3,240	4,180
Non-government	184	270	435	555	708	904	1,153
Second Level - total (c)	135	156	220	257	301	353	416
Government	115	128	174	198	226	258	294
Non-government	20	29	46	59	75	95	122
Third Level - total	6	8	10	13	17	22	28
Non formal - total	N.A.	182	889	1,092	1,365	1,765	2,075
<b>Participation Rates</b> (in percent)							
Age 7-10 - first level (d)	16.4	35.1	54.8	58.6	67.3	80.1	92.4
Age 11-18 - second level (c)	3.0	3.1	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.3
Age 19-24 - third level	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5
Age 11-18 - non-formal	N.A.	1.8	7.7	8.3	9.2	10.4	10.9
Age 19-34 - non-formal	N.A.	1.3	5.7	6.2	6.8	7.7	8.0

(a) Traditional primary school

(b) Includes second level vocation-technical schools

(c) Includes middle, secondary, vocation-technical schools and III's

(d) Includes a small number of 5th and 6th grade pupils in non-government schools

(e) Includes grades 7-12

N.A. Not available or not applicable

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Exhibit V-C-2.

TABLE 24

## Income per Capita (P.C.)

Estimate for 1969 and Projection for 1990  
(in constant 1969 Ethiopian dollars)

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>Average Annual Growth Rate in Percent</u>
All population:			
Total income P.C. Eth.	\$161	\$258	2.3
Monetary income P.C.	\$ 91	\$198	3.8
Urban population:			
Total income P.C.	\$680	\$713	-
Monetary income P.C.	\$649	\$702	-
Rural population:			
Total income P.C.	\$109	\$135	1.0
Monetary income P.C.	\$ 35	\$ 63	2.3

- negligible

Source: Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Education Sector Review," Appendix II-A-1, p. 9.

The stress placed on producing 8+1 rather than 12+1 teachers was clearly for the sole purpose of cutting costs. The "Review" was explicit concerning this point. It stated:

Increased use of 8+1 teachers would have a marked effect on the ability of the nation to expand its first level schools within limited financial resources. Based on 1970/71 data, the cost of an 8+1 teacher over a ten-year period, including training and 10 years of salary payments is \$22,700. The cost of a 10+2 teacher is almost twice as large—\$41,240. Thus for an equivalent amount in teachers' salaries—the chief component of education cost—almost twice as many pupils could be taught by using 8+1 teachers.<sup>15</sup>

The "Education Sector Review" was accepted by the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts in 1972, and was to be implemented starting in September 1973; however, as it was kept secret, the teachers were not aware of the contents.<sup>16</sup> Their criticism, which was vehement and categorical, and their strike, which was crucial in overthrowing Haile Selassie, came after the information was leaked later during the year. We shall see that after examining the condition of education in Ethiopia, and why students and teachers decided to continue their rebellion, what events were taking place in the meantime—events which are considered equally crucial in the final months of the feudal regime.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. V-5 - V-25.

<sup>16</sup>For some unknown reason, the "Report of the Education Sector Review" is still kept on the restricted list of government documents, and the author's attempt to obtain it from the present military government was to no avail. An attempt to get the report from the World Bank also ended with failure. The author finally received the entire copy of the "Review" from a concerned Ethiopian official who must remain anonymous.



## General Conditions of Education and Final Challenge by Teachers and Students

By the early 1970s, in addition to the chronic problems the teachers faced, the state of education and the condition of Ethiopian youth at all levels of schooling were fraught with such deepening problems that it is difficult to imagine how the regime could have averted the revolution which the students and their teachers were soon to ignite. We have already documented in detail the endemic problems associated with the Ethiopian school system in Chapter IV. But this was only the tip of the iceberg. What follows emerges from an empirical study conducted by the author and is a result of several years of research to fathom the immediate causes of the 1974 revolution.

At the most elementary level, as the background of Peasant Association leadership in Tigré Province shows (see Table 25), the level of education in Ethiopia at the time the regime was overthrown was dismally low. Ninety-five percent of the school-age children in the rural areas had never seen a school in their lives. Everywhere one saw young people clad in rags playing in the mud or tending herds. In the entire country, less than 10 percent of the people were able to read and write (see Table 26). Only 14.1 percent of all school-age children were enrolled in primary schools, and 2.9 percent in secondary schools<sup>17</sup>—one of the lowest enrolment figures and consequently one of the smallest outputs of educational systems in the world.

The students and their teachers had been aware for a long time of the wide gap that was present and increasing between Ethiopia

<sup>17</sup>UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 1974), passim.

TABLE 25

## Peasant Association Leadership in Tigré

Peasant Association Position	Total Sample	Average Age (approx.)	Sex		Priest		Land Holdings (in hectares)							Education (in grades)			
			M	F	Yes	No	0-1	1-2	2-3	3-4	4-5	5	None	1-5	6-8	10-12	Further
Chairman	85	45	85	-	12	53	11	17	16	9	7	5	33	29	3	-	-
%			100	0	12.5	51.5	12.9	20.2	24.6	13.9	10.8	7.7	50.8	44.6	4.5	-	-
Secretary	66	39	85	-	13	52	13	23	10	8	7	4	12	48	5	-	-
%			100	0	20.0	80.0	20.0	35.4	15.4	12.3	10.8	6.2	18.5	73.8	7.7	-	-
Treasurer	85	45	85	-	3	82	7	23	14	6	4	11	47	16	2	-	-
%			100	0	4.8	95.4	10.8	35.4	21.5	9.2	6.2	18.9	72.3	24.6	3.1	-	-
Committee Members	158	43	158	0	10	148	30	43	31	24	14	16	120	32	8	-	-
%			100	0	6.3	93.7	18.9	27.2	19.6	15.2	8.9	10.1	75.9	20.3	3.8	-	-
TOTAL	363	-	363	-	38	315	61	106	71	47	32	36	212	125	18	-	-
%			100	0	10.8	89.2	17.3	30.0	20.1	13.3	9.1	9.1	80.1	35.4	4.5	-	-

Source: World Bank, The Agriculture Sector Review (Addis Ababa, 1976), Appendix B.

TABLE 26

Percentage of Literate People (1974)\*

	Rural inhabi- tants	In Towns				Urban popu- lation	Total
		10, 000- 20, 000 population	20, 000- 100, 000 population	Asmara	Addis Ababa		
Males	7.9	45.0	50.0	73.0	61.0	54.0	11.2
Females	0.5	10.0	23.0	32.0	26.0	19.0	2.0
Total	4.1	26.0	40.0	50.0	45.0	36.0	6.6

\* By literate Ethiopian statistics meant people who could read and write.


Source: Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts (Addis Ababa: 1974-75).

and the whole world, Ethiopia and the other developing nations, and, most importantly, Ethiopia and her African neighbours. In relation to the latter, what was considered a matter of grave concern was that the development growth in African countries took place after, not before, independence, and therefore Ethiopia's comparative lower achievement could not be blamed on Ethiopia's inability to compete with the resources of the colonial powers.

To show the extent of the lag in educational development, this author has analyzed data covering almost a quarter of a century (1950-74). As Figure 7 shows, while progress in enrolment was being made during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, it was far from fulfilling the country's needs. In 1951, the number of students registered per school-age population was under 5 percent, but by 1974, it was still under 10 percent.

Furthermore, as shown in Figure 8, while the number of primary school students per 1000 inhabitants for both Ethiopia and Africa increased from 1951 to 1974, the gap between the two continued to widen. Figure 9 shows the same trend. Ethiopia continued to lag behind Africa in the number of students registered in general secondary schools per 10,000 inhabitants. Here also the gap was widening. The number of vocational secondary school students per 100,000 Ethiopians went up from 1952 to 1963, but showed a steady decline for the following eight years. The number of registered vocational students for Africa showed an erratic growth but continued to be high. Most importantly, this number never declined (see Figure 10). The number


Figure 7  
Development of Education in Ethiopia



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962, and Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1980.

Figure 8


## Number of Primary School Students per 1,000 Inhabitants



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962, and Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1980.

Figure 9


Number of Students in Secondary Schools per 10,000 Inhabitants



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962  
and Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1980.

Figure 10

Number of Vocational Secondary School Students per 100,000 Inhabitants



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1963;  
and Statistical Yearbook, 1964-1974.



of students in secondary teacher training schools per 100,000 inhabitants was also following the same trend. Ethiopia continued to trail Africa until the gap had greatly widened by 1974 (see Figure 11). The number of university students per 100,000 inhabitants also shows a similar discrepancy (see Figure 12). University enrolment in Ethiopia per 10,000 university-age population slowly grew from 1951 to 1966, but then entered a premature plateau from 1966 to 1971 (Figure 13).


Globally, the problems were similar. As shown in Figure 14, an extensive data analysis by this author covering twenty-four years immediately preceding Haile Selassie's fall, shows that the percentage of Ethiopian students in the population stagnated within the .5 to 3.5 range between 1950 and 1974, while the corresponding figure for Africa skyrocketed from less than 1 to 14 percent, and that for developing countries from under 5 to 12 percent; the figure for world totals also rose from 9 to 15 percent and that for the developed countries from 18 to 22.5 percent.

A similar analysis by the author (covering the years 1950-74) also shows that the number of university students per university-age population remained under .3 percent for Ethiopia, while that for Africa went from under .5 to 1.25 percent, for developing countries from 1 to 5.5 percent, the world total from over 6 to 14.25 percent, and developed countries from 12.5 to 29 percent, North America made an enormous jump—30 to 68.5 percent (Figure 15).

The ratio of public education expenditure to gross national product for Ethiopia and African countries shows how modern education

Figure 11


Number of Students in Secondary Teacher-Training  
Schools per 100,000 Inhabitants



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1963; and Statistical Yearbook, 1964-1974.

Figure 12


Number of University Students per 500,000 Inhabitants



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1963;  
and UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1964-1980.

Figure 13


University Students Enrolled per 10,000 University Age Population  
in Ethiopia



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1963, and Statistical Yearbook, 1964-1977.

Figure 14


Students as Percentage of Total Population (1950-1974)



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962  
and Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1977, passim.

Figure 15

University Students as a Percentage of Population  
Aged 20-24 (1960-1974)



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962 and Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1977.


was not given the priority it deserved during the Haile Selassie regime. Our data analysis (see Figure 16 ) covering the period from 1960 to 1970, for example, shows a huge discrepancy between the two. Although there was some improvement in Ethiopian educational expenditure during that decade, African countries continued to outspend Haile Selassie's government. Whereas from 1965 on, the former spent at least 4 percent of their gross national income on education, Ethiopia continued to spend less than 3 percent of its total domestic product on education.

The Ethiopian government's priorities had been such that from 1964 to 1973, it spent more than a quarter of the national budget on defence and security, allocating only 13 percent for education (Figure 17). Per capita expenditure for university students as a result declined from E\$5,000 in 1963 to E\$3000 in 1973 (Figure 18 ).

Compounding the problem, the failure rate for high school students jumped from 10 percent in 1951 to a stunning 81 percent in 1970 (Figures 19 and 20 ). At the elementary level, while there were more passes than failures, the effect was dramatically similar. As enrolment expanded, the number of failures also proportionately increased, until it passed the 10,000 mark by the year 1970 (Figure 21 ). Furthermore, a large number of those who passed could not advance to the second level. The cumulative effect was predictable. Tens of thousands of the displaced students congregated in the cities and towns—mainly in the capital city of Addis Ababa to look for jobs that were not available. Ultimately, together with their teachers, who were equally alienated,

Figure 16

## Educational Expenditure as Percentage of Gross National Product




Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1974; and Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Abstracts, 1962-1972.



Figure 17


Budget on Selected Items of Proportion of  
Total National Expenditure (1964-1973)  
in Ethiopia



Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1964-76 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1976).

Figure 18


Per Capita Expenditure for University Students  
in Ethiopia 1963-1973



Source: Aklilu Habte, "Higher Education in Ethiopia in the 1970s and Beyond," (Addis Ababa, 1973).

Figure 19


Passes and Failures in the Ethiopian Secondary School Leaving Certificate Examinations (1951-70)



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962 (Geneva: United Nations Office, 1963); and UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1977 (Geneva: United Nations Office, 1978).

Figure 20


Percentage of Failures in the Ethiopian School Leaving  
Certificate Examinations (1951-1970)



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962, and Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1977.

Figure 21

Passes and Failures in Eighth Grade National Examinations (1951-1970)



Source: UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education, 1950-1962, and UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1963-1977,

and their colleagues still within the educational system, this same body of youth became a fuse for the popular uprising against the feudal regime—a regime that had long lost touch with the needs of its people and the pulse of its radicalized new intelligentsia.

By 1970, to any scholar who knew Ethiopia well, the question was not if, but when, the feudal regime would fall. But to those who were apologists for Haile Selassie, including most western scholars, the important consideration was the façade of social and economic transformation that had taken place since the 1941 liberation. To prove their point, writers usually singled out the developed sector of the economy in total disregard of the underdevelopment prevailing in the rural regions. It was true that in the developed sector there were superficial trappings of developed modern economies, such as airports and supermarkets. But, as discussed in detail above,<sup>18</sup> the contrast between this small sector and the grinding poverty and underdevelopment of the rest of the country was striking. It is only against this background that we can evaluate the events that took place between 1973 and 1974, and trace the student and teacher agitation leading to the mass upheaval which brought down the feudal government of Haile Selassie.

The student movement that started radical confrontations in the mid-1960s continued to increase its tempo and, despite massive repression, politicization of the masses became even more intense from 1973 to 1974. In April 1973, university students demanded the

<sup>18</sup>Supra, pp. 276-84.

reinstatement of their union, which Haile Selassie had officially banned the previous year. When this request was rejected, students boycotted classes. Then, on April 20, the government sent the police to the campus, and several students were injured in the ensuing confrontation. University professors, now led by former radical student leaders such as Dr. Eshetu Cholé and long-time anti-feudalist Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam, unanimously passed a resolution deploring "violence in all shapes and forms, no matter what the source," and deploring "even more strongly the violent response of the police." The professors also regretted "the invasion of the campus, classroom buildings and departmental offices" where "severe beatings and the terrorization of both staff and students had taken place." They also added that when "opportunities for peaceful assembly and peaceful expression of thought are denied, it constitutes a breeding ground for violence."<sup>19</sup> This particular event showed that students and their teachers were closing ranks more than ever.

Outside the university campus also, students had continued their radical activities. At General Wingate Secondary School, students who paid homage to their fallen comrades who had died in the 1972 airplane hijacking incident by placing flowers on their graves clashed with police and many people were injured. Most schools in Eritrea were closed when students protested against examination fees and police

---

<sup>19</sup>Ethiopian University Teachers' Association, "Ké Etiopia Yé University Memheran Mahber Yéwetta Meglecha," [Resolution of Ethiopian University Teachers' Association] (Addis Ababa, April 23, 1973). A copy of this document is in the author's possession.

and troop brutalities in the province, where a state of emergency was already in effect. In the province of Sidamo, students held a protest demonstration against the government's practice of giving lands which peasants were already farming to ex-servicemen and to the local balabats. A similar unrest also was evident in Harar. In the sub-province of Kambatta, the students bypassed government bureaucrats, collected taxes and took the money to government offices where they gave in the money only upon being issued official government receipts. This was to save the illiterate peasants second or even third-time payments, a widespread practice in the country. Kambatta students also built roads for their local communities across lands belonging to absentee landlords. In both these cases, the government ordered the arrest of the student leaders, but the local population came in large numbers to their defence. In Guder, in southern Shoa, students who alleged that water was being diverted from the traditional peasant users tore up pipes leading to the vineyards of Ras Mesfin Sileshi (one of the wealthiest landowners, later to be killed during the 1974 revolution).<sup>20</sup> A clash ensued between students and police, and when the latter opened fire, four students were killed.<sup>21</sup>

The year 1973 was very important in the history of the Ethiopian student movement, because during this year they unearthed

<sup>20</sup>Ras Mesfin Sileshi was reputed to have two million hectares of fertile coffee land in Kaffa Province alone. See Africa Report, XX (May-June, 1974), p. 33.

<sup>21</sup>Africa Contemporary Record (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1974), pp. B154-B155.



a crucial issue—the hidden Wollo famine—which they helped publicize and which Haile Selassie was later called to answer for. As Colin Legum of The Observer puts it, from then on, it "hung like a stinking albatross around the neck of the Emperor."<sup>22</sup>

Although the 1973 mass starvation in Wollo became a rallying point for the radicals, the ravages of famine in feudal Ethiopia were not new. From 1830 to 1930, over fifty devastating famines had hit the country and had killed millions of people. One acute famine took four years to subside, from 1888 to 1892. In more recent years, there had been three serious famines. All three were successfully hidden not only from the rest of the Ethiopian people but also from the international community. In 1958, for example, over 100,000 peasants were said to have died of starvation. In 1965, tens of thousands died of famine in the Wollo regions, and about 250,000 in Tigré.<sup>23</sup>

What was new in the 1973 famine was that through the efforts of the students and teachers, the disaster was highly publicized, both locally and internationally. As reported in the Africa Contemporary Record, in 1974:

It is doubtful whether the drought controversy would have assumed such large proportions were it not for the militant role of university

---

<sup>22</sup>Colin Legum, "The Night They 'Hanged' Haile Selassie," The Observer, XV (September, 1974).

<sup>23</sup>Mesfin Wolde Mariam gives a detailed account of the extent of famines from 1956 to the time Haile Selassie was overthrown. See Mesfin Wolde Mariam, "Twenty Years of Famine in Rural Ethiopia," unpublished seminar paper, Addis Ababa, Institute of Development Research, 1978.

professors and students who first exposed what was happening and the subsequent concern expressed by leading establishment figures.<sup>24</sup>

Reasons for the government's official silence included a mistaken sense of national pride and Haile Selassie's persistent refusal to acknowledge the fact that such terrible conditions could exist in his imperial domain. Not only did the government flatly refuse to admit the existence of the famine, but it had lost so much perspective that the official English language daily, which published the government's position, at the same time ran an editorial warning its readers against the dangers of "overreacting."<sup>25</sup> Also, Ethiopia continued to export grain and other foodstuffs in greater amounts than before. According to the executive administrator of Djibouti, M. Rousseau, in 1973 Ethiopia exported "1,800 tons of maize and wheat" through the port. He also pointed out that 9,400 tons of cereal grains were exported from Ethiopia to Hodeida, North Yemen, during the same year.<sup>26</sup>

The terrible news from Wollo came when several hundred peasants, trying to run away from the famine-ravaged area, scrambled over hundreds of miles of rough, mountainous terrain, and streamed into the outskirts of Addis Ababa, and told university students and professors the horror they were facing.<sup>27</sup> The government immediately

<sup>24</sup>Africa Contemporary Record, p. B151.

<sup>25</sup>The Ethiopian Herald, April 29, 1973, p. 2.

<sup>26</sup>"Ethiopie: Les Successeurs de l'empereur," Jeune Afrique (Sept. 28, 1974), pp. 22-26.

<sup>27</sup>"Legese Bezun Endanegugernatchew," [Interview with Legese Bezu], Mennen, (Miazia 1966 [April, 1973]), pp. 17-47.

sent in police to disperse the students and professors and commanded the starving peasants to return to their districts. Later, makeshift shelters were made to accommodate some of them.

Three Ethiopian university professors—Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Professor of Geography, Solomon Inqai, Dean of the Extension Department, and Dr. Seyoum Gebre Igziabher, Head of the Department of Public Administration—then conspicuously travelled to Wollo on April 14, 1973 and brought back to the capital news of the ominous conditions they had seen. The eyewitness reports they brought back were indeed both grim and unpleasant. They included descriptions of "the walking corpses of adults and children," and "the piles of human and animal bones along the winding roads." The students prepared an exhibition of photographs brought back by their professors and reproduced their reports. Then, at an alumni meeting on the university campus, the three professors severely criticized the government for not taking appropriate measures to save the lives of hundreds of thousands of its tax-paying citizens. Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam, quoting from the recently published autobiography of the Emperor, My Life and Ethiopia's Progress remarked that things had hardly changed from what the Negus described during the early years of his reign. Mesfin then dubbed the existing regime "a mafia government."<sup>28</sup>

As for Haile Selassie, he immediately reverted to his old tactic of shum-shir. He designated Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam

<sup>28</sup>Report from an interview with Mr. Iyob, July 15, 1976.

as Governor of Gimbi, in Wollega province, which was ruled by an arch-reactionary Governor, Dejazmatch Sahlu Difayé (later executed during the 1974 revolution). Dr. Seyoum Gebre Igziabher was appointed as kantiba (mayor) of Gondar, and Professor Solomon Inqal as cultural attaché in Moscow. While the latter two grudgingly accepted their posts, and went where Haile Selassie wanted them to go, Mesfin refused to budge until the exact nature and conditions of his appointment were officially explained. But he was soon arrested inside a downtown bookstore and presented with two choices: to remain in Addis Ababa, in prison, or to accept the governorship. He chose the latter, and was posted in Gimbi until the following year, when he returned to join the Commission of Inquiry that was to try former ministers of Haile Selassie.<sup>29</sup>

After the reports of their professors, the students immediately demanded the government declare a national state of emergency and take action to provide relief to the victims. To show their concern, the students agreed to forego their breakfasts and collect food and money for the peasant masses. The aim was to demonstrate their solidarity with the starving peasants and to create a wedge between the people and the government which had neglected them.

The Haile Selassie regime, already aware of this tactic, decided to intervene. When student delegations went to Wollo in May 1973 with the relief money and asked for an audience with the Inderassie.

<sup>29</sup>Addis Zemen, Nehase 21, 1967 [August 30, 1974].

(Governor-General) of the province, Dejazmatch Solomon Abraha, police were called in and in an attempt to stop the students' activities, killed several of them.<sup>30</sup> Many others, including Professor Abraham Demoz, were arrested and taken into police custody.

By the time the government was forced to admit the existence of famine in Ethiopia, it was already too late for hundreds of thousands of people. The devastation was so severe that one of the journalists who later witnessed the harrowing scene wrote:

I have visited refugee camps in the Middle East, photographed starving babies in India, and children injured by war in Vietnam, but I have never seen anything so horrifying and distressing as the situation in the Wollo province of Ethiopia.<sup>31</sup>

Jonathan Dimbleby, who visited Wollo and made a film for British television six months after the students' and teachers' attempts to publicize the famine, reported that of the 13 relief stations in Wollo province, holding 14,000 victims each, 700 to 100 died each week due to starvation or disease. The camp in Dessie, with 4,000 refugees, he reported, was filled with disease; there was no sanitation and not even a single doctor. OXFAM and Dimbleby also claimed that at least 500 people were dying each day throughout the country, most too far away from relief stations.<sup>32</sup>

As if that were not enough, traders and local government officials embarked on exploiting the victims by buying their crops and

<sup>30</sup>The Times (London), November 19, 1973, p. 13.

<sup>31</sup>Brian Iris, The Sun (London), October 29, 1973, p. 5.

<sup>32</sup>B.B.C. World Broadcasts, October 25, 1973.

( ) livestock at very low prices. They then sold the grains to the famine-ravaged peasants at highly inflated costs. Emergency feeding cards were sold instead of being distributed free and that made local government officials richer at the expense of the dying multitudes. A large number of the victims who flocked into the towns to receive aid either perished on the way or were doomed to die of malnutrition since they could not purchase the emergency cards.

That in the absence of agitation by the students and teachers, the 1973 famine could have been successfully hidden, like those that took place in 1958 and 1965, cannot be doubted. And perhaps the world, especially the western public, would not have understood some of the immediate causes of the Ethiopian Revolution. We believe that although, due to the reasons described previously, the fall of the Haile Selassie regime was inevitable, publicity about the famine had provided an excellent platform from which to attack the system and had thus created a strong rallying point for the students and teachers. It also paved the way for the erosion of the enormous popularity that Haile Selassie had enjoyed internationally, and forestalled the possibilities of any foreign intervention on his behalf.<sup>33</sup>

We have previously described in detail the contents of the 1972 "Education Sector Review," which was restricted and thus kept secret from the teachers, the students and the public. Only participating experts and a few high-level government officials were allowed access;

( <sup>33</sup>American intervention, such as that during the abortive 1960 coup, was always on the minds of Ethiopian revolutionaries. See supra, pp. 224-25.

( ) since the government controlled the media, national newspapers, television and radio stations were curiously silent on the subject. During the summer of 1973, 2000 teachers, supervisors and school directors attending a summer school at Haile Selassie University inquired about the "Review" but were ignored. However, when sympathetic Ethiopian educators who had access to the "Review" leaked the contents to their teaching colleagues in 1974, a barrage of criticism immediately ensued.

The Ethiopian Teachers' Association, reflecting the consensus among its rank and file, pointed out, in a publicly distributed pamphlet that although the "Education Sector Review" followed the Tanzanian experiment, it had failed to take into consideration the intrinsic differences between the Tanzanian and Ethiopian situations.<sup>34</sup> Tanzania, they argued, had taken the following steps before introducing its programs:

- 1) It had made administrative reforms, whereby local governments' autonomy was guaranteed;
- 2) It had made land reform to enable the youth to function without constraints from big landowners;
- 3) It had supplied adequate books and teaching equipment;

---

<sup>34</sup>The basic difference in addition to the great ethnic diversity of 70 different tribes found in Ethiopia, was the very intricate land tenure system in Ethiopia, where one-third of the arable land was controlled by the Church, 20 percent by the big landlords, and 10 percent by the Emperor and members of the royal family; in Tanzania, a small, comparatively homogeneous population, with communal land ownership, the problems were relatively less severe.

(

- 4) It had enough trained teachers at higher levels when the project was first put into practice; and to ensure success, the Tanzanian government had made several adjustments to meet its own local needs.<sup>35</sup>

The Ethiopian Ministry of Education, on the other hand, pointed out the Ethiopian Teachers' Association, planned to put the project into practice before the government had made the necessary administrative and land reforms, before the condition of teaching materials had changed, and before the power of local administration had been granted to all regions of Ethiopia. Thus, had it been implemented as projected, the consequences, whether social, economic or political, would all the same have been extremely grave, even if they were not compounded with other problems.

The loopholes in the "Review" were indeed many. The recommendation that 90 percent of the 11- to 13-year old children who could barely read and write were to go into such occupations as agriculture, ignored the fact that the children would still continue to be dependent on their parents and that the number of graduating children would be too small to make any significant economic contribution to the country. The "Education Sector Review's" requirement that 90 percent of primary school graduates should serve in their communities mainly in the development of modern agriculture did not explain how the plan could be effected, since agricultural land had not been allocated for these projects. Contrary to the "Review's" proclaimed intent, it was possible

---

<sup>35</sup>See Ethiopian Teachers' Association, "The Education Sector Review," unpublished monograph (Addis Ababa, 1974). The document is in the author's possession.



that all these children could end up as burdens to society in general and their communities in particular. The standard of education at the primary level would also be so low that upon completion, the children could not—through individual readings, for example—develop their knowledge any further, and might, as a result, revert to their previous ignorance.

The intended plan to provide the few existing private schools with financial aid, significantly disproportionate to their possible contribution to the Ethiopian society, would have been tantamount to reserving higher education for the children of the ruling classes and was thus blatant discrimination against the rural poor whose children could never have been in a position to avail themselves of this type of education.

That the reduction in salaries of teachers, especially in the face of spiralling inflation, was not only impractical but would have a demoralizing effect on the enthusiasm of the teaching staff for the successful implementation of the recommendations was ignored is indeed very surprising. It is true that the "Review" came as a radical educational policy to solve the problems of a feudal society and had many merits, particularly in its emphasis on vocational training and advocacy of pedagogical expansion into the rural districts. However, it seemed to have ignored the long-standing grievances and low status and plummeting morale of the teachers, already in a very critical state when the program was launched.

For a long time, the problem of producing qualified teachers and retaining them on the job had continued to plague the country.

Even as late as 1969, United Nations reports had pointed out that of the 15,000 people on the Ministry of Education staff, more than 10 percent were expatriates, 1,450 of them hired as teaching personnel.<sup>36</sup>

In fact, in the late 1960s, the majority of the secondary school teachers were foreigners. Of the Ethiopians teaching in junior high schools in 1971, only 9 percent were qualified, and at the senior high school level, no more than 10 percent of the teachers had the necessary teaching qualifications.<sup>37</sup>

Even UNESCO, which found the level of Ethiopian teachers critically low, had attempted in 1964 to provide emergency aid.<sup>38</sup> But the Ethiopian government continued to neglect the issue.

A 1967 survey by one of Ethiopia's most distinguished educators, Aklilu Habte, had found an appalling situation in the training and status of Ethiopian teachers. In a systematic examination of reasons why elementary school teachers left their profession, this study put almost all the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, and, by implication, the Ethiopian government itself. Concerning the training of teachers, Aklilu Habte concluded:

The position with regard to further education is, to put it mildly, unsatisfactory. Successful

---

<sup>36</sup>United Nations, "Report to the Ethiopian Ministry of Education and Fine Arts," December 20, 1969, pp. 1-143.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "The Development of Pre-Service Teacher Education 1937-1963 [1944-1971]," pp. 1-55.

performance in the ill-organized vacation courses have rarely brought any appreciable monetary reward. No attempt has been made to cater to the desire of rural teachers for afternoon or evening classes, correspondence courses, mobile professional libraries, or scholarships for further study within Ethiopia. When teachers see their colleagues in Addis Ababa and other favored areas getting the opportunity for further education and getting higher salaries as a result, they naturally seek ways and means of getting a transfer, or, failing that, quit teaching altogether and find another job which offers them the possibility of educational advancement.<sup>39</sup>

The government's failure to attempt to improve the status of the teachers was mainly due to its resolve not to increase the allocation of educational expenditure. Starting from 1960 to 1974, capital expenditure in the field of education was so dismally low that the 1974 budget was only 30 percent greater than that in 1960. This was despite a significantly larger enrolment during the same period. As should be expected the quality of education in the country was thus severely affected.

When an increase in the education tax doubled the revenue collected in 1971 to E\$14 million in 1972, most educational planners thought it might help in alleviating the problems of education at the primary level. But the government, in a blatant show of disregard for the promises it had made to the public, argued that the added tax money was part of the general revenue not necessarily earmarked for educational purposes.

---

<sup>39</sup> Aklilu Habte, "Brain Drain in the Elementary School: Why Teachers Leave the Profession," The Ethiopian Journal of Education, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1967), p. 37.

As late as 1971, overcrowding was still a major problem in Ethiopian schools. From 1970 to 1971, for example, 19,000 teachers in 2,000 schools had to teach 800,000 students. This was due to the fact that recruitment of teachers did not keep pace with student enrolment. The expansion rate for school facilities was also lagging. The inevitable consequence was thus heavy teaching loads for the instructors and overcrowded classrooms for the students.

The Ethiopian teacher thus was part of a neglected and forgotten profession, without the rewards due to that position. Aklilu Habte's study clearly shows this sorry situation. The general problems faced by elementary school teachers he described inter alia as:

... the absence of regular salary increments; the lack of a salary scale to indicate the maximum to which the teacher may aspire; the meagerness and infrequency of increments—which are not always awarded on the basis of merit; the lack of any provision for salary given in the matter of salaries to teachers from Addis Ababa or from other favored or politically conscious areas; the lack of any apparent concern on the part of the Ministry officials about the future of teachers; the despair of those who have served the Ministry for many years without advancement.<sup>40</sup>

Those teachers working in the countryside were particularly bitter about the way Haile Selassie's Ministry of Education treated them. Their meagre wages rarely arrived on time; some teachers had to wait for up to three months to receive their salaries. "In the interval, they [were] obliged to live on credit and beg or borrow from their neighbours to avoid starvation"<sup>41</sup> (emphasis added).

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

Almost all teachers interviewed by Aklilu Habte complained that the mandarins in the Ministry moved them around according to their whims, paying no regard to the teachers' well-being.<sup>42</sup> They were subjected to undue punishments. The Ministry of Education in general was considered a nest of family favouritism, graft, tribalism and spies. Ministry officials never bothered to separate honest teachers from those who were simply idling away their time. Teachers had developed a high sense of insecurity. They felt that no system of justice existed to protect them against official mistreatment and unjustified accusations by students and their parents. Some teachers went to carry out their duties in areas where there was great danger to themselves and were not provided the necessary protection by the government.

The working conditions were extremely poor. Educational aids were unavailable. Even the bare essentials such as blackboards and chalk were sometimes considered luxuries. Overcrowding was always a major handicap.

Once teachers left Addis Ababa, their contact with the currents of the outside world virtually ceased. They felt exiled, or as if they had been put into solitary confinement; they received no newspapers, no educational journals, and (for many) no letters.

Directors of schools were chosen "on the basis of every criterion except ability and professional qualification," and thus many

<sup>42</sup>Professor Margaret Gillett of McGill University had told the author in March, 1982, that, according to Dr. Wanda Robertson, a member of the U.S.A.I.D. team attached to the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, the ratio of people in the Ministry and teachers in the classrooms was 4:1.

honest instructors had to resign from their teaching profession in absolute disgust. Those who did not change their profession but settled down to live with all these problems dubbed their ordeal a "life sentence."<sup>43</sup>

What solutions did most teachers suggest? Aklilu Habte's survey showed that:

Teachers suggest that a Tewodros Minister of Education is needed to put the educational house in order. The Ministry is sometimes pictured as a remote island peopled with incompetent and corrupt clerks and administrators, whose sole preoccupation—besides coffee-drinking and gossip—is the devising of ways and means to oppress teachers. Teachers further allege that the degree of oppression and suppression increases proportionally with the distance of the school from Addis Ababa and the provincial capitals.<sup>44</sup>

After describing the teachers' views, Aklilu Habte concludes on a sour note: "the sense of ill treatment by the administration is so deeply ingrained and so widespread that one wonders how the situation can ever be rectified."<sup>45</sup> Even the official report of the Ministry of Education had come to a similar conclusion:

The typical Ethiopian elementary or secondary school teacher is a disgruntled individual, who views the Ministry as his enemy and his duty as chore, who is constantly on the look-out for

---

<sup>43</sup>Aklilu Habte, "Brain Drain in the Elementary School," p. 37.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 36. The reference is to Emperor Tewodros, who in the mid-1800s waged a war against independent Ethiopian warlords and forcibly reunited the country, thus bringing to an end the chaos of Zemene Measfint.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*

another job and who has been embittered by the lack of regular salary increments and by the absence of any appreciation of the conditions of hardship in which he teaches. It would not be an exaggeration to say that his morale, along with his status in society, has reached rock-bottom. It is unfair to the students—and dangerous to the future of Ethiopia—to entrust our children to a group of individuals in this frame of mind.<sup>46</sup>  
(emphasis added)

Although one wonders how the government could ignore such dire warnings from a highly respected Ethiopian educator<sup>47</sup> and even from its own concerned officials, it is only against this background that we can clearly see the implications of the recommendations contained in the "Education Sector Review" and why the Teachers' Association took a revolutionary course when it categorically rejected the government's attempt to implement them, and later called a successful national strike.

That the government should ignore the teachers' concerns even when it was taking additional steps that would not only bring about the institutionalization of these conditions but even worsen them is difficult to understand. The Ethiopian Teachers' Association (ETA) had already presented its grievances to the government demanding salary increments comparable to the public employees'. The demand for an upgraded salary scale, made in 1968, continued to languish.<sup>48</sup> Since

<sup>46</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, "Report on the Current Operation of the Education System in Ethiopia," (Addis Ababa: 1969), p. 34.

<sup>47</sup>Aklilu Habte was then Dean at the University College of Addis Ababa.

<sup>48</sup>The Ethiopian Herald, March 17, 1974, pp. 1, 3.

no action had been taken for so long, the ETA, representing a membership of over 16,000 government primary and secondary school teachers publicly requested a 10 percent increase in basic salary and a 50 percent increase in yearly increments. The ETA notified the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts that it would call a general teachers' strike unless their demands were met by December 1973. The teachers waited patiently, but as usual the feudal system was slow in responding.

Furthermore, the fundamental elements of the already controversial "Education Sector Review" were made public on February 8, 1974, and when the minister responsible attempted to explain the "Review's" positive ingredients, the teachers remained unconvinced.<sup>49</sup> On February 14, 1974, the ETA bypassed the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts and went directly to the Emperor with three fundamental demands: 1) salary increments; 2) suspension of the "Education Sector Review"; and 3) land to the tiller of the soil.<sup>50</sup>

It is important to note that the teachers, already politicized, were not satisfied with matters that only concerned themselves in a narrow sense. The "Land to the Tiller" program, which had a more fundamental political content, was a rallying point of school radicals and had been since 1965; at this point, the student movement and the teachers' union started to act in concert. It is also important to note

---

<sup>49</sup>See, for example, their rebuttal in a document entitled "Yémin Heywet Naw" [What a Life], distributed in Addis Ababa on February 19, 1974.

<sup>50</sup>A copy of this petition of February 4, 1974 is in the author's possession.



that none of the soldiers' grievances that were soon to erupt at Negele and Asmara contained political demands, although many scholars have mistakenly taken them as the origin of the 1974 revolution, even going to the extent of labelling the ETA's demands self-centered. This erroneous view, whether due to scholarly oversight or deliberate distortion, can be seen in Marina and David Ottaway's assertion that the teachers' "demands had no revolutionary content; they merely reflected the concern of the urban petty bourgeoisie to safeguard its status and to keep open the channels of upwards mobility."<sup>51</sup>

Events in 1974 moved more and more towards violence. On February 14, 1974, students staged a public demonstration backing their teachers' demands. When the students started to attack city buses and to stone cars, police opened fire and five students were killed and several wounded.<sup>52</sup> Concerned about this trend, the rubber-stamp parliament immediately met to discuss outstanding grievances including those of the teachers, but the riots on the streets continued through February 15.

It was slowly being realized throughout the country that the students were merely the nation's conscience. But the Haile Selassie regime vowed to silence them by the most brutal methods. Blair Thomson, who was a BBC correspondent in Ethiopia during the period describes one such method:

<sup>51</sup> Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (London: Holmes and Meier, 1978), p. 34.

<sup>52</sup> New York Times, February 23, 1974, p. 6.

At one school . . . [the suppression] took a most brutal and sadistic form. . . . A group of police took five pupils out of a classroom and played a vicious form of Russian Roulette with them, making the pupils roll down a hill while the police fired at them. Three were killed, the other two badly wounded.<sup>53</sup>

However, no amount of terror would frighten those who had already decided to challenge the regime. On February 18, with the support of parents and a large segment of the population, teachers throughout the country went on strike. Taxi drivers, who were protesting a 50 percent increase in the price of gasoline, were also coordinating their demands with those of the teachers and they too called a general strike.<sup>54</sup>

The demonstrators soon attracted a large number of street vendors, the jobless and the poor in the city. Buses, private cars, and anything moving on the streets, were stoned. Moreover, the insurrection was for the first time not limited to Addis Ababa; it was Empire-wide. Student demonstrators in Adama and Bishoftu attacked the feudal establishment itself. In the latter city, a hotel belonging to one of the biggest Ethiopian landowners, Ras Mesfin Sileshi was severely damaged. The mansions of Lt.-General Abiye Abele in Bishoftu were also destroyed.

On February 21, the subdued city police had lost control and students and civilians were in almost full command of Addis Ababa.

<sup>53</sup>Blair Thomson, Ethiopia: The Country that Cut Off Its Head (London: Robson Books, 1975), p. 24.

<sup>54</sup>New York Times, February 25, 1974, p. 3.

The following day, parents, supported by some radical air-force non-commissioned officers, marched to Bishoftu police station and demanded the release of students arrested for illegal demonstrations, a demand to which the Prime Minister acquiesced immediately.

Haile Selassie had, in the meantime, called an extraordinary meeting of both his cabinet and the Crown Council and had come to the decision that the teachers' salaries would be partially increased, and that the implementation of the "Education Sector Review" would be suspended. The Executive meeting also decided that the price of gasoline for taxi drivers and other essential services would be reduced, and that price controls would be instituted on all staples.<sup>55</sup>

These decisions, which the Emperor announced on television on February 23, however, came too late. By February 24, several people were dead, and at least twenty-two reported wounded. Thirty-eight residential villas belonging to high government officials and large numbers of vehicles, including 75 buses, 36 private cars, 26 government vehicles, 7 diplomatic cars, 2 trains and a motorcycle were also severely damaged. The government then announced its crackdown. About a thousand people, including 350 taxi drivers, were arrested and charged with sedition.<sup>56</sup> When one takes into consideration the manner in which negative information and data were released by the government on previous occasions, the real figures should actually be

---

<sup>55</sup>New York Times, February 25, 1974, p. 6.

<sup>56</sup>The Ethiopian Herald, February 24, 1974, p. 1.

double or triple the amount quoted.

In the confrontation that ensued, the teachers refused to call off the strike, and the students continued their political agitation until public protest in all spheres had escalated to such a level that Haile Selassie could no longer control events. And, at this juncture, it would be only proper to point out that the "Education Sector Review" had become the Achilles heel of the regime.

Since the beginning of the decade of the sixties, when the Ethiopian student movement had started to expose the injustices and the weaknesses of the system, political power had been rapidly sliding away from the Negus. Age itself had also taken a toll. Haile Selassie had lost his alertness of the 1920s and 30s, and his Machiavellian capacity for containing developments detrimental to his throne. His tactics had worn out and were no longer effective in the second half of the twentieth century, when, instead of traditional feudal elements, he had to deal with highly sophisticated youth who had received a dose of Marx, Lenin and Mao, and who had a good understanding of the general mechanisms involved in mass consciousness, class struggle, and people's revolution.

In order to see the weakened condition of the regime Haile Selassie was precariously holding together when it was just about to founder under the repeated and determined onslaught of the students and the teachers, it would be useful to explore the chaos that characterized political alignments in the Emperor's ghibi (Palace). One basic weakness concerned the future of the crown itself since the question of

succession to the throne after Haile Selassie had departed had always been a sticking point in Ethiopian court circles. The fact that Haile Selassie remained silent on the subject and only indirectly implied that the Crown Prince Asfa Wossen would succeed him as stipulated in the constitution, did not dispel the speculation that the Negus had someone else in mind for many years. There was an unfounded, but nevertheless widespread rumour that the Crown Prince was the illegitimate son of Haile Selassie's old rival, Emperor Iyasu,<sup>57</sup> and that the Emperor, who had never publicly shown a liking for Asfa Wossen, was grooming his favourite son, Prince Makonnen, the Duke of Harar, for the post. The latter was indeed favoured in the palace. He was allowed to amass a huge fortune by establishing several business ventures, including one of the largest private enterprises in the country—the African Import/Export Company. The public media and the government's security service conducted publicity campaigns about Makonnen's "concern" for the plight of

---

<sup>57</sup> The author, who never believed the story, once asked Emperor Iyasu's son, Abba Yohannes Wolde Negodgwad (né Prince Yohannes Iyasu) who, for fear of Haile Selassie became a Catholic priest (thus assuring his break with the Ethiopian Church and making his claim to the throne virtually impossible), if he could corroborate the rumours. The reply was: "Yes, Crown Prince Merid Azmatch Asfa Wossen is my elder brother." The author, however, still believes that the story was not true. It seems just one of the many scandalous rumours spread, and probably originated from one of the several factions in the court circle. The interview with Prince Yohannes was conducted in Addis Ababa on October 19, 1964.

the poor and the downtrodden.<sup>58</sup> The mysterious death of the Prince in Bishoftu, however, removed him from the contest. His death was officially reported to have been caused by a car accident, but was widely believed to have been a hushed-up murder case perpetrated by an officer of the armed forces, who was said to have shot him in a jealous rage in an adultery case involving the officer's wife. After this event, the Emperor had taken to favouring the late Duke's sons, particularly Wossen Seged who inherited his father's peerage and Prince Michael Makonnen, presumed to be second in line to his brother. It was never clear whether it was genuine or deliberately meant to leave the people in suspense but Haile Selassie was clearly sending cues by paying special attention particularly to Wossen Seged. Both princes were sent to the United States and Canada for higher education but both ended up gaining notoriety as extravagant playboys and were said to have been disappointments to the Emperor who indulged them so much following the loss of his favourite son. Despite their ambition to succeed to the throne, both were grossly ignorant of the highly complicated Ethiopian political scene. Both princes were pathetically unaware of the political turmoil that had been simmering in the country for a long time—a turmoil that was

---

<sup>58</sup> One particular story which was widely disseminated was that one day, while distributing thousands of dollars to the poor, he ran out of cash and left them his own brand new limousine!

soon to engulf them.<sup>59</sup> Despite his half-hearted denials,<sup>60</sup> when confronted with the question, Haile Selassie's grandson, Rear Admiral Iskender Desta, was also in the contest for the throne.<sup>61</sup> In the 1960s and 70s, he was known to be busy cultivating support among the young officer corps and some educated civilians for whom he often sponsored scholarships abroad. According to Lij Mesfin Biru, a young aristocrat with close family ties to the Royal family and a strong supporter of

<sup>59</sup>In 1967, Prince Michael Makonnen contacted the author who was a former student leader and after admitting to his ignorance about the political issues in the country from which he claimed to have been "insulated," asked: "Why are students rebelling against my grandfather?" When the author told him that Haile Selassie was an epitome of Ethiopian feudalism and that if radical changes such as land reform were not instituted immediately, there would be many heads to roll and that the Emperor's children and grandchildren, including himself, would be the first casualties of the impending revolution, he was totally baffled by the remark. He then attempted to argue that the Emperor's position as a mediator between the radical youth on the one hand and the conservative church and aristocracy on the other put him in an unenviable position. When the author presented him with the counter-argument that this was only a myth perpetrated by the Emperor's supporters since both the church and the aristocracy were already under his own control and that the Emperor's failure to bring about land reform was because he did not want to distribute his own huge estate, which was more than 20% of Ethiopia's most arable land, the young Prince went into a temper tantrum and angrily shouted at the top of his voice: "I do not like anybody who criticizes my grandpa! No children of Dihoch (the poor) will take away our land." Prince Michael, and his brother, the former Duke of Harar, together with many members of the royal family, are at the time of writing in the maximum security prison known as Alem Bekagn (literally "Bye-Bye to the World"), which was built by Haile Selassie more than half a century ago.

<sup>60</sup>See, for example, his conversation with the author, *supra*, p. 361.

<sup>61</sup>Iskender had even gone to the extent of hijacking the Emperor's plane on September 14, 1973 and holding him hostage at gunpoint in a futile attempt to force him to abdicate in his favour. See the New York Times, September 20, 1973, p. 8.

the Crown Prince, Asfa Wossen, the latter was being secretly informed of Iskender's political intrigues through his own secret security network and was taking all necessary precautions.<sup>62</sup>

The Emperor, who was aware of all these animosities and rivalries among his children and grandchildren, never intervened. When in 1966 a radio commentator asked him about the succession, for example, Haile Selassie replied with anger, "Go and see Our constitution."<sup>63</sup>

The advice of his closest associates, nevertheless, concentrated on passing the throne to Asfa Wossen and his line. Even though it might not have done him any more good than being saved from the personal humiliation of dethronement, Haile Selassie had several times rejected the advice of his friends that since he was getting too old, he should step down in favour of either the Crown Prince or his grandson, Prince Zara Yacob (the latter's eldest son). Merid Azmatch Asfa Wossen was, however, unpopular with the public since he was partly responsible for the several hushed-up famines while governor of Wollo.<sup>64</sup> The Emperor had also never fully forgiven him for reading

---

<sup>62</sup>The late Mesfin Berou told this to the author in a private interview conducted in Ottawa on September 11, 1967.

<sup>63</sup>Interview with Ato Samuel Ferenj, Radio and T.V. anchor-man, attached to the Ministry of Information, Addis Ababa, June 7, 1967.

<sup>64</sup>The announcement of the Derg in 1974 that Asfa Wossen would be proclaimed King of Ethiopia was not only a ploy to lure him into the country and force him to bring back the huge fortunes that he and his father had amassed in a Swiss bank, but also to try him for the hushed up Wollo famines between 1956 and 1973. At the time of writing the Prince was residing in Switzerland.



the rebel's manifesto during the 1960 abortive coup d'état. Instead of providing him open support and settling the question of the succession once and for all, Haile Selassie deliberately kept the Crown Prince in his own shadow until the day of his overthrow. The Negus wanted him to remain in obscurity so much so that in the 1960s and 70s it was not uncommon for educated Ethiopians who frequented Asfa Wossen's palace to be questioned and sternly warned not to pay any more visits to his ghibi.<sup>65</sup>

In the palace itself, the strongest advice for Haile Selassie to step down in favour of his son came from the Habte Wold family, one of whom was the Prime Minister, Aklilu Habte Wold, and an ambitious aristocratic group led by Leul Ras Asrate Kassa, chairman of the Crown Council. Both these groups had the confidence and trust of Haile Selassie, and both had strong political clout. Aklilu Habte Wold's group, being mainly from non-aristocratic classes, controlled almost all the ministries and thus political power, next only to Haile Selassie. The second group, together with the Church, controlled most of the land in the Empire, and thus the economic lifeline of the nation. It was Haile Selassie's deliberate aim to juxtapose these two groups in order to "divide and rule."

---

<sup>65</sup>The Crown Prince was also trying to break out of this isolation. He was attempting to keep his contacts open. However, this made the Emperor even more wary. It should be pointed out that it was not uncommon in the country's history for a prince to overthrow his father from the throne. That was why most Ethiopian princes during the Gondar Empire were kept at the inaccessible "Wehini" escarpment jail that Samuel Johnson had later immortalized in his famous book, Rasselas: The Prince of Abyssinia. See supra, p. 36.

Both groups, for their own reasons, thought it best that the Emperor relinquish his throne in favour of Asfa Wossen. By this act, the Habte Wold family and their supporters, Shoan in regional affiliation and commoners by birth, hoped to continue to dominate political power under a Crown Prince who was already half-paralyzed from a massive heart attack and who would have made, as some quipped, "the best figurehead." The Habte Wolds, who had their own non-governmental spy ring, had always kept an eye on the future emperor and all political radicals since the 1950s, when Makonnen Habte Wold (executed during the 1980 coup) organized the network. But in later years, the Crown Prince himself had rallied to his side a viable political group, some of whom were vying for Aklilu Habte Wold's post—the prized position of Prime Minister.

Asrate Kassa's Crown Council, and other aristocratic families, mostly Shoans as well, wanted to use the opportunity to advise the Crown Prince to oust Haile Selassie's ministers, whom they called Yedeha Lijoch (Children of Nobodies) and to return the chewas (nobles) to their "rightful" place.

Haile Selassie, of course, refused to take any of their advice. He also ignored the enormous problems facing the people. As a matter of fact, he seemed to be more interested in increasing his international reputation by winning the Nobel Peace Prize, towards which he was said to have spent a large sum of money to gain support among influential western scholars who had many times recommended him

for the honour.<sup>66</sup> Worse, the Negus had not allowed the creation of permanent institutions that would take over vital responsibilities in his absence. The cabinet, including the prime minister, was handpicked. The parliament was nothing more than a debating society, since the decisions of the popularly elected chamber of deputies could be annulled by the senate, whose members were all chosen by the Emperor, mostly from among the nobility and trusted retainers. In the final analysis, the Emperor had veto power over all bills passed by parliament. He also issued his own laws by simple imperial decree.<sup>67</sup>

Indeed, the situation in the ruling and bureaucratic circles and in the country at large during the early 1970s left no other option but a revolutionary change to put the nation's house in order. Even the adibays (careerists) were now frustrated, since their talents were not being properly utilized and higher positions were fast becoming scarce. Regional and ethnic grouping, encouraged by the Habte Wold family for their own purposes of divide and rule, was becoming more and more important. The Oromos, the majority tribe in the country, and the Tigrés, the third largest ethnic group, including the Eritreans, were making legitimate demands to share the levers of power in the

---

<sup>66</sup>Haile Selassie almost succeeded in achieving his aim of winning the prize had it not been for a damaging publicity campaign by his former Ambassador to Sweden, Tafari Sharew who, as a supporter of the 1960 coup d'état was in exile in Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. Tafari produced evidence of people being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the Negus. Interview with Woizero Tsigé Sharew, Washington, D.C., July 17, 1980.

<sup>67</sup>Government of Ethiopia, The Ethiopian Constitution (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1955).

nation. There were several serious revolts in the Empire. The Eritreans, whose federal status Haile Selassie abolished and reduced to direct autocratic rule from the centre, had taken up arms to gain independence. The Somalis in the Ogaden, the Oromos in Balé and Sidamo, even the Amharas in Gojam, were staging open rebellions. Haile Selassie's answer was brutal repression. However, whereas the revolts in many of the provinces cracked under Haile Selassie's police and military force, those in Balé, Sidamo, the Ogaden, and specially in Eritrea, continued to grow to a level the regime could not normally handle. It should not be surprising therefore that the soldiers' revolt in 1974 should start in the combat areas of Sidamo and Eritrea.

Land reform, a sensitive and crucial issue, was totally neglected. This was, of course, understandable. The Emperor and the imperial family were not prepared to dispense with their own gabar meret (feudal landholdings). Anybody who advocated reform in feudal land tenure relations was immediately attacked by the aristocracy as being "bought by a foreign enemy." In parliament, already packed by the nobility, a land reform bill had been repeatedly rejected. At one point, during a parliamentary debate, an organizer and leader of an aristocratic lobby, Ras Mesfin Sileschi, was said to have castigated the Minister of Land Reform, Belay Abay, who had put forward some very modest reforms, as "a communist."

It was due to these facts that the system was successfully being undermined by the radicals among the students and teachers, who

had by then gained the support of the rank and file membership of the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions. The demands from this quarter were political. They concerned the entire population of the country, and all workers. This radical coalition attacked corruption in high places, the low salaries and bad working conditions of the workers, the spiralling cost of living, the exploitation of and inhuman treatment meted out to the landless peasantry, and the unfair distribution of educational resources.

All the movement of the disaffected non-commissioned officers of the military, which appeared only in 1974, had to do was to deliver a coup de grâce to an institution whose foundation had already disintegrated beyond repair. Thus, it is only against this background that we can trace and evaluate the events immediately preceding Haile Selassie's fall, and the role the military played in those final hours

#### Popular Uprising and a Military Coup de Grâce

Haile Selassie's policy of divide and rule was not limited to the higher civilian politicians and bureaucrats of his feudal aristocracy. The general configuration of command positions in the military was similarly set in such a manner that there were rivalries in every unit, every division, and over every key post. The modern imperial body-guard was checked by a traditional territorial army based on loyal Amhara peasants. The paratrooper corps was trained and based near the air force, in order to check the latter's activities. In fact, during

the 1960s and 70s, it was not uncommon to see the air force personnel being physically attacked near their bases by the karate-trained comandos. At one time, the attacks became so common and vicious that airforce men were afraid to tread outside their quarters at night. In the imperial army and bodyguard, two classes of officer were trained. Those from Harar Military Academy, modelled on Sandhurst, were highly qualified; they were either recruited from colleges or had passed the General School Leaving Certificate Examination. Their academic and military training, which led to the rank of second lieutenant, took three years. Those from the Holata Military Academy, on the other hand, were usually from the tenth grade level or below, or were career soldiers rising through the ranks with limited educational background but with well-recognized military or combat achievements. The latter group's training took only one year; they graduated with the same rank of second lieutenant. The Harar group, despite carrying the same titles, were paid significantly higher salaries. This, as was to be expected, was severely resented by the Holata graduates.<sup>68</sup>

Personal enmities or tribal rivalries were also important considerations in appointments to high military command positions. It was known to this author, who was a former official of the Defence Ministry, that the Minister of Defence and the chief of staff of the Armed Forces were not on speaking terms in the 1960s and 70s. It

<sup>68</sup> Majors Mengistu Haile Mariam and Atnafu Abate, who were first and second in command of the Derg when it took power, were graduates of Holata. Over 90 percent of the officers in the Derg were also from this training centre.

is due to this fact that none of the attempted coup d'états led by command officers were successful. Rivalries, suspicions and betrayals always worked in Haile Selassie's favour. When the initiative came from the NCOs, in a rather spontaneous manner, based on justified and long-standing grievances, however, the Emperor's strategy failed.

The first of these new rebellions took place at Negele Borana (Sidamo Province) as a result of complaints lodged by NCOs against their officers. On January 12, 1974, a group of mutineers detained their brigade commander and all their officers, accusing them of negligence in not getting their water pump repaired, and refusing to let them use the still functional officers' water facilities. They also protested that NCOs and enlisted men were provided with inedible food and that there were corrupt practices evident in the handling of army provision contracts. Holding their hostages, the soldiers petitioned the Emperor that the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, and the Commander of the Territorial Forces be sent to investigate their grievances. When the Emperor dispatched General Diresse Dubale, Commander of the Territorial Forces, however, they held him hostage as well, and forced him to eat the same food as the men, thus giving him "serious diarrhoea." They tied the general up and left him under a tree for eight hours while negotiations continued with the Ministry of Defence. It was said that within a few hours, the general was on the verge of total breakdown both physically and mentally.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>69</sup>An interview with Lieutenant Tafari (who was a member of the Armed Forces during the period under discussion), Toronto, August 15, 1980.

The Emperor, furious over these actions, and hoping to intimidate them into releasing their hostages, ordered two jet bombers to buzz the brigade garrison. But when the NCOs stood fast, he promised to redress their grievances and also not to court-martial them for insubordination. The rebels then released all their hostages. In order to avoid a possible domino effect, the government hushed up the entire incident.

There are three important points to this incident that we should note. First, Haile Selassie, hoping to enhance his own popularity among the NCOs and enlisted men, gave in to rebel demands under duress, thus undercutting his own senior military commanders. Second, although the government hoped to avoid a domino effect by covering the incident up, the opposite effect ensued. News of the Negele revolt was transmitted by the noncommissioned officers involved to other armed forces barracks, who in turn disseminated the story through military radio and telegram. In a matter of hours, the story was spread beyond the military to the civilian population by word of mouth. Third, the Negele incident had no political content; its goals were limited and it in no way challenged the feudal system itself. The only issue presented was that of living and working conditions of the soldiers. This was, then, very different from the demands of the teachers and students.

With stories of the handling of the Negele rebellion spreading far and wide, another mutiny immediately followed. This time it was air force NCOs who held their officers hostages from February 10 to 13, and made twelve demands, none, again, political. They asked for



improvements such as better sanitation in the men's quarters, and higher pay for NCOs and privates. The Emperor immediately agreed to a raise in wages of E\$18 per month for privates.

Soldiers in other units, however, were not appeased by the new salary scale. Thus, another rebellion cropped up in the north. This particular mutiny happened to coincide with strikes by students, teachers and taxi drivers.

On February 25, 1974, rebel NCOs of the second division in Asmara (Eritrea) arrested all senior officers, including their military commander, Major-General Seyoum Gedle Giorgis, and the Governor of Eritrea, General Debebe Haile Mariam. At the same time, they took control of radio stations, vital institutions such as banks, the international airport, and all major roads leading to the capital of the Eritrean region.<sup>70</sup>

These rebel demands, we should stress again, were purely limited to their own living conditions. They specifically expressed their unflagging loyalty to the Emperor himself, in setting forth the following twenty-two demands:

1. Private soldiers should be paid a minimum monthly salary of E\$150.
2. Too many Mercedes cars are given to Ministers with allowances to run them and this practice should be stopped. [This demand was brought in to refute the government's contention that the country was too poor to afford further salary increments for soldiers.]

---

<sup>70</sup>The Times (London), February 25, 1974; Thomson, The Country that Cut Off Its Head, pp. 29-31.

3. Officers are given too many privileges; this practice should stop.
4. Private soldiers should be guaranteed a basic monthly pension of E\$85 upon retirement.
5. Soldiers involved in solving civil disorders or sent to a war zone should receive bonuses.
6. Servicemen who die within six months of their employment by the army should be entitled to full pension rights to their families.
7. Privates should be given privileges for free medical treatment like the officers.
8. Children of soldiers should be given preference in schooling and employment.
9. The E\$18 salary increase for soldiers is too small and is therefore unacceptable.
10. Free food rations should be provided to soldiers.
11. There should be equal application of the law to every group [in the military].
12. Soldiers' salaries should be paid on time.
13. There should be a provision to transport private soldiers' bodies to their villages, as is already done for officers.
14. In cases of punishment, there should be no reduction in salary.
15. Medical treatment for officers, NCOs and private soldiers should be similar.
16. There should be a two-year rotation to other areas for those assigned to hazardous war zones.
17. Soldiers should have the right to attend and participate in sports.

18. Technical personnel should be given special bonuses of E\$30 a month.
19. Orders for transfer of soldiers in hazardous war zones should be carried out without delay.
20. Soldiers should receive family allowances.
21. Families of soldiers should be given free medical care.
22. The chief medical officer in Asmara should be transferred from the second division due to his embezzlement and illegal trade in medicine.<sup>71</sup>

The Emperor's reply to these demands was that the country could not afford to pay more than the E\$18 increment allotted the previous day, but that the other grievances would be attended to. To this end, Haile Selassie immediately dispatched Lt.-General Assefa Ayene, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and Lt.-General Assefa Demisse, his own senior ADC, to Asmara.

But on February 26, the rebel NCOs sent telegrams asking for unity from other NCOs all over the country; pledges of support immediately started to pour in. The air force—third and fourth divisions—and the navy sent messages of solidarity with their colleagues. What is more, by February 27, mutinies were widespread. The Signal Corps, the Engineers' Corps, the Musicians' Corps and the Transport section arrested their officers and units in the air force, and the second division in Addis Ababa had staged their own local insurrections. The

---

<sup>71</sup>Transcript (in the author's possession) of a Radio Amhara broadcast, February 12, 1974.

latter had also rounded up some ministers, and held them in custody. Informed of his impending arrest, the Emperor's grandson, Rear Admiral Iskender Desta, Deputy Commander of the Imperial Navy, fled the naval base at Manaansa and sought refuge in Djibouti.<sup>72</sup>

The regime was sensing for the first time that the situation was getting out of hand. The cabinet went into almost continuous session. Lt.-General Assefa Ayene, one of the senior officers sent to the north to negotiate, left his colleague Lt.-General Assefa Demissear hostage, and returned from Asmara with three NCOs who wanted to present their grievances to the Emperor. Amid reports that all vital arms of the Ethiopian military forces—the army, the air force, and the navy—had already agreed to carry out a coordinated insurrection, the cabinet had no choice but to accept the E\$150 salary level (an increase of E\$90) plus better pensions and allowances.

The NCOs and the soldiers who were satisfied with the government's acceptance of their demands and especially its agreement to raise their monthly salary immediately returned to their barracks. Even where some units showed solidarity with the rebel soldiers, they did nothing more serious than putting their officers under arrest. At no time did they strive to take a coordinated action which would have far-reaching consequences. And after Haile Selassie acceded to their demand for larger salary increase, all the officers were discharged from custody. The widespread agitation of the civilians in Addis Ababa

---

<sup>72</sup>The New York Times, March 2, 1974, p. 3.

was ignored. Even the few ministers and aristocrats who were interned on charges of treason and corruption were released by the Fourth Division rebels upon receiving promises of non-reprisals for their action. In fact, complying with the government's instructions, they immediately went to restore order in the capital. It was the same in the Northern front. After releasing their hostages and opening the airport and all the roads they had previously blockaded, the Asmara rebels peacefully returned to their barracks.

The shock effect which these rebellions had on the government, however, continued to reverberate. Although, unlike those of the students and teachers, the demands from the military did not yet have any political content and concerned only wages and working conditions, the Haile Selassie cabinet had already panicked. Prime Minister Aklilu Habte Wold and his entire cabinet had tendered their resignations to the Emperor, only eight hours after acceding to the NCOs' demands.

Their panic was indeed understandable. Even if they appeased the military in general, they knew that they would not quell the long-standing rebellion by the teachers and students, which had expanded in scope and was raging throughout the country. Furthermore, other civilian groups had started joining in with their own grievances. The Prime Minister and his cabinet also knew of the close ties between the university students and the young NCOs, especially those from the air force and special army units such as the Army Aviation Corps, Mechanical Brigade, Army Musical Corps, and Army Medical Corps.

NCOs in these groups were former high school students who were already politicized. They had joined the units only due to lack of alternative employment. Thus, it is not surprising that they were the most vocal and the most radical among the soldiers' movement of 1974.

On February 28, 1974, Ethiopia was actually without a government and the civilians on strike—including students, teachers, and workers—continued their open rebellion. Then, on February 28, Haile Selassie appointed an Oxford-educated aristocrat, Endalkatchew Makonnen, as the new prime minister. The Emperor's choice was difficult to understand, as Endalkatchew was unpopular with the public.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, the new ministers he brought in were almost all of aristocratic origin. The army, however, promised its allegiance to Haile Selassie's newly created team, and returned to its barracks. The well-trained crack Imperial Bodyguard then released the following communiqué:

The recent Armed Forces movement has reiterated its dedication to the Country and the Emperor. Ethiopia shall continue protecting her independence and embracing her Emperor.

We, members of the Imperial Bodyguard, knowing that the life of our Emperor is the life of our nation, rededicate ourselves to Him and accept the ministerial change made. There should be no disturbance or bloodshed in effecting the change.<sup>74</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup>A demand by the Ethiopian University teachers that Endalkatchew be removed was circulated on Yekatit 22, 1966 [March 1, 1974]. See also Ethiopian Students and Teachers, "Hod Siyawuk Doro Mata" [The Obvious Pretension], Yekatit 28, 1966 [March 7, 1974]. Copies of all the documents are in the possession of the author.

<sup>74</sup>Ke-Neguse-Negustu Yé-Kibir Zebegna Yétesette Meglecha [Notice from the Imperial Bodyguard] (Addis Ababa: n.d.). Copy of the document is in the possession of the author.

The students and teachers were alarmed by the army's betrayal but they continued their agitation. Ethiopian members of the University Teachers' Association immediately went on the offensive.

On March 1, 1974, they pointed out:

We, Ethiopian university teachers assessing the recent developments in the country . . . accept the resignation of the Aklilu Habte Wold Cabinet with jubilation, but we do not believe that political and administrative change means allowing exit to the first oppressor through the front door and inviting entry to another oppressor through the back door.

1. The newly appointed Prime Minister Endalkatchew Makonnen should not be accepted by the public because

a) being from a class of exploiters he cannot understand the people's problems. It is to be remembered that he campaigned for the United Nations Secretary General's position on the platform that he deserved the position because as he put it 'both my grandfather and my father were rulers.' . . . When he was Minister of Industry and Commerce, he built himself a huge apartment complex through embezzlement. Endalkatchew Makonnen is one of the major oppressors of the Ethiopian people, and should be brought to public trial.

2. Any political official, including the prime minister, should be elected by popular franchise and all political figures should represent and be responsible only to the people.

3. There should be a fundamental economic, political and social change in the country. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are parts of basic human rights and should be respected.<sup>75</sup>

Simultaneously, numerous pamphlets were being circulated by the striking students and teachers. One pamphlet distributed on the same

---

<sup>75</sup>Ethiopian Students and Teachers, "Tishalin Tiché Tibisin Agebahu [Worse Than Before] (Addis Ababa: Yekatit 22, 1966 [March 1, 1974]). A copy of this document is in the author's possession.

day as the new cabinet's appointment said in part:

Move forward, soldier, move . . . let students, teachers, soldiers unite. . . . If as a patriot you do not take up the cause of the oppressed and speak for justice, what are you carrying arms for? . . . You should not allow the government of power brokers to be established again. . . . Where are those pitiless exploiters of the people? Where are those who trampled on justice and enriched themselves by robbing the people.<sup>76</sup>

The students, the teachers, and other civilians who had already joined them against the regime attacked not only the new government but also the military, for neglecting the cause of the country as a whole in return for their own individual comfort. They were enraged that the soldiers agreed to return to the barracks once their own demand for salary increase was fulfilled, thus putting themselves in an income bracket much higher than that of many industrial workers and middle level civil servants. Wherever the soldiers went—in public bars, night clubs, market places and the like—they were subjected to chirikta (an Ethiopian way of showing contempt by spitting through the upper incisors). Anybody wearing a military uniform was hissed and booed. Most were thus forced to wear civilian clothes in public if they ever ventured out of their barracks.

On the other hand, the university students and teachers also kept in touch with the radical NCOs in the air force and the special units who had formerly been members of the Ethiopian student move-

<sup>76</sup>Ethiopian Students and Teachers, "Atawolawul Wotté" [Do Not Hesitate Soldier] (Addis Ababa: Yekatit 21, 1966 [March 2, 1974]). A copy of this document is in the author's possession.



ment. Some, especially those from the air force, were enrolled in the university's Extension Department at that time, and were thus in constant touch with the university student leaders and radical professors. Some had already graduated from the university<sup>77</sup> and were highly politicized by their contact with the student body.

Soon, a new wave of political pamphlets attacking the old and new cabinets appeared all over the capital. They were mostly written and duplicated at the university and spread by air force planes and army helicopters. This was in fact the first real break in politicizing the military.

As reported in the Africa Contemporary Record:

An important nucleus of radical officers had formed in the air force; they constituted the most ideologically committed cell of all the military leaders. Their links were with the student movement and the intelligentsia; all of them had grown up during the years of student agitation at the university.<sup>78</sup>

The Asmara division, however, went to the extent of criticizing the teachers for putting their own demands to the government, and categorically warned that no political questions be raised again from any quarter.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>77</sup>In response to our survey, October 8, 1981, Dr. Edouard Trudeau, former Dean of the University College, pointed out that many members of the Derg are graduates of the College's Extension Department.

<sup>78</sup>Africa Contemporary Record (1974), p. B162.

<sup>79</sup>"Besemenawi Etiopia Yémigegnew Yé Huletegnaw Kifle-Tor..." [The Second Division From the Northern Front ...] (Addis Ababa: Megabit 5, 1966 [March 12, 1974]). A copy of this document is in the author's possession.

Realizing their isolation, radical air force NCOs went to the university and asked for support. After general discussions of strategy concerning the continuing rebellion were made, the students expressed their solidarity in action. Air force NCOs then buzzed the city and distributed the following pamphlet:

To the Ethiopian people:

In relation to the students', teachers', taxi drivers', soldiers', and workers' movements of the last few days, delegates from the armed forces have been assured that the following questions which were put to the Emperor will be fulfilled:

1. Freedom of the press.
2. Freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration.
3. Political parties to be instituted and democratically elected people's government be established.
4. Land be given to the tillers of the soil.
5. Regulations determining labour/management relations be reformed.
6. Political prisoners be released.
7. Education be free for all.
8. Price control regulations be passed and effectively enforced.
9. Former government officials [ministers] who had directly and indirectly stolen the people's property and money be brought to trial.
10. Salaries of soldiers and workers be raised with cost of living bonuses.
11. A committee of civilians and military personnel be formed and see to it that the above demands are properly executed.

However, Ministry of Information news and radio reporters have misrepresented the military's questions concerning salaries and have led the public to believe that it had sold out the people's democratic demands. This has confused the populace and there is already public hatred and suspicion against the armed forces.

We want the Ethiopian people to know that our understanding is that all questions put to the

Emperor will be fulfilled. We also want the new government . . . to use the public media, publicize these demands and see to it that a committee of civilians and military representatives mentioned in item 11 be quickly formed. If the democratic questions enumerated above are not wholly fulfilled, we shall be forced to take action.<sup>80</sup>

The pamphlet was signed "The Armed Forces." But that despite being presented as the entire military establishment's view this pamphlet originated with air force NCOs and only a few of the special units of the army is beyond doubt. Numerous rebel and military unit documents available with this author show that in March, 1974 there was no coordinating committee speaking for all the armed forces except the legally accepted channel through the Chief of Staff or the Minister of Defence. What were in existence were cells of politicized factions in the Air Force, the 29th Brigade of the Fourth Division, the Signals, Engineering and Airborne Corps. In addition to the Body Guard which had issued the warning mentioned previously, the Second Division in the North, and the Police Force had also categorically rejected the political demands emanating from these small radical units.

In late March, a committee of twenty-five NCOs in the air force decided to buzz the capital with jets to protest the new government's failure to arrest former ministers and government officials. But Endalkatchew, bolstered by the support he received from the bulk of the remaining armed forces units, ordered an arrest of the plotters, accusing

---

<sup>80</sup>A copy of this document entitled "Yé-Etiopia Hezb" [To the People of Ethiopia], distributed in Addis Ababa, March 4, 1974 is in the author's possession.

them of being foreign agents and of attempting "to bomb the city and overthrow the government." However, as Blair Thomson, the BBC correspondent who had met the group in question, reported:

Two of the people . . . had, in fact, contacted me the previous Wednesday, and in cloak-and-dagger fashion, involving changes of cars and secret signals, we had arranged a meeting that afternoon. . . . They were both in the air force—one a leading aircraftsman, the other an NCO. . . .

There had never been a plot to overthrow the government. What had happened was that the 'ginger group' of radicals in the air force—of which the NCO claimed to be the leader—had, with the support of officers and pilots at Ethiopia's three main air force bases and of similar radicals in several army units, decided to do something to show their dissatisfaction with the speed of reforms. The plan was to 'buzz' Addis Ababa with a squadron of jet fighters, while colleagues in the Airborne Division dropped leaflets from helicopters. The Asmara units would do the same, and the action was planned for Monday, March 25.<sup>81</sup>

To show solidarity with their colleagues, NCOs from Asmara representing the army, the police, and the navy, arrested fifty senior military officials, secured the government radio station in Asmara and for the first time, put forth some specific political demands. But since the bulk of the military was still loyal to Endalkatchew, the Airborne Division surrounded the Bishoftu Air Force Base and the air force radicals were detained. Then, instead of challenging the government, the Asmara rebels declared their allegiance to both Endalkatchew and the Emperor. They released their hostages and peacefully returned to

---

<sup>81</sup> Thomson, The Country That Cut Off Its Head, p. 52.

their barracks. No further demands were made to gain the release of the radical NCOs.<sup>82</sup>

All evidence shows that at this stage, the military was not interested in wider political issues which the students, the teachers, and the workers were still championing. Their unshaken loyalty to Haile Selassie and his throne was, of course, never questioned. They continued to refer to him as "Our August Sovereign" and showered thanks on him for taking action against former ministers who failed to carry out their duties in a proper manner. The Emperor, according to the Paratroopers' Unit, the 29th Brigade, and the Communications and Engineering Corps, as well as the territorial army, had "deep love for the people."<sup>83</sup> The Second Division in Asmara specifically pointed out that they did not want to mutiny against their Emperor. They stated in their communiqué:

Our August Sovereign had discharged from duty those high government officials who had been oppressing the people for so long. Together with His loving people and all His loyal Armed Forces, we are elated by His moves. His Majesty's actions have proven again the well-known love he has for His people.<sup>84</sup>

One pamphlet, entitled "Rejoice," and addressed to all the armed forces and civilian population asked that action be taken against

---

<sup>82</sup>New York Times, March 25, 1974, p. 7.

<sup>83</sup>A copy of this document, entitled, "Le Tor Haylochnna Le Police Serawit Wondimochachin" ["To our Army and Police Force Brothers"], distributed in Addis Ababa, March 24, 1974, is in the possession of the author.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

former officials and that in future, government officials be elected by the people. But it was satisfied with the status quo for fear of "enemies encroaching on Ethiopian borders," and continued:

In the last few days, the changes for which we have been working have been accomplished without bloodshed. The wolves we were hunting have voluntarily resigned. That is precisely what we wanted to happen and thought would benefit the country. . . . To forestall a danger that may befall the country, we urge that all members of the armed forces stay in their present positions and that all others [civilians] return to work and fulfill their duties. Do not be alarmed by rumours of agitation since that would only benefit the enemy.<sup>85</sup>

Leaders of mutinying soldiers in the Second Division in Asmara had sent a telegram to all armed forces personnel emphasizing that the Emperor's announcement of February 28, 1974 had fulfilled their demands. They specifically pointed out that they would not go along with any political demands some NCOs from the air force had put forward. Ministers arrested by the Fourth Division were also duly released. The arrest of the ministers, the Division leaders informed Haile Selassie, had been carried out because the ministers "had let down the Emperor at a time of crisis by deserting him."<sup>86</sup>

By March 2, 1974, the armed forces seemed to have fully accepted the Endalkatchew government, and were thus, for all practical purposes, effectively neutralized. The ceremony on March 2, celebrating

---

<sup>85</sup>A copy of this document, entitled "Yemeseratch . . . Ethiopia" ["Rejoice . . . Ethiopia"], distributed in Addis Ababa on 28 February, 1974, is in the author's possession.

<sup>86</sup>New York Times, February 28, 1974.

the Ethiopian victory over the Italians at Adwa went without a hitch. The Emperor and his new team were received with great applause and the traditional jubilation.<sup>87</sup>

The striking teachers and students were, however, far from being appeased. Even the army's denial of support for the second time did not make them change their strategy. They openly let it be known that they were not satisfied with a simple resignation of the cabinet. On the day of Aklilu Habte Wold's resignation, they held a big rally in Addis Ababa, and asked for vengeance against the former ministers, not only for being corrupt but also for being irresponsible and causing the death of hundreds of thousands of peasants in Wollo.<sup>88</sup> More than 5,000 students, teachers and other civilians marched through the capital carrying an effigy of former Prime Minister Aklilu Habte Wold with a noose around its neck, and demanding that all the ministers be sent to the gallows.<sup>89</sup> They shouted, "Endalkatchew out! Death to Aklilu!" Endalkatchew was venomously attacked on his aristocratic arrogance; he was accused of being a powermonger and for having embezzled government money.

On March 1, 1974, the Ethiopian Teachers' Association put forward the following demands to the Emperor:

---

<sup>87</sup>New York Times, March 3, 1974.

<sup>88</sup>World Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students, "The Dilemma of Famine in Ethiopia," Combat, II (January 1974), 1-48.

<sup>89</sup>For descriptions of this and other major student demonstrations against the new cabinet, see the Times (London), March 2, 8, 12, and 29, 1974.

1. Since Ethiopia is singularly dependent on agriculture, and economic and educational development go hand in hand, a thorough land reform measure must be immediately introduced.
2. Many Ethiopians are subjected to discrimination on the basis of tribe, religion and regional affiliation. There should be government legislation prohibiting such practices and guaranteeing the basic human rights of all citizens.
3. The nation's wealth should not be accumulated in the hands of a few people. The wealth of the people and of the government should always be invested in areas that would benefit the country as a whole.
4. No unnecessary price and tax burdens should be put on the people.
5. The nation's justice system, administration and security must be overhauled and modernized.
6. The newly appointed Prime Minister, Endalkatchew Makonnen, who did not carry out his duties properly when he was Minister of Education and who has consistently exhibited a tendency to trample on people's rights, should be immediately removed from office.<sup>90</sup>

On March 5, 1974, the Ethiopian University Teachers' Association, after making a thorough analysis of the condition of the country, posed some fundamental questions. Their demands are summarized as follows. First, the newly appointed prime minister should be removed, since he had not been elected by the people and his appointment by the Emperor went against the people's basic demands. Second, there should be a committee formed by groups and parties representing the important

<sup>90</sup>A copy of this document, dated Yekatit 22, 1966 [March 1, 1974], is in the author's possession.



sectors of the population—armed forces, teachers, workers, peasants and students—to draft a new constitution. Third, all outstanding demands of the teachers, workers, students, and soldiers should be brought to a speedy solution. There should be freedom of speech and press. There is no point in rotating cabinets when people are not free to discuss, to comment, to criticize and to correct mistakes. They asked, "After the voice of the people is gagged, whose voice will be listened to?" The Department of Censorship in the Ministry of Information should be immediately dismantled.

There should be freedom of information. In addition to freedom of speech and press, people should have the right to know what their government is doing, as well as the condition of their own country. The disastrous Wollo famine was hidden from the people and the international community and thousands became victims because of lack of this basic right. Government newspapers should give unbiased and correct information. Uncensored non-government newspapers should be established.

There should be freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration. These freedoms are essential elements of people's maturity and instruments of checking the governing body.

All Ethiopian workers should immediately call a strike in solidarity with the revolutionary forces of the country. There should be a right to organize associations and political parties. All existing regulations which hinder this right should be abolished. The Security

Department of the Ministry of the Interior, which has consistently denied people's rights to move and speak freely, should be abolished.

Workers' and soldiers' salary increases should be tied to strictly enforced price control measures. These controls should not be aimed simply at the small trader but should be enforced with big merchants who have already unlawfully enriched themselves.

The "Land to the Tiller" program, demanded by the students for over ten years, should be immediately implemented. It is not enough to boast that "Ethiopia can feed the entire African population" when Ethiopians in Wollo and the eastern region starve to death. All lands stolen from the people and given to the aristocrats should be immediately redistributed to their rightful owners, i.e., to the peasant actually farming them. These measures should be taken by a provisional people's government.

Those former and present government officials who have plundered the Ethiopian people directly and indirectly are internal enemies of the people and should be put on trial immediately. Those who have been released from detention should be re-arrested before they succeed in secretly stashing away the wealth they have illegally amassed. The armed forces are specifically urged to carry this out.

A provisional administration should be formed to carry out these demands. The present government should give way to a new people's government to be established in six months' time.

Unless all the above demands are met, the entire Ethiopian teaching staff at Haile Selassie University who have gone on strike as

of March 4, 1974, will not return to work.<sup>91</sup>

Urged on and encouraged by the resolution of the University Teachers' Association, the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions made sixteen demands concerning workers and labour-management relations. They then struck on March 7. From then on, with 100,000 workers on strike, the main cities, including Addis Ababa, were virtually paralyzed. Most of the hotels in the country were closed down and industrial activities came to a virtual halt.<sup>92</sup>

With student and teacher agitation continuing, the strike spread to other non-unionized areas. Members of the Civil Aviation Authority went on strike without even giving warning. Five hundred casual day labourers at Akaki marched carrying a red flag protesting the government's refusal to give them the right to join the already organized union and thus receive better pay.

On March 11, thousands of students demonstrated, and burnt the effigy of Prime Minister Endalkatchew Makonnen. For the first time, they openly called for the formation of a "People's Government." They also asked that their previous demands for "Land to the Tiller" be fulfilled. The demonstrators requested the immediate formation of a provisional administration, the trial of former ministers before a "people's court," worker and peasant representation in the drafting of a new con-

<sup>91</sup>Ké Etiofia University Memeheran Maheber Yewetta Meglecha [Resolution of the Ethiopian University Teachers' Association] (Addis Ababa: Yekatit 26, 1966 [March 6, 1974]). A copy of this document is in the author's possession.

<sup>92</sup>New York Times, March 8, 1974.

stitution. This mass student rally came to an end after a violent clash with the police.<sup>93</sup> Then, on March 12, Dr. Eshetu Cholé and five other university professors were arrested when they were caught while duplicating political pamphlets. Their papers were confiscated by police. On the same day, 200,000 rank and file priests of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, whose status was not much better than their peasant parishioners', threatened a strike, demanding better pay and pension rights "similar to other civil servants."<sup>94</sup> The priests also accused the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Abuna Tewoflos, of entertaining a desire to become "Ethiopia's Makarios."<sup>95</sup>

It is important to note that all these movements and strikes were mainly instigated by the student radicals who had already infiltrated the majority of people's organizations that had mushroomed across the country. As Marina and David Ottaway, correspondents for the Washington Post at the time, point out:

... practically every demonstration by striking CELU [Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions] workers or government employees had its student contingent, both in the capital and in smaller towns like Jimma in the southwest, Dire Dawa in the east, or Mekele in the north.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>93</sup>New York Times, March 12, 1974.

<sup>94</sup>New York Times, March 13, 1974, p. 5.

<sup>95</sup>"To the Air Force, . . . Students, Teachers . . . 'Yéteressa Mastawesha'" [A Reminder], distributed throughout the country on March 12, 1974. It is interesting to see how much the students and the teachers have become important at this stage that people's grievances (from famine victims to oppressed priests) were continuously brought to them.

<sup>96</sup>Ottaway and Ottaway, Empire in Revolution, p. 36.

The movement had also spread to the traditional peasantry.

In the subprovince of Adaa, the students had politicized the Oromo peasants of the region to rise against their Amhara landlords. In the violent rebellion that ensued, several dozen balabats (landlords) were killed and their crops destroyed.

With student agitation spreading like wildfire, rural discontent had changed to militant protest, thus forcing the feudal system to disintegrate at its very foundation. In the Central and Southern Provinces peasants, supported by students, clashed with members of the police force, the provincial government officials and particularly the landlords. In many places, tenants did not wait for the promised agrarian reform. They seized lands by force and refused to pay taxes. Again, supported by student radicals, they drove away corrupt officials, judges and governors from the countryside. All municipalities were forcibly shut down when workers struck demanding higher wages and the removal of unpopular officials. The only exception to this was Gondar<sup>97</sup> where Dr. Seyoum Gebre Igziabher was the Mayor.<sup>98</sup> Strikes had also soon spread to all the ministries.

By the end of March, except for a few air force radicals, who were already neutralized by the army, all military units had kept their

<sup>97</sup>Africa Contemporary Record (1975), p. B173.

<sup>98</sup>It should be noted that Dr. Seyoum Gebre Igziabher was one of the Ethiopian university professors who had helped to publicize the Wollo famine and was as a result sent to Gondar as a form of exile. The fact that workers refused to strike against his administration shows the degree of solidarity already created between the workers and the progressive intelligentsia.

pledge of loyalty to the Haile Selassie regime and the new Endalkatchew cabinet. But student agitation and the workers' militancy continued to expand in scope.

The month of April saw the most widespread strikes in the history of the nation. Industrial workers, students, teachers, civil servants, army veterans, municipal employees, railway personnel, bus drivers, hospital staff, garbage collectors, priests, even Imperial Palace servants went on strike. But at the beginning of the third week of April, except for seeking the arrest of the former ministers, which parliament also demanded, the military had agreed to work in full cooperation with the Endalkatchew cabinet. But the military could not bring the populace into line. On April 20, 1974, with the organizational help of the student radicals, one of the largest demonstrations in the country—100,000 Moslems and their supporters—marched through the capital demanding equal rights with the Christians, rights denied them for over five centuries. The mayor of Addis Ababa was forced out of his office when a huge mass demonstration stormed the municipal building.<sup>99</sup>

On April 26, a newly created Military Coordinating Committee arrested the former ministers, bypassing Haile Selassie. This was necessary because it was a popular demand, from all sectors of the population. It was also an action which Endalkatchew had always wanted to use against Aklilu Habte Wold because of their long rivalry for the prime minister's position. Once agreement had been reached on this

<sup>99</sup>New York Times, April 13 and 21, 1974.

issue, Colonel Alem Zewd Tessema, head of the Military Coordinating Committee warned that strikes and demonstrations would no longer be tolerated by the armed forces. He stated:

The continuation of unlawful demonstrations will create bloodshed, chaos, looting, religious and tribal wars, and would afford an advantage for foreign intervention. The armed forces, which function in accordance with the policies of the government, will not be an idle spectator to these events.<sup>100</sup>

This being done, the Coordinating Committee (a predecessor of the Derg), together with the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, was entrusted by Endalkatchew to take all necessary steps to stem the widening strike throughout the country. Thus, on April 30, a new military unit, called the National Security Commission, was organized under the leadership of General Abiy Abebe, the Minister of Defence. The Military Coordinating Committee and the National Security Commission immediately established a policy not only to stop mass strikes but also to break the backs of all student, teacher, and worker unions. The Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions was warned that if it did not call off the strike then in force, the whole labour confederation would be banned and severe military measures taken against it. As threatened, there ensued a severe crackdown on workers by troops of the Fourth Division. At the end of May there was only a pocket of strikes by telecommunications employees who had staged sit-downs and hunger strikes. But not for long. By the use of brute

<sup>100</sup>

Addis Zemen, Miazia 20, 1966 [April 27, 1974].

force, the armed forces broke this last proletarian enclave, arrested all who organized the strike and brought an uneasy calm to the capital city. The warning that the military gave, loudly and clearly, was that their action would be repeated with more severity, if need be.

It was not until the month of May that the secret Committee of the Armed Forces, now known by its Ge'ez name Derg (committée) had started to emerge. The Derg, also known as the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police and Territorial Army,<sup>101</sup> was organized as a backlash against the unpopularity of Endalkatchew and his delay in bringing former ministers (his former colleagues in the previous government) to trial as demanded by the public and the rank and file of the military forces.

It should be pointed out that at this time "people's committees" were mushrooming all over the country—in government departments as well as in private domains. It was the birth of the first spontaneous grassroots democracy in a nation that knew nothing but feudalism for over a thousand years. The Derg was simply one offshoot of the plethora of mass organizations that were springing up throughout the country.

The difference between workers' committees and the new committee of the soldiers was that while the first were still trying to organize, the latter was by tradition the most well-organized wing of

---

<sup>101</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Information and National Guidance, Ethiopia: Four Years of Revolutionary Process (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1978), p. 20.



the feudal state.<sup>102</sup> Although it had always functioned as an arm of one feudal prince against another, the Ethiopian army had thousands of years of history in political intervention. But most importantly, this time it was well-armed. The major obstacle was the division that Haile Selassie had carefully cultivated and conspicuously encouraged between individuals and groups at all levels. However, since the high officer command was rapidly disappearing and junior officers, NCOs and private soldiers, whose hands had not been tainted in official corruption, whose class origin was generally at the bottom of the social ladder, and whose basic interests were the same as these classes of society, emerged as leaders, that obstacle was removed. In fact, initially the army was not sure what role it should play: power seemed to have suddenly fallen into their hands. The military had never planned for a political takeover.

The Derg, just like the first Military Coordinating Committee, was organized by less ideological but more nationalistic career officer Major Atnafu Abate (later executed by Mengistu), but it excluded all colonels from membership. This eliminated Colonel Alem Zewd, the leader of the first Coordinating Committee, who had become highly unpopular with the public for his cruel crackdowns on striking workers and his close association with Endalkatchew, his close relative. In fact, even when the Derg was being organized, Alem Zewd was besieging the air force base at Bishoftu to subdue the radicals. In a clash that took

<sup>102</sup>This fact is admitted by the Derg itself. See Government of Ethiopia, Government Revolution Centre, Revolutionary Ethiopia Fact Sheet (Addis Ababa: January 1978), p. 10.

place on June 20, 1974, there were twenty-two casualties, mostly air force men.<sup>103</sup>

In June, 1974, the Derg simply stumbled into a virtual power vacuum; it emerged from the vortex and soon discovered that the new government and even the former absolute monarch had come to be wholly dependent on it for their own survival. This explains why, as soon as it was hastily formed (in many units, no formal elections were held), with a membership of 120 representing all units of the armed forces, it started to dictate all future courses of action. The much publicized "creeping coup"<sup>104</sup> of the Derg, supposedly a skilful preplanned operation, we argue, is a myth. Alem Zewd's Coordinating Committee and General Abiy's Military Commission had, we should note, forced most mass movements to change strategies, or at least to avoid direct clashes with the army. And since the feudal rulers were hopelessly divided,<sup>105</sup> and the high-ranking military officers were already detained, there was no need to "creep."

In the months of June and July, the main preoccupation of the secretive Derg members was to determine the manner in which they would guide the nation's future without any radical change. On

<sup>103</sup>"B.B.C. World Broadcast," June 21, 1974.

<sup>104</sup>See, for example, Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), pp. 22-30.

<sup>105</sup>See, for example, the testimony of Prime Minister Aklilu Habte Wold, in which he blamed the Emperor, the Emperor's daughter, the aristocratic elite, and a few of the educated ministers for failing to carry out his wishes and their duties, Addis Zemen, Meskerem 11, 1967 [September 20, 1974].

June 12, 1974, the Emperor attended an OAU meeting in Mogadishu, and returned. On June 26, a member of parliament from Harar, Major Admasu Zeleke, and seven other parliamentarians, went to the Fourth Division headquarters, where the Derg was based, and asked a rally of 2,000 soldiers to release the twenty-five ministers arrested previously, including former prime minister Aklilu Habte Wold. The Derg, despite still being in an early and formative stage, was already in control of the major section of the security service, and had had reports that the old "Lion of Judah," supported by the new ambitious Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, had decided to gamble on a political comeback.<sup>106</sup> The alleged plot was to fly an unidentified general to Nairobi, Kenya, engage armed men, and make a surprise attack on the Derg during its general meeting.

Blatta Admassu Retta, Keeper of the Royal Privy Purse, was, the reports alleged, sent to military units with a suitcase full of money to bribe supporters and pave the way for a counter-revolutionary coup, to be staged by the Emperor and the traditional forces. General Assefa Demisse, the Emperor's ADC, and Solomon Gebre Mariam, the Private Secretary of the Negus, were also preparing imperial land grant "certificates" to loyalist army officers, NCOs and soldiers.

Alarmed by these reports, the Derg decided to take action. It immediately arrested all the alleged plotters and almost all the prominent personalities in the previous feudal establishment. About 200

<sup>106</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Provisional Military Administrative Council, Yétigil Me'eraf [Chapter of Struggle] (Addis Ababa: Artistic Press, 1975), pp. 1-40.

people were taken into custody in the first round alone. Those detained included Minister of Defence General Abiy Abebe, and the Emperor's grandson and former Deputy Commander of the Imperial Navy, Rear Admiral Iskender Desta. Only two resisted arrest—the Enqu Selassie brothers; Tsehayu Enqu Selassie was killed fighting arrest, while Tadesse Enqu Selassie was captured and later executed.

On July 2, 1974, the Derg went to the palace to present several demands to the Emperor. Although this action seemed to be merely ritual, since Haile Selassie had already been stripped of power for all practical purposes, one should not forget the fact that he still wielded traditional authority over the masses of illiterate peasants in the North and Amhara Neftegnas [Armed Colons] in the South. The questions put to the Emperor were basically popular demands which the Derg thought would win the public to its side: the arrest and trial of former officials accused of corruption and a coverup of the Wollo famine, the release of all political prisoners, the right of political exiles to return to their country, the speedy drafting of a new constitution, the appointment of the popular general Aman Mikael Andom (a native of Eritrea) as the Army Chief of Staff, and the right of the Derg to work in close contact with the civilian cabinet. Haile Selassie agreed to all their demands including the arrests, except that he grudgingly accepted the internment of his grandson, Iskender. And this was to be a fateful decision for the Negus. The misjudgement Haile Selassie made was in readily acceding to the military's demand for the incarceration of his aristocratic colleagues who had a hidden cache of arms, who

had gained experience in guerrilla tactics during the Italian occupation and who could have aided him in a counter coup. In fact, Haile Selassie personally urged some to return from their underground hiding places. His strategy was based on the apparent expectation that he would again be in control of the situation and punish the rebels for treason. This was supposed to be a repeat of an incident over half a century earlier when, complying with the demands of political rebels against his regency, he dismissed all his ministers; then after the explosive situation was successfully diffused, he slowly succeeded in purging the ringleaders. All, including Fitawurary Merdassa Joté, one of the radicals who was thinking of another coup to overthrow Tafari, were later confined to life imprisonment where they eventually died. Haile Selassie must have forgotten that things had changed greatly within the previous half century. He had also neglected to take into account the fact that the rebel soldiers and their civilian advisers had already been familiar with his age-old tactics.<sup>107</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup>Not surprisingly, an insider who had spent his childhood and adult years in the palace, Dejazmatch Kebbede Tesemma, brought up Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam where the latter's mother worked as a maid servant. The Dejazmatch knew all the court intrigues from the 1910s to the 1970s. He was an Ifign Askelkay (butler) to Queen Zawditu until her death in 1930 and was a close confidant of Haile Selassie for a long time (in 1974 he was the Emperor's Minister of the Palace). Mengistu was highly groomed under Kebbede and was already a seasoned politician when power fell into the military's hands; hence his great influence among the rebel soldiers when, due to lack of leaders, they were on the verge of being the victims of a counterrevolution, and his success of uniting them with resolve. His abilities to survive so many of the power struggles within military circles and even organized political attacks of the civilian opposition is also a result of this childhood influence. Just five years previous to Haile Selassie's overthrow, Mengistu's mentor, Dejazmatch Kebbede, had published the revolt of the 1920s in which Abba Wukaw, Commander of the Mahal Safari [the Standing Army] and Fitawurary Merdassa Joté of Wollega had played leading roles. Until then, only insiders knew what had really taken place. See Dejazmatch Kebbede Tesemma, Yetarik Mastawesha (Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1969), pp. 57-63.

After the leading aristocrats and former ministers were interned, with Haile Selassie's tacit approval, the Derg made a series of additional arrests. In a few days, sixty-one more aristocrats, including provincial governors, generals and other high-ranking military and police officials, were taken into custody.<sup>108</sup>

At this stage, it can be seen that the politicizing efforts of the students and teachers were paying off. The military was for the first time taking major political decisions. Nevertheless, they were still loyal to Haile Selassie and his crown.

In the course of this major political exercise, the Derg was debating in secret sessions the possible courses of action which could be taken to shape the country's future political system. Several options were considered. According to the official history of the Derg they had to decide among the following:

1. Reforming the existing cabinet and removing all obstacles within and outside it while retaining His Imperial Majesty's throne.
2. Replacing entirely the existing cabinet with a new one while retaining His Imperial Majesty's throne.
3. Replacing the civilian administration with a military government while retaining His Imperial Majesty's throne.
4. Setting up a civilian-military coalition government, which is independent of the Crown while retaining His Imperial Majesty's throne.

---

<sup>108</sup> Addis Zemen, Nehase, 1966 [August 3, 7, 1974].

5. Abolishing the monarchy, reforming the existing cabinet under a provisional military government to prepare the people for an eventual transfer of power to a representative people's government.
6. Installing a military government by abolishing the Crown and Cabinet altogether.
7. Instituting a representative popular government by abolishing the Crown and the Cabinet altogether.<sup>109</sup>

The Derg officially claims that it decided to work not only with one, but with three options, starting with option 1, followed by option 5, and culminating in option 7. But the fact that today, eight years later, the regime, instead of preparing a way for a representative popular government as stipulated in option 7, is attempting to form a party based not on mass organizations but comprised of individuals carefully chosen by the Derg shows that the adoption of the last option was a moot question. What is clear is that to consolidate its position, the Derg started to move towards more and more political activities. On July 9, it announced its political program of Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First), which was not radical but nationalistic in tune. Most importantly, the Derg reiterated its pledge to Haile Selassie and the Crown.<sup>110</sup>

On July 15, however, there appeared a shift in policy. The Derg announced:

---

<sup>109</sup> Government of Ethiopia, Provisional Military Administrative Council, Yétigil Mé'eraf, pp. 1-40.

<sup>110</sup> Addis Zemen, Hamle, 1966 [July 9, 1974].

We are not interested in power . . . but the Armed Forces would not return to the barracks without accomplishing their mission of ensuring the implementation of fundamental reforms that would transform the country. <sup>111</sup>

On July 22, the Emperor, as titular Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, announced the appointment of a new prime minister—Oxford-educated Lij Mikael Emeru, son of the "Red" Ras Emeru, known for his Fabian socialist leanings. To satisfy the students, teachers, and workers, Endalkatchew was detained on August 11 and accused of "devious conduct, plotting to get the Derg members liquidated, and of non-enthusiasm for their new program of Ethiopia Tikdem." He thus joined his former colleagues whom he had ordered arrested while prime minister.

However, changing Endalkatchew to Mikael Emeru was not accepted by the radical students and teachers. They immediately started to attack the new prime minister and his cabinet. One pamphlet originating among the student and teacher movements was entitled "How Long Under the Government of the Lijoch." There was a "wax and gold" pun on the word lijoch, which meant both "children" and "offspring of the aristocracy." Both Endalkatchew and Mikael Emeru carried the title Lij, with the latter connotation. This particular pamphlet made a virulent attack on the Derg for the course of action they had taken. It also severely attacked the Emperor and his absolute monarchy. It stated:

The Derg, which promised the people to rescue it from the clutches of the aristocracy, has reneged. The workers and the peasants are now

---

<sup>111</sup> Addis Zemen, Hamle, 1966 [July 16, 1974].



therefore preparing for the next struggle....  
 An old broom cannot clean a dirty house....  
 The only thing that would sweep it clean is  
 only the emerging people's revolution....

The Ethiopian masses are saying enough to  
 feudal rule. They are demanding their free-  
 dom. They are asking for their land. They  
 are waiting for employment. They are watch-  
 ing with apparent alarm the Derg which  
 claims to have been born from the people's  
 ranks, but is appointing a series of robbers  
 to rule over them. They are saying that  
 'people' does not only mean military, and  
 that therefore they should participate in deter-  
 mining the future of their own lives. They  
 are saying let us choose our leaders to-  
 gether. The revolutionary ire of the poor  
 masses has boiled over and soon the people's  
 anger will engulf the reactionary feudal order.  
 No guns, no lijoch, no feudal princes would  
 stop them. What the oppressed people want  
 is true democracy. And for this, they will  
 fight to the end....

The masses will overcome! The govern-  
 ment of the Lijoch will fall! Government of  
 the people, by the people and for the people  
 will be established! Ethiopia will be first!<sup>112</sup>

What the students, the teachers, and their radical civilian and  
 military supporters were demanding of the Derg was a multi-party state.  
 The strategy was clear. They aimed to bring the contradictions of the  
 society into the fore.

Then, to appease the public, the Derg ordered a commission  
 of inquiry to be established. Two of its members were well-known pro-

---

<sup>112</sup> A copy of this document, entitled "Eskéméché Yélijoch  
 Mengist" [How Long Under the Government of the Aristocrats], dis-  
 tributed on August 5, 1974, is in the author's possession. See also,  
 Ethiopian Students and Teachers, "Tatbo Chika: Tiglu Yiketital" [Step  
 Backwards: The Struggle Will Continue] (Addis Ababa, Hamlé 16, 1966  
 [July 30, 1974]).

gressives: Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam, and Dr. Bereket Ab Habte Selassie. The former was appointed chairman. This commission was to decide the fate of the political detainees who had been accused of neglecting to discharge their responsibilities, and who "in good faith and in an upright manner, enriched themselves, and unlawfully committed judicial and administrative harm."<sup>113</sup>

The official government gazette which was issued on June 12, and determined the powers under which the officials would be tried, was still coming out under the name of the Emperor. It was issued under the orders of "the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Haile Selassie I, Elect of God, Emperor of Ethiopia."<sup>114</sup> This was despite the fact that students and teachers were still agitating for the removal of the Emperor and all the vestiges of feudalism.

The writing of the constitution, which was launched immediately after Endalkatchew's cabinet was formed, was still being debated and drawn up by liberal Ethiopian specialists.<sup>115</sup> On completion, the draft, which was approved by parliament, proposed the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, the disestablishment of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (while still retaining the traditional place of the Monophysite

<sup>113</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Pen, Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation No. 326 of 1966 [1974].

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>For details, See Ethiopian Herald, "Ethiopia Drafts Democratic Constitution," August 10, 1974. For public commentaries on the content of the draft, see Addis Zemen, "Sélé Higé Méngistu Rekik Hizbu Min Yilal?" ["What do People Say about the Draft Constitution?"], Nehase 22, 1966 [July 29, 1974].

Christianity as state religion). All crown lands were to be state property. There was to be a bicameral parliament with the lower house elected by adult franchise. The prime minister was to be elected by parliament, to which he would be responsible. An independent judiciary was to replace the Emperor's appointed courts. There would be no chilot (Imperial Appeals Court).

The Derg had now two options. Either it had to accept the new draft, hand over power to civilians and return to the barracks, or it had to dismiss, however ceremoniously, the new constitution, and stay in power. But an official involved in the drafting, Bereket Ab Habte Selassie, points out that the soldiers had already "found the exercise of the combined powers of emperor and prime minister too exciting."<sup>116</sup> They did not even want to make the draft public; they did so only at the insistence of the members of the Constitutional Commission.

When the document was published on August 10, 1974, in national newspapers, the Derg, which was initially ambiguous on the whole issue, adopted the strategy of allowing an open discussion concerning the future of the monarchy in Ethiopia. This gave an opportunity to the anti-feudalists and anti-monarchist students, teachers, and many educated civilians to air their views.

All the criticisms had a cutting edge, and once the mood of the progressive student and civilian rebels who started to roll the wheel

<sup>116</sup>Bereket Ab Habte Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa, p. 29.

of the revolution in the first place was measured, the Derg decided to take their platform away from them. All the Emperor's former associates, including his closest palace servants, were arrested.<sup>117</sup> The Derg then set to uproot the major institutions of Haile Selassie's imperial power. On August 16, the Derg abolished the Crown Council and the Emperor's own Appeals Court, the Chilot. It also abolished the office of Chief-of-Staff in the Emperor's private cabinet. The following day, the commander of the Imperial Bodyguard, General Assefa, was arrested. On August 24, the Office of the Emperor's Exchequer was removed. The following day, the Jubilee Palace, which had been the Emperor's main residence since the abortive 1960 coup, was nationalized and renamed the "National Palace."<sup>118</sup> On August 26, the National Resources Commission, which looked after the Emperor's private holdings to finance gifts and favours, was removed, and attached to the Ministry of Finance.

The government-controlled press simultaneously orchestrated a barrage of direct attacks on the monarchy, and on the Emperor in person. It opened its columns to all opponents of the Emperor and the Crown. Critics then questioned the principles in the 1930 and 1955 constitutions which put the Emperor above the law, and accused him of treason for not defending the country and instead abandoning the people and taking refuge abroad during the Fascist occupation.<sup>119</sup> The

<sup>117</sup>New York Times, August 10, 1974.

<sup>118</sup>For further details, see Addis Zemen, Hamle 25 to Nehasse 20 [August 3 to August 25, 1974].

<sup>119</sup>Addis Zemen, Nehasse 22, 1966 [August 29, 1974].

government press attacked Haile Selassie for unlawfully enriching himself through various business ventures, including part ownership of the largest bus service, as well as the major brewery in the country, the St. George Beer Company.<sup>120</sup> It publicized the huge land holdings of the imperial family, holdings second in size only to those of the Church, which owned one third of the land in the entire country.

One popular item in the anti-Haile Selassie publicity campaign was the Emperor's Chihuahua, "Lulu." The small pet, which was a constant companion to the Emperor, had attracted great attention both at home and abroad. There were even Court dej-tegnis (job seekers) who were said to address "Lulu" with the Amharic equivalent of the French - "vous." During the Emperor's visit to Expo '67 in Montreal, Canadian national papers such as The Montreal Star and The Gazette carried articles about the imperial Chihuahua.<sup>121</sup> Waiters at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel where Haile Selassie stayed used to compete to clean up the carpet which Lulu spoiled since they got \$200 tips for their services. At the 2,500 year anniversary of the Iranian National Celebration at Persepolis, "Lulu" was the major attraction among the world's notables because she wore a collar studded with \$100,000 worth of diamonds around her neck.<sup>122</sup> She led a long life sitting comfortably on the royal lap until she died in 1972. According to eyewitness reports, courtiers,

<sup>120</sup>Addis Zemen, Page 1, 1966 [September 4, 1974].

<sup>121</sup>See, for example, The Gazette, June 20, 1967, and The Montreal Star, June 21, 1967.

<sup>122</sup>See Life Magazine, November 1971, p. 20.

including the Emperor's grandson, Prince Iskender, were said to have cried as an Ethiopian would when the nearest of kin passes away. Lulu was ceremoniously buried on the palace grounds and a fine headstone was erected on her grave. The Emperor was particularly attacked for building marble statues for "Lulu" and feeding his live dogs with choice meat, while hundreds of thousands of Wollo peasants starved to death. The government television station broadcast pictures of the Emperor feeding his dog, and a close-up of the chihuahua's tombstone. The inscription on the stone read, "To Lulu—Our Beloved Dog. He has been with Us in Europe, Latin America, and Asia."

Then, when the personal attack on Haile Selassie became more and more vigorous, some already demanding his immediate removal and his speedy trial by a people's court, the Derg blew the whistle on the campaign. In mid-August, it ordered that "no slanderous personal attacks" on the Emperor should be made. It was again taking a respite in order to weigh public opinion, especially that of the majority of the rural population, who, many experts thought, were still loyal to Haile Selassie. But there were no protests.

In the meantime, the agitation by students, teachers, and growing numbers of anti-feudalist and anti-monarchist educated Ethiopians, and by old patriots who felt neglected by Haile Selassie during the previous three decades, continued unabated. Then, on August 28, the Emperor was directly linked to the coverup of the Wollo famine when a former governor of the province, Mamo Seyoum, testified at the proceedings of the special commission of inquiry that he had warned the

country's highest officials, including the Emperor, as early as 1970 that famine might affect large numbers of the Wollo population, but that the Prime Minister, the Crown Prince, and the Emperor ignored the warning and refused to give directives to meet the emergency.<sup>123</sup>

Even after this damaging testimony, the Derg was still undecided as to what course of action to take concerning the Negus. On September 3, however, a crowd of students paraded on the streets of Addis Ababa shouting, "Haile Selassie is a thief!" and "Hang Haile Selassie!" The Derg gave stern warnings against any such public protests against the Emperor.<sup>124</sup> But it had also observed that, contrary to what had been expected, there was no public outcry at the students' actions. The popularity of the Negus had already been eroded. The Sword of Damocles was hanging over his throne.

The Derg, which had always followed the students—always one step behind, but immediately coming to accept their platform before they passed to the next stage, held a marathon secret meeting from September 6 to 9 and after a lengthy debate, decided on dethroning Haile Selassie.

At this stage, the students and radicals, some in the Derg already won to their side, demanded a trial. The question at this stage was whether the Derg could charge the ministers with a responsibility

---

<sup>123</sup>Addis Zemen, Nehasse 21, 1966 [August 26, 1974].

<sup>124</sup>For details about the phases through which the revolution was passing, see Ethiopian Students Union in Europe, Tiglachin, No. 1, Tekemt, 1967 [October, 1974].

which was collective, try, incarcerate or execute them for hushing up the Wollo famine, or for committing other crimes, but ignore Haile Selassie's part in all of these actions.

In order to gain the radicals' support and legitimate its power, the Derg did consider a public trial. But it refrained from taking action when it realized that if Haile Selassie's popularity had virtually disappeared at home, it was still intact in Africa and the West.<sup>125</sup> Warnings came from friendly African nations that the Emperor should not be harmed.<sup>126</sup> Even progressive leaders such as Julius Nyerere had shown their concern, and among the usually hostile members of the Arab League, President Jaafar Numiery of Sudan had stated that Haile Selassie was "not just an Ethiopian: he belongs to Africa."<sup>127</sup> Several nations, including the Sudan, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Cameroon, also offered him asylum. But even before the Derg's decision, which would possibly have been negative, was known, Haile Selassie told the few foreigners remaining in the country, among whom were some International Red

<sup>125</sup> Haile Selassie's popularity in the West went back to the days of the League of Nations in the 1930s. For example, Edward Ullendorff, one of the most respected authorities on Ethiopia, wrote in 1976, "I have admired Emperor Haile Selassie for 40 years from a distance as well as at close quarters and may thus be forgiven if I am emotionally incapable of joining the rats which are now forsaking the proud ship as it threatens to founder." Translator's preface, The Autobiography of Emperor Haile Selassie, 1892-1937 (trans. E. Ullendorff), p. xiv. See also Peter Schwab, Haile Selassie I Ethiopia's Lion of Judah (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1979), pp. 101-114.

<sup>126</sup> Africa magazine also pointed out that "Haile Selassie was always regarded with a certain indulgence in other parts of the continent." Africa, November 1974, p. 18.

<sup>127</sup> Africa Contemporary Record (1975), p. B179.



Cross officials, "I am an old man, and I have been in exile once in my life; I have no desire to become an exile again."<sup>128</sup>

From then on, what followed was simply a matter of formalities, but the Derg had to make sure that there was no attempt to revive the Emperor's position; they had already made him a virtual prisoner in the palace. The radicals' campaign against the Emperor now went unopposed. Leaflets posted on Haile Selassie Avenue showed the Emperor's photographs taken while he was feeding pieces of choice meat to his dogs from a silver tray. Pictures of starving peasants were then put alongside these photographs. Some people displayed the Emperor's caricatures from car windows; the caricatures depicted the Emperor as a wolf in Lion's clothing. Others had his head surmounting a "Belsen" skeleton. It was at this time that the Derg started to move to catch up with the students' demands. On September 11, the Emperor's only surviving daughter and his closest personal adviser during the last years of his reign, Princess Tenagne Work Haile Selassie, was arrested. And on the same evening, there was a figurative "hanging" of the Emperor on radio and television. The Ethiopian National Television network showed the British journalist Jonathan Dimbleby's film on the Wollo famine which had previously been smuggled out of the country with the help of sympathetic Ethiopian students and teachers. The documentary, entitled "The Hidden Famine," showed the starving children, men and women of Wollo in mid-1973. Many Ethiopians in the capital, who had never previously understood the magnitude of the disaster, were said

---

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

to have burst into tears.<sup>129</sup> For political purposes, the film was interspersed with pictures of the Emperor and his officials in real life. They were shown sipping champagne, and eating caviar. The Negus, who was also shown feeding beef to his dogs from a silver tray, was forced to watch the program.

Colin Legum, who was in Addis Ababa at the time, wrote:

It was the kind of show which, if there had been TV in the days of Henry the Eighth, might have been seen by Englishmen: the picture of a patronage society in which the great King and his nobles and courtiers, who, having profited richly from their service in a war against foreign invaders, in extending the realms of the kingdom and in suppressing the King's enemies, had shared out the land among themselves; who imposed a system of landlordism over the peasants, built up vast estates and feasted lavishly in palaces while a starving countryside was fed on speeches about the monarch's love for 'our' people.' We were shown a locally-made film of the disastrous famine in the Wollo province in which an estimated 200,000 peasants died and another 1,000,000 were brought to ruin.

Shots of Belsen-like skeletons were interspersed with scenes of extravagant champagne receptions in the emperor's palace, at a time when people in Wollo were dying like flies. One sequence showed the ostentatious wedding of a nobleman's daughter, at which the centrepiece of the feast was a wedding cake, flown out from England and reputed to have cost £1,250.<sup>130</sup>

---

<sup>129</sup> Addis Zemen, "Tenant Addis Abeba," [Addis Ababa Yesterday], Meskerem 3, 1967 [September 12, 1974].

<sup>130</sup> The nobleman in question was Ras Asrate Kassa, former chairman of the Crown Council. The author has also learned that E\$1 million worth of gifts were given by the aristocracy to the bride. Interview with Mrs. Tsehai, wife of the former Ethiopian Ambassador to Canada, Ato Dawit Abdo, in 1970—Mrs. Tsehai was one of the women entrusted with the collection of the gifts.

The cake, we were told, had broken in transit, and had cost the insurers hundreds of pounds to repair.<sup>131</sup>

In addition, there was a massive indictment of the Emperor: that during his lifetime the Emperor had impoverished the nation by illegally appropriating over 2 billion pounds sterling and stashing it in gold bars in his private vault in a Swiss bank.<sup>132</sup>

The final hours came when, on September 12, 1974, the Derg announced the following over the national radio:

Considering that, although the people of Ethiopia look in good faith upon the Crown, which has persisted for a long period in Ethiopian history as a symbol of unity, Haile Selassie I, who has ruled this country for more than fifty years ever since he assumed power as Crown Prince, has not only left the country in its present crisis by abusing at various times the high and dignified authority conferred on him by the Ethiopian people but also, being over 82 years of age and due to the consequent physical and mental exhaustion, is no more able to shoulder the high responsibilities of leadership; . . .

Realizing that the Constitution of 1955 was prepared to confer on the Emperor absolute powers; that it does not safeguard democratic rights but merely serves as a democratic façade for the benefit of world public opinion; that it was not conceived to serve the interests of the Ethiopian people; that it was designed to give the baseless impression that fundamental natural rights are gifts from the Emperor to his people; and that, above all,

---

<sup>131</sup>Legum, "The Night They 'Hanged' Selassie," p. 10.

<sup>132</sup>It was also charged that as one Swiss bank vault could not handle the quantity of gold bars, a large amount was sold and deposited in secret charge accounts. See Addis Zemen, Meskerem 3, 1967 [September 12, 1974] and Ethiopian Herald, "Ex-Emperor Refuses to Bring Back Fortune," September 12, 1974.

it is inconsistent with the popular movement in progress under the motto 'Ethiopia Tikdem' [Ethiopia First] and with the fostering of economic, political and social development; and

Believing that the ill effects of the past aristocratic rule have thrown the country into an abyss of economic, social and political problems; that it has become necessary to establish a strong provisional administration dedicated to serve the public good and capable of developing Ethiopia and coping with the various security problems prevailing at this transitional period; It is hereby proclaimed as follows:

Haile Selassie I is hereby deposed as of today, September 12, 1974.<sup>133</sup>

The proclamation pointed out that there would be a constitutional monarchy, that Crown Prince Asfa Wossen Haile Selassie would ascend the throne as "King of Ethiopia" with no powers in the country's administrative and political affairs. It also added that parliament was suspended and that the

... armed forces, the police and territorial army have hereby assumed full government power until a legally constituted people's assembly approves a new constitution and a government is duly established.<sup>134</sup>

On the morning of September 12, 1974, a small group of junior army officers and NCOs were sent to the palace to announce the dethronement to the Emperor. But despite the damaging evidence against him, the image the Emperor had built over half a century was hard for some military men to ignore; their political consciousness

<sup>133</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Provisional Military Administrative Council, "Awaj" [Proclamation], Negarit Gazeta, No. 1/1967 [1974]. See also, Addis Zemen, Meskerem 3, 1967 [September 12, 1974], and the Ethiopian Herald, September 12, 1974. For the verbatim Deposition Proclamation, see Appendix IV.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid.

was far behind those of the students and teachers who were still on the streets clamouring for the trial and execution of the Negus. According to eye-witness reports, the hands of the officer reading the proclamation were shaking uncontrollably and some of the junior officers present could not witness the event. They broke into tears and left the room.<sup>135</sup>

Haile Selassie, who had proclaimed in his 1930 and 1955 constitutions that "by virtue of His imperial blood as well as by the anointing He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is inviolable and His power indisputable," was unceremoniously led out of the palace into a small Volkswagen and driven a short distance to the headquarters of the army's Fourth Division amidst cries from student demonstrators of "Thief! Thief! Hang Haile Selassie!"<sup>136</sup> The Negus was then incarcerated in a humble korkoro bet (a small wattle and daub hut with a tin roof).

Thus came to an end the era of Menelik's and Haile Selassie's modernizing feudalism that the young intelligentsia, produced in the western school system, had vowed to topple. A Jesuit priest has

---

<sup>135</sup> Recounted to the author by Mr. Iyob on July 7, 1976. Iyob was very close to Colonel Mengistu Habte Mariam before "Meison" broke alliance with the Derg and went underground. He has since been killed in a clash with the police forces of the military regime. See infra, p. 506.

<sup>136</sup> Valentin Korokikov, who was in Addis Ababa at the time, reported that "Boys ran alongside the Volkswagen, some of them even beating it with sticks. The crowd pelted the car with coins bearing the image of the Emperor." Ethiopia: Years of Revolution (Moscow: Novosty Press Agency Publishing House, 1979), p. 30. See also Valdez Vivo, Ethiopian Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1977), pp. 15-19; and Afrique-Asie, December 23, 1973 to October 6, 1974, p. 24.

described how, in 1945, when Haile Selassie summoned Lucien Matte and his team of French Canadian Jesuits to open modern schools in Ethiopia, he had cried at the feudal emperor's comments, which he had thought prophetic. Haile Selassie had said, "L'education est contre nous-même!"<sup>137</sup> Hence, the emperor must have known that modernization and feudalism could never be reconciled, and that the end of his one-man rule was inevitable. The precise reasons for his decision to continue to pilot the feudal ship of state, knowing well the consequences, may be investigated by future scholars, but being both a feudal state's leader and a conservative politician, Haile Selassie had no choice but to go down with his sinking institution. In all this process, however, the armed forces' role was simply one of delivering a coup de grâce to an ailing political system which was crumbling and already in its death throes. The system was, for too long, the target of a series of attenuating forays—violent and non-violent—which the Western educated youth outside the military had unleashed with the determined purpose of its eventual overthrow. Indeed, in that sense, the civilian educated youth—mostly students and teachers—were Haile Selassie's nemesis. And that had to be. In the dialectics of a political system which is autocratic in orientation, educated people may be easy to govern with but hard to govern, easy to drive with but hard to drive. Haile Selassie had said in 1930, "We need European progress because We are surrounded by it. That is at once a benefit and a misfortune. It will expedite our develop-

<sup>137</sup> Recounted to the author by Grum Tesfaye, a member of the Society of Jesus, in Montreal, December 5, 1981.

ment but We are afraid of being swamped by it."<sup>138</sup> Since the Negus did not move along with the changes in motion and ignored many of the challenges associated with modernization, he was ultimately swamped by it. And, as would be expected, this cost him his throne.<sup>139</sup> But, if for the Negus it was a question of losing his throne, for Ethiopia it was an entirely different matter. The event closed a long chapter in the annals of a millenium-year-old feudal rule and signalled a way towards the opening of a new epoch in the history of this ancient land.

---

<sup>138</sup> Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia 1800-1935 (Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie University Press, 1968), p. 27; see also the Ethiopian Herald, March 9, 1971, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>139</sup> The Emperor's death was announced by the Derg in 1975. It was during a period of constant turmoil when the question of who would fill Haile Selassie's vacuum was still unsettled. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party had already declared war on the military and their supporters. The Pro-monarchist Ethiopian Democratic Union was getting an important foothold in the Provinces of Tigré and Gondar. The nationality movements of the Somalis in the East, the Oromos in the South and particularly the Eritreans in the North were gaining strength day by day. There were widespread rumours that some right wing factions might stage a daring attempt to abduct Haile Selassie from his Palace prison and use him as a rallying point for the conservatives in the country to launch a successful counterrevolution. Although the Emperor's death was anti-climactic, the circumstances under which he died were not adequately explained. The Derg's announcement was that he died of old age and post-operative complications. The government had also announced that his private doctor was in Asmara and was not available when called to help the ailing ex-Emperor. Two prominent Ethiopian doctors who, for obvious reasons, do not want their names divulged, and who were close to Dr. Asrat, Haile Selassie's private physician, have told this author that Dr. Asrat was furious over the announcement, since he was not outside of Addis Ababa. It is also not known if any other doctor was in attendance. Nevertheless, considering his very old age (84) and his failing health, this author believes that the Negus died a natural death.

## CONCLUSION

We started the investigation of the relationship between education, educated elites and political processes in Ethiopia with the notion that Ethiopia has a unique status in the international community because of its long period of independence and the subsequent isolationism which shielded and preserved its age-old feudal system. As pointed out, modern exigencies forced Emperors Menelik and Haile Selassie to introduce Western education into the country and set in motion the process of modernization from 1905 onwards. But the modernization they introduced was to run parallel to feudalism and was not aimed at supplanting the existing system. This inevitably created a clearly discernible dialectical process fuelled by the apparent co-existence of two contradictory social forces, namely, the new order and the old.

The contradictions between these forces are not hard to observe. Feudalism, by its very nature, presupposes lord-vassal relationships where seignorial and manorial rights of the lord are recognized and he is entitled by traditional conventions to exercise a high degree of authority over peasants farming his land. Modernization presupposes the creation of appropriate participatory institutions for channelling temporal power to be shared and channelled through a more efficient bureaucratic decision-making process. Feudalism as a political system is highly personalized and makes no divisions between the political functions of the institution of the monarchy at the apex of the political pyramid. Modernization requires the bridging of



political communications from several quarters and the distribution of policy decisions through modern institutions; it also requires the transfer of ultimate loyalty from the monarch to the nation-state. Feudalism is characterized by huge land holdings of a powerful aristocratic class and the granting of fiefs to subjects in return for loyalty and service to the monarch. Modernization requires the creation of political legitimacy for new elites or a meritocracy who may not own land but who, nevertheless, draw significant benefits from their education and acquired skills. The list is by no means exhaustive.

That the stimulus for Menelik's and Haile Selassie's decision to introduce Western education into Ethiopia was spurred by the Japanese success in adopting Western methods and industrializing their country has already been explained. However, both emperors had missed the fundamental differences in the socio-political traditions of these two old nation-states.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, those who suggested, and this includes many

<sup>1</sup>It may be useful to point out at this juncture that in Japan, the industrialization drive and the introduction of Western education came about as a political revolution—state power being centralized in the Meiji Court. Although Haile Selassie had also attempted to do just that, the structure and traditions of Ethiopian feudal society was fundamentally different from that of the Japanese. In Ethiopia, association with business as well as craft was despised and all those connected with these professions were looked down upon. This explains why the country's first industries and business enterprises were almost wholly monopolized by foreigners—Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, and Indians. In Japan, on the other hand, there was a significant merchant class even before the 1868 Meiji Restoration. This class carried out inter-regional trade and produced and controlled a great deal of indigenous craft and business. Furthermore, it was drawn from the Samurai—a class highly respected in the society. Japanese modernization, therefore, depended on traditional business elite unlike that of Ethiopia which hinged on the gentry. In Japan, those who held prestige and power did not hold their property in land since the Meiji land settlement had freed the peasants of servitude to their landlords by compensating the latter with government bonds. The bonds were, in turn, heavily invested in banking and major industrial enterprises.

Western-educated Ethiopians of the earlier generation, that Ethiopian traditional rulers could modernize the country without serious societal strains that might lead to revolution were clearly wrong. Feudalism and modernization are by their very nature incongruous and cannot live side by side without creating fissures in the body-politic. As already pointed out, even Haile Selassie seemed to have realized the long-range consequences early in his reign.

In order to trace the historical development that led to the fall of the feudal regime in 1974, the writer has employed a historical-political approach and has shown that the role of the educated intelligentsia in overthrowing a monarch or even a dynasty was not a new phenomenon, but rather a continuation of the role played by the traditional Ethiopian intelligentsia—known as the Debteras who were church educated.

Traditional power in Ethiopia involved the tripartite relationship of the monarchy, the church, and the Debteras. By virtue of being the custodian of the institution of education, the church supplied the monarchy not only with its pen, but also with its interpreters and justifiers of political legitimacy. In this sense, the educated had dual dependence. On the one hand, they hinged on the ecclesiastical hierarchy as a conduit to the secular powers. On the other hand, they aspired to win the favours of the secular powers from whom they received land grants which, through its pecuniary and symbolic values, gave them better status than the peasants from whose ranks they were largely drawn. In turn, the Debteras served the feudal monarchs and aristo-

crats in interpreting to the masses of the uneducated peasantry, the rulers' actions in terms of customary, historical and religious ideas. This symbolic explanation assured the legitimacy of the feudal power structure.

Despite the fact that to a certain degree the triple power relationship between the monarchy, the church and the Debteras was asymmetrical in favour of the monarchy, the Debteras had an important ideological role to play in the Ethiopian body politic, for dynasties have fallen and risen through their direct political machinations. However, one very important point to bear in mind is that all the time, feudalism was untouched; a change in monarchies and dynasties did not mean a change in systems. This, we stress, was the fundamental difference. The 1974 event was a mass movement which challenged and succeeded to tear apart a millenium-old system at its roots. The previous ones did not. In other words, whereas the former ones were coup d'états, the latter was a political revolution.

With modern education came a new power relationship. As we showed with reference to Ethiopian political history, starting from Emperor Tewodros, whose experiment in opening Ethiopia to Westernization was cut short by his death at the battle of Makdala in 1868, Ethiopian monarchs had a strong desire to create a modernizing autocracy. The first ruler to embark fully on this course was Emperor Menelik, followed by Haile Selassie. Both relied heavily on Western-type schools to produce a new type of intelligentsia and establish a

modern state. With the new intelligentsia came a new type of power relationship. By losing their traditional monopoly on education during the long reign of Haile Selassie, the church and the traditionally-educated elite were, for all practical purposes, out of the political equation. The aristocracy which was enfeebled by Haile Selassie's centralization efforts was later almost wholly liquidated during the Fascist occupation. The monopoly of education now passed mainly to Britain and the United States who used it as a conduit for cultural penetration. Thus, the modern power relationship included: a) the monarchy, b) the Western Metropolitan nations of Britain and the United States, and c) the new intelligentsia. The central assumption when this study was undertaken was that the intrinsic contradictions between the values of metropolitan political systems to which the Ethiopian intelligentsia were exposed and the political realities of a modernizing autocracy, triggered the Ethiopian revolution, and led to the fall of Haile Selassie in December, 1974.

We have advanced several hypotheses in our analysis, to lay a groundwork for the proper understanding of the Ethiopian revolution. In the process, we have shown that there is a strong correlation between education and revolution. This study has further indicated that the economic structure and the social relations of education, the form and content of education and the mode of production in Ethiopia were linked. The reason was that there was no balance between social sciences and technical training. The regime consistently favoured

social sciences, disciplines that would create high level intellectuals to modernize feudalism from the top and not fundamentally transgress its character and structurally transform it. Education in feudal Ethiopia was elitist, male oriented and attempted to Amharize the entire Ethiopian population. And as the "Education Sector Review" rightly pointed out, it also neglected eighty percent of the rural masses. When the authorities came to redress this problem, however, it was too late; the attempt to solve the problem at the expense of the Ethiopian teachers who were already alienated and were on the verge of revolt simply sharpened the existing contradictions. It neglected the fact that Ethiopian students' and teachers' struggle for educational reform was inextricably linked with the struggle to democratize the economic life of their country. This seems to prove that problems characterised as students' or teachers' revolt in Third World countries emanate not from the school as such but from the contradictions of the workings of the political system within which the institution itself is located. It also proved that an autocratic dependent state is not monolithic but contradictory since it also carries within itself progressive elements which may propel it towards an eventual revolution.

The supply side of education also seems to indicate that under certain conditions the economic situation of the elites may have some correlation with the social upheavals that may erupt. The high level of unemployed intellectuals in Ethiopia preceded the widening rebellion of the educated; the more the per capita expenditure per student

decreased the more the students rebelled against the regime; the larger the number of high school and elementary school failures, the more the student agitation increased. All this seems to indicate that intellectual rebellions are, to a significant degree, born of alienation which arises when self realization becomes unattainable. In other words, the process of "rising expectations" inevitably breeds the "Revolution of Rising Frustrations."

Our study has proven, beyond any reasonable doubt, how students and teachers can play a decisive role in precipitating a revolution in countries governed by autocratic Third World regimes. It has also proven that, contrary to popular belief, the Ethiopian military which was created as an arm of Haile Selassie's autocratic regime, was status quo oriented, that it initially threw its weight behind the emperor and his throne, and as the Ethiopian revolution kept on raging, it played a "sit and wait" game. It took a counter-establishment role only when the popular movement seemed to be succeeding. Even then, it started with the prodding and, indeed, the attack and the strong influence of the teachers and the students who successfully infiltrated some sectors of the military establishment.

The educated elites' perception of their own status and particularly the status of their country in comparison with their African neighbours was undoubtedly what fuelled their alienation from the established order and thus spurred them more and more to agitate for a revolutionary change in Ethiopia. The study conducted by this researcher,

which covers almost a quarter of a century immediately prior to Haile Selassie's fall, had shown the extremely low level of Ethiopian progress towards the expansion of modern education compared with all countries of the world, the technologically advanced nations, the developing nations and particularly with the newly independent African countries. The fact that the alienated elites were alarmed by this huge discrepancy can be seen from the main platforms of the abortive 1960 coup d'état and the 1974 revolution in which the elites indicated their apparent shame at the status of Ethiopian education and called for an immediate redress.

The alienation described above was reinforced by the intense American cultural penetration which was channelled through the Ethiopian school system. Whereas Haile Selassie, hoping that the American free enterprise system would absorb those his bureaucracy could not, gave free reign to the U.S. to influence the Ethiopian youth, the strategic position of Ethiopia, and the missionary zeal that guided America's global policy of "containment" combined to create a situation where the United States invested heavily in the ideological section (i.e., education) of its "anti-Communists" campaign.

In the beginning, the American pedagogy did produce, as Haile Selassie had hoped, a different breed of educated people. Whereas the traditional educated class, the Debteras, were strongly attached to the people, their values and customs, the new elite tended to isolate itself from the mainstream and express its faith in the American way of life and ideology. It became the cerebral link in the metropolitan-

client relationship that was taking shape through the material weight that American economic and military aid had created in the Ethiopian social fabric. But as long as the new elite had an unrestricted access to money and eventually to power, the imperatives of interest dictated that all three partners—Haile Selassie, the Western-educated elite, and the United States should construct a viable bond of interdependence and patronage.

But when the new generation of students discovered the level of American cultural penetration in the mid 1960s, there came the first crack not only in the armour of the tripartite alliance of the monarchy, the Western-educated class and the United States, but also in the fragile co-existence of the Adirbays (careerists) and the still not coopted young rebels churned out of the modern school system. The latter phenomenon then rendered a serious challenge to the ideological quietism practised by the already integrated intelligentsia. A new chapter was thus opened in the history of the educated youth—a chapter which made possible the mobilization of the students and the formation of a political front in a struggle against the feudal-client government of Haile Selassie, which by its intensity imposed itself as a trigger of the political consciousness of some of the important sectors of the power structure, especially the army, the air force and the police.

For the new products of Western education, particularly the students and the teachers, who were caught up in the educational, social, and economic bottleneck of Ethiopia's modernizing autocracy, the pro-



cess of funnelling radical political consciousness among the lower ranks of the military and paramilitary forces—the only organized group in the country (other than the students, whose weapons were merely ideological)—was not a difficult one. The objective conditions were such that the system was virtually on the verge of collapse. There were internal wranglings among members of Haile Selassie's family, the aristocrats and ministerial factions as to who should control power once the aging Emperor had left the scene, either by abdicating in favour of one of his children or grandchildren, or through his natural death. Despite spiralling inflation and outstanding grievances for higher wages, the government was threatening to produce only low paid teachers—thus raising the wrath of the country's educators. This was according to the recommendation of the "Education Sector Review," which was accepted by the government, the projected date of implementation being 1973. Other accepted recommendations were that the work year for teachers should be 48 weeks, with double shifts of five hours daily teaching, and a class load of at least 67 students. In addition, the failure rate in the entire pedagogical system was extremely alarming. In the high schools, for example, failure jumped from 10% in 1950 to a stunning 81% in 1970. Per capita expenditure per student was similarly on a continuous decline.

In the social and economic spheres, also, the problems were no less acute. Taxi drivers could not absorb the sudden steep increase in gasoline prices. Workers in the few factories could not democratically organize themselves to carry on genuine collective bargaining. Trade

unionism was actually forbidden until 1962 and when later The Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions was established, the government put stringent controls on its activities. Strikes were regarded as insurrectionist in nature and mass dismissals were usually the result. Unemployment was chronic and average worker salaries were less than U.S. \$20 per month. Ethiopian peasants were still paying 50-75% of their produce to their landlords. Famine had laid its murderous hands on hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians. The feudal order at the apex of the political pyramid was in a state of irredeemable disarray, and the morale of the soldiers fighting in the north and the south of the country was at its lowest ebb due to deplorable living conditions. The country was thus ripe for revolution. But to the extent that these objective realities were facilitating the growth of radical political consciousness among the populace, the students and the teachers, imbued with Western liberal education, but now armed with Socialist and revolutionary ideological weapons, were taking the plight of their people to the political arena. In short, the role of this new breed of educated youth was one of the necessary catalysts to enhance the pace of revolutionary ferment that ultimately sealed the fate of the feudal regime in December 1974.

This analysis has focussed on the spectrum of the political face of the Ethiopian educational system because education in Ethiopia has been political. While the line of continuity between the traditional system of education and the modern one can only be drawn by a dichotomy of dialectically-related variables—conflictual/consensual—which have

always existed between the political powers and the catalytic intelligentsia, the burgeoning conflict smouldering for over a decade ultimately superseded the tripartite consensus and hastened the revolutionary uprising in Ethiopia which culminated in the creation of a new political order. The fall of the Haile Selassie regime was, however, inevitable not only because the objective conditions were leading towards that end, but also because his modernizing autocracy could not, by its very nature, accommodate metropolitan liberal values acquired by the new elite through the Ethiopian educational system. A system seething in the dangerous atmosphere of an economic and political cauldron needs protection even from its own people. This leads to dependency. Protection is readily available owing to the fact that the strategic, economic and political advantages accruing from such a relationship are of crucial importance to the penetrating system. Whereas Metropolitan guardianship is a precursor to cultural penetration, in the long run, cultural penetration breeds a condition which becomes a catalyst for an eventual social upheaval. Hence, we can conclude that an authoritarian, penetrated system that attempts to introduce Western education and all the accompanying values without changing the intrinsic character pertaining to itself, carries the seeds of its own destruction.

## POSTSCRIPT

The overthrow of Haile Selassie was not the end, but the beginning of a major socio-political transformation in Ethiopia. It was also the beginning of the end of the alliance between the anti-Haile Selassie forces—civilian and military. Initially, the Derg had indicated that the military would return to the barracks once the job of overthrowing the feudal establishment was accomplished, and government officials accused of gross misconduct and corruption were brought to justice for their actions.<sup>1</sup> But in the September 12, 1974 proclamation, the Derg legally entrenched itself by assigning the unlimited control of political power to the "Provisional Military Administrative Council."<sup>2</sup> Following this development, on September 16, 1974, over 2,000 students staged a major demonstration outside the university campus, and chanted, "Down with the military government!" and "We want a people's republic!"<sup>3</sup> Also, on the same day, the Confederation of Ethiopian

---

<sup>1</sup>A Derg spokesman, Lt.-Colonel Tessema Aba Derash, reiterated this when in an interview he stated, "This is only a provisional military administration. . . . We don't want power, and the military movement has said so countless times. It has shown by its actions since then that there is no movement within the military that wants to install a perpetual military government." See "The Army Speaks," Africa, No. 39 (November 1974), pp. 24-26.

<sup>2</sup>Proclamation No. 1 of 1974, Negarit Gazeta, September 15, 1974.

<sup>3</sup>The Times (London), September 17, 1974. The students were demanding this even before Haile Selassie's overthrow. See, for example, an interview with student leaders Mitiku and Begashaw, "Students Speak," Africa, No. 39 (November 1974), pp. 23-27.

Labour Unions circulated a communiqué making the same demands.<sup>4</sup>

The Derg's answer to this was the swift incarceration of student and labour leaders who were pushing for the military government's removal.<sup>5</sup> Then, in December 1974, it announced its commitment to an ideology called hebrete sebawinet, which was simply a potpourri of Ethiopian nationalism and home-grown socialism. The Derg's official English translation actually referred to it as "Ethiopian socialism."<sup>6</sup> But in 1975, when a large number of Ethiopian student leaders who had been in exile in Europe and the United States returned home, some officers and NCOs in the military ruling circle came into direct contact with, and were strongly influenced by the ideologically committed leftist returnees.<sup>7</sup> It was at this stage that the Derg, which had refused

<sup>4</sup>New York Times, September 17, 1974. It is important to note how far to the left CELU had shifted by 1975. With the collaboration of the country's young socialists, it had the Communist Manifesto translated into Amharic and disseminated among its rank and file. See the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions, The Communist Manifesto, Be-Karl Marx Enna Friedrich Engles Yetederrese (Addis Ababa: Yekatit 1967 [February 1975]).

<sup>5</sup>Among those jailed were the president, vice-president and secretary-general of the CELU; they refused to withdraw a resolution passed by the general assembly of the CELU which demanded that "People's provisional government replace the provisional military government." See "Labour Speaks," Africa, No. 39 (November 1974), p. 27.

<sup>6</sup>This was just a reinterpretation of their old slogan Ethiopia Tikdem [Ethiopia First]. The meaning of hebrete sebawinet was, according to the Derg, "self-reliance; the dignity of labour; the supremacy of the common good; and the indivisibility of Ethiopian unity." See "Ethiopia Tikdem, The Origins and Future Directions of the Movement, Addis Ababa: December 20, 1974.

<sup>7</sup>Haile Fida, who returned from his studies at the Sorbonne in Paris and Dr. Sennay Likké, a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, were said to be particularly responsible in giving Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam and other Derg members a crash course in the theory and practice of Marxism. Sennay Likké, who was very close to key Derg members, particularly Mengistu, had also given the future strongman of the Derg karate training.

to relinquish state power in favour of a "people's government," started to change its course. With a series of actions that fulfilled long-standing popular demands, it took the steam out of the combined left opposition. The Derg nationalized banks, insurance companies, key financial institutions<sup>8</sup> and all industrial and commercial establishments.<sup>9</sup> This move was warmly welcomed by the students, and particularly by the CELU. Later, when all rural land was nationalized and tenancy was declared illegal,<sup>10</sup> the students were caught by surprise. Nevertheless, they were elated. As Marina and David Ottaway, correspondents for the Washington Post, stationed in Addis Ababa at the time, point out:

The radical students . . . were highly enthusiastic. During a massive demonstration in Addis Ababa immediately following the announcement, a group of students broke through police and army barriers, climbed the wall and escarpment around Menelik's palace, and embraced Major Mengistu as the hero of the reform.<sup>11</sup>

The Derg also abolished the monarchy altogether, and unravelled what it called a determined plan to bring about the speedy establishment of a "people's democratic republic" which the students, the teachers,

<sup>8</sup>Government of Ethiopia, Provisional Military Administrative Council, Abiyotawit Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Tahsas 15, 1969 [December 1977], p. 9.

<sup>9</sup>Ethiopian Herald, February 6, 1974; Government of Ethiopia, Provisional Military Administrative Council, Four Years of Revolutionary Progress (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information and National Guidance, 1978), pp. 22-23.

<sup>10</sup>"A Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of Rural Lands," Negarit Gazeta, April 29, 1975. See also, Government of Ethiopia, Provisional Military Administrative Council, Measures for Rural Transformation (Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1977), pp. 5-47.

<sup>11</sup>Marina and David Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), p. 71.

and the workers had demanded.<sup>12</sup> It nationalized all urban land and provided a law by which a Kebellé [urban dwellers] Association would be formed to help run the nationalized property.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, it reduced rents by 15 to 50 percent, the largest reductions going to low-level residential houses.<sup>14</sup>

The Dërg's policy thus became to routinely dodge the question of returning to the barracks, but to take all radical actions championed by the civilian left. To counter those who were in doubt about its aims, it even announced its commitment to "scientific socialism" and a "New Democratic Revolution."<sup>15</sup> Paradoxically, the Dërg was taking these steps even when it

---

<sup>12</sup>See supra, pp. 461-68; 502-03.

<sup>13</sup>For the proclamation and details on urban land ownership, see the Ethiopian Herald, July 26, 1975, pp. 1-8.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>It is interesting to see how far the military has "officially" committed itself to "scientific socialism" and the "New Democratic Revolution." In commenting on its guiding principle, the Dërg's ideological organ, the Ethiopian Revolution Information Centre, stated: "As is succinctly stated in the program of the NDR of Ethiopia, the aim of the Ethiopian People's Revolution is to wipe out feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism from the face of the land, and through a united front of all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces of the country build the people's democratic republic of Ethiopia and lay a solid foundation for transition to socialism. For this end, the struggle has to be waged under the leadership of the working class party in alliance with the peasantry, the left wing section of the petty [sic] bourgeoisie and all other anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces." See Ethiopian Revolution Information Centre, Revolutionary Ethiopia Fact Sheet (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1978), p. 11. See also, Government of Ethiopia, Provisional Military Administrative Council, Support the Just Cause of the Ethiopian People (Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1977), pp. 6-11.

It is important to note here that Ethiopian students had already passed a resolution to work for a new democratic revolution in 1972. See World Wide Union of Ethiopian Students, "The National Democratic Revolution in Ethiopia," Challenge, XII (October 1, 1972), pp. 1-97; for excerpts, see also Appendix IV.

was arresting those who had been demanding the implementation of the same socialist measures to which it had officially committed itself. The latter, it should be remembered, were also demanding that the military return to the barracks. It was differences on the short term aims concerning the Derg which led to a hopeless, costly and fratricidal division between the civilian intelligentsia—between those who came to the conclusion that the Derg was nothing but a "fascist junta" (views of EHEAPA or EPRP<sup>16</sup>) and those who believed that the actions of the Derg were progressive enough to deserve "critical" support until a workers' party was organized and a people's government established (views of "All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement," also known as MEISON).<sup>17</sup> Although these two groups

<sup>16</sup>The first stands for "Yé Etiopia Hezb Abiyotawi Party", the second, for its English equivalent "Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party." Its first leader was Berhane Meskel Redda, one of the student airplane hijackers of the 1960's who lived in exile in Algeria until 1974. Berhane Meskel had been waging guerrilla warfare against the Derg at Assimbba in Tigray and later at Walaita in the South, but was later captured and executed by the Derg.

<sup>17</sup>Both the EPRP and MEISON used to publish clandestine ideological papers, the former Democracia, the latter Yesefiw Hezb Demts [Voice of the Broad Masses]. The MEISON also worked officially with the Derg, through an organization called the "Political Bureau," which offered courses on Marxism to civilian and military cadres including some Derg members. For the EPRP's position, see Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, Abyot, I, No. 7 (1976), pp. 1-20, and I, No. 8 (1976), pp. 1-20. For MEISON's views, see Ethiopian Students' Union in Europe, Fourteenth General Assembly Report (Meskerem 1967 [September 1975], pp. 1-28; Ethiopian Students' Union in Europe, "The Political Bankruptcy of Acherguzoism [Short Cut Movement]," Teglachin Zenna, March, 1975, pp. 1-74; Ethiopian Students' Union in Europe, "Yé Ethiopia Gizeyawi Hunetanna Tegbarachin," [Conditions in Ethiopia and our Duties], Tatek, No. 2, Hamle 1966 [July 1975], pp. 1-74. Later, MEISON also had a fallout with the Derg. Its official leader, Dr. Kebede Mengesha, committed suicide when his forces were encircled by the Derg's security men in the Guder area of Shoa, in 1978. The de facto leader of the movement, Haile Fida, was captured and is at the time of writing in the Derg's jail. For MEISON's views after a falling out with the Derg see United Progressive Ethiopian Students' Union in North America, "Resolution of the Third General Assembly," Yeteramaj Tigil, III (August, 1978), pp. 1-20.




differed in the short-term strategy of dealing with the Derg, however, their long-range views were the same: the military should return to their barracks and power should be handed over to the civilians. Other parties organized in addition to the EPRP and MEISON were ECHAAT, MALERED, WOZ-ADER League, and ABYOT SEDED.<sup>18</sup> (For post-1974 power structure, see Figure 22 ).

One outstanding plan of the Ethiopian student movement, spanning more than a decade, was the launching of a voluntary educational zemecha for second and third level students to go to the rural areas and expand alphabetization and politicize the peasantry. In April 1974, the question was again raised in a university student forum and the delegates agreed to forego one year of schooling to fulfil this important mission. Then, as was already a pattern in the Derg's policy direc-

<sup>18</sup>ECHAAT stands for "Yé Etiopia Chikunoch Abiyotawi Tigil" (Ethiopian Oppressed Peoples' Revolutionary Struggle). This party, which catered to the oppressed nationalities such as the Oromos, was led by Baro Tumsa, who is presently at large fighting in the Balé region. MALERED (Marxist-Leninist Ethiopian Revolutionary Organization) is a faction broken off from MEISON and does not have any fundamental differences with the latter. Both WOZ-ADER League (the Workers' League) and ABYOT SEDED (Revolutionary Flame) were organized by Dr. Sennay Likké, who died in the palace shootout of 1977. Sennay was a very close friend and adviser of Mengistu, who had come out the winner in the power struggle with his opponents, the Alemayehu-Mogus-Teferi faction. However, as the organizer of the two important parties, both of which had a strong following in the civilian and military quarters, Sennay was said to be planning to overthrow Mengistu and might have succeeded had he not been killed during the 1977 incident. The leaders of all six major parties above were former university student leaders of the 1960's and 70's whose major activities have been explained in detail in Chapters IV, V and VI.

Figure 22

## Post - 1974 Power Structure



\*The EDU (Ethiopia Democratic Union) is a Monarchist and restorationist movement and was organized by Leul-Ras [Prince] Mengesha Seyoum and General Nega Tegegn, both of whom were married to Haile Selassie's granddaughters.

\*\*The major Nationality Movements are the Eritrean Liberation Front, (Pan-Arabic), Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Forces (Leftist), Oromo Liberation Front, Tigrean Peoples' Liberation Front, Western Somali Liberation Front, and Afar National Liberation Movement.

\*\*\*Commission for Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia. Despite the name, the structure of COPWE indicates it to be an embryonic political party. All Politburo members are Derg members and the Chairman is Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam.

tion, the Derg coopted the students' platform, and announced the zemecha four months later.<sup>19</sup> Leaving many political episodes of the post-1974 era which need critical analysis for a future study,<sup>20</sup> we would like to mention briefly this highly significant and fruitful brainchild of the student movement—the educational zemecha of 1974-76.<sup>21</sup>

The zemecha program, which was officially launched in October 1974, involved an educational and developmental campaign carried out in the rural areas of the country during the course of eighteen months. Over fifty-thousand students (tenth grade high school to fourth year university), all school teachers and all university lecturers and professors were involved. By 1976 when the operation came to a close, 350,000 peasants were made literate; 155 schools and 296 clinics were

---

<sup>19</sup>Ottaway and Ottaway, Empire in Revolution, p. 70.

<sup>20</sup>The mysterious circumstances under which close to sixty former officials were executed while others were spared, the bloody purges that consumed several radical officers, NCOs and men of the Army Engineering and Aviation Corps who opposed a military government in favour of a people's government, the killings of the first and second heads of state—General Aman Andom and Tafari Banti—the execution of the organizer of the Derg, Vice-Chairman Atnafu Abate, the shootout in which several prominent members of anti-Mengistu officers and his military and civilian supporters were killed, and the so-called "White" and "Red" terror campaigns during which thousands of educated youth fell, have already been researched by the author and will be treated in future publications.

<sup>21</sup>For a detailed analysis of the 1974-76 zemecha, see Paulos Milkias, "Zemecha: Assessing the Political and Social Foundations of Mass Education in Ethiopia," Studies in Comparative International Development, XV, No. 3 (Fall, 1980), 54-69. For background to the event as well as the philosophy of the campaign, see Paulos Milkias, "Mass Campaign in Ethiopia—The Political Economy of Education for National Reconstruction," The Journal of Educational Thought, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (December 1980), pp. 187-95.

built in the rural areas; 2 million trees were planted, and 300,000 head of cattle were vaccinated against deadly livestock diseases. The zemecha participants helped build numerous health shelters, garbage holes, places of public gathering, wooden bridges, rafts, feeder roads, water wells and latrines.<sup>22</sup> They did not accomplish all these without serious sacrifices on their part. One hundred and sixteen Zemachs (or zemécha campaigners) were killed during the operation—some by former landowners,<sup>23</sup> and others by rural police forces. Thousands more have also died since. But the ball of the revolution that the students and teachers started to roll will continue to go on. As one of the student leaders involved in the violent political struggles of the 1960's and 70's puts it, "We have not fought and died in vain."

---

<sup>22</sup>Since 1979 a major literacy campaign in which large numbers of students and teachers are involved has been launched. The success of the campaign was so impressive that UNESCO gave the United Nations' Literary Award to Ethiopia in 1980. For details, see Paulos Milkias, "The Political Economy of Education: An Adult Literacy Campaign in Ethiopia," a Paper presented to the International Council for Adult Education, the University of Toronto, January, 1980. The author is at present writing a book on the same topic. The work, which was commissioned by ICAE, is being funded by the National Research Centre of the Government of Canada.

<sup>23</sup>The students were responsible for distributing rural lands to the peasants.

**APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX I

## RELIGION AND EDUCATION

Proclamation on the Establishment of the Ministry of  
Religion and Education: Menelik, Emperor



የደህንነትና ፡ ትምህርት ፡

የደህንነትና ፡ የትምህርት ፡ ሚኒስቴር ፡ ደንብ ፡

(ካፒ ፡ ምኒልክ ፡ የተሰጠ) ፡

መገመሪያ ፡

የደህንነት ፡ ነገር ፡ ያቡን ፡ ሥራ ፡ ነው ፡ እርሳቸው ፡ የደህንነት ፡  
አለቃ ፡ ናቸው ፡

ሁለተኛ ፡

የደህንነት ፡ ሚኒስቴር ፡ ባቡንና ፡ በመንግሥት ፡ መካከል ፡ ይሆናል ፡  
በቀረባቸው ፡ ይገኛል ፡

ሦስተኛ ፡

ዋና ፡ ሥራው ፡ የቤተ ፡ ክርስቲያንና ፡ የቁሶች ፡ ጠባቂ ፡ ነው ፡

አራተኛ ፡

ያገር ፡ ትምህርት ፡ ቤቶችን ፡ ይጠብቃል ፡

አምስተኛ ፡

የጤና ፡ ሚኒስቴር ፡ ይረዳል ፡ የፈረንጅ ፡ ትምህርት ፡ ቤት ፡ በሚ  
ያስተምሩ ፡ በታ ፡ ሁሉ ፡



ጥእላንበላ፡ ዘለፍንገደ፡ ደህሳ፡ ምገደልክ፡ ንጉሠ፡ ነገሥት ፡

For translation see next page.

The document above is adopted from Mahteme Selassie, Zekre Nager, p. 502  
and Tsehafe Téezez Gebre Selassie, Tarik Zemen Zedagmawi Menelik, p. 70.

## APPENDIX I

## RELIGION AND EDUCATION

Proclamation on the Establishment of the Ministry of  
Religion and Education: Menelik, Emperor

## One

The Abun [the Archbishop of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church] shall be responsible for all matters pertaining to Religion. He is its Supreme authority.

## Two

The Ministry of Religion which is the liaison between the Abun and the government shall exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Priests.

## Three

The main duty of the Ministry is to look after Ecclesiastical affairs and the Clergy.

## Four

The Ministry of Religion shall administer traditional schools.

## Five

Wherever European Education is taught, the Minister of Health shall be the adjunct.

## Seal

Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah,  
Menelik, King of Kings

~~100,000~~

የኢትዮጵያ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ዘርፊ ወረቀት

ደ.ፍ.ረ.ባ. ገ.ገ.ቡ.ር ሙ.ኢ. ጠርፈኛ.

0 7 00 . 0505 . 2 0 3 .

ታ. ፲፭. የወደ ጅኑ. መገገድ. መዝሙሪት. ሳይታወቅም.  
ወደ ድሁ: ፲፮. ግጥ. በየጊዜው. የሚገኝ ሳይሆን. ከገጠን. የሥነ  
ግጥም. የሥነ ጥበቃ. የኢኮኖሚ. የመገንጠያ. የጥራት. የጥራት.

[illegible]

6. 6: 428: 007.33.



514



## APPENDIX II

(Translation)

(Coat of Arms)

Ras Tafari Makonnen,  
Heir to the Empire of  
Ethiopia.

To His Excellency Mr. Harding,

President of the Republic of the United States  
of America

Mr. President:

I wish and must inform you that I am trying every way to open friendly relations with the nations of the United States, but I am very sincerely sorry that there was not appointed in Ethiopia either a representative of your government or a responsible company whom I could have told about the plan I have in mind every minute. Even at this moment I have not found anyone from your country whom I could commission to put me in connection with a leading bank or responsible company of the United States which I would have entrusted with my money now invested in Europe since the days of my father.

So I have recourse to your kindness to ask for your assistance in order to find the needful means enabling me to entrust a bank or a reliable company with that money.

I beg Your Excellency to pardon my putting you to any trouble with this business.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the sum is about 100,000 pounds sterling.

I beg Your Excellency to accept the homage of my profound sincerity.

Addis Ababa, February 1923.

Signature:  
Ras Tafari Makonnen

(Seal)

JSM/SDM

### APPENDIX III

Haile Selassie's Inauguration Address at the Convocation of Haile Selassie University (now renamed Addis Ababa University) on December 18, 1961



GUENNETE LEUL PALACE  
ADDIS ABABA

The spread of knowledge is the bastion of liberty. Education has always been the Affair of State closest to Our heart, and the sight of Our young people being schooled has always given Us Our greatest pleasure.

It is therefore with great joy and renewed confidence in the future that We mark this Convocation which inaugurates Our new University. To this great cause We have been able to secure financial and professional help from the United States of America and a number of other friendly nations. This institution will now co-ordinate and make more fruitful Our existing centres of learning, both the University College of Addis Ababa and the various technical colleges. The founding of this University crowns Our many years of struggle and devotion to the cause of Education in Ethiopia.

As We have said on other occasions, the attainment of a goal is only a temporary achievement. The challenges to you, the faculty and students of this University, have only begun. New opportunities for enabling yourselves to set ideals of achievement for your fellow countrymen are waiting to be seized. We charge you to make the most of them through the humility, toil and perseverance that give education its deepest meaning.

*dp HSA Nizor. 3h.*

HAILE SELASSIE I  
EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA

## APPENDIX IV

### The "National Democratic Revolution Program" of the World Wide Union of Ethiopian Students [Excerpts]\*

#### Ethiopian Conditions - A Brief Survey

At present there is an excellent revolutionary situation in Ethiopia. The ruling class, beset by a deep ongoing crisis within itself and unable to rule in the old way, has been pushed to talk loudly and promise certain reforms and to make external alliances of all sorts in an effort to continue its threatened rule. The masses far from being duped by the ruling class's demagoguery and eternally eminent but never actualized reforms have taken up arms and resorted to other forms of protest to manifest their desire for a total change.

This realization by both the ruling class and the oppressed masses that things cannot at all continue in the old way (i.e., as before) has had its results—on the one hand the ruling class has become more and more repressive while on the other the masses have determinedly started to prepare and organize to destroy once and for all their oppressors and exploiters.

In short, all the contradictions within the Ethiopian society have been exacerbated. The struggles of the peoples of Eritrea, Ogaden, Bale, etc. against national oppression and for the right of self-determination has continued and particularly in Eritrea, reached new dimensions. In other places, the peasant masses have continued their

\*Footnote references have been eliminated. For exact references and quotes, see the original.

struggle against feudal exploitation in its various forms. In the cities the proletariat, undaunted by the fierce repression to which it has been subjected in the last eight years, has continued to wage strikes and work slowdowns in opposition to its exploitation by the rapacious foreign capitalists. The student movement has also continued its militant struggle and has not ceased to intensify and broaden its struggle despite the massacre and repression it was subjected to especially in December 1969.

In the exploitation, oppression and repression of the Ethiopian people, feudalism and imperialism—mainly U.S. imperialism—coalesce. 'Everything backward, moribund and medieval' in Ethiopia 'sees eye to eye with U.S. imperialism,' the latter will do all in its power to forestall any genuine revolution by the oppressed masses against Ethiopia's backward, moribund medieval feudal system. 'In this alliance between feudalism and imperialism the benefits flow in both directions.' The feudal regime maintains its security and continues its exploitation of the masses while the U.S. imperialists continue to tighten their hold over the country and to gain their strategic political and economic objectives. At present Ethiopia is a semi-feudal neocolony of U.S. imperialism and the two fundamental contradictions in society—between feudalism and the broad masses of the people and between imperialism and the Ethiopian people are acute.

'Land to the tiller,' 'An end to national oppression,' 'Down with feudalism and imperialism'—these and other anti-feudal and anti-imperialist slogans are actualized in all peasant rebellions, worker

strikes, and student demonstrations. And significant is the fact that the masses are becoming increasingly aware of the need for an organized and concerted action against feudalism and imperialism; there is no doubt that the masses are definitely being organized for the decisive battle.

At the international level the situation is excellent and fully to the advantage of the revolutionary forces. Imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism is breathing its last death gasps. The struggle of the world's people against U.S. imperialism has been surging forward, making one onslaught after another against it. In the 1960's the heroic fight by three Indochinese peoples has dealt U.S. imperialism heavy blows and greatly quickened the pace of its decline. In fact the U.S. imperialist hegemony which existed for over twenty years after the second world war is ending due to the contradiction between U.S. imperialism and the struggling people of the third world more specifically through its vanguards in Indochina. The recent victories of the Vietnamese revolutionaries and the subsequent developments as regards U.S. imperialism are ample proof of how much the latter has been pushed nearer to its inevitable demise.

The U.S. economy inflated in the course of the war is bogged down in grave crises which erupted five times in more than twenty postwar years. Interwoven in financial and dollar crises these crises have lasted so long and grown so serious that no kind of economic policy (whether it is called new and revolutionary by the U.S. ruling class) has found a way out of it. "The 'dollar empire' of yesterday has become

the world's biggest debtor country harassed by dollar devaluation and a vast outflow of gold. At present U.S. imperialist rule is being shaken to its core by the intensified anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of the third world, by the growing strength of the socialist countries and the anti-monopolist struggle of the workers, Afro-Americans and youth of the U.S. itself.

At the same time the forces fighting for progress, democracy, peace and socialism are becoming stronger. The socialist community despite its difficulties, is gaining in strength and influence, rendering invaluable assistance to the peoples of the third world, and assuring that imperialism does not ride roughshod over the people of the world. The anti-imperialist struggles of the third world—headed by their vanguards in Indochina—is increasing in intensity and it is becoming more and more clear with every passing day that Socialism will replace capitalism just as capitalism replaced feudalism. This is an irresistible law of history and the tide of the world revolution is pushing ahead today precisely in accordance with this law.

Specifically the situation in our part of the world—Northeast Africa, the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf area—is at present characterized on the one hand by the growing in strength of the revolutionary forces (Eritrea, Dhofar, Oman, S. Yemen, etc.) and on the other by the alliance being forged by the ruling classes of the countries in these areas. This weakness of each country's ruling class to face alone the country's revolutionary forces has been manifested in the settlement of the Southern Sudan 'problem,' the ceding of Ethiopian territory at Setit

Humera to the Sudan, Numeri of the Sudan's compliance to restrict and hamper the activities and movements of the ELF, the renunciation of Somali's claim over Djibouti, the occupation of five North Yemenite islands on the Red Sea by Ethiopia (with the possible acquiescence of N. Yemen) in an effort to cut the ELF supply line (also to encircle S. Yemen and to assure free passage to Zionist ships or ships bound for Israel through the Bab-el-Mandeb), the increasing plots and attacks against S. Yemen by all the reactionary regimes of the area, the meeting in Jedda of Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, N. Yemen and Saudi Arabia to discuss on how to make the Red Sea a sea of "peace," . . . etc. All in all we see the reactionaries uniting in one form or another to weaken and destroy the revolutionary forces in the area. In this connection the increased U.S. influence in the area and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Sudan as well as North Yemen, the Expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Egypt, and the results of the Nixon-Moscow talks as regards the Middle East, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean should be given due consideration.

It is interesting to note that in their frenzied drive to forge alliances, even if temporarily, the reactionary ruling classes of these countries (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, N. Yemen, etc) have not found in nationalism and religious differences so much of an obstacle as before. Thus we see the Ethiopian feudalists whose nationalist demagoguery was that "not an inch of Ethiopia's sacred territory will be cut off or ceded away" have not blinked even an eye when they cede 35 kilometres of

the 'sacred' soil to the soldier-dictators in the Sudan and equally N. Yemen did not protest when Haile Selassie occupies its five islands, while Somali who used to air nationalist claims on Djibouti and Ogaden is found renouncing the claims to come to terms with and placate the feudal regime in Ethiopia.

The reactionaries in Ethiopia and elsewhere in this area are desperate. U.S. imperialism is dying. The world situation is excellent for the revolutionary forces fighting for progress, democracy, peace and socialism.

#### Targets of the Ethiopian Revolution

The determining of the principal enemies or chief targets of the revolution is a strategic question of cardinal importance. 'To master the enemy' and defeat him it is important to know who he is exactly, and this is the task of revolutionary strategy.

The nature of Ethiopia's socio-economic system determines the targets of the revolution. Ethiopia is a semi-feudal neo-colony of the U.S. The targets of the Ethiopian national democratic revolution are feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism. The Ethiopian revolution is directed mainly against feudalism and imperialism as these two are the chief oppressors, the chief obstacles to the progress of the (Ethiopian) society at the present stage. And throughout the whole strategic period of the N.D.R. the strategic enemy to overthrow is imperialism and the feudal class allied to it.



### Which Imperialist? Which Feudalist?

It is not enough to determine who is the enemy in general. We must also be able to "discern the concrete enemy in the immediate," i.e., now, at this period and stage. This means we must distinguish the principal enemy of the moment to overthrow him, to exploit the contradictions in the ranks of the enemy, to divide them at the highest level and to concentrate the fire of the revolutionary struggle on the principal enemy of the moment.

Hence it is not enough to say that the strategic enemy during the overall strategic period of the N.D.R. in Ethiopia is imperialism and the feudal-comprador bourgeois classes allied to it. We must make a concrete analysis of Ethiopia's concrete situation at each strategic stage or each period to determine which imperialism as well as which feudalists are to be overthrown.

This is the only way we can pinpoint our attack to the maximum effect on the actual, main enemy of the moment. Elaborating on this Troung Chinh explains the experience of his party—the Vietnamese Workers Party—as follows:

"In our country in that which concerns the imperialist enemy, since the foundation of our Party up to 1940, the enemy was French imperialism. During the period of the Democratic Front (1936-1939) . . . the enemy were the French Fascists and the reactionary French colonialists in Indochina (and not French imperialism or colonialism in its entirety). From August 1940 to 1945, after the entry of the Japanese

militarist Fascists into Indochina—with whom the French were sharing power—the principal enemy of the people became the Japanese and French Fascists. After the coup de force of March 1945 provoked by the Japanese Fascists to eliminate the French colonialists the imperialist enemy of our people were the Japanese Fascists."

When the Japanese were defeated and left Indochina the French colonialist aggressors once again became, together with the American imperialists who were encouraging and helping them in their aggression, the principal enemy. "After the Dien Bien Phu victory over the French, the imperialist enemy became U.S. imperialism which unleashed its war of aggression on the South and war of destruction on North Vietnam."

The same was the case with the feudal landlord class which was not treated in its entirety during each strategic stage or period. The Vietnamese Worker's Party defined, up to 1939, the King, the mandarins and the cruel nobility—i.e., the feudalists in power and in the service of the French imperialists—as the targets of the revolution. After 1939 the feudalists to be overthrown were only those who were traitors or puppets under the service of the Japanese and French Fascists and not the whole feudal landlord class. And so on. As Troung Chinh noted: "We have thus differentiated the feudal landlord class, isolated the very reactionary ones to overthrow them at the same time as their masters, the Japanese and French Fascists, without overthrowing the feudal landlord class in its entirety."

The importance of clearly ascertaining "which imperialism, which feudalism" is corroborated also by the experience of the Chinese

Revolution. Starting from the principle that the main blow of the revolution should be directed at the chief enemy the Chinese Communist Party, both during the war of resistance against Japan and the War of Liberation, correctly solved the strategic and tactical problems of distinguishing between the principal and non-principal contradictions, taking advantage of the contradictions among the enemies of the revolution and concentrating the revolutionary forces on fighting the principal enemy of the moment.

Thus during the First Revolutionary Civil War the Northern Warlords constituted the principal enemy of the Chinese Revolution. In the period 1927-37, the acute contradiction was between the Chinese people and the pro-imperialist Chiang Kai Shek regime. And after Japan occupied China the contradiction between China and Japan became the principal contradiction, and thus Japanese imperialism and the pro-Japanese section of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie became the principal enemies of the Chinese people. After the surrender of Japan, U.S. imperialism stepped into its shoes and using the Chiang Kai-Shek reactionary ruling class as its tool tried to turn all China into its colony. This made the Chiang Kai-Shek regime and U.S. imperialism the principal enemies of the Chinese people. In the various periods mentioned above all the imperialists and domestic reactionaries other than the principal enemies of the time were temporarily secondary enemies.

Hence in dealing with the targets of the revolution there is the need to discern the change that occurs in the principal contradiction and

the principal enemy, always bearing in mind that the fundamental contradictions for the whole strategic period of the N.D.R. do not change.

What about Ethiopia?

In that which concerns imperialism the main imperialist enemy at this stage is U.S. imperialism which fully dominates our country in almost all spheres and which is the mainstay of the feudal regime. It is against U.S. imperialism that the fire of the Ethiopian N.D.R. must be directed in all its intensity.

As to the feudal landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie we must make a general class analysis of the two to help us in our task of ascertaining "which feudalism, which comprador" is to be overthrown. It is important to note at this point that only a clear-cut, on the spot class analysis (in the sense of or meaning objective and scientific) and the revolutionary practice itself will best determine and show the way to the solution of this problem.

#### The Feudal Landlord Class

This class is divided into two sections—big feudal landlords and lower feudal landlords:

a) The big feudal landlords: These comprise of the Emperor, the Royal Family, the Aristocracy, nobility, bishops and high dignitaries of the Church. This section of the feudal landlord class is 0.01% of the total population and owns about 70% of the arable land. The primitive and reactionary relations of production maintained by the big feudal landlords accounts for the fettering of the country's productive forces.

These social parasites engage in no productive work but live luxuriously in the capital city or other cities far away from their estates. The big feudal landlord class is strongly tied with (in fact it has now become an appendage of) imperialism and is the center of the counter-revolutionary forces in Ethiopia. Being the ultra-reactionary wing of the feudal landlord class it is absolutely hostile even to the minimum reformist demands, let alone a revolutionary change. At this stage of the Ethiopian N.D.R. this section of the feudal landlord class is an enemy and a target of the revolution.

b) The lower feudal landlords: To this section belong the Neftegnas, local landlords in the oppressed nationalities and different regions of Ethiopia, and big "Chika-Shums" or their equivalents in other places (Burka in Harar, Koro, etc.). They have in general, a substantial amount of land which they maintain under the "Gabar" system. In most cases they hold feudal titles like Fitawrari, Kagnazmatch, Grazmatch, Balambaras, etc. Their economic power is land and like the big feudal landlords they maintain feudal mode and relations of production which stand against the development of the productive forces and the economy.

About half of the section of this class are absentee landlords who congregate in the capital city and other cities. The other half stays in the countryside and in most cases serves the local tax collector, maintains "law and order," passes down government decrees, administers "justice," and, in short, runs the administration. This is especially true in places where the modern central state administration has not been

consolidated and being in close contact with the peasant masses they often participate in the repression of the peasants. The lower feudal landlords can acquire as much land as they can so long as they do not come into conflict with the aristocrats and nobles. The wealth and duties of the lower feudal landlords are inherited by their sons.

The majority of the members of this section of the feudal landlord class are reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries whose class interests are tied with feudalism and imperialism. They are opposed to the N.D.R. The changes the coming revolution will bring on the land question, on the national question and generally on the whole political system will undoubtedly erode their economic and political power, and eliminate their present privileged position, thus they have no objective basis to support the revolution. Nevertheless, as the experience of the 1936-1941 Anti-Fascist Resistance and the struggles of the oppressed peoples in Eritrea, Bale, Wollamo, Harar and Sidamo has shown a number of individuals from this section (be it of 'patriotic Sentiments' or to oppose national oppression) may support the N.D.R. and join the United Front. Finally, it should be remembered that with the growing in strength of bureaucratic capitalism the political and economic power of this section of the feudal landlord class is being affected.

In the feudal landlord class there are a group of people (it is not possible to categorize them as a section) who are not direct products of the feudal political and economic system. They are the products of the modern bureaucracy and using their bureaucratic position and influence have been able to amass land. However, they are in effect, landlords as

in most cases, they have not changed the relationship of production but continue to exploit peasants under the Gabar system. To this group of people belong provincial governors, 'Auraja' governors, provincial and 'Auraja' judges, police commissioners, mayors, provincial and Auraja heads of the various branches of the ministries, 'Woreda' governors and deputy governors, high government officials in Addis Ababa, etc.

The economic power of the group does not rest solely on land—in fact, it is their political and administrative power that accounts for their strength. These bureaucratic landlords might not oppose a change that would not touch their lands but will substitute feudal mode of production by a capitalist one. Their class interest, in the main, is tied with the modern bureaucracy and not the feudal landlords. Still, they have significant ties with the feudal landlord class and even though they might not be against very small reformist changes in the socio-political system they will surely be opposed to the N.D.R. which aims at the total overthrow of the existing socio-political system from which they benefit so much. Since most of these bureaucratic landlords are of the Amhara nationality this is an addition reason for their opposition to the N.D.R. which will mobilize and liberate the oppressed peoples of the various nationalities.

### The Comprador Bourgeoisie

The economic power base of the comprador bourgeoisie is imperialism—particularly U.S. imperialism. It lives on its connections with and by sowing imperialism faithfully in all spheres. The comprador

bourgeoisie cannot survive a day without the support of imperialism. It exists on the so-called 'aid' from U.S. imperialism and on trade exchanges with the developed capitalist states. In addition, it serves by running managerial activities where imperialism makes a direct capital investment. The comprador bourgeoisie has two sections: the bureaucratic comprador bourgeoisie and the private comprador bourgeoisie.

The Bureaucratic Comprador Bourgeoisie: This section is the biggest, politically well-developed section of the comprador bourgeoisie. To this section of the comprador bourgeoisie belong the high government officials and high military officers. These people, using their offices and influences and through bribes, embezzlement, hoarding, theft of government funds, speculation and through privileges they acquire as bureaucrats, have succeeded to accumulate a huge amount of wealth. Furthermore they serve international capitalism by acting as members of boards of directors investing in share companies and by managing different companies.

This bureaucratic bourgeoisie grew and consolidated itself when Haile Selassie started strengthening the central government and built a modern administrative apparatus, army and police forces. At the present time this bureaucratic bourgeoisie has the administrative power in its hands.

Private Comprador Bourgeoisie: To this section of the comprador bourgeoisie belong all those who are directly tied with imperialist capital through trade, industry and agriculture. The private comprador



bourgeoisie in Ethiopia are very insignificant both in terms of their numerical strength as well as their economic power. We find in this section of the comprador bourgeoisie big merchants, big industrialists, former bureaucrats who had amassed enough wealth through their administrative positions and are now engaged in private business, owners and managers of private banks, insurance companies, import and export firms, etc. Whatever the people are engaged in, or the products of their trading, industrial and agricultural enterprises are directly tied or under the control of the imperialists.

The main function of the private comprador bourgeoisie is to act as a conveyor belt in forwarding agricultural products, raw materials, etc. to the capitalist countries to distribute in the internal markets (of Ethiopia) the finished goods coming from these (capitalist) countries. This section of the comprador bourgeoisie through its participation in the numerous economic activities has increased since the Third Five Year plan, its political power remains absolutely weak. Nevertheless, with the increasing decline of feudalism and intensified economic penetration of imperialism (U.S. imperialism, especially, has intensified its economic activities in Ethiopia since the last few years) the economic and political strength of the private comprador bourgeoisie will certainly increase.

In general the whole comprador bourgeoisie is tied up with U.S. imperialism and feudalism and will be totally against the N.D.R. However, it is necessary to keep in mind the following points:

1) that despite its alliance with the feudal landlord class, the comprador bourgeoisie has its contradictions with this class. It does not like the junior role it occupies in the present feudal-comprador bourgeois ruling class alliance.

2) that as an agent of imperialism—international capitalism, the comprador bourgeoisie or a section of wants to expand 'capitalism.' This also leads to the exacerbation of the contradiction within the ruling class.

3) that the comprador bourgeoisie, just like the feudal landlord class, is divided according to different interests, nationality, etc.

So "which imperialist, which feudalism" in Ethiopia? At the present, when a clear revolutionary movement is not unfurled in the country, when we see the experience that revolutionary practice can give (in terms of its effect on the various classes including the ruling class), we state in general that the feudal landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie are the enemies of the Ethiopian N.D.R. As to what concerns imperialism it is undoubtedly U.S. imperialism which is the enemy of the Ethiopian people. What is most important at this point is that every revolutionary grasps the complex task of ascertaining the principal and non-principal contradictions at each period or stage of the revolution. . . .

. . . . .

## [Conclusion]

It is a well known fact that many spontaneous struggles based on particular grievances have occurred in Ethiopia. There can be no denying of the fact that the revolts have been exclusively the work of certain specific classes: the peasantry, the working, and the urban petty [sic] bourgeoisie. No landlord or bourgeoisie has organized even a section of its own class for a combat with the neo-colonial administration on a scale and persistence commensurate with the oppressed classes. Neither the landlord nor the bourgeoisie (which is tied to the landlord state) could fight the state for whose preservation it always deploys its every means. Hence the duty of the revolutionaries is to be partisan wholly, deeply and unhesitating on the side of the oppressed people. This is a cardinal principle because a revolutionary who wants to preach sermons to a bourgeoisie whose only religion is cold cash will endanger and complicate the direction of the revolution.

Why do we call for a revolution? Is it because a revolution is a picnic without agony and frustration, hate and love, anxiety and fears, violence and death, setbacks and retreats? No. First the reason one calls for a revolution is to remove by any means necessary the nexus of exploitation of man by man. This lofty principle requires the change of man himself about his own role as a living thing. And unless man struggles about his old conception of himself with the new, he would fail to overcome the old and adopt the new. He will fail to march in concert with progress, subduing the age-old inertia and backwardness that have

shackled his development.

The second reason lies precisely with the extent of the contradictions in a given society. The fact is that the Ethiopian theocratic state is too brutal and barbaric and this weighs heavily on the dispossessed masses. This situation has forced the people to rise up in various ways to fight this evil system. Hence revolution under the circumstances arms the people with the unshakable principles of victory. Many more reasons can be sighted, but the need for revolution in Ethiopia is dictated by the particular historical substratum of our country. If Ethiopian students deeply think of the strategies and tactics of this revolution, it is not because they are wishful thinkers, rather it is because they are articulating the demands of the Ethiopian oppressed classes whose struggles against their exploiters to date have been bitter. Our perspective for the revolution must have an objective basis independent of the parameter of those who consider themselves to be revolutionaries. It is only when the objective basis for the revolution is grasped that one can begin to appreciate the role of revolutionaries for their foresight and dedication. The glib talk that so and so is a revolutionary because so and so has this particular characteristic going for him is too simplistic and borders on the absurd. It is not the character of an individual revolutionary that makes the revolution a requirement. It is not the subjective form but the objective content of the oppressed classes that makes revolution both a desirable and necessary reality.

A revolution occurs when the oppressed classes abhor the present state of their lives and fear the future no longer. In educating the masses as to the ugliness of their present conditions and the brightness of the future, revolutionaries can play a decisive role. To overcome the fears of people, to assure them that once they grasp the nature of their oppression, they need not fear the outcome of their struggle; such are the tasks of the revolutionaries. The correct education that the masses must hold their own destiny firmly under their rational and collective, purposive and conscious control, must again come from revolutionaries. Therefore, the rôle of revolutionaries in the Ethiopian revolution must be put in its proper context. Again, it is not the revolutionaries that make the revolution; it is the revolutionary masses who are the primary motive forces. The revolutionary must integrate himself with the masses to revolutionize them on the subjective front. The fact that revolutions have objective foundation means that they are inevitable. Therefore, in one way or another, despite the desires of all opportunists and their tireless effort to befog the people with all kinds of theories, the revolutionary fire will ultimately prevail. Therefore, since revolution is neither the exclusive monopoly of those who call themselves revolutionaries nor of those few who try to prevent its ultimate occurrence, all people are called to struggle for the inevitable revolution.

To sum up the essence of our paper: We have argued that the masses are the real makers of history and they must be led only by the proletariat and its party. We have called for the creation of the

vanguard party now. We are acutely aware of the shortcomings of our research. Where investigation or empirical knowledge about our society is lacking, the choice is to resort to all sorts of generalizations. And for our popularisations to hold water, concrete investigations have to be undertaken. Ultimately, the decisive test of everything is social practice alone. And the next order of business is the practice of the integration of theory to the demands of our national historical substratum. While the study of theory is crucial, we realize that it is vacuous if theory is not made to serve practice. The study of theory in the abstract, theory for theory's sake, is a trade we hardly enjoy. We believe that we must grasp revolution by studying theory and by ultimately joining heart and soul with the masses of our people in their sacred revolution against those who unremittingly bully and exploit them. THE ETHIOPIAN PEOPLE SHALL WIN DECISIVELY.

#### APPENDIX

The proletariat's

favorite virtue: simplicity

favorite quality: strength

chief character: singleness of purpose

idea of happiness: fighting tyranny

idea of misery: submission to oppression

vice they detest most: servility

favorite motto: Liberation or Nothing

favorite song: The Internationale

favorite color: RED

The people and the people alone are the matrix and vector, spirit and letter, author and actor, proposer and disposer, the very premise and conclusion of human history. That is why the Ethiopian people's future is bright; their glorious victory is inevitable! \*

---

\*Source: World Wide Union of Ethiopian Students, Challenge, XII, No. 1 (October 1972), pp. 11-97.

## APPENDIX V

### Proclamation on the Dethronement of Emperor Haile Selassie

#### "Ethiopia Tikdem"

CONSIDERING that, although the people of Ethiopia look in good faith, upon the Crown, which has persisted for a long period in Ethiopian history, as a symbol of unity, Haile Selassie I, who has ruled this country for more than fifty years ever since he assumed power as Crown Prince has, not only left the country in its present crisis by abusing at various times the high and dignified authority conferred on him by the Ethiopian people, but also, being over 82 years of age and due to the consequent physical and mental exhaustion, is no more able to shoulder the high responsibilities of leadership;

RECOGNISING that the present system of parliamentary election is undemocratic; that Parliament heretofore has been serving not the people but its members and the ruling and aristocratic classes; that as a consequence it has refrained from legislating on land reform which is the basic problem of the country while passing laws at various times intended to raise the living standard of its members, thereby using the high authority conferred on it by the people to further the personal interests of its members and aggravating the misery of the people; and that its existence is contrary to the motto "Ethiopia Tikdem";

REALISING that the Constitution of 1955 was prepared to confer on the Emperor absolute powers; that it does not safeguard democratic rights but merely serves as a democratic façade for the benefit of world public opinion; that it was not conceived to serve the interests of the



Ethiopian people; that it was designed to give the baseless impression that fundamental natural rights are gifts from the Emperor to his people; and that, above all, it is inconsistent with the popular movement in progress under the motto "Ethiopia Tikdem" and with the fostering of economic, political and social development; and

BELIEVING that the ill effects of the past aristocratic rule have thrown the country into an abyss of economic, social and political problems; that it has become necessary to establish a strong provisional administration dedicated to serve the public good and capable of developing Ethiopia and coping with the various security problems prevailing at this transitional period;

It is hereby proclaimed as follows:-

1. This Proclamation may be cited as the "Provisional Military Government Establishment Proclamation, No. 1 of 1974."
2. Haile Selassie I is hereby deposed as of today, September 12, 1974.
3. (a) The Crown Prince, His Highness Merid Azmatch Asfa Wossen shall be King of Ethiopia.  
 (b) The coronation ceremony shall be held as soon as the Crown Prince returns to his country.  
 (c) The King shall be Head of State with no power in the country's administrative and political affairs.
4. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (Parliament) is hereby dissolved until the people elect through truly democratic processes their genuine representatives dedicated to serve the interests of the people.

5. (a) The Constitution of 1955 is hereby suspended.  
(b) The new draft constitution, the promulgation of which has been demanded by the Armed Forces Council as a matter of urgency, shall be put into effect after necessary improvements are made to include provisions reflecting the social, economic and political philosophy of the new Ethiopia and to safeguard the human rights of the people.
6. The Armed Forces, the Police and Territorial Army Council has hereby assumed full government power until a legally constituted people's assembly approves a new constitution and a government is duly established.
7. All courts of law through the country shall continue their normal functions.
8. It is hereby prohibited, for the duration of this Proclamation, to conspire against the motto "Ethiopia Tikdem," to engage in any strike, hold unauthorized demonstration or assembly or engage in any act that may disturb public peace and security.
9. A Military Court shall be established to try those who contravene Article 8 of this Proclamation and other laws to be issued hereafter as well as officials who may be charged with administrative and judicial misfeasance and unlawful enrichment. Judgement handed down by the Military Court shall not be subject to appeal.
10. All existing laws that do not conflict with the provisions of this Proclamation and with all future laws, orders and regulations shall continue in force.

11. This proclamation shall be in force as of Meskerem 2, 1967  
[September 12, 1974].

Provisional Military Government Establishment Proclamation,

Negarit Gazeta, 34/1, 12 September 1974.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### PRIMARY SOURCES

#### Documents: Government, Private and General

Abyssinia and Italy. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Information Department Papers, No. 16, 1935, Ac. 2273.

Abyssinia Association, England. Miscellaneous pamphlets. London, 1937, etc. W.P. 15232.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report for 1945. London, 1946- . 8. A.R. 1050.

\_\_\_\_\_. Speech of His Majesty the Emperor of Abyssinia at Geneva. Saint Catherine Press, 1936, 29 June, 1936, 012301, eee. 56.

Abyssinian Association, Italy. Laws. Treaties broken by Italy in the Abyssinian War. (Extracts from the relevant portions of various treaties.) Abyssinia Association, 1937. 5357. a. 14.

Abyssinian Expedition, 1867-1868. Financial Reform Union. Papers on Taxation and Expenditure. No. 6. How we drifted into the Abyssinian War. 1869.

Amda Seyon\* (Chronicles of). King of Ethiopia. Histoire des guerres d'Amda Seyon. Paris, 1890. 8. 754, b. 14.

Aloisi, Baron P. Speech of Baron Aloisi, Head of the Italian Delegation, to the League of Nations Assembly on October 9, 1935.

Arbitration Commission on the Wal Wal Dispute. Proceedings and other documents of the Commission. Edited by B. Pitman Potter. The Wal Wal Arbitration, 1938, 8.

"Avis des experts sur la constitution de l'Erythrée (L')." In Bulletin des nations unies, 15 mars, 1952.

Austin (Major). Foreign Office Document 403/299. London: Government of Great Britain, July 7, 1900.

Badoglio, Pietro. La Guerra d'Etiopia. Milano: Editioni Aurora, 1936.

\_\_\_\_\_. The War in Abyssinia. London: Methuen, 1937.

\*Following the Ethiopian tradition of identifying a person by the first and second names put together (and in that order), all Ethiopian names are classified in alphabetical order under the first name. This is an already accepted procedure among Ethiopian scholars and Ethiopianists.

Beke, (C. T.) A. A Statement of Facts Relating to the Transactions Between the Writer and the Late British Political Mission to the Court of Shoa. 1845. R98.

British-Italian Bulletin. Abyssinia, Italy and the League of Nations: A Guide to the Italo-Abyssinian Dispute and An Outline of Its Possible Settlement. London, 1935.

\_\_\_\_\_. A Short History of the Abyssinian Question. 1936.  
Illus. (47p.)

British Italian Council for Peace and Friendship. Correspondence Respecting Abyssinian Raids and Incursions into British Territory. B.P.P. 1924-5. XXX.

\_\_\_\_\_. England, Italy and Abyssinia: An Englishman's Impartial Survey. 1936. Z.

British Trade Mission to Ethiopia. Report. London: Committee for Middle East Trade, 1965.

Calder, Grant H. "Business and Public Administration in Ethiopian Higher Education." In Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia, Section III, 1961.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. Division Of Intercourse and Education. Italy and Ethiopia. (Addresses Delivered before the League of Nations Assembly by Sir Samuel Hoare, M. Laval and Mr. Cordell Hull, 11-13 Sept., 1935. N.Y., 1935. 20020. h. 30.

Claudius, King of Ethiopia. Chronique de Galawdewos, 1540-1559. Paris, 1895. 8°. 754. b. 32.

Committee on the Operation of the Education System. "The Current State of Affairs: A Short Review." Addis Ababa: November, 1966.

Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions. "Meglecha," [Resolution], March 1, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. Yé Communist Manifesto, Be-Karl Marx Enna Friedrich Engels Yetederresse. Addis Ababa: Yekatit, 1967 [February 1975].

Confederazione Fascista dei Commercianti. La prima missione commerciale nell'Africa imperiale italiana; relazione. Roma: Bemboral, 1936.

Dallari, G. Colonie ed autarchia. Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura. Sezione Provinciale di Torino. Autarchia, 1938.

de Bono, Emilio. Anno XIII, The Conquest of an Empire. London: Crescent Ross, 1937.

\_\_\_\_\_. La Preparazione e le Prime Operazioni: La Conquisia dell'Impero. Roma: Castaldi, 1937. WP5272/1.

The Diplomatic Press Trade Directory of the Empire of Ethiopia, Including Classified Trade Index. 1st edition. London: Diplomatic Press and Publishing Co., 1955.

The Ethiopian Armed Forces [The Air Force, Commando Units, Army Aviation, 29th Brigade, Engineering and Communications Corps], "Le Tor Hailenna Le Police Sérawit Wondemochachin," [To Our Armed Forces and Police Brothers]. Addis Ababa: March 24, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Yémesserach," [Rejoice]. Addis Ababa: February 30, 1974.

The Ethiopian Army, Second Division. "Besemenawi Etiopia Yémigegnew Yé Huletegnaw Kiflé-Tor..." [The Second Division From the Northern Front ...]. Addis Ababa: Megabit 5, 1966 [March 12, 1974].

Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce. Director of Industry: Addis Ababa, Akaki, Debre Zeit, Mojo, Nazreth and Dire Dawa, Harar and Asmara. Addis Ababa: 1972. 2.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopia, A Partner in International Trade. (L'Ethiopie comme partenaire dans le commerce international.) Addis Ababa: 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_. Guidebook of Ethiopia (With Illustrations). Addis Ababa: 8. S. v. 404 (443), 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_. Import and Export Formalities in Ethiopia, 1967. Addis Ababa: 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. Monthly Bulletin, 9, 2. Addis Ababa: Feb. 1971.

\_\_\_\_\_. Trade Directory. Addis Ababa: 1966.

The [Ethiopian] Emperor. The Ethiopian Herald. Addis Ababa: Dec. 9, 1960.

Ethiopian Nationalist Organization, "Keij Ayshal Doma" [Not Better].  
Addis Ababa: February 23, 1974.

Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, Abyot, 1, 7, 1976 and 1, 8, 1976.

Ethiopian Press Association of the Ministry of Information. "Le Etiopia  
Tor Hailochenna Le Etiopia Hezb" [To the Ethiopian Armed  
Forces and the People of Ethiopia.] Addis Ababa:  
February 28, 1974.

Ethiopian Priests. "Yeteressa Mastawesha" [The Forgotten Point].  
Addis Ababa: February 18, 1974.

Ethiopian Students and Teachers. "Atawolawul Wotté" [Do Not Hesitate  
Soldier]. Addis Ababa: Yekatit 21, 1966 [March 2, 1974].

\_\_\_\_\_. "Eskéméché Yélijoch Mengist" [How Long Under the  
Children of the Aristocracy?]. Addis Ababa: August 5, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Hod Siyawuk Doro Mata" [The Obvious Pretension].  
Yekatit 28, 1966 [March 7, 1974].

\_\_\_\_\_. "Tatbo Chika: Tiglu Yiketilal" [Step Backwards: The  
Struggle Will Continue]. Addis Ababa: Hamlé 16, 1966  
[July 30, 1974].

\_\_\_\_\_. "Tishalin Tiché Tibisin Agebahu" [Worse Than Before].  
Addis Ababa: Yekatit 22, 1966 [March 1, 1974].

\_\_\_\_\_. "Yé Aklilu Awaj" [Aklilu's Proclamation]. Addis Ababa:  
February 20, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Yé Etiopia Hizb Hoy" [To the Ethiopian People]. Addis  
Ababa: March 3, 1974.

Ethiopian Students' Union in Europe. Fourteenth General Assembly  
Report, Meskerem 1967 [September 1975].

Ethiopian Teachers' Association. "Besemien Etiopia . . ." [Northern  
Ethiopia]. Addis Ababa: Megabit 5, 1966 [February 12, 1974].

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Education Sector Review." Unpublished monograph.  
Addis Ababa, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Meglecha" [Resolution]. Addis Ababa: March 1, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Yé Addis Ababa Memheran Dimtz" [Voice of Addis Ababa  
Teachers]. Addis Ababa: Yekatit 27, 1966 [March 2, 1974].

Ethiopian Teachers' Association. "Yemin Heywet New" [What Life?].  
Addis Ababa: February 20, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Yetemehert Atekalay Tenat" [The Education Sector Review].  
Addis Ababa: Yekatit 22, 1966 [February 29, 1974].

Ethiopian University Teachers' Association. "Ké Etiopia Yé University  
Memheran Mahber Yéwetta Meglecha" [Resolution of Ethiopian  
University Teachers' Association]. Addis Ababa: April 23,  
1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Meglecha . . ." [Resolution . . .]. Addis Ababa, February 19,  
1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Meglecha" [Resolution]. Addis Ababa: Yekatit 22, 1966  
[February 27, 1974].

Fetha Nagast and the Ethiopian Sinodos. Testi di diritto antichi e moderni  
riguardanti gli Etiopi. [Extracted for the Most Part from the  
"Fetha Nagast" and the "Sinodos." ] Edited by Mauro Da  
Leonessa. Vatican City: 1931.

Government of Ethiopia. Berhanenna Selam (Amharic). Addis Ababa:  
Sené 30, 1919 [1926], Tirr 21, 1917 [1926], Hamlé 5, 1920  
[1928], and Miazia 18, 1920 [1927], Megabit 22, 1919 [1926].

Government of Ethiopia. Central Statistical Office [Yé-Statistics Mesria  
Bet]. Report on Survey of Adwa (and Other Urban Areas  
and Provinces). Addis Ababa: 1968.

\_\_\_\_\_. Statistical Abstracts. Addis Ababa: 1960-1974.

Government of Ethiopia. Central Statistical Office and Ministry of Com-  
merce, Industry and Tourism. Survey of Manufacturing and  
Electricity Industry 1964/5 - 1966/7, Addis Ababa: June 1969.

Government of Ethiopia. Committee on the Operation of the Education  
System. The Current State of Affairs: A Short Review.  
Addis Ababa: November 1966.

Government of Ethiopia. The Constitution of Ethiopia Promulgated by  
Emperor Halle Selassie. Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam,  
1931.

Government of Ethiopia. Customs Head Office [Goomrook Mesria Bet].  
Annual Import and Export Trade Statistics. Addis Ababa:  
annual 1949-1952, 1956-7, 1959-60, 1962-1966.

\_\_\_\_\_. Monthly External Trade Statistics. Addis Ababa: 1 Jan. 1967.



Government of Ethiopia. Department of the Press and Information.  
La Civilisation de l'Italie Fasciste en Ethiopie. 2 Vols.  
 Addis Ababa: 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Eritrea . . . and Benadir: Fight for Your Own King, and  
 Your Own Flag!" Addis Ababa: 1945.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopia; General Background Information. Rev. and  
 improved. Addis Ababa: 1958.

Government of Ethiopia. Dispute Between Ethiopia and Italy. (Memoran-  
 dum by the Imperial Ethiopian Government on the Incidents at  
 Wal Wal Between Nov. 23rd and Dec. 5th, 1934.) Dated  
 15 January 1935. U.N.E. 83.

\_\_\_\_\_. Dispute Between Ethiopia and Italy. . . . (Memorandum  
 by the Imperial Ethiopian Government.) Distributed on  
 May 22nd, 1935. 1935. U.N.E. 85.

\_\_\_\_\_. Five Year Development Plan, 1957-1961. (2nd English  
 edition.) Addis Ababa: 1959. VII.

Government of Ethiopia. Ministry of Commerce and Industry [Yé-  
 Nigdinna Yé-Indoostry Ministér]. Economic Handbook of  
 Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 1951.

\_\_\_\_\_. Economic Handbook. Addis Ababa: 1958  
 IX, 93, S.

\_\_\_\_\_. Economic Progress of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 1955. XII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopian Economic Review. Addis Ababa: 1974. .

\_\_\_\_\_. A General Summary of Information Regarding Export  
 Commodities and Local Manufactures of the Empire of Ethiopia.  
 Prepared by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the  
 Imperial Ethiopian Government. Addis Ababa: Chamber of  
 Commerce, Foreword 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. Quarterly Bulletin. Addis Ababa: 1952 to date, 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report on the External Trade of Ethiopia . . . Sept. 11,  
 1946 - Sept. 10, 1952. Addis Ababa: 1953. fo. (XI), 29.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report on External Trade of Ethiopia, 1937-43, Ethiopian  
 Calendar. Addis Ababa: 1952. fo. (II), 21.

Government of Ethiopia. Ministry of Education and Fine Arts. [Yé-Timhirtinna Yé Sinétibéb Ministér]. Annual Report. Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1969-1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. Bureau of Educational Research and Statistics. "Government, Mission, Private, Community, and Church Schools." Addis Ababa: 1960.

\_\_\_\_\_. Culture: A National Problem. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, 1967. 10, 41.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Development of Pre-Service Teacher Education." Addis Ababa: 1937-1963 [1944-1971].

\_\_\_\_\_. "Education in Ethiopia: A Survey Issued by the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts." Addis Ababa: 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Elementary [and] Community School Curriculum." Addis Ababa: 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. Long Term Planning Committee. "A Ten Year Plan for the Controlled Expansion of Ethiopian Education." Addis Ababa: 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_. A Proposed Plan for the Development of Education in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Press, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Report on the Current Operation of the Education System in Ethiopia." Addis Ababa: 1969.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Report of the Education Sector Review." Addis Ababa: August: 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Report of the Education Team on Elementary School Building Programme." Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report of the Technical Education Committee. Addis Ababa: 1950, Article IV, Section 2.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Report on the Current Operation of the Education System in Ethiopia." Addis Ababa: 1969.

\_\_\_\_\_. "School Census for Ethiopia." Addis Ababa, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. "School Census for Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_. "School Census for Ethiopia" (part 2). Addis Ababa: 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Secondary School Curriculum 1951 EC [1958]." (2nd edition.) Addis Ababa: 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. Teacher Education Division. "The Development of Pre-Service Teacher Education." Addis Ababa: 1937-1963 EC [1944-1970].

\_\_\_\_\_. Yearbook. Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1942-43 [1949-51 G.C.].

\_\_\_\_\_. Yé/1967/1968 Zemecha Kenewun Atekalay Zegeba. " (Summary Report of the 1974-75 Educational Campaign.) Vol. 1. Addis Ababa: 1968 [1976].

Government of Ethiopia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ethiopian Embassy in London. Ethiopia in Review. London: 1957. 4 . S.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Memoranda Presented by the Imperial Ethiopian Government to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London." September 1945. Addis Ababa: 1955.

Government of Ethiopia. Ministry of Information [Yé-Mastawékiya Ministér]. Ethiopia: A Brief Sketch. Addis Ababa: Publications and Foreign Languages Press Dept., Ministry of Information, n.d.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopia: Facts and Figures. Issued by the Ministry of Information of the Imperial Ethiopian Government. Addis Ababa: 1960. (65, IV, IV p.)

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopia. The Handbook for Ethiopia, Incorporating "Welcome to Ethiopia." Written, produced, and published for the Publications and Foreign Languages Press Department, Ministry of Information, Imperial Ethiopian Government. Nairobi, Kenya: 1969.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopia: Liberation and Silver Jubilee, 1941-1966. Chief editor: David Abner Talbot. Collaborators: Narayan Easwaran and others. Addis Ababa: Publications and Foreign Languages Press Department, Ministry of Information, 1966. VII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopia, Past and Present. Addis Ababa: Publications and Foreign Languages Press Dept., Ministry of Information, 1967.

Government of Ethiopia. Ministry of Information. Image of Ethiopia.  
Addis Ababa: 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_. Industry in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Publications and  
Foreign Languages Press Department, Ministry of Information,  
1966.

\_\_\_\_\_. National Defence of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ministry of  
Information, Publications and Foreign Languages Press  
Department, 1968.

\_\_\_\_\_. Notre Terre. Addis Ababa: Département des publications  
et de la presse en langues étrangères, Ministère de l'informa-  
tion, [n.d.].

\_\_\_\_\_. Public Health in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam,  
1965.

Government of Ethiopia. Ministry of Justice [Yé Fird Ministér].  
Documents on Italian War Crimes Submitted to the United  
Nations War Crimes Commission by the Imperial Ethiopian  
Government. Addis Ababa: 1949, 1950. 2 Vols. fol. S.

Government of Ethiopia. Ministry of Pen [Yé Tsihfét Ministér].  
Negarit Gazeta. Addis Ababa: July 28, 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_. Negarit Gazeta. Notice No. 284, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Order No. 1 of 1943." Negarit Gazeta, II. Addis Ababa:  
1950.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Proclamation No. 94 of 1947." Negarit Gazeta, VII.  
Addis Ababa: 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Proclamation No. 326 of 1966." Negarit Gazeta. Addis  
Ababa: 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Public Safety and Welfare Order, 1964." Negarit Gazeta.  
Addis Ababa: April 7, 1969.

Government of Ethiopia. Ministry of Planning and Development. Capital  
Project Inventory; Forms and Explanations for the Detailed  
Guidance of the Planning Committees and Units in the  
Ministries and Agencies. Addis Ababa: 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. Memorandum on the Establishment of Appropriate Machinery  
at the Central Government Level for Preparation of the Third  
Five-Year Development Plan. Addis Ababa: 1967.

Government of Ethiopia. "Italy's War Crimes in Ethiopia." Evidence for the War Crimes Commission. New Times and Ethiopia News. Woodford Green, 1945.

Government of Ethiopia. Planning Board [Yé Planing Bord Mestriya Bét]. Annual Development Program, 1955 E.C. Addis Ababa: Imperial Ethiopian Government, Office of the Planning Board, 1955 [1962]. (68p.)

\_\_\_\_\_. First Five-Year Development Plan. Addis Ababa 1950-1955 [1957-1962 G.C.].

\_\_\_\_\_. Second Five-Year Development Plan, 1955-1959 E.C. [1963-1967 G.C.]. Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_. Third Five-Year Development Plan, 1961-1965 E.C. [1968-1973]. Addis Ababa, 1968.

Government of Ethiopia. Provisional Military Administrative Council [Gizeyawi Wettaderawi Astedader Mengist (or Derg)]. Abiyotawit Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Tahsas 15, 1969 [Dec. 1977].

\_\_\_\_\_. "Awaj" [Proclamation]. Negarit Gazeta, No. 1, 1967 [1974].

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopian Revolution Information Centre. Revolutionary Ethiopia Fact Sheet. Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1978.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ethiopia Tikdem," The Origins and Future Directions of the Movement. Addis Ababa: Dec. 20, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. Measures for Rural Transformation. Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1977.

\_\_\_\_\_. "National Literacy Campaign Status Report." Addis Ababa: 1979.

\_\_\_\_\_. "A Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of Rural Lands." Negarit Gazeta, April 29, 1975.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Proclamation No. 1/1974." Negarit Gazeta. Addis Ababa: September 15, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministry of Information and National Guidance. Four Years of Revolutionary Progress. Addis Ababa, 1978.

Government of Ethiopia. Provisional Military Administrative Council.  
Support the Just Cause of the Ethiopian People. Addis Ababa:  
 Berhanenna Selam, 1977.

\_\_\_\_\_. Yétigil Mé'eraf [Chapter of Struggle]. Addis Ababa:  
 Artistic Press, 1975.

Government of Ethiopia. Regulations Prohibiting Trading with the Enemy.  
 Addis Ababa: 1915. fol. 8244.

\_\_\_\_\_. Revised Constitution of Ethiopia, as Promulgated by His  
 Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, on Twenty-four Tekemt,  
 one thousand nine hundred and forty eight (4th November 1955)  
 on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of his  
 Coronation. Addis Ababa: 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Royal Chronicle of Abyssinia, 1969-1840. Cambridge:  
 1922. 754, ee. 10.

\_\_\_\_\_. Rules of Court for His Majesty's Courts in Abyssinia.  
 Addis Ababa: 1916. fol. 5319.

\_\_\_\_\_. Quarterly Exports of Principal Agricultural Products,  
 Ethiopian Years, 1937-47. Division of Agricultural Economics  
 and Statistical Bulletins Publication. No. 1. Addis Ababa:  
 1955. fo. 43.

Government of Italy. Appendix. Politics. The Grounds for the Serious  
 Charges Brought by Italy against Abyssinia. Rome: 1935.  
 20020.

\_\_\_\_\_. Corpo di Siao Maggiore. Ufficio Storico. La Campagna  
 1935-36 in Africa orientale. Roma: 1939. W.P. 1244.

\_\_\_\_\_. Confederazione Nazionale Fascista del Commercio. Etiopia  
 Italiana. Aspetti e sviluppi della valorizzazione economica  
 dell'A.O.I. Roma: 1936. 20011. ff. 43.

\_\_\_\_\_. Dispute Between Ethiopia and Italy. Memorandum by the  
 Italian Government on the Situation in Ethiopia. 3 pt.  
 Geneva: 1935. Ac. 2299/37.

\_\_\_\_\_. Istituto Coloniale Italiano. Il Tigre. Descritto da un  
 Missionario gesuita dea secolo. XVII. Roma: 1909. 0100751.

\_\_\_\_\_. Istituto Nazionale Pascista di Cultura. La Conquista dell'  
 impero. Roma: 1937. W.P. 5272.

Government of Italy. Memoria del Governo Italiano circa la situazione in Etiopia. Milano: 1935. 20010. f. 20.

\_\_\_\_\_. Memorandum of the Italian Government on the Situation in Abyssinia. 2v. (in 1). Rome: 1936.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministero dell'Africa Italiana. Sillabario e Piccole Letture (Scuole Primarie per Indigenie). New edition compiled by Fulvio Contini. Rome: 1937.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministero dell'Africa Italiana. Libro Sussidicorio per la Terza Classe Elementare (Scuole Elementari per Indigeni). Sesta edizione. Rome: 1937.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministero dell'Africa Italiana. Il Libro della Seconda Classe. Rome: 1937.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministero dell'Africa Italiana. Rassegna di studi etiopici. Rome: 1943. P.P. 4188. gf.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministero degli Affari Esteri. Comitato per la Documentazione dell'Opera dell'Italia in Africa. L'Italia in Africa. Serie Storica. v. 1. Etiopia—Mar Rosso, 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministry of Information. Le Campagne d'Ethiopia. Relazione ufficiale delle operazioni nell'Africa orientale italiana. (Pubblicata dal Ministero delle Informazioni per conto del Ministero della Guerra. London: 1945.

\_\_\_\_\_. Supplemento al vol. 7. Consuetudini giuridiche del Seraé. Raccolte dall'assemblea dei suoi notabili ad iniziativa del Commissariato regionale de Addi Ugri. Ethiopie et Italia. Roma: 1948- . P.P. 4188. gf. (2).

\_\_\_\_\_. Victor Emmanuel III, King. The Italo-Ethiopian Dispute. Abstracts from the Memorandum of the Italian Government. Roma: 1935. 20020. g. IV.

\_\_\_\_\_. Victor Emmanuel III, King. Memoria del Governo Italiano circa la situazione in Etiopia. 2 Vols. 1935. fol. S. 35. ee.

Government of the United Kingdom. "The Abyssinian Campaigns." London: Ministry of Information, 1942.

\_\_\_\_\_. Agreement Between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 19th December, 1944. 8 . 1945.

Government of the United Kingdom. Agreement Between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia for the Regulation of Mutual Relations. With annexure, schedule and exchange of letters. Addis Ababa: 19th December, 1944. (English and Amharic.) 1949. 8 .

\_\_\_\_\_. Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia 1944. Addis Ababa: 1944-45. B. P. P.

\_\_\_\_\_. Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia relating to Certain Matters Connected with the Withdrawal of British Military Administration from the Territories Designated as the Reserved Area and the Ogaden. London: November 29, 1954. B. P. P. 1954-55, XIX.

\_\_\_\_\_. British Admiralty. A Handbook of Abyssinia. 2 pt. London: 1917. 8 . & fol. 010094. e. 57.

\_\_\_\_\_. Board of Trade: Trade Mission to Egypt, the Sudan and Ethiopia. Report. London: 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_. Captives Liberation Fund. Letters from the Captive Missionaries in Abyssinia. 1865. R237.

\_\_\_\_\_. Copy of Two Despatches from Sir Robert Napier to the Secretary of State for India, dated April and May, 1868. B. P. P. 1867-8, XLIII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Correspondence relating to the Land Transport Corps. B. P. P. 1871, L.

\_\_\_\_\_. The English Council in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 1929-31. 1932.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopian King's Regulation Made Under "The Abyssinia Order in Council, 1913." London: 1933. B. S. 14/41. a.

\_\_\_\_\_. Explanation of Lord Napier of Magdala Relating to Certain Statements in Mr. Rassam's Abyssinian Report. B. P. P. 1868-9, LXIII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Exchanges of Notes Between the United Kingdom and the French Government Regarding Proposed Cession of Territory in the Zella Area to Ethiopia. B. P. P. 1948-49, XXXV.



Government of the United Kingdom. Exchanges of Notes Between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia amending the Description of the Kenya-Ethiopia Boundary. B.P.P. 1947-48, XXIX.

\_\_\_\_\_. Exchanges of Notes Between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia for the appointment of a Mixed Committee to Demarcate the Boundary Between Kenya and Ethiopia. B.P.P. 1950-51, XXXII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Exchange of Notes Between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia Extending the Period of the Operation of the Mixed Committee to Demarcate the Boundary Between Kenya and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: December 15, 1953/January 11, 1954. B.P.P. 1953-54, XXXIII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Exchange of Notes Between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia Extending the Period of the Operation of the Mixed Committee to Demarcate the Boundary Between Kenya and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: March 22/April 11, 1955. B.P.P. 1955-56, XLIV.

\_\_\_\_\_. Exchange of Notes Between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia Regarding the Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia under the Sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown. Addis Ababa: August 27/29, 1952. B.P.P. 1953-54, XXXIII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Exchange of Notes Between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia Providing for the Termination of the Lease of the Gambella Enclave. Addis Ababa: July 5, and August 12, 1955. B.P.P. 1955-56, XLIV.

\_\_\_\_\_. Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ethiopia amending the Description of the Kenya/Ethiopia Boundary. Addis Ababa: 29th September 1947. 1948.

\_\_\_\_\_. Foreign Office. Index to the Ethiopia Order in Council, 1934. 1936. B.S. 14/27.

\_\_\_\_\_. Further Correspondence Respecting the British Captives in Abyssinia, 206. B.P.P. 1867, LXXIII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Further Papers Connected with the Abyssinian Emperor, 184. B.P.P. 1867-8, XLIII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Government Publications. Agreement and Military Conventions Between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia. B.P.P. 1941-42, IX.

Government of the United Kingdom. Government Publications. Correspondence Respecting Abyssinian Raids and Incursions into British Territory and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. B.P.P. 1928-9, XXIII.

\_\_\_\_\_. A Handbook of Abyssinia. General. 1917.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ministry of Information. The Abyssinian Campaigns. London: 1942.

\_\_\_\_\_. Miscellaneous Public Documents, George V. The Ethiopia Order in Council, 1934. 1934. B.S. 32/3.

\_\_\_\_\_. Papers Concerning Raids from Ethiopia Territory into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. B.P.P. 1931-2, XXVII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Paper Connected with the Abyssinian Emperor. B.P.P. 1867-8, XLIII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Papers Relating to the Imprisonment of British Subjects in Abyssinia. B.P.P. 1865, LVII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report by A.E. Butter in the Survey of the Proposed Frontier Between British East Africa and Abyssinia. B.P.P. 1905, LVI.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report by Mr. Rassam Respecting his Mission to Abyssinia. B.P.P. 1868-9, LXIII. (51p.)

\_\_\_\_\_. Report from Consul Cameron respecting his Imprisonment in Abyssinia. B.P.P. 1868-9, LXIII.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report from the Select Committee on the Abyssinian Emperor, 694. B.P.P. 1870, V.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report from the Select Committee on the Abyssinian War; With the Minutes of Evidence. 213, 41. B.P.P. 1868-9, VI.

\_\_\_\_\_. Routes in Abyssinia. (Illus.) B.P.P. 1867-8, XLIV.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaties. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ethiopia Relating to Certain Matters Connected with the Withdrawal of British Military Administration from the Territories Designated as the Reserved Area and the Ogaden. London: Nov. 29, 1954. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1955.

Government of the United Kingdom, Treaty, Ethiopia, August 6, 1971.

Exchange of Notes Concerning an Interest-Free Loan by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Government of the Empire of Ethiopia (Ethiopia/United Kingdom Agricultural Equipment Loan Agreement 1971). Addis Ababa: 6 August, 1971. London: H.M.S.O. 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaties Between Great Britain and Ethiopia, Ethiopia, Oct. 1, 1973. Exchange of Notes Concerning Financial Assistance by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Empire of Ethiopia (Ethiopia/United Kingdom Highway Maintenance Equipment Loan and Grant 1973). Addis Ababa: 1 Oct. 1973. London: H.M.S.O. 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaties, Ethiopia, April 23, 1973. Exchange of Notes Concerning an Aid Grant and Loan by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Government of the Empire of Ethiopia (Ethiopia/United Kingdom Aid Grant and Loan Agreement 1973). Addis Ababa: 23 April 1973. London: H.M.S.O. 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaties, etc. Ethiopia, March 21, 1972. Exchange of Notes Concerning an Interest-Free Loan by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Government of the Empire of Ethiopia (Ethiopia/United Kingdom Civil Aviation Loan Agreement 1972). Addis Ababa: 21 March, 1972. London: H.M.S.O. 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaty Between Great Britain and Ethiopia. B.P.P. 1898, CV.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaty Between the United Kingdom, France, and Italy Respecting Abyssinia. B.P.P. 1907, XCIX.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce Between Great Britain and Abyssinia. B.P.P. 1852, LIV.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaties Related to the Frontiers Between the Soudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, signed at Addis Ababa, May 15, 1902. B.P.P. 1902, CXXX.

\_\_\_\_\_. United Kingdom Trade Mission to Egypt, the Sudan, and Ethiopia. Report. London: H.M.S.O., 1955.

Government of the United States of America. American Consul in Aden, Arabia, Letter to the Secretary of State of the United States. Aden: April 20, 1919.

\_\_\_\_\_. American Consul in Aden, Arabia, Letter to the Secretary of State of the United States. Aden: Dated February 6, 1922.

\_\_\_\_\_. American Consul in Aden, Arabia, Letter to the Secretary of State of the United States. Aden: Dated April 20, 1919.

\_\_\_\_\_. American Consul in Egypt (Coert du Bois). Notes on the Situation in Abyssinia. Port Said, Egypt: March 14, 1923.

\_\_\_\_\_. American Legation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Letter to the Secretary of State of the United States. Addis Ababa: Dec. 8, 1928.

Government of the United States. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States of America. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927.

\_\_\_\_\_. Foreign Relations of the United States of America, IV. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942, p. 106.

\_\_\_\_\_. A Letter from the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa to the Department of State. National Archives of the United States, M-412. Government of the United States, 1914.

Government of the United States. Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia Effected by Exchange of Notes Signed at Addis Ababa, June 12, and 13, 1952, Entered into Force June 13, 1952. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 54, 39.

\_\_\_\_\_. Special Consular Report on Abyssinia: Present Commercial Status of Country with Special Reference to Possibilities for American Trade. 1918. W.

\_\_\_\_\_. Technical Co-operation: Application to Eritrea. Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia, effected by exchange of notes dated at Addis Ababa, December 24, 1952, and March 30, 1953, Entered into Force March 30, 1953. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 54.

\_\_\_\_\_. Technical Co-operation: Application to Eritrea of program for Technical and Science Education. Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia, Effected by Exchange of Notes Dated at Addis Ababa, June 19, and 25, 1953, Entered into Force June 25, 1953. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 54.

Government of the United States. Technical Co-operation: Program of Agriculture. Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia, Effected by Exchange of Notes Dated at Addis Ababa, June 23 and 30, 1953, Entered into Force June 30, 1953. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 54.

\_\_\_\_\_. Technical Co-operation: Well Drilling Under Program for Water Resources Development. Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia, Effected by Exchange of Notes dated at Addis Ababa, June 27 and 30, 1953, Entered into Force June 30, 1953. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 54.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaties, 1946-1953 (Truman). Amity and Economic Relations. Treaty, with Exchanges of Notes, Between the United States of America and Ethiopia Signed at Addis Ababa, September 7, 1951. Ratifications Exchanged at Addis Ababa, September 8, 1953; Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America November 3, 1953; Entered into Force October 8, 1953. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaties, 1953- (Eisenhower). Utilization of Defense Installations within Empire of Ethiopia. Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia Signed at Washington, May 22, 1953. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_. Treaties, 1963- (Lyndon B. Johnson). Exchange of Official Publications. Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia Effected by Exchange of Notes signed at Addis Ababa, November 25, 1964. Washington: For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.

\_\_\_\_\_. U.S. Consul in Paris [Robert Skinner]. Abyssinia of Today. New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1966. (pp. 91-92)

\_\_\_\_\_. U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa. Commission for Educational Exchange Between Ethiopia and the United States. Addis Ababa: 1963.

\_\_\_\_\_. U.S. Operations Mission to Ethiopia. Progress Report Point IV Report to Ethiopia on Ten Years of Joint Technical and Economic Cooperation Between the United States and the Imperial Ethiopian Government. Addis Ababa: U.S. Communications Media Centre, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_. "U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia." Part VIII. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1970.

Government of the United States. U.S. Congress. U.S. Foreign Operations in Africa. Senate Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Utilization of Defense Installations Within Empire of Ethiopia. Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia Signed at Washington, May 22, 1953, entered into Force May 22, 1953. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 54.

Governments of Ethiopia and the United States. "Amity and Economic Relations—Treaty with Exchange of Notes Between the United States of America and Ethiopia (1946-1953)," Signed at Addis Ababa: Sept. 7, 1951. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Mutual Defense Assistance: Facilities and Assistance Program." Addis Ababa: December 26, 1957.

\_\_\_\_\_. Utilization of Defense Installations With the Empire of Ethiopia—Agreement Between the United States of America and Ethiopia. Signed at Washington, May 22, 1953. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

Graziani, (R.) Il Fronte sud. Milano: 1938. 09062, d. 1. (348p.)

Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia. "An Address by the Emperor of Ethiopia at the Inauguration of Haile Selassie I University." In Education and Nation Building in Africa. Edited by L.G. Gowan, J. O'Connell, and D.G. Seanlon. London: Pall Mall Press, 1965. pp. 303-309.

\_\_\_\_\_. Emperor of Ethiopia, 1891-1975. An Anthology of Some of the Public Utterances of His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I. Addis Ababa, 1949.

\_\_\_\_\_. Emperor of Ethiopia. Important Utterances of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, 1963-1972. Addis Ababa: Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Inaugural Address," UNESCO-ECA Final Report. UNESCO: E.D/181, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_. King of Kings, Heywetenna Yé Etiopia Ermeja (Amharic, written in 1936). Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1972.

Haile Selassie University. "Message from the Emperor." Program of the Convocation Celebrating the Founding of Haile Selassie I University. Addis Ababa, 1961.

Heerfordt, (C.F.) A Scandinavian Proposal Concerning the Basis and the Method for a Possible Attempt of Making Peace Between Italy and Abyssinia. 1935. Copy (mimeographed).

Hezbawi Revolution Dirijit (Peoples' Revolutionary Organization). "Yé Ethiopia Hezb Ayi Wéhabédm—Yé Leul Ras Asraté Kassa Tenkolenna Gif" [One Cannot Fool the Ethiopian People: His Highness Ras Asrate Kassar's Intrigues and Oppression]. Addis Ababa: February 30, 1974.

Imperial Ethiopian Bodyguard. Ke-Neguse-Negestu Yé Kibir Zebegna Yétesette Meglecha [Notice from the Imperial Bodyguard]. Addis Ababa: 1974.

Imperial Ethiopian Institute of Public Administration—Research Division. Negarit Gazeta. Alphabetical Index. Prepared by R.F. Ward. (Issued jointly by the Imperial Ethiopian Institute of Public Administration and the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration.) Addis Ababa: 1958.

Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. Milan. Il Conflitto italo-etiope. Documenti, 1936, W.P. 11872.

Kebra Nagast. The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek. Translation by Sir E.A. Wallis Budge. London: Medici Society, 1922. 754. ee. 9.

League of Nations (The). VII. 1923. Admission of Abyssinia to the League of Nations: Report Presented by the Sixth Committee to the Assembly. G.

\_\_\_\_\_. Council. Dispute Between Ethiopia and Italy. Report by the Committee of Five to the Council, 24 Sept. 1935. Geneva: 1935. fol. Ac. 2299/37.

\_\_\_\_\_. Dispute Between Ethiopia and Italy: Co-ordination Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant: Decisions and Resolutions of the Second Session, October 31st-November 2nd, 1935. 1935. G.P.

\_\_\_\_\_. Dispute Between Ethiopia and Italy. Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant. 5 pt. Geneva: 1935. fol. Ac. 2290/36.

\_\_\_\_\_. Dispute Between Abyssinia and Italy. (Memorandum by the Imperial Ethiopian Government on the Incidents at Wal Wal Between Nov. 23 and Dec. 5, 1934.) Geneva: 1935. fol. Ac. 2299/37. (1).

League of Nations (The). Dispute Between Ethiopia and Italy. Memorandum (by the Ethiopian Government), 22 May 1935. Geneva: 1935. fol. Ac. 2299/37.

\_\_\_\_\_. Dispute Between Ethiopia and Italy. Request by the Ethiopian Government. Report of the Council under Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, Adopted on Oct. 7th, 1935. Geneva: 1935. fol. Ac. 2299/37.

\_\_\_\_\_. Dispute Between Abyssinia and Italy: Request by the Ethiopian Government Under Article 11, Paragraph 2, of the Covenant. 1935. G.P.

\_\_\_\_\_. League Against Imperialism and for National Independence. International Secretariat. The War Danger Over Abyssinia. London: The League, 1935.

\_\_\_\_\_. Memorandum by the Italian Government on the Situation in Ethiopia, 1935.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report of the Committee of Five to the Council. 1935. G.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report of the Council under Article 15, Paragraph 4, of the Covenant. 1935. G.P.

\_\_\_\_\_. VII. 1923. (4) Request for Admission to the League of Nations. f. A. pp. (2). G. (in French and English).

\_\_\_\_\_. Request by the Ethiopian Government. Illus. 1935. G.P.

League of Nations Union (England). The Tragedy of Abyssinia. 1936. 20020. bb. 13.

Mabaa Seyon. Lives of Mabaa Seyon and Gabra Krestos. The Ethiopic Texts, edited with an English translation by E.A.W. Budge. 65. London: 1899. 4 . 754. g. 3.

Matte, Lucien. "Haile Selassie University Committee Report." Addis Ababa: 1952.

Memer Lessanu. "Nuzazenna Subae Begoffa" Sefer [Testimony at Goffa District]. Addis Ababa: Hemlé, 18, 1966 [July 23, 1974].

Monthly Report on Economic Conditions and Market Trends of Ethiopia, 2, 8. Nov. 1950. Addis Ababa: 1950-1974. 4 . S. v. 410/5.



Mussolini, Benito. I Dritti della Scuola. 8. Roma: Dec. 10, 1935, p. 118.

\_\_\_\_\_. La Fondazione dell'Impero. Roma: 1936.

\_\_\_\_\_. Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini. Vol. III. Edited by Eduardo and Dmitro Sumel. Firenze: La Ferrice, 1959.

The New Movement Group and Cultural Revolutionaries. "Bezimet Yagétu Zarés Tégalétu" [Exposing Promiscuity]. Addis Ababa: February 30, 1974.

New Times and Ethiopian News. Italy's War-Crimes in Ethiopia. Evidence for the War Crimes Commission (with illustrations). Woodford Green: 1945.

Rocke, (C.) The Truth about Abyssinia by an Eye Witness, in an Open Letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lords Cecil, Craigmyle and Snowden, the Rt. Hon. G. Barnes, Sir Norman Angell. 1935.

The Royal Chronicle of Abyssinia, 1769-1840. With Translation and Notes by H. Weld Blundell. 543. Cambridge: University Press, 1922. 8 . 754. ee. 10.

Royal Institute of International Affairs. Information Department Papers. No. 16. Abyssinia and Italy. Illus. 1935.

A Short History of the Abyssinian Question. London: British-Italian Bulletin, 1936.

Skinner, Robert Peet. Abyssinia of Today. An Account of the First Mission Sent by the American Government to the court of the King of Kings, 1903-1904. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1989. [See also Government of the United States.]

Simigli de San Detole, (T.) Etiopia Francescana nei documenti dei secoli XVII e XVIII. Firenze: 1928.

Southard, A. E. Abyssinia. Present Commercial Status of the Country. Washington: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Special Consular Reports, no. 81, 1918.

State Bank of Ethiopia. Monthly Letter. Vol. 1, no. 1 - Vol. 2, no. 6/7. Nov. 1948 - June/July 1950. Addis Ababa: 1948-50. 4 .

\_\_\_\_\_. Statement of Condition and Profit and Loss Statement as at December 31, 1946 (English and Amharic). Addis Ababa: 1947- . v. 410/2.

State Bank of Ethiopia. Statistical Office. Monthly Report on Economic Conditions and Market Trends. Addis Ababa: 1948 to 1974.

Susenyos, King of Abyssinia. *Chronica de Susenyos, Rei de Ethiopia*. Ethiopian and Portuguese. 2 tom. Lisboa: 1900. 754. b. 42.

Tafari Makonnen [later Emperor Haile Selassie]. Ras, Heir to the Throne of Ethiopia. A Letter to Mr. Harding, President of the United States of America. Addis Ababa: Yekatit 3, 1916 [February 23, 1923].

Thames Television. The Unknown Famine: A Report on Famine in Ethiopia. By Jonathan Dimbleby on Thames Television Broadcast 18 Oct. 1973. London: Thames Television, 1974.

Trivedi, Uma Shanker. Ethiopian Economy. Asmara: Department of Economics and Commerce, His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I Comprehensive School, 1968. -

United Progressive Ethiopian Students' Union in North America. "Resolution of the Third General Assembly." Yeteramaj Tigil III. August, 1978.

United Nations. Demographic Yearbook. New York: U.N. Publications, 1949-1982.

\_\_\_\_\_. Food and Agriculture Organization. Expanded Technical Assistance Programme. Select Bibliography on Ethiopia. Rome: 1952.

\_\_\_\_\_. General Assembly. Official Records Seventh Session, Supplement No. 15. Final Report of the United Nations Commission in Eritrea. New York: November 1952. A/2188.

\_\_\_\_\_. International Labor Office. Report to the Government of Ethiopia on the Organisation of an In-service Training System for Clerical Staff of the Ministries and Government Agencies. ILO/OTA/TAP/Ethiopia/R. 5. Geneva: 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Report to the Ethiopian Ministry of Education and Fine Arts." Dec. 20, 1969.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). International Yearbook of Education. Geneva: United Nations Office, 1950-1962.

\_\_\_\_\_. Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations Publications, 1963-1982.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). "Final Report." Addis Ababa: UNESCO E.D. 181, 1961.

University College of Addis Ababa. "Second Term Examination: Philosophy." Addis Ababa: 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. University College Calendar. Addis Ababa, 1957.

University of Utah. "Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia, 1959-60." Addis Ababa, 1960.

University Workers Union. Yé University Serategnoch Abetuta Dewel. [University Workers Demands]. Addis Ababa: February 28, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Yé University Serategnoch Dimtz" [University Workers' Voice]. Addis Ababa: February 20, 1974.

World Bank. "Agriculture Sector Review." Washington, D.C., 1976.

\_\_\_\_\_. World Development Report 1980. London: Oxford University Press, 1980.

World Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students. Challenge, XIII. Addis Ababa: August, 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The National Democratic Revolution in Ethiopia." Challenge, XII. Addis Ababa: October 1, 1972.

"Yeteressa Mastawesha" [A Reminder (Ethiopian Priests)]. Distributed March 12, 1974.

Yilma Deressa (Ato). Minister of Finance and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Haile Selassie University. A Speech at the Convocation of Haile Selassie I University. Addis Ababa: 1961.

Questionnaire and Survey (October 1981 to March 1982)—Expatriate  
Teachers, Professors and Educational Administrators in Ethiopia  
(1945-1979)

Beland, Guillaume (Mr.), October 16, 1981.\*

Brisebois, Louis (Mme.)

Cantin, Gilles (Mr.), November 20, 1981.

Chojnachi, S (Prof.), October 19, 1981.

Côté, Charles, Eugene (Mr.)

Dean, Thomas P. (Mr.)

Dinelle, Ulla M. (Mme.), October 20, 1981.

Dion, Roland (Mr.), October 11, 1981.

Doucet, Alphonse (Mr.)

Dupas, Amédé (Mr.), October 15, 1981.

Ferland, Yvon (Mr.)

Fortier, Guy (Mr.)

Gauthier, Craig (Mr.)

Germain, William Manley (Mr.), October 17, 1981.

Grondines, Laval (Mr.), October 21, 1981.

Hogue, Louis (Mr.), October 17, 1981.

Knipp, Thomas R. (Prof.), November 17, 1981.

Labrosse, Gerard (Mr.)

Loiselle Gilles (Mr.)

Loiselle, Lorraine (Mme.)

Martin, Jean-Paul (Mr.)

---

\* Exact dates are given only for survey answers directly quoted or indirectly referred to in the thesis.

Michaud, Lucien (Mr.)

Mohr, Ann (Mme.), November 16, 1981.

Mohr, Paul (Prof.), November 16, 1981.

Monajem Foad (Mr.), October 10, 1981.

Monfette, Thérèse (Mme.), October 9, 1981.

Monty, Vincent (Mr.), October 16, 1981.

Morency, Guy (Prof.), October 18, 1981.

Nadeau, Claude (Mr.)

Pariseau, Jocelyne (Mme.)

Pion, Gilles (Prof.), November 4, 1981.

Prouty, William (Prof.), Dec. 5, 1981.

Rail, Ronald. (Mr.)

Richer, Francine (Mme.)

Richer, Maurice (Mr.)

Rogers, Al (Mr.)

Roy, Maurice (Mr.)

Samaan-Hanna Anis (Prof.), Oct. 13, 1981.

Savagnac, A. (Mr.), Oct. 18, 1981.

St. Onge, Denis (Mr.), Oct. 18, 1981.

St. Onge, Jeanne (Mme.), October 18, 1981.

Savard, George Clovis (Prof.), January 3, 1982.

Thompson, Robert, Dr., November 5, 1981.

Trudeau, Edouard, Dr., Oct. 8, 1981.

Zeffel, Léon, (Prof.), Nov. 18, 1981.

### Personal Interviews

- Aklilu Habte, Dr. Director of Education, The World Bank. Washington, D.C., August 15, 1979.
- Alemayehu Seifu. Washington, D.C., Aug. 5, 1979.
- Bekele Jijo. Addis Ababa, Sept. 8, 1966.
- Digaf Tedla, Lieutenant. Montreal, Jan. 10, 1981.
- Eleni Emeru (Princess). Toronto, Aug. 9, 1979.
- Eshetu Cholé (Prof.). Montreal, Sept. 7, 1971.
- Fire Senbet (Brigadier General). Addis Ababa, Aug. 15, 1967.
- Gillett, Margaret (Prof.). Montreal, March 10, 1981.
- Grum Tesfaye. Dec. 2, 1981.
- Haile Selassie, Emperor. November 14, 1960.
- Iskender Desta (Prince, Rear Admiral). Dec. 20, 1966.
- Iyob. Montreal, July 7 and 15, 1976.
- Jembere Melaku (Alaka). Addis Ababa, Sept. 5, 1966.
- Mebratu Yohannes. Montreal, Sept. 5, 1967.
- Merid Mengesh, (Lieutenant-General). Nov. 20, 1966.
- Mesfin Berou. Sept. 11, 1967.
- Michael Makonnen Haile Selassie (Prince). Montreal, June 10, 1967.
- Samuel Ferenj. June 7, 1967.
- Sebhat Gebre Igziabher. February 15, 1967.
- Tafari Lieut. Toronto, August 15, 1980.
- Tameru, Fayissa.
- Tedla Berhane Meskel Lij. July 10, 1978.
- Tsehai (Mrs.). Canada, 1970.
- Tsigé Sharew Wolzero. Washington, July 17, 1980.
- Wangielu Elias. August 22, 1967.
- Yohannes Wolde Negodgwad (Aba) (né Prince Yohannes Iyasu). Oct. 19, 1964.
- Yoseph Tesfaye, Dr. March 30, 1982.
- Zelege Bekele, Dr. Toronto, August 9, 1979.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

Abbati, A. H. Italy and the Abyssinian War. London: London General Press, 1936.

Abir, Mordechai. Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes; the challenge of Islam and re-unification of the Christian Empire, 1769-1855. New York: Praeger, 1968.

Acheber, Gabré Hiôt. La Verité sur l'Ethiopie révélée après le couronnement du roi des rois. Lausanne: Editions Fren-  
weiller-Spiro, 1931.

Addis Hiwet. Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution. London: Review of African Political Economy, 1975.

Afework, Gebré Yesus. Gukde de Voyageur en Abyssinie. Rome: 1908.

Ahmad Ibn Al-Kadir, S. al-D. Histoire de la conquête de l'Abyssinie, XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, 2 pt. Algiers: Ecole Supérieure des Lettres, 1897.

Alémé Eshété. La Mission catholique lazariste en Ethiopie, par M. Eshété Alémé. Aix-en-Provence; Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines, Institut d'histoire des pays d'outre-mer, 1972.

Alvares, Francisco, d. ca. 1540. Historia de las cosas de Etiopia, en la qvai se cventa muy coplosamente, el estado y potécia del emperador della) que es el que muchos an pensado ser el Preste Ivan), con otras infinitas particularidades, assi dela religion de aquella gente, como de sus ceremonias, segun que de todo elle fue testigo de vista Francisco Aluarez. Agora nueuamente trázduzido de portugues en castellano, por el padre fray Thomas de Padilla. Anvers: I. Steelzio, 1557.

Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to Abyssinia, 1520-1527. London: Hakluyt Society, 1881.

- Amin Samir. Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment. 2 Vols. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Unequal Development. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976.
- Annesley, Earl G. and Henry Salt. Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, The Red Sea, Abyssinia, and Egypt. 2 Vols. London: Miller, 1809.
- Angoulvant, G. Djibouti, Mer Rouge, Abyssinie. Paris: Ardre, 1902.
- Annaratone, C. In Abyssinia. Toma: Voghua, 1914.
- Armandy, A. La Désagréable Partie de Campagne. Incursion en Abyssinie. Paris: A. Lemmere, 1930.
- Asfa Yilma, Princess. Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia. New York: D. Appleton Century, 1936.
- Asmorom Legesse. Gada: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1973.
- Assefa, Bequèle. A Profile of the Ethiopian Economy. Edited by Assefa Bequèle and Eshetu Chole. Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Atkins, Harry, M.A., F.R.G.S. A History of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Central Press, 1969 (?).
- Baer, George W. The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Baran, Paul. The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975.
- Baravelli, G.C. Le dernier rempart de l'esclavage. L'Abyssinie. (The Last Stronghold of Slavery. What Abyssinia is). Roma: Società Editrice di Novissima, 1935.
- Bardone, R. L'Abissinia. Firenze: 1888.
- Baroli, Marc. L'Ethiopie. Paris: Editions du Dialogue, 1969.
- Bartlett, E.J. In the Land of Sheba. Birmingham: 1934.



Bastin, J. L'Affaire d'Ethiopie et les diplomates, 1934-1937.  
Bruxelles: 1938.

Battaglia, Roberto. La Prima guerra d'Africa, 1895-96. Torino: Einaudi  
1958.

Baum, J. E. Savage Abyssinia. London: Cassels, 1928.

Beccari, C. Notizia e saggi di opere e documenti riguardanti la storia  
di Etiopia durante i secoli XVI, XVII, e XVIII. Roma: 1903.

Beckingham, Charles Fraser, ed. and tr. Some Records of Ethiopia,  
1593-1646; being extracts from the History of High Ethiopia  
or Abassia, by Manoel de Almeida, together with Bahrey's  
History of the Galla. Translated and edited by C. F. Becking-  
ham and G. W. B. Huntingford. London: Printed for the  
Hakluyt Society, 1954.

Beckingham, Charles Fraser. The Achievements of Prester John.  
London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1966.

Bellavita, E. Adua. I precedenti—la battaglia—le conseguenze, 1881-  
1931. Geneva: 1931.

Bent, James Théodore (1852-1897). The sacred city of the Ethiopians;  
being a record of travel and research in Abyssinia in 1893.  
With a chapter by H. D. Müller on the Inscriptions from Yeha  
ans Aksum, and an appendix on the morphological character  
of the Abyssinians, by J. G. Garson. London, New York:  
Longmans, Green, 1896. St. Clair Shores, Mich.: Scholarly  
Press, 1971.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Sacred City of the Ethiopians. London: 1893.

Bentwich, Norman de Mattos. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somaliland.  
London: Victor Gollancz, 1945.

Berkeley, G. F. H. The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik.  
London: Constable, 1902.

Bérékete Habte Selassie. Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa.  
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980.

Bianchi, G. Alla terra dei Galla. Milano: 1884.

Billi, G. Stato reporative e sanzioni ginevrine. Firenze: La Nuova  
Italia, 1936.

Billon, Charles. L'Ethiopie, du roi Salomon et de la reine de Saba à l'empereur Haïlé Sélassié 1<sup>er</sup>. Marseille: Impr. Brugnot, 1966.

Blanc, Henry. A narrative of captivity in Abyssinia, with some account of the late emperor Theodore, his country and people. London: F. Cass, 1970.

Bodini, C. L'Abissinia degli Abissini. Torino: 1887.

Borelli, J. Ethiopie méridionale. Paris: 1890.

Borsi, Umberto. Cittadinanza e Sudditanza Coloniale nell' Ordinamento Odierno. Roma: Centro di Studi Coloniali, Atti del Terzo Congress, 1937.

Boulvin, F. Une Mission Belge en Ethiopie. Bruxelles: Société d'Etudes Coloniales, 1908.

Brinton, Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1938.

Bronzuoli, A. Adua. Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato Libreria, 1935.

Brown, Leslie. Ethiopian Episode. London: Country Life, 1965.

Bruce, James. Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile. Vol. 1. Edinburgh: G.G.J. Robinson and J. Robinson, 1790.

Bruls, J. Vers les hauts plateaux d'Abyssinie; avec les congolais en guerre. Louvain: Editions Sam, 1946.

Buchholzer, John. The Land of Burnt Faces. Translated from the Danish by Maurice Michael. London: A. Barker, 1955.

Budge, Sir E. A. T. W. A History of Ethiopia, Nubia and Abyssinia. 2 Vols. London: Methuen, 1928.

\_\_\_\_\_. Life and Exploits of Alexander the Great. A series of Ethiopic texts, with an English translation. 2 Vols. London: 1896.

\_\_\_\_\_. Notes on the Gold Sceptre presented by King George V to Haile Selassie, King of Ethiopia, and the Gold and Ivory Sceptre presented by Queen Mary to Wayzarô Manan, Queen of Abyssinia. London: Garrard, 1930.

Burns, E. Ethiopia and Italy. (An examination of the causes of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, Oct. 3, 1935.) New York: International Publishers, 1935.

Busk, Douglas L. The Fountain of the Sun; Unfinished Journeys in Ethiopia and the Ruwenzori. London: M. Parrish, 1957.

Bussidon, C. Abyssinie et Angleterre. Paris: 1888.

Buxton, A.B. The Four Winds of Ethiopia. Blackburn: Durnham and Sons, 1935.

Buxton, David Roden. The Abyssinians. London: Thames & Hudson, 1970.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Abyssinians. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.

\_\_\_\_\_. Travels in Ethiopia. London: Lindsay-Drummond, 1949.

Cabot, L.J. L'Ethiopie et la Société des Nations. Paris: 1939.

Cabouge, A. de. Une Mission en Ethiopie. Paris: 1902.

Caimpenta, U. L'Empero italiano d'Etiopia. Milano: Editioni "Aurora," 1936.

Caix de Saint-Aymour, Viscount A. de. Relations de la France avec l'Abyssinie, 1634-1706. Paris: Challamel, 1886.

Carter, B. Black Shirt, Black Skin. London: Allen & Unwin, 1935.

Castanhoso, A. The Portuguese Expedition to Abyssinia. Translated by R.S. Whitney. London: Hakluyt Society, 1902.

\_\_\_\_\_. Die Heldentaten des Dom Christoph da Gama in Abessinien, 1541-43. Berlin: 1907.

Castro, L. de. Nella Terra dei Negus. 2 Tom. Milano: 1915.

Cecchi, A. L'Abissinia settentrionale. Milano: 1887.

Centre d'Etudes de Droit et de Politique Colonial Fasciste, L'Institut Nationale pour les Relations culturelles avec l'Etranger. La Civilisation Fasciste en Afrique Orientale Italienne. Rome: 1963.

Cerulli, E. Documenti arabi per la storia dell'Etiopia. Roma: 1931.

Cerulli, Ernesta. Peoples of South-West Ethiopia and its Borderland. London: International African Institute, 1956.

Cerulli, Enrico. L'Islam di ieri e di oggi. Roma: Istituto per l'Oriente, 1971.

Chatterji, Suniti Kumar. India and Ethiopia, from the Seventh Century B.C. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1968.

Chauvelot, R. Un Grand Politique: L'Empereur Ménélik II. Paris: 1896.

Cherian, K.A. Ethiopia Today. Addis Ababa: Central Print Press, 1969.

Cherian, K.A., ed. Agriculture, Industry and Commerce in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Asmara: 1957.

Cheesman, Robert Ernest. Lake Tana and the Blue Nile. An Abyssinian quest by Major R.E. Cheesman. 1st ed. reprinted, new impression. London: Cass, 1968.

Chiavegatti, A. and C. Piazzesi. Con la '23 marzo' alla conquista dell'Impero. Roma: 1937.

Chorley, Katherine. Armies and the Art of Revolution. London: Faber and Faber, 1943.

Cimmaruta, R. Ual Ual. Milano: A Mondadori, 1936.

Cipolla, A. Da Baldissera a Badoglio. Firenze: R. Bemporad, 1936.

Nell'impero di Menelik. Milano: Società Editrice "La Grande attualità," 1911.

Citerni, C. Al confini meridionali dell'Etiopia. Milano: 1913.

Civinini, G. Ricordi di carovana. Abissinia settentrionale, 1924. Abissinia occidentale, 1926. Verona: 1932.

Clapham, Christopher S. Haile Selassie's Government. Foreword by Dame Margery Perham. New York: Praeger, 1969.

Coffey, Thomas M. Lion by the Tail: The Story of the Italian-Ethiopian War. London: Hamilton, 1974.

Cohen, John M. A Select Bibliography on Rural Ethiopia. Compiled by John M. Cohen. Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University Library, 1971.

Cohen, John M. and Dov Weintraub. Lands and Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia: The Social Background to Revolution. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1975.

Collat, O.E. L'Abyssinie actuelle. 1906.

Collombet, E. L'Ethiopie moderne et son avènement à la communauté internationale. Dijon: Imprimerie J. Belvet, 1936.

Comber, P. L'Abyssinie en 1896, etc. Paris: 1896.

Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions. The Communist Manifesto, Be-Karl Marx, Enna Friedrich Engels Yetederresse. Addis Ababa: Yekatit 1967 [Feb. 1975].

Conti Rossini, Carlo. Italia ed Etiopia. Dal trattato d'Ucciali alla battaglia di Adua. Roma: Istituto per L'Oriente, 1935.

Pubblicazioni etiopistiche dal 1936 al 1945. Rassegna di studi etiopici. Vol. 4. Italia: Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, 1946.

Coulbeaux, J.B. Histoire politique et religieuse d'Abyssinie. 3 tom. 1929.

Coursac, J. de. Le Règne de Yohannès (John IV), depuis son avènement jusqu'à ses victoires de 1875 sur l'armée égyptienne. Paris: Romans, 1926.

Cox, R. Pan Africanism in Practice. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Crawford, Osbert Guy Stanhope, ed. Ethiopian itineraries, circa 1400-1524, including those collected by Alessandro Zorzi at Venice in the years 1519-24. Cambridge: Published for the Hakluyt Society at the University Press, 1958.

Crummey, Donald. Priests and Politicians: Protestant and Catholic Missions in Orthodox Ethiopia, 1830-1868. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

Currey, M. A Woman at the Abyssinian War. London: Hutchinson, 1936.

Dagniachew Worku. The Thirteenth Sun. London: Heinemann Books Ltd., 1973.

Darley, Henry Algernon Cholmley. Slaves and Ivory in Abyssinia.  
New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.

Darkwah, Redford Henry Kofi. Menelik of Ethiopia. London: Heinemann Educational, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire 1813-1889.  
London: Heinemann, 1975.

The Daughters of Sheba. An Account of the Ethiopian Women's Work Association and an appeal for help. London: 1941.

Davies, Baron D. Nearing the Abyss. The Lesson of Ethiopia.  
London: Constable, 1936.

Davy, André. Ethiopie d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. Paris: Le Livre africain, 1970.

Dawson, R. E. and K. Prewit. Political Socialization. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1969.

Del Boca, Angelo. The Ethiopian War, 1935-1941. Translated from the Italian by P. D. Cummins. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

De Marco, R. R. The Italianization of African Natives. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943.

de Monfried, Henry. L'Avion noir. Paris: 1936.

\_\_\_\_\_. Vers les terres hostiles de l'Ethiopie. Paris: Bernard Franet, 1933.

Deramy, J. Introduction du Christianisme en Abyssinie, 330-480.  
Paris: 1895.

de Tocqueville, Alexi. The Old Regime and the French Revolution.  
New York: Harper and Bros., 1856.

Dewey, John. "Democracy and Education," in Language and Concepts of Education. Edited by O. B. Smith and R. H. Ennis. Skokie, Ill.: Rand & McNally, 1961.

Dillman, C. A. Lexicon Linguae Aethiopicae cum Indice Latino. Lipsâae: T. O. Weigel, 1865.

Diodorus of Sicily. Edited by Francis R. Walton. 12 Vols. London: Heinemann, 1967.

Doresse, Jean. Au Pays de la reine de Saba. L'Ethiopia antique et moderne. 4<sup>e</sup> édition. Paris: 1956.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopia. Translated by Elsa Coult. London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959; New York: Frederick Ungar, 1959.

\_\_\_\_\_. Histoire de l'Ethiopie. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1970.

\_\_\_\_\_. L'Empire du Prêtre-Jean. Paris: Plon, 1957.

Dos Santos, Theotario. "The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America," in Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today. Edited by Henry Bernstein. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973, pp. 57-80.

Dowling, T.E. The Abyssinian Church. London: Cope & Fenwick, 1909.

Drouin, E.A. Les Listes Royales Ethiopiennes. Paris: 1882.

Dufton, Henry. Narrative of a Journey Through Abyssinia in 1862-63. With an appendix on "The Abyssinian captives question." Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press, 1970.

Dugan, James and Lawrence Lafore. Days of Emperor and Clown. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1973.

Dunckley, F.C. Eight Years in Abyssinia. London: Hutchinson, 1935.

Durand, M. Crazy Campaign. A personal narrative of the Italo-Abyssinian war. London: Routledge: 1936.

Dye, William McEntyre. Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia; or, Military service under the khedive, in his provinces and, beyond their borders, as experienced by the American staff. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.

Dyer, Jacob A. The Ethiopian in the Bible. New York: Vantage, 1974.

Eadie, J.I. An Amharic Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924.

Easton, David and J. Dennis. Children in the Political System. New York: Penguin Books, 1964.

Edwards, Lyford. The Natural History of Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927.

- Engeda-Work. Ethiopia: A Pawn in European Diplomacy. New York: 1935.
- Ephraim Isaac. The Ethiopian Church. Boston: H.N. Sawyer Co., 1967.
- Farago, Ladislav. Abyssinia on the Eve. London: Putnam, 1935.
- Feierabend, Ivo K., Rosalind L. Feierabend and Ted Robert Gurr, eds. Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972.
- Feierabend, Ivo K., Rosalind Feierabend and Betty Nesvold. "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns." In Violence in America. Edited by Hugh D. Graham and Ted Gurr. New York: Signet, 1969.
- Ferone, Francesco. Adua e il dramma di Francesco Crispi. Napoli: 1957.
- Fiaschi, T. Da Cheren a Cassala. Note di viaggio. Firenze: 1896.
- Findlay, L. The Monolithic Churches at Lalibela in Ethiopia. Cairo: 1944.
- Flad, J. M. The Falashas of Abyssinia. London: 1869.
- Fleichen, Count. With the Mission to Menelik. London: Edward Arnold, 1898.
- Forbes, Duncan. The Heart of Ethiopia. London: Hale, 1972.
- Forbes, J. R. From Red Sea to Blue Nile. Harmondsworth: 1939.
- Forbes, Mrs. R. From Red Sea to Blue Nile. Abyssinian Adventures. London: Cassells, 1925.
- Ford, James W. and Harry Gannes. War in Africa. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1935.
- Frank, Andes Gundar. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
- Franzoi, Augusto. Continente nero. Novara: Istituto geografico de Agostini, 1961.



Friere, Paolo. Education for Critical Consciousness. New York: Seabury Press, 1973.

Lettres à la Guinée-Bissau sur l'alphabétisation: Une expérience en cours de réalisation. Paris: F. Maspero, 1978.

Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Herdes and Herdes, 1970.

Fromow, G.H. The Italo-Abyssinian Crisis and the Revival of the Roman Empire. Rome: Sovereign Grace Advent Testimony, 1935.

Gamst, Frederick C. Travel and Research in Northwestern Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Haile Selassie I University, 1965.

Garavaglia, Lino. Etiopia, XXV (i.e., Venticinque) secoli di civiltà e di storia. Milano: Missioni estere cappuccini, 1973.

Gebré-hiywot Baykedagn. Mengistenna Yé-Hizb Astedader, 2nd edition. Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam, 1953.

Gebré Hiywot Baykedagn. Dagmawi Menelikenna Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 1914.

Gebre-Selassie (Tsehafe-Téezaz). Tarik Zemen Ze Dagmawi: Menelik Neguse Negest Ze-Etiopia. Edited by Like Likawunt Haile Meskel Gebre Medhen, Dejazmatch Kebbede Tesemma, Blata Mersée Wolde Kirkos, and Kentiba Zewde Gebre Selassie. Addis Ababa: Artistic Press, 1966 (1901).

Gedle-Gelawdewos. Translated by W. E. Conselman, Paris: Bouillon, 1895.

Gentizon, P. La Revanche d'Adoua. Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1936.

Gerster, George. Churches in Rocks: Early Christian Art in Ethiopia. Translated (from the German) by Richard Hosking. London: Phaidon, 1970.

Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. 4 Vols. London: John Murray, 1846.

Giglio, Carlo. L'articolo XVII (i.e., diciassettesimo) del trattato di Ucciali. Como: P. Cairolì, 1968.

- Gillett, Margaret. A History of Education: Thought and Practice. Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1966.
- Gilmour, T.L. Abyssinia: The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers. London: 1906.
- Gleichen, Count A.E.W. With the Mission to Menelik, 1897. London: 1898.
- Gobat, Samuel. Journal of Three Years' Residence in Abyssinia. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.
- Goodspeed, D. The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'Etat. London: 1962.
- Greenfield, Richard. Ethiopia: A New Political History. London: Pall Mall Publishers, 1965.
- Groomer, Gwendolyn. Inventory of American Aid to Education in Africa, A Report for the African Liaison Committee of the American Council of Education. Washington, D.C.: American Council of Education, 1962.
- Gruchl, M. L'Impero del Negus Neghesti. Milano: Edizioni Minerva, 1935.
- Guasco Gallarati, Prince, Marquis di Bisio, E. Italia—Etiopia—Inghilterra e Societa della Nazione. Casale: Cooperation Bellatore Bosco, 1936.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Gutkind, Peter C.W. and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa. London: Sage Publications, 1976.
- Haddis Alemayehu. Feker Eske Mekaber (Amharic). Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1965.
- Hagopian, Mark. The Phenomenon of Revolution. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974.
- Hallé, C. To Menelik in a Motor-Car. London: Hurst & Blacklett, 1913.
- Hamilton, E. The War in Abyssinia. A brief military history. New York: Heritage, 1936.
- Hansbury, William Leo. Pillars in Ethiopian History (The William Leo Hansbury African History Notebook). Vol. 1. Edited by Joseph E. Harris. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974.

Hanson, Herbert M. For God and Emperor. Eds. Herbert M. and Della Hanson. Mountain View, Calif.: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1958.

Hardie, Frank. The Abyssinian Crisis. London: Batsford, 1974.

Harmsworth, A. G. A. Abyssinia Marches On. London: Hutchinson, 1941.

\_\_\_\_\_. Abyssinian Adventure. London: Hutchinson, 1935.

Harris, Sir William Cornwallis. The Highlands of Ethiopia. 1st ed. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longman, 1844. Republished London: Farnborough, Gregg, 1968.

Hart, Mark. The Dynamics of Revolution. Stockholm: Totobekman, 1971.

Hartlmaier, Paul. Amba Ras; eine Reise durch das Kaiserreich Äthiopien. 1. Aufl. München: F. Bruckmann, 1953.

\_\_\_\_\_. Golden Lion, a Journey Through Ethiopia. Translated from the German by F. A. Voigt. London: G. Bles, 1956.

Hayes, A. J. The Source of the Blue Nile. A journey through the Soudan to Lake Tsana in Western Abyssinia. 1905.

Hayter, F. E. In Quest of Sheba's Mines. London: Stanley Paul, 1935.

Heeren, Arnold Hermann Ludwig. Historical Researches into the Politics, Intercourse, and Trade of the Carthaginians, Ethiopians, and Egyptians. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.

Herbert, Baroness M. R. Abyssinia and Its People. London: 1867.

Herui Blattein Getta. Meshafe Kiné (Amharic). Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1925.

Hess, Robert L. Ethiopia; The Modernization of Autocracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970.

Hoben, Allan. Land Tenure Among the Amhara of Ethiopia. The dynamics of cognatic descent. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1973.

Hodson, A. W. Seven Years in Southern Abyssinia. New York: Fisher Unwin, 1927.

Hodson, A. W. and E. H. Walker. Elementary and Practical Grammar of the Galla or Oromo Languages. London: S. P. C. K., 1922.

Hoffman, Philip. Abyssinian Memories. Santa Barbara, Calif.: 1948.

Holmes, Charles Henry. Ethiopia, the Land of Promise. A book with a purpose, by Clayton Adams (Pseud.). New York: AMS Press, 1973.

Homer. The Iliad and the Odyssey. Trans. by E. V. Rieu. New York: Penguin Books, 1946.

Hotten, John Camden, ed. Abyssinia and Its People; or Life in the land of Prester John. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.

Howard, William Edward Harding. Public Administration in Ethiopia; a study in retrospect and prospect. Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1955.

Hubbard, W.D. Fiasco in Ethiopia. The story of a so-called war by a reporter on the ground. New York: 1936.

Huggins, Willis Nathaniel. An Introduction to African Civilizations, With Main Currents in Ethiopian History. Edited by Willis N. Huggins and John G. Jackson. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.

Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Hyatt, H.M. The Church of Abyssinia. Luzac: 1928.

Hyman, H. Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959.

Ilich, Ivan. After Deschooling What? New York: Macmillan, 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. Deschooling Society. New York: Penguin, 1973.

Imbakom Kalewold. Traditional Ethiopian Church Education. Translated by Mengistu Lemma. New York: Teachers' College Press, 1970.

Indian Institute of Foreign Trade. Marketing Research Division. Report on Indo-Ethiopian Trade Prospects. New Delhi: 1973.

Industrial Ethiopia. Nairobi: United Africa Press, 1970.

Isaac, Charles A. Modern Ethiopia. A historical survey. Kottayam: C.M.S. Press, 1956.

Isenberg, Karl Wilhelm. The Journals of C.W. Isenberg, and J.L. Krupp Detailing their Proceedings in the Kingdom of Shoa and Journeys in Other Parts of Abyssinia in the Years 1839, 1840, 1841 and 1842. London: 1843; new impression, London: Cassels, 1968.

Jésman, Czeslaw. The Russians in Ethiopia; an essay in futility. London: Chatto and Windus, 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Ethiopian Paradox. Vol. 63. London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1963.

Jessop, Bob. Social Order, Reform and Revolution. New York: Macmillan, 1973.

Jevons, H.S. Italian Military Secrets—Three years' preparation for the Abyssinian War. London: H.S. Jevons, 1937.

John, Prester. The Discovery of Abyssinia by the Portuguese in 1520. A facsimile of the relation entitled Carta das Novas que vieram a el Rey nosso Senhor do Descobrimento do Preste Joham, Lisbon, 1521. London: British Museum, 1938.

Johnson, Charles. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little Brown, 1966.

Johnson, Samuel. Rasselas, the Prince of Abyssinia. London: 1759.

Johnston, Charles. Travels in Southern Abyssinia. 1st ed. With a new introduction by Richard Pankhurst. Farnborough: Gregg, 1972.

Jones, Arnold Hugh Martin. A History of Ethiopia. Edited by A.M.H. Jones and Elizabeth Monroe. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_. History of Abyssinia. London: Clarendon Press, 1935.

Junod, Marcel. Warriors Without Weapons. Oxford: Alden Press, 1951.

Kammerer, A. La Mer Rouge, l'Abyssinie et l'Arabie depuis l'antiquité. Le Caire: 1929.

Kaplan, Irvin, et al. Area Handbook for Ethiopia. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Kaula, Edna Mason. The Land and People of Ethiopia. 1st ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965.

Kebbede Tesemma. Dejazmatch Yetarik Mastawesha. Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1969.

- Kelly, George A. and Linda B. Miller, Internal War and International Systems: Perspective on Method, in George A. Kelly and Clifford Brown, Struggles in the State: Sources and Patterns of World Revolution. New York: Wiley, 1970.
- Khun de Prorok, B. Dead Men Do Tell Tales. London: Harrap, 1943.
- King, Kenneth, ed. Ras Makonnen: Pan Africanism from Within. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Korovikov, Valentin. Ethiopia: Years of Revolution. Moscow: Novotny Press Agency Publishing House, 1979.
- Korten, David C. Planned Change in a Traditional Society: psychological problems of modernization in Ethiopia. Edited by David C. Korten with Frances F. Korten. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
- Lambiri, Argyro. L'Ethiopie contemporaine. (Articles in French and English edited by A. Lambiri.) Addis Ababa, Le Caire: 1949.
- Landsberger, H.H., ed. Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973.
- Langer, W. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902. New York: 1951.
- Lasswell, H. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958.
- LeBon, Gustave. The Psychology of Revolutions. New York: Ernest Benn, 1913.
- Leclercq, Claude. L'empire d'Ethiopie. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1969.
- Lefever, Ernest W. Armies and Politics in Tropical Africa. Highlights of spear and scepter: army, police, and politics in tropical Africa. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971.
- Lefevere, Renato. Riflessi etiopici nella cultura europea del medioevo e del rinascimento, 1944-45. Vols. 8 and 9. Rome: The City. Pontificio Museo Missionario Etnologico. Annali Lateranensi, 1937.
- Legum, Colin. Africa: The Year of the Students. London: Rex Collings, 1972.

- Legum, Colin. The Fall of Haile Selassie's Empire. New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1975.
- LeRoux, H. Ménelik et nous. Paris: 1902.
- Leroy, Jules. L'Ethiopie; archéologie et culture. Préf. de Teklé-Tsadik Mekouria. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1973.
- Leslau, Wolf. Documents Tigrigna-Ethiopien Septentionel, Grammaire et Textes. Paris: Société de Linguistiques de Paris, 1941.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Falasha Anthology: The Black Jews of Ethiopia. Translated by Wolf Leslau from Ethiopian sources. New York: Schocken Books, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Scientific Investigation of the Ethiopian Languages (an inaugural lecture delivered at the University College of Addis Ababa, February 12, 1954). Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1956.
- Levine, Donald. Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-ethnic Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Wax and Gold. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- Lewis, Herbert S. A Galla Monarchy; Jimma Abba Jifar, Ethiopia, 1830-1832. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965.
- Liano, A. Ethiopie, empire des nègres blancs. Paris: 1929.
- Lister, I., ed. Deschooling: A Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Littmann, E. Bibliotheca Abessinica: studies concerning the languages and history of Abyssinia. Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1904.
- Lord, Edith. Queen of Sheba's Heirs; cultural patterns of Ethiopia. Washington: Acropolis Books, 1970.
- Louis A.J.M. F.F. (of Savoy), Duke degli Abruzzi. La Esplorazione dello Uabi-Uebi Scebeli dalle sue sorgenti nella Etiopia meridionale alla Somalia italiana, 1928-29. Milano: 1932.
- Luther, Ernest W. Ethiopia Today. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958.
- Lyle-Smith, Alan. Sheba Slept Here. (By Alan Caillon (Pseud.) London: Abelard-Shuman, 1973.

MacCallum, E.P. Rivalries in Ethiopia. Boston, Mass.: 1935.

MacCreagh, G. The Last of Free Africa. The account of an expedition into Abyssinia. New York: 1935.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Last of Free Africa. The account of an expedition into Abyssinia. New York: 1928.

Mahteme Selassie Gebre Meskel, (Balambaras) Zekre Neger (Amharic) Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1948.

Malécot, Georges. Les voyageurs français et les relations entre la France et l'Abyssinie de 1835-1870. Paris: Société française d'histoire d'outre-mer, 1972.

Mandel'shtam, A.N. Le Conflit italo-éthiopien devant la Société des Nations. Paris: 1937.

Mantegazza, V. Menelik, l'Italie e l'Etiopia. Milano: 1910.

Manzi, L. Il commercio in Etiopia. Roma: 1886.

Marcus, Harold. The Life and Times of Menelik II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Markakis, John and Nega Ayale. Class and Revolution in Ethiopia. London: Review of African Political Economy, 1978.

Martelli, G. Italy Against the World. London: Chatto & Windus, 1937.

Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Translated by M. Milligan. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1959.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. Wage, Labour and Capital, Selected Works, I. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955.

Massaja, Cardinal G. In Abyssinia e fra i Galla. Firenze: 1895.

Mathew, David, Bishop of Aelia. Ethiopia, The study of a polity, 1540-1935. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1947.

Matthews, H.L. Eyewitness in Abyssinia. With Marshal Badoglio's forces to Addis Ababa. New York: Secker & Warburg, 1937.

\_\_\_\_\_. Two Wars and More to Come. (Reminiscences of the Italo-Abyssinian War and the Spanish Civil War.) New York: 1938.



- Mazzucconi, R. La Giornata di Adua, 1896. Milano: A Mondadori, 1935.
- Melady, Thomas Patrick. The Economic Future of Ethiopia. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1959.
- Mengistu Lemma. The Marriage of Unequals. London: Macmillan and Co., 1970.
- Merriam, C. Civic Education in the United States, Report of the Commission on the Social Studies, American Historical Association, part 6. New York: Scribner, 1934.
- Mesfin, Wolde Mariam. An Atlas of Ethiopia. Rev. ed. with additional material. Addis Ababa: 1970.
- The Middle East and North Africa. London: Europa Publications, 1969-70.
- Migdal, Joel. Peasants, Politics and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Missiroli, Mario. What Italy Owes to Mussolini. Rome, 1938.
- Mistahl, A. Ethiopia: Political Contradiction in Agricultural Development. Uppsala: Political Science Association in Uppsala, 1974.
- Molteni, A. Depo Adua. Diario di un italiano prigioniero degli Scioani, 1896-97. Lecco: 1936.
- Moore, Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
- Moorhead, Alan. The Blue Nile. Rev. ed. London: Hamilton, 1972.
- Morie, L.J. Histoire de l'Ethiopie. 2 tom. Paris: 1904.
- Mosley, Leonard. Haile Selassie, the Conquering Lion. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964.
- Murphy, Dervia. In Ethiopia With A Mule. London: Murray, 1968.
- Myatt, Frederick. The March to Magdala: The Abyssinian War of 1868. London: Leo Cooper Ltd., 1970.
- Naish, R.T. 1934—and After! Abyssinia and Italy. Thynne: 1936.
- Naylor, R.H. (Pseud.) Abyssinia—What the Stars Foretell. London: Hutchinson, 1935.

Nerazzini, C. Itinerario in Etiopia. 1885. Roma: 1890.

Newman, E.W.P. Italy's Conquest of Abyssinia. London: T. Butterworth, 1937.

\_\_\_\_\_. The New Abyssinia. London: Rich & Cowan, 1938.

Nicol, C.W. From the Roof of Africa. 1st ed. New York: Knopf, 1972.

Nolen, Barbara. Ethiopia. New York: F. Watts, 1971.

Norden, H. Africa's Last Empire. Through Abyssinia to Lake Tana. London: Witherby, 1930.

Nordfelt, Per Martin. A Galla Grammar. Vols. 33-35. Paris: Periodical Publications. Le Monde Oriental, 1906.

O'Hanlon, W.D. Features of the Abyssinian Church. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1946.

D'Orleans, Prince Henry. Une Visite a l'Empereur Ménélik. Paris: 1899.

Ortega y Gasset, E. Etiopia. El conflicto italo-abisinio. Madrid. J. Puyeyo, 1935.

Osio, E. La Spedizione inglese, 1867-1888. Roma: 1887.

Ottaway, Marina and David. Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution. London: Holmes and Meier, 1978.

Paez, Pedro. Historia da Ethiopia. Vol. 3. Oporto: Livraria Civilização, 1945-56.

Paige, Jeffrey M. Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World. New York: Free Press, 1975.

Pakenham, Thomas Frank Dermot. The Mountains of Rasselas. An Ethiopian adventure. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1959.

Pankhurst, Estelle Sylvia. British Policy in Eastern Ethiopia. The Ogaden and the reserved area. Woodford Green: Sylvia Pankhurst, 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_. British Policy in Eritrea and Northern Ethiopia. Woodford Green: Sylvia Pankhurst, 1945.

Pankhurst, Estelle Sylvia. Eritrea on the Eve; The Past and Future of Italy's "First Born" Colony, Ethiopia's Ancient Sea Province. Woodford Green, Essex: New Times and Ethiopia News Books, 1952.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopia; A Cultural History. Woodford Green: Lalibela House, 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Ethiopian People. London: Lalibela House, 1946.

Pankhurst, Estelle Sylvia, and R.K.P. Pankhurst. Ethiopia and Eritrea: the Last Phase of the Reunion Struggle—1941-1952. Woodford Green, Essex: Lalibela House, 1953.

Pankhurst, Richard Keir Pethick. A Brief Note on the Economic History of Ethiopia from 1800 to 1935. Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. An Introduction to the History of the Ethiopian Army. Addis Ababa: Imperial Ethiopian Air Force, 101st Training Centre, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800-1935. 1st ed. Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University Press, 1968.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Ethiopian Royal Chronicles. Extracts edited by R.K.P. Pankhurst. Addis Ababa: Oxford University Press, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888-1892. Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_. Language and Education in Ethiopia: Historical Background to the Post-War Period. Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University Press, 1969.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Penetration and Implications of Fire-arms in Ethiopia prior to the Nineteenth Century. Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University Press, 1968.

\_\_\_\_\_. Travellers in Ethiopia. Edited by R.K.P. Pankhurst. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Pareto, Vildredo. The Rise and Fall of the Elites; An Application of Theoretical Sociology. Totwa, N.J.: Bedminster Press, 1968.

Paul, James C.N. Ethiopian Constitutional Development. A source book, prepared by James C.N. Paul and Christopher Clapham. Addis Ababa: Faculty of Law, Haile Selassie I University, 1967.

- Paulos Milkias. Yegeda Hegena Yeoromo Hezb Astedader Serat. Addis Ababa: Ethio-American Mapping and Geography Institute, 1960.
- Pausewang, Siegfried. Methods and Concepts of Social Research in a Rural Developing Society; a critical appraisal based on experience in Ethiopia. Munich: Weltforum Verlags, 1973.
- Pease, A.E. Travel and Sport in Africa. 3 Vols. London: A.L. Humphreys, 1902.
- Pellegrinescri, A.V. Etiopia. Aspetti economici. Messina: 1936.
- Pennisi, P. La Societa delle Nazione e la controversia tra l'Etiopia. Catania: Studio Editoriale Moderno, 1937.
- Perham, Dame Margery Freda. The Government of Ethiopia. London: Faber and Faber, 1947.
- Perl, Lila. Ethiopia, Land of the Lion. New York: Morrow, 1972.
- Pettee, George S. The Process of Revolution. New York: Harper, 1938.
- Pierce, B. Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth, Report on the Commission on the Social Studies, American Historical Association, Part 3. New York: Scribner, 1933.
- Pigli, M. L'Etiopia nella politica Europea. Con il testo di tutti i trattati ed accordi. Padova: 1936.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Italian Civilization in Ethiopia. London: Dante Alighieri Society, 1936.
- Portal, G.H. My Mission to Abyssinia. London, 1892.
- Postman, N. and C. Weinberger. Teaching As A Subversive Activity. New York: Penguin, 1971.
- Potter, Pitman Benjamin. The Wal Wal Arbitration. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938. New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1971.
- Problems. Contemporary Problems. The Negus and the negro problem. Articles in defence of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. Calcutta: 1936.
- Quaranta, Baron F. Ethiopia. An empire in the making. London: P.S. King, 1939.

Rebeaud, H. Chez le roi des rois d'Ethiopie. Paris: Neuchatel: 1935.

Reimer, E. School Is Dead. New York: Penguin, 1971.

Rey, Charles Fernand. In the Country of the Blue Nile. London: Camelot Press, 1927.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Real Abyssinia. New York: Seeley, 1935.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Real Abyssinia. 2nd ed. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Romance of the Portuguese in Abyssinia. An account of the adventurous journeys of the Portuguese to the empire of Prester John, their assistance to Ethiopia in its struggle against Islam and their subsequent efforts to impose their own influence and religion, 1490-1633. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.

\_\_\_\_\_. Unconquered Abyssinia As It Is Today. New York: Seeley, 1923.

Renato, A. Riflessi etiopici nella cultura europea del medioevo e del rinascimento, 1444-45. Rome: Pontificio Museo Missionario Etnologica, 1937.

Rimbaud, J.A. Lettres de J.A. Rimbaud. Egypte, Arable, Ethiopie. Paris: 1899.

Rittlinger, Herbert. (Schwarzes Abenteuer.) Ethiopian Adventure. From the Red Sea to the Blue Nile. Translated by Eva Wilson. London: Oldham's Press, 1959.

Robinson, H.R. England, Italy, Abyssinia. London: W. Clowes, 1935.

Rosenau, James N., ed. Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergencies of National and International Systems. New York: Free Press, 1969.

Rossetti, C. Storia Diplomatica dell'Etiofia durante il regno di Menelik II. Torino: 1910.

Rostow, Walt Whitman. Politics and the Stages of Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Royal Chronicles of Abyssinia. The Glorious Victories of Amda Seyon, King of Ethiopia. Translated and edited by G.W.B. Huntingford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.

Rubenson, Sven. The Survival of Ethiopian Independence. London: Heinemann and Addis Ababa University Press, 1978.

\_\_\_\_\_. Wichalé XVII, The Attempt to Establish a Protectorate over Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: 1964.

Russel, David. Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Forces: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

Russel, Count S. Une mission en Abyssinie. Paris: 1884.

Saineau, M. L'Abyssinie dans la seconde moitié du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Leipzig: 1892.

Salt, Henry. Voyage en Abyssinie, entrepris par ordre du gouvernement britannique, exécuté dans les années 1809 et 1810. 2 Vols. Translated by P. F. Henry. Paris: Magimel, 1816.

Sanceau, E. Portugal in Quest of Prester John. London: Hutchinson, 1943.

Sandford, Christine. Ethiopia under Haile Selassie. London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1946.

Sanguinetti, J. Essais de pénétration européenne en Ethiopie, 1885-1906. Montpellier: 1907.

Schwab, Peter. Decision-making in Ethiopia. A study of the political process. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Ethiopia and Haile Selassie. Edited by Peter Schwab. New York: Facts on File, 1972.

\_\_\_\_\_. Haile Selassie I Ethiopia's Lion of Judah. Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1979.

Schwartz, David. "Political Alienation: The Psychology of Revolutions First Stage." In Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research. Edited by I.K. Feierabend, R.L. Feierabend and T.R. Gurr. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972.

Sergew Habte Selassie. Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History to 1270. Addis Ababa: United Printers, 1972.

Sherman, Richard. Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution. New York: Praeger, 1980.

Siculus, Diodorus. (Fragments of Books XXXIII-XL.) Translated by Frank R. Walton, Diodorus of Sicily. 12 Vols. London: Heinemann, 1967.

- Simon, G. Voyage en Abyssinie. L'Ethiopie. Paris: 1885.
- Simonson, Joseph. Come Along to Ethiopia. Minneapolis: T.S. Denison, 1968.
- Skinner, Robert. Abyssinia of Today. New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1966.
- Skocpol, Theda. "Explaining Revolutions: In Quest of a Social Structural Approach." In The Uses of Controversy in Sociology. Edited by Lewis Coser and Otto N. Larson. New York: Free Press, 1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Smelser, Neil. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press, 1963.
- Smelser, Neil and Seymour Martin Lipsett. Social Structure and Mobility In Economic Development. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966.
- Smith, H. F. H. Through Abyssinia. London: 1890.
- Snowden, Frank Martin. Blacks in Antiquity: Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience. Cambridge: Belknap P., Harvard V.P., London: distributed by Oxford V.P., 1970.
- Sommer, John W. A Study Guide for Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Boston: African Studies Centre, Boston University, 1969.
- Sorokin, Pitrim. The Sociology of Revolution. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1925.
- Starkie, E. Arthur Rimbaud in Abyssinia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937.
- Steer, G. L. Caesar in Abyssinia. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1936.
- Stern, Henry Aaron. Wanderings Among the Falashas in Abyssinia together with a description of the country and its various inhabitants. 2nd ed. London: Cass, 1968.
- Steuben, Kuno. Alone on the Blue Nile. London: Hale, 1973.
- Stigand, C. H. To Abyssinia Through an Unknown Land. New York: Seeley, 1910.

Stinchcombe, Arthur. "Stratification Among Organizations and the Sociology of Revolution." In Handbook of Organizations. Edited by James March. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.

Tadesse Mecha. Tekur Anbassa (Amharic). Asmara: 1950.

Tadesse, Tamrat. Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

Taffara de Guefe. Capital Formation in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: University College Press, 1959.

Talbot, David Abner. Haile Selassie I. Silver Jubilee. The Hague: W.P. van Stockum, 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_. Contemporary Ethiopia. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952.

Taverna, E. Le service du train dans la campagne des Anglais en Abyssinie, 1867-1868. Paris: 1897.

Tekle Tsadik Mekouria. L'Eglise d'Ethiopie. Paris: Promotion et édition, 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. Yé-Etiopia Tarik Katsé Téwodros Eské Kédamawi Haile Selassie. Addis Ababa: Berhanenna Selam Printing Press, 1946.

Teshome G. Wagaw. Education in Ethiopia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979.

Thiersch, H.W.J. Abyssinia. London: 1885.

Thomson, Blair. Ethiopia: The Country that Cut Off Its Head. London: Robson Books, 1975.

Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Revolutions and Collective Violence." In Handbook of Political Sciences. 3 Vols. Edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

Tomaselli, C. Con le colonne celeri dal Mareb allo Scioa. Milano: 1936.

Tonkin, Thelma. Ethiopia With Love. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1972.

Torre, F.M. della and F. Santagata. Le Sanzioni. Da Ualual alla vittoria dell'Endertà. Genova: 1936.



- Tortonese, Mario. Le Istituzioni Scholastiche in Libia. Rome, 1937.
- Tosti, A. La Più grande impresa coloniale della storia. Roma: 1936.
- Toy, Barbara. In Search of Sheba. London: Butler and Tanner, 1861.
- Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. Between Niger and Nile. London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- The Tragedy of Abyssinia. A selection of some recent expressions of feeling and opinion by British men and women. London: 1936.
- Traversi, L. L'Italia e l'Etiopia. Da Assab a Ual-Ual. Bologna: 1935.
- Trimberger, Kay Ellen. Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978.
- Trimingham, Spencer. Islam in Ethiopia. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965.
- Ullendorff, Edward. The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People. 3rd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Exploration and Study of Abyssinia. A Brief Survey... With an appendix on "The Obelisk of Matara." Asmara: Il Lunedì dell'Eritrea, 1945.
- Vanderheym, J.G. Une Expédition avec le Négous Ménélik vingt mois en Abyssinie. Paris: Hachette, 1896.
- Vaucher, P. and P.H. Siriex. L'Opinion britannique. La Société des Nations et la guerre italo-éthiopienne. 1936.
- Viarana, E. Abissinia. Il Trattato ki Ucci-alli, Adua, usi e costumi dell'Etiopia d'oggi. Milano: Casa Editrice Ceschiana, 1936.
- Vigilantes. (Pseud.) Abyssinia. The essential facts in the dispute and answer to the question—"Ought we to support sanctions?" London: New Statesman, 1935.
- Vignerat, S. Une mission française en Abyssinie. Paris: 1897.
- Vigoni, P. Abissinia. Milano: 1881.
- Villari, Luigi. Storia diplomatica del conflitto italo-etiopico. Bologna: 1943.
- Villella, Giovanni. Italia chiama Africa. (Etiopia 1885-1941). Roma: C.E.N., 1968.

- Virgin, E. The Abyssinia I Knew. London: Macmillan, 1936.
- Vivian, Herbert. Abyssinia; Through the Lion-land to the Court of the Lion of Judah. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969.
- \_\_\_\_\_. H. Abyssinia. London: 1901.
- Vivo, Raul Valdez. Ethiopia: The Unknown Revolution. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Ciudad de la Habana, Novotny Press Agency Publishing House, 1979.
- Vollbrecht, H. Im Reiche des Negus Negasti Menelik II. Stuttgart: 1906.
- Volta, S. Graziani a Neghelli. Firenze: Garzanti, 1936.
- Walker, C.H. The Abyssinian at Home. London: Sheldon Press, 1933.
- Waldmeier, T. Ten Years in Abyssinia. London: 1886.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Origins of the Modern World System. New York: Academic Press, 1974.
- Waterbury, John. Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1979.
- Waterhouse, F.A. Gun Running in the Red Sea. London: Sampson Low, 1936.
- Watson, Jane (Werner). Ethiopia, Mountain Kingdom. Champaign, Ill.: Garrard Publishing Co., 1966.
- Waugh, Evelyn. (Remote People.) They Were Still Dancing. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1932.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Waugh in Abyssinia. London: Longmans, 1936.
- White, Freda. The Abyssinian Dispute. London: League of Nations Unions, 1935.
- Whiteway, Richard Stephen, comp. The Portuguese Expedition to Abyssinia in 1541-1543 as narrated by Castanhoso, with some contemporary letters, the short account of Bermudez, and certain extracts from Correa. Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1967.
- Wienholt, A. The Africans' Last Stronghold. (On the author's experiences with the Ethiopian Red Cross.) London: J. Long, 1938.
- Winstanley, William. A Visit to Abyssinia. 2 Vols. London: 1881.

Wolde Mariam (Alaka). Yedagmawi Tewodros Neguse-Negest Ze-Ethiopia Band Abnet Yemigegn Tarik. Paris: Librairie Orientale et Americaine, 1904 (1881).

Wolfe, Eric. "Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century." In National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World. Edited by Norman Miller and Roderick Aya. New York: Free Press, 1971.

Woolf, L.S. The League and Abyssinia. New York: Woolf, 1936.

Work, Engeda. Ethiopia, A Pawn in European Diplomacy. New York: Appleton Century, 1935.

Wylde, A.B. Modern Abyssinia. London: Methuen, 1901.

Zeneb, Debtera. Y-Tewodros Tarik. Edited by E. Littmann. Princeton: 1902.

Zervos, Adrian. L'Empire d'Ethiopia: Le miroir de l'Ethiopie moderne 1906-1935. Alexandria: Imprimerie de l'Ecole professionnelle des Freres, 1936.

Zewde Gebre Selassie. Yohannes IV of Ethiopia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Zoli, C. Cronache etiopiche. Roma: 1930.

\_\_\_\_\_. La Conquista dell'impero. Cronistoria degli avvenimenti diplomatici, militari et politici dal dicembre 1934-XIII ali' aprilo 1937-XV. Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1937.

## Articles

- Abebe Fassil and Stanley Fisher. "Language and Law in Ethiopia." Journal of Ethiopian Law (Addis Ababa), 5, 3, Dec. 1968: 553-9.
- Abir, (K.) "Education and National Unity in Ethiopia." African Affairs (London), 69 (274), January 1970: 44-59.
- Abir, M. "Salt, Trade and Politics in Ethiopia in the Zamana Masafent." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 4, 2, July 1966:1-10.
- Abraham Demoz. "The Many Worlds of Ethiopia." African Affairs, 68, 270, January 1969: 49-54.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Emperor Menelik's Phonograph Message to Queen Victoria." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 32 (2), 1969: 251-256.
- "Addis Ababa." Journal of Ethiopian Studies. Haile Selassie I University, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 1, Jan. 1963.
- "Addis Ababa's Establishment." Africa 1962, 5, March 9, 1962:8.
- Addis Zemen, Nehase 21, 1967 [Aug. 30, 1974].
- Adler, Mortimer. "The Crisis in Contemporary Education." The Social Frontier, " 5, November, 1974, Africa, 1939.
- "Administrative (The) Framework for Economic Development in Ethiopia." Economic Bulletin for Africa, 6, 2, July 1966:103.
- Afewerk Gebre Yésus. Berhanenna Selam (Amharic), 5, 20, July 1929.
- Africa Contemporary Record, New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1974.
- Africa Diary, 10, Jan. 22-28, 1970.
- Africa Report, 20, May-June, 1974.
- "Africa's Man of the Year "[Emperor Haile Selassie]. Africa 1963/64, 25, Dec. 20, 1963:7-8.
- Ahooja, K. "Law and Development in Ethiopia, A Report on Haile Selassie I University Faculty of Law Seminar." Ethiopia Observer 10 (2), 1966:152-163, Table.

Akheigbe, S. "Menelik and Ethiopian Independence." The Historia, 2, 1, April 1965:74-80.

Aklilu Habte. "Brain Drain in the Elementary School: Why Teachers Leave the Profession." The Ethiopian Journal of Education, 1, 1, June 1967.

\_\_\_\_\_. "A Brief Review of the History of the University College of Addis Ababa." University College Review (Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University), 1, 1, Spring 1961: 25-33.

Aklilu Habte, Mengesha Gebre Hiwet and Monika Kehoe. "Higher Education in Ethiopia." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 1, January 1963.

Alderfer, Harold F. "Government in Ethiopia." Journal of Administration Overseas, 13, 1, January 1974.

Aleme Eshete. "Bekédmo Zéménat Ke 1889 Amété Meherét Béfeet Wuch Agér Yetémaru Etiopia wuyanoch [sic] Tarik." Ethiopian Journal of Education, 1, 1, 1967.

Allen, W. E. D. "Ethiopian Highlands." Geographical Journal, 101, 1, Jan. 1943:1-15.

"Alliance française in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 4, 2, March 1960: 61-63.

Alter, G. M. "Ethiopia: Foreign Capital. Development Loans to Private Enterprises in Underdeveloped Countries, a Progress Report on New Credit Institutions in Ethiopia, Turkey and Mexico." Civilisations, December 1952: 505-520.

"Amaha Desta School." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 4, May 1958:157.

Amman, Peter. "Revolution: A Redefinition." Political Science Quarterly, 77, 1, March 1962.

Andargatchew Tesfaye. "The Training and Development of Manpower for the Social Services in Ethiopia." The Ethiopian Journal of Education, 6, June 1973.

"Arabic Version of the Sheba Story." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 6, July 1957: 198.

Archer, George D. and Paulos Milkias. "The Second Scramble for Africa," Horn of Africa, 11, 3, 1979:55-66.

Aregay, M. W. "Two Unedited Letters of Galawdewos, Emperor of Ethiopia (1540-1559)," Studia, 13-14, 1964:363-376.

- "The Army Speaks." Africa, 39, November 1974.
- Asbé Hailu, "Berhanenna Selam" (Amharic), 3, 29, July 1927.
- Askew, W.C. "The Secret Agreement Between France and Italy on Ethiopia, January, 1935." Journal of Modern History, 25, 1, March 1953:47-48.
- Assefa Bekele. "The Educational Framework of Economic Development in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 11, 1, 1967:49-58.
- Ayalew Gebre Selassie. "Three Years' Experience in Education." Ethiopia Observer, 8, 1964.
- Baer, G.W. "Haile Selassie's Protectorate Appeal to King Edward VIII." Cahiers d'études africaines 9 (2), 32, 1969:306-312.
- Bairu Tafla. "The Education of the Ethiopian Mekannent in the Nineteenth Century." Ethiopian Journal of Education, 6, 1, 1973:18-27.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Three Portraits: Ato Asma Glyorgis, Ras Gobana Duci and Sahafe Telzaz Gabra Selassie." Journal of Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa), 5, 2, 1967:233-30.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Two Ethiopian Biographies." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 6 (1), January 1968:123-130.
- Baker, Ross K. "The Ethiopian Army and Political Stability, Prospects and Potentials." Middle Eastern Studies, 6, 2, May 1970:331-340.
- Baran, Paul. "The Political Economy of Growth." Monthly Review Press, (New York), 1975.
- Barry, B.O. "Haile Selassie 1st University Medical Faculty." Overseas Universities, 4, Feb. 1964:10-14.
- "Battle of Adowa Issue. Introduction Annus Mirabilis." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 11, Dec. 1957:342.
- Baxter, P.T.W. "Ethiopia's Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo." African Affairs: Journal of the Royal African Society, 77, 308, July 1978.
- Bekstrom, J.H. "Transplantation of Legal Systems: An Early Report on the Reception of Western Laws in Ethiopia." The American Journal of Comparative Law, 21, 2, Summer 1973:557.

Bender, M.L. "Notes on Lexical Correlations in Some Ethiopian Languages." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 4(1), January 1966:5-16, Bibliography.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Remarks on Glottochronology of Northern Ethiopian Semitic Languages." Journal of Ethiopian Studies 6 (1), January 1968:1-11.

Bentwich, N. "Ethiopia: Twenty-five Years after the Emperor's Restoration." Quarterly Review, 304 (650), October 1966: 379-384.

Borsi, Umberto. "Cittadinanza e Sudditanza Coloniale nell'Ordinamento Odierno." Centro di Studi Coloniali, Atti del Terzo Congress, Rome, 1937.

Braddick, Henderson B. "The Hoare-Laval Plan: A Study in International Politics." Review of Politics, July 1962:342-264.

"British Survey (Ethiopia)—History of a Christian African Empire; its place in contemporary Africa" (by N.B.). British Survey, Main Series 147, June 1961:1-19.

Brooke, C. "The Rural Village in the Ethiopian Highlands." Geographical Review, New York, January 1959: 58-75.

Bulcha Demeksa. "The Ethiopian Budget." Journal of Ethiopian Law, 4, Dec. 1967:369-382.

Burke, William J. "The Arts and Sciences in Ethiopian Higher Education," University of Utah, "Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia, 1959-60," Section II. Addis Ababa, 1960.

Buxton, D.R. "Ethiopian Rockhewn Churches." Antiquity, 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Shoan Plateau and Its People: An Essay in Local Geography." Geographic Journal, 114, Oct.-Dec. 1949:157-72.

Bontwich, Norman. "Education in Ethiopia." Message 35, Sept. 1944: 40-41.

Calder, Grant H. "Business and Public Administration in Ethiopian Higher Education." University of Utah, "Survey of Higher Education in Ethiopia, 1959-60," Section III. Addis Ababa, 1960.

Caleb, Gattegno. "Ethiopia's Problem." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 4, May 1958:140.

"Can the Salomonic Throne Stand?" Africa 1961, 18, Sept. 1, 1961:5-7.

Carosone, C. "L'economia dell'Etiopia." Voce dell'Africa, Roma, 1-15, June 1958:2.

Castagno, Alphonse A. "Ethiopia Reshaping An Autocracy." Africa Report, 8, Oct. 1963:3-7.

Cattmney, Donald. "Tewodros As Reformer and Modernizer." Journal of African History (London), 10, 3, 1969:437-469.

Ciarlantini, C. I Dritti della Scuola, Roma: Feb. 20, 1936, 19:202.

Clapham, C. "Imperial Leadership in Ethiopia." African Affairs 68, 271, April 1969:110-120.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Ethiopian Coup d'Etat of December 1960." Journal of Modern African Studies 6 (4), Dec. 1968:495-507.

Cohen, Marcel. "Amharic Language." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 3, Feb. 1958:101-103.

Comhaire, Jean. "Urban Growth in Relation to Ethiopian Development." Cultures et Developpement (Louvain), 1, 1, 1968:25-39, Bibliography.

Comhaire, Sylvain S. "Higher Education and Professional Training of Women in Ethiopia." Women Today (London), 6, 3, Dec. 1964: 58-59.

Consiglio, G. "Gli investimenti in Etiopi." Africa (Roma), A. 18, 6, Nov.-Dec. 1963:299.

"Constitution of 1931 (July 16, 1931)." Ethiopia Observer, 5, 4:363-365.

Conti-Rossini, Carlo. "Expeditions et possessions des Habasat en Arabie." Journal asiatique, ser. 11, 18, 1921:1-36.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Storia di Lebna Dengal, Re d'Etiopia, sino alle prime lotte contro Ahriad ben Ibrahim." R.C. r. Accademia Lincei, ser. 5, 3, 1894:617-40 (text and translation).

\_\_\_\_\_. "Naovi documenti per la storia d'Abissinia nel secole 19." R.C. t. Accademia Lincei, ser. 8, 2, 1947:357-416.

Cooper, Robert L. "The Description of Language Use in Ethiopia." Journal of the Language Association of Eastern Africa, 1, 1, 1970:6-10.



"Co-operative Technical and Economic Programmes of the Imperial Ethiopian Government and Point Four." Ethiopia Observer, 3, 1, February 1959:4-29.

Copeland, Quincy. "Recent Economic Developments." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 5, June 1957:173.

Cora, G. "Ethiopia: External relations: Italy, Le relazioni diplomatiche italo-etioptiche." Rivista di studi politici internazionali (Firenze), 19, 1-2, Jan.-June 1952:29-39.

\_\_\_\_\_. "La ripresa delle relazioni diplomatiche fra l'Italia e l'Etiopia," ("Resumption of diplomatic relations between Italy and Ethiopia"). Rivista di studi politici internazionali (Firenze), 19, 1-2, Jan.-June 1952:29-38.

Cox, David R. "The Adolescent in Ethiopia." Ethiopian Journal of Education, 1, 1, June 1967:50-56.

"Crossroads of Africa." Nation 209 (4), 11 August 1969:104-109.

Davis, A. J. "The 16th Century Jihad in Ethiopia and the Impact on Its Culture: Part II. Implicit Factors Behind the Movement." (a suivre). Journal of History and Sociology Nigeria 3 (1), Dec. 1964:113-128.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Sixteenth Century Jihad in Ethiopia and the Impact on Its Culture." (a suivre). Journal of History and Sociology Nigeria 2 (4), Dec. 1963 (Nov. 1964):567-592, ann.

Davies, James. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American Sociological Review, 28, 1, Feb. 1962.

"Debre Berhan Community School." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 7, August 1957:282-35.

"Debre Berhan Community Training School." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 10, November 1958:330-335.

Déréssa Amanté Blatta. Berhanenna Selam, 3, 8, 1927.

Desanges, J. "Une mention altérée d'Axoum dans l'Expositio totius mundi et gentium." Annales d'Ethiopie 7, 1967:141-155.

Desta, P. "Le secret de la politique étrangère de Haile Selassie." Remarques africains, 9 (261), 12, janvier 1967:16-18.

- Destà, P. "L'Ethiopie en marche vers en revolution." Remarques africains 257, 12 janvier 1966:21-23.
- Detley, Karsten. "Ethiopia: Industrialization of a Developing Country." New Africa (London), 10, 3-4, 1968:11-12.
- "Development of Manufacturing Industry." Ethiopian Economic Review, 9, May 1966:13.
- "Development of the Ethiopian Constitution; a Comparison of 1931 and 1955 Constitutions." Ethiopia Observer, 5, 4, 1961:361-62.
- "Development and Legislation in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer 10 (4), 1966:234-320.
- De Young, M. "An African Emporium: the Addis Markets." Journal of Ethiopian Studies 5 (2), July 1967: 103-122.
- Doresse, Jean S.M. "La Constitution ethiopienne." Revue Juridique et Politique 24 (2), avr-juin, 1970:267-288.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "La constitution ethiopienne." Revue Juridique et Politique, 24, 2, April-June 1970:267.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "L'empereur Haile-Selassie 1<sup>er</sup>: sa carrière politique." Revue juridique et politique, 21, (4), Oct.-Dec. 1967:539-52.
- Dos Santos, Theotario. "The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America." In Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today, edited by Henry Bernstein. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973.
- Dow, T.E. Jr. and Peter Schwab. "Imperial Leadership in Contemporary Ethiopia." Genève Afrique, 12, 1, 1973:58.
- "Draft Second Five Year Plan of Ethiopia (The). 1955-59, E. C. [1963-67 A.D.]." Ethiopian Economic Review, 6, April 1963:24.
- Dreewen, A.S. "Origin of the Semitic Languages of Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 3, February 1958.
- "Early ge'ez qene." Traduit par A.Y.A. Gabra Selassie. Journal of Ethiopian Studies 4 (1), janvier 1966:76-119.
- Easton, D. and Robert D. Hess. "The Child's Political World." Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6, 1962.
- Eckstein, Harry. "The Etiology of Internal War." History and Theory, 4, 2, 1965.

"Economic Co-operation Agreement." Ethiopian Economic Review, 6, April 1963: 65.

"Education Report 1959-60." Ethiopia Observer, 5, 1, 1961:61, 72, 73.

Eisenstadt, S. N. "Sociological Theory and An Analysis of the Dynamics of Civilizations and of Revolutions," Daedalus, 106, 1, Fall, 1977.

"Elementary Schools Curriculum." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 4, May 1958: 145-147.

Ellwood, Charles. "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions." American Journal of Sociology, 11, 1, July 1905.

"Empress Menen School for Girls." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 5, June 1958: 172-175.

Enahoro, Peter. "Symbol of African Unity." (An interview with Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia). Africa (an international business, economic and political monthly), 9, May 1972:23-25; 28-30.

Ephraim Isaac, "Social Structure of the Ethiopian Church." Ethiopia Observer, 14, 4, 1971:242-247.

Eshetu Chole. "Taxation and Economic Development in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 11 (1), 1967:43-48.

"Ethiopia." New Africa (London, supplement), 7, 2, February 1965:i-xvi numerous photos, map.

"Ethiopia After the Coup." Africa 1961, 7, March 30, 1961:4-6.

"Ethiopia: The Opposition." Africa Confidential, 2, 6, March 13, 1970:1-3.

"Ethiopia: History of a Christian African Empire: Its Place in Contemporary Africa." British Survey. June 1961:1-19.

"Ethiopian Budget for this Year (The) 1965-66." Ethiopia Observer, 10 (3), 1966:192-198.

"Ethiopian Budget for year ending September 19, 1958." Ethiopia Observer, 3, 2, March 1959:58-61.

Ethiopian Herald, April 20, 1966.

Ethiopian Herald, April 29, 1973.

Ethiopian Herald, "Ethiopia Drafts Democratic Constitution," Aug. 10, 1974.

"Ethiopian Imports and Exports 1946-55, Table by Trade Returns of Imperial Ethiopian Customs." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 5, June 1957:175.

"Ethiopian Overseas Study." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 6, 1958:222.

"Ethiopian State Secondary Leaving Certificate Examination; requirements and tables of 'passes' for Addis Ababa Schools." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 5, June 1958:185-186.

Ethiopian Students' Union in Europe. "The Political Bankruptcy of Acherguzoism [Short Cut Movement]," Tezlachin Zenna, 2 (3), 1975:1-77.

Ethiopian Students' Union in Europe, Tiglachin, 1, Tekemt, 1967 [October 1974].

Ethiopian Students' Union in Europe, "Yé Ethiopia Gizeyawi Hunetanna Tegbarachin," ["Conditions in Ethiopia and our Duties"], Tatek, 2, Hamlé 1966 [July 1975].

"Ethiopia's Dreams of an Air Empire." Business Week, 1741, Jan. 12, 1963:106-108.

"Ethiopia's Exports and Imports; Traditional Pattern for her Foreign Trade." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 7, August 1958:227-229.

"Ethiopia's External Trade in the Year 1961." Ethiopian Economic Review, 6, April 1963:127.

"Ethiopia's First Five-Year Plan." Ethiopia Observer, 3, 4, May 1959: 106-135.

"Ethiopia's Foreign Trade (1962-1966)." Ethiopian Economic Review, 10, Jan. 1968:15.

"Ethiopia's Imports of Motor Vehicles." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 7, August 1958:251-252.

"Ethiopia's Unknown War," Africa Digest, 18, 2, Apr. 1971:32.

"Ethiopia-ex-Italian Somaliland Boundary, Treaty of May 6, 1908; Map 303." Ethiopia Observer, 6, 9, October 1957:302.

"Ethiopie: Les Successeurs de l'Empereur." Jeune Afrique, Sept. 28, 1974.

Feierabend, Ivo K., Rosalind Feierabend and Betty Nesvold. "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns." In Violence in America. Edited by Hugh D. Graham and Ted Gurr. New York: Signet, 1969.

"Foreign Trade Regulations of Ethiopia." Overseas Business Reports, April 1966:1-7.

Fraser, Ian S. "The Administrative Framework for Economic Development in Ethiopia." Journal of Ethiopian Law, 3, 1, June 1966.

"Gebre Mariam School (Franco-Ethiopian Lycée)." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 5, June 1958:188-190.

Gattegno, Caleb. "Ethiopia's Educational Problems." Ethiopia Observer, 2, March 1958.

Gazette, (Montreal), June 20, 1967.

Gebre Wold Ingida Work. "Ethiopia's Traditional System of Land Tenure and Taxation." Translated by Mengesha Geusesse. Ethiopia Observer, 5, 4, 1962:302-339.

"General Wingate Secondary School." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 5, June 1958: 171-172.

Geschwender, James. "Explorations in the Theory of Social Movements and Revolution." Social Forces, 47, Dec. 1968.

Giglio, Carlo. "Ethiopia: External relations. La questione del lago Tana, 1902-1941." Riviste di studi politici internazionali, October-December 1951:643-686,

Gilbert, A. M. "Higher Education in Ethiopia." Africa Today 14 (2), 1967:6-8.

Gillett, Margaret. "Symposium on Africa: Western Academic Role Concepts in Ethiopian University." Comparative Education Review, 7, 1963.

Girma, Amare. "Aims and Purposes of Ethiopian Church Education." Ethiopian Journal of Education, 1, 1, June 1967:1-11.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Government Education in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 2, 1962:335-342.

Goldstone, Jack A. "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation." World Politics, 32, 3, April 1980.

"Gondar Public Health College." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 4, March 1957.

"Governor of the State Bank." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 7, Aug. 1958:241.

Grany, Michael. "Education in Ethiopia." Times, Aug. 4, 1933.

Graziosi, P. "New Discoveries of Rock Paintings in Ethiopia." Antiquity 38 (150), June 1964:91-98; 38 (151), Sept. 1964:187-190, fig., map, pl.

Greenfield, Richard. "Afro-Ethiopia: A Note on the Current State of Higher Education and University Research in Ethiopia." Makerere Journal, 8, 1963:1-16.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Brief History of the Geography Society of Addis Ababa." Ethiopia Observer, 5, 4, 1961:360-361.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ethiopian Itineraries. Some Routes in Northern Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 6, 4, 1962:313-335.

\_\_\_\_\_. "An Ethiopian Protest Poem: Submit to Cross-examination." Literature East and West (Austin, Tex.), 12, 1, Mar. 1968: 12-19.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Geography Notes." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 3, 1957:207-214.

\_\_\_\_\_. "A Note on a Modern Ethiopian Protest Poem." Research Review (Institute of African Studies, Lagos), 5, 1, 1968:17-31.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Remembering the Struggle." Makerere Journal, 9, 1964.

Griaule, Marcel. "Les saints patrons en Abyssinie." Orientale (Roma), 3, 1, 1934:105-111.

Gryziewicz, S. "Main Determinants of Ethiopia's Economic Development Policy." Ethiopia Observer, 7 (3), 1964:192-201.

Haberland, E. "Les Gallas du Sud-Ethiopie." L'Ethiopie, 46, fevr. -mars, 1966:20-23.

Haddis Alemayeh. Interview in Addis Zemen, 10 Ginbot 1956 [May 1961].

"Haile Selassie Military Academy (Harar)." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 2, March 1958:79-80.

"Haile Selassie Military Academy." Ethiopia Observer, 4, 10, Nov. 1960: 331.

Hallpike, C.R. "The Status of Craftsmen Among the Konso of Southwest Ethiopia." Africa 38 (3), July 1968:258-269.

Han, Lee-Min. "Historical Sketch of the Public Health College and Training Centre; Gondar." Ethiopia Observer, 10, 3:199-203.

"Harar Agricultural College." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 2, March 1957:72.

Hess, R.L. and G. Loewenberg. "The Ethiopian No-party State: A Note on the Functions of Political Parties in Developing States." American Political Science Review 58 (4), Dec. 1964:947-950.

Hoben, Allan. "Social Anthropology and Development Planning—A Case Study in Ethiopian Land Reform Policy." The Journal of Modern African Studies, 10, 4, Dec. 1972:561.

Hodgkin, Thomas. "Education in Ethiopia." Manchester Guardian, 12 January 1955.

Huntingford, G.W.B. "The Constitutional History of Ethiopia." Journal of African History, 3, 2, 1962:311-316.

Illinois State Register, January 12, 1964.

"Industrial (manufacturing) Development in the Second Five-Year Plan." Ethiopian Economic Review, 6, April 1963:35.

"Industrialization and Its Likely Impact on Ethiopia's Foreign Trade." Ethiopian Economic Review, 8, April 1964:22.

"Initiation of Ethiopia's Postal Service." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 1, February 1958:26-27.

Inkles, A. and Dan J. Levinson. "National Character: The Study of Model Personality and Sociocultural Systems." In Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2. Edited by Gardner Lindzey. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954.

Inqai, Solomon. "Adult Literacy in Ethiopia—A Profile." Journal of Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa), 7, 1, Jan. 1969:55-63.

"International Commission of Jurists. The Rebellion Trials in Ethiopia." Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva), 12, 1961:29-37.

"Investment Decree." Ethiopian Economic Review, 7, Sept. 1963:94.

"Investment Guaranty Agreement." Ethiopian Economic Review, 6, April 1963:55.

"Investment Proclamation, 1966." Ethiopian Economic Review, 10, Jan. 1968:53.

Iris, Brian. The Sun (London), Oct. 29, 1973.

Jackson, R.H. "Social Structure and Political Change in Ethiopia and Liberia." Comparative Political Studies, 3, 1, April 1970: 36-62.

Jacobsen, Gene S. "The Organization and Administration of the Public Schools in Ethiopia." Ethiopian Journal of Education, 1, 1 June 1967:12-17.

Jady, E. C. "Ethiopia Today: A Review of Its Changes and Problems." Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, 306, July 56:106-116.

Jaenen, Cornelius J. "The Galla or Oromo of East Africa." South Western Journal of Anthropology, 12, 2, 1956:171-90.

Jandy, Edward C. "Education in present-day Ethiopia." International Educational Review (Salzburg), 4, 3, 1947-8:427-435.

Jansen, Charles. "Ethiopia's Experiment in Progress." Listener, 5 May 1955:778-780.

"Jewish Legends of the Queen." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 6, July 1957: 200-201.

Karsten, D. "Problems of Industrialisation in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 11 (1), 1967:36-42.

Karagu, F.T. "Kenya African Comes to Study in Addis Ababa." Ethiopia Observer, 3, 3, April 1959:86-67.

Kessings Contemporary Archives, 18, 1971-72.

Klassen, Frank. "Teacher Education in Ethiopia." School and Society, 91, Feb. 23, 1963:96-98.

Kleine, Herman. "U.S. Aid to Ethiopia, Foreword." Ethiopia Observer, 3, 1, February 1959:2.



- Knowles, L. "History of the Peace Corps at the Business College of Haile Selassie I University." Ethiopia Observer, 9, 1, 1965: 42-45.
- Korten, David C. "Statistical Study of the Independent Businessmen Registered with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia." Ethiopian Economic Review, 9, May, 1966:35-42.
- Kottwa, David C. and Francus F. Kortwa. "The Impact of a National Service Experience Upon Its Participants: Evidence from Ethiopia." Comparative Education Review, 13, Oct. 1969: 312-324.
- Kramer, Roberta C. "Teacher Training in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 9, 1, 1965:37-38.
- Krammick, Isaac. "Reflections on Revolution—Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship." History and Theory, 11, 1, 1972.
- "Labour Law." Ethiopian Economic Review, 6, April 1963:54.
- "Labour Speaks." Africa, 39, November 1974.
- "Land Tenure and Taxation from Ancient to Modern Times"(An Introduction by the Editor). Ethiopia Observer, 1, 9, October 1957:283.
- "Language of Ethiopia (The)." Ethiopia in Review (London), 11/12, 1960: 16-20.
- Last, G.C. "Introductory Notes on the Geography of Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 6, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Some Notes on the Scenery of the Ethiopian Rift Valley." Ethiopia Observer, 5, 1961.
- Lederer, Emil. "On Revolutions." Social Research, 3, 1, February 1936:1-118.
- "Legese Bezun Endanegugernatchew," ("Interview with Legese Bezun"). Mennen, Miazia 1966 [April, 1973].
- Legum, Colin. "The Night They 'Hanged' Haile Selassie." The Observer, 15, September, 1974.
- Leslau, Wolf. "The Languages of Ethiopia." Ethiopian Student News (New York), 17, March 1932:20-22.

Leslau, Wolf. "Languages of Ethiopia and Their Geographical Distribution." Ethiopia Observer, 3, 3, February 1958:116-121.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Black Jews of Ethiopia." Commentary (New York), 7, 3, March 1949:216-224.

\_\_\_\_\_. "South-East Semitic (Ethiopic and South Arabic)." Journal of the African Oriental Society, 63, 1943:4-14.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Influence of Cushitic on the Semitic Languages of Ethiopia: A Problem of Substratum." Word, 1, 1945:59-82.

Levine, D.N. "The Flexibility of Traditional Culture." Journal of Social Issues 24 (4), Oct. 1968:129-142.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Roots of Ethiopia's Nationhood." Africa Report, 16, 5, May 1971:12.

Lewis, W.H. "Ethiopia: The Quickening Pulse." Current History 54 (318), February 1968:78-89.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Ethiopian Empire: Progress and Problems." Middle East Journal, 10, 3, Summer 1956:257-268.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ethiopia's Revised Constitution." Middle East Journal, 10, 2, Apr. 1956:194-199.

Life Magazine, November, 1971.

Linz, Juan. "Patterns of Land Tenure, Division of Labour and Voting Behavior in Europe." Comparative Politics, 8, April 1976.

"Loans and Credits." Ethiopian Economic Review, 7, Sept. 1963:81.

"London University General Certificate of Education Examination Summer 1957; Tables for Addis Ababa School 'passes.'" Ethiopia Observer, 2, 5, June 1958:186-187.

Lord, Edith. "Education—What For?" Ethiopia Observer, 2, 4, May 1958:141, and 5, 2, 1961:170-171.

Luke, Sir Harry. "Witness of Ethiopia Palace Revolt." The Times, Dec. 30, 1960.

Maaza, Bekele. "Some Thoughts on the Future [of Education]." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 4, May 1958:139-140.

Madsen, Harold S. "English Language Testing in Ethiopia." Ethiopian Journal of Education, 1, 1, June 1967:46-49.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Objective Ethiopian School Leaving Examination, Rationale and Technique." Journal of the Language Association of Eastern Africa, 1, 1, 1970:64-74.

Malecot, G.R. "La Politique Etrangère de l'Ethiopie." Revue française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines, 79, July 72:39-57.

Marein, Nathan. "Laws Affecting Women." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 3, February 1957:94-97.

Markakis, John. "Social Formation and Political Adaptation in Ethiopia." The Journal of Modern African Studies, 11, 3, Sept. 1973:361.

Markakis, John and A.A. Beyene. "Representative Institutions in Ethiopia." Journal of Modern African Studies, 5, 2, Sept. 1967:193-220.

Mariam, M.W. "Background to the Ethio-Somalian Boundary Dispute." Journal of Modern African Studies, 2, 2:189-220.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels, "Wage, Labour and Capital." Selected Works [of Marx & Engels], Vol. I. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955.

• Marzan, Frank. "La questione etiopica." Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 39, 1, January-March, 1972.

McLaren, I.M. "Mass Education in Ethiopia: A Visit to the Tabasse Community Centre." African World, August 1946:16-18.

Melady, Thomas F. "The Economic Future of Ethiopia." Duquesne Review (Pittsburgh, Pa.), 4, 1, Fall 1952:12-21.

Mesfin Wolde Mariam. "Twenty Years of Famine in Rural Ethiopia." Unpublished seminar paper. Addis Ababa: Institute of Development Research, 1978.

Messing, S.D. "Changing Ethiopia." Middle East Journal, 9, 4, August 1955:413-432.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Role Differentiation in the Amhara Family in Ethiopia." Journal of Human Relations, 8, 3/4, 1960:388-393.

Mitiku and Begashaw. "Students Speak." Africa, 39, November 1974.

Mohammed, D. "Private Foreign Investment in Ethiopia: (1950-1968)." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 7 (2), July 1969:53-78.

Mollignoni, Gigliola. "La storia di re Bacaffa nel racconto di James Bruce." Rassegna di studi etiopici, 6, 1, 1947:36-41.

The Montreal Star, June 21, 1967.

Mordfeldt, Maria. "A Galla Grammar (with Galla Words in Amharic Characters)." Monde Oriental, 31/39, 1939-42:1-261.

"Mulu Initiative. Mula Sain School (Sandfords)." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 10, November 1958:343-344.

Mulugeta Wodajo. "The State of Education Finance in Ethiopia." Ethiopian Journal of Education, 1, 1, June 1967:18-26.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Some Pressing Problems and the Role of Education in Their Resolution." Journal of Negro Education (Washington), 30, 3, Spring 1961:232-240.

Muntasser, Mahmud Bey. "The Five Year Development Plan (1965-1968)." Mondo Afro-Asiatico (Roma), 3, 5, 15 febbraio 1965: 9-19, illus.

Mustoe, N.E. "Modern Ethiopia." African Affairs (London), 61, 244, July 1962:216-222.

Naomi Gebrat. "Girl Students." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 3, Feb. 1957: 102.

Neumann, Sigmund. "The International Civil War." World Politics, 22, April, 1979.

"New Ethiopian Legislation on Employment." Ethiopia Observer, 6, 4, 1962:302-309.

New York Times, February 23, 1974.

Nteziryayo, Antoine. "Review of Education in Ethiopia, by Teshome G. Wagaw." Comparative Education Review, 25, 3, 1981:464-65.

O'Conner, Lillian. "Some Aspects of the Language Problem." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 4, May 1958:143.

"Oldest Modern Hospital in Ethiopia (Menelik II)." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 4, March 1957:127.

Omer-Cooper, Joseph. "A Happy Valley of Wars (Arusi Customs)." Nineteenth Century and After, 105, 1929:713-718.

Orser, Edward. "History of the Special Teacher Training Programme." Ethiopia Observer, 9, 1, 1965:39-40.

Oudes, Bruce. "Viewpoint: The Lion of Judah and the Lambs of Washington." Africa Report, 16, 5, May 1971:2.

"Out of Africa: Dahomey/Ethiopia/Ghana/Cape Verde/Rhodesia." Africa Report, 14, 8, Dec. 1969:5.

Outline of the Fiscal System in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 7, 4, 1965:293-322.

Pankhurst, Richard. "The Emperor Theodore's Amulet." Ethiopia Observer, 6, 3, 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ethiopian Army of Former Times." Ethiopia Observer, 7, 2:118-142.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ethiopian Historiography in English." Journal of Asian and African Studies (Toronto), 3 (3-4), 1968:296-299.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century." Ethiopia Observer, 7 (1), 1964:84-96, Bibliography.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Ethiopian Patriots and the Collapse of Italian Rule in East Africa, 1940-41." Ethiopia Observer, 12 (2), 1968: 92-127, Illus., Bibliography.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Fascist Racial Policies in Ethiopia, 1922-1941." Ethiopia Observer 12 (4), 1969:270-286.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Fire-Arms in Ethiopian History (1800-1935)." Ethiopian Observer, 6, 2 (1962:135-180.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Foundation of Education, Printing, Newspapers, Book Production. Libraries and Literacy in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 6, 3, 1962:241-290.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Franco-Ethiopian Railway and Its History." Ethiopia Observer, 6, 4, 1962:342-399.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1889-92." University College Review (Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University), 1, 1, Spring 1961:90-103.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Habshis of India." Ethiopia Observer, 4, 10, 1960:347-352.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The History of Fire-arms in Ethiopia Prior to the Nineteenth Century." Ethiopia Observer, 11 (3), 1967:202-225, Illus., Bibliography.

Pankhurst, Richard. "Industrialization of Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 5, June 1957:152-154.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Introduction." In Traditional Ethiopian Church Education, by Alaka Imbacom Kalewold. New York: Columbia University, Teachers' College Press, 1970.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Inscriptions and Royal Chronicles of Ethiopia." Tarikh 2 (3), 1968:52-63, illus.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Linguistic Research in Ethiopia." Linguistics Reporter (Washington, D. C.), 8, 3, June 1966:3.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Menelik and the Foundation of Addis Ababa." Journal of African History, 2, 1, 1961:103-117.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Menelik and the Utilisation of Foreign Skills in Ethiopia." Journal of Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa), 5, 1, January 1967: 29-86.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Notes for the History of Gondar." Ethiopia Observer, 12 (3), 1969:177-227, illus., Biblio.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Role of Foreigners in Nineteenth-century Ethiopia, Prior to the Rise of Menelik." In Boston University Papers on Africa, Vol. II: African History. Edited by J. Butler. Boston: Boston University Press, 1966.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Schools of Addis Ababa." New Times and Ethiopia News (London), 812/816, z. Dec. 1951-5 Jan. 1952.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Sir Robert Napier's Comments on Clement Markham's History of the Abyssinian Expedition." Ethiopia Observer, 12 (1), 1968:58-60.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Some Factors Depressing the Standard of Living of Peasants in Traditional Ethiopia." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 4, 2, July 1966:45-98.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Some Notes for an Economic History of Ethiopia from 1800 to 1935." Ethiopia Observer, 11 (1), 1967:59-62.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Status, Division of Labour and Employment in Nineteenth-century and Twentieth-century Ethiopia." Bulletin of the University College Addis Ababa Ethnological Society, 2, 1, July-Dec. 1961: 7-57.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Text-books of Italian Colonial Africa." Ethiopia Observer, 11 (4), 1967:327-332, illus.

Pankhurst, Richard. "Theodore II, Empereur d'Ethiopie." Presence Africaine, 47, 1963:123-144.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Three Nineteenth-century Ethiopian Profiles: Sahle Selassie, Ras Wube and Yohannes IV." Ethiopia Observer, 9 (3-1), 1965:202-207.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Transport and Communications in Ethiopia, 1835-1935." Journal of Transport History (Leicester), Nov. 1961:69-88; May 1962:166-181; Nov. 1962:233-254.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Tribute, Taxation and Government Revenue in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Ethiopia." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 6, 1968:21-72, illus.

Pankhurst, Sylvia. "Education in Ethiopia II: Secondary Education." Ethiopia Observer, 11, April 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Elementary School Curriculum." Ethiopia Observer, 2 March, 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Ethiopian Agriculture in Retrospect and Prospect." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 9, Oct. 1957:278-282.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Fascist Foreign Policy and the Italo-Ethiopian War." Ethiopia Observer, 3, 11, December 1959:334-343.

\_\_\_\_\_. "History of Ethiopian Schools." Ethiopia Observer, 2, March, 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Tafari Makonnen School." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 5, 1958:177-79.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The University College of Addis Ababa." Ethiopia Observer, 11, May 1958.

Paulos Milkias. "Mass Campaign in Ethiopia: The Political Economy of Education for National Reconstruction." Journal of Educational Thought, 14, 3, Dec. 1980:187-195.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Political Spectrum of Western Education in Ethiopia." Journal of African Studies, 9, 1, Spring, 1982.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Romance or Oppression: 'La Chute de l'Empereur.'" The Free Press, v, 1, 1974:1-11.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Traditional Institutions and Traditional Elites: The Role of Education in the Ethiopian Body-Politic." African Studies Review, 19, 3, December 1976.

Paulos Milkias. "Zemecha as an Educational Innovation." Journal of North-East African Studies, 11, 1, 1980:19-30.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Zemecha: Assessing the Political and Social Foundations of Mass Education in Ethiopia." Studies in Comparative International Development, 15, 3, Fall, 1980.

Paulos Milkias and George D. Archer. "The Second Scramble for Africa." Horn of Africa Journal, 11, 3, July-September 1979: 55-66.

Prosterman, Roy. "IRI: A Simplified Predictive Index of Rural Instability." Comparative Politics, 8, 3, April 1976.

"Queen of Sheba in European Art." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 6, July 1957: 202-204.

"Queen of Sheba in the Koran." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 6, July 1957:199.

Raphaelli, N. "Ethiopia: Emperor, Elites and Modernization." Journal of Modern African Civilizations, 17, 4, 1967:422-434.

"Ras Makonnen's Vacant Mausoleum." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 2, March 1958:69-70.

Ravenson, John. "Travel: Ethiopia: Ancient Glories." Africa Report, 17, 5, May 1972:29.

Rawlings, E.H. "Progress in Ethiopia. Substantial Foreign Aid for Industrial Development." African World (London), April 1961:14.

"Recent Developments in Ethiopian Education." Ethiopian Economic Review, 6, April 1963:67.

"Review of Current Economic Conditions in Ethiopia." Ethiopian Economic Review, 6, April 1963:7-23.

"Review (A) of Ethiopian External Trade—1963-1965." Ethiopian Economic Review, 9, May 1966:9.

"Review of Current Economic Conditions in Ethiopia." Ethiopian Economic Review, 9, May 1966:7.

"Review of Development Trends and Policies of Ethiopia." Ethiopian Economic Review, 7, Sept. 1963:10-21.

"Review of Export Trade of Ethiopia." Ethiopian Economic Review, 7, Sept. 1963:28-33.



Rey, Charles F. "The Arusi and Other Galla of Abyssinia." Journal of African Sociology, 23, 90, Jan. 1924:85-95.

"Rioting By Students." Africa Diary, May 19-25, 1968.

Rogers, John. "The Teaching of English in Ethiopia." Ethiopian Journal of Education, 1, 1, June 1967:40-45.

Romainville, François de. "Ou en est l'Ethiopie?" Revue Politique et Parlementaire. December 1951:392-397.

Rosenau, James. "International War and International Systems." In Struggles in the State: Sources and Patterns of World Revolution. Edited by George A. Kelly and Clifford Brown. New York: Wiley, 1970.

Rossini, Conti. "Legende Georges Giudaiche." Bollentino della Regio Societa Geographica Italiana, 1925.

Rubenson, Sven. "Adwa 1896: The Resounding Protest." In Protest and Power in Black Africa. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970: 113-142.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The ~~E~~ Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Christian Symbol and/or Imperial Title." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 3 (2), July 1965:75-85, Photo.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Professor Giglio, Antonelli and Article XVII of the Treaty of Wichalé." Journal of African History, 3, 1966:445-457.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichalé Treaty." Journal of African History, 5 (2), 1964: 243-283.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Some Aspects of the survival of Ethiopian Independence in the Period of the Scramble for Africa." University College Review (Addis Ababa. Haile Selassie I University), 1, Spring 1961: 8-24.

Savard, G.C. "War Chants in Praise of Ancient Afar Heroes." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 3 (1), 1965:105-109.

Schafer, John C. "Utilisation of Amharic in the Teaching of English in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 9, 1, 1965:33-36.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Thoughts on a Peace Corps Volunteer's Larger Aims; His Responsibility to Help Preserve as Well as Change." Ethiopia Observer, 9, 1, 1965:26-29.

Schiller, A. Arthur. "Customary Land Tenure Among the Highland Peoples of Northern Ethiopia: A Bibliographical Essay." African Law Studies (New York), 1, June 1969:1-22.

"School Nutrition Activities." Ethiopia Observer, 4, 4, May 1960:110-111.

"Schools of Addis Ababa." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 4, May 1958:100.

"Schools (Harar)." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 2, March 1958:81-99.

Schwab, P. "The Agricultural Income Tax and the Changing Role of Parliament in Ethiopia." Genève-Afrique, 8, 1, 1969:34-45.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Education in Ethiopia: A Brief Survey." Genève-Afrique, 8 (2), 1969:61-63, Biblio.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Paying for Progress in Ethiopia." African Development, Dec. 1970:25-27.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Tax Systems of Ethiopia." The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 20, 1, Jan. 1970:77.

Schwartz, David. "Political Alienation: The Psychology of Revolutions' First Stage." In Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research. Edited by Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend and Ted Robert Gurr. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972.

"Secondary School Curriculum." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 5, June 1958: 164-169,

Sedler, R.A. "The Chilot Jurisdiction of the Emperor of Ethiopia: A Legal Analysis in Historical and Comparative Perspective." Journal of African Law, 8 (2), 1964: 59-76.

"Sélé higé Méngistu Rekik Hizbu Min Yilal?" ["What Do People Say About the Draft Constitution?"]. Addis Zemen, Nehase 22, 1966 [July 29, 1974].

Sendu Gabru, "Girls' Education." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 3, February 1957:76-80, 93.

Seyoum Gebre Egziabher. "The Ethiopian Patriots: 1936-1941." Ethiopia Observer, 12 (2), 1968:63-91, Illus.

Shack, W.A. "Organization and Problems of Education in Ethiopia." The Journal of Negro Education (Washington), 28, 1959: 405-420, Table.

- Silberman, L. "Ethiopia: Power of Moderation." Middle East Journal, 14, 2, April 1960:141-152.
- Simons, F.J. "Some Questions on the Economic Prehistory of Ethiopia." Journal of African History, 6, 1, 1965:1-13.
- Skocpol Theda. "Explaining Revolutions: In Quest of a Social Structural Approach." In The Uses of Controversy in Sociology. Edited by Lewis Coser and Otto N. Larson. New York: The Free Press, 1976.
- Smith, M.R. "Basic Data on the Economy of Ethiopia." Overseas Business Report, 67 (14), Feb. 1967:1-32.
- Soen, D. "The Falashas: The Black Jews of Ethiopia." Bulletin of the International Committee on Urgent Anthropological and Ethnological Research, 10, 1968: 67-74.
- Southard, Addison E. "Modern Ethiopia." National Geographic Magazine, 59, 1931:679-746, Illus., Maps.
- Staude, Wilhelm. "Iconographie de la Legende Ethiopiens de la Reine d'Azieb ou de Saba; Analyse et Interpretation des Thèmes." Journal de la Société des Africanistes, 27, 2, 1957:139-81, Illus.
- Stauffer, R.B. and M.J. Coolebrook. "Economic Assistance and Ethiopia's Foreign Policy." Orbis (Philadelphia), 5, 3, Autumn 1961:320-341.
- Stinchcombe, Arthur. "Stratification Among Organizations and the Sociology of Revolution." In Handbook of Organizations. Edited by James March. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.
- Strelcyn, Stefan. "Quelques Eléments du Vocabulaire Magique Ethiopien (séries verbales)." C.R. Groupe Linguistique d'Ethiopie Chamito-Sémitique, 5, 1948-51:41-43.
- Stone, Lawrence. "Theories of Revolution." World Politics, 84, 2, Jan. 1966:159-176.
- Straw, A. "Student Unrest in Ethiopia." New Middle East Journal, 3, June 1972:31-32.
- "Students Speak." Africa, 39, November 1974.
- Suzuki, Hideo. "Some Aspects of Ethiopian Climates." Ethiopian Geographical Journal, 5, Dec. 1967.

- Tadesse, Tereffe. "Progress, Problems and Prospects in Ethiopian Education." Ethiopia Observer, 8, 1, 1964:6-18.
- "Tafari Makonnen School." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 5, June 1958:177-179.
- Tayback, M. Prince, J.S. "Infant Mortality and Fertility in Five Towns of Ethiopia." Ethiopian Medical Journal, 4 (1), 1965: 11-17.
- Tayetch Wolde Georgis. "School of Home Economics, Addis Ababa, Home Economics in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 4, 4, May 1960:113-211.
- Tedeschi, S. "L'Etiopia nella storia del patriarchi alessandrini," Rassegna di studi etiopici 23, 1967-1968:232-271.
- Tegegn Yetesha Work. (Editorial.) Ethiopian Herald, April 20, 1966.
- "Tenant Addis Ababa" [Addis Ababa Yesterday]. Addis Zemen, Meskerem 3, 1967 [September 12, 1974].
- Terefe Wolde Tsadik. "The Unification of Ethiopia (1880-1935): Wallaga." Journal of Ethiopian Studies 6 (1), January 1968:73-86.
- Tessema Aba Derash, Lieut. Col. "The Army Speaks." Africa, 39, Nov. 1974.
- Tilly, Charles. "Revolutions and Collective Violence." In Handbook of Political Science, Vol. III. Edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975.
- The Times (London), Nov. 19, 1973.
- Tiryakian, Edward. "A Model of Social Change in Its Lead Indicators." In The Study of Total Societies. Edited by Sam Z. Klausner. New York: Anchor Books, 1967.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. "Balance Sheet of the Western Way of Life. Can Non-Western Countries Avoid the West's Mistakes." Ethiopia Observer, 8, 2 (1964):138-142.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "How Should History Be Studied in Ethiopia?" Ethiopia Observer, 8 (2), 1964:142-145.
- Tsehai Berhane Selassie. "The Life and Career of Dejazmatch Balcha Aba Nafso." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 9, 2, July 1971.
- Tubiana, J. "'Turning Points' in Ethiopian History." Rassegna di studi etiopici, 21, 1965:162-166

Ullen, N. in Schootem, M. "Le développement économique de l'Ethiopie." Bulletin Commercial, 42, 1952.

Ullendorff, E. "The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 30 (3), 1967:641-654.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The 1897 Treaty Between Great Britain and Ethiopia." Rassegna di studi etiopici, 22, 1966:116-134.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Ethiopic manuscripts in the Royal Library (Windsor Castle)." Rassegna di studi etiopici, 12, Jan.-Dec. 1953: 71-79.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Glorious Victories of 'Amda Seyon King of Ethiopia.'" Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 29 (3), 1966:600-611.

\_\_\_\_\_. "A Letter from the Emperor Theodore to Queen Victoria in Neue afrikanischen Studien. Edited by J. Lukas. Hamburg: Deutsches Institut für Afrika-Forschungen, 1936. (Hamburger Beiträge für Afrika-Kunde, 5:251-55.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Obelisk of Matara." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Apr. 1951:26-32, illus.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Semitic Languages of Ethipia and Their Contribution to General Semitic Studies." Africa, 25, 2, Apr. 1955:154-160.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Studies in the Ethiopic Syllabary." Africa, 21, 3, July 1951:207-217.

\_\_\_\_\_. "A Tigriaya Language Council." Africa, 19, 1, Jan. 1949: 63-64.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Translator's Preface." The Autobiography of Emperor Haile Selassie, 1892-1937. Translated by E. Ullendorff. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Ullendorff, E. and A. Demoz. "Two Letters from the Emperor Yohannes of Ethiopia to Queen Victoria and Lord Granville." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 32 (1), 1969: 135-142, pl.

"United States Information Service, What Is It?" Ethiopia Observer, 4, 2, March 1960:59-60.

"University College of Addis Ababa Debates Emancipation of Women." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 3, February 1957:103, 105.

"University College of Addis Ababa." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 6, July 1958: 195-207, 210-213.

"University College of Addis Ababa; Examination Papers." Ethiopia Observer, 2, 6, July 1958:213-214.

"University College Students Union." News and Views (Addis Ababa), March 10, 1962.

Valor, F. "La Nouva Costituzione Etiopica" (The New Ethiopian Constitution). Revista di Politica Economica, 46, 6, June 1958: 509-515.

"Version of Alavarez (on Queen of Sheba)." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 6, July 1957:202.

Vestal, Theodore M. "Peace Corps in Ethiopia. An Overall View." Ethiopia Observer, 9, 1, 1965:11-24.

"Visit to the Empress Menen School for Girls." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 3, February 1957:107-111.

"Vocational Building School." Ethiopia Observer, 1, 7, Aug. 1957:221-224.

Von Baudissin, G. Graf."Labour Policy in Ethiopia." International Labour Review, 89, 6, 1964:551-569.

\_\_\_\_\_. "An Introduction to Labour Developments in Ethiopia." Journal of Ethiopian Law (Addis Ababa), 2, 1, 1963:102-140.

Vycichl, Werner. "Le titre de roi des roies: étude historique et comparative sur la monarchie en Ethiopie." Annotation d'Ethiopie, 2, 1957:193-203.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Le pays de Kouch dans une inscription Ethiopienne." Annotation d'Ethiopie, 2, 1957:177-179.

Watt, D.C. "The 'Decembrists': Russia 1825, Ethiopia 1960. Two Revolutions Compared." International Relations, 2 (7), Apr. 1963:459-468.

Waters, Mona. "The Battle of Amba Aradam." Ethiopia Observer, 10, 3, 1966:222-227.

Weir, V. "The Changing Face of Ethiopia." African World, Apr. 1967: 7-8.

Wellby, Montagu S. "King Menelik's Dominions and the Country Between Lake Gallab (Rudolf) and the Nile Valley." Geographical Journal, 16, 1900:262-306, map.

"Where Did the Queen of Sheba Come From?" Ethiopia Observer, 1, 6, July 1957:197.

"Where Do Ethiopian Exports Go? When Do Ethiopian Imports Come?" Ethiopia Observer, 2, 7, August 1958:230.

"Where The Peace Corps Volunteers Serve in Ethiopia." Ethiopia Observer, 9, 1, 1965:47.

Wilcox, Ray T. "A Manpower Strategy for Ethiopia." Summary of a Booklet by Eli Ginzberg and Herbert A. Smith. Ethiopian Journal of Education, 1, 1, June 1967:57-62.

Wingate, Sir Ronald. "Two African Battles: The Battle of Galabat: 8th - 11th March 1889." Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 109, May 1964:149-154.

Wolfe, Eric. "Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century." In National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World. Edited by Norman Miller and Roderick Aya. New York: Free Press, 1971.

Woolbert, R.G. "Feudal Ethiopia and Her Army." Foreign Affairs, October 1935:72-81.

"World Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students." Challenge, 13 August 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Dilemma of Famine in Ethiopia." Combat, 2, January 1974:1-48.

Yabets, Z. "Roman Campaign in Ethiopia and the Policy of Augustus." Ethiopia Observer 9 (2), 1965:86-89.

Yakobson, S. "The Soviet Union and Ethiopia: A Case of Traditional Behavior." Review of Politics (Notre Dame, Ind.), 25, 3, July 1963:329-342.

Yekuno-Amlak Gebré Selassie (Alaka). "Yekedmo Kinewoch." Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 4, 1, 1966.

Yezareitu Ethiopia, Tikimt 2, 1967 [October 12, 1974]:1-3; Tikimt 23, 1967 [November 2, 1974]:1-5.

Zaborski, A. "Some Remarks Concerning the Ezana's Inscriptions and the Beja Tribes." Folia Orientalia, 9, 1967:298-306.

Zack, A. "Trade Unionism Develops in Ethiopia." In Boston University Papers on Africa. Edited by J. Butler and A.A. Castagno. New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967. (pp. 104-114.)

\_\_\_\_\_. "The New Labour Relations in Ethiopia." African Survey, July 1964:4-10; August 1964:12-16.

Zagorin, Perez. "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography." Political Science Quarterly, 83, March 1973:23-52.

Zingarelli, I. "Das Aethiopien des Kaisers Haile Selassie." Aussenpolitik, 3, 2, Feb. 1952:89-98.



# Serials and Newspapers

Abyot (E. P. R. P.)

Abyotawit-Etiopia (Ideological Journal of the Ethiopian Provisional Military Administrative Council or the Derg).

Addis Zemen. (Ethiopian Government's controlled daily.)

Africa (London).

Africa Confidential (London).

Africa Contemporary Record (London).

Africa Diary (New York).

Africa Report (Washington, D. C.).

Afrique-Asie (Paris).

Challenge (Journal of World Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students).

Combat (Journal of the World Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students).

Democracia (Ideological organ of the E. P. R. P.).

Digest of B. B. C. World Broadcasts (London).

Ethiopia (Ethiopian News Agency Bulletin).

The Ethiopian Herald (Ethiopian Government paper).

Forward (Journal of the World Wide Federation of Ethiopian Students).

Horn of Africa (Summit, New Jersey).

Jeune-Afrique (Paris).

Kessings Contemporary Archives (London).

Le Monde (Paris).

Meskerem (Journal of COPWE).

The New York Times.

The Observer (London).

Sendeq Alamachin (Ethiopian Government controlled daily).

Spark (Journal of the Ethiopian University Students in North America).

Tatek (Theoretical Journal of the World-Wide Federation of Ethiopian students).

Tiglachin (Journal of the Ethiopian Students' Union in Europe).

Tiglachin Zenna (Journal of the Ethiopian Students' Union in Europe).

The Times of London.

Tsedéy (Progressive non-government monthly journal published in Addis Ababa).

Yé Sefew Hezb Dimts (Ideological organ of Meison).

Yéteramaj Tigil (Journal of United Progressive Ethiopian Students' Union in North America).

Yézaréitu Ethiopia (Ethiopian Government controlled daily).

### Unpublished Material

Aklilu Habte. "Higher Education in Ethiopia in the 1970's and Beyond." Addis Ababa: 1973.

Ethiopian Teachers' Association. "The Education Sector Review." Unpublished monograph. Addis Ababa: 1974.

Germamé Neway. "The Impact of White Settlement Policy in Kenya." M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1954.

Haile Wolde Michael. "The Problems of Admissions to the University through School Leaving Certificate Examinations." May 1969.

Māaza Bekele. "A Study of Modern Education in Ethiopia: Its Foundations, Its Development, Its Future, With Emphasis on Primary Education." Ed.D. dissertation, Teachers' College, Columbia University, 1966.

Mesfin Wolde Mariam. "Twenty Years of Famine in Rural Ethiopia." Unpublished seminar paper. Addis Ababa: 1976.

Paulos Milkias. "The Political Economy of Education; Adult Literacy Campaign in Ethiopia." Paper presented to the International Council for Adult Education, Ontario Institute of Education, University of Toronto, January 1980.

---

"Political Linkage: The Relationship between Modern Education and the Fall of Haile Selassie's Feudal Regime." A paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association at the meeting of the Learned Societies of Canada, held at the University of Quebec in Montreal, June 3, 1980.

---

"The Ethiopian Zemecha." A paper presented to the Canadian Society for the Study of Education, at the meeting of the Learned Societies of Canada, held at the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon, June 6, 1979.

Trudeau, Edouard. "Higher Education in Ethiopia." Ed.D. dissertation, Teachers' College, Columbia University, 1964.